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THE RANGE OF THE LOGOS-TITLE IN THE PRO- LOGUE TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Notwithstanding the great amount of exegetical labor expended on the Fourth Gospel, much of it with the special end in view of ascertaining its doctrinal character, some of the foremost biblico-theological problems to which the Gospel gives rise still remain *sub judice*. One of these is the question of the precise reference of the chief christological titles employed. Are these titles given to Christ from the point of view of the preincarnate state and thence carried into the incarnate life of the Saviour, or does the Evangelist use them of the incarnate Christ exclusively, so that they lack all bearing on the premundane and preincarnate stages of our Lord's existence? In the former case their significance will not be confined to the sphere of soteriology, or of christology in its purely soteriological aspect, but will extend into the doctrines of creation and providence, and may even reach up into the ontological problem of the divine nature and mode of existence as contemplated in themselves. As indicated by our form of statement there is no absolute alternative involved: reference of these titles to the preincarnate Christ does not exclude, but includes, their application to the incarnate life as well. The exclusiveness is found with the defenders of the view according to which the names describe the God-Man and predicate of Him something that is true only in virtue of the incarnation. What applies to the original existence of Christ will remain true and continue operative in the life on earth, but the rule does not work conversely, that what applies to the incarnate state must necessarily reach back into the life preceding the incarnation. The sole point at issue therefore is, whether the attributes or functions expressed by the names under debate first originated when Christ appeared in the flesh, or whether their emergence in the earthly life

of Jesus is a mere continuation, in a new concrete form, of something that had been predicable of Him before.

In order to preclude confusion of thought another distinction should be drawn at the outset. It is one thing to ascribe to the Evangelist the use of one or more of these names as significant of relations and functions pertaining to Christ in the preincarnate or premundane state, and quite another thing to believe that he uses them loosely, by way of anticipation, where he speaks of the Saviour's original existence, fully conscious that in the strict sense of the terms they belong to the later stage of His life. The mere fact that one of these names and some preincarnate or originally divine attribute are joined together cannot, without more, be held to prove the inherent reference of that name to the larger or eternal aspects of Christ's Person. The use of a name is often far wider than the range of its inherent significance or of the point of view which originally determined its choice. When certain things are affirmed in connection with the Logos, it by no means follows that He is called the Logos in virtue of these things or even was the Logos when these things took place. The Evangelist's intention might simply be to affirm the things referred to of Him who afterwards and for other reasons came to be the Logos. We shall, therefore, have to put the question sharply in each separate case, whether the function affirmed is a function of the Person of Christ in general, here incidentally called Logos, or a function specifically connected with his Logos-character, a Logos-function as such, the nature of the function inducing the use of the name.

The three titles in regard to which the said difference of opinion prevails are Logos, Son of God, Only-Begotten Son (or God Only-Begotten). As more or less formal names of the Saviour they are clearly distinct from other designations which partake rather of the nature of descriptive metaphors. It is true, Zahn denies this of Logos and would consider it as a figure entirely on a line with "the life",

"the light", "the vine". Even when the Evangelist singles it out from among other metaphors applied to Christ, to use it as subject for a number of statements, this is done, Zahn thinks, with full consciousness of the metaphorical intent, so that, in order to render the writer's meaning exactly, one would have to paraphrase: In the beginning was He who may be fitly compared to the word of God, etc.¹ It is, however, doubtful whether the Gospel ever uses other conceptions such as "light" and "life", without additional qualification, entirely after the same fashion as Logos, to designate the Person of Christ in the concrete. The Prologue says: "the Logos was", but: "in Him was life", "and the life (that was in Him) was the light of men". "The life" and "the light" remain abstract conceptions, although, of course, their reality is concentrated in the personal Christ. In verses 7, 8, it is true, τὸ φῶς is used as a designation of the historic Jesus. By the side of this may be placed iii. 19-21, although here the personal interpretation is not necessary. But even so there remains a perceptible difference between such a way of speaking, where the identification of the person with the abstract idea is led up to by previous statement, and the procedure of verse 1 in the Prologue, where, wholly without preliminaries, ὁ λόγος is introduced as a fixed designation.² We have sufficient

¹ *Das Ev. des Joh.* pp. 97-106. Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert* (Freiburger Theol. Stud. 1910, 2) distinguishes only between the trinitarian, ontological interpretation of the Logos-name and its metaphorical interpretation, pp. 3 ff. From the sequel of the discussion it will appear that in order to reach clearness three exegetical positions are to be distinguished: 1) the name is not, strictly speaking, a name, but a metaphor; 2) it is a real name, but a name descriptive of function only; 3) it is a name used ontologically to describe inherent mode of provenience or existence. The view of Jannaris *ZNTW*, 1901, pp. 13-26, according to which logos in the Prologue is not even a metaphorical name of Christ, but simply God's utterance at creation, may be left out of account.

² In 1 Jno. i. 1, 2 "the word of life" is understood by some exegetes abstractly "the message concerning the life", notwithstanding the obvious allusion to the Prologue in ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. Others insist upon the concrete sense of "Logos". Zahn *Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 103 has most convincingly shown that the latter must be intended by his

warrant, therefore, for placing ὁ λόγος on a line with the other two designations as a formal name of Christ.

The various positions taken in regard to these names may be classified as follows. First there is the extreme view of Zahn, who would restrict all three to the manifestation of Christ in the flesh.³ Zahn, of course, finds in John the doctrine of a real preëxistence of Christ, but in his view no denomination applies to the preëxistent one as such except the simple θεός of i. 1°. Next comes the view which after the same manner restricts "Son" and "Only-Begotten", but allows an exception for Logos regarding this at least as a name applicable to the preincarnate, if not the premundane, Christ. Among the advocates of this view may be named Lücke,⁴ Luthard,⁵ Weiss,⁶ Beyschlag,⁷ and Harnack.⁸ One step farther go those who

explaination of the peculiar construction περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς. He observes that by writing τὸν λόγον τῆς ζωῆς . . . ἀπαγγέλλομεν the author would have left open the abstract interpretation: "we declare the message of life". In order to preclude this and to convey unambiguously what he had in mind from the beginning, viz., that the personal Logos is the object of the ἀπαγγέλλειν, he, by manner of afterthought, changes the construction and inserts the περὶ. When the message is "concerning the Word", then "the Word" is personal. That even the neuter pronoun οὗ in verse 1 has such a personal reference follows from ἐώρακαμεν, for an abstract message cannot be seen. In verse 2 ἡ ζωὴ is also a personal designation of the Saviour, because of ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἐφανερώθη, and because it also is the object of "seeing". This comes nearer to the peculiar use of ὁ λόγος in the Prologue than anything in the Gospel.

³ *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 82, 97 ff. Nevertheless Zahn affirms p. 464 that according to x. 36 the sonship involves the θεὸς εἶναι. This would seem to carry the sonship back into the θεότης. In restricting all these names to the incarnate Christ Zahn has a precursor in von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*² I, pp. 118 ff.

⁴ *Commentar*³ I, pp. 344, 362.

⁵ *Das Joh. Ev.* I, pp. 298 ff.

⁶ *Lehrbuch*⁶ par. 143, 145.

⁷ *N. T. Theol.* II, pp. 422, 425.

⁸ *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, pp. 189-231.

With this group may be classified Spitta, *Das Johannes-Evangelium* (1910), who recognizes the cosmical and even pretemporal reference of the Logos-name, but assigns i. 1-5 and i. 14 (in part) to the "Bearbeiter", to whose account is also put in the sequel of the gospel

assign "Only-Begotten", together with Logos to the pre-mundane and preincarnate Christ, but place the simple "Son" this side of the incarnation. This is given as the view of Biedermann and Schanz.⁹ Formally resembling it, but with a different distribution of the names, is the view of Belser, who, like Zahn, makes Logos a designation of the incarnate Christ, but speaks of "the eternal only-born Son of God in his historical appearance", making both the other titles refer to the Saviour in his pretemporal existence.¹⁰ Finally there are those who make the simple "Son" follow Logos and Monogenes into the class of names descriptive of the preëxistent, eternal Christ.¹¹ Among the numerous representatives of this group may be named Godet,¹²

everything in connection with the other names that couples these with the idea of preëxistence, pp. 36-53.

⁹ By Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der N. T. Theol.* II, p. 437, note 1 (omitted in the 2d ed.). This, however, seems to rest rather on an inference than on the direct affirmation of these writers. Cpr. Biedermann, *Chr. Dogm.* II, 115-120; Schanz, *Commentar*, pp. 98-99.

At first sight it would seem inevitable that all who read in i. 18 *μονογενὴς θεός* should connect the name Monogenes with the eternal, divine life of Christ. But the example of Harnack and Zahn, who both strongly advocate this reading, shows that this does not follow. *Μονογενής* and *θεός* are not by Zahn attributively combined, so that the former would qualify Christ in his deity, but are understood as describing the one subject in two aspects, on the one hand as Only-Begotten (through the incarnation), on the other hand as divine. Harnack does not even consider the deity as something ontologically carried back into the preëxistent state, but as resting on an ethico-religious basis. The sharp theological antithesis, God or man, is in his view foreign to the Evangelist.

We know of no representative of the alternative view, the association of Monogenes with the incarnation and the carrying back of the generic sonship into the eternal life of Christ. This position is quite possible in itself and quite defensible from an exegetical point of view.

¹⁰ *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 1903, pp. 483-519. Differently in his *Einleitung* (1905) p. 285 "Der Logos ist eine Person . . . und selber Gott, und als solcher ist er Schöpfer und Erhalter der Welt".

¹¹ The title "Son of Man" might have been added to the other three, since it begins more and more to be recognized as in John's Gospel significantly associated with the glory either of the preëxistent or of the postexistent state.

¹² *Commentaire*,² II, p. 79.

Meyer,¹³ Keil,¹⁴ Köstlin,¹⁵ Hilgenfeld,¹⁶ Scholten,¹⁷ Immer,¹⁸ Thoma,¹⁹ Pfeiderer,²⁰ Lipsius,²¹ Oscar Holtzmann.²² It is moreover the view which has behind it the weight of authority of the orthodox church-tradition from the time of Origen onward.²³

A glance at these several views and at the distribution of the prominent names connected with them suggests the following significant fact. The traditional exegesis of the orthodox church in tracing back these distinctive names of Christ to the state of preëxistence receives support from the foremost representatives of the extreme critical school, which in its estimate of the date, the provenience and the historical truthfulness of the Gospel stands at the farthest remove from the conservative and apologetic position in regard to such matters. And on the other hand the great modern apologetes of the Gospel who have done so much to vindicate the orthodox view of the church in regard to its Apostolic origin and trustworthiness show not seldom a tendency to part company with the church-exegesis so far as the titles under review are concerned, assigning one or two or even all three of them to the incarnate Christ and insisting in the same measure upon their non-applicability to the immanent Godhead, the opposite of which the orthodox theology has always emphatically maintained, its in-

¹³ *Gospel of John*, p. 64.

¹⁴ *Commentar*, p. 110.

¹⁵ *Lehrbegriff*, pp. 89, ff. 96, pp. 149 ff.

¹⁶ *Die Evangel.*, p. 332.

¹⁷ *Het. Ev. naar Joh.*, pp. 82 ff.

¹⁸ *Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 509.

¹⁹ *Die Genesis des Joh. Ev.*, pp. 184 ff.

²⁰ *Urchr.*² II, pp. 463 ff.

²¹ *Dogm.*³ pp. 465 ff.

²² *Das. Joh. Ev.*, p. 82.

²³ In the above classification the view which makes the subject of the Prologue first attain to personal existence through the incarnation has been left out of account. According to this view that which previously existed in God unhypostatically was already as such the Logos of God. The view, therefore, would fall under the second rubric. Cpr. Lücke, *Commentar*,³ I, p. 361; Holtzmann-Bauer, *Hand-Comm.*³ IV, 1, p. 54.

terest lying in the defense of the deity of Christ which seems so obviously bound up with the pretemporal reference of these names. The phenomenon here noted is not, of course, an isolated one; it furnishes but one striking instance of the curious alignment which in exegetical and biblico-theological matters tends to group together conservative scholars with their extreme critical antipodes and to force apart the same conservative scholars from such as are their natural allies in the great critical debate. A high exegesis is joined to a low critical view of the Gospel, and a high critical estimate of the Gospel in the case of the apologetes is accompanied by a low exegesis. But mystifying as this alignment at first sight may be, it is quite capable of rational explanation. The negative critical school, especially in its older Tübingen form, contended that the Gospel is essentially a philosophico-theological document, that it contains speculation and not, in the main, history, and that in this speculative complexion the teaching of Jesus which it pretends to record is radically distinct from and irreconcilable with the kind of teaching preserved in the Synoptics. It is therefore natural for this school of critics to find not only a solid substance of doctrine in the Gospel, but also to consider the doctrine found of the highest speculative type. Now this inevitably brings their exegetical conclusions into close touch with the church-theology, for the church has always found in the Fourth Gospel the main source for its teaching on the deep things of the Godhead. On the other hand it is but human in the apologetes of the historical character of the Gospel to endeavor to approximate its doctrinal content as much as possible to the current conception of the Synoptical teaching of Jesus, for the simple reason that thus one of the chief obstacles to its historicity can be removed. Thus it comes about that a certain predilection not only for an un-speculative, but even for an untheological and undoctinal interpretation of the statements of the Gospel can be observed in apologetic circles. The tendency becomes doubly

strong where it receives reënforcement from the widely-prevailing Ritschlian antipathy to everything that savors of the speculative and metaphysical in Christian teaching. Harnack's exegesis of the Gospel with its sharp distinction between the speculatively colored Prologue and the absolutely undoctrinal body of the Gospel and its refusal to recognize the Prologue as in any sense a programme for the Gospel-teaching, making it a mere accommodation to the standpoint of the readers, clearly reveals the influence of this latter motive. But the tendency as such is not dependent on this secondary influence for its existence. It is plainly perceptible in cases where every suspicion of Ritschlian sympathies is excluded, e.g., in the case of so orthodox a writer as Zahn. For such as still set store by the great theological doctrines for which the Fourth Gospel preëminently has furnished the basis, and therefore continue to attach not merely an historical, but also a specifically theological value to its teaching, the tendency spoken of may easily seem fraught with the danger of depriving whatever success has attended the apologetic efforts on behalf of the historicity of the Gospel of much of its value. One may be inclined to feel that the historical character of the document has been saved at the expense of its theological importance. We are encouraged to maintain or regain our confidence in the actual provenience of this body of teaching from the lips of Jesus, but somehow in the apologetic process which has restored our confidence the former richness and pregnancy and distinctiveness of the teaching seem to have been lost to such an extent, that we are no longer able to reap from it any appreciable addition to our store of knowledge obtained from the Synoptical sources.

As already stated, among the doctrines thus affected the Christological truths which have always been considered characteristic of our Lord's Johannine teaching stand out prominently. Among these again the Logos-doctrine occupies an important place. It is a matter of considerable

moment, theologically speaking, whether Christ bears this name in connection with his appearance in the flesh and his soteriological activity, or whether it belongs to Him in virtue of what He is and does apart from and antecedently to his work as incarnate Saviour of the world. In attempting to register the theological consequences of the adoption of the former view, we naturally think first of the doctrine of the Trinity, specifically of the relation within the Godhead between the Father and the Son. The name Logos has long since been understood as intended to throw light on this trinitarian mystery. The point of comparison is given a psychological turn and the thought results that as the logos stands related to the person who produces it, so the Son stands related to the Father. In other words the idea of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father is found expressed in the Logos-name. The name characterizes this generation as an intellectual process.²⁴ The ontological interpretation of the Logos-name either in this specialized or in a more general form is not confined to the older and oldest exponents of the church-theology; it still finds advocates among modern exegetes both of the orthodox and of the liberal school, although, owing to the fact that the question is seldom raised in a sufficiently pointed and explicit form, it proves difficult to ascertain the opinion of most writers in regard to it.²⁵

²⁴ The idea reaches back into the patristic theologizing. Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland*, *Freib. Theol. Stud.*, 1910, II, p. 3, refers for the patristic evidence to Petavius, *De Trinitate*, II, II, VI, 5 ff. and quotes the definition of Aquinas from the *Summa Theol.* I, 34: *Verbum proprie dictum in divinis personaliter accipitur et est proprium nomen personae Filii; significat enim quendam emanationem intellectus . . . huiusmodi processio dicitur generatio.* Cpr. also Schanz, *Commentar*, pp. 70, 71.

²⁵ Of conservatives we may mention Lasson, *Das ewige Wort*, p. 5; Simon, *Der Logos*, p. 5; Westcott, *the Gospel according to St. John*, p. 3 "the word Logos includes the conception of the immanent Word"; "the economic Trinity, the Trinity of revelation is shown to answer to an essential Trinity"; Lütgert, *Beiträge zur Förderung Christl. Theol.*, 1899, p. 125: "nicht um der Welt willen hat Gott einen Logos, sondern er ist in Ihm selbst, in seinem eigenen geistartigen Wesen, das sich nur in 's Wort zu fassen vermag begründet." Lütgert takes

The problem is a complicated one and for successful treatment needs sharp separation of the various elements that enter into it. The following questions should be kept distinct: 1) Does the Evangelist make ontological or purely functional statements concerning the Person whom he calls the Logos? 2) If ontological statements are made, do they concern the specific point of the provenience of the Logos from God? 3) Are the ontological statements associated with the inherent meaning of the name Logos? 4) Is there reason to believe, apart from the direct statements of the

the peculiar view that the representation of Christ as Logos stands in the service of the spiritualizing tendency of the Gospel, that it lies on the line of the contrast between word and miracle. The majority of the Catholic exegetes and dogmatists adhere to the old tradition. So Scheeben, *Handb. der kath. Dogmatik* I, p. 843; Pohle, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*, I³, p. 324; Krebs, *Freib. Theol. Stud.*, 1910, II, pp. 3 ff.; an exception among the Catholics is Belser, *Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1903, pp. 483-519, who explains the Logos-name from the work of the incarnate Christ; differently in *Einleitung*² p. 285, where the creation and preservation of the world are associated with the name. Belser does not deny the eternal generation; the difference between him and the other Catholics is that he does not find it in the Logos-title as such. Among liberal Protestant writers of recent date the following with varying clearness incline towards considering Logos a name of being and origin as well as of function: Weizsäcker, *Das apost. Zeitalter*,² p. 552 "im Sinn der wesentlichen Einheit mit Gott"; Holtzmann, *Lehrb. d. Neutest. Theol.* II¹, p. 392, through the Logos "rundet sich der Begriff Gottes in sich selbst ab"; Grill, *Untersuchungen über die Entsteh. des vierten Evang.* I, pp. 167, 169, 175 ff., "Er ist Logos, ist Wort in höherem Sinn, schon vor Entstehung der Welt, schon ehe er in der Welt und zu der Welt geredet hat: schon ehe Gott durch Schöpfung und Offenbarung so geredet hat, dass ein kreatürliches Gottesbewusstsein entstand, hat er ausserzeitlich und seinem eigensten Wesen entsprechend, sich bei sich selbst ausgesprochen, ist er im Logos κατ' ἐξ. sich selbst gegenständlich geworden".

On the other hand Pfeleiderer, *Urchristenthum*², II, 463, thinks that the Evangelist consciously avoided all speculation as to the origin of the Logos: "er gibt keine nähere Begründung dafür, dass oder warum es einen Logos gebe, sucht ihn auch nicht irgendwie aus dem göttlichen Wesen abzuleiten—er scheut die gefährlichen Spuren gnostischer Emanationen und Theogonien." Spitta, *Das Johannes-Ev.* pp. 50, 51, conjectures that the designation of Jesus as Logos had its origin in the superscription of the Gospel as ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου I. X. (Cpr. Mk. i. 1); this invited the "Bearbeiter" to preface the "Grundschrift", which contained the account of the life of Jesus, with a dogmatic introduc-

Prologue, that the writer can have attached to the Logos-name an ontological and specifically an ontogenetic significance?

The first question is the easiest to answer. That verses 1 and 2 are meant as ontological statements descriptive of the premundane relation of the Logos to God, is admitted on well-nigh every hand. The three points emphasized are the eternity, the personal God-wardness and the deity of the Logos. It is true, these three great affirmations are not made for the purely theological purpose of explaining the inner mode of the divine existence. What they predicate about the Logos is introduced because of its bearing on the functions afterwards ascribed to Him. To show the qualification of the Logos for these functions it was of supreme importance to answer the three questions: 1) When was the Logos? 2) Where was the Logos? 3) What was the Logos? Although, therefore, the writer's mind is even in these two verses already fixed upon the significance of the Logos for the world, none the less what he affirms concerns the God-ward aspect of the life of the Logos, it is ontological and not functional in its essence: it recurs to explain the function upon the mode of being. It implies that there is more to the Logos than is involved in His functional relation to the world. To put it sharply: before the world was not merely were these three things true of the Logos; they were true of Him altogether irrespective of the actual or

tion "welche auf den geheimnisvollen göttlichen Ursprung Christi zurückgreift. Damit sinkt die gepriesene Spekulation . . . allerdings sehr von ihrer Höhe herab, und das Geheimnis des mystischen Eingangs wird sehr schlicht, wenn es zu seiner Keimzelle eine prosaische Buchüberschrift hat." According to Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.*, p. 123, the Johannine Logos has nothing Philonic about him: "er ist das befehlende und offenbarende Wort Gottes. Man braucht den Jüdisch-biblischen Ideenkreis nicht zu verlassen um zu sehen woher er stammt; die Meinung dass den Juden solche Hypostasierungen fern lagen trifft nicht zu." As to the exegesis of i. 3, 4 Wellhausen is frankly pessimistic: "Wer i. 3, 4 verstehen muss, ist nicht zu beneiden". Schwartz (*Aporien im vierten Ev.*, Nachr. v. d. Königl. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Gött. 1907-1908, p. 548) regards the Greek element even in Philo a mere superficial varnish and recognizes only the meaning "Word".

possible existence of the world, would have been true if no world had come into being. It is not permissible to eliminate the ontological element from verses 1 and 2 by carrying into them the Philonic idea of the Logos as a world-plan or a world-potency. In that case the whole distinction between the ontological and the functional would be obliterated; to say that the Logos as world-plan or world-potency was in the beginning, and was with God, would only affirm the eternity and the eternal presence with God of the world in these two respects; it would not give the Logos ontological significance apart from the world. But this understanding of the words, while it might apply to the first of the three affirmations ("in the beginning was the Logos"), can scarcely apply to the second ("the Logos *ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, the Logos was in active intercourse with and in perfect communion with God" Westcott), since it is difficult to conceive of a personal, eternal, God-related being with no other *raison d'être* than the mediation of the origin and organization of the world. And most certainly such an understanding of the words is excluded by the third affirmation (*θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*). To limit the being of the Logos to his significance for the world, and yet to make this Logos partake of the divine nature, would mean to pass the line that separates theism from pantheism and to carry the principium of the world as an eternal reality back into the immanent life of God.

Since the third question concerns equally the general ontological problem just touched upon and the specific problem of ontological provenience, we must immediately raise it at this point with reference to the conclusion reached, even before we attempt to answer the second question. Is there any association between the inherent meaning of the Logos-name and the facts affirmed about the intra-divine existence of the Logos? Is there anything in the Logos-conception as such that will explain His being in the beginning, his being *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* and his being divine? Here, of course, we are face to face with the ques-

tion, whether Logos means to the Evangelist "reason" or "word" (either in the sense of τὸ λέγειν, the act, or in that of τὸ λεγόμενον the product). The preponderance of opinion seems to incline towards the latter interpretation.²⁶ It is, however, hardly necessary to press for a decision on this point at the present stage of our enquiry. At first sight, to be sure, it might seem as if the interpretation "reason" offered a better, or perhaps the only, possibility for an association of the Logos-concept with the immanent ontological life of the Godhead. "Reason" is a psychological term which calls up to the mind the inner structure of our spiritual being. "Word", on the other hand, almost inevitably suggests the presence of an outside reality to which the word is addressed. The impression thus created is frequently strengthened by applying to our problem the old philosophical distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός, the former designating the process of thought on its inward side as "reason", the latter the same in its utterance ad extra as "speech".²⁷ Decisive neither of these two considerations can be called. It is not impossible to view the process or product of speaking on its internal, mental side as an integral process of the personal life and on this principle to utilize the Logos-title for a trinitarian construction. And on the other hand it is equally possible to conceive of "reason" as a function or process turned outward having a cosmical object to operate

²⁶ The arguments are stated with great clearness and skill by Zahn, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 103-107.

