

THE
JESUITS
MORALS.

COLLECTED

By a DOCTOR of the COLLEGE
OF
Sorbon in Paris.

WHO HATH

Faithfully extracted them out of the *Jesuits* own Books, which
are printed by the permission and approbation of the
Superiours of their Society.

J. S. Hyde.

By *Perrault* (son of *Charles Perrault*) & was first published
Written in French, and exactly Translated into English.
at Paris in 3 Vol. 8vo. & burnt in Paris in 1670.

But they shall proceed no further, for their folly shall be manifest unto all
Men. 2 Tim. Ch. 3. V. 9.

LONDON,

Printed for John Starkey, at the Miter in Fleet-street, near
Temple-Bar, MDCLXX. Pret: -8.



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I Have perused a Book, Entituled *The Jesuits Morals*,
Translated into English, and compared divers of the
Quotations therein mentioned with the Original Authors,
as they are in *Sion-College-Library, London*: and do find
them faithfully and exactly recited. *Viz.*

Laymannus.

Lessius.


Fillintius.

Sanchez.

Azorius, cum aliis.

April 27. 1670.

John Spencer Library-keeper.



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1847

And M^{rs} J. B. ...
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ADVERTISEMENT

Concerning the Publication of this Work.

THE Greatness of God hath never been more resplendent than in the particulars, wherein the Benefit of his Church hath been concerned. Herein he is so absolute, that he alone disposeth of all Events, which have any respect of tence towards it, and overturning all the measures which humane prudence hath made for it self, he permits them not to appear in the eyes of men, but cloathed with such circumstances, as he judges most proper for his designs, and wherein they are least expected.

Such is the conduct he pleased to observe about this Book which we have now published. The Author took it in hand in a time which appeared of all that ever were the most favourable for it. The Morality of the Jesuits then happening to be in the greatest averfation and horreur to all them who had any light or piety. The ingenious Letters of *Montalte* to the Provincial, and the learned Writings of the Parochial Rectors of *Paris* having discovered the corruption of the greater part of their Maxims; and a great number of the Prelates celebrated for their ability and piety, having already censured them. So that it seemed, that the Church had no farther need in that particular; than of some prudent and clear-headed person, who might collect together in one and the same Writing all the Principles of these corrupted Morals, and who therein might represent their excesses, to the end that thereby the rest of its Pastors might be animated fully to banish from its bosom all those pernicious Novelties which disfigure the purity of its manners.

This was the cause which moved the Author of these Books with an incredible care and labour to apply himself thereunto, having extracted out of the Books of the Jesuits all the principal Errours which they had introduced into Christian Morality, and having reduced them unto certain heads with a very neat and pure order, which may be worthy to have the name of the particular Character of his Spirit. But God permitted that when he had finished this so important Work, he delivered it into the hands of a Doctor, one of his Friends, that he might communicate it unto others, who were of known Learning and Zeal. This Doctor acquitted himself faithfully in this Commission: but those to whom he committed

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this Book, that they might examine it, being diverted therefrom, by a multitude of affairs ; returned no answer unto him of a long time ; so that the Author continuing sick, saw himself nigh unto death, without knowing in a manner what was become of his Book, and only understood that they judged it most worthy to be printed, and that the Church might draw therefrom very great advantages, if it pleased God to give it his blessing.

As therefore he proposed unto himself in this Work no other thing than to serve the Church, this answer sufficed to banish out of his mind all the disquiet which he could have had thereabouts, and he very easily, and without farther trouble, did wholly commit the care of it to Divine providence, to which he had been always most submissive. This submission notwithstanding hindred not, but that some time before his death he recommended it unto another of his friends, whom he knew to be very greatly concerned, for every thing whereunto he had relation. But this Friend being not able to address himself to any other save that Doctor, who had not the Book any longer in his own hands, and who could not himself learn thereof any news at all, saw himself speedily after out of condition to serve both the Church and his Friend in such manner as he earnestly desired.

Some years past over in this uncertainty of what was become of this so precious a Work, at which time God, who had reserved unto himself the disposal thereof, caused it to fall happily into the hands of a person who had no correspondence with its Author, but seeing that it might be profitable to the Church, thought himself obliged to contribute all his credit and power to its publication.

Here you have what was thought meet for the Readers to know concerning the History of this Book. It were to be desired that we might speak here more openly concerning its Author ; but the Society of the Jesuits have accustomed themselves so to use those who endeavour to serve them by discovering unto them the excesses wherein they engage themselves, and such is the implacable fury with which they pretend to have right according to their Maxims to persecute them, as will not permit us to render unto his name the glory he hath therein deserved. All that we can say therein, to the end we may not leave those who come after us without knowing at least something of a person to whose zeal they will esteem themselves so much obliged, is only this, that he seemed to have been raised to combat and confound the Errours of these Fathers.

He had a mind facile, clear, and solid ; a sweetness and moderation in all respects charming, an humility ingenuous beyond all that can be imagined, stealing away the splendour of his other vertues from the eyes even of his most intimate Friends. His education was admirable, and contributed not a little to the beauty of his Spirit, the purity of his Learning, and the innocence of his Manners. For he was born of a Father who had a care altogether peculiar to him to fortifie happily his Children against popular Errours, to inspire into them the most pure Maxims of the Gospel, and to enlarge their minds with the fairest speculations.

This

This so sage and so Christian conduct helped very much to augment the inclination which he had unto piety; so that he had no sooner finished his course in Philosophy than he proceeded of himself to the study of Divinity, to which he applyed himself with so great success, that being received into the Colledge and Society of *Sorbonne*, he performed all his acts with universal applause, and thereupon received there the Doctors Cap.

The only thing he had to combat with in this his laudable enterprise, was the passionate affection which he had for the Mathematicks. For as this Science is the most assured of all humane Sciences, and almost the only one in which may be found any certainty capable to satisfy a Spirit which loves the truth; the love which he had even to this truth it self, wrought in him so violent an inclination to this Science, that he could not withhold himself from applying and busying his thoughts therein for the inventing some or other new machine. But at length the Holy Spirit, which did conduct his Studies; made him overcome in a little time the propensity he had to these innocent inquiries and curiosities, and he thought that it was not sufficient for a Divine to despise the diversifications of the world, but that he ought also to deprive himself of those of his mind, and he did only search after the truth where it was to be found, that is to say, in the Holy Scripture and in the Books of the holy Fathers. So that we may well say of him what *S. Gregory Nazianzene* said in commendations of his Brother *Cæsarius*, who had greatly loved Astrology and the Mathematicks, that he had the ingenuity to draw out of these sorts of Sciences all that was profitable therein, learning thence to admire the invisible greatneses of God, which were resplendent in his works, and knew to defend himself from that which was pernicious in them, which is the adherence they have, who apply themselves thereunto, to their conjectures and to those truths which they pretend to discover therein.

This generous disengaging himself from all other things, advantaged him not a little in the progress which he made in Ecclesiastical knowledge, and in that part of Divinity which they call Scholastick, which conducts Reason by the light of Faith and Tradition. This his progress appeared more especially in the troubles which agitated the Faculty of Divinity of *Paris* in the year 1656. for he there defended the truth with so great moderation, that he did not render it odious, but on the contrary he did astonish and surprize his enemies.

The zeal he had for it was ardent, but this ardour was tempered by his prudence: and his knowledge was not less modest than his sweetness was couragious; that there might be seen equally lighting in his discourse, the regard which he had not to disoblige any person, and the inflexible firmity which God had given him for the defence of his truth.

The wounds which that renowned Body received then in its Discipline, entred very deep into his heart; and the grief which he received therefrom, increased by the consideration of the mischiefs

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which the Church was threatned with, and which it resents unto this day, began to alter his health, and to indispose him towards that sickness whereof he dyed.

But nothing touched him more to the quick than the corruption which the Jesuits had introduced into the Morality of the Church: He was a mortal enemy to their compliances, and he could not bear with their presumption which bent them to consult no other in their Divinity than their own proper light. He declared against their looseness in all the Ecclesiastick Conferences whereunto he was invited, and he gave himself up particularly in the Sermons and Instructions which he made in the Churches, to fortifie the Faithful against their pernicious Maxims.

His Discourses made so much deeper impression upon their Spirits, because they were sustained by his own examples, and the truths of Christianity were no less visible in his manners, than they were intelligible in his words. He handled all sorts of matters with such exactness and solidity, as if he had employed all his life only in study of some one of them alone; and it might be perceived that he studied in all his Discourses only to clear the understanding, to touch hearts, and heal diseases; and not to puzzle the mind, please the ears, and flatter the diseased.

But the love which he had for the purity of Christian Morals was too great for to suffer him to rest so contented. He believed that to heal well the mischiefs which the Jesuits had done the Church, it was necessary to have a perfect knowledge thereof, and to imitate Physicians who addict themselves to know the bottom of diseases before they apply themselves to any remedy. He gave himself for this cause to read the Books of these Fathers, and to extract out of them the principal Errours, of which he hath composed this Book which we now publish, but at length he could not but sink under so painful and afflicting a labour. His patience found it self exhausted. The grief he had to see the Morality of Jesus Christ so horribly disfigured, seized his heart, and cast him into such a languor as dried him up by little and little, and ravished him away from the Church, after he had received with great resentments of Piety and Religion all the Sacraments at the hands of his upper Pastor.

I will not take in hand to give here an Idea of the design which this excellent Man hath had in this Work, of the order which he hath observed, of the reasons which he hath had to undertake it, and of those in particular which have engaged him to cope with the Doctrine of the Jesuits, because he hath himself given satisfaction in all these points in his Preface.

I shall only answer here to those who have wished that he had not discovered the Errours which are represented in this Work, without refuting them by the true Principles of Christian Morality, which are Scripture and Tradition. They avow that this had been advantageous to the Church; and it was the very design of the Author. But this hinders not but that his labour, although separated from the more large Refutation, may have also its utility. For they who are acquainted with the Affairs of the Church, understand that

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that it is no new thing simply to set down the Errours which the Corrupters of Faith and Manners have attempted to introduce into the Church, without undertaking to combat them by long Reasoning, and that S. *Epiphanius* (as also S. *Austin* observed) hath only represented by way of History the pernicious Opinions of the greater part of Hereticks, without taking in hand to refute them in particular; rehearsing all things with an Historical Narration, but not contending for the truth against falshood by any disputation.

Historica
narratione
commemorans
omnis, nulla
disputatione
adversus falsi-
tatem pro veri-
tate decertans.
S. August. de
Hæres.

I know well that there is cause to believe, by that which S. *Austin* adds presently after, that he had only an Abridgment of the Books of S. *Epiphanius*. But I know also, that if this Saint had seen them all entire, he would still have discoursed after the same manner, and that this Judgment may very justly be passed on them; for that of eighty different Sects, of which *Epiphanius* hath undertaken to report the Errours, he only tracks the foot, as I may say, of them one by one, and refutes in the manner of a Divine only four or five, contenting himself in a few words, and as it were on his way passing by them, to shew the absurdity of the Conceits of those Hereticks, and how far they were distanced from the truth. See how he interprets himself in his Preface concerning the manner in which he had designed to handle these things: *In which truly this one thing we shall perform, that we shall oppose against them as much as in us lies, in a few words, as it were an Antidote, whereby we may expel their poysons, and by Gods help may free any one who either wilfully or un-awares happens to fall into these Heretical opinions, as it were into the poyson of some Serpents.*

In quo qui-
dem hoc unum
præstebimus,
ut adversus illa
quicquid in no-
bis situm erit
paucis uno atq;
altero verbo ve-
lut antidotum
apponamus,
quo & illorum
venena propul-
semus, & secun-
dum Deum
quemlibet qui
vel sponte vel
invitus in hæ-
retica illa dog-
mata velut ser-
pentum virus
inciderit, si
quidem vellet
ipse, liberare
possimus.

This is the same thing which the Author of this Book of Morals, which is now made publick, hath given us to see therein with a marvellous address and vivacity of Spirit. For though he undertake not to refute these Errours of the Jesuits, but only to discover them, he does notwithstanding discover them without making their excesses to appear most plainly; and the opposition also which they have to the truth and sound doctrine. So that according to the progress by which we advance in reading this Book, we find our selves insensibly convinced of the falsities of all the Maxims which are therein related; and our minds filled with the opposite truths; and our hearts piously animated against these so horrible corruptions, and edified by the violence which we observe this Author hath done upon himself for to moderate his zeal, and to keep himself back from refuting opinions so contrary to the common sense of the Faith. *For unto such evils deep sighs and groans are more agreeable than long discourses.*

Cum talibus
malis magis
prolixo gemitus
& fletus quam
prolixo libri de-
beantur S. Aug.
Epist. 122.

Indeed the arguings of the Jesuits which he relates, and whereof they make use to authorize their monstrous opinions, are so evidently contrary to the Principles and Maxims of the Gospel, and to the light of Nature; the abuse to which they put the words of Scripture and the Fathers, is so visible and so gross, and there needs so little discerning to see that they take them in a sense contrary to what they do indeed contain, that these Authors destroy them-
selves,

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elves, and are refuted themselves by themselves, and it suffices simply to report their Doctrine, to make appear that it overturns the Foundations of Religion, and that it is not only opposite to the Wisdom of the Cross and Christian Philosophy, but also to Reason and the Philosophy of the Heathens.

It is true that this corruption is not equally evident in all their Maxims, and that to surprize more easily those who have some fear of God, they do propose these unto them with some kind of temperament, covering them with some specious pretences, which serve for reasons to engage them to follow them without scruple. But the Author of these Morals hath so dextrously unfolded all these Artifices, and all these studied subtilties, and hath so neatly discovered their malignity, that there is no fear that those who read them will suffer themselves to be deceived by them, nor that they can have any confidence in the people, whom he hath made clearly to appear to have a priviledge to speak every thing that they please, and not to contradict themselves at all in speaking things altogether contrary, according to the diversity of places, times, and the interest of their Society; who give themselves the liberty and the right, not only of two contrary opinions, to chuse that which is most for their commodity, but even to follow both the two according to divers occasions, and the different relishes of those who consult with them; finally, who content not themselves only to refute the holy Fathers, the Popes, and the Councils, when they are not for their convenience, but who also take the confidence to make them speak what they please, altogether contrary to what they do speak.

It is true also, that this Author having undertaken to make us see the general corruption which the Jesuits have spread all over the Morals, could not avoid to speak of those matters, which *S. Paul* saith ought not to be proceeded in so far as to be named by Christians; and that he is forced to shew how they would make Marriage, which is the Image of all pure and all holy Union of Jesus Christ with the Church, and which ought to be handled with all honour, to give right to shameful filthinesses, which even the Pagan Philosophers themselves have condemned, according to these excellent words of an ancient Author: *Adulter est uxoris amator acrior. He is an Adulterer who is too eager a Lover of his Wife.*

Notwithstanding he hath been careful not to transcribe those orders, with which *Sanchez* hath filled whole Volumes; among which some have been so scandalous, that they have been left out in some Editions, which yet have been no hinderance to *Tambourin* and *Amadeus* to renew them; where he speaks of these excesses and other such like, it is with such temperance, that discharging the Reader of a good part of the confusion which he might have received thereby, he doth not forbear at all to instruct him sufficiently, and make him conceive all that horroure wherein he ought to have these miserable Writers, who seem principally to be composed to satiate their imagination with most enormous unheard of crimes.

Finally, That which doth yet more justifie the design of the Author of these Morals, and the manner wherein he handles these things,

things, is that now of a long time all these excesses which are herein rehearsed, have been made publick by the Jesuits themselves, who have caused them to be printed and sold, and who have delivered them into the hands of an infinite of Religious persons and Directors of others not very clear sighted, who think that they cannot better learn the Maxims of Christian Morality than in reading the most famous Authors of so celebrated a Society. So that it will be of very great importance to make the corruptions of these Authors so known, that no man may hereafter be mistaken in them. And this cannot be better executed than by proposing those very same Maxims as impious and detestable, which the Jesuits have propounded in their Books as good and safe; this alone being sufficient to work effects altogether contrary in mens spirits, as may be seen in the Example of *Escobar*, who having been imprinted thirty nine times, as a very good Book, hath been now imprinted the fortieth time, as one of the most mischievous Books in the whole World; which hath so wrought, that whereas the first thirty nine Editions were very prejudicial to the Church, this fortieth hath been very beneficial unto it.

And the same we believe may happen in the publication of these Morals, which the alone zeal and love of the purity of the Morality of Jesus Christ hath induced us to make publick. It is hoped that this Publication will prevail to remove the scandal, which the Jesuits have caused from the Church; to which they gave place to the Hereticks to attribute those Opinions for which it hath the greatest horror; and that these unhappy persons who are separated from its communion, shall not impute them unto it any more, after so publick a disavowing of these Maxims altogether abominable as they are; not giving them yet any advantage above the Jesuits themselves, because it is not hard to make appear that the Principles of their Morality are no less corrupted nor pernicious than those of these Fathers.

It is hoped that this Publication will stir up the Pastors of the Church to renew the zeal which they have already made appear against the Authors of so many corruptions; that they will interdict in their Diocesses the reading of these Books; that they will take the ways which the Sacred Canons have prescribed them, (*2 Tim. 2. 17.*) to repress so pernicious Novelties, and that they will hinder them that they spread not over mens spirits, as Gangrenes which waste and corrupt by little and little that which was found; and that they will fear, lest while they dissemble these excesses, and pass by those who are their Authors, they make themselves culpable of the loss of a great number of Souls, which these blind Guides seduce and train along with them into the pit.

We despair not even of the Jesuits themselves, that they also may draw from thence the advantage which this Author hath earnestly desired to procure them. For although it seems by their conduct, which they have hitherto held herein, that they are resolved to persevere in maintaining these damnable Maxims, and to despise the wholesom advertisements which the whole Church hath given them,

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to abandon them ; yet notwithstanding it may be said, that if they have used them in this sort, it hath been perhaps, because they were not yet sufficiently convinced of the justice of the reproaches which have been cast on them, and that some secret interest hath hindred them from perceiving them in the Writings of those whom they looked upon as their Adversaries. But now that a person whom they cannot suspect, and who hath never been engaged against them, hath presented unto them so distinctly the concatenation of the Maxims and Conclusions which their Authors have taught, it will be very hard for them not to be surprized therein, and not to be powerfully struck by so many detestable Opinions. Who knows but God, hearing the prayers, which have now for a long time been ordained by the whole Clergy of *France*, and which have been made publickly in some particular Diocesses, to beg for them, that he would open their eyes, may touch them and bring them on highly to disowne the Authors of so many abominations, and to make it appear by their condemning them themselves as publick Plagues and declared Enemies of all Truth and Justice, that the Crimes with which they have been reproached belong only to some private men, and not to the whole Society.

The approbation of the Doctors hath not been sought after for the Publication of this Book. For besides that there was no apparent need to expose the Approbators to the indignation of a Society, who hold it for a Maxime, that they may with a safe conscience kill them who pretend to hurt them in their reputations, it was believed that this precaution would not be necessary on this occasion. Indeed the Author producing nothing of his own in this Book, and having prescribed unto himself only therein to represent faithfully those Maxims alone of the Jesuits Morals which are notoriously wicked, and which are the very same against which all the Parochial Rectors of the most considerable Towns of the Realm have been stirred up ; so that the Pope, the Bishops, the Sorbonne, and the other Catholick Faculties have condemned by their Censures the Apology of the Casuists ; and that the Faculty of Divinity in *Paris* have now very lately censured in the Books of *Vernant* and *Ama-deus*, we believe all these Censures to be as so many Approbations of this Book, and that for that cause the Pope, the Bishops, the Sorbonne, and the other Faculties, and the Parochial Rectors of the principal Towns of *France* may pass for its Approbators, or at least of the Doctrine contained therein. For as to the knowing whether the Author hath been a faithful Relator of the Propositions of the Authors whom he cites, every one in particular, may well be allowed to judge thereof ; because indeed better Judges of this sort of differences, than the eyes of those who shall have any scruple in this point, cannot be had.


But if the Jesuits and some of the Partisans of their Society complain of this Author, because he hath so exactly represented their Extravagances, there is cause to hope that all other faithful people will be satisfied therewith, because that one may say in truth that he gives by his Book unto every one that which belongs unto him,
and

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and which the Casuists of the Society have used their utmost force to ravish from them. He gives unto God the love, the acknowledgment, and the worship which belongs unto him; to the Church the belief and submission of the Faithful; to worldly Powers their honour and the fidelity of their Subjects, safety to their Estates; to Fathers and Mothers the obedience and respect of their Children; to Children the love and tenderness of their Fathers and Mothers; Conjugal fidelity to Husbands and Wives; to Masters the fidelity of their Servants; to Servants kindness of their Masters; to the Ecclesiasticks Piety and Religion; equity and integrity to Judges; true honour unto the Nobility; fair dealing unto Merchants. Finally, he establishes in the World all those Vertues which the Jesuits seem resolved to banish from thence, that they might entertain and cause to reign there all the disorders which the malice of men or the Devil himself was capable to invent.