²⁷ The distinction is of Stoic origin. By the Stoics it was employed in an anthropological sense, not with reference to the universal logos. It is frequently asserted that Philo carries the distinction into the Logos of God. Aall, *Gesch. der Logos-Idee in der Griech. Phil.* I, p. 197 denies this. The fact is that in the one passage where Philo introduces the distinction (*Vit. Mos.*, III, 13, II, 154 Mangey) he does not explicitly apply it to the divine Logos, but only to that in man. After distinguishing between the Logos περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων and the Logos περὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν, he adds: ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. The idea therefore is applied to the divine Logos by way of illustration, not as adequate terminology. Cpr. Grill, *Unters. üb. d. Entsteh. des viert. Ev.* I, pp. 146-147.

upon, so that a reference to the created world would, even on this rendering, fully satisfy the terms of the comparison and render the application to the purely immanent life of God unnecessary. How possible the latter is may be seen from Philo. On the whole Philo's Logos means "reason". And yet Philo in the development of his Logos-doctrine pursues a purely cosmical interest. The internal life of God lies for him beyond the reach of all human knowledge; the conception of the Logos as the reason in God does not detract in the least from his uniform and consistent application of the idea *ad extra*. It should be remembered in this connection that *ὁ λόγος* even in unphilosophical language can be the objective reason in things, their intelligible aspect, and not merely the faculty of reasoning in the subjective sense.²⁸ Thus it will be also seen, that the conception of the Logos as *ἐνδιάθετος* does not carry with it the true immanence of the same in the ontological sense. Philo's *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* as applied to God is not the faculty of reasoning in God, nor even the process of reasoning in God, but the ideal product of the divine reasoning, the *κόσμος νοητός*, which stands related to the *λόγος προφορικός* as the plan of a building to its execution. The *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* is no less than the other the *λόγος θεοῦ ἤδη κοσμοποιούντος*.²⁹ The ontological immanence of the church-theology lies along deeper lines than this whole distinction.

Is there anything to indicate that the writer apprehended the statements in verse 1 in terms of the Logos-concept? With reference to the first statement this would seem excluded from the nature of the case, for eternity cannot be expressed in terms of the Logos as such. But in regard to the other two statements it is quite conceivable. The author might mean to affirm that as the logos is most closely identified with the person whose logos it is, so the Person of Christ in his premundane life is as closely identified with God. It is true the preposition *πρός* c. Acc. would not be the most natural form of expression for such a

²⁸ Cpr. Lücke, *Commentar über das Ev. des Joh.*³, I, p. 251.

²⁹ *Opif. Mundi* 6, I, 7 (Cohn and Wendland).

thought; some other construction, like *παρά* with the Dative, would appear better suited for the purpose. Still this objection has little weight in view of the fact, that in the present case what is compared from the point of its close identification with God, is a person, and the writer could reckon with this personal element by the use of *πρός* c. Acc. instead of *παρά* c. Dat., the identification of person with person not being a mere matter of fact but a matter of purposeful direction. We shall have to say, therefore, that there is nothing strained in this interpretation: both the *πρός θεὸν εἶναι* and the *θεὸν εἶναι* admit of being conceived as implications of the logos-figure. Christ's eternal communion with God and his participation in the *θεότης* can properly be compared to the closeness of in-being of reason or speech with regard to the reasoning or speaking person.³⁰ It will further be noticed that this interpretation of the Evangelist's statements easily adapts itself to the obvious purpose which, as above stated, these statements are by the context shown to subserve. If the "being-towards-God" and the "being-God" furnish the basis for the creative and revealing function of Christ, for his Logos-activity towards the world, and if this "being-towards-God" and "being-God" are in themselves a sort of Logos-existence, then the thought results that Logos-function is grounded in Logos-nature. That the Son can be described as Logos immanently with reference to God explains how he can act in the capacity of Logos with reference to the world. Though a twofold turn is given to the figure there is a point in which the two comparisons meet: He who has the closest logos-like union with God can bring the fullest and clearest logos-like revelation of God.

While this is an exegetical possibility, and there is nothing to contraindicate it, we shall have to admit that just

³⁰ The Logos-figure so understood is a spiritual analogon to the corporeally expressed figure of i. 18 ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, with the same peculiar construction to express the combination of rest in with direction towards. Cpr. also the comparison in 1 Cor. ii, 11.

as little is there anything in the text that positively requires it. The mere fact that the writer uses Logos as the subject of the affirmations made can scarcely be regarded as doing this. At first glance, it is true, the reader will be inclined to think, if the Logos was in the beginning, was towards God and was God, then he must have been these three things in his capacity of Logos, and thus will conclude that the Logos-name has before all else an immanent Godward reference. A moment's reflection, however, will show that such a conclusion is premature. We must here reckon with the possibility referred to in our introductory remarks, that the writer may have used the Logos-name in verses 1 and 2 by way of anticipation, so that the three great affirmations made would be predicates of the subject of the sentence but not of Him in His Logos-capacity. In order to establish the possibility of this latter view it is, of course, necessary to show, that in the given context there would be a plausible reason to introduce such an anticipation. As a matter of fact it is easy to point out such a reason. As already observed the author makes the three statements for the specific purpose of laying a basis in the eternal intra-divine life of Christ for his creative and revealing activity in time, i.e., for his subsequent Logos-function. In order to make us feel that what he affirms has this bearing upon the Logos-function, he might very appropriately name the subject of the affirmations *ὁ Λόγος* without thereby implying that He had these attributes in virtue of an immanent Logos-character in an ontological sense. To put it in simple paraphrase the peculiar form of statement may easily to his mind have had this meaning: He who was to function as the Logos was in the beginning, was towards God, was God.

We may now turn to the second of the four questions above formulated and enquire whether in our verses there is any ontological statement that concerns the specific point of the provenience of the Logos from God. It was noted above that the ontological interpretation of the words in

question has been most frequently given this specific turn. The Logos-figure implied in the name is regarded as involving two distinct elements, that of causality in general and that of intellectual causality in particular. It is a figure descriptive of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father *per modum intellectus*. So far as the opening two verses of the Prologue are concerned it is plain that no *explicit* warrant for this dogmatic construction is contained therein. The three great deliverances all presuppose the existence of the Logos as a given fact and in themselves enunciate nothing about His provenience. He was in the beginning, was towards God and was God—this they affirm but not how He came into being or came to be this. It would have been easy for the author, had the making of a statement about the provenience of the eternal Christ lain in his plan, to do this by employing in the second sentence the preposition ἐκ instead of πρὸς. In not availing himself of this opportunity he clearly shows that for the practical purpose in hand (the grounding of the revealing function of the Logos in His relation to God) not the origin of the Logos but His mode of existence was regarded by him of prime importance. And yet we should be scarcely warranted in saying, that this fact absolutely precludes us from finding any reflection upon the provenience of the Logos here or from crediting it to the writer in general. What is not explicitly affirmed in the three statements as such, might possibly be implied in the subject of the affirmations, that is in the Logos-name itself. On the supposition that the *tertium comparationis* in this name lies in the point of causation, Logos would be equivalent to “one who is engendered of God as the word or reason are produced by the speaker or thinker”. If such an understanding of the term was current in the circle of the writer and the readers, the word Logos itself, without further unfolding, would be able to convey it in all its pregnancy of meaning. Paraphrased the statement would read: “The God-engendered One (= Logos) was in the beginning, and

the God-engendered One was towards God, and the God-engendered One was God". In the thought that provenience determines mode of existence there is, of course, nothing unusual. Even the Prologue itself offers material for its illustration. In both verse 14 and verse 18 the idea finds expression that Christ in virtue of his sonship carries the fulness of grace and truth in Himself and so can bring the supreme revelation of God. And in verse 18 this even assumes a form strikingly analogous to the thought discovered in verse 1 on the view under discussion. Here the *μονογενής*-relation to God and the being *εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς* are joined together, after precisely the same fashion as in verse 1 the *λόγος*-relation to God and the being *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* are joined. The only difference between these two cases is that *μονογενής* by its very form suggests the idea of provenience, whereas in *λόγος* this idea would be clothed in a more recondite figure, which for its understanding would require the help of current association. But this difference does not touch the main analogy consisting in this, that the being-with-God is significantly joined to the being-from-God.³¹

³¹ In the above statement it is assumed that *μονογενής* is for John not simply equivalent to *μόνος* "unique" either in the literal or in the metaphorical sense of "dearly beloved". In three of the four instances of its occurrence in the Gospel it stands in a context which makes the idea of *γενᾶσθαι* from God prominent. The same is true of 1 Jno. iv. 9. Besides this in Jno. i. 14, the idea of endowment through derivation is plainly present. The words *δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός* are not a mere comparison "a glory as great as an only-begotten son would have", but a statement of full correspondence between the idea of the glory pertaining to the *μονογενής*-relation and its reality in Christ, as Godet well formulates it: "une gloire comme doit être celle du Fils venant d'auprès du Père". The *παρὰ* is not to be construed with the *-γενής* in *μονογενής*, for it is not the proper preposition for this; it belongs either to the implied idea of "receiving" (so Zahn) or to the implied idea of "coming" (so Godet) from the Father. The Evangelist measures the fulness of the glory of Christ by a twofold standard: 1) it is the glory of a *μονογενής*; 2) it is a glory of one who was endowed by or came from the Father, i.e. in his historic appearance. The coordination of these two standards appears more natural, if in *μονογενής* there is felt the same idea of the

The assumption that the Logos-name is used in the opening sentences of the Prologue, not by way of anticipation, but with inherent ontological significance receives some support from the extraordinary emphasis placed upon it by its repetition in the second and third clauses. The question may be legitimately put whether a simple statement, "In the beginning was the word and was towards God and was God" would not have been more in keeping with the functional conception of the name and its purely proleptic employment here, than the strongly reiterative form of speaking adopted by the Evangelist. The sequel

Son's deriving his glory from the Father which is present in the *παρὰ πατρός*. The whole statement amounts to: such a glory as the Only-Begotten has in virtue of his begetting and in virtue of his endowment or commission from the Father. Whether the *γίγεσθαι* implied in *μονογενής* relates to the eternal generation or to the virgin-birth is, of course, immaterial to the point of the argument, which concerns only the idea of determination of being through birth. As to Jno. iii. 16, 18, here the reference of the *μονογενής* to the preëxistent state of Christ is plain: God gave, sent his *μονογενής*; He therefore was the *μονογενής* antecedently to being sent: the very greatness of the sacrifice lay in the giving of Him as *μονογενής*. The idea of a being-begotten from God which occurs in the preceding context here relates to man, not to Christ. But it is at least a debatable question, whether the statement of verse 12 "If I told you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things", which has given exegetes so much trouble, does not allude to a higher, absolutely heavenly generation in comparison with which even the regeneration of believers may be called an earthly thing. Finally in Jno. 1. 18 (no matter whether *μονογενής θεός* or *ὁ μονογενής υἱός* be read, and whether in the former case *μονογενής* be construed with *θεός* or a supplied *υἱός*, or whether *μονογενής* be taken as a noun, *θεός* as the attribute), the qualification to declare God, to explain which *μονογενής* serves, is far better accounted for by "only-begotten" than by "only". The reference of the words *ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός* to the divine life of the Saviour deserves the preference by far over Zahn's proposal to understand them of the glorified human Saviour, the present tense of *ὢν* being explained from the standpoint of the Evangelist: "who is now again in the bosom of the Father." The latter view succeeds only very artificially in making Christ's return to the Father a ground of his ability to declare the Father during his earthly life, for to that the Aorist *ἐξηγήσατο* refers. Zahn's explanation is, that the return to the bosom of the Father has set the seal of God's approval upon Christ's work and so assures us that He has adequately declared God while on earth.

of the Prologue suggests that rhetorical motives may have had something to do with the peculiar structure of the opening verses. But this peculiar structure is not entirely dependent on the repetition of the word Logos. It is difficult to dismiss the impression that, when the Evangelist takes pains to say that it was the Logos who was towards God, and who was God, and when in the next following sentence by means of *οὗτος* he again emphasizes that it is only the Logos of whom this can be predicated, there must have been some vital connection in his mind between the name employed and the great things affirmed.

The only other statement in the Prologue which would admit of a strictly ontological interpretation connected with the inherent meaning of the Logos-name is the first clause of verse 4 "In Him (i.e., in the Logos) was life". This considered in itself could be understood of the purely immanent life possessed by Christ before the world was, and it could be associated with his Logos-character, either on the general principle of identification with God or on the more special ground of derivation from God. In view, however, of the place given to the statement immediately after verse 3, descriptive of the Logos-activity in the creation of the world, it is preferable to understand the words in question not absolutely of Christ's own divine life, but of the life-giving potency that existed in Him with reference to the world, a view also favored by the immediately following clause: "and the life (that was in Him)³² was the light of men". We move here no longer in the sphere of ontology but of function.

Our enquiry so far has yielded only the result that the Gospel-statements were found to allow of and be adjustable to an ontological application of the Logos-idea on the writer's part. Positive exegetical indications absolutely compelling this view we were not able to discover. The result may seem meagre and unsatisfactory. Its negative character, however, should not be allowed overmuch weight

³² Notice the change from the simple *ζωή* to *ἡ ζωή* in the second clause.

as an argument against the view discussed and in favor of the purely functional interpretation. For it must be remembered that the restriction of the Logos-idea to the cosmical or soteriological significance of Christ is hardly in a better position. That Logos means the utterance of the creative power of God or his revelation concentrated in the Person of Christ, the Evangelist does not tell us in so many words either; we are left to infer it from the connections in which the term is introduced. In i. 14 the sense of "revelation" may seem implied in that the Logos become flesh is made the object of a beholding on the disciples' part, one who carried the pleroma of grace and truth in Himself, the counterpart of the Old Testament Shekhina as a self-manifestation of God. But absolutely certain that these things, plainly enough affirmed in themselves, are associated with the Logos-name we cannot be here any more than in verse 1. The same applies to 1 Jno. i. 1-3. It is here obvious again that the *Λόγος τῆς ζωῆς*, also called the *Ζωή*, comes in the character of a revelation, for He is the object of "hearing", "seeing", "handling", "declaring". All the same, that these things are by the author found expressed in the Logos-name is a matter of inference rather than of direct positive statement. In regard to "the life" which is said to have been manifested, no one draws the inference that the idea of manifestation is analytically contained in that of life. The third context where the Logos-names occur in the Johannine writings is Rev. xix. 11-16. Here Zahn argues for the restriction to a functional significance in the sphere of revelation, from the contrast between the name which no one knows but the Christ Himself, verse 12, and the name wherewith He has come to be designated (*κέκληται* perf. tense), viz. "the Logos of God". This contrast would seem to assign the Logos-name to the revealed, soteriological province of the Saviour's life and mark it as inapplicable to the esoteric, unknowable side of His existence within the Godhead, which can be apprehended by Himself alone. It seems to us doubtful whether the con-

trast between the unknowable and the knowable in Christ here signalized by the distinction of these two names, coincides with the contrast between the life of Christ as related to God and his function as related to redemption. No one claims that the Logos-name in its ontological application is exhaustively descriptive of what Christ is in Himself as God with God. Even so it is a name in which the divine mode of existence has been brought near to the level of our human capacity of apprehension. Given its full trinitarian profundity of meaning, it still is not the name "which no one knows but He Himself". This being so there is no reason to infer from the representation that the Logos-title can have nothing to do with the mysteries of the immanent life of the Godhead.³³

In view of the inferential character of the conclusions obtained from our reading of the Prologue itself, the question, whether parallel representations outside of the Prologue can throw any light on the possibility or probability of an ontological or ontogenetic use of the Logos-name, acquires additional interest. This is the fourth question above formulated and we now proceed briefly to look into it. It has begun to be recognized of late that at the time of the writing of our Gospel the Logos-name had a wider currency in philosophical and religious parlance than was previously supposed. The exclusive dependence of the Prologue on Philo is no longer advocated, even where a direct connection between his Logos-speculation and the Logos-doctrine of the Evangelist is insisted upon.³⁴ It is not the purpose of this paper to enquire into the extra-biblical emergence of the Logos-idea nor to discuss to what extent, if any, it may have exerted an influence upon the

³³ Krebs, *Freiburger theol. Stud.* 1910, II, p. 115 observes that at any rate the restriction of the Logos-name to the soteriological sphere, to the exclusion of all wider cosmical significance is contraindicated by the context of Rev. xix. 11-16. If the Logos is the creative power and wisdom of God, if the world is in virtue of this his own, then it becomes easily explainable, that He who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords should also be called the Logos of God.

³⁴ Cpr. Holtzmann-Bauer, *Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 50-58.

thought of the Prologue, either positively by contributing to it formative elements, or negatively by way of soliciting protest or correction from the Evangelist. The only point that at present concerns us is whether in these parallels, earlier or contemporary, the Logos-idea or related ideas are turned to ontological account or have a purely functional, cosmical reference.³⁵ In certain instances the presence of ontological speculation cannot be denied. The hypostatical beings of the Persian religion which occur in the Gathas and bear the name of Amesha Spentas were certainly known in the first century of our era, whatever may be thought of the controversy between scholars as to their much higher antiquity, and as to the chronological possibility or non-possibility of making them the prototype of the Jewish archangels, or of making one of their number, Spenta-Armaiti, the prototype of the Jewish Chokma-hypostasis.³⁶ Among these Amesha Spentas there is one who bears a remote resemblance to the Logos-conception, viz. Vohu-Manô "the good thought". While Vohu-Manô appears as the counsellor of Mazda in regard to the creation of the world, i.e., in a functional capacity, he is also represented as the Son of Mazda. Mazda is called "la matrice de Vohu-Manô"; he lives with Vohu-Manô "in one house".³⁷

In the Babylonian-Assyrian religion Marduk appears as the possessor and dispenser of wisdom, the coequal Son of Ea, the primordial wisdom. He figures also as the Creator of the world, but it is not clear that there is a close connection between his wisdom-character and his birth from Ea on the one hand, or between his wisdom-character and his creative function on the other hand. As a wisdom-God

³⁵ The following account of the extra-biblical parallels is in part dependent on Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert* (Freib. theol. Stud. 1910) I, *Logos-Spekulation und Erlösungslehre im Heidentum des ersten Jahrhunderts*, pp. 21-75.

³⁶ In favor of the later date of the Avesta, Darmesteter, *Le Zendavesta* (*Musée Guimet* XXI, XXII, XXIV), and lately Lagrange, *La religion des Perses* (*Revue biblique internationale*, 1904). In favor of the older date Bousset, *Religion des Judenthums*,² pp. 591 ff.; Mills, *Zoroaster Philo and Israel*; Carnoy, *Religion of the Avesta*.

³⁷ In Darmesteter's translation, *Yasna* 21, 8; 44, 9; 47, 3.

he is immanent in the world; the whole construction rests on the basis of a pantheistic naturalism, which obliterates all distinction between what applies to the Godhead in itself and what pertains to its relation to the world. The same must be remembered when in certain Assyrian-Babylonian hymns the Word of a God appears personified. And that much of these ideas of older date survived as a living religious reality in the first century of our era is not probable.³⁸

A much closer analogy is afforded by the ancient Egyptian religion. This religion has in its doctrine of the gods certain constantly recurring features, one of these being "that a god engenders his son, or, strictly speaking, his double, through his mouth, through speaking, and that the activity and manner of working of the gods in general are accomplished by means of that powerful word".³⁹ Pre-eminently this is predicated of the God Tauth or Tot. In a text from the Ptolemaic period this god is addressed as follows: "Tauth, thou hast cast forth Schu from thy mouth,—he proceeded from the tip of thy mouth—thy lips cast him forth"⁴⁰. But the idea is much older. In an inscription of the eighth century B.C. Tot himself is called "the tongue, the image of Atum". Of Atum it is said that "from every god's body and every god's mouth" he produces his own being. "All men, all cattle, all reptiles live, in virtue of his thinking and uttering whatever he wills." Tot is the mouth "which has pronounced the name of everything" (and so created it).⁴¹ Striking as, from a formal point of view, the resemblance is of this to the ontological version of the Johannine Logos-idea, the great

³⁸ Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 96, 243, 428 ff.; 548: "Marduk . . . is commonly designated as the son of Ea . . . the sun rising out of the ocean—the domain of Ea—was a factor in this association."

³⁹ Krebs, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴⁰ Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen*, pp. 53, 83; cpr. also Brugsch, *Rel. der Ägypter*, pp. 427-429 and Wiedemann, *Die Rel. der alten Ägypter*, p. 73, both cited by Krebs, p. 122.

⁴¹ Krebs, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

material difference in two respects ought not to be overlooked. In the first place the substratum of this whole representation is pantheism; the producing of another god, which is equivalent to the production of self, and the production of the content of the world are not separated. And secondly from a generation *per modum intellectus* the process thus described is far removed. It is not idealistically but quite realistically conceived, as a veritable birth or ejection from the mouth, both the engendering and the engendered deity being materialistically conceived of.

This old Egyptian theology has of late been brought into the closest proximity to and connection with the Johannine Logos-teaching through its assumed combination with the cult of Hermes as Logos, first in Egypt, and then spreading from there over the Hellenistic world, about the beginning of the Christian era. Reitzenstein in his two works entitled "*Zwei religions-geschichtliche Fragen*" (1901) and "*Poimandres*" (1904) has endeavored to establish the dependence of the Prologue on the Hermetic literature in its older form.⁴² The Stoics made Hermes the "Word" of Zeus. This Stoic Logos coalesced in Egypt with the old Egyptian Tot as early as the time of Alexander the Great. Reitzenstein thinks it can be made probable that the peculiar forms which this syncretistic Logos-theology shows in the Hermetic corpus and in some later pieces were current much earlier than the date of these writings, in fact that already in the Ptolomaeic age a Hermetic religion with Hermetic writings existed in which these peculiar views were embodied. The statements coming under consideration for our present purpose are mainly the following. In the Poiman-

⁴² Cpr. also from the same author "*Hellenistische Theologie in Ägypten*" in Ilberg's *Neues Jahrbuch für klassisches Alterthum*, 1904 (a compact summary of his views) and *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen, ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen*, 1910. A thoroughgoing critique of Reitzenstein's theories is given by Krebs as an appendix to his study on *Der Logos als Heiland* in the *Freib. theol. Stud.* 1910, pp. 119-172. Cpr. also Zielinski, *Hermes und die Hermetik* in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1905, pp. 321-372 and 1906, pp. 25-60; *Theol. Literaturz.* 1911, col. 20-24.

dres proper, the first of the eighteen pieces belonging to the collection passing under that same name, a theogony and cosmogony in one are described. The highest divine being is the Nous, the primordial light (identical with the Poimandres who gives the revelation). Out of the Nous the ἅγιος Λόγος proceeds, and subsequently the Nous, Demiourgos, still later the Anthropos αὐτῷ ἴσος, ἴδιος τόκος. All these three emanations engage in creative activity. Particularly the Logos on first coming forth from the Ur-light separates the elements of fire and air, but remains entangled in the as yet unseparated water and earth. Afterwards when the Demiourgos Nous has created the seven spirits of the spheres, the Logos leaps upward from the lower elements and unites himself with the Demiurge, the two henceforth forming a sort of Homousia. Here accordingly we have a Logos and a Nous, both sons of the Ur-light, flashed forth from the supreme Nous and remaining in a certain relation to him as well as entering upon a close relation to each other.⁴³ In another piece of the Hermetic collection, entitled the Τέλειος Λόγος, the Logos likewise appears as the Son of God, and at the same time as the supernatural being produced in man in the new birth, so that here the ontological and the soteriological conceptions are combined. In what Reitzenstein calls the "Strassburg Cosmogony", the following representation of the Supreme God occurs: "Having drawn off from himself a certain portion of his

⁴³ Reitzenstein thinks the peculiar situation in the Poimandres can only be explained from dependence on the old Ptah-theology of Memphis. In an inscription of the VIIIth Century B.C. Ptah is represented as the heart (= nous) and tongue (= logos) of the gods. At the same time Horos and Tot (who together = Ptah) are represented as the heart and tongue of Atum respectively. It ought to be observed, however, that others deny every connection of the Poimandres theogony with this ancient Egyptian speculation. So Zielinski, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, 1906, pp. 27-29. The representation in the Poimandres is held to be composite even after the elimination of the Neo-Platonic elements, which Reitzenstein himself recognizes, by Bousset, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1906, p. 697, and Dibelius, *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, 1905, pp. 178-183. If it is composite, the above combination loses much of its ontological significance.

manifold power (= Logos-Hermes) . . . he charged him to fashion the all-beautiful world".⁴⁴ In the same work Reitzenstein also discusses an Ave-Maria text preserved on an ostrakon of the VIth century.⁴⁵ In this text the words "thou shalt conceive" are lacking. He interprets this as implying that the conception has already taken place, viz. at that very moment through the Angel's speaking unto the Virgin. Reitzenstein ventures to regard this as the original version of the nativity-story, older than the present synoptical account, and brings it into connection with Gnostic texts in which it is the Logos-Gabriel who makes the annunciation to Mary.⁴⁶ This would furnish an instance of the Logos-ontology—brought into connection with the incarnation of Jesus, in the peculiar form of the Logos himself creating *per modum verbi* in the Virgin his own human nature, and uniting Himself with the same.⁴⁷

The value of these Hermetic speculations for throwing light upon the Prologue is greatly diminished by the fact that their pre-Johannine currency or even their cotemporane-

⁴⁴ So *Zwei religionsgesch. Fragen*, p. 53. Later on in the same piece Logos is the son of Hermes, p. 56.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-131.

⁴⁶ On this view, as Reitzenstein suggests, the Logos-doctrine of the Prologue would not so much be a different conception substituted for the original synoptical one, but a direct development out of the older synoptical version. Attention is called to the fact that as late writers as Ephraim Syr. and John of Damascus speak of Mary having conceived through the ear, Krebs, p. 154, note 6.

⁴⁷ Hence in a sermon by Pseudo-Athanasius appeal is made in refutation of the above error to the statement of Lk. i. 38 "And the angel departed from her"; if he departed this proves that he was not the Logos-Angel abiding in her united to his own human nature.

The conception of the Logos as producing his own human nature in the Virgin is already found in Justin Martyr, *Apol. I*, 33. Cpr. Cramer in *Zeitsch. f. Neut. Wiss.*, 1901, p. 314. Here, however, the Logos is not identified with the speaking angel, but only with the *δύναμις Ὑψίστου* of which the angel speaks, cpr. Veil, *Justins des Philosophen und Märtyrers Rechtfertigung*, 1894, pp. 70, 71. Cramer qualifies the representation that the preëxistent Christ begat the historical Christ, a "*haarsträubende Vorstellung*" and seeks to eliminate it from Justin by excision. But there is nothing extraordinary in it from Justin's premises.

ousness with the origin of the Gospel cannot be established. Reitzenstein dates the Poimandres-corpus from the time of Diocletian. The correctness of this dating is disputed by others. But, apart from that, the grounds on which he believes that the substance of the Hermetic ideas, as embodied in a more primitive form of the first document (the Poimandres proper), can be carried back into the first century of the Christian era or earlier are very precarious. His main reliance is the alleged dependence of the fifth vision of the Shepherd of Hermas on the vision with which the Poimandres opens. Dibelius and Krebs have shown how weak this position is, and how easily the relation between the two documents may be reversed and the Poimandres made dependent on the Shepherd.⁴⁸ As to the "Strassburg cosmogony", the papyrus on which this is preserved is from the IVth century, the ostrakon containing the peculiar Ave-Maria text is of the VIth century after Christ. Reitzenstein's efforts to bridge over the gulf between this late date and the earlier period and to make plausible the existence of a Hermetic religion with Hermetic writings as early as the Ptolemaic age are exceedingly unconvincing. If the speculations in question are of later origin they fall in line with the Gnostic teachings of a similar nature, particularly the Valentinian gnosis, and lose all significance for the illustration of the meaning of the Prologue.

It should be observed that Reitzenstein himself does not put an ontological or ontogenetic interpretation upon the Logos-name as used by John. In his view the Johannine Logos is nothing but the divine word of revelation. The dependence of the Gospel, so far as the Logos-conception is concerned, on the Hermetic belief would thus be reduced to that popular aspect of the latter which makes Hermes the Logos, the Revealer. The emanation-mythology would

⁴⁸ Dibelius in *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.* 1905, pp. 175 ff.; Krebs *op. cit.*, pp. 137-142. According to Granger, *Journal of Theolog. Studies*, 1904, the word Poimandres does not even mean "shepherd", but "witness", being taken from the Coptic, in which he assumes the treatise to have been originally composed.

not have cast its reflex in the Prologue. The other respects in which according to Reitzenstein the peculiar modes of thought and formulas of expression of the Hermetic mysticism have influenced the Fourth Gospel do not concern us here.⁴⁹

From Philo, whose Logos-doctrine has been so often made the proximate source of the Johannine conception, we can see how germane ontological and ontogenetic questions were to the idea. The use made of it by Philo was not in itself favorable to the raising of such problems. In fact every precise formulation and definite solution in connection with them threatened to interfere with the main use the Logos-conception subserved in the system of the Alexandrian philosopher. If none the less we find Philo raising these questions and framing an answer to them which at least preserves the semblance of an ontology of the Logos, this is convincing evidence that the idea could scarcely be thought without this. The Philonic Logos serves to effect that converse and interaction between God and the world which the transcendence of God renders it impossible for Him to maintain directly. But this requires from the outset a certain indefiniteness and ambiguity in the conception formed of his nature, provenience and position. If the Logos were made truly divine, the difficulty of bringing him into touch with the world would be quite as great as in the case of God. On the other hand, if he were sharply separated from the divine nature the same difficulty would arise at the other end, viz. as to how the Logos could be in close touch with God; by his own distinctness from God he would only accentuate the separateness between God and the creature. Hence the Logos oscillates between God and the world; he is *δεύτερος θεός, μεθόριος, μεθόριος φύσις*, is called God *ἐν καταχρήσει* only, is neither *ἀγέννητος ὡς θεός* nor *γέννητος ὡς ὑμεῖς*, but *ἀμφοτέροις ὁμνηρεῖται*.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Cpr. Krebs, *op. cit.*, under the heading *Poimandres und Johannes*, pp. 157-172.

⁵⁰ Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* VII, 13; II, 625 Mangey; *Quis rer. div. her.*, 42; III, 47 Cohn-Wendland; *Somn.* I, 39; III, 253 CW; II, 28; III, 289 C W.

But the uncertainty in the point of nature carries with it the same kind of indefiniteness as regards personality, for the definite and positive conception of the Logos as hypostatized would have forced the issue between his subsumption under the divine or under the created.⁵¹ Here the Platonic and Stoic strands in Philo's philosophy came to the aid of his interest in upholding the transcendence of God consistently with God's operation in the world. By conceiving the Logos as the Platonic world of ideas, not, however, as something distinct from God, but as the image of the world objective to God in God's own mind, and at the same time conceiving of him after the Stoic fashion as efficient and operative in the world, a representation was found which, in semblance at least, satisfies the requirements of the problem. The Logos in this conception is God, something in God, and yet distinct from God, something ideally objective to the mind of God. To be sure the problem is only solved in appearance, not in reality, for in the question how the Platonic ideas, which to Philo form a part of God's life, can at the same time operate upon the world as the Stoic Logos, it reëmerges in all its former acuteness. It will be perceived from the above that the Philonic Logos is in his very essence unthinkable apart from the world, in fact is the world as ideally present to the mind of God.⁵² Even those names of the Logos which at first sight might seem to give him a degree of immanent significance for God, on closer examination appear to have as their necessary correlate his significance for the world, and to be understandable from this point of view only. The Logos is *πρωτόγονος, πρεσβύτερος, πρεσβύτατος υἱός*, but he bears

⁵¹ In favor of the personality Heinze, *Lehre vom Logos*, pp. 291-294. The question is unanswered and unanswerable according to Zeller, *Die Phil. der Griechen*, III, 2^a, p. 378; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, III³, p. 556; Reville, *La doctrine du Logos*, pp. 26, 29; against personality: Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, II, 223-273; Grill, *Unters. üb. d. Entsteh. des vierten Ev.* I, pp. 139-144.

⁵² Here the fundamental difference between Philo's Logos and the Logos of John can be most clearly perceived. The former creates and can create because he is not-God, John's Logos creates and can create because He is God.

these names in his capacity of *κόσμος νοητός* with an implied side-reference to the *νεώτερος υἱός*, the visible world.⁵³ Now for the Logos thus conceived there was really no need of ontological or ontogenetic definition, since the conception itself defines his position with the Godhead. Notwithstanding this we find Philo not infrequently employing terms for the purpose of such definition, as if he felt that it would be unsatisfactory to speak of a Logos without seeking to define, after some fashion, his affiliation with and provenience from God. The Logos has for his father God, for his mother Wisdom.⁵⁴ The designation of him as *εἰκὼν θεοῦ* comes still nearer to the purpose, especially since it is coupled with the predicate *ὁ ἐγγυτάτω* "the one nearest to God", which has reminded some exegetes of Jno. i. 1 (*ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*).⁵⁵ And here we have something inherently expressed by the Logos-name itself; he is *εἰκὼν* because Logos, for the point of the figure in *εἰκὼν* lies in the co-spirituality of the Logos with God, and this co-spirituality belongs to him because he is the objective content of God's reason (= Logos).⁵⁶ The same applies to the equation *σκιὰ θεοῦ ὁ λόγος*,⁵⁷ or when the Logos is described as *ἀνθήλιος ἀνγή* in distinction from God the *ἥλιος*, or when God is called *ἡ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου λόγου πηγὴ*.⁵⁸ In all these cases the figures are but so many

⁵³ *Somn.* I, 37; III, 251 CW; *Conf. ling.* 14; II, 241 CW; 28; II, 257 CW; *Agric.* 12; II, 106 CW; *S. q. D. s. imm.* 6; II, 63 CW.

⁵⁴ *De prof.* 20; I, 562 M: *πατὴρ μὲν θεοῦ, ὃς καὶ τῶν συμπάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ, μητὴρ δὲ σοφίας, δι' ἧς τὰ ὅλα ἦλθεν εἰς γένεσιν*. Notice the side-reference to the world even here.

⁵⁵ *De prof.* 19; I, 561 M.

⁵⁶ Here again the fact should not be lost sight of that as *εἰκὼν* the Logos already postulates the world: *λόγος δὲ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ δι' οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο*. Nevertheless the idea of closeness to God is undoubtedly present; Cpr. Grill, *Unters.* I, p. 107 "Mit dem Wesen des Logos als des Geistigsten ist es hienach gegeben, dass er das Abbild Gottes und als solches Gott am nächsten stehend ist. In der Vorstellung des *εἰκὼν* liegt also wesentlich das Moment der Unmittelbarkeit des Verhältnisses zu Gott, der engsten Zusammengehörigkeit mit ihm."

⁵⁷ *Leg. alleg.* III, 31; I, 134 CW.

⁵⁸ *Qu. det. pot. ins.* 22; I, 277 CW.

variations of the Logos-figure: what they affirm of the being of the Logos with God or of his provenience from God could be affirmed by means of the Logos-idea as truly, if not so graphically. And in all these cases we have a sort of ontology of the Logos, though it is kept throughout related to the world and is of a psychological, not of a strictly metaphysical, nature, Philo being prevented from indulging in the latter by the terms of his system. That the idea of the Logos required some such definition of being and provenience can be even more clearly observed when Philo comes to speak of the impartation of the Logos to the world and to man. "Every man is as to his understanding inhabited by a divine Logos being thus an impress (*ἐκμαγεῖον*), a detached portion (*ἀπόσπασμα*) or an effulgence (*ἀπαύγασμα*) of the blessed nature of God".⁵⁹ The most realistic cosmogonic language is not shunned when the origin of the world from the demiurge as father and Episteme as mother is described in the following terms: ἡ (scil. τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ) συνὼν ὁ θεὸς οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἔσπειρε γένεσιν, ἡ δὲ παραδεξαμένη τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρματα τελεσφόροις ὠδίσι τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν υἱὸν ἀπεκύησε τόνδε τὸν κόσμον.⁶⁰ Though this is said of the birth of the visible world, the terms employed (the mother = Episteme = Sophia, and the title "Son") mark it as the counterpart of the birth of the higher Logos in God.

From the foregoing it appears that there was that in the idea of the Logos which invited an ontological use of the conception. That Philo was unable to proceed beyond a mere psychological or metaphorical ontology was not due to the idea in itself, but to the peculiar nature and uncertain position of his Logos-subject. The situation would become quite different when a subject was given in regard to whose

⁵⁹ *De Opif. Mundi*, 51.

⁶⁰ *De ebriet.* 31; II, 176 CW. Reitzenstein (*Poimandres*, p. 41) finds in this the influence of Egyptian mythology. Cpr. also (*ibid.*) the Platonizing representation of Plutarch (*De Is. et Osir.* 53-54) clothed in the forms of the Egyptian myth of Osiris-Isis, Horos-Typhon. Here also there are two Logoi, Osiris = *κόσμος νοητός*, Horos = *κόσμος αἰσθητός*.

essential deity and true hypostatical character in the form of eternal divine sonship there existed no doubt. Such a subject was given in the Person of Jesus Christ. It is difficult to see how, once the Logos-concept was pressed into the service of the Christian doctrine concerning Christ as God, the inference could fail to be drawn for any length of time that the name was also adapted to express the mystery of the personal relation to and provenience of the Son from the Father. A presumption is thus created that the significant use of the Logos-name as a subject for ontological predicates in the opening sentences of the Prologue has already for its background a development in this direction in early Christian teaching. This is rendered all the more probable by the observation that in the case of analogous terms, which in Philo and Sap. Sol. had shared with the Logos-name and with Wisdom the cosmical reference, we can show how in the New Testament teaching their christological application is immediately accompanied by their enlistment in the service of ontology. Thus the term *εἰκὼν θεοῦ* occurs in Philo and in Sap. Sol. as a predicate of the Logos and of Wisdom. It expresses an inherent characteristic of both. Even so, however, it remains inseparable from the idea of the kosmos. Paul applies this term to Christ not merely in respect of his human nature in an eschatological sense (Rom. viii. 29; 1 Cor. xv. 49; 2 Cor. iii. 18) but also in respect of his deity in a trinitarian sense. Christ is *ὑπάρχων εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ* 1 Cor. xi. 7; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15, *ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*⁶¹, *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*. In this last passage the *πρωτότοκος* shows that the figure of the *εἰκὼν* has already connected with it in Paul's mind the idea of provenience; Christ is the *εἰκὼν* of the invisible God not merely in respect of similarity to God, but specifically in respect of similarity due to deriva-

⁶¹ The point of the statement is not that the visible, incarnate Christ is the image of the invisible God, but that the divine Christ, precisely because He is invisible, spiritual Himself, reproduces God in this respect. It is as *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ* that He functioned in the creation of all things.

tion; the *εἰκὼν* not only resembles, it is drawn off from the prototype.⁶² Even more clearly the observation can be made in regard to Heb. i. 3. Here Christ is described as *ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως (τοῦ θεοῦ)*. The words characterize Him not as the God-man, but as to his preëxistent deity, for they are brought into connection with his mediatorial activity in creating the world and in providence.⁶³ Both terms are found in Philo of the Logos, the former also in Sap. Sol. of "Wisdom";⁶⁴ they have here a cosmical reference: the soul is stamped with the seal of God, of which seal the eternal Logos is the *χαρακτήρ*; every man is inhabited by the divine Logos, being thus an *ἀπαύγασμα* of the nature of God; Wisdom is an effulgence from everlasting light. There is little doubt to our mind that the writer of Hebrews, while not excluding the cosmical use of the figures, means to have them understood in an ontological sense. He does not say that the son in creating carries the *δόξα* of God into the world, and stamps the world with the *χαρακτήρ* of God, but that in his own Person He *is* the *ἀπαύγασμα* and *bears* the *χαρακτήρ* of God. *Ἀπαύγασμα* is a passive form and therefore represents the Son not so much as an active instrument but rather as the passive product of the *ἀπανυγάζειν*. As to *ὑπόστασις* (here = "substance" not = "person"), this seems scarcely capable of being communicated to the world, while of the Son in Himself it can be appropriately said that the divine substance is expressed in Him.⁶⁵ We see no reason, therefore, for abandoning the ontological interpretation which has prevailed without dissent from the time

⁶² This on the supposition that *πρωτότοκος* is not a mere figure for precedence, but looks to the origin of Christ, in other words that the *-τοκος* has its own significance.

⁶³ Notice the particle *τε* in the following clause *φέρων τε τὰ πάντα*, which derives Christ's function in providence from his being the *ἀπαύγασμα* and *χαρακτήρ* of God.

⁶⁴ *De Opif. Mundi*, 51; I, 51 CW; *De Plantat. Noë*, 5; II, 137 CW; *Leg. alleg.* III, 96; I, 106 M; *Sap. Sol.* VII, 26.

⁶⁵ It will be observed that on the view above favored *χαρακτήρ* must be given the passive sense of *ὃ ἐστὶ κεχαραγμένον*. The other view requires the active sense of *ὃ χαράσσει*.

of the early Greek commentators, till a comparatively recent date.⁶⁶ If it is correct, we have in this passage a striking instance of the early ontogenetic use made of terms previously employed in cosmical relations. What happened to *εἰκὼν*, *ἀπαύγασμα* and *χαρακτήρ* may well have happened to *λόγος*.

A few words may be devoted to the hypostatical conception of "Wisdom" in its bearing on the problem in hand. There is difference of opinion among scholars as to the precise point where poetic personification passes over into hypostasizing. Those who fix a late date for the composition of Proverbs and Job and explain the peculiar form assumed by the idea of Wisdom in these writings from the influence of Persian religion or of Greek philosophy, will naturally incline towards finding a Wisdom-hypostasis even here, whilst the advocates of an earlier date as a rule favor the theory of mere personification.⁶⁷ Difference of opinion exists also in regard to Sirach, but that in Sapiientia Solomonis Wisdom appears as a fully-developed hypostatical being is generally recognized.⁶⁸ It is not necessary to enter into this question here. Although to the writers of Job and Proverbs, or even of Sirach, Wisdom might not have come to be more than a divine attribute personified, nevertheless when later the hypostatical character of this Wisdom became an object of belief and reflection, the descriptions given of it and the predicates joined to it in the earlier period, would inevitably, in the light of this new doctrinal apperception, acquire a new significance. What had been said about Wisdom as an attribute might already, it was felt,

⁶⁶ Of late the cosmical reference of the figures has been advocated by von Soden, in Holtzmann's *Handkommentar*², III, 2, p. 19. Bruce regards it as possible. *The Ep. to the Hebrews*, pp. 37 ff.

⁶⁷ Cpr. Friedländer, *Griechische Philosophie im Alten Testament*, 1904.

⁶⁸ Heinisch, *Die Griech. Philos. im Buche der Weisheit* denies that Wisdom is in Sap. Sol. a "Mittelwesen" as in Philo, i.e. that wisdom performs a function which God could not perform, but does not deny the hypostatical character of the conception (pp. 126-136 in *Alttest. Abh.* I).

have carried intimations about Wisdom as an hypostasis and in this view could be transferred from the one to the other. And in many cases the hypostatical interpretation would undoubtedly be read back as an *explicitum* into the earlier documents, where an exegesis guided by finer historical sense would say that at most it could be only hinted at and foreshadowed. Now it is of importance to observe, that in all the sources, canonical and extra-canonical, where this figure of Wisdom emerges certain significant statements concerning its origin and mode of existence with God are made.⁶⁹ These statements would, on the supposition of the personifying nature of the description, be only so many allegorical details in the general poetic picture. Like the whole picture, however, they would immediately become invested with a new and most profound significance, where the attribute had been recognized as veiling an hypostasis. Instead of being taken as mere poetic embellishments, they would be inevitably seized upon as pointing to important ontological and ontogenetic verities. In view of this it will be worth while to gather and compare the statements referred to. In Prov. viii. 22 ff. Wisdom speaks of herself: "Jehovah formed me (other rendering "possessed me") in the beginning of His way,⁷⁰ before His works of old. I was set up (or "formed" or "anointed") from everlasting, from the beginning, before the earth was . . . before the hills was I brought forth . . . when He established the heavens I was there . . . then I was with Him as a masterworkman (other rendering "as one brought up"⁷¹), and I was daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him, rejoicing in His

⁶⁹ An exception must be made for Baruch iii. 9—iv. 4 where in the picture of Wisdom nothing of this nature occurs.

⁷⁰ Frankenberg in Nowack's *Handkommentar*, reads "als Erstling seiner Schöpfung". But ראשית seems to point to Gen. i. 1.

⁷¹ Frankenberg rejects "masterworkman" and renders "unter seiner Obhut" on the ground that שְׁעֵשִׁיעִים and מְשַׁחֲקֶהָ, as figures of child-like deportment, are inapplicable to the high creative function. But cpr. Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.* p. 123 note 1. "Chokma, die in Prov. viii. dem Schöpfer die bunten Arten der Geschöpfe vorspielt ehe er sie schafft."

habitable earth, and my delight was with the sons of men." In Job. xxviii. after the contrast between human wisdom and the divine Wisdom has been pointed out in verses 1-11 and 12-22⁷² the poet continues to describe the presence of Wisdom with God at the time of creation in the following terms: "Then did He see it and declare it; He established it, yea, and searched it out" (verse 27). Sirach employs similar language. In i. 1-10 it is said of Wisdom: she "comes from the Lord and is with Him forever . . . the days of eternity who shall number? . . . and Wisdom who shall search out? . . . Wisdom has been created before all things, and the understanding of prudence from everlasting . . . the Lord sitting upon his throne: He created her, and saw and numbered her, and poured her out upon all His works." And in xxiv. Wisdom praises herself as follows: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High . . . I dwelt in high places . . . and in every people and nation I got a possession . . . with all these I sought rest . . . then the Creator of all things . . . said, Let thy tabernacle be in Jacob and thine inheritance in Israel. He created me from the beginning before the world; and to the end I shall not fail. In the holy tabernacle I ministered before Him and so was I established in Zion" (vss. 1-10⁷³). Perhaps the most striking statements are found in Sap. Sol. vii. 22-27. Here Solomon is introduced speaking about Wisdom: "She

⁷² Merx, *Hiob* p. XLII thinks that in Job there is an implied protest against the idea of wisdom as worked out by Proverbs. The latter preaches in the public places, while in Job wisdom is represented as hidden from the eyes of all the living. But this overlooks the distinction between human and divine wisdom. The latter is a hidden wisdom in Proverbs also (viii. 22-33) cpr. Friedländer, *Griech. Phil. im Alt. Test.* p. 122.