The Translators Conjecture concerning the Author of this Advertisement, and of the Book it self.

THis Advertisement seems to be Father *Arnolds*, the Preface and Work his Nephew Monsieur *Pascals*, who is also supposed to have written the Provincial Letters, not without his Uncles privity and assistance; whose head and hand could not be wanting to this Work also, if his. The style much differing, and *Lewis Montalt*, affirming himself to be no Doctor, makes me suspect a third hand to have been made use of in drawing up those Letters; however these Doctors, as I am credibly informed, were the Headcontrivers of them. There are also many passages in the Provincials, which seeming to promise this Work, confirm my Conjecture.



The Preface of the Author.

The Design and Order of this Work.

THE end of Morality, not only among Christians, but also among the Pagans, hath always been to make known that which is good, and to separate it from the bad; to carry men on to vertue and to good actions, and to turn them away from vice and from sin; and in pursuit thereof to teach them the means to proceed from the one to the other. It cannot be shewed, more easily and more evidently, how dangerous and prejudicial the Moral Divinity of the Jesuits is, than by making it appear that it tends and leads to a quite contrary end; and that it walks in ways opposite to Reason and to the Law of Nature, as well as those of Christian Piety; that it confounds good and evil, or to use the words of Scripture, it calls evil good, and good evil; that the more part of the resolutions which it gives upon the points and particular cases which respect conscience, tend to the stopping up in men the lights and motions of conscience it self, and favours lust which corrupts it; that the Principles from which they draw their Resolutions, and the Reasons of which they make use for to support them, are so many means and expedients proper for to authorize vice, to sustain sin, to excuse the most criminal actions, and to entertain looseness and disorder in all sorts of Professions.

This is that which I have a design to make appear in this Book. And to the end that I may before-hand give a general Idea of all that which I handle therein, and represent most clearly the Method and consequence of the means whereof I make use to justify that which I pretend, I will expose here in a few words the whole order and disposition of my Discourse.

I reduce all these matters to certain principal Points, which I handle after such manner and in such order as seems to me most clear and most proper to make appear the consequence of the Moral Doctrine of the Jesuits, the connexion of their Principles with their Conclusions, and the conformity of their practice with their Opinions. For the consort and the resemblance which is between their Doctrine and their Conduct is so perfect, that it is visible it proceeds from the same Spirit, tends to the same end, which is to please men, to satisfy them by flattering their passions and their interests, and to train them up in vice and disorder.

To see clearly the truth of this point, which is the whole subject of this Book, it must first be considered that there seems not possible to be found a way more proper to authorize vice and sin, than to approve and tolerate all that which nourishes them, and to abolish all that which is opposite to them, and may destroy them.

2. That the things which beget and nourish vice and sin, are partly
within

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within man, as corrupt seeds from whence proceed all the evil which he commits; and partly without man, as outward objects, which beating upon his senses and his mind, carry his will to consent unto evil and sin, which abides and acts incessantly within him.

3. That the things which are within man, as the corrupt fountain from whence comes all the disorders and sins which he commits, are lust, ignorance, and evil habits, and hypocrisie, or the secret malice of the heart covered with a veil of good intention; and that the outward things which carry him on unto evil are the occasions of sin, the objects which draw on the evil examples, the evil customs which excite them and nourish them; and above all, humane Authority and humane Reason corrupted by sin, which furnisheth Inventions for continuance in evil, and in the occasions of evil wherein he is engaged, and to justifie or excuse the most criminal actions by imaginary probabilities.

4. That the things which destroy or expel sin are likewise of two sorts, some as if it were internal, and others external. I call those internal which attract to and establish in the heart of man the Grace of God, by which sin is destroyed, such as are Faith, Prayer, Repentance, good Works, and a right use of the Sacraments. I call these external, which do from without represent sin unto a man, whether it be by the knowledge which they give him of its malice, of the hatred which God bears towards it, of the punishments which he hath prepared for it in the other life, and those with which he punisheth it sometimes even in this very life; or which in any other like manner may give him an aversion from it, and hinder him from committing it; as are the Commandments of God, those of the Church, and generally all the holy Scriptures old and new, which contain all the Promises which God hath made to good men, and all the evils with which he doth threaten sinners.

There is no person, I am confident, who will not easily agree to these Truths and general Principles. So that I have nothing to do, but apply them to the particular Subject which I handle, to acquit my self entirely of what I have undertaken to prove, to wit, that the Divinity of the Jesuits is as favourable to vice and sin as possibly it can be. It suffices me for this purpose to make appear that it nourishes lust, ignorance, evil habits, and the corruption of the will, covered with a veil and pretence of a good intention.

That it entertains men in occasions of sin, in evil customs, in licences and abuses, as well publick and common to all, as peculiar to every Profession, making use of humane and corrupt Reason for authorizing these disorders, and to make them pass as good and indifferent, and gives for a Rule of Christian life and the Foundation of eternal life, not Faith and the Word of God, but the Authority of Men, and all the imaginations and thoughts which present themselves unto their minds, provided they can render them probable, and give them some colour and appearance of truth.

That it abolisheth or corrupts Repentance, Prayers, good Works, the Sacraments, the Commands of God, of the Church, and the Holy Scriptures.

That finally it introduceth and confirmeth corruption and looseness in

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all sorts of Professions Seculars and Ecclesiasticks, attempting to justify and excuse those vices and sins which are most opposite thereto, and which are to them for all that most common, as injustice in the Courts, unfaithfulness in Traffick, and other such like.

If I can justify all these things, I have all my design accomplished, and I shall have shewed that the Jesuits Divinity favours and nourishes vice and sin as much as men can do, and that they seem to be become thereof the Advocates and Professors.

Which I hope to do in this Writing with so much clearness, that no person shall be thereof unconvinced, and with such perfect fidelity, that those who are the least equitable, because they are too scrupulous or too passionate, shall have nothing to reproach me with on this Subject. For I will do nothing else but report simply the Opinions of the Authors Jesuits as they have expressed themselves in their Books. I will frequently add their proper Reasons, and in the more important Points I shall sometimes ascend to the Principles from whence they draw their Conclusions.

I undertake not to refute their Errors, but only to discover them, and make them appear. This is the cause why without engaging my self to produce the places of holy Scripture or of Tradition, any more than the Reasons which may be alledged to refel them, I content my self to consider and represent them in such sort, that they may be understood what they are; and many times I content my self to reberse them as they themselves expresse them, when that is sufficient to raise an horrour against them. When the malice is more concealed, I endeavour to discover it, and to make it evident by some Reflections or some Observations, or by Examples and sensible Comparisons: and if I make use of any Reasons, I take them in a manner always from themselves, or from Principles of Faith and natural Light, which are altogether indubitable, and so evident, that to oppose them, were to renounce common sense, as well as Christian Piety and Religion.

I meddle not here with matters of Faith, nor Mysteries of Religion, where it was as easie to make appear that the Jesuits are no less transported than in the Maxims of Morality, as will appear clearly by one Example out of the Chapter (of Jesus Christ) which I thought should be added to that of Grace. There may be seen in what manner they speak of the Son of God; of his Incarnation, of his Humanity, of his Divine Person, and that they have thereof thoughts so base, so unworthy, so shameful, that they are not more proper for any end than to expose our Mysteries to the scorn and contempt of Infidels and Libertines, and to raise horrour and aversation in the Faithful themselves by their impious expressions and reasonings, by which they profane Holiness it self, and destroy the respect and veneration which ought to be given it.

I insist upon Moral matters only, and even without design to contain them all. I should need many Volumes only to make an Extract of that which may be found in their Books contrary to good Manners and to Christian Piety. I intend only to collect some principal Propositions by which Judgment may be made of the rest. I report them simply as they are in their Books. And when I translate them, I will

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set the passages on the Margin in Latine, to the end that the fidelity and sincerity with which I recite them may appear.

If amongst many passages which I commonly produce on the same Subject, there be some which appear not clear enough, there may be found in others that which seems to be wanting in them. But I have reason to believe that there is no cause to reproach me herein, for I have taken a particular care not only to speak things, so as I understood them, but also to enter as far as I could into the very thoughts of the Fathers whom I have alledged, knowing that it is never lawful to wound Justice or Charity under a pretence of combating Error, and defending Truth, and that Error it self may not be assailed, nor Truth defended by lying and disguisement.

I am so far from desiring to augment this evil, or to exaggerate these things, that I oftentimes abstain from speaking as I could without departing from my design. They that have any love or knowledge of the Truth, will easily perceive this my moderation, and they will oftentimes find nothing else to reprove me for in many important points, but that I have not spoken enough therein, and that I give over many times where they would cry out to me that I ought to go on, and follow my Subject to the utmost.

If there be any who find herein expressions which seem to them to be too vehement, and far removed from that sweetness and moderation which they love; I beseech them not to judge according to their disposition, but according to the things whereof I speak. The passion or the preoccupation they may be under, either for the pernicious Maxims which I represent, or for the Authors, or for the Defenders of them, may be capable to perswade them that I ought to have spoken of them with so much respect and moderation, as belongs to the most serious and holy things. But the reason and the nature even of the things themselves may easily undeceive them, if they consider that expressions ought to correspond with their Subjects, and that it would introduce a disproportion, to represent those things which are ridiculous and contemptible as seriously as if they were not, and that this were to give too much advantage to presumption and insolence, which speaks proudly to make Error triumph over Truth, and to give it in some sort the victory, to treat it otherwise than with such force and vigour as is capable to repress and humble it.

So it is that Truth would be defended, and hath it self declared that it will one day revenge it self on them that have assailed it with scorn and obstinacy, only bruising their heads, but also insulting over them, that they may be covered with confusion.

So that I have some cause to fear in this point on the behalf of Truth, that I have been rather too reserved than too free. And it seems that they who have any love for it, may complain of me, that I have not defended it with force and ardour enough in an encounter where it hath been assaulted by a very extraordinary Conspiracy of persons who for their own interest, sufficiently well known, have endeavoured to blot out of the memory of the Faithful, and Books of the Church the most pure and safe Maxims concerning the Regulation and Conduct of Christian life and Manners.

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And I may perhaps have some trouble to defend my self from this reproach, and to hinder that it be not believed, That I have not defended the Cause of the Church and of Truth with the zeal which they deserved, but that I have already declared that I have not at all undertaken properly to defend it, or refute those who have assailed and hurt it so cruelly; but to make appear only the Errours and the pernicious Maxims by which they have overturned all Discipline and all the Rules of Manners and Christian life, even the most holy and best established upon the Scriptures and Books of the Saints, and also by their Examples.

Hercunto I have limited and obliged my self in this Work. It may be God will raise up some other who shall go on where I leave, and will undertake to refute fully the Errours which I have discovered, and to establish by the Principles of Faith and Tradition the Truths which I have only noted in my passage. The manner in which this first Book shall be received, and the profit which will come thereon, may procure a disposition to receive also yet better another of greater importance, and be a motive to engage God to stir up some other person to labour therein. We are all in his hands, our travels and our thoughts, whereof the first and principal ought to be never in any thing to have other than his designs. He knows that which he hath given me in this Work, is no other than to perform some Service to his Church and my Neighbour. I beseech him to bless it with success, leaving it to his Providence to dispose of it according as he shall please, and I do for the present accept with all respect and submission whatsoever he shall ordain thereof.

The Necessity and Utility of this Work.

IF the pernicious Maxims of the Jesuits Morality should for the present be presented no otherwise than in an extract, without adding any thing thereto but what is found in their Authors, the World is at this day so indifferent in things which respect their Salvation and Religion, there would be found very few persons who would be touched therewith, or who would take any pains to consider them.

But it is come to pass by the particular order of Divine Providence, that he who hath enterprised to discover them some years ago, hath expressed them in a manner so taking, that hath attracted the whole World unto him to read them by the grace of his style, and thereupon hath made them easily to appear odious and insupportable by their proper excesses and extravagancies.

This so happy beginning had hath success much more happy; for mens minds being touched with a desire to know particularly things so important and so prejudicial to their Consciences and Salvation, my Masters the Parochial Rectors of Rouen and Paris have in pursuit thereof published with a zeal worthy of their Charge many learned Writings, which have given to all the World enough of instruction and light to conceive the distance and horrour they ought to keep towards that wicked Doctrine, and the danger whereinto they put them who follow these Guides who pursue or practise them.

But as their design was only to make a speedy order against an evil which then did but begin to appear, they believed that it was sufficient
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to advise their people thereof in general terms, in notifying unto them some of the more pernicious propositions, without extending them further to discover their principles, consequences, and unhappy effects, as it had been easie for them to do; and they thought that to strangle them in their birth, it would have been sufficient only to expose them to the view of the whole World, being in themselves so odious and monstrous, and to oppose themselves to those that teach them, as the Shepherds obliged to resist the Wolves who would devour their flock. Yet they omitted not to have recourse to the Authority of the Church, and to address their complaints and requests to my Lords the Bishops and to the General Assembly of the Clergie of France, in the year 1656. who seeing that it was not at all in their power at that time to do them justice, did at least make it known to the whole Church, that opportunity only was wanting unto them. And for that cause ordained that the Instructions of S. Charles should be imprinted by the order of the Clergie, with a circular Letter to all my Lords the Prelates, which served to prejudge their opinions, and to give as it were a commencement to the condemnation of all these Maxims in general, expecting till some opportunity were offered to do it more solemnly.

The voice of these charitable Pastors was heard and faithfully followed by their sheep, who by the submission they owed to them, and through the confidence which they had in their honesty and sufficiency, entred into an aversion against this new Doctrine, as soon as it was declared unto them, that it was contrary to the Doctrine of the Church and that of the holy Fathers.

It were also to be wished, that this same voice which came from Heaven, being Jesus Christ speaks in the Church by its Pastors, had turned, or at leastwise stayed the Authors of this Doctrine, and had kept them in silence, and that they had themselves also suppressed these strange opinions and pernicious Maxims, against which they saw the whole World to rise with a general indignation, and with a most just zeal.

But this did nothing but provoke them yet more, so that instead of receiving Christian-like the charitable correction of these worthy Pastors of Souls, they had the confidence to appear in publick to maintain so great Errours by Writings yet more wicked; imitating those fierce beasts, who issue in fury out of the Forests and Dens to defend their young when they are about to be taken from them.

My Masters the Parochial Rectors had by an extraordinary temperance and moderation suppressed the names of the Jesuits, and not distinguished them from the other Casuists, attacking the Doctrine only without touching the persons of any particular Order. But these good Fathers could neither lye hid, nor keep silence, and judged themselves unworthy of the favour which they had received upon this occasion. And as if this Doctrine had been their own particularly, they would needs declare themselves the Defenders of it, as indeed they are the principal and even the first Authors thereof in many of its most important points. They made for it an Apologie, wherein so very far were they from disavowing and retracting those pernicious Maxims wherewith they were reproached, that they did highly maintain them, and to testifie that they never intended to recant them, they have declared
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that in many matters wherein their excesses are most visible; they can yet speak more, and give yet more licence to their spirits.

An evil so publick and so obstinate cannot be healed nor stayed by simple words. Which thing hath obliged my Masters the Parochial Rectors, to renew their complaints and their instances to my Lords the Prelates.

Some of them have already worthily acquitted themselves in this their duty to the Church and People who depend on their charge. And it is hoped that the zeal and charity of the rest will press them to give the same testimony unto the truth; and that if some of them, for some particular reasons, cannot do it so solemnly as they desire, yet they will not cease to condemn in their hearts, and upon occasions which shall be offered, this novel Doctrine, and to keep those whom they can at a distance from it, as a most pernicious Divinity.

After all this, it was thought to be high time farther to discover this Doctrine, and to represent it in the whole extent it hath in the Books of the Jesuits, that the corruption and the venom of it might be better known. It had been to little purpose to have done it sooner, because that the excess and overthrow it hath given to all the true Rules of Morality and Christian piety, are so great and so incredible, that the world having yet never heard any thing like unto it, would have been surprized at the novelty and impiety of the principal Maxims of these dreadful Morals: so that many would have been troubled to believe it; others would have been offended at it; and many would have altogether neglected it, and would not so much as have taken the pains only to have informed themselves so far as that they might not suffer themselves to be surprized therein.

The Jesuits themselves would not have failed to have broken out into complaints, calumnies, and impostures, which are common with them in use against such as discover their secrets, and the shame of their Divinity: and they would have employed all their artifices and disguises to elude or obscure the most clear things wherewith they should have been reproached, though they had been represented simply as they are expressed in their Books.

But yet notwithstanding that these pernicious Maxims had been confounded and decryed by my Masters the Parochial Rectors, fulminated by the censures of the Bishops, there is cause to hope that exposing them to the day will be useful to many of the Faithful, and hereby will be seen more clearly the justice and necessity of the pursuits which the Parochial Rectors made for obtaining a censure of them, the equity of the Judgment of the Prelates made in pursuance thereof, and the obligation which all the Faithful have upon them to stifle these Monsters of Error and Impiety, which multiply continually, and prey upon the Church. So that this will even contribute very much to redouble the submission and confidence which they ought to have towards their Pastors, seeing from what mischiefs their vigilance and their zeal hath preserved them, and with what prudence and wisdom they have conducted them in this affair, having not discovered the greatness of the evil to them before, as it may be said, they had delivered them from it.

And it may also come to pass, that the Authors and Defenders of these wicked

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wicked Doctrines may themselves be surprized and have horrow, when they see together in a sequence of Principles and Conclusions the opinions which they have maintained to this present. Because it is very common for things good or evil, which apart make no great impression upon the spirit, surprize and touch it powerfully when as they are united and joynd together.

There is also cause to be believe that many of those who have followed unto this present these novel Maxims of the Jesuits, only because they did not perceive all the unhappy consequences and pernicious effects of them, now coming to know them, as this Book will give them means to do, will relinquish them with joy, and those who shall adhere to them, through passion or interest may be brought to testifie the horrow they have conceived against them, by the renunciation which they shall make of them, or at least by the silence they shall keep, and wherein they shall bury them, so as neither to hold nor teach them any more for the future.

But if they shall not draw hence the fruit which is desired, and they persist both the one and the other to maintain the same Maxims, they testifie openly hereby, that they also admit all the consequences, whereof they cannot be ignorant any longer. And by consequence they shall make themselves responsible for all the consequences and all the unhappy effects which are therefrom inseparable. And if after all this they make an out-cry in the world, and hold themselves offended when such disorders are imputed to them, and when they are declared the Authors and Cherishers of these Irregularities, of Corruption, of Libertinism, which are spread over all conditions in these last times, they cannot attribute it to any other than themselves, because they are reproached with nothing but what they have avowed themselves, in that they would not disavow it, after it hath been represented unto them, and they have been condemned by the Church.

The Faithful shall at least draw hence this advantage, that they may hereby discover the false Prophets and false Pastors from the good and true ones, and take heed of those who under a pretence of piety do corrupt piety it self, seducing simple and innocent souls, so far as to endeavour to hale them out of the bosom of their true and lawful Pastors, and to turn them away from their conduct, and engage them in horrible precipices.

Reasons wherefore we take the Morals of the Jesuits for the Subject of this Book rather than those of other Casuists.

THAT I produce in this Work no other Authors than those of the Society of the Jesuits, is not through any passion towards them, or toward others. For though I speak not of other Casuists; yet do I not neglect them entirely, as neither do I approve them, nor excuse them, in their opinions which they have common with the Jesuits, and which are conformable to those which I reprove.

But as he who would cut down a Tree, amuses not himself in cutting off the branches one after another, but betakes himself to its body and root, which being cut, the branches must necessarily fall; and so, I

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believe, that destroying the pernicious Doctrine of the Jesuits, touching Manners, and Cases of Conscience, I overturn all at once, whatsoever there is conformable unto it amongst the new Casuists, because they are in a manner all their Disciples; having learned that which they say in their Schools, or in their Books.

After all this, the Jesuits declare themselves the Masters of this sort of new Learning, and they give this name to their principal Authors, whom they would have pass for the Doctors and Masters of the whole World. And they would, even that they might assure themselves of the possession of these Titles, eject the holy Fathers therefrom, endeavouring to hinder men from hearing them, from following them, and from imitating the example and holiness of their lives by this pernicious Maxime which they have invented and established, as a Principle of their Divinity; that it is not the ancient Fathers, but the new Divines and Casuists of these times, who must be taken for the Rule of Manners and Christian life.

Quæ circa
fidem emer-
gunt difficul-
tates consona ve-
teribus sancien-
da; quæ vero
circa mores ho-
mine Christia-
no dignos à no-
vetis scriptori-
bus. Reginald.
Præfat. ad lect.