⁷³ Friedländer would find in this definite location of Wisdom in Israel and Zion, implying its identification with the law, a particularistic and legalistic departure from the Wisdom-teaching of Proverbs. *Op. cit.*, p. 166. This is hardly just to Sir., for according to i. 9, 10 Wisdom is in his view, no less than that of Proverbs, poured out upon God's works and found with all flesh according to his gift. Even the context of xxiv. 8 ff. does not fail to state that Wisdom has gotten a possession in every people and nation.

that is the artificer of all things taught me . . . for there is in her (other reading: "she is") a spirit quick of understanding, holy, alone in kind (monogenes), manifold, subtle, freely moving, clear in utterance, unpolluted, distinct, unharmed, loving what is good, keen, unhindered, beneficent, loving toward man, steadfast, sure, free from care, all-powerful, all-surveying, and penetrating through all spirits . . . Wisdom is more mobile than any motion; yea she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness. For she is a breath (*ἀτμός*) of the power of God, and a clear effluence (*ἀπόρροια*) of the glory of the Almighty . . . an effulgence (*ἀπαύγασμα*) from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image (*εἰκόν*) of His goodness. And she, being one, hath power to do all things; and remaining in herself, reneweth all things. And from generation to generation passing into holy souls she maketh men friends of God and prophets." And in viii. 3, 4: "She glorifieth her noble birth in that it is given her to live with God, and the sovereign Lord of all loved her, for she is initiated into the knowledge of God and she chooseth out for Him His works . . . an artificer of the things that are". According to ix. 4, 10 she sits by God on his throne.⁷⁴

It would be unreasonable to expect in this wisdom-literature the precise and carefully-guarded definitions and distinctions of the later church-theology. Certain things are said of Wisdom, which it might be difficult to incorporate into the scientifically formulated doctrine of the deity of Christ and the Trinity. Instead of wondering at this we ought rather to be surprised at the extent to which on the whole the wisdom-conception fits into the subsequent revelation concerning the Person of our Lord and His place within the Godhead. To be particularly noticed, however, for our present purpose is the fact that this rich elaboration

⁷⁴ In Enoch xlii. 1, 2 Wisdom also is hypostatically conceived: not finding place among mankind, she returns to her place and takes her abode among the angels. According to 2 Enoch xxx. 8 God commanded Wisdom to create man.

which the idea of Wisdom had received at the hand of Old Testament revelation and Jewish theology, could not fail to influence the development of the Logos-doctrine. That Wisdom and the Logos were closely-allied conceptions, and that many features originally pertaining to the former were subsequently transferred to the latter admits of no doubt. Even some of the earliest descriptions invited this. The representation that Jehovah "declared" Wisdom (Job xxviii. 27), that she came forth from the mouth of the Most High (Sir. xxiv. 3) seems to make her procession from God resemble that of the Word. With this agrees the later statement of Sap. Sol. that she is a breath of the power of God (vii. 25). The circumstance that both Wisdom and the Word have a mediatorial function in creation and providence would also facilitate such an interchange of attributes and predicates. But it can also be shown *à posteriori* that Wisdom and the Logos were identified. In Sap. Sol. ix. 1 we read that God is *ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ* to which is added *καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ σου κατεσκεύασας ἄνθρωπον*. The Logos is characterized in xvi. 12 as *ὁ πάντα ἰώμενος*, a soteriological character elsewhere ascribed to Wisdom, x. 1, 4, 6, 9, 15; xi. 1 ff. That in Philo Wisdom and the Logos (= Reason) are practically identical has been shown above. Philo appeals to Prov. viii. 22 where he represents the Logos as the child of God and Wisdom.⁷⁵ There is reason to believe that the hypostatical Wisdom was recognized by the inspired writers of the New Testament as embodied in Christ, and that consequently in their circle also the Logos-conception of Christ could easily borrow traits from the Wisdom-Doctrine.⁷⁶ As a matter of fact the Prologue itself contains some traces of this mutual fructification which the Wisdom and the Logos-

⁷⁵ *De ebriet.* 31; II, 176 CW; Friedländer, *Der vorchristliche jüd. Gnostizismus*, p. 54; *Griech. Phil. im Alt. Test.*, p. 86.

⁷⁶ Cpr. Mt. xi. 19; Lk. vii. 35; xi. 49; 1 Cor. i. 24, 30; ii. 7, 8; 2 Cor. ii. 14; iv. 4; Col. ii. 3. Krebs, pp. 81-93 seems to assume that the whole teaching of Ephesians and Colossians with its emphasis on knowledge and wisdom rests on the background of the identification of Christ with Wisdom. This would be difficult to prove.

conception received from each other. The ἐν ἀρχῇ of Jno. i. 1, while pointing back to Gen. i. 1, probably also alludes to Prov. viii. 23 πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐθεμελίωσε με ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸ τοῦ τῇν γῆν ποιῆσαι.⁷⁷ The description of the Logos as a mediator in creation in verse 3 may well have the same double background of the creative word in Gen. i. and elsewhere in the Old Testament, and the creative Wisdom in Prov. viii. and other passages of the Wisdom-literature. The idea of a tabernacling of the Logos in verse 14 has a striking parallel in the use of the same figure with reference to Wisdom taking up its abode among Israel.⁷⁸ The close association between Logos and light in the Prologue likewise favors the view that the wisdom-teaching was one of the contributory sources to John's teaching on this subject. The occurrence of the pleroma-conception in the Prologue on the one hand as associated with the Logos, in Ephesians and Colossians on the other hand as associated with the Wisdom in Christ, perhaps also points to an inner connection between the two ideas.⁷⁹

In view of the foregoing it does not seem unreasonable to assume that part of the ontological and ontogenetic as-

⁷⁷ Similarly 1 Jno. i. 1 ἀπ' ἀρχῆς seems to point back to Sir. xxiv 9 and Rev. iii. 14 ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ may have its precedent in Prov. viii. 22 κύριος ἐκτίσεν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ.

Bugge, *Das Gesetz und Christus*, *Zeitsch. f. N. T. Wiss.* 1903, pp. 89 ff. thinks that the equation of Logos with Wisdom is but one instance of the general identification of Christ with the hypostatical Thora.

⁷⁸ Sir. xxiv. 8; Bar. iii. 37.

⁷⁹ The Fourth Gospel does not make explicit use of the conception of "Wisdom". It has been suggested by Grill (*Untersuch.* I, pp. 199-201) that this is due to a conscious avoidance of the term on the part of the Evangelist occasioned by the abuse made of it in Gnostic speculation. Sophia as one of the aeons played a prominent rôle in several of the Gnostic systems. She did not belong to the higher aeons, which came first in the self-unfolding of the divine being, but received her place among the later and latest emanations, so as to actually fall out of the pleroma into the hyle. Avoidance of the explicit name Sophia for the reason stated would not, of course, hinder, but rather promote the transferring of certain Wisdom-predicates to the Logos, and is therefore not inconsistent with the view that the Prologue looks back to the earlier Wisdom-teaching in its purer form.

sociations with which the conception of Wisdom was so richly invested from the beginning came to attach to the Logos-name. Some have found in the *ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν* of Jno. i. 1 a direct reference to Prov. viii. 27 *συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ*.⁸⁰ But whether any weight be attached to this detail-point or not, at any rate the belief that the Logos-name from its earliest use in Christian circles carried with it a certain ontological flavor, has a high degree of plausibility.

In the next place we cast a glance at the Memra-doctrine of the Jewish Theology. If a hypostatical "Word" was known to this previously to the date of the Fourth Gospel, this would have an important bearing on the problem of the ontogenetic use of the conception in John. For the "word" is so plainly a product of the divine act of speaking, that once being hypostatized it can scarcely fail to share as a hypostasis in this dependence on God for its origin, conceived after the manner of speaking. Unfortunately it is impossible to tell how old this Jewish conception of a hypostatical Memra is. In the Targum of Onkelos there occurs frequently the phrase "Memra of Jehovah" side by side with two other phrases "Shekhinta of Jehovah" and "Jekara of Jehovah". These phrases do not, according to Dalman,⁸¹ designate hypostatical entities distinct from God, but are used as circumlocutions, where the Old Testament predicates anthropomorphisms of the Deity, in order that these may no longer appear directly combined with Jehovah. To a limited extent these same phrases seem to have come into use outside of the stated Targum-address. The next step in the development of the usage seems to have been that "Memra of Jehovah" was no longer confined to anthropomorphic contexts, but became a reverential designation of God in general.⁸² But even here it would be difficult to stop. The frequent substitution of Memra for God would naturally

⁸⁰ Cpr. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, II, p. 474.

⁸¹ *Die Worte Jesu*, I, p. 187. In later Targums is also found, instead of Memra, "Dibbera" or "Dibbūra of Jehovah."

⁸² Cpr. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*,² p. 182. Weber does not clearly distinguish between a circumlocutory and an hypostatical Memra.

tend towards hypostasizing. In a certain passage⁸³ it is said that at the promulgation of the law the Dibbur proceeded from the mouth of God, went to every Israelite in the camp, asked him whether he was willing to receive it, and kissed every one who agreed to do so on his mouth. This can hardly be explained on the basis of personification or reverential speech about God.⁸⁴ As stated, however, we are not certain how early or late the circumlocutory use passed over into the hypostatical representation. Some would find the hypostasis as early as 4 Ezra iv. 43 where it is said that "the Word" proceeds from God, as in the Targum. But the Old Testament likewise has this as a mere personification. We cannot even be certain that the circumlocutory use has influenced the Prologue. It has been claimed that such influence is traceable in Jno. i. 14, because here the three ideas of the Memra, the Shekhinta and the Jekara occur together.⁸⁵ But it would be difficult to prove that there is anything in this verse that cannot be adequately explained from the Old Testament. The joint-occurrence of the three phrases is easily accounted for, since the Shekhina and the glory go naturally together, and the resumption of the term Logos as connected with the other two would be suggested to the Evangelist by his desire to emphasize the palpable presence and bodily manifestation of the Logos among men, since the Shekhina was the most

⁸³ Shir Rabba, I¹, quoted by Weber, p. 180.

⁸⁴ Against Dalman who would deny the real hypostasis cpr. Bousset, *Die Rel. des Judenth.*² p. 398, note 2. There is force also in the words of Hackspill (*Revue biblique internationale*), 1902, p. 62: "Peut-on dire que dans toutes ces locutions la Parole ne soit autre chose qu'un acte de Dieu, une manifestation de sa volonté ad extra? Si la parole est identique à l'être divin, pourquoi fait-on dire à Dieu "Ma Parole" quand on pouvait lui faire dire simplement "Moi"? pourquoi ce soin scrupuleux à faire agir la Parole comme intermédiaire entre Dieu et les hommes. A quoi bon choisir un intermédiaire apte à prévenir toute relation directe, si cet intermédiaire est identique à l'un des deux termes extrêmes, c'est à Dieu? La fréquence du recours . . . prouve . . . que cette conception . . . avait dû prendre une consistance plus que logique dans la réflexion religieuse juive."

⁸⁵ So Dalman, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

substantial form of God's real presence with his people under the old covenant.⁸⁶ We do not pass beyond the realm of possibilities in this matter.

The recently recovered "Odes of Solomon" would bear a conclusive witness to the early familiarity of Jewish circles with a hypostatical "Word", if Harnack's view in regard to the original Jewish provenience of the Odes (with later Christian interpolations) could be accepted.⁸⁷ They might render the same service on the hypothesis of Rendel Harris, the re-discoverer and editor of the Odes, who assigns them to a Jewish-Christian source and thinks that the elements regarded by Harnack as interpolations are original.⁸⁸ For a Jewish-Christian Logos-conception at so early a date might point back to the still earlier existence of the same in purely Jewish circles. In the existing uncertainty as to the dating of the Odes little reliance can be placed upon them for proving an early development of the Memra-doctrine.⁸⁹ But the Odes, altogether apart from this question, possess an interest in themselves on account of their relation to the Fourth Gospel in general and of their Logos-conception to the Johannine Logos in particular. Here, however, everything again depends on the date assigned to them. The lively discussions of the past three years have shown that the problems of provenience and date are yet far from ripe for a final decision.⁹⁰ If the Odes are gnostic

⁸⁶ In Sir. xxiv. 8-12, the Sophia and the Shekhina are brought into connection.

⁸⁷ Flemming und Harnack, *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert in Text. u. Unt.*, 1910, III, 5, 4. Harnack puts the Jewish author between 50 B.C. and 67 A.D., the interpolator about 100.

⁸⁸ *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*,² 1911.

⁸⁹ Clemen in *Theol. Rundschau*, 1911, pp. 18, 19, thinks that the repeated association in the Odes of the conceptions Logos-Light-Life is not to be explained from dependence of the Odes on the Fourth Gospel, but points back to certain early speculations on which both John and the Odes are equally dependent. According to Clemen the Odes are Christian; he does not say whether the speculations referred to were Jewish or early-Christian.

⁹⁰ Cpr. Harris' *Brief Summary of Criticism* prefixed to the second edition of 1911. Since then several new contributions have been made to the subject from various quarters. With Harnack side: Menzies

and date from the middle of the second century or later, this, as Harris pointedly observes, sweeps away all references to a pre-Johannine school of thought and they can no longer be expected to throw light on the antecedents of the Johannine Logos-doctrine. Still it must be remembered that even on this supposition the Odes furnish an illustration of a very early and considerably developed use of the

(*Interpr.* 1910), who thinks the Jewish origin can in certain cases be maintained without resorting to the hypothesis of interpolation; Spitta (*Zeitsch. f. d. N. T. Wiss.* 1910; *Monatsch. f. Past. Theol.* 1910), whose dissection does not coincide, however, with Harnack's; Spitta believes Paul knew the Odes; as 4 Ezra illustrates Paul's state of mind before the conversion, so the Odes his state of mind after the conversion; he does not think it likely that either the writer or the redactor of the Fourth Gospel was influenced by the Odes; the interpolater probably drew from the Gospel; Staerk (*Zeitsch. f. wiss. Theol.* 1910), who adopts Harnack's view while rejecting his main arguments for Jewish origin drawn from alleged reference to the temple in Odes 4 and 6; Dietrich (*Die Reformation* 1910), who separates between an older Jewish stratum, and a younger Christian stratum, which latter he at first regarded as orthodox-Christian, subsequently as heretical-Christian. With Harris, though not accepting his arguments from the temple-references, sides Haussleiter (*Theol. Literaturbl.* 1910); the Odes presuppose the Fourth Gospel; in favor of Christian origin (not specifically Jewish-Christian): Zahn (*Neue Kirchl. Zeitsch.*, 1910), who believes that much can be explained from the view that the author impersonated Solomon and made Solomon speak not merely for his own person, but also for Christ in a typical capacity; the date approximately between 120 and 180 A.D.; the author knew Matthew, the Fourth Gospel, the Pauline Epistles, the Apocalypse; Bernard (*Journ. of Theol. Stud.* 1910), who makes the date about 150 A.D., perhaps later, and throws out the hypothesis that the Odes are baptismal songs; baptismal allusions are also found by Lake (*Theol. Tydsch.* 1911) and Dietrich (see above); Wellhausen (*Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1910): the Odes are Christian, probably dependent on the Fourth Gospel; Connolly, (*Journ. of Theol. Stud.* 1912) the Odes are Christian; not earlier than 150 A.D.; in favor of heretical origin: Gunkel (*Zeitsch. f. d. N. T. Wiss.* 1910): the production of a gnostic sect; probably Jewish-gnostic; no dualism proper; Batiffol (*Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911) the work of a syncretist with gnostic-docetic leanings of the type opposed by Ignatius; agrees with Zahn in finding impersonation of Solomon; Preuschen (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1910) the work of Valentinus; Fries (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1911) Montanistic effusions; Krebs (*Freib. Theol. Stud.* 1910) products of gnostic piety and poetry in the second century; the parallels from gnostic writings have been collected by Stölten (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1912).

Logos-name, as well as of some other conceptions, which, together with the Logos-name, occur also in John. Whether this be dependent on John or not, in either case it is not too remote from the Johannine writings chronologically to claim for it considerable historical interest and importance. According to Harnack himself light is thrown by the Odes on the Fourth Gospel in a twofold respect. First in so far as the original Jewish document reveals a preformation of the Johannine type of piety and theology and secondly in so far as the work of the Christian interpolator bears features that are allied to the Johannine teaching. Whether or not the interpolator knew the Gospel Harnack does not venture positively to decide, although in certain instances he thinks it probable he did. But in the first respect the dependence of John is clear and pronounced; the Odes disclose to us the quarry from which the Johannine blocks were hewn. While this is unhesitatingly affirmed with reference to such conceptions as "light", "life", "truth", "knowledge", "faith", "love", "hope", "new birth", all of which the Evangelist simply borrowed from the early Jewish mystics, and back of all of which he simply placed his Christ,⁹¹ the matter is not quite so simple where the Logos-idea comes under consideration. Here Harnack fails to make a clear statement as to how he conceives of the relation between the Logos-conception reflected in the Odes and the Logos-doctrine in John. On the one hand it is emphasized repeatedly that the Logos-conception of the Odes shares with the other ideas enumerated in that there is nothing Hellenic about it.⁹² On the other hand Harnack seems still to uphold his old distinction between the body of the Fourth Gospel as practically free from Hellenic influence and the Prologue as explain-

⁹¹ The conceptions were originally un-Messianic. Harnack thinks that the Odes are "the intermediate link which enables us to connect a very important strand of late Jewish literature with the presuppositions of the piety and theology of John, without recourse to the synoptical, i.e., the historical Jesus Christ, and without the help of all Messianism", Flemming-Harnack, pp. 99, 102.

⁹² *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalm.*, pp. 42, 11, 119.

able only from the intrusion of the Hellenic Logos-doctrine.⁹³ For he qualifies his statement that "in the Johannine theology there is nothing truly Hellenic" by excepting the Prologue.⁹⁴ Accordingly it would seem, since the Prologue is, according to Harnack, the only portion of the Gospel into which the Logos-idea enters, that as regards the Logos-conception the same close resemblance does not exist, which is supposed to exist between the Odes and the Gospel in the use of the other characteristic ideas. In all other respects the peculiarly Johannine trains of thought are now accounted for as Jewish-mystical and non-Hellenic, the Johannine Logos-doctrine alone cannot be so accounted for, because it is Hellenic, while the Logos-conception of the Odes is not. The alleged differences between the Prologue and the Gospel thus entail a corresponding difference in the point of dependence of both on the mysticism of the Odes. Now as many have been unable to follow Harnack in this discovery of a principal difference between the Logos-Christology of the Prologue and the Christology in the remainder of the Gospel, so we believe many will fail to see that the Prologue is in a different position as regards resemblance to the Odes from the other parts of the Gospel.⁹⁵ According to Harnack himself the "mystical complex" of the Odes comes very close to Hellenic-philosophic ideas, although not being quite equivalent to "Logos" in the sense of the latter, and although originated under quite different presuppositions. With such close resemblance between the two there is some room for scepticism as to the reality of a distinction which it requires considerable refinement to make perceptible.

⁹³ *Zeitsch. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1892, pp. 189-231.

⁹⁴ *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalm*, p. 119.

⁹⁵ Cpr. Strachan in *The Exp. Times*, xxii. p. 14 who makes this very point: "He (Harnack) regards these Odes as proving that in the Johannine theology, apart from the Prologue, there is nothing essentially Hellenic. It may, however, be added that, as regards the Prologue, one is very much struck with the fact that there is scarcely a single sentence in it, where some kind of parallel might not be deduced from these Odes."

The subject of the Logos-conception in the Odes is beset with great difficulty owing to the general obscurity of the Odes and because it is well-nigh impossible to retain within fixed moulds of conceptual thought the often vague and ever-fluctuating mystical effusions of the poet. In a work like this the line of division between abstract ideas or personifications and a real hypostasis is exceedingly hard to draw. So far as we are able to ascertain the outstanding facts are as follows.⁹⁶

The first reference to "the Word" occurs in Ode VII, 9 "The Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge." In the preceding verses 4-8 the subject spoken of is the Lord Christ as condescending to the poet in the incarnation. If the subject remains the same, then Christ as "the Word" is here called "the Father of knowledge", probably in the sense of the source of knowledge. This is favored by the content of verses 10-13 which speak of the poet's creation by him who is the Word, the Father of knowledge and also reintroduce the note of condescension. If this interpretation be adopted a new subject will appear in verse 14 "He has given him to be seen of them that are his, in order that they may recognize Him that made them", for here God is the one spoken of as giving Christ to be seen. Some interpreters, however, think that not verse 14 but verse 9 is the place where the subject changes. In that case "the Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge" is spoken of God not of Christ.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ The best discussion of the Christology of the Odes that has come to our notice is by Batiffol in the *Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911, pp. 52-59; 161-181.

⁹⁷ Zahn says of vss. 9-13 "folgen dunkle Sätze" and seems to understand "the Father of knowledge" of God, *Neue Kirchl. Zeitsch.*, 1910, p. 688. Cpr. Ode XLI, 9 "the Father of truth" of God. Harris is not explicit in his notes, but seems to apply "the Word" to Christ. Clemen thinks there is no hypostatical conception here, *Theol. Rundschau*, 1911, p. 18. Gunkel says God is referred to *Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.*, 1910, pp. 323, 327. Batiffol, *Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911, p. 47 surmises ("je crois entendre") that the meaning is "Dieu enfant la Science en tant qu'il la parle," and refers to Sir. xvii. 6; xxiv. 3. This might do for verse 10, but in verse 11 it is not said that the Father of knowledge

In Ode VIII, 9 "Hear the word of truth and receive the knowledge of the Most High" there is nothing to suggest a hypostatical conception. The same applies to IX, 1, 2 "open your ears and I shall speak to you. Give me your souls, that I may also give you my soul, the word of the Lord, and his good pleasures, the holy thought, which He has devised concerning his Messiah." This passage, however, is interesting, because it shows how closely the poet identifies even the appellative "word" with God; it is God's very soul, because it is his inmost thought. For the understanding of his idea of the Christ-Word this is certainly suggestive. In Ode X, 1 we have again the word in the ordinary sense of speech coming from God to the Messiah or the poet.⁹⁸ It will be observed how the hypostatical conception of "the Word" by no means interferes with

speaks the Word of knowledge, but that He *is* the Word of knowledge. If the subject is God, the Father, and "the Word" hypostatical, I do not see what else this could be but an expression of the identification of the Father and the son as regards the source of knowledge. If "the Father of knowledge" means Christ, the statement is a simple one, which affirms that in "the Word" is the source of knowledge. A difficulty lies in verse 13 where on our view Christ would be called "the pleroma of the ages and the father of them". Still this is not in itself impossible. If Christ is the Father of knowledge because He imparts it, He can be the Father of the ages because He created them. Even the pleroma, as we know from the New Testament, has its place in Christ. Or the difficulty may perhaps be relieved by drawing verse 13^b as the subject to the following verse: "The pleroma of the ages and the Father of them has given him (= Christ) to be seen of them that are his." This is the punctuation of Labourt *Rev. bibl. intern.*, 1910, p. 489. Harnack eliminates verses 4^b-8 as a Christian interpolation, and also verses 14, 15 and 18. On this view of course the subject becomes throughout God. But in what sense God, the Father of knowledge can be called the Word of knowledge in verse 9 Harnack does not make clear. His paraphrase of the connection between verse 3 and verse 9 covers up the difficulty: "Nun wird in Vers 9 fortgefahren—allerdings im Ausdruck etwas dunkel—dass der Vater der Erkenntniss schafft, dies durch das Wort thut" (p. 34). But the verse does not say that the Father of knowledge creates through the Word: He *is* the Word.

⁹⁸According to some interpreters the speaking person is first the poet, then the Christ takes his place after the same immediate fashion as happens elsewhere in the Odes.

speaking of a word addressed to Christ or concerning Christ. The appellative and the technical use stand side by side.