It is with the same Spirit that did testifie so great an esteem for Novelty, they profess to follow it, and many amongst them, as Posæ, Celot have taken in hand to defend it, to praise it, and to make Apologies for it. And hereby without doubt they designed to make the presumption pass for current, that they borrowed nothing at all from others, and especially nothing from the Ancients, but that they produced their Opinions themselves, and found them in their own heads; and that they have no other Rule for their conduct and their knowledge, but their own sense and humane reason, and not the Authority of the Saints; and that being as it were Independents, they ought not to pass for Children of the Fathers, and for Disciples of the holy Doctors, but Masters of Novelties amongst the Authors of these times.

But although they think hereby to exult their Doctrine, and to acquire more honour unto it, they disgrace and ruine it themselves in effect; because that Novelty hath always been blamed as a mark of Errour, not only by the Catholicks, but also by the Hereticks, who have always affected and attempted to make people believe, that their Doctrine, as well as their Religion, were ancient, so that there were never any found, who would suffer themselves to be reproached, much less who would boast themselves to advance new Maxims, as is to be seen in the Example of the Lutherans and Calvinists, who vaunt themselves, though falsely, to follow the Doctrine of the ancient Church and of the Disciples of Jesus Christ, and hold it for a great injury to be called Innovators, though indeed they be such.

The Jesuits, on the contrary, seem to affect this odious Title, since they despising the Authority of the holy Fathers, and renouncing the Doctrine of the Ancients, prefer Novelty before them, and make open profession to follow and invent new Opinions, which none had ever produced before them, as is manifestly seen in the proper declaration of Molina, Posæ, Amicus, Maldonat, and as may easily be proved by many other Casuists of the Society.

As they are the chief Masters in this novel Science, so they are solicitous to make themselves many Disciples, who in time becoming Masters, make up a Body so puissant, and an Assembly of probable Doctors

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so numerous, that it would be hard to find so many in all other Societies taken altogether. So that whether we consider the Votes, or compute them, they will still prevail above all others, and remain the sole Arbiters and Masters of this new Morality.

And the better to maintain themselves for ever in this advantage above other Casuists and novel Doctors, knowing that Empire and Dominion amongst the Learned as well as amongst the Vulgar, is supported by union, and ruined by division, they are expressly ordered by their Superiors to agree in the same opinions, and to maintain them all at least as probable, and above all, when they are advanced by some of the Heads and principal Authors of the Society, and they believe that the interest and honour of their whole Body is in question.

This Conspiracy in the same Opinions whereto the Glory of the Society hath engaged them, does hold them fastned thereto with so much obstinacy, that no Consideration nor Authority whatsoever, no not even of the Church, can oblige them to acquit them; or if they quit them, being forced thereunto by the publick Complaints and Censures, it is only in appearance, and for a time, and they afterwards resume their very same opinions, and maintain and publish them as before, as one may see in the Books of the English Jesuits, of Sanctarel, of Bauny, of Celot, and of Posa, and of divers others, who having been censured by the Church, they have disavowed and suppressed them for a season, but have shortly after produced them with the same opinions, which had been condemned in them, and with the approbation of the Superiors of their Company.

They have also established upon the same foundation the insupportable confidence which they have had unto this present to handle the Cases of Conscience, and to govern Souls; not only in an imperious manner; but in a kind of Tyranny, and to pass over all the primitive and true Laws of Christian Morality and Discipline, that they may regulate all things according to their own proper reason and sense, and sometimes against their own proper thoughts, by their will only, regarding nothing but their own interest, and the satisfaction of the world, whom they endeavour to please, by conducting them rather according to their desires, than according to the Rules of Truth, and for their Salvation.

It is by this confidence joyned to so great complacency, that they labour to introduce themselves in the world more than all others who hold their Maxims, and endeavour to get credit with all persons, great and small, who finding their Divinity favourable to their interest and their passions, do easily follow their advice and their conduct. And so they easily diffuse every where the venom of their pernicious Doctrine, which brings looseness and corruption into all sorts of conditions, as we shall make it evidently appear at the end of this Extract.

These reasons have obliged me to take the Jesuits Morals for my Subject in this Book, rather than those of others who are in the same opinions, considering that they are the first Masters of this new Science; that they surpass others in number of Writers, as well as they believe themselves to surpass them in knowledge; that they are the Inventors of many Opinions, and those the most pernicious; that they are all of a piece, and agree together to sustain them; that they are most obstinate

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in defending them, even then when they are condemned; that they are most advenyrous and most insinuating to diffuse them unto the world, and most complacent to cause them to be received.

So that I believe I shall combat all the corruption which Novelty hath introduced into Christian Morality, by fastning upon the Divinity of the Jesuits, since it is all inclosed therein, as in the fountain from whence it diffuseth it self into the spirits of other new Casuists, who imitatethem, and into the consciences of the people of the world who follow them, because of the facility of their conduct, who permit them every thing that they will, and sometimes more than they durst hope for.

The Order of the Matters of this Book.

I Distribute all this Book into three Books. In the first, I will handle the Principles of Sin, to make appear that the Jesuits do establish and nourish them. In the second, I will speak of the Remedies of Sin, to shew that they abolish or alter them. In the third, I will examine the particular Duties of every Profession, and the Sins which they do ordinarily commit, to shew that they excuse and favour these last, and dispense with the first, by abolishing and obscuring them in such manner, that they appear not at all.

The first Book shall have two Parts. The first shall be of the Interior Principles of Sin, and the other of the Exterior. I will divide every Part into so many Chapters as there are Principles of Sin, which I shall take notice of. And when the abundance of matter, or the diversity of questions shall require it, I shall divide also the Chapters into Articles, the Articles into Points, and the Points into Paragraphs; I shall keep the same order in the other Books.



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T H E
F I R S T B O O K.
 Of the Inward and Outward
Principles of S I N.

T H E F I R S T P A R T :

Of the Inward Principles of Sin.

These Principles are Lust, Ignorance, Ill Habits, the Intention, and the Matter, or the Object of Sin. I will treat severally of these five internal principles of Sin, in so many different Chapters.

CHAPTER I. *Of Lust in general.*



Charity and Lust divide our whole life: these are the two Trees of the Gospel, of which the one produceth always good fruits, and the other can produce none but bad. As all the good which we do comes from the Spirit of God, who works it in us, and causes us to do it, forming in our hearts those good desires which are as it were the seed thereof: in the same manner Concupiscence, which every one beareth within him, is the general source of all the temptations which we feel; or, to speak better, it is a

20 continual temptation, which carries us on to evil and sin, in drawing us without ceasing, by secret solicitations, to sensual and temporal good, which serve for a bait and entertainment to our passions. This is that which made St. Leo to say, ² *That he committed no sin without lust; and that every unlawfull desire is a sickness and disorder, which comes from that violent motion which carries us on unto evil.*

So that to justify that the Divinity of the Jesuits makes an entertainment for sin, we need no other proof, neither can any better be brought, than to shew that it favoureth and nourisheth the lusts of men as much as it can upon all occasions, as I shall make clearly appear in the whole progresse of this Book, by the simple representation of their Opinions and their Maximes.

This Chapter of Lust in general will notwithstanding not be unprofitable; for that as our bodies are so composed of four qualities and four humours, that there is alwayes one which is predominant and prevails above all others, and

which at length gives the name unto the temperament, and causes one to be stiled melancholique, and another cholérique; thus likewise our souls are so, I will not say compos'd, but corrupted, by the lusts and passions which sin hath produced therein, that there is no person who carries them not all in his bosome enclosed in concupiscence, which is thereof the spring and principle, although they appear not, nor act altogether equally in all sorts of persons; yet there is commonly one more strong than the rest, which domineers in every person, and which seems to be as it were proper unto him, adhering to his nature, his age, his manner of living, and his condition or profession: so we see that the lusts and passions of young people are other than those of the ancient; that those of persons of great Birth, are different from those of Peasants, and Artificers; and those of Merchants from those of Lawyers.

For this cause, that I may compleatly accomplish the design I have undertaken, to prove that the Divinity of the Jesuits doth favour the lusts and passions of men so much as is possible for it, and consequently those sins which are the products and effects thereof, I will make it appear that in every condition and profession they cherish the lust and vice which is peculiar thereunto; as namely, the covetousnesse and frauds of Merchants, the Ambition and Vanity of the Nobility, the injustice of Officers. But first of all I will say something in general of the more common lusts and passions, which are found in all men, and are in them as it were the spring of corruption, the matter of vices, and the cause of all sins, as *Hate, Pride, Covetousness, Uncleaness, Gluttony, and Injustice*. For this purpose, I will divide this first Chapter into 6. Articles.

ARTICLE I. Of Hatred.

That the Divinity of the Jesuits entertains aversions against our Neighbour: that it permits to wish, and do him ill, and even to kill him, though it be for temporal concernments; yea, though also you be assured that in killing him you damn him.

^a Bauny in his Summe, ch. 7. p. 81.

BAUNY in his Summe, after he had delivered unto us the marks of an irreconcilable hatred in these terms: ^a *The third mark of hatred against our neighbour, is not to be willing to accompany him, to have such an alienation, and so violent from him, as not to refuse to talk with him upon any matter whatsoever, nor to assist him in his businesse, or not to pardon him at all when he acknowledges his faults, and offers reasonable satisfaction.* And after he hath reported two authorities and two passages, one of St. Ambrose, and the other of St. Austen, in which these holy Doctors shew us the obligation we have to love, and wish well to one another, and to serve one another as members of the same body, he concludes boldly in this manner; *Notwithstanding I believe it is no mortal sin to be wanting in these points, if it be not in case of scandal; that is to say, it is never, or almost never, mortal sin, according to the doctrine which he establisheth, Chap. 39. p. 623. that a man is not capable of the sin of scandal, but when by a formal design he doth some thing to destroy his neighbours soul; which is a design of hell, and which seems not easily to come into the spirits of other persons than the damned and Devils.*

^b *An indignatio non volentis videre vel audire eum cui irascitur, sit mortale peccatum? Communiter veniale esse Tolæus affirmat. De Escob. Tract. 2. Exam. 2. de peccatis, n. 98. p. 304.*

Anthony de Escobar says the same thing briefly in his Moral Divinity, where, after he hath put this question; ^b *If that indignation, which is the cause that a man will neither see nor speak with him against whom he is angry, be a mortal sin?* He answers, that Tolæus assures us, *That ordinarily this is but a venial sin.*

The words of this Jesuit are of great weight with his Society, because first of all he professes to advance nothing of his own, and withall to borrow nothing of Authors that are strangers; but only to report in every matter the opinion of the Doctors and Writers of the Society. ^c *I sincerely declare, saith he, that*

^c *Hoc ingenue profiteor, me nihil toto libello scripisse, quod Societatis Jesu non acceperim ex Doctore. Quas enim proprias passim resolutiones in uno, ex schola Societatis aperte ductas existimaverim. De Escobar in Idæa operis, in fine.*

I have written nothing in all this Book, which I have not taken out of some Doctor of the Society of Jesus; and I would not have it believed that the resolutions which I have ordinarily given as my own, are any other than conclusions evidently drawn from the principles of the School of the Society.

2. Of all the Casuists of the Society he chose 24. particularly, the most knowing and experimented, whom he considered and hearkned to as his Masters, or rather as the Masters of all the World, and he represents them as sitting upon 24. Thrones, to teach the whole Church, abusing in this that place of the Revelation; where 24. Elders sitting about the Throne of God are spoken of.

^a I present unto you, saith he, 24. Jesuits sitting on so many Thrones, having chosen them as the most antient and most elevate of the Society, not only for age, but also for knowledge, that is Sanctius, Azor, Tolet, &c.

60 3. Neither yet doth he take indifferently all that these knowing-men have said or written, he hath chosen that only which is best and most certain in every of them, concerning all the matters which they handle, yet without depriving himself of the liberty of reporting also out of other Authors of the Society whatsoever he could that was good in them. ^b In every matter, saith he, I have kept close peculiarly to the principal Authors of the Society, and I have chosen out of them the best, and as it were the marrow of their discourse, leaving it to the discretion of Confessors to make use thereof, as they shall judge to be convenient.

4. And that he might give all kind of repute to these 24. Elders of the Society, whom he compares to the 24. Elders of the Revelation, he proposes their Resolutions in matter of Conscience, as so many Revelations made unto them, and which they had received from the mouth of God and Jesus Christ. Here are his terms; ^c I only report the Revelation which the Lamb hath made to the principal Jesuits whom he hath chosen for his Secretaries, whose Writings I have devoured; like as St. John in the Revelation devoured the Book presented to him by the Lamb.

70 After this none can easily judge, but that the Resolutions of these Authors ought to pass in the Society, not only for common and assured Opinions, but also for Oracles, and almost for Articles of Faith, of which they are not permitted to doubt. And indeed the Book of this Jesuit is in so great reputation in the Society, and they have so dispersed it all over, that it hath been already printed 39. times, as is observed in the first Page.

Emanuel Sa, who laboured near upon 40. years in the study of Moral Divinity, and to compose a Book, which he hath published in form of Aphorisms, as he saith himself in his advice to the Reader, treating of Charity, is not contented to say with *Bann* and *Escobar*, that one may without mortal sin desire never more to behold ones Enemy; but he addes thereto, that it is permitted to desire his death, and to be well pleased that it is come upon him. ^d You may, saith he, desire the death of an Enemy that is capable of doing you much hurt, provided you do not this out of hatred, but only to avoid the evil which he would do you. It is also permitted you to joyce in his death, because of the good which may come to you thereby.

We need only, according to this Author, love our own Interest, that we may without crime desire the death of our Neighbour, and joyce in it when it befalls him. That is to say, that Covetousness or Ambition may justifie a murderous and inhumane soul; and that instead of being doubly culpable, it ought to pass for innocent. For he condemns only these who desire the death of a man in a frolick, and without being transported by any interest.

80 There is no Murderer nor Parricide who may not very well fit unto himself this maxim, and who may not easily make use thereof to cover his crime and his passion. If you reproach him, that in the sight of God he hath killed his Brother by the will and desire he hath had to see him dead, he will tell you with this Jesuit, that he had not desired his death, but that he feared he would do him some mischief: *non odio, sed ad vitandum damnum*, not out of hatred, but to avoid damage; or because he might hinder him from enjoying some good, *ob bonum inde secutum*. So almost all mortal hatreds, and all revenges shall be permitted, because they do not arise commonly but from worldly inte-

^a Consider le-
ctiores 24. Je-
suita seniores
quidem, non æ-
tate solum, sed
scientia, videli-
cet Sanctius, A-
zorius, Toletus,
&c. Ibid. in
principio.

^b Qualibet in
materiâ in pri-
mis authorum
Societatis ex-
haurio medullam
Confessionum
iam ex am a expo-
nentiam. Ibid.
ad finem.

^c Ego solummq-
do memoro re-
ferationem fa-
ctam ab Agno
suis authoribus
Jesuitis, quo-
rum scripta ab-
sumere curavi.
Ibid. ad finem.

^d Potes optare
hosti tibi aliqui
valde nocituro
mortem, non
odio, sed ad vi-
tandum dan-
num tuum: item
de morte ejus
gaudere ob bo-
num inde secu-
tum. Emanuel
Sa, verbo Char-
ritas, n. 5. p. 46.

rest of Ambition, Covetousness, and Pleasure; and it belongs only to Devils and Desperadoes to desire the death of men of pure malice, and without design of drawing therefrom any worldly advantage.

Bauny extends this maxim indifferently to all sorts of persons, and giveth the self-same liberty to a Mother, who, according to him, may desire the death of her Children. *One* may, saith he in the 6. Chapter of his Summe, p. 73. desire evil to befall his Neighbour without sin, when he is urged thereunto by any good motive. So *Bonacina* on the First Commandment, d. 3. q. 4. n. 7. exempts a Mother from all fault who desired the death of her Daughters, ^a when she could not dispose of them in marriage according to her desire, because of their deformity and poverty; or because for their sakes she was abused by her Husband, or injured. For she did not properly detest her Daughters out of a displeasure towards them, but in detestation of her own evil.

^a Quando ob deformitatem aut inopiam nequeat juxta animi sui desiderium eas nuptui tradere; quia occasione earum male secum agitur à marito, aut injuriis afficitur. Non enim proprie detestatur filias ex displicentia earum, sed in detestationem proprii mali.

He terms a lawfull motive to carry a Mother on to desire the death of her Daughters, *the want of beauty*, for that they were not handsome, *ob deformitatem*, or because they were not rich enough, *aut inopiam*: and because she could not marry them according to her desire, that is, not after her ambition, or so advantageously as she would.

I leave it to the Reader to reflect upon this abominable maxim, and to draw consequences from it. I wonder only that *Bauny* did not carry it yet farther, and said not, that this Mother might procure the death of her Daughters, as well as desire it, provided she might do it without scandal. For this seems to be the necessary consequence of his opinion; for she may do that which she may desire; the things which are lawfull to be desired cannot be other than good and lawfull. And indeed this is the Doctrine of the Society, and almost of all the Jesuits, asserting and maintaining it in other matters, changing only the examples and not the maxime, as I shall shew when I come to speak of Murder. I will here only report as it were by way of advance one passage of *Lessius*, who assures us, ^b That it is permitted to a man of Honour to kill an enemy, who with intent to affront him, attempts to give him a blow with a cudgel, or a box on the ear, if he cannot otherwise avoid this dishonour. And a little after, repeating the reason for which one may attempt the life of another, and deprive him thereof, he speaks in this manner; ^c The fourth case in which you may kill without sin, is when by false reports attempt is made to decry you in the spirit of a Prince, a Judge, or other persons of Honour, and that you cannot otherwise hinder this wrong they would do you in your reputation, than by killing him secretly, who is the author thereof. P. Navarre n. 375. inclines very much to agree, that it is lawfull to kill this Enemy. Bannes holds the same opinion the more probable, q. 64. art. 7. d. 4. And he adds, That we may affirm the same thing, though the crime whereof he accuseth us were true, so it be secret.

^b Dico secundo fas etiam est viro honorato occidere in vasorem, qui sustem vel alapam nititur impingere, ut ignominiam inferat, si aliter hæc ignominia vitari nequit. Lessius de just. & jure l. 2. c. 9. p. 81.

^c Quantum modus est, si nomini meo falsis criminationibus apud Principem, Judicem, vel viros honoratos detrabere nitaris, nec ulla ratione possim illud damnum fame avertere, nisi te occulte interficiam. Petrus Navarrus n. 375. inclinat licitum esse talem è medio tollere: eandem tanquam probabiliorum defendit Bannes, q. 64. art. 7. d. 4. addens idem dicendum etiam si crimen sit verum, si tamen est occultum. Lessius ibid. n. 81.

In this case, and these examples of *Bauny*, *Escobar*, *Sa*, and *Lessius*, the three principal degrees of Hatred against our Neighbour may be remarked; the first is to have and entertain an ill will, and an irreconcilable aversion against him, so as not to be willing either to see or speak with him any more; the second is, to desire his death; the third is, actually to kill him. And all this is lawfull, or it is no great sinne, according to the Divinity of these Authors the Jesuits.

After this that might be justly said of those who teach these pernicious maxims, as well as of those that practise them upon their word, which our Saviour Christ said of Tyrants; ^d They kill the body, and after there is nothing that they can do; if they did not proceed yet farther, and gave power to make souls perish also as well as bodies, in permitting to kill him from whom we fear to receive any displeasure, or any damage in reputation or temporal good, though we be assured that he shall be damned.

^d Occidunt corpus, & post hæc non habent amplius quid faciant. Luc. c. 12. v. 4.

This is the opinion ^a of *Molina*, who saith, that this circumstance ought not to hinder a *Quod autem*
 from killing him; and that there is no Law of Justice, nor even of charity it self, *circumstantia*
 which obligeth us to spare the eternal life of his soul, no more then that of his body. *illa etoni inco-*
 This is also the opinion ^b of *Amicus*, who, that he might better expresse his mind, *gnitus in justo ag-*
 upon this case, proposes an example of a man who had committed a mortal Sin, and *gressus non in-*
 afterwards was drunk, or fallen into madnes: he assures us that if he assaile us in *pediat, affirmat*
 this estate, we ought not to make any difficulty to kill him, though we know assured- *caus. 2. 2. q.*
 ly that he is in mortal sin, and by consequence that he shall be damned. *64. art. 7.*
Molina de
just. commut.
tit. 3. d. 13.

n. 1. p. 1762. *Tunc lege charitatis non est necesse praeponere vitam illius spiritalem nostrae propriae corporali, imo vero*
neque nostro honori, aut bonis nostris externis quae ille injuste velit à nobis auferre. ^b *Quid si invasor sit cibus vel*
amens ad tempus, quem ante amentiam mihi certo constat fuisse in peccato mortali, & cum eo in amentiam incidisse?
Respondeo ex S. l. v. eodem art. 7. q. 3. adhuc in ejusdem amentia licite posse invasum contra invasorem suae vitae cum mo-
deramine culpatae intellae, usque ad necem invadentis se defendere. *Amicus tom. 5. de just. & jurc. d. 36. sect. 5.*
 n. 85. p. 408.