In Ode XII on the other hand we meet once more with the personal Logos. According to verse 3 ff. "the mouth of the Lord is the true Word, and the door of his light, and the Most High has given it to the worlds, which are the interpreters of his own beauty and the repeaters of his praise, and the confessors of his counsel, and the heralds of his thought, and the chasteners (or "those that keep pure") of his servants (or "works"). For the swiftness of the Word is inexpressible, and like its expression is its swiftness and force; and its course knows no limits. Never does it fail, but it stands sure, and it knows not descent nor the way of it. For so is its work, so also its end. For it is light and the dawning of thought; and by it the worlds talk one to the other, and in the Word there were those that were silent.⁹⁹ And from it came love and concord, and they spoke one to the other whatever was theirs; and they were penetrated by the Word; and they knew him who made them, because they were in concord; for the mouth of the Most High spoke to them; and his explication ran by means of it (i.e. the Word): for the dwelling-place of the Word is man and his truth is love. Blessed are they who by means of it have understood everything, and have known the Lord in his truth." The difference between this and Ode VII is that here the Logos, while having a similar function to there, is not definitely identified with the Christ. He creates and renders the worlds vocal so that they can praise God, produces love and concord, and light by which intelligence dawns. All this in itself might be understood on the basis of the Wisdom-theology.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ So Harris and Flemming. Labourt: "et ils ont existé par le Verbe ceux qui étaient silencieux."

¹⁰⁰ Batiffol, who so interprets it, refers to Sap. Sol. ix. 1 and Sir. xlii. 15; xliii. 26. *Rev. bib. internat.* 1911, p. 190. Spitta (*Monatschr. f. Pastoralth.* VII, p. 95 even denies the hypostatical character of the Word in this Ode.

Even when it is said that "the dwelling-place of the Word is man", a parallel may be found for this in Baruch iii. 37, "Afterward did she (Wisdom) appear upon earth, and was conversant with men."¹⁰¹ None the less the coincidence of all these features with the Prologue strongly suggests that the Wisdom-hypostasis and the Person of the Messiah have here grown together. That something more concrete than hypostatical Wisdom is meant seems also to follow from the form of expression in verse 3 "the mouth of the Lord is the true Word". This can hardly mean that God speaks Wisdom; it seems to imply that the true Word acts as the mouth of God; as God creates and teaches by his mouth, so He creates and teaches per Verbum; unless the figure is a mere tautology, the Word is distinct from God. No doubt less definite Old Testament representations have here been made contributory to the description of the Word.¹⁰² But this does not warrant the assumption, that we here have a stage of the development of the Logos-idea not perceptibly in advance of the Wisdom-idea at its extreme point. The Christian Logos incorporates all the more indefinite and less concrete forms of representations of its antecedents, but does not on that account partake of the unformed state of the latter.

Ode XVI, which at first seems to take the Word in an appellative sense (verse 8: "his Spirit will utter in me the glory of the Lord and his beauty . . . and the strength of his Word"), in the sequel personifies. "The Word of the Lord searches out all things both invisible and that which reveals his thought" (verse 9). "The worlds were made by his word, and by the thought of his heart" (verse 20). The association of Word and Thought as both creative mediators might seem to remind of Philo, unless in the

¹⁰¹ Harris, p. 108 thinks that "the dwelling-place of the Word is man" cannot reproduce the Johannine thought of the incarnation, because the dwelling of the Logos with man is there collective, here individual. But Cpr. Rev. iii. 20.

¹⁰² It is evident that besides the Wisdom-conception Psalm xix is borrowed from.

latter there is no more than the influence of the Wisdom-doctrine.

Ode XXIX, 9, "to make war by his word and to take victory by his power" has nothing in it to suggest the personal Logos. That this, however, does not necessarily prove the personal conception to have been absent from the poet's mind may be seen from Ode XXXIX, 8-10. Verse 8 "The Lord has bridged them (the rivers) by his word" sounds quite impersonal, and yet the poet continues: "and He walked and crossed them on foot, and his footsteps stand firm on the water". That the pronouns here do not refer to God (as Harris by not capitalizing the word in verse 8a and by capitalizing the following pronouns represents it) but refer to the Logos seems clear from the recurrence of the "footsteps" as the footsteps of the Christ in verse 10, "And the waves were lifted up on this side and on that, but the footsteps of our Lord Messiah stand firm and are not obliterated and are not defaced".

The most interesting statements of all are in Ode XLI, 8-17, "All those will be astonished that see me. For from another race am I: for the Father of Truth remembered me:¹⁰³ He who possessed me from the beginning: for his bounty¹⁰⁴ begat me, and the thought of his heart: and the Word is with us in all our way; the Saviour who makes alive and does not reject our souls: the man who was humbled and exalted by his own righteousness, the Son of the Most High appeared in the perfection of his Father; and light dawned from the Word that was beforetime in Him; the Messiah is truly one; and He was known before the foun-

¹⁰³ Haussleiter (*Theol.-Literaturz.*, 1910, col. 273) understands verse 9 of the Christian, not of Christ. The change of the speaking subject (first person plural vss. 1-7, first person sgl. 8-10, first person plur. 11-17) is strange but not any stranger than in other Odes. Labourt: "un beau dialogue spirituel entre les chrétiens et le Verbe Rédempteur." Harnack assigns to the Christian writer 1-7, 11, 12-17. That is to say the purely Jewish element is confined to verses 9, 10. As Fries observes (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1911, p. 124) this would look like a Jewish interpolation in a Christian song.

¹⁰⁴ So Harris; Batiffol: "sa plénitude (= pleroma) m'a engendré."

dation of the world, that He might save our souls for ever by the truth of his name". Harris well observes that the language here has its nearest parallel in the Johannine theology. Harnack observes that even here the Logos-idea is not the Hellenic one. If this means that it differs from or remains behind the Logos-conception of the Prologue, it would be difficult to point out in what respect.¹⁰⁵

Summing up we may say that in these passages of the Odes the Logos appears mainly in a functional capacity. He is the Father of knowledge; the Word of knowledge (VII, 9); He created wisdom (VII, 10); He created men (VII, 11, 15), the worlds (XVI, 11, 20); all created speech and intelligence are derived from him (XII, 3 ff.), all love and concord in the creation (XII, 9, 10). The speech and light imparted by the Logos to the world are imparted to make the world interpret God's beauty, repeat His praise, confess His counsel, herald His thoughts (XII, 4). As the Logos is from God, so his function is unto God. The Logos searches out all things in the invisible and the visible sphere (XVI, 9).¹⁰⁶ He is the revealer of God not merely in virtue of what He brings, but of what He is or becomes. (Cpr. the emphasis in Ode VII on the condescension of the incarnation in connection with the Logos-function.) More specifically soteriological functions are ascribed to the Logos. He makes a dwelling-place with man (XII, 11), he lets Himself be put on by man (VII, 6), is gracious (VII, 7, 12) gives man of his sacrifice (VII 12),¹⁰⁷ crosses the rivers for his own that they may follow after him (XXXIX, 11), is with them in all their way, a Savior, who makes

¹⁰⁵ Harnack apparently does not deny verse 15 "and light dawned from the Word that was beforetime in Him" to the Jewish writer on account of the Logos-doctrine, but because of its concatenation with a Christian context.

¹⁰⁶ Cpr. 1 Cor. ii. 10 (of the Spirit of God); Heb. iv. 12 of the word (logos) of God.

¹⁰⁷ Nestle (Harris p. 99) suggests that the Syriac translator here mistook *οὐσία* for *θυσία* so that the true reading should be "he granted me to ask from him and to receive from his ousia ("being" or "property"?).

alive, and does not reject their souls, saves their souls for ever by the truth of his name (XLI, 11-17).¹⁰⁸

It would, however, be scarcely correct to say that in the Odes the significance of the Logos-name is confined to the function of the Christ. It has its bearing also upon his inherent nature and relation to God. The Logos occupies quite a unique position by the side of God in the author's universe. He is not an aeon like others, one in a series, as the Gnostics conceive of their Logos.¹⁰⁹ Nor does the Logos appear on the background of the dualism of the great Gnostic systems. He is both the Creator and the incarnate One.¹¹⁰ If there is a trace of gnosticism in the Christology it must lie in the docetic traits which Batiffol thinks can perhaps be discovered in Ode XVII 4^b-6 ("I received the face and fashion of a new person . . . all that have seen me were amazed: and I was regarded by them as a strange person"); XIX, 8^c (*ἐγέννησεν ὡς ἄνθρωπον* with the emphasis on the *ὡς*, not a true man; according to an emended text¹¹¹); XXII, 11 "thou hast introduced thy face (= *μορφή*) into the world";¹¹² XXVIII, 14-16 ("I did not perish, for I was not their brother, nor was my birth like theirs, and they sought for my death and did not find it; for I was older than the memorial of them, and vainly did they make attack upon me", = the impassibility of the Logos-Messiah¹¹³); XXXIII, 1 ("Grace again ran

¹⁰⁸ That this soteriology differs from that of the Fourth Gospel, and of the New Testament in general, by the absence of the elements of sin and forgiveness has been truly observed by Zahn and others. But the difference is of a material rather than of a formal nature.

¹⁰⁹ Cpr. Grill, *Unters.* I, 184 ff. Some approach to a Gnostic conception might seem to be made in Ode XII, 8, the aeons endowed with the Word become vocal. But cpr. Flemming-Harnack, p. 42; Harris, p. 108; Batiffol, p. 190. Gunkel (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.*, 1910, p. 328) finds an aeon Truth in Ode XXXVIII of which it is impossible to tell whether the poet conceives as an abstraction or as an hypostasis.

¹¹⁰ Batiffol, p. 162, note 2.

¹¹¹ Harris: "She brought forth as if she were a man."

¹¹² Harris punctuates and renders quite differently: "(Thy way was without corruption) and thy place; thou didst bring thy world to corruption."

¹¹³ Harnack, p. 61 infers from this representation, that Christ cannot

and put on corruption");¹¹⁴ XXXIV, 5° ("what is below is nothing but the imagination of those that are without knowledge").¹¹⁵ Whether these observations be well-founded or not, it is certain that the divine side of the Logos-subject is magnified and emphasized by the Odes. His preëxistence is affirmed; He is older than the memorial of men, He was before them (XXVIII, 15, 17), was known before the foundation of the world (XLI, 16). Side-lights fall on His relation to God in this eternal state. God possessed him from the beginning; he was beforetime in God (XLI, 9, 15). In Ode XXXII he is even designated as "the Truth who was *self-originate*".¹¹⁶ If we could be certain that in verses 9 and 10 of Ode XLI the speaking subject is the same Logos-Christ who is spoken of in the third person in the sequel, we would here have the ontogenetic statement "his pleroma begat me", but as observed above (note 103), the connection is somewhat obscure.¹¹⁷ Attention should be called in this connection to the repeated association in the Odes between the "Word" and the "Thought" of God. When the same idea which finds expression in Ode IX, 1, 2 of the unhyposstatical Word, viz. that it is God's very soul, his holy inmost thought, is applied in Ode XXVIII, 17, 18 to the eternal Christ ("they sought to destroy the memorial of Him who was before them: for the Thought of the Most High cannot be antici-

be thought of as the subject. This hardly follows, even where no docetism is found here. If according to the Fourth Gospel even the believer does not truly die, how much more could this be affirmed of Christ. As a matter of fact verse 16 adds the reason: "I was older than the memorial of them." They might kill him as a man, they could not kill his divine Person.

¹¹⁴ According to an amended text; Harris: "forsook corruption".

¹¹⁵ For the remarks on the above passages cpr. Batiffol, pp. 55, 58, 163, 193. Also Krebs, *Freib. Theol. Stud.* 1910, II, p. 64.

¹¹⁶ According to Harris this is the rendering of the Greek *αὐτοφύης* used in Lact. *De Div. Inst.* I, 7 of the divine nature. Cpr. further Ode VII, 12, where, according to Nestle's conjecture, the Logos gives men of his *οὐσία* ("being" or "property"?).

¹¹⁷ Spitta (*Monatsch. f. Pastoraltheol.* VII, p. 93 finds in verse 10 "Christi ewige Zeugung und Geburt" according to the presumably oldest reading in Jno. i. 13 *ὁς ἐγεννήθη* (instead of the plural).


pated: and his Heart is superior to all wisdom"), this would seem to bring us very close to an ontogenetic application of the Logos-name. As thought dawns from the Logos XII, 7, so the Logos Himself seems to proceed from the thought of the Most High.

What we have found in our rapid survey of the Logos-passages in the Odes does not favor the view, that the doctrine is here in a more primitive, more unformed stage of development than that observed in the Johannine writings, particularly in the Prologue. If anything, the statements go a shade beyond the Johannine ones in theological definiteness and suggestiveness. This is of importance to know, no matter what the outcome may be of the discussions of the experts in regard to the antiquity and milieu of provenience of the Odes. For, even if the Odes, as would seem at present most likely, should be recognized as posterior to the Gospel, they remain on the dating of conservative scholars a very early witness to the ideas that were at that time associated with the Johannine Logos-doctrine, and prove that the later trinitarian use made of this doctrine by the church-theology reaches back to a point not so very far distant from the composition of the Gospel itself.

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(To be continued)



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THE RANGE OF THE LOGOS-NAME IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The four points in dispute in connection with the Logos-title are: 1) its ontological reference to the immanent life of the Godhead; 2) its functional reference to the creation of the world; 3) its functional reference to the continued supply of life and light to the world in the sphere of providence; 4) its functional reference to the revealing and redemptive work of the Old Testament dispensation. When we compare these four questions as to their exegetical status, it appears that in regard to the first and the second it is not the presence of the idea in the text that is called in question, but only the association of the Logos-name with this idea, whereas in regard to the third and fourth points the presence of the idea itself is denied by certain exegetes. That the words: "In the beginning was the Logos and towards God was the Logos, and God was the Logos" are intended to convey information touching the internal life of the preëxistent Christ as related to God is recognized by all, and the difference of opinion concerns merely the question whether the truths expressed are analytically contained in the Logos-name or not. Similarly, there is no dispute about the fact that ver. 3 (of Jno. i.) makes the preëxistent Christ the mediator of creation. The words: "All things were made through Him" admit of no other understanding.¹ What remains subject to doubt is again merely the question whether the preëxistent Christ bears the Logos-name on account of this function. In regard to the third and fourth points the situation is quite different. That the writer in vs. 4, 5, 9, 10 means to refer to a continued operation of the Logos in supplying life and light to the natural world is by no means admitted on all hands. Many exegetes here refer what used to be thus understood to the

¹ The old Socinian interpretation of even ver. 3 as describing the new spiritual creation may be discounted. *Cpr.* Lücke, *Comm. üb. d. Ev. des Joh.*³ I, p. 302.

activity of the incarnate Christ in the sphere of redemption. Consequently, there here lies back of the problem whether the Logos-name connotes such a function, the more fundamental exegetical problem whether such a function existed in the mind of the writer or at least has found expression in his words. And even more common is the opinion that the alleged Old Testament activity of the preëxistent Christ found by some in vs. 11-13 has no real place in these verses, the reference here also being to the incarnate appearance and activity of the Saviour, so that with the whole idea of a function of Christ under the Old Covenant the inclusion of such a function in the Logos-title also disappears.

It follows from the foregoing, that in the second step of our inquiry, as in the first, the exegetical basis of fact may be taken for granted, and our attention concentrated upon the question whether the function affirmed of Christ is to the writer's mind a specific Logos-function. It is necessary to remember here the strong vantage-ground offered by ver. 14, in defense of the position that before the incarnation Christ not merely preëxisted, but preëxisted as Logos. The statement "the Logos became flesh" to our view absolutely requires the assumption that He of whom it is made was the Logos previously to His becoming flesh. Either in His previous mode of existence or in His previous mode of activity there must have been something that entitled Him to this designation. Zahn escapes from this conclusion only through a most artificial rendering of the clause in question. He translates: "The Logos became in this fashion, that as flesh He entered into existence."² This rendering judges

² "Der Logos ist so geworden dass er als Fleisch in 's Dasein trat." *Einkl. i. d. N. T.*¹ II, p. 546. In the *Kommentar* this specific paraphrase is not found. By implication, however, the *Kommentar* gives the same view. To justify the above curious rendering Zahn compares Lk. xxii. 44; 1 Cor. i. 30; xv. 45; 2 Cor. i. 19; 1 Thess. i. 5; 1 Thess. ii. 1. None of these passages, however, can be placed on a line with Jno. i. 14. In Lk. xxii. 44 *καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἰδρῶς αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ θρόμβοι αἵματος* surely does not mean that the sweat came as blood into existence, but that it was turned into blood. The thought of 1 Cor. i. 30, *ὃς ἐγενήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ θεοῦ* is not that Christ Jesus came into existence as "wisdom"

itself. From Zahn's own point of view a more simple escape from the difficulty would have lain through finding here in ver. 14, after the manner assumed by many exegetes in ver. 1, a proleptic introduction of the Logos-name. But this, while relatively preferable to the other translation, has its own difficulties. A proleptic use of the Logos-name in the very sentence which describes the origin of the Logos is after all something quite different from what is found in ver. 1, and cannot in point of plausibility be even remotely placed on a line with it. The fact, therefore, remains that on the only natural and practically universal understanding of ver. 14, a previous existence or functioning of the Saviour in a Logos-capacity is implied. This previous reality of the Logos-character must have lain either in the intra-divine life or in the cosmical activity of the preëxistent Christ. The writer of the Prologue may have been unacquainted with either the one or the other of these two ideas; he cannot have been unfamiliar with both. Those, therefore, who refuse to follow the church-theology in its trinitarian understanding of the clauses of ver. 1, are by reason of this very refusal all the more bound to find in the sequel some reference to that pre-incarnate display of the Logos-character which the opening words of ver. 14 imply. On the other hand, recognition of the ontological significance as implied in ver. 1 does not preclude further recog-

for us; the construction with ἀπὸ does not require such a reference to the origin of the Saviour, and would permit it only if ἀπὸ θεοῦ stood before ἐγενήθη: the meaning is simply that Jesus was made unto us all this through His mediatorial work. In 1 Cor. xv. 45 the construction, ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν. the construction (with εἰς) differs from that of Jno. i. 14, but, apart from this, the former half of the statement is a quotation from Genesis and owes its peculiar form to this; the second half is modelled after the first. 2 Cor. i. 19, ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸς . . . οὐκ ἐγένετο Ναὶ καὶ Οὐ does not mean "came not into existence as", but "did not prove to be". Similarly 1 Thess. i. 5, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον does not refer to the origination of the gospel, but to what it came to be for the Thessalonians. The same applies to 1 Thess. ii. 1, οἴδατε τὴν εἰσοδὸν ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅτι οὐ κενὴ γέγονεν; here γέγονεν is simply "proved to be".

dition of the functional significance as expressed in the sequel. The wording of ver. 14 involves the idea that the subject of the incarnation bore the Logos-name significantly before, but this may be true in two or three capacities as well as in a single one.

What reasons, then, have we to assume that the Evangelist not merely ascribes a mediatorial agency in creation to the Logos-subject, but finds in this agency a manifestation of the Logos-character? We cannot *à priori* refuse to consider the proleptic interpretation: All things were made through Him who afterwards was to appear as the Logos. The possibility of this must be reckoned with, because we have already granted the same possibility in regard to ver. 1. The very respectable body of exegetical opinion which stands back of the proleptic interpretation there, shows that it lies well within the range of the debatable. If we recognize as a possible paraphrase of ver. 1: In the beginning was He who was afterwards to appear as the Logos, etc., we are bound to bring the same open mind to the paraphrasing of ver. 3 on the same principle. From a purely exegetical point of view the two cases are precisely alike. On the other hand, a certain degree of implausibility attaches to the view which in ver. 1 takes the name proleptically, and then in ver. 3 finds it necessary to insist upon inherent appropriateness with reference to the function affirmed. One cannot help feeling that some allowance must be made for the likelihood of the author's introducing the title in both cases for the same reason. The exegesis which finds prolepsis in the former verse and excludes it from the latter, is weaker than that which treats both verses alike, either on the principle of prolepsis or otherwise. As a matter of fact, the case for prolepsis is slightly more favorable in ver. 3 than in ver. 1, because the word Logos occurs explicitly in the great opening sentences of the Prologue, whereas in ver. 3 it appears only by implication as the antecedent of the pronoun in *δι' αὐτοῦ*. To say, through Him (= the Logos) all things were made, calls less attention to

the Logos-character of the subject than to say, in the beginning was the Logos. If therefore it should appear that even in the statement which less accentuates the name Logos, the author nevertheless has clearly the inherent significance of the title before his mind, then this cannot fail to have some retroactive effect upon our understanding of the great opening sentences of the Gospel. The two questions, as to whether the Logos-character enters into the ontological mode of existence of Christ, and whether it enters into His creative activity, are to this extent interlinked.

There are weighty reasons for believing that in ver. 3 the author introduces the creative works of Christ as a Logos-function in the strictest sense of the word. The preponderance of exegetical opinion to this effect among the very class of writers who hold back in ver. 1 and refuse to entertain the ontological exegesis there, sufficiently proves how cogent these reasons are. If it were not for them, the same shrinking from the speculative, which seeks to keep the Logos-name and the trinitarian ontology apart, would also operate to keep the Logos-name and the doctrine of creation apart. But the facts speak too plainly in the latter case to allow of this.

In the first place one must reckon with the obvious allusions in vs. 1-5 to the Genesis-account of the creation. These allusions render it necessary to assume that the author finds the Logos-name reminiscent of the part played in that account by the creative speech of God.³ It is one thing to believe that the whole Logos-doctrine as presupposed and further developed in the Prologue can be without residue explained from Genesis i, and quite another thing to say that, once the creation-story stood clearly before the writer's mind, he could not possibly have represented the

³ Hölemann, *De Evangelii Johannis Introitu*, Lipsiae, 1855, has ingeniously traced the parallelism between Genesis and the Prologue, but with too much refinement of detail. Godet not merely finds correspondences in the ἐν ἀρχῇ of verse 1, but also associates the ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν with the plural of Gen. i. 26 ("let us make man"), the life and light of ver. 4 with the trees of life and of knowledge of good and evil, the σκοτία of ver. 5 with the story of the fall.

Logos as mediating in the creation of the world, without observing that this fitted in admirably with the Scripture-account according to which God called all things into being through His word. The same suggestive force of the combination that has obtruded itself upon so many exegetes can hardly have escaped the notice of the Evangelist. That the Evangelist not merely intends to ascribe to Christ a part in the creation of all things in general, but specifically means to represent Him as performing that part in the capacity of Logos, follows also from the preposition employed. The statement is not *πάντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο* but *πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*. For the general thought that Christ participated in the creation of all things the former would have been the natural expression; for conveying the specific idea that His rôle was the rôle played by the divine word in Genesis, the construction with *διὰ* was the one peculiarly fitted.⁴

Weight must further be attached to the standing association everywhere else between the Logos-name and the creative function of the subject so designated. No matter where the Logos meets us, whether it be in Philo or in the Hermetic writings or in the Jewish theology, the mediation in the making of things is a specific and prominent part of His office. The constant recurrence of this feature indicates of itself that no mere accident can account for this; the name and the function belong naturally together. Whatever be the ultimate sources of the doctrine, sufficient acquaintance with and reference to the contemporaneous Logos-belief and speculations may safely be credited to the Evangelist, to render it certain that in speaking of the Logos in connection with the creation he would expect to be understood in the current sense.