This is also the Doctrine of the four and twenty Elders of the Society, or rather
 it is the opinion of all the Society reported by *Escobar*, who hath placed this decision
 amongst the Oracles which the Lamb hath pronounced by the mouth, and written
 by the pen of the Jesuits, whom he hath chosen to be his interpreters: ^c *We may* *c malefactoris*
 kill, saith *Escobar*, *all those that do us wrong, as those that rob by night or by day, and* *possunt occidi,*
all other sorts of persons, who offend us, though we be assured that they shall be damned, *nocturni, diurni*
 dying in this estate. *fures, & alii*
quicumque ma-

lefactores, etiam certo damnandi, De Escobar tr. 1. exam. 7. c. 2 pag. 1154. sect. 1. num. 21.

Observe these words, *quicumque malefactores, whatsoever offenders or malefactors.*
 Whence it follows, that though this assailant were our friend, or our kinsman, it were
 permitted to kill him though he should be damned. Yea, even a Monk might kill
 his Superiour, and a Son his Father in a like case. For that is the sense of these
 words, *quicumque malefactores possunt occidi; any malefactors whatsoever may be*
killed. And although this explication of it self be clear and natural enough, yet for
 fear it should trouble any one, and appear suspected because of the strange excess
 which it contains, *Amicus* hath made a particular conclusion of it, and declares in
 formal terms, that this liberty of killing any one whosoever it be that is ill-affected
 towards us, or any thing that belongs to us, is a right which suffers no limitation or
 exception whatsoever. ^d *This right, saith he, of thus defending ones life doth not apper-* *d Hoc jus tuen-*
tain only to one private man against another private man, but to a private man against a *di propriam vi-*
publicke person, to a Subject against his Superiour, and to a Son against his Father, to *tam non solum*
a Father against his Son, to an Ecclesiastique or Monk against a Secular, and to a Se- *habet privata*
cular against an Ecclesiastique or a Monk, without incurring any irregularity there- *persona contra*
fore. *privatas, sed*
etiam privata
contra publicam,

subditus contra Superiorem, filius contra patrem, parens contra filium, Clericus aut Religiosus contra secularem, & contra,
absque ulla irregularitate contractione. *Amicus de just. & jurc disp. 36. sect. 5. n. 76. p. 407.*

It is true that this Jesuit seems not here to give power to kill a Father, Mother,
 Superiour, and any one whosoever, but onely to defend ones life against their enter-
 prizes and wicked designs; but he expounds himself more clearly afterwards,
 speaking of honour and goods, for defence whereof he gives liberty indifferently to
 kill all sorts of persons, as well as for the defence of ones life. ^e *The Authors of* *e Conveniunt*
whom I have already spoken, saith he, are all agreed in this point, that to defend our *supradicti fas*
selves from some affront that would be put upon us, it is permitted to prevent the aggres- *esse ad popul-*
sour by killing him: as well as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjustly of our life, *sandam ignomi-*
or of any member, we may kill him before he be able to execute his mischievous design. *niam, quam mi-*
hi aliquis inferre
conatur, illum

praeveniens occidere; sicut fas est ad declinandam mortem quam mihi injustus invasor molitur, illum occidere antequam
mibi mortem vel mutilationem inferat. *Ibid. sect. 7. n. 106. p. 410.*

It is not needful, according to this Author, to stay untill your Father or Master
 smites you, maims you, or makes you lose your honour. For if he attempt onely
 to do it, and you know his evil design, he permits you to prevent and kill him: *Potes*
illam

^a Sicut mihi licet pro tutela vitæ meæ & honoris, ita & pro honorum meorum quæ ad vitam, vitæque statum & honorem conservandum necessaria sunt, aggressorem, si alia via illa defendere non possum, interimere. Ibid. sect. 8. n. 127. p. 413.

illum preveniendo occidere. And a little after speaking concerning goods. ^a As I may, saith he, slay him who assaults me in the defence of my life and my honour, so is it also lawful for me to do the same for defence of my goods, which are necessary for the preservation of my life, my estate, and my honour, if I cannot preserve them otherwise.

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But if this crime appear too horrible to be undertaken upon the word of this Casuist, I will make it appear in that which follow in this work, that his opinion is the common sense of the Society. In the mean while this charitable man and lover of the peace of consciences, to remove from them all scruple about this point, makes no difficulty to testify that he is ready in case of necessity to do the same himself first of all which he adviseth unto others. ^b It is lawful for me, saith he, as well as any other whosoever he be, for'the defence of my life and my honour, &c. to kill any one without exception whosoever assails me.

^b Licet mihi pro tutela vitæ meæ & honoris, &c. aggressorem interimere, &c.

So that a Monk himself ought not to make any difficulty upon this point, unless he will be so presumptuous as to think himself a man of better abilities or more honest than a Jesuit, who assures him that he is permitted to kill all those in general who would attempt any thing against his honour, against his estate, or against that of his Society. For he doth not attribute this unto his Company as a particular priviledge; but he assures us that it is a common right to all the Religions of what Order or reformation soever they be. ^c It shall be lawful, saith he, for an Ecclesiastique or a Monk to kill a slanderer who threatens to produce great crimes against him, or against his Order of Religion, if he have no other way to defend them there-from; as indeed it seems that he hath no other, when the slanderer is ready to reproach him, or his Order of Religion with those crimes publicquely, or before some person of great Authority, if he be not slain before. To kill such a man it is not needful to stay till he attempts, it is enough that he be ready to produce the crimes, si calumniator sit paratus, &c. it is enough that he threatens to defame and to speak much evil, gravia crimina spargere minantem. And to assure the Monks yet more in an enterprize of this consequence, these Divines declare that herein they do not onely nothing against Justice; but also that it may so happen that Justice it self, charity and the affection which they owe unto themselves and their Society may oblige them to use this remedy so sweet and so charitable. It is Amicus who urges this discourse also for the rest. ^d The Ecclesiastiques and Monks may also defend their honours, even at the cost of their lives who attempt to deprive them thereof, provided they passe no farther then to what is simply necessary to defend themselves; and they may be even obliged, at least by the Law of Charity, thus to maintain their reputation, if your Infamy should redound to the disgrace of their whole Order.

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^{n. 118. p. 544.}
^d Hunc honorem poterunt Clerici ac Religiosi cum moderamine inculpate tutele, etiam cum morte invasoris defendere. Quin etiam interdum, lege saltem charitatis, videntur ad illum defendendum teneri, si ex violatione populi fame integra Religio infamaretur. Amicus ibid.

This is a very strange charity, since it hath the effects of the most violent hatred: and rather it is a most monstrous hatred which brings one to kill in cold blood, and to take away life in charity from him, for whom he ought to lay down his own, since our Saviour hath said, that charity obliges us to lay down our life for our friends; and that it requires us not onely to love our friends, but our nenemies also, and those who wish or do us hurt.

There remains now, as it seems, onely one difficulty in this important subject, which is, that possibly every one knows not how to kill men; and have not hearts hard enough to embroe their hands in the blood of a Superiour, or of a Father in such cases, in which the Jesuit assures him that in conscience he may do it. But he himself and his companions furnish him with many very easie expedients to berid of them as by ambushes, and by other secret and sure ways, which may be learnt of them when I come to rehearse more largely their opinions upon the Commandment of God which forbids murder.

ARTICLE II. Of Pride.

That the Jesuits countenance Pride and Vanity in all sorts of persons, even in the most Holy actions: and that according to their Divinity it is almost impossible to sin mortally by pride or vanity.

I Take Pride in this place generally, containing under this name ambition, vanity, boasting, presumption, and all lust and desire of honour, glory and esteem amongst men.

Ambition is the vice of the Great ones, and of the Nobility; and one of the subjects, in which it doth most appear, and in which the effects and consequences of it are most deplorable, especially in France, are Duels.

160 Although *Fillintius* dare not absolutely authorize these unhappy combats which are made for an imaginary point of honour, yet he proposes an opinion which maintains them as probable. ^a It is demanded, saith this Casuist, what is to be said of the fourth pretence which they make for those who fight duels, saying that it is to defend their honour? I answer, that the opinion which assures us that this reason is sufficient, may passe for probable. He makes this opinion so probable by the reasons wherewith he strengthens it, and which we may elsewhere deduce from other places of his book, that the contrary opinion which he teaches afterwards, as the more true, appears much less probable in his writings.

Escobar who writ after *Fillintius* is bolder than he, because he is authorized by his Society. He answers absolutely and clearly to this question: For after he had demanded ^b whether a Gentleman might accept a Challenge to defend his Nobility? he saith, he may, if, in refusing the Combat, he run the hazard of losing his honour, or Office. He may even, according to this Divinity, challenge him that attempt any thing upon his honour, as well as against his life, and even against his goods, as I shall make it appear by the testimony of this Jesuit, and many others of his Society, when I shall handle the matter of Duels, in expounding the duties of the Nobility, and the vices which are common amongst them.

170 If Ambition be the vice of persons of honour, who live after the Laws of the World, vanity is that of Women, and they give themselves thereto especially in what concerns their beautie. For those who are not fair, do what they can to appear so; and those who are, do endeavour to appear yet more so, and they make use of all sorts of artifices and disguises for this end. *Emanuel Sa* justifies the first sort, and renders the sin of the other slight. ^c A Woman, saith he, may dresse her self to hide her deformity; and if she do this through vanity to cause her self to appear fair when she is not, it is no mortal Sin.

Escobar speaks yet more clearly and more resolutely: ^d When a Woman adorns her self without any wicked design, by a natural inclination which she hath unto pride, it is but a venial sin, and sometimes it is no sin at all. He troubles not himself as others do to palliate and excuse the vanity of women, the luxurie of their habits, and the too much care and art which they use to dresse themselves upon divers pretences, as their quality, the custom, the desire to please their Husbands: he absolutely justifies the natural passion which they have unto pride and vanity, as a thing which in itself is not ill, and which cannot passe, according to the Laws of Divinity for an evil end. And if there be found some, whose consciences are somewhat scrupulous, who make difficulty to follow so strange a Doctrine, he can easily accommodate himself to their humour, by assuring them that if it be any sin, it can be at most but a venial one: *Veniale tantum erit, aut aliquando nullum. It will be onely a venial one, or sometimes none at all.*

Emanuel Sa gives the same licence to Nuns. For having before said generally, ^e that a woman may adorn her self to hide her deformity: and if she do this of vanity, to cause her self to appear fair when she is not, there is in that no mortal sin; he adds, that

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sem ad fingendam pulchritudinem, mortale non est, etiam in Religiosis, si moderate se ornent. Sa. verb. orn. n. 1. p. 38.

^a Quid juris de quarta causa, ob honoris defensionem? Respondeo, & dico videri posse probabilem opinionem id affirmantem. *Filluc. us tom. 2. mor. q. tract. 29. c. 8. n. 145. p. 294.*

^b Potestne quis vir nobilis acceptare duellum in nobilitatis defensionem? Potest si ex illius recusatione bonorem aut munia publica offeram stirus. *De Escobar tr. 1. Exam. 7. n. 96, 97, 98. p. 134. sect. 12.*

^c Ornari potest femina ad tegendam turpitudinem: quod si fiat ob vanitatem, ad fingendam pulchritudinem, mortale non est. *Sa verb. orn. n. 1. p. 38.*

^d Ornatus corporis si fiat non malo fine, sed ob naturalem fastus inclinationem, veniale tantum erit, aut aliquando nullum. *De Escobar tract. 1. Exam. 8. n. 5. p. 139.*

^e Ornari potest femina ad tegendam turpitudinem: quod si fiat ob vanitatem

is true even in reference to a Nun, provided always that she dresse her self with moderation. That is to say, as he expounds himself afterwards, provided that she imploy not for adorning her self, and to make her seem fair, that which is necessary for her Nuns maintenance, if she be their Superiour, or that which is appointed for the alms whereunto they are obliged. For in this case alone he should be troubled to excuse her from mortal sin. ^a It is true, saith he, that if she imploy that which she

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^a Illud verum si in eo expendatur quod esset necessario dandum pauperibus, peccari mortaliter. Ibid.

^b Quod si quis alius sumat inde occasionem peccandi mortaliter; iuxta mortale esse quidam aiunt: Sed melius alii negant. Ibid.

is obliged to give unto the poor, she sins therein mortally. But when she gives occasion of sin to some who see her adorned in that sort, doth she offend mortally or not? This Jesuite thinks that they who would make her responsible for this crime, would be too severe, and he loves rather to conclude with others more favourable and more complacent, who discharge her from mortal sin.

^b But if any one, saith he, take from thence an occasion to offend God mortally, there are some who say that in this case the Nun sins mortally, but others have more reason so deny it.

^b But if any one, saith he, take from thence an occasion to offend God mortally, there are some who say that in this case the Nun sins mortally, but others have more reason so deny it.

Sanchez in this point accords with Emanuel Sa. For proposing this question:

^c An femina conspectui viri se offerens, a quo se turpiter amari novit, peccet mortaliter peccato scandalosi? Sanchez op. mor. lib. 1. c. 6. n. 16. p. 19.

^d Communiter Doctores cam peccare mortaliter censent, quando nulla necessitate ducitur, sed in sua voluptati satisfaciat, indifferenter hac & illac discurret. Ibid. ^e Aliis tamen placet hanc non peccare mortaliter. Ibid. ^f Et ideo quamvis primam opinionem probabilem credam, existimo, &c.

^c Whether a Woman who presents her self to the view of a Man whom she knows to love her dishonestly, do commit a sin of scandal which is mortal? After he hath reported the common opinion of the Casuists in these terms: ^d The Doctors commonly answer, yea, when she doth it without any necessity, and when she courses about without discretion onely for her pleasure. Afterwards he relates the opinion of some persons, who exempt this woman from mortal sin. ^e Yet there are others who hold that this woman doth not sin mortally. And after he hath deduced their reasons, or rather those which he invented himself for to justify this vicious liberty, he concludes in this manner: ^f And therefore although I believe that the first opinion is probable, yet nevertheless I believe the second is the truer, and therefore that this reason is not sufficient to conclude that a woman is obliged to deprive her self of the liberty of standing at a door or a window, or to walk forth into the Town.

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His principal reason is, because this woman doth nothing in this, but make use of her right and of her liberty: and that if one would constrain this woman, as some do, whom he terms scrupulous, to deprive her self of the pleasure which she takes in walking abroad, and going out to be seen when she pleases, although she have no occasion; quando nulla necessitate ducitur, sed in voluptati satisfaciat, this would give her too much trouble, and she should be too much disquieted, if she were obliged to consider when she had reason to go out, and when she had not. And therefore she ought not to torment her own spirit, nor trouble her self about that which may befall her, being it is lawful for her ^g to make use of her right and of her liberty, which she cannot be deprived of, without making way for a thousand scruples, which would come into her minde whensoever she had a desire to go abroad, for to understand whether she had any necessity for it or not. So that to take away these scruples, he would have the rains let loose to passions and other disorders. I ut this Divinity, doth not accord with that of our Lord, who saith in the Gospel, that it were better one were cast into the Sea with a Mill-stone fastened about ones neck, than to offend the meanest of men; and who commands expressely to pull out the eye, and to cut off the foot and the hand, rather than to suffer them to be causes of offence.

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After they have thus authorized a-part amongst men and women these two vices of ambition and vanity, they authorize them jointly amongst Ecclesiastiques and persons consecrated unto God. I have already touched something of Ambition in the precedent Treatise, and I have showed how the Jesuits give unto the Ecclesiastiques and the Religious, Monks and Nuns, the same licence which they give to the Seculars, to preserve their worldly honour by all sorts of effectual ways, and even to prevent and kill, if need be, those who would deprive them thereof. Therefore I will not touch this point here, of which I must also speak elsewhere. I will onely relate some passages of their Casuists: to make it appear that they justify

^g Jure suo & libertate sibi concessa utitur, nec ea commode privari potest quin mille scrupulis aditus pateat circa egressum e domo, necessarius sit, nec ne. Ibid.

vanity amongst the Ecclesiastiques, and that they do introduce it into the most high and holy functions of their ministry.

See how *Emanuel Sa* speaks in this business. ^a *There are that say that it is mortal sin to say a Masse, or to Preach principally for vain glory; and others say the contrary.* Mindes being divided in this point, the one and the other opinion are at least probable, and by consequence one may follow which likes his conscience best, according to the constant maxime of the Jesuites School.

^a *Pana gloria causa precipue predicave, Misam celebrare, peccatum esse mortale quidam aunt, quidam negant. Sa, verb. vana gloria, num. 2. pag. 485.*

210 He saith elsewhere simply that there are some who at least do excuse this action from mortal sin, without saying that there are any that condemn it. ^b *Some Jesuits, saith he, hold that it is a mortal sin to Preach without allowance; others say that it is not to Preach Principally for the glory of this world or for money.*

^b *Mortale quidam censent predicare sine legitima licentia, &c. non*

esse autem si quis ob gloriam aut pecuniam principaliter predicet, aiunt nonnulli. Sa verb. predicave. tr. 4. p. 405.

Escobar speaks more confidently, and saith that by his advice, which is that of the Society, there is not in this any appearance of mortal sin. ^c *I am assured, saith he, that it is no great crime to relate a fable in a Sermon or relation, which one hath invented; and if it be done to excite the spirits of the Auditors to hear with more devotion, it is no sin at all; but I maintain it, that one may without mortal sin Preach out of vanity, or for money, although one should regard vanity or money as the principal ends.*

^c *Scio non esse grave crimen fabellam recitare, imo si id sit animo excitiandi auditores ad pie audiendum, nullum peccatum est.*

Porro predicare quem principaliter ob gloriam aut pecuniam, mortale non esse affirmo. Escobar tract. 6. Exam. 7. n. 132. pag. 769.

Sanchez saith the same thing, and taking it yet higher, he expounds it also with advantage in this manner: ^d *To do the most sacred actions out of vanity, as to administer all the Sacraments, or to receive them, or to celebrate the Holy Masse for vain glory, can be but a venial sin, though vain glory be proposed as the principal end.* They are not content to excuse as much as may be the vanity of the Clergy and the Friars, but they pretend also that they may make it their principal end in the most Holy and Divine Functions of Religion, without committing any great fault. ^e *To Preach, say they, or say Masse principally for vain glory, is no more then a venial sin.* But to preach, and to say Masse principally for the glory of this World, is to sacrifice the Body of Jesus Christ to vanity, to the World, and to the Devil, who is the Prince of the World and the Father of pride and vanity; and this is no great matter according to the Divinity of the Jesuites; this is at most but a venial sin; *non excedit culpam venialem.*

^d *Res quantumcumque facias principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere, Sacrum celebrare, non excedit culpam venialem.*

Sanch. l. 1. oper. Mor. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9.

^e *Si iactantia & vana gloria de aliquo bono fit, est sola culpa venialis. Sanch. loco citato.*

Sanchez discovers in a few words the foundation of this Doctrine, establishing for his first conclusion, that ^c *if boasting and vain glory have for its object any good, it is onely a venial sin:* That is to say, that one may vaunt and glory as much as one will of things which are good in themselves and advantagious, without committing a great sin.

Escobar flies higher than *Sanchez*. For he doth not onely free them from mortal sin who glory in the good qualities which they have, or which they think they have, but those also who would make men believe that they have such as they have not, and who go about to establish their honour and reputation amongst men by a false appearance of Sanctity which they affect and counterfeit on this design. For after he hath given this definition of hypocrisie: ^f *It is a manifestation of ones proper excellence by fained and deceitful actions,* he adds, *This is always a sin, because a lye is alway prejudicial; and this sin is mortal; when one would be wicked within, and appear good without: but it is onely a venial sin, if one do onely something before men to appear Holy.*

^f *Hypocriſis est manifestatio proprie excellentie per facta ficta, & falsa. Porro hypocriſis semper est peccatum, quia mendacium semper perniciosum est; mortale quidem erit si inuis vult esse malus, & foris tantum bonus apparere: veniale autem si aliqua praestet exterius ut sanctus appareat. Escobar tr. 2. Exam. 2. n. 11. p. 291.*

Escobar tr. 2. Exam. 2. n. 11. p. 291.

a Periocum quis se iactat flagitium grave gessisse, si non adfit scandalum occasio, aut facti vel confitendi operis non admiscetur complacencia, vel faciendi voluntas, veniale est. Ibid. n. 9. p. 291.

b Quidnam inventio novitatum? Est manifestatio propriae excellentiae per facta quaedam, puta novas opiniones, novas vestes exponere. Quae quidem inventio nisi aliunde gravissimetur, ex se venialis tantum culpa est: quia communiter eiusmodi inventionem quis solummodo gessit aliorum laudem comparare. Escobar, ibid. n. 10.

He proceeds yet farther, and saith in the same place n. 9. that one may without fear of mortal sin boast of evil, and glory in the greatest crimes of the World, whether one have or indeed have not committed them. ^a When, saith he, a man boasteth himself to have committed some enormous crime, provided that he doth this without scandal, and without complacence in this action true or fained, and without desire to commit it, it is but a venial sin. That is to say, that if a man onely vaunt himself of a crime, it is but a light fault, and that he ought onely to take heed to avoid scandal; modo non adfit scandalum occasio. So that if a man who doth glory in the most enormous crimes, have but onely the discretion not to speak thereof before persons who may thereby be scandalized, he may vaunt thereof freely before debauched people, who will onely laugh and take pleasure thereat.

He speaks in the same same manner of novelties, and of those who invent new fashions and new opinions, that they may as well content their own curiosity and vanity, as that of others, whom he also exempts from mortal sin. For having proposed this question: ^b What is it that is called invention of novelties? He answers, It is a demonstration of ones own excellence by certain actions, as in inventing new opinions or new sorts of Garments. This invention of novelties is of it self but a venial sin, if there occur no other circumstance which may render it more criminal. His reason is: Because commonly the Authors of these novelties do look after nothing but the estimation and praises of the World. Provided then that a man set his soul and heart onely on the desire of worldly honour and glory, this desire is either not evil at all, or it is but a small fault according to these Divines; and what ever one doth or saith for this end well or ill, with truth or falsehood, he shall not lose the grace of God, nor fall short of Salvation.

c Superbia est appetitus propriae celsitudinis perverse voluntarius. Escobar Tr. 2. Exam. 2. n. 4. p. 290.

d Quando nam appetitus ille graviter vulnerat conscientiam? Quando cum Dei contemptu copulatur. Ibid. n. 5.

Ibid. n. 6.

If this be no heynous fault, to boast himself, even of crimes, to invent novel opinions, to counterfeit actions of piety and vertue, to gain honour in the world, it must needs be that neither is it a great fault to desire honour even with a desire irregular and vitious. For this cause Escobar concludes well, according to his own principles, in that place, where after he hath given us this definition of that haughtynesse of mind, which they commonly call Pride: ^c Pride is no other thing then an irregular desire of ones own greatness: he makes this question: ^d When is it that this desire doth notably hurt conscience? And he answers: When it is joynd with contempt of God. And that he may leave no doubt nor difficulty in this so nice a point, he adds also by way of demand: ^e Expresse your self, that we may know when this contempt is contained in Pride. And as if he had a design to satisfie the desire, or rather the passion of the ambitious, and settle their consciences in quiet, he declares that there is no contempt of God, and by consequence no mortal sin, in the most vehement passion that a man can have for his own excellence, and for worldly glory, except onely in these cases.

f Quando quod a Deo habet, a seipso habere existimat. Aut vult ab aliis tanquam a seipso bona habens existimari. Aut vult a seipso & non a Deo bona sua possidere.

First, ^f When he thinks to have of himself that which he receives from God. Secondly, When he would have others think that he hath those good things from himself. Thirdly, When he desires to have them from himself, and not from God. Fourthly, When he is sorry that he hath received them from God, and not from himself. Fifthly, When one believes indeed that he hath received from God all that he hath, but he thinks that he holds them not by his mere grace, but that he owes them to him of Justice, and because of his Fasts, Alms, and other good works, which he hath done.

Aut dicit quod huiusmodi bona a Deo, & non a seipso receperit. Aut cum quis existimat, quidem se bona habere a Deo, sed non gratis ei obvenisse, verum ex iustitia sibi debita propter jejunia, elemosinas, &c. Escobar ibid. n. 6. p. 290.

And a little after n. 9. ſumming up all the marks, and all the effects of contempt of God, which alone according to his opinion makes a mortal ſin of Pride, and contracting them together into one point alone which contains all the reſt, he concludes in theſe words: ^a *If Pride doth notably wrong the honour of God, or the reputation of ones Neighbours, it may be mortal ſin, or at leaſt it comes near thereto, ad mortalem accederet.*

^a *Tunc autem ad mortalem accederet, quando graviter aut Dei reverentia laederetur, aut proximi fama.* Ibid. n. 9.

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He will not abſolutely avow that this great irreverence againſt God is mortal ſin, but onely that it may be, and that it approacheth thereto: and nevertbeleſs explicating what it is that he underſtands by this great irreverence againſt God, he adds immediately after: ^b *That the honour of God is greatly injured by Pride, when a man is ſo fooliſh as to ſay like the King of Tyruſ: I am a God.*

^b *Fit equidem cum gravi Dei irreverentia, cum in morem Regis Tyri dixerit fatuus: Ego ſum Deus.* Ibid. n. 9.

So that to offend God mortally in matter of Pride, according to the Divinity of the Jeſuits, it is required that this paſſion be ſo ſtrange, that it carry a man to the utmoſt extravagance, and make him loſe all ſenſe and reaſon.

And moreover they hold not this exceſſe of Pride, which transports a man ſo far as to put himſelf in the place of God, to be always mortal ſin; but onely that it may be, and that it comes nigh unto it, *accederet ad mortale*: of which it ſeems that he could not alledge any better reaſon, then to ſay that an imagination ſo fooliſh could never come into any but a ſpirit altogether perverted, and almoſt incapable of ſin as well as reaſon. So that to ſpeak properly, according to theſe Doctours, it will be true that a man who hath his judgement ſound, can never offend God mortally by Pride, in what manner ſoever his heart be puſt up and elevated.

ARTICLE III. Of Fleſhly pleaſure, and diſhoneſty.

270 **F**irſt. **W**E will ſpeak in this Article, firſt of diſhoneſt Diſcourſes, Looks, and Touches. Secondly, Of Panders, and maintainers of debauched Women, and the ſervices which the one and the other may do them. Thirdly, Of diſhoneſt thoughts and deſires, of fornication and Adultery, and other like actions, and of pleaſure one may take therein according to the Divinity of the Jeſuits. And as for this ſubject, we will divide this Article into three Points.

I. POINT.

Of diſhoneſt Diſcourſes, Looks, and Touches.

AS the ſpring and ſeat of all carnal impurity is in the pleaſure of the ſenſes, ſo all other ſenſes and all other pleaſures ſerve that of the touch, and are related unto it as their end, and that wherein impurity is attained and finiſhed, becauſe it is the moſt material and baſe of all the ſenſes. This is the reaſon that the Divinity of the Jeſuits, which is all methodical, obſerves well to keep the order of the means, and the end in this matter; it gives all ſorts of liberty to the ſenſes, and juſtifies in a manner all ſorts of pleaſure which it can taſte, as if they had a deſign to excuſe or to diminiſh with all their power the crime which is committed, with the loweſt and moſt infamous pleaſure of the fleſh.

Filliutius after he had ſaid that diſhoneſt words, though they repreſent the moſt filthy actions and matters, are of themſelves indifferent, he eſtabliſheth this for a concluſion, that ^c *diſcourſes even of filthy things, though they proceed from curioſity and levity, do not go beyond a venial ſin.*

^c *Dico 2. loquutionem eorundem factam ex levitate & curioſitate quadam, non excedere peccatum veniale.* Filliutius tom. 2. mor. tract. c. 10. n. 227. p. 325.

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He ſaith moreover that when one adds unto the pleaſure of curioſity, that which may be taken from diſcourſing, even of filthy things, and from expreſſing the moſt diſhoneſt actions that are, this exceeds not a venial ſin. ^d *To ſpeak,* ſaith he, of

^d *ſi locutio ſit de rebus*

in pijs, ſolum ob voluptatem qua praeciſe oritur ex ipſa narratione, abſque ulteriore inſenſione ipſarum rerum, ſic non excedit culpam venialem. Ibid. n. 209.

filthy things, for the pleasure that is taken in those discourses, without having a design to passe on to dishonest actions, is but a venial Sin.

He is no lesse indulgent to those that hear these filthy discourses, then to those who utter them: ^a *You will ask, saith he also, what we ought to think of those that hear these filthy discourses? I answer as before, that it is in it self an indifferent thing; and that if it be done through curiosity or lightness, it is but a venial Sin.*

^a *Queres de audicione rerum curpium? Respondedo eodem modo ex se esse veni indifferentem,*

He is not more rigorous in condemning those who take pleasure in reading filthy books, concluding by his principles, ^b *That the same thing is to be said of those who read filthy books, and which have dishonest loves for their principal subject. For to read these books simply of curiosity, and for the pleasure they take to consider the art, and strange enconnters of the discourses which they contain, is but a venial Sin.*

^b *Ex his inferui, idem dicendum de legentibus libros turpes & tractantes ex professo de obscenis amoribus.*

Ob solam curiositatem & delectationem quodam modo speculativam ex artificio & miro modo rerum sic narraturum, non excedit veniale. Ibid. n. 213.

He gives the same liberty to the sight as to the hearing, to satiate it self with filthy things, without sinning otherwise then venially: ^c *The beholding of filthy things for natural & sensual delight onely, without design, and without danger of passing on to the pleasure of the fleshly act, seems to me to be onely a venial sin.* And a little after proceeding in the same matter, he saith that his apprehension is, ^d *That one may without any Sin behold all the parts of his own or anothers body, which are commonly uncovered, without indecency in the converse of the world, as the Arms, Bosom, and the Leggs.*

^c *Aspectus rerum turpium ob delectationem naturalem & sensitivam tantum, sublato periculo transeundi ad delectationem venream, non videtur excedere culpam venialem, Ibid. n. 215.*

^d *Partes quaecumque corporis propriae vel alicuius, qua communiter & honeste in humano convictu ostendi solent, ut brachia, pectus, crura, absque peccato ullo aspicere possunt. Ibid. n. 217.*

He declares that it is ordinarily lawful to go with the Breast open, and to walk in company with the arms and legs uncovered. And he adds thereupon that ^e *When one bathes, whether privately or in the River, for any necessity or benefit, or even for any convenience or pleasure, which serve for health, one may behold all his own or anothers body naked without any Sin, as he said before, provided that they hide their shame.*

^e *Totum etiam corpus cooperitis pudendis in balneo vel flumine si necessitas vel utilitas aliqua, vel etiam commoditas vel delectatio ob sanitatem intercedat, absque ullo peccato aspicere potest. Ibid.*

After so many motives and pretences of necessity, profit, convenience, pleasure, or health, for which he gives full liberty to behold ones own or anothers body naked, he condemns in this respect curiosity alone; ^f but yet with so great indulgence, that he holds it onely for a venial sin. And because vice, unto what excess soever it may arrive, cannot take away that natural confusion, which falls on a man and woman in beholding one another all naked; to the intent he might remove from them this shame, if he could, which else might hinder them from contenting their curiosity, and to take this shameful pleasure which he permits them when occasion presents it self, he lays down for his second conclusion; ^g *that one may behold the naked bodies of persons of different sexes of more curiosity without mortal Sin, provided that one behold them at a distance and for a short time, in such manner that place be not given to some notable emotion.*

^f *Ex sola curiositate non excedit culpam venialem.*

^g *Personae diversae sexus nude à remoto loco brevissimo tempore, ita ut non deatur occasio notabilis emotionis, ob solam curiositatem aspicere possunt. Ibid. n. 218.*

But a little after he overturns these clauses and these restrictions, speaking in this manner of persons of different sexe: ^h *I believe that they cannot be beheld nearhand and for a long time, without mortal Sin, considering these things practically, and as*

^h *E loco proximo longiori tempore communitate & regulariter loquendo ob probabile periculum in praxi, censo absque mortali sectari eas non posse, quidquid speculativè alii excusent à mortali; qua in re quisque satisfaciat suae conscientiae. Ipse enim aspectus damnatur tantum quia periculosus moraliter. Ibid. n. 218.*

they ordinarily happen, by reason of the danger to which such would probably be exposed, notwithstanding, there are others who considering this case onely in general, and in the theorie, exempt them from mortal Sin. In this every one ought to follow the judgement of his own conscience. For this beholding cannot be condemned but because it is commonly dangerous.

That is to say, that although his own opinion be favourable enough to corrupt passions, yet notwithstanding the contrary opinion, which is yet more favorable, is also probable at the least, considered in it self and in general, without particular circumstances, which may make it evil; and that it may be defended in dispute and in discourse, and which indeed some do defend, and consequently may be followed without sin, according to that maxime and reasoning which is common with this sort of people. This is the reason why this Jesuit complying therewith, as he that knows not what it is to torment any person, after he had simply spoken his own thought, leaves every one to his own conscience; *quâ in re quisque satisfaciat suæ conscientiæ*: Thereby testifying that he treats of a thing which cannot be absolutely condemned.

And that he might yet give more assurance to carnal curiosity and concupiscence, he attempts to cover it with this reason: ^a *Looking is not blamed, but that it is ordinarily dangerous.*

Escobar hath recollected and couched in a few words all that which *Fillintius* hath written upon this point. For he saith generally, that ^b *to speak of dishonest things, is a thing indifferent in it self.* And a little after: *speaking out of more curiosity and lightness, taking away the danger, or other evil end, is but a venial Sin.* And in the end he concludes, *that to talk thereof for the pleasure we take or receive by the discourse of such things, can be but a venial Sin.*

^a Ipse enim aspectus damnatur tantum quia periculosus moraliter.

^b Locutio rerum turpium ex se res indifferentis est ob curiositatem tantum vel levitatem.

tatem, sublato periculo, aut alio malo fine, veniale peccatum est; ob delectationem vero ex narratione non excedit venientem culpam. *Escobar* tract. 1. Exam. 8. c. 1. n. 2. p. 1348.

And in the following page n. 4. demanding what evil may be in dishonest looks, he answers: ^c *To behold dishonest things for natural pleasure onely, is but a venial Sin, provided that one bring not himself in danger to go on forward unto carnal pleasure.* And some lines after: *to behold these of curiosity is but a venial Sin, provided one be out of danger of proceeding unto carnal pleasure.* He is also more hardy then *Fillintius* who permits, or at least passes by as small faults, all sorts of beholding all parts of the body, except those which nature obliges us to cover. For he declares that this exception is not absolutely necessary: ^d *As for me, saith he, if one look on those parts of the body which natural modesty obliges us to hide, or even a man in the act with a woman, I will not condemn him, considering the thing in it self and in general, all be it that, in the practise, I believe that it ought to be condemned of mortal Sin, because there is therein danger to passe to that which is unlawful.* If he condemn this look, it is not because he doth acknowledge it to be absolutely evil, but onely because of the danger therein of committing, and passing on from an action lawful to that which is not lawful.

^c Aspectus rerum turpium ob delectationem tantum naturalium, omni periculo sublato transeundi ad veneream, venialis culpa tantum est. *Ibid.* n. 4. p. 139.

^d Enimvero si esset aspectus partium, quas pudor velat, vel ipsius concubintæ, speculative quidem non

d. m. n. v. e. m. p. r. a. t. e. t. a. m. e. n. s. u. b. m. o. r. t. a. l. i. d. a. m. n. a. n. d. x. m. e. x. i. s. t. i. m. o. , o. b. p. e. r. i. c. u. l. u. m. f. a. c. i. l. i. t. e. r. t. r. a. n. s. e. u. n. d. i. a. d. i. l. l. i. c. i. t. a. *Ibid.* num. 4. pag. 139.

And to shew yet better the conformity of the opinions of these Jesuits, who agree also with the most part of the rest who have written on this subject, it is worthy to be observed, that as *Fillintius* after had said what he could to take away or diminish the sin of impurity, which is found in these dishonest looks, leaves every one to his own judgement and to his own conscience to do that which he pleaseth; *quâ in re quisque satisfaciat suæ conscientiæ*: in the same manner *Escobar* leaves every one to his liberty in particular to follow his own sense in a matter so dangerous, and to rule himself by his complexion and age: *consultatur cujusque complexio & ætas.*

There is nothing that carries men more strongly to impurity then Stage-plays, and particularly those which represent dishonest things. For in other sensual objects and divertisements there are but one or two senses commonly that are satisfied: but in Stage-plays all the senses in a manner are affected, are almost all engaged in impurity

by sensible images and representations, which hath obliged the Saints to condemn them so often, and to turn men away from them as one of the most dreadful inventions of the Devil, and most capable to destroy souls.

a R. presentat. in
tes comedias
res turpes conti-
nentes, vel eo
modo ut ad ve-
nerem excitent ut

For this cause *Escobar* speaks according to the truth, where he saith, ^a *They who act Comedies wherein dishonest things are contained, or represented in such manner as ordinarily to excite impurity, sin mortally.*

Escobar tr. 1. Exam. 8. c. 1. n. 3. p. 139.

But if the Comedians find this proposition at first sight to be rigorous, I am assured that they will receive it without much trouble when they shall understand that which follows. For after he had condemned of mortal sin those who act Comedies, he adds that ^b *those that go thither to learn something, or for any other good end, sin not at all; and if they go thither of curiosity or lightness, they sin only venially.*

b Porro audien-
tes obsecantiam,
ob at quem bo-
num finem, non
peccant, ob cu-
riositatem aut
levitatem, ve-
nialiter delin-
quunt. Ibid. n.
3. P. 1349.

These Stage-players will easily satisfy themselves by this last proposition, seeing it destroys the former, and shews clear enough that their Profession is in effect good, or at least indifferent, for there is no appearance that one can be a partaker in another mans sin, or be present voluntarily without cause, by lightness, or onely to please his curiosity at a wicked action; and an exercise which of it self is a mortal sin, and draws on to sin, being *St. Paul* doth testify, that not onely they who do evil are worthy of death, but they also who consent thereto; that is to say, those who approve it by their actions, by their words, by their presence, and even by their silence. So that if *they who act Stage-plays sin mortally*, as *Escobar* saith in his first proposition, it follows according to *St. Paul*, that those who go to hear them expressly upon lightness, and curiosity, make themselves partakers of their sin. And if on the contrary, *they who go to them sin not at all, or sin venially*, as the same *Escobar* saith, though they go thither through lightness, and more curiosity, it will follow that they who act the Comedies do not sin at all neither, or sin but venially, contrary to what *Escobar* affirms in his first proposition, and against the judgement of all the Saints.

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c Si ob solam cu-
riositatem au-
diantur vel de-
lectationem re-
presentationis,
non verum re-
presentatum,

Filliutius in the place which I have cited, speaks of Stage-plays almost like *Escobar*; ^c *If one goes thither, saith he, only for curiositie, or for the pleasure he takes in beholding good Actors, and not of the things which they represent, this is but a venial sinne; provided that he come not thereby in apparent danger of falling into mortal sin.*

Et alioquin non sit probabile periculum lapsus in mortale, non excedit veniale. *Filliutius*, mor. tom. 2. Tr. 30. v. 10. n. 212.

And to shew that he esteems this venial sin to be a very small one, and that commonly there is even none at all in attending on these filthy and dishonest Stage-plays; he permits this to the Ecclesiastiques. ^d *The Ecclesiastiques themselves, saith he, sin not in going to a Stage-play, provided that it be without scandal, which hardly happens at all, saith Sanchez, because they go thither very frequently.*

d Non etiam
Clerici peccant
sublato scanda-
lo, quod sepe non
intercedit, ex
Sanchez, qui a frequen-
tissime interfunt. Ibid.

He saith, that Ecclesiastiques sin not in going to Stage-plays, provided they can go thither without scandal; and at the same time he declares that there is no scandal therein; *because they go thither very frequently.* It is true, and we see it too well at this day, that the greatest crimes cause no horror, nor offend the world, but only when they are not common, as soon as they become so they cease to cause horror; and daunt no more the spirits of men, and often times they passe even for innocent actions.

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For what concerns dishonest touches, *Escobar* saith generally, that they are permitted betwixt persons espoused, and relates this as the opinion of *Sanchez* and many others. ^e *Sanchez, saith he, and many others assure us that they are permitted, provided that no danger of falling into pollution come thereby, nor of giving consent unto any unlawfull thing.*

e Sanchez & al-
ii multi affir-
mant licite, si
absit pollutio
& consensus in rem
illicitam periculum

Escobar tr. 1. Exam. 8. c. 74. d. 149. sect. 3.

A. I. B. I. C. I. A. 3. P. I.

He

He also makes Sanchez speak more boldly in this point, citing him again the second time: ^t Sanchez, whom I have already cited, saith, that kisses, and touches of the body are permitted to persons betrothed, though they foresee that pollution will follow thereon; provided the man be moved to it by some just reason; as namely, that he may not appear to be of an ill humour, or too austere. It is better, according to Sanchez and Escobar, to give a mans self up to impurity and unnatural excess, than to passe for an uncivil person before men or women.

sponso, scilicet ad vitandum inurbanitatis seu austeritatis notam. Sanchez citatus ait licere oscula & tactus exterioros, etiam si secutura pollutio praevidetur dummodo adsit justa causa. Ibid. n. 74.

Fillinius reports it as an opinion of the same Sanchez, & that it is no mortal sin, nor commonly a venial one, to kisse the tender and delicate fleshs of children.

Non esse mortale, nec saepe veniale ex osculari molles infantium carnes. Fillinius moral. tom. 2. tract. 30. c. 9 n. 171. p. 321.