Still further, the obvious progress of thought between ver. 3 and ver. 4 speaks likewise in favor of this conclusion. It is not necessary here to prejudge the question, whether ver. 4 ("In Him was life, and the life was the light of

⁴ *Cpr.* 1 Cor. viii. 6 *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα*; Col. i. 16 *ἐν αὐτῷ* and *δι' αὐτοῦ*; Heb. i. 2 *δι' οὗ ἐποίησεν*.

men") relates to the preincarnate or to the incarnate Christ. In either case a connection will have to be assumed between the task of the Logos in creation and the presence in the same Logos of the subsequent supply of life and light for the world. Because of the fact that all things were made through Him, and in harmony with this fact, it is affirmed that in Him was life, and that this life was the light of men. By universal consent the furnishing of life and light to the world belongs to the very essence of the Logos-task. Consequently, that which forms either the basis for or the prelude to the quickening and enlightening of the world cannot have been something wholly detached from the Logos-character. If Christ gives life and light qua Logos, and if His mediatorial agency in the creation was but the beginning of this line of activity, then He must appear to the Evangelist at the former stage the same as He does in the latter, *i.e.*, as the Logos.

Finally, the obvious parallelism between the work of Christ in nature and in redemption, traced by the Prologue, renders it more than probable that it is precisely the Logos-name in which the writer finds the two members of this parallelism reduced to their higher unity. It is through the Logos that all things were made; it is also through the Logos, become flesh, that all things in redemption were accomplished. In the former case the connection between name and work can hardly be different from that in the latter. That in the latter case it is of the most intimate and organic character is recognized on every hand, most of all by the advocates of the restriction of the Logos-title to the incarnate stage of the Saviour's work. The coördinate-ness of the two activities, both of them alike coupled with the Logos-name, carries with it a high degree of probability that the inherent meaning of the name extends not simply to one but to both. Of course this agreement would be still stronger, if it were to be urged in connection with the chronologically progressive interpretation of the Prologue. If the Evangelist meant to affirm of the Logos-Person

that in succession He operated in creation, in providence, under the Old Covenant and since the incarnation, then the presumption in favor of a significance of the Logos-title equally distributed with reference to each of these four stages would grow in proportion to the care and deliberateness with which we should have to credit the Evangelist in building up this harmonious scheme of a progressive Christological function. Since, however, the chronological structure of the Prologue is subject to serious doubt, we prefer not to present the argument in this particular form.

In view of the above considerations we continue to believe that ver. 3 not merely records an important fact about Him who subsequently was to act as the Logos, but also represents this fact as an integral part of the specific Logos-task. In the creation of the world the Logos-character of the Preëxistent One finds expression. Even if we were to ascribe to the writer no conscious etymological reflection upon the way in which the Logos-name and the Logos-function hang together, this would still have to be maintained. The link between the two might be one of mere conventional association, the Logos-name calling up the thought of creating and *vice versa*, but it would work none the less with necessity. And this, even in its unconscious associational form, would be something far different from the view according to which in the mind of the writer the name Logos as applied to Jesus and His creative function were originally quite foreign to each other, the name having been given Him in the first place for a totally different, purely redemptive reason, and then afterwards, without reflection upon His name, mediation in the making of all things having been affirmed of this redemptive Logos. If this were the correct view, then the Logos-name would have inherently no more to do with the creation of the world than the name Christ or Kyrios. As Paul could say that through Christ or through the Lord all things were made, so John would have said that through the Logos all things were called into being. In both cases the two things

would be linked together after a purely external fashion. It is precisely in regard to this that we believe the use of the name Logos differs in such a connection from the name Christ or Kyrios. It is the name appropriate to the occasion.

A mere conventional association, as stated above, would be sufficient to uphold this view. But there is reason to assume that to the Evangelist the connection was a thoroughly intelligent one. The first element entering into it is undoubtedly that of the instrumentality of divine omnipotence. That God acts in general, and in particular creates by His word, is a common Old Testament expression for describing the omnipotent mode of His activity. This was the case in the first creation of all things, when God spake and by His mere speaking the effect was accomplished. Now if the Evangelist identifies the preëxistent Christ with this omnipotent creative word, his first thought will have been that through Christ the divine omnipotence asserted itself, that Christ entered into the creation as the Logos of God because God made Him the Mediator of His almighty power.

That this thought was actually present to the writer's mind follows not merely from the obvious dependence of the representation on the account in Genesis, but also from the mention of "life" in ver. 4 as the first thing present in the Logos in consequence of his Logos-relation to the world. He is the Logos because in Him is life; the connecting link that holds these two ideas together is none other than that of His being the organ of omnipotence. As in the divine word there is in general the unique potency of producing life wherever it is uttered, so in Him as the personal Word the same potency inheres.⁵

⁵ The idea is not directly expressed that the preëxistent Christ was the possessor of omnipotence, but that He acted as the instrument of omnipotence. Nevertheless the deity and the omnipotence of Christ are implied. It will be observed that the general representation: God creates through His (mere) word, and the specific turn here given it: God created through the personal Logos, seem at first sight mutually

This interpretation of the use made of the Logos-concept in ver. 3 in the light of ver. 4 holds good, no matter whether the statements of the latter verse relate to the preëxistent or to the incarnate Christ. It makes no difference whether the life spoken of was the life of nature or the life of redemption; in either case the possession of it by Christ is in accordance with and the result of His Logos-character; in either case the underlying thought of the connection is: to be the Logos of God means to be the organ for the production of life.

It is of the highest importance to mark sharply at this point that the first thing associated with the Logos-name by the writer does not lie in the sphere of knowledge but in the sphere of power; the first characteristic Logos-product is life, not light. This is all the more significant, since the sequence of the creative acts of God in the Genesis-account places the production of light before that of life, so that the reversed sequence of the Prologue: "In Him was life, and the life (that was in Him) was the light of men", obtains a pointed significance. Here it plainly appears already that the equation, Logos = Revealer, fails to do justice to the pregnancy of the title as employed by the Evangelist. Before this is thought of, the other more fundamental equation, Logos = Omnipotent Source of Life, should be called to mind. The clear recognition of this at the very root-point where the Logos-idea bifurcates is of the utmost importance for a correct understanding of the subsequent teaching of the Gospel as a whole. It places at the outset the life-giving and the illuminating aspects of Christ's activity, or, to speak soteriologically, the redemptive and revelatory functions of His work as Saviour, in their proper relation to each other. It saves the Gospel from the contradictory, the point of the former being the immediateness, that of the latter the mediateness of the transaction. The contradiction, which on Philo's premises is unresolvable, resolves itself on the premises of the Evangelist, by remembering the preceding statement *θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*. The instrumental character of the Logos here does not interfere with the immediateness of the act, because in the instrument the divine creating omnipotence is personally present.

charge of intellectualism, which has so often been brought against it, and which its characterization as the Logos-Gospel seemed to justify. If Christ as Logos has a wider task than that of imparting light and knowledge, if He fulfills His Logos-nature in the production of life, then the Gospel can be truly a Logos-Gospel, without lying open to the charge of a one-sided intellectualism. The new-creation of all things in the sphere of redemption becomes, on this wider and more correct view, as truly a part of the Logos-function as the communication of supernatural knowledge.

On the other hand, starting with this wider and more adequate appreciation of what the Logos-name covers, it will be far easier to show that the Logos-concept actually underlies and shapes the teaching in the body of the Gospel, and is not due to a mere idiosyncrasy of the mental state out of which the Prologue was written. All that the Gospel teaches concerning salvation, the whole circle of ideas connected with life and regeneration and resurrection, will on this view naturally range itself with the interpretation of Christ's Person and work from the Logos-point of view. How easy it was for the Evangelist to subsume these ideas under the rubric of creative omnipotence, operating as such by means of the word, may be seen from Jno. v. 25, 28, where the resurrection is represented as taking place through the utterance of the voice of the Son of God, and where there is the same close association between the ideas of the omnipotent word and the idea of life as in the Prologue: "The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself."⁶

⁶ It is true that in Jno. v. 25, 28 the representation differs in so far as the Son here has and utters the word instead of being the Word. But this is not fatal to the assumption that the writer connected both representations. As in the sphere of revealing God, Christ is the Logos, and yet all He speaks, forming part of what He is, is subsumed under this Logos-character, so in the sphere of omnipotent creation, Christ may be conceived both as being the Word, and as uttering it, the latter relation being subsumable under the former.

The last words of this quotation suggest that the point just made may also have a bearing on the trinitarian aspect of the Logos-idea. Where Logos is taken as descriptive of the manner of provenience of the Son from the Father, and at the same time the significance of the Logos-concept is confined to the sphere of revelation, the inference may seem justified that the eternal generation takes place *per modum intellectus*. But when it is realized that the writer of the Gospel makes the first application of the idea not in the sphere of revelation but in that of omnipotent power, that in fact the Logos-name calls up first to his mind not the idea of light but that of creation and life, then it will be perceived that the intellectualistic construction of the doctrine and the formula coined for it are by no means inseparable from the doctrine itself. The Logos-name in its ontogenetic aspect need signify no more than that the filiation within the Deity is an act of omnipotent power. On the specific *modus* of this act it need throw no further light.⁷

The question next presenting itself is, whether subsequent to the creation, and with reference to the existing world of nature, a Logos-activity is taught in the Prologue. This also the older interpretation affirmed (Chrysostom: *ἐπάγει περὶ τῆς προνοίας λόγον*), whereas more recent exegesis in varying forms inclines to denying it. This is done by transferring everything usually understood in vs. 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the work of the Logos in providence to His activity in the incarnate state and for redemption. In Him as the incarnate Christ was life, and this life on earth was

⁷ The line of argument pursued above would lose its force if it could be shown that the idea of "life" itself belongs for the writer to the intellectual sphere, for in that case the production of life would be equivalent to the production of light, of intelligence, and the equation Logos = Revealer would suffice for deducing life from the Logos-idea. But the dependence of ver. 4 on ver. 3 proves that "life" must have a wider significance than this, since it is the result of the creation of *all things* by the Logos, and only in man, not in all things, could life have this intellectual content. As a matter of fact it is only in ver. 4 that the writer comes to speak of man specifically and of the specific light-form that the life of the Logos assumes for man.

the light of men. It now (*i.e.*, at the time of writing) shines in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended (or, overcame) it not. The Saviour come in the flesh is the true light which lighteth every man. Through His incarnation He was in the world, and as such the world knew Him not. By this exegesis the whole idea of a Logos-function in providence is forced out of the Prologue. What remains is, on the one hand, the work of the Logos in creation (ver. 3), and on the other hand His work in the incarnate state (vs. 4 ff.); the middle term hitherto interpreted as linking these two together disappears.

It will be seen at a glance how radically this interpretation differs from the most wide-spread view as to the structure of the Prologue. According to the latter the principle of construction is a chronological one: the Evangelist takes his point of departure in eternity, then speaks of the task of the Logos in creation, joins to this a statement about His work in providence, next records His activity under the Old Covenant, and finally enunciates the great truth of His advent for the purpose of redemption. But if vs. 4 and 5 already speak of the Logos in the flesh and vs. 9 and 10 relate to the same thing, then it is plain that nothing remains of this whole chronological progression. According to Zahn, the Evangelist three times takes a new departure: "he starts first from the premundane existence of the Logos and closes with the joyful assurance, that, notwithstanding all its assaults, the dark world has not succeeded in extinguishing the light of men which has appeared in the living Logos (vs. 1-5). The second time he sets out from a point in the midst of history, *viz.*, the witness of John the Baptist to the Jesus who was already present in the world and had come to His people, and sketches in broad outlines His history with reference to the world and to Israel. The world as a whole has not known Him; the Jewish nation has not received Him, but in the congregation, neither Jewish nor Gentile, of those who confess Him the result of His being and activity in the world may be seen (vs. 6-12). A

third group of sentences (vs. 13-18) describes the appearance in the world of Him who up till now had been called the word, the life, the light, as of a human personality, in His relation both to God and to those of mankind for whom He did not come in vain."⁸ And Harnack tells us, that the movement of thought in vs. 1-14 is not from the past to the present, but from the abstract idea of the Logos to the concrete conception of the *μονογενὴς θεός*, which the Evangelist had in mind from the beginning and which he desired to substitute for the former as the only adequate expression of the true character of Christ.⁹ Like Zahn, Harnack finds in ver. 5 the first point in which the thought of the Prologue comes to rest, and his understanding of vs. 1-5 he sums up in the words: "The writer has not given us a history—for instance of how the Logos proceeded out of God, what He did before and after, etc.—but he has sought to determine a well-known yet undefined conception of a being, and has done this in such a way as to make this being appear in ever greater concreteness."¹⁰ And in regard to vs. 1-14 as a whole we read a little further: "Those who assume that the Prologue up to ver. 14 deals with the *λόγος ἄσαρκος* involve themselves in special difficulties in view of vs. 12 and 13. In point of fact these verses prove that the author did not intend to give a continuous history of the Logos, but to state who He is, and what relation the Logos who has appeared sustains to the World."¹¹ And once more: "Ver. 9 looks back to ver. 5; . . . the general proposition *τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει καὶ ἡ σκοτία οὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν*, has therefore received its more precise definition in the statements that He of whom John bore witness as the light, has come into the world created through Him, but with the tragic result that 'the world'

⁸ *Das Ev. des Joh.* p. 72. The summary of the content of the third group presupposes in ver. 13 *ὃς ἐγεννήθη* instead of *οἱ ἐγεννήθησαν* as the original reading.

⁹ *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 218, note 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

has not known Him, and that He has even been rejected by the people peculiarly His own."¹² "The ἐγένετο (of ver. 14) is not to be so understood, as if the author only now passed on from the λόγος ἄσαρκος to the λόγος ἑνσαρκος, but the historic fact which even from ver. 5 onward had as to its effects stood before the writer's mind, receives now special prominence."¹³

It must be granted that the old exegetical position has been made untenable by the admission, now almost universally made, that not only ver. 14 but vs. 11-13 also relate to the historical Christ. The words ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο are not introduced to mark the great incision which separates the preincarnate life of the Logos from His incarnate existence. Only on the view of Baldensperger, who believes that the coming of the Logos with its twofold result described in vs. 11-13 is the coming of Christ under the Old Covenant in the theophanies to the patriarchs and other divine manifestations, does it still remain possible to arrange everything that precedes ver. 14 according to strict chronological sequence.¹⁴ But this exegesis of the verses in question has met with little or no acceptance, and we shall have to admit that ver. 14 is at least not the final mile-post in the progressive journey of the writer's thought that it has been traditionally assumed to be. For its introduction some other motive will have to be assigned, than the desire of the Evangelist to add the grand climax to the chronological presentation of the history and work of the Logos.

Into this we need not here further inquire. It would be quite possible to move the great incision, which used to be found in ver. 14, back to ver. 11, and continue to interpret all that precedes this latter verse on the principle of chronological progression. Or, in view of the historical character of ver. 6, one might go even farther back, and make the division between the preincarnate and the incar-

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁴ Baldensperger, *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, pp. 13 ff.

nate state at that point, still maintaining that the relation between vs. 1-5 on the one hand and the sequel of the Prologue on the other hand is that of chronological progression. But the main thing to insist upon is that the exegesis which finds in the Prologue a continuous Logos-activity previous to and apart from the incarnation, does not stand or fall with the belief in any particular structure of the Prologue, chronological or otherwise.

Opinions as to the structure of a discourse are bound to be more or less subjective, to a far larger degree than the interpretation of its component parts individually considered. The starting-point, therefore, in discussing a problem like the one before us should always lie in the detailed exegesis of the separate statements. What the writer positively affirms in them, not the coloring they may receive from any estimate of the drift of the discourse as a whole, should be given the decisive weight in a matter of this kind.

An instructive illustration of the importance of this rule is afforded by Harnack's treatment of the Prologue in the article already repeatedly cited. Harnack does not in this article deal directly with the range of the Logos-title. His main purpose is to ascertain the relation between the Prologue and the body of the Gospel. Nevertheless the way in which he determines the latter, plainly exerts its influence when he comes to touch upon the other point. In his view the Logos-idea is not merely immaterial to the remainder of the Gospel but even inharmonious and incommensurable therewith. The Evangelist uses it by way of accommodation to his readers, not because he feels any personal sympathy with its point of view. His use of it is inspired by the desire rather to correct than to commend it. Hence from the outset, *i.e.*, even in writing ver. 1, he is intent upon replacing it by the designation far more acceptable to him, "Only-begotten God" (ver. 18). Once the substitution has been made, he feels relieved at being able to dismiss the Logos-title and never even once alludes to it afterward in the body of the Gospel.

It goes without saying that a view like this is not exactly favorable to a generous conception of the range of the Logos-function. If the Evangelist only grudgingly employs the term at all, he will not enlarge but narrow its scope as much as possible, because any magnifying of its specific significance would run directly contrary to his desire to dismiss it. And if the title that he prefers, upon which his mind is fixed from the beginning, the "Only-begotten God", be, as Harnack assumes, a designation of the incarnate Christ pure and simple, with no metaphysical retrospect into the premundane life of God attaching to it, then it becomes all the more inevitable that its provisional and unsatisfactory substitute shall receive no wider range of application. Thus it comes about that Harnack, who in 1892 did not doubt the Alexandrian, Philonic source of the whole conception, including the association of the Logos with the creation of the world, nevertheless in regard to vs. 4 and 5 expressed himself to the effect that, in speaking of the enlightening activity of the Logos, the Evangelist has throughout in mind His human activity (to be sure, His human activity considered *sub specie aeternitatis*), and that, if John had ascribed actual and independent importance to the idea that the Logos first had functioned before His historic appearance and secondly had functioned *ἐν σαρκί*, he would probably have expressed himself differently.¹⁵

It appears then that in Harnack's case this opinion about the main reference of the Logos-name to the incarnate, historic activity of Christ is largely based on a subjective estimate of the drift of the Prologue, which, brilliant though it may be as a piece of conjectural analysis, is nothing more than that, and certainly falls far short of the cogency that belongs to exact exegetical demonstration. The analysis proposed is not the only possible one, nor by any means the most plausible one. We venture to assert that in the whole manner and tone of the Evangelist up to ver. 14 there is a suggestion of the very opposite of what

¹⁵ *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 218, note 2.

Harnack imputes to him: instead of a desire to displace the Logos-idea, many readers have felt through the sentences and phrases a positive delight of the writer in the conception, and a perceptible inclination to linger on it and magnify its intrinsic value and importance. That the Evangelist did not let this positive sympathy with the idea betray him into the anachronism of putting it back into the mind and upon the lips of Jesus, affords surely no argument against its actual presence in his own mind, at least not for those who believe that he meant to record the actual words of Jesus.

As to ver. 14, where according to Harnack lies the actual turning-point of the movement in the writer's mind away from the Logos-idea and towards the idea of the Only-begotten God, here also the same observation may be made, *viz.*, that the very words exhale the writer's sense of the entire harmony between the two conceptions, instead of revealing a subtle intent to offer to his readers the one for the other. In the last analysis it is only Harnack's peculiar reading of the Christology in the body of the Gospel itself, that makes him thus skeptical about the Evangelist's sincere and positive interest in the Logos-conception, and leads him to put this odd interpretation upon the Prologue. If in the subsequent teaching of the Gospel every thought of an ontological background to the sonship and preëxistence of Jesus is so pointedly absent, as Harnack would have us believe, then it becomes natural not to find in this a purely negative phenomenon, but to explain it from the conscious aversion of the writer to that whole mode of thinking. And in that case one will be *à priori* inclined to surmise that the Prologue can introduce the Logos-idea only after a half-hearted fashion, for the purpose of disowning rather than of endorsing or commending it. But the whole estimate of the Christological teaching of the Gospel as ethico-religiously and not metaphysically oriented, on which this rests, is, to say the least, exceedingly one-sided and inadequate. To show this here is, of course, impossible, but

it has been abundantly shown by Grill, to whom we may refer the reader.¹⁶

We now turn to the concrete statements of the Evangelist in vs. 4, 5, 9, and 10, for it is in the careful scanning of these, and not through any preconceived general view as to the structure and purport of the Prologue as a whole, that the decision in the matter at issue as to the providential function of the Logos will have to be reached.

As to ver. 4 the question would be settled immediately, if δ γέγονεν, usually read as the close of ver. 3, were to be drawn into ver. 4 as the beginning of the next sentence and

¹⁶ *Unters. üb. d. Entst. d. vierten Ev.* I, pp. 31-88. From the above it should not, of course, be inferred that we fail to recognize the excellent points of Harnack's discussion in other respects. Before all things his article shows convincingly that the Christological material in the teaching of Jesus in the body of the Gospel is not obtained through deduction from the Logos-idea, as the Tübingen exegesis assumes. We feel bound to take issue with him when he proceeds beyond this to the assertion that it could not have been so deduced, for the reason that it is not only of a totally different type, but incommensurable and inharmonious with the Logos-doctrine. Our position would be a third one: the peculiar teaching in the body of the Gospel has not been deduced from the Logos-idea, and yet can as a matter of fact be deduced from it, because the Logos-idea is to the mind of the Evangelist simply the most appropriate conception, into which he has gathered up the teaching of Jesus concerning Himself in the discourses. We believe, what Harnack denies, that *so far as substance is concerned* the Logos-doctrine is present in and pervades the body of the Gospel. This applies to its ontological content, including the purely spiritual preëxistence, and to its soteriological content, taking the latter both in its Old Testament proleptic aspect and in its New Testament form. The only element in the Prologue not represented in the Johannine teaching of Jesus is His work in creation and providence, but for this a solid basis existed in earlier New Testament teaching, so that the writer of the Gospel could simply incorporate it together with the other elements in the Logos-concept.

We also agree with what Harnack says about its not being the purpose of the Prologue to lay a theological foundation for the high conception of Christ as God. But here again we do not feel shut up to a choice between this and Harnack's own view. The Prologue seeks a basis in eternity, not, to be sure, for the absolute, transcendent significance of Christ in the abstract, but specifically and concretely for the absoluteness and transcendence of His work as Redeemer and Revealer of God.

the rendering adopted: "that which was made was life in Him"; for this would imply that the created world continuously had its source of life in the Logos.¹⁷ This interpretation, however, involves the rendering of ver. 4 in such extreme unnaturalness and has been opposed on such convincing grounds, textual-critical and otherwise, by eminent modern exegetes, that we must discard the help to be obtained from it in favor of our position.¹⁸

Leaving δ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\epsilon\nu$ to the third verse, we inquire what is the meaning of the statements, "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness apprehended (or, overcame) it not." The problem here centers in the peculiar use of the tenses, the imperfect $\eta\nu$ twice in ver. 14, and the present $\phi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\iota$ in ver. 5. As to the imperfects, the most obvious interpretation would at first sight seem to be that which refers them to the same past state as that to which the threefold imperfect of ver. 1 refers, the state of eternity.¹⁹ The connection of thought then would be that ver. 4 explains the possibility of what was affirmed of the Logos in ver. 3: He could be the mediator of creation, because in Him was life, *i.e.* antecedently to the creation, in His eternal state. This would also explain the transition to the present tense in ver. 5 as a transition from the potential in eternity ($\eta\nu$) to the actual in time ($\phi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\iota$).

¹⁷ The above rendering makes δ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ the antecedent of $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$. According to others, who adopt the same interpretation, the antecedent is δ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\epsilon\nu$ which yields: "What was made, in it was life." On this rendering the implication remains that the Logos supplies the life of all created things, but it does not become clear, whether this is due to the original act of creation or to a subsequent continued Logos-influence. Still another construction is that proposed by Hilgenfeld, who would render: "What was made in Him, was life", on the basis of a distinction between three kinds of genesis: $\delta\iota'$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, $\omicron\upsilon$ $\chi\omega\rho\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}$. *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.*, 1889, p. 137.

¹⁸ *Cpr.* Grill, *Untersuchungen*, I, p. 91; Harnack, *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 217, note 4; Bauer-Holtzmann in *Handcommentar*,³ IV, p. 34; Zahn, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 50, 51. Bauer, in Lietzmann's *Handbuch z. N. T.*, II, 2, p. 10, assumes a corruption of the text.