³⁶⁰ ^h And speaking of touches and kisses which are given for pleasure only, he saith, that they can be but venial sins; and besides, he testifies, that he could hardly condemn them of venial sin: *Erunt ad summum peccata venialia.* And a little after having made this question, ⁱ If the embraces of two persons all naked, be of the same nature with these touches, (he speaks of Criminal touches) or if one may well place them also in the rank of touches which are to testifie good will, which before he had said were innocent and lawfull? He answers, ^k that considering things in the theory and in general, these embracings themselves are things indifferent, and may be done without sin.

an vero possit etiam esse inter tactus causa benevolentiae? Ibid. n. 174. ^k *Respondco si speculative loquamur etiam illa est res indifferens, & potest sine peccato fieri.* Ibid. n. 174.

And a little after pushing on the question yet farther, and to the uttermost extremity that it can go, without entirely accomplishing the crime; he saith, ^l that if these embraces of bodies all naked be made by persons of different sex, or of young people of the same sex, he beleeves they can hardly be done without mortal sin, considering them practically, especially in places secured and removed from the view of the world.

Si tamen fieret inter personas diversi sexus, vel adolescentes ejusdem sexus, praesertim in locis clausis & remotis ab aliorum aspectibus, practice vix fieri crediderimus absque peccato mortali. Ibid. n. 174.

He dares not absolutely condemn of mortal sin an action so shamefull, so immodest, and which leads manifestly to the extremity of sin, under pretence that it was done out of love and friendship; honouring with the name of amity a passion so loose and infamous: And although he saith, that it is hard as to the practice not to commit sin in these embracements, and even mortal sin; yet he forbears not at the same time to give us to understand, that it may be done without any sin at all; so that what he affirmed in the beginning, continues alwayes true: according unto him, that this action is good or indifferent in it self: *si speculative loquamur, etiam illa est res indifferens, & potest sine peccato fieri;* which suffices to give unto men the liberty of embracing in that manner, every one being easie to be persuaded that there is no hurt in it, or that he may do a thing in it self indifferent.

II. POINT

Of the Ministers and Panders in the trade of Whoredom, such as they are who carry messages, bear letters, appoint meetings to debauched women, or who lodge or protect them.

I Suppose that I have sufficiently proved that the Jesuits do cherish the Vice of Impurity, in making it manifest that they justify it, or at least they discharge from this crime dishonest readings, looks, touches and embraces, which are the most

most common and nearest dispositions unto it. But I will not stay there, because their Divinity goes yet farther, and it favours and approves more than any person that hath any little of honour or reason can believe, the accomplishment of this crime which is Fornication, Adultery, Incest, and other such like crimes.

First, in permitting to co-operate with, and be aiding to the commission of these crimes.

In the second place, in giving liberty to the spirit to entertain voluntarily and with pleasure the thoughts of these shamefull actions, when they do not actually commit them. 380

And, in the third place, in giving means to perpetrate these infamous actions, or at least to justify them after they are done, and to take as much pleasure in the remembrance of them as if they had been innocent actions.

For the first point, *Sanchez* speaking generally of those who make themselves partakers of other mens sins by co-operating therein, establisheth this rule as a principle whereon depends the resolution of all difficulties which may occur in this matter. *We must answer*, saith he, *that it is lawfull to sell all things which are indifferent; as also to perform all sorts of services which are in themselves indifferent, though we know certainly that they will be abused; provided that we have no intention to co-operate to the ill use whereunto they are put by others, and we have some reasonable motive to excuse us.*

m Dicendum est licere quaecunque indifferentia vendere, aut obsequia indifferentia exhibere, quamvis constet alterum abuturum; dummodo desit intentio co-operandi ad malum alterius usum, & adsit proportionata excusans causa. Sanchez oper. moral. lib. 1. c. 7. n. 13. pag. 21.

If it be lawfull to sell and to lend all indifferent things, and also, in serving another, to do every indifferent thing, it will follow, that it is lawfull to sell, to lend, and to do almost all sorts of things, because every thing that may be sold or lent, is not only indifferent, but good in it self, being the creature of God, who hath made nothing but what is good. And although one cannot say that all the actions of men are good, yet notwithstanding, the greater part even of those which are bad, being not ordinarily such; but by the occurrence of evil circumstances and evil consequences, they will be all lawfull as well as the other: for it is sufficient, according to this principle of *Sanchez*, that they be indifferent in themselves, and considered in general; though in particular, with their evil circumstances and effects which arise from them, they are very criminal, and this be certain and known by him who doth these actions, or sells these things; because he sees clearly, that he for whom he doth them, or to whom he sells them, will abuse them: *quamvis constet alterum abuturum.* 390

So that according to this Divinity, if one see a man who seeks for a precipice to throw himself down, or a sword wherewith to kill himself or some other, one may help him to a sword, or shew him a precipice, and even lead him thither, if it be needfull, without partaking in his crime, provided only that he have no intention to co-operate with him therein; *modo desit intentio co-operandi ad malum alterius usum*, though he do in this manner actually co-operate with him therein.

The Jesuites serve themselves of this rule to justify the greatest crimes. And indeed if this be to be received, a man that gives a ladder to robb his neighbour, that lends his Chamber wherein to deliberate and resolve to murder him, who sells poison for this intent, or provides a sword to kill him, shall have no part in any of all these crimes, if he in this manner knowingly and willingly co-operate therein, he may say his intention was not to co-operate therein; *dummodo desit intentio co-operandi*; especially if having no formal intention of doing ill, he have some reason which may excuse the ill he doth actually; *& adsit justa causa proportionata excusans.* 400

And the best reason, or at least the most common one, and which the Jesuits approve, and alledge most usually in these occurrents, is that of some temporal interest or worldly reputation. So they allow a Gentlewoman of good quality not to refuse a man to enter into her house with whom she hath offended God, if she cannot so do it but that the world wil talk thereof; a maid-servant not to depart from the house of her Master who abuseth her, if he will not pay her her wages; a ser-

vant not to quit the service of his Master who employes him in his debauches, if he receive or hope therefrom any good recompence.

These are the consequences which the Jesuits themselves draw from this principle, with many other which we shall see in their Casuists. Sanchez who is the principal author of this maxim, after he hath established it upon divers foundations which he proposeth, amongst many Conclusions which he draws therefrom, puts this same for the fifth: ^a *It follows from this principle, that a servant may saddle the horse of his Master, accompany and attend him, if it be not to defend him or stand centry for him, of which we speak in the next following numbers, although he well know that he goes to visit debauched women.* And to expound what he intends by that restriction, *quando non custodia causa comitantur*; He adds in the sequel: ^b *For if they go with their Master with a design to assault and combat his Corrivals, that is not lawfull, because it is an action evil of it self: but if they go only to defend their Master against those who shall assail him, or to give him notice of any come to offend him, to the end that he may save himself without receiving any hurt, it is lawfull, though this very rarely, and only upon great necessity.*

^a Quinto, deducitur posse famulos sternere equum, herum comitari & expectare, quando non custodia causa, de quo numero sequenti dicemus, quamvis non nisi ipsi ad fornicandum abire. Sanchez

op. mor. l. 1. c. 7. n. 22. p. 23.
ratione licet, quod sit intrinsece malum. Si autem ut à rivalibus aggrediantibus herum tueantur, vel ut admonerent herum adveniencem aliquo qui ipsum offendere possit, ut sic incolumis evadat, adhuc rarissime erit licitum, & urgentissima necessitate occurrenti. Ibid. n. 23.

^b Si enim comitantur ut rivalet illius mulieris invadant cum eis pugnant, nulla ratione licet, quod sit intrinsece malum. Si autem ut à rivalibus aggrediantibus herum tueantur, vel ut admonerent herum adveniencem aliquo qui ipsum offendere possit, ut sic incolumis evadat, adhuc rarissime erit licitum, & urgentissima necessitate occurrenti. Ibid. n. 23.

It is therefore true, according to Sanchez, that a servant may be innocent in all these occurrences, because that he pretends that all these offices he doth for his Master, ^c *are things of themselves indifferent, and which may be well or ill used.* This is his general principle and his principal reason, whereby he maintains that these things are lawfull for servants: only he wills that they be done rarely and upon great extremities, because he avows that they are dangerous, and easie to be abused, the servants who are employed on these occasions having commonly more courage than discretion and moderation: So that instead of contenting themselves to defend their Master, as is lawfull for them, they are easily transported to assault and outrage those who would interrupt their dishonest pleasures. For this cause he is wise, and considers that he shall not give warranty to their excessive heat, if he be content to maintain, *that all this is permitted because it is lawfull and indifferent in it self*; and it is only needfull to consider the ill use that may be made thereof, and the danger that therein may occurre: ^d *because the servants that are employed on these occasions expose themselves to the danger, not only of barely defending their Masters, but also of fighting and assaying, which makes their Masters more bold and confident in their sin.*

^c Quia etsi hee actiones indifferentes sint, utpote quæ bono & malo usui, possunt deservire, & ideo posse aliquando licitas esse affirmo. Ibid. n. 23. p. 24.

^d Quia famuli hi manifeste se non solum defendunt, sed pugnae ineundæ periculo exponunt, atque hucus ea severitate animosior ad peccandum redduntur, ac majori libidine peccat. Ibid.

He draws also this Conclusion from this Principle; ^e *That it is lawfull for a servant to make meat ready, to wait at the Table, and to make the bed for his Masters Concubine:* And he quotes for this opinion Ledesma and Emanuel Sa, whom he makes to say, with some others, ^f *That it is no fault for one that serves a Whore, to help her to dresse her self:* which is not found so exprest in Emanuel Sa. But the secret passion which Sanchez hath for this affair, hath drawn him on to borrow the quill of another to write that which he durst not publish in his own proper name, contenting himself with a reason deduced from his principle, which is, ^g *that all these things are of themselves indifferent, and have no reference to sin but from afarre off.*

^e Sexto deducitur licere famulis cibos condire, ad mensamque ministrare, lectulum sternere concubinae heri. Ibid. n. 24.

^f Fas est ornare hanc meretricem. Ibid.

^g Quia hec Ibid. n. 24.

omnia sunt ex se indifferentia, & valde remote se habent ad peccatum.

He finds, that to prepare a banquet for debauched men and women, to attend them at the table, to make their bed, are actions farr remote from sin, though it follows so close thereupon: and therefore they are lawfull to men and maid-servants; and that there needs no other reason to justify them in these affairs, than the service they owe to their Masters and Mistresses; That is to say, that for a ser-

h At in non famulis aliqua iusta causa defideraretur. Ibid.

want to perform all these good offices to his Master without fear of sin, it is enough that he be hired to serve him: But for a friend or any other person that would do so much, it behoves that he have some particular reason, as he declares in expresse terms, saying, *h that if they are not servants, it behoves that they have some just reason for to do it;* which thing seems to agree very well with his principle. For if these actions in themselves be indifferent, as he presupposes, they may as well be lawfull for a friend as a servant, the quality of a friend giving no lesse liberty to serve a friend; than that of a servant a Master.

i Pamulus potest jussu heri videre quod femina aliqua eat, & ubi habitet, eique munuscula deferre, herumque comitari ad domum concubinae, sive causa honoris, sive defensionis heri, & ei pedem sustinere ad ingredendum per fenestram domus

So that *Hurtado* is more reasonable, and acknowledging the natural consequence of this principle, he gives absolutely the same liberty to a friend, a son, and to any other, as to an household servant. For after he had said, *i That a servant might watch a woman whither she went, or where she abode, if his Master command him, and carry her little presents, and accompany his Master, whether it be to honour him, or to defend him when he goes to see her, hold him by the foot when he goes in to her through the window, buy for him the pourtraiture of his Mistresse, go to tell her that his Master prays her to come to meet him, accompany her, and conduct her to the place where he is, open the door for her, make the bed, but not incite her to sin with him.* After all this, I say, he adds; *k That a son may do all the same things if his father command him, especially if he fear he shall draw on him his indignation if he refuse. What a servant or a son may do in these occurrents, any other may do as well as they, if he hopes that thereby there may some considerable benefit come to him, and much more for avoiding some great losse, or some great evil.*

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concupinae, & ei picturam concubinae emere, & ire ad concubinam, & ei dicere: herus meus te vocat, & eam ad domum heri comitari, & januam aperire, & eis lectum sternere; non tamen potest eam invitare ad alium ipsum inhonestum cum heri.

Gaspar Hurtado apud Dian. part. 5. p. 435. in addendis atque emendandis in par. 5. resp. mor. in tr. 7. de Leand.

k Et eadem omnia potest filius ad mandatum patris, praesertim si ex omissione indignationem patris timeat. Et eadem omnia quae possunt famulus & filius, etiam potest quilibet alius titulo alicujus considerabilis utilitatis sibi accrescentis, & multo melius titulo vitandi aliquod grave incommodum aut damnum. Ibid.

It remains only that we affirm the same thing of a daughter towards her father, and a wife towards her husband; For it is not worse for a wife to do these dishonest offices for her husband, than for a son or a daughter to perform them for a father or mother; and the reasons of this Casuist prove it equally, or they prove nothing at all.

And although shame, as it seems, kept him back from this, yet he hath notwithstanding sufficiently discovered his thoughts by these general terms; *etiam potest quilibet alius; also any other may do it;* shews plainly, that what he speaks expressly of a son in regard of his father, ought also to be extended to a wife towards her husband; and he condemns not, it may be, these good offices even in a Monk or Priest, since he excepts no person at all: *etiam potest quilibet alius.*

As for carrying of presents to dishonest persons, *Sanchez* makes no difficulty thereof for servants; And he draws this also from his principles: *l It follows,* saith he, *that it is lawfull for a servant to carry, at his Masters commandments, to a woman whom he keeps, little presents, and things to eat:* and the reason of his principle always returns; *because these things are indifferent.*

l Nono deducitur licere famulis jussu heri portare aliqua munuscula aut esculenta ad concubinam, cum haec sint indifferentia. Sanchez l. i. c. 7. n. 29. p. 25.

He is a little more troubled to permit servants to deliver messages, and to appoint meetings, and to carry them Love-letters; but that which hinders him principally, is, that this opinion is not commonly received, and that there are some who condemn this traffique as a thing that is evil in it self: *m Some,* saith he, *do condemn this as a thing evil in it self;* and not only as evil, but also as shamefull; saying, that those who meddle with this commerce are decried and noted with an infamous name, which is at this day of so little credit in *France*, that we must content our selves to rehearse it in Latine, as *Sanchez* also hath set it, *quod communis existimatio testatur, hos lenones appellans; which the common opinion testifies, whilst these are called panders and bauds.*

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But there is cause to believe, that it is rather the name than the thing which displeaseth

m Quidam hoc tanquam in-erinsce malum damnant. Ibid. n. 26.

displeaseth him: For after he had cited some Authors who condemned justly these infamous servants, he adds in their favour, *that* ⁿ *Others exempt from sin* ⁿ *Alii vero excusant à peccato* ⁿ *these servants, who because of the service they owe their Masters do these messages,* ⁿ *famulos qui ratione famulatus* ⁿ *and carry these Letters, by which their Master commands a woman to come meet* ⁿ *hæc internuntia* ⁿ *him in the night, although they know that he causes her not to come in the night* ⁿ *aut scripta deferunt, in quibus* ⁿ *but that he may sin with her.* And to make us perceive that this is his opinion, ⁿ *herus petit à* ⁿ *though he dares not say it openly, he applies his principle to it: ° Because, saith he,* ⁿ *concubina ut ea* ⁿ *without speaking of the sin. He beleeves that this mental distinction and restriction is* ⁿ *noſſe ad ſe venire, eſi norint* ⁿ *ſufficient to ſhelter this crime and any other, how great ſoever they may be.* ⁿ *velle ut veniat*

ad for. candum. Ibid. n. 26. ° *Quod hæc rem indifferentem continent, cum non ad fornicationem, ſed ad adventum* ⁿ *inducant.* Ibid.

Molina ſaith, that in places where Whores are tolerated, ^p *It is no ſin to let* ^p *Peccatum non eſt* ^p *them a houſe, provided that he who ſets it have only an intention to let it them to lodge* ^p *locare eis domum modo locator non intendat fornicationem* ^p *in, and not to prostitute themſelves therein, though he knows that they will abuſe his* ^p *earum ibi, ſed* ^p *houſe to ſin in it. According to this reſolution, it is lawfull to lend or ſell a ſword* ^p *locare ſolum domum ad habita-* ^p *to a man who is known to demand it for no other reaſon than to kill himſelf or ſome* ^p *ationem illarum, ſciens eas abuſuras ea habitatione ad peccata.* *Molina de juſt. tom. 2. tit. 2. diſp. 500. p. 1122,*

Eſcobar makes *Valentia* to ſay the ſame thing. For demanding, ^q *If it be law-* ^q *Licet ne ex* ^q *full to let ones houſe to Common Women, or to any who deſires it to keep ſuch therein?* ^q *juſta cauſa lo-* ^q *He answers, That Valentia holds that this is lawfull, becauſe to ſet ones houſe is a* ^q *care domum me-* ^q *thing in it ſelf indifferent, which is not evil, but through the evil intention of theſe* ^q *retrici, vel alicui* ^q *who abuſe it. And becauſe the queſtion is important, he puts it again the ſecond* ^q *petenti ad for-* ^q *time in theſe terms: ° Is it lawfull to let ones houſe to a Whore, or an Uſurer? After* ^q *nicanſum? Va-* ^q *he had teſtified that Mendoza made ſome difficulty therein, he answers, ° That Va-* ^q *lentia docet* ^q *licere, quia lo-* ^q *470* ^q *lentia holds that he may let them it, though he might eaſily let it to ſome other; that is* ^q *care domum eſt* ^q *res per ſe indi-* ^q *to ſay, provided a perſon find any Temporal advantage therein, it concerns him not* ^q *ferens, que ex* ^q *ſola prava abu-* ^q *though God be offended in his houſe, and that to offend God is alſo an indifferent* ^q *ſentis intentione* ^q *thing with him, as well as the letting of his houſe to perſons whom he knows do* ^q *ad malum ordi-* ^q *hire it to offend God therein.* ^q *natur.* *Eſcobar* ^q *tract. 1. Exam.*

B. n. 98. p. 155. ° *Nam licet locare meretrici aut uſurario domum.* *Eſcobar tract. 3. Exam. 9. c. 4. n. 28.* ^p *Valentia tom. 3. diſp. 5. qu. 21. part. 4. docet locari poſſe, etiamſi alteri commode poſſet locari.* Ibid. n. 28.

There is no ſon ſo unnatural who dares ſo much as think of letting a houſe which he holds of his father, to perſons whom he knows to require it for no other end than therein to offend his own father, and to abuſe his own ſiſter, or his mother; and if any ſon were capable of this exceſſe, there is no father who could ſuffer this affront, and who would not think himſelf in this more injured even by his ſon, than by his enemies, and thoſe who attempted to diſhonour him in this ſort; and yet according to the Divinity of the Jeſuites, God is not offended by ſuch unworthy uſage; and he will not take it ill, that a man who is related to him by ſo many titles of Son, Servant, and Creature, who holds all he hath of him, and who depends abſolutely upon him, lets out his houſe to offend him, and to commit crimes and abominations againſt him.

It is hard to have ſuch thoughts of God without renouncing faith, and even reaſon it ſelf, and without repreſenting God as an Idol of wood, or ſtone, to beleeve that he is unſenſible of ſuch outrages and infamous actions as theſe; and to imagine ⁴⁸⁰ that he would not take it ill, that a perſon who makes profeſſion to be his; and to ſerve him faithfully, not only ſuffers theſe in his houſe, but gives them his houſe to commit them in, without other reaſon than his intereſt; and even without reaſon, and without neceſſity, as ſome Jeſuits maintain.

So it is that *Sanchez*, who is the Maſter in this ſubject, after he had ſaid, that *Navarre* was therein too exact and too ſcrupulous, ſatis ſcrupuloſè locutus; com-

mends *Valentia* and *Azor* for having been more bold, and for having surpassed all others in the defence of so good a cause; ^a *But Valentia, saith he, speaks in this better than all the rest.* And in another place he saith, *that he hath surpassed himself, and that AZOR and he held that one might let out his house to a Whore, though he had no just reason to do it.*

a Sed ultra alios optime Valentia 2. 2. disp. 5. 9. 20. puncto 5. col. 5. vers. Ex hoc autem, Et melius q. 21. puncto. 4. col. penult. & Azor Tom. 2. Instit. moral. l. 12. c. ult. q. 3. censent etiam nulla causa justa excusante licere locare domum meretrici. Sanchez op. mor. l. 1. c. 7. n. 20. p. 23.

These are three Jesuites who speak together after this manner, and these three the most famous of their *Society*, *Azor*, *Valentia*, and *Sanchez*, who reports the opinions of the former to confirm his own.