¹⁹ So Pfeiderer, *Urchristenthum*,² II, pp. 338, 465, and Bauer-Holtzmann, p. 35.

If we had only the former half of ver. 4 to reckon with, this exegesis would unquestionably deserve the preference above all others. But there is also the second clause, and the form assumed by this forbids our adopting it. When it is said: "the life was the light of men", the existence of mankind is clearly presupposed; the past therefore must be a past within time, not in eternity.²⁰

Next Godet's proposal claims consideration. According to him the imperfects are meant to cover the period between the creation and the fall. In that ideal state, before sin entered the cosmos, there was life in the Logos, and this life was the light of men. From what applied to this past period the fifth verse would then proceed to the present state of sin, exchanging the imperfect for the present (*φαίνει*) and introducing the idea of "darkness", and of the conflict between this and the light. This view implies a distinction between the effectual operation of the life and the light spoken of in ver. 4 and the mere objective presence of the light, not subjectively appropriated, referred to in ver. 5. But this exegesis assumes an antithesis, which would require pointed expression in the text in order to be perceptible to the reader, and of the presence of which in the writer's mind there is no stylistic indication. It would have been easy by a simple adverb to mark the contrast between the past before and the present after the fall,²¹ or to make the alleged important difference between the effectual *ἦν τὸ φῶς* and the ineffectual *τὸ φῶς φαίνει* unmistakable. Apart from this, the form of ver. 4 hardly seems suited to bring out the efficacy of the Logos-operation in the state of rectitude. "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men" does not affirm anything more than that the

²⁰ This would not count against Harnack's solution, according to which ver. 4 relates to the incarnate Logos but shows Him and His activity *sub specie aeternitatis*. Why the imperfect as such should be characteristic of the latter is not explained. Harnack himself observes that "es in jenen Sphären, wie kein Oben und kein Unten, so auch kein Vorher und Nachher giebt". In ver. 1, to be sure, the imperfect is the tense of eternity, but only in comparison with the moment of creation.

²¹ A simple *νῦν* before *φαίνει* would have served the purpose.

Logos was adapted for quickening and enlightening the world. This adaptation He had at all times, and not only during man's state of rectitude.

Essentially distinct from the two preceding views is that of Zahn and others, according to whom the imperfect tenses of ver. 4 already transport us into the earthly life of Jesus. The Evangelist, after having spoken of the eternal existence of the subject called *θεός* in ver. 1, and of His share in creation, now proceeds to speak of His Logos-appearance in the flesh, and affirms that, during His historical activity on earth, He had life in Himself and as such was the light of men. The fifth verse then adds that this light, which had appeared in the historical Jesus, still continues to shine, after His earthly life has come to a close, in the darkness of this world, and that so far, that is, up to the Evangelist's time of writing, the darkness has not overpowered it.²²

The serious objection to this exegesis is that it involves too abrupt a transition from ver. 3 (creation of the world through the Logos) to ver. 4 (presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, as the source of life and light, viewed as a past fact), and again from ver. 4 to ver. 5 (operation of the exalted Logos in the world-darkness as a source of light). Some word or phrase to indicate the temporal movement would be expected. Zahn appeals to the prevailing representation in the body of the Gospel, according to which Jesus' abode in the flesh upon earth is the definite, circumscribed presence of the light in the world to be followed by its withdrawal.²³ Similarly Spitta, who observes that the discourses of the Gospel speak frequently of the illuminating function of Jesus during the days of His flesh, but never of a like influence during the state of preëxistence; whence he concludes that the words "the life was the light of men" must have reference to the incarnate life exclusively.²⁴ The answer to this is obvious: the Jesus-discourses in the body of the Gospel cannot be thus quoted as a check

²² *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 55-62.

²³ *Cpr.* Jno. iii. 19.; ix. 5; xii. 35 ff., 46.

²⁴ *Das Johannes-Evangelium*, p. 38.

upon the range of application which the Evangelist may have given to such ideas as life and light in the Prologue, for the simple reason that the Prologue, while it professes to subsume the teaching of Jesus under its highest rubric, yet in accordance with early Apostolic teaching, gives this rubric a wider sweep, with reference to the cosmical activity of the preëxistent Christ, than Jesus Himself does in the discourses recorded. The Evangelist was not bound to speak of Christ as "life" and "light" with the same redemptive restriction as, according to his own report, Jesus did. The fact that he never makes Jesus employ the word *Logos* as a name for Himself proves the writer to have been perfectly conscious of a distinction between what Jesus said about Himself, and what he, John, says about Jesus. The latter was meant to incorporate and epitomize the former: it was not meant to remain shut up within it.

Besides this, Zahn's appeal to the representation of the light as present in and withdrawing with the incarnate Christ proves too much, since it would exclude the light from the period after the death of Christ also, whereas according to Zahn's own interpretation the *φαίνει* of ver. 5 affirms that the light still shines at the time of the Evangelist's writing. If the withdrawal of the light in one form through Jesus' death does not prevent its reappearance in another form since His resurrection, then the epiphany of the light through the incarnation should not exclude its presence and influence in the cosmos previously in still a different form. The emphasis on the incarnate and redemptive phase of its manifestation can afford no instance against understanding the statements of ver. 4, in regard to both life and light, of the relation of the preëxistent *Logos* to the world as such.

Underlying the view criticized is the unwarranted assumption that the imperfect tense must in this case describe a state of things no longer true in the present, and that therefore the activity of the *Logos* in nature through providence cannot be meant, because this is never a thing of the

past, but goes on as long as the world exists. On the other hand, the historic activity of Jesus on earth is supposed to meet this condition, it being a thing past and definitely concluded. But, as already urged above, the Evangelist does not, as a matter of fact, look upon the life-giving and light-giving function of the Logos spoken of in ver. 4 as having come to an end. The light according to ver. 5 shines now, and the same continuance may be confidently affirmed of the influx of life. The preterite therefore is not a true chronological preterite on any view. Hence it may well be asked, if the chronological limits of the tense cannot be strictly drawn in case our verse be understood of the historic work of Christ, why should such strictness of limitation be imposed upon the view which finds here the cosmical function of the Logos? On the latter view, no less than on the former, it must be possible to reconcile the two representations that in the Logos *were* life and light and that these things *are* in Him.

By far the simplest exegesis, and that which best avoids all difficulties, is to make the imperfect tense refer to the point of time fixed by ver. 3 and let it describe something that was true at and since that point of time. Since, and in virtue of, the creation of all things through Him, and in direct continuity therewith, the Logos carried life in Himself and this life was henceforth the light of men. This surely is a most natural use of the imperfect, which frequently describes a state of affairs as existing in the past and introduced at some definitely marked point of time. On this view the connection between ver. 3 and ver. 4 is so close and self-explanatory, that no particle or adverb of more precise definition is required. The normal relation to the world of Him who had acted as the Mediator of creation, was such that thereafter the world and mankind were dependent for their life and light on Him. He was the Logos in providence, just as He had been the Logos in creation.

If it still be objected that the Evangelist might far better

have expressed this fact, as a fact of still continuing validity, by means of the present tense, the answer is twofold. In the first place, the writer takes his position at the point of the completed creation, and affirms what then was true without thereby denying that it still is true. And, secondly, he probably had already in mind the contrast between this providential Logos-activity and a fuller, richer activity performed by the same Logos since the incarnation, in comparison with which the former, while not *de facto* come to an end, may yet, inasmuch as it no longer stands alone but is now accompanied and modified by the latter, be considered in its original form a matter of the past.

The connection between the two clauses in ver. 4 likewise favors the view that not the incarnate, redemptive activity, but the cosmical activity of the Logos in His preëxistent state is referred to. When the light of men is derived from the Logos not directly, but mediately through the life that He supplies, this is a representation which suits the natural relation of mankind to the Logos far better than the redemptive relation. The Gospel of John everywhere makes a point of it that in the soteriological process the light of revelation comes first in order, as supplied by Christ after an objective, supernatural fashion, and not as something that emerges out of the new life of man, and passes through his subjectivity. It is the word, the truth, that quickens and cleanses and sanctifies. In this sphere it could be more truthfully said that the light is the life of men, than conversely that the life is their light. But in natural religion the case is quite different. Here the Logos-revelation is actually mediated through the subjective life which man in dependence on the Logos possesses. The life here naturally produces the light. The meaning is not that in man life assumes the form of light, which would savor of idealism, but that the life which man receives carries in itself, and of itself kindles in him, the light of the knowledge of God. The wording of the statement so exactly fits this peculiar relationship between the two factors in the natural religion

of man, that it is difficult to believe the author did not have the latter in mind when he wrote it.²⁵

If the above view be adopted—and we do not see what serious objection can be raised to it—the question next emerging is, how the transition to the present tense in ver. 5 can be explained on this basis. Two possibilities exist here. The present *φαίνει* might be understood in sharp contrast to the imperfect *ἦν*, as describing the illuminating function of the incarnate Logos in distinction from His light-giving activity in the natural world of the past. On this view, in ver. 5 the Evangelist, who took his point of departure in eternity and advanced from there to creation and providence, has now arrived at the stage of Jesus' earthly life. Where, however, the idea of straight temporal progression is thus maintained, the objection urged above against Godet's and Zahn's views retains its force, *viz.*, that some temporal adverb or particle would be required to render the writer's meaning understandable.²⁶ The second interpretation of the present *φαίνει*—the one that in our view deserves the preference—makes the Evangelist advance from the general proposition that the world when created was as such dependent on the Logos as its source of life and light, to the specific reflection, or after-reflection, that this holds true even now under the reign of darkness in the

²⁵ Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.*, 1910, p. 7, thinks that the transition from the Logos as a cosmical principle (ver. 3) to the Logos as a source of revelation (ver. 4^e) is a harsh one, and that the idea of "life" is a purely mechanical contrivance introduced to effect it. The lack of coherence is so great, in his view, as to lead him to suspect that the text is composite and the hand of a redactor traceable in the looseness of its texture. The above remarks show that it is not impossible to find an organic, intelligible connection between the life that flows from the Logos and the light into which it blossoms for mankind. Moreover, in ver. 10 the same two aspects of the Logos, the cosmical and the revelatory, are also conjoined: "The world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not."

²⁶ The transition from ver. 3 to ver. 4 is so natural and close, that no explicit marking is required. That from ver. 4 to ver. 5, on the other hand, involves on the above view the overleaping of a considerable interval and the transporting of the mind into a totally new and different situation.

world. The light that functioned at the beginning functions also in a world which is positively darkened through sin. The only difference is that under these circumstances there is a conflict between it and the world.

It will be perceived that this view differs from Godet's interpretation, as above stated, not so much in the outcome, as in the manner in which the thought is approached and presented by the Evangelist. According to Godet, the discourse progresses chronologically from the creation (ver. 3) to the period of rectitude (ver. 4), and from this to the period of sin (ver. 5). According to our view, the progression of thought is not historical but logical, from the general to the special. The Evangelist first describes what was the normal relation of the Logos to the world after it had been created through Him, and then passes on to the concrete, specific statement, that this holds true even in the present peculiar state of the world as a world of darkness. The simple *καί* is quite sufficient to link these two propositions, the general and the special, together.²⁷

²⁷ Two other views found among expositors may be briefly mentioned. According to one, the present *φαίνει*, in distinction from *ἦν*, marks the progress from potency to actuality: The light was there—the light shines. According to the other, the present is a present of characteristic description: it is the nature of the light to shine in the darkness. Both views are open to the objection that they take the *σκοτία* as the necessary correlate of the light, and not as an abnormal fact, whereas the presence of darkness is in ver. 4 as little supposed to condition the function of the light, as the presence of death is there thought necessary to the quickening function of the Logos.

Of the two interpretations of *κατέλαβεν* that which takes it as "apprehended" in the noëtic sense deserves the preference. Most of the Greek commentators take it in the other sense of "laying hold upon" for the purpose of getting in one's power. But this latter signification, which the verb undoubtedly has, falls quite short of the proposed rendering "overcame it not". The "laying hold upon" is but the first step towards overpowering. Hence Origen: "did not overtake it", *cpr.* Rom. ix. 30, 31; Jno. xii. 35 *ἵνα μὴ σκοτία ὑμᾶς καταλάβῃ* does not go beyond "overtaking". It is plain that the rendering "the darkness has not overtaken it", or even "the darkness has not laid hold upon it", introduces a weakening element into the context. The prelude to the tragic note of vs. 10 and 11, which has been justly recognized in ver. 5^c, also speaks against this interpretation, while it is

That a reference to the incarnate Logos in vs. 4 and 5 brings a disrupting element into the context, is recognized, where on the basis of it the composite character of the Prologue is diagnosed. Thus Schwartz argues from the imperfect tenses that the clauses in which they occur must refer to the Christ on earth; so interpreted, however, these clauses reflect a totally different point of view from that of the preceding statements, and the lack of coherence is charged to the account of a redactor.²⁸

While not disputing the unity of this part of the Prologue, Spitta allows himself to be led into a most artificial rearrangement of the clauses of vs. 1-5, in order to explain the immediate juxtaposition of the cosmical and the redemptive aspects of the Logos-activity.²⁹ By drawing δ γέγονεν to the sequel, "was geworden ist, ist³⁰ in ihm lebendig", the way is opened up, he thinks, towards restoring the original structure of the text. It consisted of a triad of three sentences as follows:

In the beginning was the Logos—and the Logos was towards God—and the Logos was God.

All things were made through Him—and without Him was not anything made—what was made is life in Him.

And the life was the light of men—and the light shines in the darkness—and the darkness overcame it not.

This, it will be observed, recognizes the cosmical function admirably expressed by the other. Of modern expositors Zahn adopts the rendering "has not overpowered".

Whether the choice of the verb φαίνειν is in pointed antithesis to the $\eta\nu$ ζωῇ and $\eta\nu$ φῶς of ver. 4, as designating the purely objective, inflectual emission of light, depends on the rendering of κατέλαβεν. If this can mean "apprehended it not", then the absence of subjective effect will be expressed by φαίνει. If on the other hand it means "overcame it not", then the energy and persistence of the light will rather be emphasized and the antithesis to ver. 4 disappears.

²⁸ *Aporien im vierten Ev. in Nachr. der Ges. der Wiss. zu Gött.*, 1907, 1908. Schwartz declares the whole section, vs. 4-13, secondary, on the ground above stated, viz., that in it throughout the epiphany of the Logos on earth, which does not take place until ver. 14, is already presupposed.

²⁹ *Das Johannes-Evangelium*, 1910, pp. 37 ff.

³⁰ Spitta reads $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ instead of $\eta\nu$ with Codex D, a reading already known to Origen. This variant, however, is found only in 4.^a not in 4.^b

of the Logos in providence.³¹ At the same time, by violently separating the two clauses of ver. 4, apportioning each to a different triad, it enables Spitta to maintain that the words "the life was the light of men" are meant of the incarnate Christ. They mark the beginning of a new train of thought; the revelatory function is no longer the reverse side of the cosmical, creative function, but something altogether detached from it. And that in the face of the fact that the ζωή of 4^a is significantly repeated in 4^b, with the addition of the article to preclude all doubt in regard to the identity of the life which all creatures possess in the Logos and the life which is light for mankind.³²

How artificial all this is needs no pointing out. The artificiality, however, proves that there is no place for the incarnate Christ in vs. 4 and 5.

Owing to its introduction of the historical figure of John the Baptist, ver. 6 is regarded by many expositors as marking the dividing-line between what relates to the preincarnate and to the incarnate Logos.³³ This argument, however, although it ought to work in both directions, is usually urged only to prove that what follows cannot possibly refer to anybody but the historical Christ, to whose appearance John bore witness. If the Evangelist consciously and pointedly uses the Baptist to pass over from the realm of

³¹ Spitta compares Rom. viii. 10; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2 ff.

³² On Spitta's interpretation it would seem to follow that the life supplied by the Logos in nature becomes the light of redemption to men. At least this could be avoided only by taking ἡ ζωή in ver. 4^b as a proper name of Christ; but against this the gender is decisive. Besides, Spitta has to disregard the clear indications which the repeated use of καί affords, as to the actual structure of the text as it lay in the author's mind. On his arrangement the καί is lacking before the third clause of the second triad ("What was made is life in Him"), although the next preceding clause of this triad has it, and although the corresponding third clauses in the first and third triads likewise have it. On the other hand, the καί, which on this arrangement introduces the first clause of the third triad ("and the life was the light of men") is out of place.

³³ Thus Theodore of Mopsuestia, quoted by Lücke, I, p. 314, note 2; Lücke himself, p. 314; Grill, *Unters.* I, p. 95; Heitmüller, in Weiss, *Schriften des N. T.* II, p. 722; Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handc. z. N. T.* II, *Johannes*, p. 11.

the metaphysical into that of the historical, then it may be argued with equal warrant, that nothing of the historical can enter into the representation of what precedes. Yet this is not always done.³⁴

On the other hand, there are those who make of ver. 6 a *point d'appui* for eliminating even from the preceding verses all reference to the preëxistent Logos as a source of life and light.³⁵ Appeal is made for this purpose to the fact that John's mission is described as having been *εἰς μαρτυρίαν* and that his witness was *περὶ τοῦ φωτός* to the end that all through him (= John) might believe (in the light). It is claimed that this statement makes *τὸ φῶς* equivalent to the historical Christ, since it was to the latter as present on earth that the Baptist pointed in his preaching. And "the light" of vs. 7-9 again determines the meaning of "the light" in vs. 4 and 5.

It must be acknowledged that there is a certain incongruousness between the two aspects of "the light", if previously to ver. 6 the exclusively metaphysical, cosmical sense is insisted upon, and after ver. 6 with equal rigor the exclusively redemptive reference is maintained.³⁶ But in our opinion relief should not be sought by carrying back the redemptive light into vs. 4 and 5; it should and can be obtained by finding the cosmical light, at least in part, repre-

³⁴ Bauer, *op. cit.*, who says: in ver. 6 the discourse proceeds to the period of the human existence of the Logos, says also: in vs. 4 and 5 the Prologue already has in view the human activity of the Logos. Similarly in Holtzmann-Bauer's Handcommentar, *Ev. des Joh.* pp. 36, 37.

³⁵ So Belser, in *Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1903, pp. 483-519, who thinks that vs. 4 and 5 are to be understood redemptively, and that the Logos-name in ver. 1 is used proleptically.

³⁶ Wellhausen, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 8, emphasizes the inconcinnity of the metaphysical and the historical. The Baptist, he observes, cannot be properly contrasted with the super-terrestrial Logos, but only with the incarnate Logos. But the latter does not enter until ver. 14. Consequently ver. 6 presents the strange phenomenon which he characterizes in the words, that the Baptist "unversehens in die Ewigkeit hineinschneit". Wellhausen seeks relief here as elsewhere, through denying the original unity of the composition. In our view, in vs. 6-9 the Baptist carries with himself the atmosphere of the higher world in that he witnesses to the eternity of the Logos-light.

sented in vs. 7-9. It is quite true, of course, that the one to whom John bore witness was the incarnate, historical Christ, but this settles nothing as to the question what he referred to when he called this historical person $\tau\omicron\ \phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$. It is just as possible that the Evangelist means to make John the Baptist bear witness, among other things, to the cosmical illuminating function of the historical Christ, as that he means to make him confine his witness to the redemptive light supplied by Jesus.

That the former is the case gains in probability, if we notice how in vs. 15 and 30 the subject of the preëxistence of the Christ is introduced as constituting, to the mind of the Evangelist, the first important element in the witness that John bore concerning Him. If the reference to the $\alpha\nu\eta\rho$ in ver. 30 cannot tie down the witness to the incarnate state, then certainly the reference to the $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ need not in vs. 6-9 be held to restrict this term to its redemptive associations.³⁷ In ver. 9 there is a positive indication that the Evangelist consciously distinguished between the existence of the Logos-light in a previous state and its existence in historical form within the cosmos.³⁸ The retroactive force of the argument drawn from the historical setting in which $\tau\omicron\ \phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ appears in ver. 7 cannot be allowed.

But the same considerations detract also from the prospective force of the argument. If the cosmical associations of the term $\phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$ are still clearly perceptible in vs. 7-9, there is no *à priori* warrant for excluding them from what is said about the same subject in the sequel. Undoubtedly the words $\epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\pi\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\lambda\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\rho\grave{\alpha}\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\,,\ \delta\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\hat{\omega}\ \text{'}\text{Ιωάννης}$ are a historical "Ansatz", on a line with ver. 19. They could, however, mark the time of the sequel only if the writer continued with statements of a similar historical character. This is not the case. In ver. 6 he speaks as a historian; in ver. 8 he has already resumed the tone

³⁷ *Cpr.* Clemen, *Die Entstehung des Johannes-Ev.*, 1912, p. 59.

³⁸ On the view that $\delta\ \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$ here means the world of men, and that the entrance of the light into it means not the incarnation, but Jesus' public appearance, see below.

of the theologian. Only a careful exegesis of the words can here decide whether the Logos-subject is introduced exclusively in its incarnate aspect, or as incarnate, yet on the background of its cosmical aspect, or whether perhaps things are freshly affirmed of it that pertain to its cosmical function as such.

For deciding this question nothing is yielded by ver. 8. To be sure, the Baptist is here contrasted with $\tauὸ φῶς$ and it might seem as if the cosmical light and a historical person were too incommensurable to be even compared with each other. But i, 15, 30 and iii, 31 ff. prove that the Evangelist felt differently on this point, for there the Baptist is represented as formally comparing himself with Christ from the point of view of the latter's deity and preëxistence. There is nothing, therefore, to show that it would have seemed incongruous to the Evangelist to say: John was not the cosmical light manifested on earth, but was sent to bear witness concerning that light.

In regard to ver. 9 the question is interlinked with the mooted problem of the construction of the sentence. Two main views are here opposed to each other. The one makes $\tauὸ φῶς$ the subject and $ἦν ἐρχόμενον$ the predicate: "the true light which enlightens every man, was coming into the world." The other supplies the subject from the foregoing, makes $\tauὸ φῶς$ the predicate, and construes $ἐρχόμενον$ with $ἄνθρωπον$ of the relative clause: "the Logos was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world".³⁹

³⁹ Other attempted renderings, covered by the above two in their bearing upon our problem, are: "there was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world", or: "the true light enlightening every man coming into the world, was present"; this overweights $ἦν$ at the opening of the sentence; "there was (or He was) the true light, which, coming into the world, enlightens every man"; this draws $ἐρχόμενον$ to the $ὃ$ of the relative clause, but yields no suitable sense, since the illuminating effect of the incarnate Christ does not coincide with His birth or public appearance; "the true light is that which enlightens every man who comes into the world"; this yields excellent sense, but would seem to require $\tauὸ φωτίζον$ instead of $ὃ φωτίζει$, as Blass actually proposes to read, but without authority.

The latter of these two constructions would directly bear out the contention that the Logos is a source of light in the world of nature, because it represents Him as exerting this influence at the time of every man's entrance into the world, *i.e.*, at his birth.⁴⁰ But this construction, while perfectly allowable in itself, would leave the ἦν at the beginning of the verse isolated without a proper subject, and for this reason alone will have to be abandoned in favor of the other: "the true light . . . was coming into the world", *viz.*, at the time of the Baptist's witnessing. And this has the twofold result of apparently rendering the relative clause ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον, now detached from ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, unavailable as an argument on our side, and of apparently furnishing a direct argument against the cosmical interpretation of the light in the sequel, inasmuch as that which is here represented as coming, must from this point onward figure in the account as having come, *i.e.*, as the light of the Christ incarnate. It should be noticed, however, in regard to the first point, that the relative clause, when separated from ἐρχόμενον, while not necessitating the reference to natural revelation as it does when combined with ἐρχόμενον, nevertheless fully permits of it. In affirming that the true light was coming into the world, it was perfectly natural for the writer to observe that this is the light which enlightens every man. In other words, the purpose of the relative clause may well be to identify the redemptive light with the cosmical light.