It is with the same spirit that *Sanchez* doth all he can to excuse those who take such infamous persons into their protection, who retain them, who pay them money, who furnish them with garments, who keep them in their houses, and walk with them to defend them when they go abroad. For though at first he confesses that he finds some difficulty in giving absolution to these persons; yet for all that he afterwards facilitates the things in such manner, that a Confessor who hath but a little contrivance, and is well entred in his opinions, shall have therein no trouble at all. He builds alwayes upon the same foundation, and draws from the same principles all the conclusions which he advances upon this matter. ^b *It is very hard, saith he, to absolve them who make themselves the protectors of Common Women.* See here a formed difficulty; but he weakens and dissipates it in the same moment, saying, ^c *It is lawfull to perform this office to them when there is no design to favour their debauchery, but only to hinder that any wrong be done there.*

b Duodecimo deducitur patro nos meretricum difficillimo negotio posse absolvere. Ibid. n. 32. p. 25.

490.

c Quamvis enim id munus obire liceat, quando non ut meretricio fruantur id obcunt, sed ut incolomes meretrices servent. Ibid. 3.

He would say that it is not lawfull to entertain nor protect debauchery, but only debauched women. As if it were as easie to separate these things in effect, as in the distinctions of the Schools; and as if this were not to protect debauchery, to hinder those who would take from them the liberty and license without which it could not subsist. The Whore may take the same excuse for her self, which is alledged for her protector, and say that she loves not the debauch, but the profit; that she her self hath the same aversion from these disorders, but necessity hath therein engaged her, having not whereupon to live without prostituting her self. It is sufficiently clear, that this answer justifies her no lesse than her protector, and the same gives us well to perceive, that subtilties of spirit and metaphysical abstractions are bad rules for the conduct of mens manners and conscience.

I will relate one conclusion more of *Sanchez* before I return to the rest. ^d *It followes, saith he, that it is lawfull to lend money, yea or a Chamber to sin with women, when it cannot be refused without great damage, which hath some proportion to this evil.* There needs only a promise of some notable summe, and presently this money and the danger of losing it will blot out all the crime of this infamous action, according to these Casuists: or it would be good to hire out the Chamber instead of lending it; both the one and the other being lawfull according to the Divinity of *Valentia* cited and approved by *Sanchez*, ^e *although you have no just reason which may serve you for an excuse.*

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e Etiam nulla justa causa excusante,

Escobar speaks of the same case in the same sense, and almost in the same words. For having supposed it as a thing altogether certain and manifest; ^f *that it is sin to co-operate to the sin of another, and that he that contributes to it only at distance sins not at all.* He inquires, *whether it may be said that he co-operates to the sin of another as a near cause, who lends his Chamber to his friend to corrupt himself with Women.*

f Scio co-operari peccato alterius, & qui concurrat ut causa remota, a peccato excusari. Rogo an quis dicatur proxime peccato co-operasse dum commodat v. g. cubiculum amico fornicaturo, ut magnum incommmodum vitari possit? Negareve respondeo ex Doctorum meorum mente. Escobar tr. 2. Exam. l. n. 58. p. 215.

to the end that he may avoid some great evil? I answer, no; saith he, according to the opinion of my Masters.

He would have us know that this is not his particular private opinion, nor of two or three, but of all his Fraternity, and especially of the 24. elders whom he had taken for his Masters, and whom he makes profession to follow: *ex Doctorum mentem*. And the reason of this answer is, ^s because to lend a Chamber in this manner is a thing of it self indifferent, and is rendred bad only by the evil intention of him that abuseth it.

⁸ Quia istis commodatio cuculi ex se est indifferens, & sola abutentis voluntate vitiat. Ibid.

This Author speaks yet more largely, and makes many questions about the good offices which one friend may do for another, and a servant to his Master, in *Treatise 1. Examen 1. page 285.* But I passe all this in silence, as many other things, which I could relate out of other Jesuits, to cut short as much as I can a matter whereof I desire not to speak at all.

I will only observe farther that which he saith in the 7th. *Treatise, Examen 4. chap. 8. p. 835.* which is as it were an abridgement of all that which he had said, and is in a manner all that can be said or done in this matter according to the rules and morals of the Jesuits. For the 7. and 8. Chapters of the book which I have now cited are intituled: The first: ^h *The practice upon the matter of penance taken out of the Doctors of the Society of Jesus.* And the other which follows immediately; ⁱ *Other decisions of particular cases for the instruction of Confessors, how they may well discharge their offices.* In the latter of these two Chapters he makes this question concerning the Confessor? ^k *How shall he deal with those persons who mediate betwixt debauched persons?* First he makes some distinctions about things which a Confessor ought to tolerate, and those things which he is to forbid these persons; after he saith that all indifferent things are lawfull for them, and by consequence, that they ought not be forbidden them. And to relieve the Confessor, he observes unto him, in particular, many actions he calls indifferent.

^h Praxis circa materiam de penitentia ex Societate Jesu Doctoribus. ⁱ Practicæ adhuc speciales resolutiones Confessorum ad munus rectè obcurandum instrumentes. ⁷ Quorum mōdo se geret cum libidinis mediatore? n. 223. p. 835.

¹ I will observe unto you, saith he, in particular, what actions are indifferent amongst the services which Masters are wont to receive from their servants, to saddle the horse on which their Master must go to see his Mistressse, to stand at the door, and keep it so long as his Master staves with her; to make ready diet, to cover the table and wait at it; to bring his Master home again, to carry Letters, if he be not assured that they are extremely dishonest. That is to say, that it sufficeth that the servant be not assured that they are full of words and discourses manifestly filthy, but that he beleeveth that his Master will content himself to testify discreetly to her whom he loveth the affection which he beareth her, which he expresseth by these words which he addeth: ^m *Though they be written with passion.*

^l Indicia quænam actiones communiter à famulis assumptæ indifferentes sunt: parare equum quo dominus profecturus est ad amasiam domum; eum mihi commorantem foris custodire; amasiam

^m mentem apponere, cibus preparare, ad domum reducere, epistolam deferre, de quarum turpitudine gravi non moraliter constat. Escobar tract. 7. Exam. 4. n. 223. p. 835. ⁿ Licet affectu sint exarata. Ibid. 832.

He also sets down in the number of services which servants may do their Masters on these occasions; ⁿ *To carry and bring back presents, to shew her house whom his Master loves; to open the doors or windoms for him, to help his Master to get over a wall, or to passe through a window, as he saith expressly in another place; and to hold the ladder if the wall or the window be too high.*

ⁿ Dona ferre ac referre, ostia aut fenestras aperire, domum amasie ostendere, auxilium domino parare ut ascendat. Ibid. p. 832.

There may be many of those people whom he calls *mediatores libidinis*, mediators for lust, who are grown old in the mystery, without ever having known or practised all that which he teaches; and I am assured that he will not find any so hard, or so untoward, who will not be content, and serve himself very advantageously of what he allows him. But I doubt whether the most obdurate and desperate can give credit unto his word, and that of his Fraternity, which permits them to do that in Conscience, and before God, which the light of reason alone, and the resentments of honour, which remains unto them in so miserable a profession, re-

presents unto them as so shamefull and infamous, that they are constrained to hide themselves therein from men, and to blush secretly in the presence of God.

He hath only forgotten to speak in this place of the appointments which a servant may make with a Curtesan on the behalf of his Master, if it be not that he beleaved that this was sufficiently comprised in the words which I have related; *epistolas deferre, licet affectu sint exarata: to carry letters, though they be passionately written: or in these others a little above, "The letters which a man writes to her whom he loveth, or whom he keepeth, to desire her to come and meet him, are indifferent things.* Notwithstanding, for the convenience of a Confessor, whom he pretends to instruct, as well as for the repose of the conscience of these honourable mediators, it seems to him that he ought to explicate it a little more clearly, or at least to remit them to the place where he decides this controversie more clearly, and places it in the rank of things indifferent; and by consequence lawful in this trafficke: *o For a servant to say on the behalf of his Master to a woman; my Master commands me to tell you that you should attend him this night, or that you come meet him at his lodging, or at least to show him the house of this woman.*

n *Litæe quibus advocatur amasia, indifferentes sunt.*

Ibid. n. 223.

Traët. 2.

Exam. 2. n.

61. p. 286.

o *Dicere nomine heri concubine:*

Dominus dicit

ut hac nocte

expectes, aut in

domum accedas,

aut figuræ locum ubi sit concubina. tr. 2. Exam. 2. n. 61. p. 286.

It seems to me after this there is nothing more to say, nor to desire, for the clearing up of all points and all the difficulties of a profession so honest, and for the entire satisfaction of them who engage therein, but only to advertise them, that they ought to set a good rate on their mysterie and trade, and to testifie how dear and acceptable the counsels and instructions which the Jesuits give them in the whole practice of their profession are unto them, that they cause them whom they serve to pay well for it. For if they think to do it freely, *Hurtado* and others will not excuse them from sin: *P Hurtado*, saith he, *will not excuse these, but by reason of their gain alone.*

p *Porro hæc omnes actiones;*

Hurtadus 2. 2.

d. 10. dist. 9.

solius militatis

ratione excusat.

Ibid.

This is the conclusion of *Escobar* after the words which I have now related; that is to say, that to avoid, or rather to cover a crime, another must be committed; and that a man may not be accounted impudent, according to the rules of the Jesuites Divinity whereby they shamefully serve lecherie, a man may help himself by avarice, and looking to the lucre he gets in the service he performs to Lust,

III. POINT.

Of dishonest thoughts and desires: Of Fornication, Adultery, and other such like sins, and of the pleasure that may be taken therein.

THe Jesuites are not yet come so far as to deny that Fornication and Adultery are sins. The Commandment of God and the Law of Nature are very expresse in this point. All that they could do herein, is, to separate by their rules and by their metaphysical abstractions, the pleasure which is found in these crimes, from the Criminal actions, that by this means they may give the spirit that satisfaction which they beleve they cannot allow unto the Body. But yet, being they could not authorize the action considered absolutely in it self, they have permitted it under a condition, and hold that one may desire it, and please themselves therein in this manner.

a *Non est mortale cogitare sic*

apud se: si

peccatum non

esset furtum aut

adulterium, illud

facerem. Sa

ver. peccatum

n. 2. p. 560.

Amongst the Aphorisms of *Emanuel Sa* we find these very terms; *a It is no mortal sin to think and say in ones self; If Theft or Adultery were no sin, I would commit it.* He that is thus disposed, hath his will not farre removed from Adultery, though the Law alone and the fear of punishment seems to keep him back from committing it: For if it had been the deformity of the action and the hate of sin had held him back, and kept him off from Adultery, wrong had been done in saying that he had only not sinned mortally; for he had not sinned at all: and it had been on the contrary a good disposition, and an act of vertue to have eschewed an action, because it is evil.

This is without doubt an excellent means and a very easie expedient to do without

out fear, or at least to desire and will to do all things whatsoever they be, if they may be made lawfull by representing them as lawfull; and if for to remove truly the evil from the most criminal actions, it be sufficient to separate it by thought only, and by an abstraction meerly imaginary, or to adde to them in the same manner that which is necessary to make them lawfull.

560 Sanchez serves himself of this expedient, more freely than Emanuel Sa, for the defence of dishonesty, giving by this rule to all persons a liberty to fill their spirits with the thoughts, and their wills with the pleasures, which they may have in the enjoyment of any women, whom they please to represent to themselves as if they were their own wives. This is in the First Book of his Morals, where after he had established this general maxim: ^b *That the pleasure which the will doth take in an object considered under a certain condition, which without this condition had been mortal sin, and was not such therewith, is not unlawfull being taken with that condition put upon it.* He brings for proof and clearing of that his proposition, this example: ^c *As the pleasure which a man hath to desire to lye with a woman if he had married her.* He had already said the same thing before, and he repeats it again, whether for the pleasure he takes therein, or because he thinks it to be important; *as if any one desire to lye with a woman, whatsoever she be, a married woman, kinswoman, or a Nun.* For he removes the evil which might be therein in regard of the one as well as of the other, by this condition, which he puts in their imagination; ^d *if she were my wife, si uxor mea esset, Ibid.* And the reason he alledges thereupon proves it very well according to his principles; for adding only this condition, in his thoughts, ^e *if she were my wife, or if I had married her, it takes away the sin that had been in lying with her; because sin consists only in lying with a person whom we have not married.*

^b Delectatio voluntatis de objecto conditionis, quod seclusa conditione esset peccatum mortale, non autem ea posita, non est illicita. Sanchez op. mor. l. 1. c. 2. n. 34. p. 9.
^c ut gaudium voluntatis de concubitu, si esset uxor. Ibid.
^d si esset sua uxor.

^e Est praetisio malitiae a copula quae consistit in ea habita cum non sua, apponendo conditionem, si esset sua. Ibid. n. 33.

570 Filliutius saith the same thing, and he expounds and extends it yet farther. He proposes first this general maxim, which may serve for a principle to resolve many difficulties in this and other matters; ^f *That when the condition whereupon an action is desired doth remove the evil that is in it of it self, as when a man saith, I would eat flesh in Lent were it not forbidden me; I would lye with such a woman if she were my wife: in this case one may desire without sin a thing which in it self is a mortal sin, under this condition, if it were lawfull.* And although this condition, being altogether voluntary and subsisting only in the imagination, be also impossible in it self in an ordinary way according to those laws which God hath established in all things: it will not fail for all that, according to these Doctors, to make innocent the most Criminal action. As when a man saith seriously and with disposition to do as he saith; ^g *I would revenge my self, if it were lawfull; I would embrace this woman, if it were no sin.*

^f Dico primo, quando conditio tollit malitiam ab actu, ut comederem carnem in Quadragesima nisi esset vetitum, cognoscerem Titiam si esset uxor, tunc potest absque peccato desiderari res ex objecto mortalis.

^g Vindictam sumerem si liceret; accederem ad mulierem nisi peccatum esset. Ibid. num. 298.

And the reason for which he justifies these motions, is, ^h *that if the omnipotence of God should in any manner whatsoever cause this condition to be accomplished, it would remove all the evil that is in the action.* And though this were also impossible in regard of Gods omnipotence, and that he could not in any manner hinder the thing to be evil, it would be of no importance at all: ⁱ *For although that malice were so intimately annexed to the action and intirely inseparable from it, yet notwithstanding he who desires this thing under this condition directs not his affection towards the evil, but rather restrains his will from moving towards it, because God hath forbidden it.*

^h Nam ea conditio si poneretur per quicumque modum divinae potentiae, tolleretur malitiam ab actu. Ibid.
ⁱ Quamvis malitia esset intrinseca actui, tamen qui ita

vult objectum, non habet affectum ad malum, sed potius cohibet voluntatem a malo ob divinam prohibitionem. Ibid.

580 And this is so reasonable and certain according to the Jesuits Divinity, that by making only this mental abstraction and restriction in the mind; *If it be not sin, if it be lawfull, if I had married her;* A man may without scruple not only suffer himself

himself to run out to some transient and imperfect motion; but also to humour himself with a perfect and efficacious desire of the most filthy and criminal things and actions. ^k Sanchez agrees, saith *Fillintius*, that one may also desire these things with an efficacious desire, and others, even with a compleat desire, only with this condition which he set above; if it were lawfull; if it were no sin; if I had married Sanchez, n. 25. her.

Alii etiam in desiderio absoluto cum tali conditione. Ibid.

Unde etiam voluntas aut desiderium ejusmodi in Religioso, qui desideraret uxorem ducere sub conditione, si liber esset a voto, non esset peccatum, Ibid. n. 297.

Quia cum delectatur celebs vel Religiosus de accessu ad mulierem si liceat, voluntas seu appetitus rationalis fertur sub ea conditione præscindendo malitiam à copula, & à copula cum non sua, quo pacto non est malum objectum, & coincidit ejusmodi delectatio voluntatis cum simplici complacentia. Quare sicut desiderium sub conditione licet, ita etiam licebit delectatio quæ propria gaudium dicitur in voluntate. Ibid. n. 229.

Quamvis hæc speculativè vera esse ponamus, tamen in praxi vix locum habent. Layman. l. 1. tract. 3. c. 6. n. 12. p. 41.

Complacentia voluntatis cuius apprehensum bonum est, non est mortale peccatum: concubitus autem cum muliere apprehensa sub conditione conjugii non est malum, sed bonum objectum. Ergo simplex voluntas complacentia & non solum desiderium, ut Cajetanus existimat dub. 1. de tali objecto apprehenso, à mortali peccato excusatur. Ibidem.

Concubitus cum muliere apprehensa sub conditione & sub statu conjugii, non est malum, sed bonum objectum.

Si rusticus à viro existimato docto & pio audiisset fornicationem & furtum externa esse peccata, ac licere fornicandi aut furandi desiderium. Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. p. 71.

This maxim explicated and practised in this manner doth seem unto them so innocent, that they permit the Monks and Nuns themselves to follow it. ^l Whence it follows, saith also *Fillintius*, that this desire and this will would be no sin in a Monk who should desire to marry if he were free from his vow. Or one might well solace himself with this thought or this desire, as he saith above: I would lye with such a woman, if she were my wife. And by consequence, a Monk may take this pleasure without scruple. The reason of this Jesuit is; ^m Because when a man who is not married, or no Monk, pleaseth himself with thinking of the pleasure which he might have in lying with a woman if it were lawfull for him, his will or reasonable appetite carries him not out to that carnal action, but under a condition, after he hath first of all removed from it all the evil that is therein, when it is done with a woman not lawfull for him. For considering if in this manner it is not evil, and the pleasure that is taken therein is only a simple complacence, and by consequence, as it is lawfull for a Monk to desire it, that is to say, to lye with a woman upon such condition; so also is it lawfull for him to take pleasure and have joy in this will.

And though *Layman* be not entirely of the same opinion with *Fillintius* and *Sanchez*, because he saw there was danger in it, yet he proposes it as a true opinion, but whereof the practice is difficult. ⁿ Though we suppose, saith he, these things to be true in general in the theory, yet it happens rarely that they can be so done in practice. Yet for all this he explicates and fortifies the reason of *Sanchez* better than *Sanchez* himself, reducing it into the form of a syllogisme. ^o The pleasure, saith he, that the will taketh in a thing which is represented to it as good, is not mortal sin. But to lye with a woman considered as ones own wife, is a good and not an evil object. By consequence the will may without mortal sin, not only desire this action considered in this manner, as *Cajetan* also affirms, but may also regard it simply with pleasure.

If this decision seem too large, you must beleieve notwithstanding that this Jesuit doth yet restrain himself in this point, and that he hath not said all that he could say therein. For if it be true, as he presupposeth and saith in the second proposition of his syllogisme, ^p that to lye with a woman whom he representeth unto himself as under a condition, and as if he were married to her, is a thing which is not evil, and which on the contrary is good. One may infer thence not only, as he doth, that it is no mortal sin; but also, that it is no sin at all to please ones self with this desire, and to apply ones self to this object, because it is good in it self.

Another expedient proposed by *Sanchez* for to justify the desire of fornication, or to take therein all the pleasure that can be taken, is that which he teaches in the resolution which he gives in this case, viz. ^q If a rustique have heard it said by a man that is in reputation for a knowing and honest man, as are in a manner all those of their Society, and especially in the judgement of the Peasants of whom

he speaks, that fornication and theft are sins, but that the desire of the one and the other are lawfull. For after he had said, that even amongst the Modern Casuists there are some who would not excuse this Peasant of mortal sin, if following the advice of this man whom he beleives to be learned and pious, he should voluntarily entertain such a desire of fornication; he adjoyns in favour of this Peasant, or rather of fornication; ^a though that opinion be probable, yet I beleve that it is more probable that this interiorr act is exempt from all sin.

^a Quibusdam neotericis doctis videtur

hanc ignorantiam minime excusare; at quamvis hoc probabile sit, probabilius tamen credo actum internum excusari oratione à mat'ra. Ibid.

610 These two expedients may be made use of indifferently, albeit the first is more proper for men of understanding, who know how to make metaphysical abstractions, and the second for simple and ignorant persons, such as are Peasants, who may also draw this advantage from the Divinity of the Jesuits above persons of wit and understanding; that because of their ignorance, they may even commit fornication it self without sin: Because invincible ignorance excusing them from sin, as the whole Society do agree it, as we shall see hereafter when we come to speak of sins of ignorance, *Fillintius* and some others assure us, that one may be ignorant that fornication is a sin, without being guilty. ^b It may be demanded, saith *Fillintius*, if a man may be invincibly ignorant that fornication is a sin? And he adds immediately after: I answer, that one may. *Azor* having taught the same thing before him, putting into the number of things which a man may be invincibly ignorant of, ^c to go to a Whore. Whence it follows, according to them, that one may in this estate of ignorance commit fornication without sin.