If it be objected that such a specific reference of the φωτίζειν to natural revelation would have to be indicated in some way in order to be understood, we answer, that it is sufficiently indicated by the object πάντα ἄνθρωπον. A light of which it is said that it enlightens every man, is

⁴⁰ We do not agree with Zahn, who thinks that ἐρχόμενον joined to ἄνθρωπον is pleonastic and useless; it has excellent sense as a temporal definition. The writer might have used it for the very purpose of making it plain that he speaks of the Logos as a cosmical light. Nor can much weight be attributed to the absence of the article before ἐρχόμενον. The Greek exegetes, who follow this construction, do not seem to have missed the article, *cfr.* Lücke, p. 317.

thereby clearly enough characterized as the general light which is common to the world as such. On the other hand, this absolute universality of the *φωτίζειν* tells against the opposite interpretation, which would have us think here of the illuminating influence of the incarnate Christ, and understand the present tense as a historical present with reference to the time of writing. As a matter of fact no such universal illumination took place at that time. We have abstained from urging this objection to Zahn's exegesis of verse 4^b. The clause "was the light of men" in its pure objectivity might properly apply to the incarnate Logos on earth.⁴¹ But it becomes a totally different matter when a verb like *φωτίζειν* is used, which clearly passes beyond the sphere of objective potentiality into that of subjective effectuation. Moreover, after we have already concluded on other grounds, that in ver. 4 both the life and the light are cosmically conceived, we may allow weight to the obvious backward reference to ver. 4 in the clause of ver. 9 now under discussion, for determining the meaning of the latter verse. The present *φωτίζει* no less clearly points back to the *φαίνει* of ver. 4, than the *πάντα ἄνθρωπον* does to *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* in the same verse.⁴²

As to the other point, that the construction of *ἐρχόμενον* with *ἦν* predetermines the reference of all that is said in the sequel to the incarnate Logos, because the subject here said to have been coming, must thereafter be present,—we are inclined to think that here, as in connection with ver. 7, the argument rests on an undue pressing of the historically progressive character of the discourse, and on an insufficient recognition of the free play which the author allows his mind in approaching the subject alternately from a his-

⁴¹ *Cpr.* viii. 12, "I am the light of the world"; ix. 5, "While I am in the world, I am the light of the world".

⁴² As a rule, where the cosmical reference in the preceding and following context is recognized, the relative clause in ver. 9 is interpreted of the same thing. Keil is an exception, who takes the *φωτίζει* of redemptive illumination, and yet in his exegesis of ver. 10 upholds the presence of the Logos in the world as a cosmical principle, *Comm. üb. d. Ev. des Joh.*, p. 97.

torical and from a theological point of view. The whole issue resolves itself into this, whether in ver. 10 it is the historian or the theologian who speaks. If the historian, then the question is immediately decided in favor of the view which finds here the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, for after the historical statement: the Logos was coming into the world, an immediately succeeding statement of similar historical import: He was in the world, can only mean that the coming into the world resulted in a presence within the world. If on the other hand it is not the historian but the theologian who speaks, then it is equally plain that the clause "He was in the world", being a free reflexion of the author, receives its chronological setting, not from the progress of events, but from the movement of the author's thought, and, provided a movement in that direction can be made psychologically intelligible, we may feel at liberty to refer the words to the presence of the Logos in the world as a principle of providence.

For this reason the mooted question as to the exact force of the periphrastic form *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* has far less to do with the exegesis of the sequel than is generally assumed. Opinion among present-day exegetes inclines to the view that the form cannot have, grammatically considered, future significance, in other words that it cannot mean, the true light was to come in the future, or, with a somewhat weaker futurizing force, was about to come. On both renderings, it is urged, *ἔρχεσθαι* receives a meaning which it cannot bear in either classical or New Testament Greek.⁴³ Only the former of these two renderings would materially affect the sense of what follows, since from the statement: the light was to come into the world in the future, no easy historical transition could be made to the statement: He was in the world; and consequently this stronger form of the futurizing interpretation would compel in ver. 10^a the rendering: He was already in the world previously to this future coming. But in its weaker form: the light was

⁴³ *Cpr.* Lücke, pp. 319-324; Zahn, pp. 67, 68.

about to come, the future understanding of the verb leaves room for imposing either sense on ver. 10^a. Perhaps even so the connection slightly favors the reference of the clause ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ to the providential presence of the Logos in the world, since between: He was about to come and: He was present, if both statements form part of one historical movement, there would be left a gap, the act itself of coming being unmentioned.

But there is no need of further considering this here, since, on the ground already stated, we follow the more recent exegesis, which takes ἦν ἐρχόμενον as a periphrastic preterite: the light was in the act of coming into the world at the time of the witnessing by John. And this certainly, even more clearly than the weaker futurizing interpretation, leaves us free to understand the next statement, "He was in the world", of the incarnate life on earth.⁴⁴ The question now is, whether we shall avail ourselves of this possibility, or choose the alternative, equally possible in itself, of rendering: He was (already) in the world.

This latter view yields a perfectly natural train of thought, and suggested itself quite early to exegetes.⁴⁵ Bengel in his usual pointed way has formulated it as follows: "Ne quis illud veniens in mundum ita accipiat, acsi lux antea in mundo plane non fuisset."⁴⁶ It is not a necessary concomitant of this view that the incidental qualification of ver. 9 should be considered the only purpose of ver. 10^a. Ver. 10, and within it the words we are considering, conveys an independent thought—that of the failure of the

⁴⁴ While, of course, grammatically different, yet as a matter of practical outcome the weaker futurizing and the preterite version of ἦν ἐρχόμενον amount to much the same thing. To say that one is in the act of coming implies, if it does not express, that he is about to come. Thus Lücke, who opposes the futurizing view, yet himself paraphrases: "*War im Begriff hervorzutreten*"; the future expelled from ἦν ἐρχόμενον reënters in "Begriff" and in "*hervorzutreten*".

⁴⁵ Theodore Mops., quoted by Lücke, p. 319, observes: εἰπὼν τὸ, 'Ἐρχόμενον εἰς τ. κόσμον περὶ τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ καλῶς ἐπήγαγεν τὸ, 'Ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, ὥστε δεῖξαι, ὅτι τὸ, 'Ἐρχόμενον πρὸς τὴν διὰ σαρκὸς εἶπεν φανέρωσιν.

⁴⁶ Cfr. Keil, *Comment. ü. d. Ev. d. Joh.*, p. 98.

world to apprehend the Logos. Whether this thought is new or a refrain-like repetition of ver. 5^b "the darkness apprehended it not", will depend on the exegesis of οὐκ ἔγνω, into which we shall look presently. In any case, the interpretation before us involves the view that the writer makes use of the incidental qualification of ver. 9, "He *was* in the world", to prepare the way for the subjoined statement: although being in the world, the world knew Him not.

The choice between the two views now before us is exceedingly difficult. The attempt has been made to decide the question by appealing to the sense of ὁ κόσμος in ver. 9^c. This must have the meaning, it is thought, of the world of humanity and of public life, and cannot here bear the sense of the created universe, for at the time of John's witnessing Jesus was entering, not into the created universe through birth, but into the world of men through His public appearance. And this sense of κόσμος is then carried over into ver. 10, from which results the rendering: He was in the world (= present among men) . . . and the world (= men) knew Him not,—a mode of representation which could be naturally applied only to the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world.

One might be inclined to reply to this, that it is not inapplicable to the alternative view, for the providential activity of the Logos with reference to mankind could be fitly described as a presence of the Logos in the world. The statement, "He was in the world", would then simply extend to the Logos the specifically divine attribute of immanence of being with reference to the life of mankind.

It is very doubtful, however, whether the argument on which this restriction of the term κόσμος is based is a sound one. To tie down the Evangelist in ver. 7 to this degree of chronological preciseness seems to us to overlook the bold, broad sweep of the whole representation. Where eternity and time are put into relation to each other, as is the case here, it would be pedantic to quibble about a matter of some thirty odd years. Even though the incarnation

had taken place that many years before the preaching of the Baptist, the writer could none the less with perfect propriety say that the light was then in the act of coming into the world and include in this act of entrance into the world everything connected with the epiphany of Christ from His incarnation down to His public appearance, and could put into the word *κόσμος* a sufficiently broad meaning to cover all this. A certain indefiniteness in its meaning would be the natural thing under the circumstances. The choice of the periphrastic conjugation may have been due in part to a desire to adjust the verb to this latitude of conception. Elsewhere also in the Gospel the phrase *ἐρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον* in Christological connections has this broad sense of transition from the higher, divine sphere into the lower, created sphere,⁴⁷ although in a single instance it may have been used with restricted reference to the public appearance of Christ.⁴⁸ And in the present case ver. 10^b ("the world was made through Him") proves how any sharp distinction between the world as the universe and the world as humanity was at this point absent from the writer's mind. It is the cosmos as including mankind and as summed up in man in which the Logos is said to have been present, and accordingly the words can be equally well understood of His presence in nature and of His historical presence among men in incarnate form.⁴⁹

By this reasoning, however, no more than the possibility of relating ver. 10 to the preëxistent Logos can be established. An actual presumption in favor of this exegesis is only obtainable from ver. 10 taken in connection with the following statement, *εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ*

⁴⁷ *Cpr.* vi. 38, 51; viii. 23, 27; ix. 39; xii. 46; xiii. 1; xvi. 28.

⁴⁸ *Cpr.* xvi. 18, 38.

⁴⁹ Spitta takes occasion from this double meaning of the word *cosmos* to cut out from ver. 10 the first two clauses: "He was in the world and the world was made through Him." In ver. 9 he throws out everything from *τὸ ἀληθινόν* to *ἄνθρωπον*. This leaves as the original statement: *ἦν τὸ φῶς ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω*, translated as follows: "Es war das Licht beim Kommen zu den Menschen, aber die Menschen erkannten ihn nicht." *Das Joh-Ev.*, pp. x, 41, 42.

παρέλαβον. As is well known, expositors are sharply divided in regard to the question, whether the terms ἴδια and ἴδιοι designate the world, and specifically mankind, as the Logos' "own" in virtue of creation, or the people of Israel, as belonging to Him in virtue of a particular redemptive relationship.⁵⁰

It should be noticed that the former of these two interpretations of ver. 11 has for its natural correlate the reference of ver. 10 to the preëxistent Logos as present and active in the natural world. If the words ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν already affirmed the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, the subsequent affirmation of His coming into the world (εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν) would make of them a singular *hysteron proteron*. The writer cannot have first said, He was present, and then added, He came, and have meant both in the same relation. On the other hand, the view which takes ἴδια and ἴδιοι of Israel, not only permits the finding of the incarnate Logos in ver. 10 but positively creates a presumption in favor of this exegesis, because after the ἦν ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, one naturally expects some mention of the result of this process, the actual presence of the Logos in the world, and this the words ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν supply. A progress in the movement of thought from the Logos-presence in nature to the Logos-advent among Israel, would leave unexpressed this indispensable intermediate conception, the advent of the Logos into the world.

With this relation existing between ver. 10 and ver. 11,

⁵⁰ Besides these two main interpretations, the views of Spitta, who thinks of Jesus' relations in the narrowest genealogical sense (*Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 42) and of Belser, who would understand the term of the Judeans, as according to the Gospel Jesus' fellow-countrymen *par excellence*, (*Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1903, p. 491) may be mentioned. Belser interprets ver. 10 of Jesus' private life before His public appearance. It was at that time that He was in the world unknown to the world; thereupon He came to His own, the Judeans, and was rejected by them. Apart from the obscure statement, Jno. iv. 1-3, which has received the most divergent interpretations, there is no evidence that the Fourth Gospel makes Judea the home-country of Jesus.

it is obviously the proper procedure to make one's exegesis of the former depend on that of the latter. The question arises, whether there is anything in the wording of ver. 11 that renders the sense less equivocal than that of the preceding statement, and consequently enables us to remove the uncertainty in which the consideration of ver. 10 by itself has left us.

Zahn believes that the terms *ἴδια*, *ἰδιοι* furnish such a positive indication. He urges that *ἰδιος* does not express appurtenance in general, but appurtenance in distinction from the absence of it in a wider sphere, that cannot be called in the same sense a person's own. For this reason, he thinks, the cosmos could not be called the *ἴδια* of the Logos, because there is no other foreign sphere to be distinguished from it in respect to this relation. It must be granted that reflections on the existence of other worlds, not equally related to the Logos with our earth, or reflections on the sub-human cosmos, as excluded from the peculiar affinity of mankind to the Logos, can scarcely be credited to the Evangelist in the present connection. But we are inclined to call in question the premise itself of Zahn's argument. It is obvious from the usage of the word *ἰδιος* as ascertainable from any dictionary, that the side-reference to what is not *ἰδιος*, while usually present, is nevertheless, etymologically considered, a purely secondary and incidental element in the signification. *Ἰδιος* simply designates that which appertains to a person and in virtue of this sustains a particularly close relation to him. From the nature of the case in human proprietary relationships, this always involves the existence of other objects not so owned, but it is not permissible to infer from this, that, where the application lies outside of the sphere of human proprietorship, this element must necessarily be retained. To say that the universe and mankind are in virtue of their creation through the Logos His *ἴδια* or *ἰδιοι* does not detract from or in the least do violence to the normal meaning of the word. The usage of *ἰδιος* therefore settles nothing as to the import of ver. 11.

But there are some considerations, which, to our view, incline the balance in the opposite direction. In the first place, we cannot help believing that there is a close connection between ἴδια and ἴδιοι in ver. 11 and the clause ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο in ver. 10. It is certainly most natural to assume that this latter clause prepares the way for and explains the characterization of those to whom the Logos came as His ἴδιοι. They were His own, because as part of the cosmos they had been made through Him. The production of a thing is the most primitive and prevalent source of the proprietary relation. Especially if τὰ ἴδια and οἱ ἴδιοι be given the sense of "his own home" and "his own home-relations", the force of this consideration will become apparent.⁵¹ On the other view the term ἴδια emerges unprepared for and unexplained.⁵²

In the second place the pointed parallelism between ἦν and ἦλθεν on the one hand, and οὐκ ἔγνω and οὐ παρέλαβον on the other hand, can be best accounted for when it is understood as a parallelism between the Logos-relation to the natural world and the Logos-relation to the world of redemption. Of the natural, cosmical relationship in its lasting, unchanging character the clause ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ is eminently appropriate, just as of the redemptive approach as a unique historical event the verb ἦλθεν is strikingly

⁵¹ *Cpr.* Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handbuch, Johannes*, p. 13. Bauer, however, although rightly explaining τὰ ἴδια of the cosmos, finds the incarnate Logos already in ver. 10.

⁵² It will have been noticed that in discussing ver. 10 we did not argue from the clause ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο that the preceding clause ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν must likewise relate the Logos to the world of nature. Such an argument would not be valid, because the middle clause might be retrospective from the point of view of redemption: "He was, incarnate, in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not." As the preceding note shows, the close connection between ver. 10^b and τὰ ἴδια can be recognized, τὰ ἴδια understood of the world, and yet ver. 10^a understood of redemption. But in that case the peculiar sequence of ἦν and ἦλθεν is unaccounted for. This is the weak point in Bauer's exegesis. Our argument is: τὰ ἴδια = the world in ver. 11 because of ver. 10^b and since the ἦν must come before ἦλθεν ver. 10^a describe preincarnate relations.

descriptive. This is not saying that $\eta\gamma\omega$ and $\eta\lambda\theta\epsilon\nu$, each considered by itself, do not yield good sense on the other view. Our point is that the delicately shaded contrast perceptible in the use of these two words by the Evangelist is obliterated by the other exegesis. And the same applies to the difference between $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \epsilon\gamma\omega$ and $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon} \text{παρέλαβον}$. The issue between knowing and not-knowing naturally reminds us of the religion of nature and man's universal failure to apprehend the light supplied by the Logos.⁵³ On the other hand, the issue between receiving and not-receiving points to a definite, historical act on the part of the Logos whereby He aggressively made His appearance among those who were His own. Here again it is not denied that the $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \epsilon\gamma\omega$ can be amply justified on the basis of what the Gospel teaches about the failure of the world to recognize the incarnate Jesus, but nevertheless the fine point of distinction between the two situations is lost, if both are made to refer to the same thing.⁵⁴

Thirdly, it will have to be remembered that the broad, universalistic outlook of the Prologue as a whole does not particularly favor the introduction of Israel at this point, co-ordinately with the natural cosmos and the Christian Church, as constituting by itself a separate sphere of Logos-activity. While such a conception is quite in keeping with the general attitude of the Gospel towards the Old Testament, and perhaps finds expression in viii. 56, yet in the presence of the highly-generalized contrast between nature and redemption which furnishes the key-note to the Prologue, its appearance here would be more or less anomalous. In the sequel, even where the author speaks in the plural, as representing the first believers who were witnesses

⁵³ Cpr. the words of Heraclitus (Sext. Emp. vii. 19, 1: $\gamma\iota\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \tau\omicron\nu \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu \tau\omicron\nu\delta\epsilon \acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu \epsilon\omicron\iota\kappa\alpha\sigma\iota\nu$, with their striking resemblance to the contrast in ver. 10.^{b c}

⁵⁴ The only possibility of retaining the contrast, other than the exegesis advocated above, is that suggested by Belser (cpr. note 47). Apart from its general implausible character, it labors under the disadvantage that the non-recognition of the Logos during His private life lacks the tragic, culpable aspect, here connoted by the $\text{o}\tilde{\upsilon}\kappa \epsilon\gamma\omega$.

of the incarnate Logos-life, he speaks not out of the specifically Jewish, but out of the general Christian consciousness of himself and his fellows.

One other consideration must be taken into account. The view which understands ver. 10 of the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world and ver. 11 of His coming to Israel encounters a difficulty when the last clauses of both verses are to be explained as marking two successive and distinctive steps in the ill-reception of the Logos. The question may be pertinently asked, to what historical events or development the words *ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω* refer if they are to be kept separate from the statement *οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον*? How or where did the world reject the incarnate Christ, apart from His not being received by Israel? The clearly perceptible climax in the tragic note as between ver. 10^c and ver. 11^c requires that the two clauses shall not be related to the same thing. It will not do, therefore, to say, that in Israel's rejection of the Logos, it was the cosmos, which, acting through Israel, rejected Him. Whatever may be thought of the theory that in the Gospel the Jews thus represent the cosmos, it is plain that, as the two statements stand here, two distinct failures to appreciate the Logos, by two distinct subjects and in two distinct relations are spoken of.⁵⁵

The singular view of Baldensperger, who understands the *ἴδια* and *ἴδιοι* of the Israel of the Old Covenant, and carries the act of the coming of the Logos back to the same period, specifically to the time of the patriarchs, needs only passing mention.⁵⁶ It lies open to three fatal objections. In the first place, the aorist tense *ἦλθεν* cannot describe a repeated coming such as is assumed on the view in question, but only a single definite advent. Secondly, what Balden-

⁵⁵ The same difficulty is encountered on the exceptional view which combines reference to the incarnate Logos in ver. 10 with the exegesis of *τὰ ἴδια* of the world in ver. 11. Thus Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handbuch* ii. 2, 13 seeks to make out a "Gedankenfortschritt von Schöpfung und Geschöpf zu Heimat und Angehörigen". In reality, however, the one is but the reverse side of the other.

⁵⁶ *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, pp. 13 ff.

sperger seems to have overlooked, the description of those to whom the Logos came as His ἱδίοι implies a previous activity on His part in regard to them. If, when the Logos came to them, the patriarchs were already His own, then it becomes necessary to think of a still earlier Logos-work that made them such, and this it would be difficult to point out. And, in the third place, the present participle τοῖς πιστεύουσιν at the close of ver. 12 excludes a reference to past believers and points plainly to the writer's own time.⁵⁷

The result of our inquiry into the purport of vs. 10 and 11 yields a twofold addition to the evidence for a cosmical Logos-function already discovered. Besides giving us the direct affirmation that the Logos was in the world made through Him by nature, it presents us with the same truth, indirectly expressed, in the description of the cosmos as the Logos' own. It is evident, moreover, that the writer does not look upon the production of the world through the Logos as a past fact, of which the significance and influence ceased with the moment of creation. It is a fact resulting in a continuous relationship, for only as such could it offer a reason why the world could and should, under normal conditions, have so known and received the Logos as is implied in both ver. 10^c and ver. 11.⁵⁸ The bare fact that the Logos had a hand in the creation of the world would not of itself have made it easier for the world to know Him; this would result only if the origin of the world

⁵⁷ Zahn, who understands τὰ ἴδια of Israel, thinks that the destination of the people to belong to the Messiah, affords a sufficient ground for calling them the Logos' own. Against this is the parallel case of the cosmos, which has its relation to the Logos not in virtue of destiny alone, but as a result of its creation through Him. Therefore, in the case of Israel also, a more substantial basis would have to be found, and the only thing to be thought of in this connection would be the activity of the Logos under the Old Covenant.

Franke, *Das Alte Testament bei Johannes*, assumes that the term ἴδια is meant by the Evangelist as an equivalent of the Old Testament קְנָלָא as a designation of Israel. But the Sept. rendering of this is περιούσιος, not ἴδιος.

⁵⁸ Notice the adversative καί before both clauses in ver. 10^c and ver 11.^o

through the Logos established a perpetual relation of immanence in the world and proprietorship of the world.⁵⁹

The result of our exegesis of ver. 10, however, proves important in still another respect. It once more shows the close connection in the author's mind between the Logos as a source of omnipotent power and the Logos as a source of revelation. As in ver. 4 the Logos in virtue of His having life in Himself becomes the light of men, so here in virtue of His being in the world, and His having made the world, He appears as the One whom the world should have known and consciously appropriated. And it is chiefly in this that the doctrinal value of the teaching of this part of the Prologue consists. The question has perhaps been raised by the reader, whether a laborious inquiry of the kind here instituted is sufficiently repaid by the establishment of a principle, which elsewhere in the New Testament finds direct and undisputed expression. Why argue at length on the riddles of the Prologue, if 1 Corinthians and Colossians, and perhaps Hebrews, teach the cosmical significance and function of the preëxistent Christ in the most unequivocal language? Our answer to this is that the Prologue, if correctly interpreted by us, presents the truth involved from a peculiar angle, from which it is not considered in these other passages. The unique feature of the Prologue consists in this, that it views the cosmical function of the preëxistent Christ as a revealing function and places it in direct continuity with His revealing work in the sphere of redemption. Not that the Messiah has a share in the creation of the world or in providence, but that in mediating both He acts as the revealing Logos of God,—this is the valuable information which the Prologue supplies. It not only vindicates for nature the character of a revealing

⁵⁹ The above answers the question, left unanswered at a previous stage, to what the οὐκ ἔγνω of ver. 10^c must be referred. It is correlated with ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν and, in accordance with our understanding of these words, describes the culpable non-recognition of the Logos by men in the state of nature, not the failure of the world to recognize the incarnate Christ.

medium through which God speaks, but also links together creation and redemption as both mediated by the same Logos. Vs. 4, 5 and 10 taken together are preëminently the *sedes* for the church-doctrine of natural revelation in its relation to God's redemptive disclosure in Christ. While it is plainly taught that mankind subjectively fails to appropriate this revelation of nature, it is likewise implied that it nevertheless remains objectively valid. Moreover we receive the guarantee of the inner harmony and mutual interdependence of the two realms of truth in which the one Logos rules. Especially in our days, when a potent current of thought seeks to banish all natural theology from religion and to void the Christian mind of all antecedent rational knowledge of God, the principle just formulated assumes more than ordinary importance, and the old exegesis of the Prologue, in which it finds classical expression, becomes invested with a new apologetic interest.

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