^b Septimo quarto an dari possit ignorantia invincibilis fornicationis? Respondeo posse dari. *Filliut. mor. q. tom. 2. tit. 30. c. 2. n. 50. p. 389*
^c Ad fornicum accedere, *Azor. tom. 1. l. 1. c. 13. p. 34.*

620 It is true, that they are constrained to acknowledge that it is hard to find this invincible ignorance amongst Christians; but then they return presently to their general proposition: ^d That for all this it is not impossible, that one may be invincibly ignorant even amongst Christians that fornication is a sin, for there are many persons amongst the Common people, who know not how to discern amongst certain sins, those which are tolerated or not forbidden, which though they be not punished, yet their disorders are not approved: as in regard that simple fornication is not punished, or that common women are tolerated, they think also that it is no sin to go to them. Which thing happens even in Cities where great pains are taken to instruct the people in the matters of Faith and Religion, as they know very well who hear their Confessions. And by consequence, those persons may by the favour of their ignorance innocently commit fornication, and particularly with common women.

^d Davi potest ignorantia invincibilis fornicationis. Multi enim vulgares homines sunt, qui nesciunt distinguere inter peccata permissa vel non prohibita quoad poenam, ut ex eo quod non puni-

tur fornicatione simplex, sed impunè permittatur meretrices, putant etiam non esse peccatum ad eas accedere, quod etiam in Civitatibus aliquo bene institutis in fide & religione persèpe locum habet; ut si qui confessiones excipiunt rite norunt *Filliut. ibid. n. 57.*

630 Men of ingenuity and understanding may also enjoy the same priviledge with these ignorants, when they are not in a condition to make use of their knowledge and wit. For *Fillintius* gives them his liberty to commit the acts, not only of fornication, but also of adultery, of incest, and of all other crimes, or at least he will excuse those that they have committed in that estate: and if after they come to remember what they have done, he permits them to take pleasure and to rejoyce, as if they had done the most honest and most lawfull actions. ^e I demand, saith he, whether sleep, drunkenness, madness or ignorance frees from sin, the pleasure that one takes in a criminal action which one committed in that estate? He relates on this matter two contrary opinions, of which the first condemns this pleasure of sin; the second frees it therefrom. He in the following discourse decides this controversy, and concludes in these terms; ^f I say first, that the former opinion is probable, and that it is good to advise according thereto as the more assured for them who aspire unto perfection, and to those who have made vows of Chastity, or who are much in love with this vertue: for though this kind of pleasure were not ill, yet it is a mark that Chastity is but imperfectly loved.

^e Quarto quinto on delectatio de re mortali ratione somni, ebrietatis, amentie, vel ignorantie excusetur? *Filliut. ib. tit. 21. c. 5. n. 290. p. 34.*
^f Delectationes ille citians male non essent, tamen indicant imperfectum affectum ad castitatem, *Ibid. n. 291.*

But as for common persons and such as lead an ordinary course of life

^a Dico 2. secundam opinionem videtur probabilem & absolutam: quia non est dilectio de opere malo: sed ex indifferenti. Ibid. b Unde ad rationem oppositam respondetur factum de se non esse mortale, quia hoc ipso quo fit absque libertate, res quadam est indifferens, sicut occisio animalis, & concubitus brutorum inter se, ibid. 293. c Hi nempe qui conjugium ita suscipiunt, ut Deum à sua mente excludant, ut suae libidini vacent, sicut equus & muus quibus non intellectus, habet potestatem demonium super eos Tobiae c. 6. v. 17.

in the world, he establisheth for them this other conclusion: ^a The second opinion seems to me more probable than the former, and absolutely one may follow it with confidence. The reason is, because this pleasure hath not for its object any evil action, but an indifferent one. Which he repeats also a little while after, answering the principal reason of the contrary opinion: which was, that it is not lawfull to take pleasure in an evil action. ^b I answer, saith he, to the reason alledged against this opinion, that this action is not a mortal sin in it self, because being done without liberty, it follows that it is indifferent; as the killing of a beast, or the coupling of beasts.

He makes great use of this comparison to this purpose; in imitation of the Holy Scripture, which compares those who are addicted to fleshly pleasure, to Horses and Mules: but he conceives amisse of the sense of the Scripture; for in that he so boldly justifies these infamous persons, he must condemn it, which condemns them. ^c When men proceed unto marriage, saith the Angel Raphael talking with Tobit, without thought of God, to take their own pleasure; and satisfy their passion, as Horses, and unreasonabe beasts, the Devil hath power over them.

If the Holy Scripture speaks after this manner of persons that enter into a married estate only to find their pleasure therein, what will it say of those who having chased God and reason it self out of their minds by drunkenesse, take that pleasure out of marriage, and commit adultery or fornication? and after being come to themselves, instead of bewayling their excessse, do approve it, and entertain with pleasure the thoughts thereof which remain with them, or the remembrance whereby they do call to mind that they have committed it.

ARTICLE IV. Of Gluttony.

The opinions of the Jesuits concerning the excessse of Eating and Drinking, and the bad effects which arise therefrom.

THe first rule, which the Divinity of the Jesuits doth prescribe in this matter is, that it is lawfull to eat and drink as much as one will, and as one can, without any necessity, onely to satisfy the sensual appetite and tast. Escobar puts this question:

^a An comedere & bibere usque ad satietatem absque necessitate ob solam voluptatem, sit peccatum. Escobar, tract. 2. Exam. 2. num. 102. p. 304. b Cum Sanctio respondeo negativè; modo non obfit valetudini. ^c Quia licet potest appetitum naturalis suis actibus frui. Ibid.

^a whether it be lawfull to eat and drink ones fill without necessity for pleasure onely? He answers generally and without hesitation: ^b I answer, with Sanctius, that it is no sin. There is onely one condition to be observed, provided that it do not prejudice ones health. As if health were more dear unto them then conscience. The reason is, ^c Because the natural appetite may be suffered to move according to its own inclinations, and enjoy the pleasure it finds therein; That is to say, that we may grant nature, or to speak better, to sensuality whatsoever it demands, relating all to pleasure onely, ob solam voluptatem, and regulating onely our pleasure by our health and bodily advantage: modo non obfit valetudini.

^d Licet potest appetitus naturalis suis actibus frui. ^e Absque necessitate, ob solam voluptatem, modo non obfit valetudini.

The Epicures may easily be content with this maxime, ^d and it expresses very well the foundation of their errors and all the disorder of their life. The end which they propose to all their actions in general, is that which this Jesuit approves in eating and drinking; which is, ^e to be carryed thereto without consideration of the necessity, and for pleasure onely, onely taking heed that health receive no prejudice; and not to love the greatest of all pleasures, which is that of health and life, for a lesser pleasure, as that of the tast, or any other particular sense.

But if it happen that one hurts his health by not being content to eat his fill usque ad satietatem, to speak in the language of this Jesuit, and that one takes in more then one can carry, so that he be forced to vomit, this will be no great harm according

660 cording to him, provided that his health be not thereby notably prejudiced. ^f *What sort of sin is gluttony?* saith he, and he answers that *in it self it is but a venial sin, though one without necessity fill himself in eating and drinking till he vomit, if it be not so that he be notably incommodated in his health.* He adds in his morall Divinity, ^g *That there is no mortal sin therein, no though one even commit this excesse with a design to commit it and to vomit.*

^f Quodam peccatum gula est? Ex genere suo veniale, etiam si absque utilitate se quis & cibo & potu usque ad vomitum ingerat. Mortale non est.

gugiet, nisi ex ejusmodi vomitione gravia salui incommoda experiantur. Ibid. n. 56. p. 298. ^g *imo quamvis advertenter id faciat ac vomat.* Escobar ibid.

And as for drinkings he gives there in the same liberty as in eating, although he takes not his measures from the same rule. The rule of temperance in eating, according to this Jesuit, is to eat as much as you will, provided you do not vomit, and hurt your health; and the rule of temperance in drinking is according to the same, to drink as much as you can without losing your judgement. Whence it comes that, according to this principle, after he had made this doubt: ^h *One drinks to excesse, not so far as to be drunk, but in such manner that his head akes, or the Wine disturbs him in such sort, that he knows not very well what he doth; but yet he hath reason enough to know that he hath drunk too much. What sort of sin is it?* He answers definitively: *I find no difficulty at all but that I may say, it is but a venial Sin of intemperance.* And the reason is, ⁱ *he hath not wholly lost the use of reason.*

^h Immoderato potu quis non quidem inebriatur, sed aut dolore capitis laborat, aut capite tentato à vino non sibi omnino

constat: attamen usus rationis perseverat qui se nimis potui indulgere cognoscit: quodnam hoc peccatum? Venialem intemperantiam dixero. Ibid. n. 62. p. 299. ⁱ *Quia absolute usum rationis non tollit.*

The Heathen Philosophers have spoken with more moderation, and they have been ashamed to give so great liberty unto drunkards. But as the Jesuits make more account of the usage of reason then of the rules of vertue, so also they respect health above reason, and the interest of the body above that of the Soul. They maintain that provided, that reason continue sound, temperance cannot be hurt; and they hold on the contrary, that reason may be stifled as well as temperance, to preserve health!

This is the opinion of Escobar, when he demaunds ^k *whether it be lawful to make a man's self or an other drunk to recover the health of the body?* The answer is, *that one may probably believe that it is lawful when there is no other remedy. As if, for example it were necessary to vomit.*

^k Licetne se vel alium pro salute corporis recuperanda inebriare, cum aliud remedium non super-

est? Probabiliter quis licere opinabitur, v. c. si opus sit ad vomitum creandum. Ibid. n. 63

This is also Azors opinion: ^l *It is no sin, saith he, to take it (a potion to make one drunk,) when it is taken because it is proper to make one vomit, though it be taken in a quantity excessive for a sound man, but not for a sick man.*

^l Si sumatur ut est potus aptus ad vomitionem; sano quidem

immodicus, sed non male habenti, peccatum non est. Azor. Instit. mor. l. 7. c. 22. p. 694.

680 ^m *Tolet saith the same thing, adding notwithstanding a condition to exempt him from sin who makes himself drunk by a maxim of health: that there be no cause to fear that there arise from his drunkenesse any of those evils which are wont to accompany it. But Escobar, who relates this limitation of Tolet, refutes it at the same time. ⁿ This great man, saith he, shall pardon me, if I say that in my judgement this limitation is needlesse; for when a man doth any thing with a formal design to provide for his health, all the evils that happen in consequence thereof are to be esteemed as coming by accident.*

^m Adjecit: Toletus tunc licere quando non timetur ex ebrietate aliquod malum secuturum, quod assolet ebrietatem comitari.

n *Quam quidem limitationem, tanti viri pace dixerim, inutilem judico; quia cum directe valetudini consulitur, cuncta mala sequentia accidentaria reputantur.* Escobar ibid. n. 63. pag. 299.

And without doubt it is for this very cause, and in consequence of this principle, that he saith a little after, that though a man know that he shall fall into pollution by excessive eating and drinking, it is no great fault.

a Gula indulget nimis venialiter: & ex ejusmodi nimietate praevidet futuram in somnis pollutionem; num sit grave gula ex hoc capite flagitium? Escobar tr. 2. ex. 2. n. 101. pag. 304. **b** Ex Lessio respondeo, non esse culpam mortalem si pollutionem per se non intendant, & per hujusmodi cibum & potum non procurent.

c Peccat qui mortaliter in nimio cibo & potu; teneatur se reum sequentis pollutionis habere? **d** Minime, si praeter intentionem accidit. Escobar tr. 1. ex. 8. n. 76. p. 151. **e** Pollutio praevisa in causa, nec intenta, quae ex sola gula mortali provenit, non est mortalis. Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 44. p. 75.

He had already said the same thing, and that also with advantage in the first Treatise. For here he speaks of pollution which comes by a venial intemperance, but there he speaks of that which arises from an excess which is mortal. **c** A person, saith he, sins mortally by eating and drinking too much; is he obliged to hold himself guilty of the pollution which follows upon it? This is the second time that he proposes this difficulty. He answers expressly in the sequel of the discourse: **d** If it happen unto him besides his intention, he is not guilty, though he did fore-see that it would befall him upon it; as he had said already. And Sanchez saith the same expressly, upon the same difficulty: **e** When pollution comes through an excess of gluttony, which is a mortal sin, it is not a mortal sin though it were fore-seen, if one had no intention to procure it.

f Quando quis, culpa sua mortali inebriatur, & ebrius factus committit peccata, quae defectu rationis non est in sua potestate vitare: difficultas est, an haec peccata ratione impotentiae aut ignorantiae excusentur. Ibid. n. 41. **g** Dicendum est, etiamsi eventus soleat esse frequenter ei qui inebriatur: si tamen tempore quo voluit inebriari, non habuit prorsus ullam dubitationem aut cogitationem de illis, nec in specie, nec in genere, minime imputari culpae. Ibid.

He doth not only excuse this crime, but all others likewise, as sottish discourses, impudencies, extravagances, quarrels, and murders themselves, which a drunken man may commit when he is drunk. For proposing this question: **f** When a man is drunk by his own fault, and being drunk committeth sins which are yet in his power to avoid, because he hath lost his reason: the difficulty is to know, whether his impotence and ignorance excuse these sins? After he had reported the opinion of many, of whom some answer with distinction, and others condemn absolutely as mortal sins all the crimes which are committed in drunkenness, he concludes: **g** that we must affirm, that though these accidents do commonly befall a person when he is drunk, yet they are not imputed to him for sin, if when he designed to be drunk, he had no suspicion nor any thought of these things, neither in general, nor in particular.

h Ea autem adhibita, etsi postea eveniant, non imputabuntur.

But for fear that drunkards should abuse that liberty which he gives them, or rather that they may make use thereof with more assurance and without scruple, he gives them this charitable advice, that when they have a mind to be drunk they take along with them such pre-cautions as possible they can for hindring those evil accidents to which they know by experience that they are subject whilst they are drunk, that they may not befall them; **h** because that otherwise they would be answerable for them: whereas after this pre-caution, all the crimes and abominations which they can commit, being drunk, shall not be imputed unto them at all, according to him; no more than if when they went to be drunk, it never came in their minds to foresee that such consequences might follow from their drunkenness; for this cause, he saith purposely, si advertat, if he perceive it,

And though the same thought should come into his mind, and as he goes to debauch, though some friend should admonish him, or his conscience, and his own proper light represent unto him the excess unto which he is wont to be transported while he is drunk; yet if he be not carried thereunto commonly, but by the occasion of other persons, who provoke him thereto, he believes, that he is for this never the more obliged to keep himself from being drunk, and he is even dispensed with from having any care of avoyding these bad effects in his drunken-

drunkenness. ^a Notwithstanding here are two things to be observed, saith he : The first is, that men who are drunk do not ordinarily those actions, which are sins when they are committed by other persons, if they be not provoked; in such manner that they are commonly accidental actions in respect of drunkards; and they are not at all obliged to use precaution to avoid them, because they are to be attributed to them who provoke them, and not to the drunkards themselves to whom they happen by misfortune. Sanchez indeed endeavours to use some moderation in this, or rather put a mask upon these words, after he had said this is the opinion of Vasquez: but it is his own opinion also, as it appears by this his second advertisement.

ebrios ea praeavere, quod iritantium culpe id potius tribuendum est, ac respectu ebriorum casu accident. Ibid. num. 42.

^b The second thing to be herein observed, saith he, is, that the drunkards say and do many things which are not to be imputed unto them for sins, though they have foreseen them, for either they indeed hurt no body, for being done without knowledge, they are without all malice, which had been in them if they had been done with the use of reason, such as are outrageous words or actions. He contents not himself to justify these crimes by two reasons, which he gives in so few words: to wit, that they hurt no body; ^c and that they commit them without reason and liberty. He adds also a third reason, which is, that ^d this excess which befalls a man when he is drunk, does not commonly passe in the opinion of men for injurie, but rather for the most part for drollerie. So that they themselves whom they fall upon, instead of being offended with them, onely laugh and make sport at them. As if the rule of sin were the opinion of Men, and not the Law of God. There are many Fathers and Mothers who do but laugh at the debauches of their Children; and there are many crimes in which God is no less offended, though men be not offended at all, but esteem them as honorable actions.

^a 44. ^c Quia vel nullum damnum inferunt, atque in ebrietate commissa destituntur omni profus ratione malitiæ. ^d Quippe tempore ebrietatis talia in communi estimatione hominum non reputantur contumeliosa, sed tanquam facetiæ adhibentur: atque ita ipsimet adversus quos dicuntur vel fiunt, tantum abest ut loco contumeliæ ea accipiant ad iramque committuntur, ut potius oblectentur & rideant. Ibid. n. 44.

^e He adds also in favour of these excesses, which drunkards commit, as are blasphemies, treacheries, perjuries; ^f That to make them imputed as sin, it is necessary that they be done on purpose and with knowledge, pretending that the sins which respect God directly, cannot be committed but by a design formed on purpose and with full knowledge; but ^g when we have to do with mens interest and things which hurt them, he holds that it is sufficient to foresee them, to make them culpable in what sort soever they commit them, ^h because, saith he, it is no less prejudice being committed by a man thats drunk, then if he had done it with judgement.

^e Vel quia postulanti scientes fieri uti impunitentur, ut sunt blasphemia, infidelitas, perjuria. Ibid. ^f Que vero damnum proferunt, impunitur si prævideantur. Ibid. ^g Quia non minus ledunt in ebrietate, quam sane mentis tempore commissa. Ibid.

So that, according to this Doctor, it is not so easie to offend God as Man; and there is less evil in sins against God then Men; against the Creator, then those that are against his creatures; so that a little temporal interest of a man appears unto him more considerable than the honor of God; and the loss of a little Wealth, of more importance than blasphemie it self.

He also rehearses, under the name of Vasques, an opinion, which justifies all the blasphemies of drunkards, saying that he would not absolutely maintain it, but he onely differs from it in words, and not in reality. But it follows manifestly from his principles, and he has indeed propounded and expounded them with clearness enough in many places of his writings; and Escobar maintains them openly.

^h Drunkenness, saith he, excuses from all sin the actions which are done without judgement, ⁱ injuriosa, ac proinde quæ sana quidem mente peccata essent, Item blasphemia, infidelitas, perjurium in ebrio, &c. Escobar tra&. 2. Exam. 1. c. 12. n. 56. pag. 285.

ment, although they hurt others, and by consequence they had been sins if they had been done with knowledge; as also blasphemy, treachery, and perjurie, which are committed by a man that is drunk. See here an abolition, or rather a justification of all sins in general, which a drunken man can do while he is drunk.

THE SUMME

730

Of the foregoing ARTICLE.

IT will be hard to alleadge any thing in the favour of drunkards and drunkennes, which the Jesuits have not said for their defence. For^a to eat and drink as much as one will, unto satiety, as speaks Escobar, without necessity, and for pleasure onely, they do not acknowledge for any ill.

^b Those who eat and drink more then they can bear, so that they are constrained to vomit, or that they are thereby damnified, so that their head akes, or they are reduced to the state wherein they know not what they do or say, according to them, commit but a small fault and easie to be pardoned.

^c Etiam si absque utilitate se quis cibo & potu usque ad vomitum ingurgitet. Ibid. n. 56. p. 298. Immoderato potu quis, non quidem inebriatur, sed aut dolore capitis laborat, aut capite tentato à vino non sibi omnino constat, venialem intemperantiam dixerò, quia absolute usum rei omnis non tollit. Ibid. n. 62. p. 299.

^c Licet se vel alium pro salute corporis temperanda inebriare? Probabiliter quis licere opinabitur. Ibid. n. 63.

^c If it be needful for a man to be quite drunk to recover his health, or to be better in health, they hold that it may be done without sin, and that even when one is drunk for pleasure, and with a formal design, he is not responsible for the excesses and disorders which he may commit being drunk, if he did not foresee them before he began to drink, though he had formerly often fallen therein when he was drunk.

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^d Etiam si eventus solent esse frequentes ei qui inebriatur, si tamen tempore quo inebriari voluit, non habuit prorsus ullam dubitationem aut cogitationem de illis, nec in specie, nec in genere, minime imputari culpæ dicendum est. Sanchez op. mor. l. 1. c. 1. 16. n. 42. p. 75.

^d Ea adhibita diligentia, etsi postea eveniant, minime imputabuntur. Ibid.

^d But if one think of these inconveniences and hath foreseen them, they pretend that he is quit thereof, provided that he bestow onely some little precaution, though to no purpose, whatsoever evil may happen thereupon; and that one is not at all obliged even unto this precaution, when one is urged to these disorders by others.

Non tenevi ebrios præcavere. Ibid. num. 43.

^e Quippe tempore ebrietatis talia in communi hominum estimatione non reputantur contumeliosa; sed tanquam factiæ admittuntur. Ibid. n. 44.

^e As to the injuries, or follies, and insolences which are committed against our Neighbours in drunkennes, they count them as nothing, and let them pass for divertisements, as well as blasphemies and impieties against God, because they provoke laughter for the most part, as well as other excesses of drunkards. In a word, they permit all things unto drunkards whilst they are drunk, provided that they do not notably prejudice their own health, nor quite lose their reason, and that they do not cause some temporal damage unto men.

Nisi grave malum corporis sequatur. Escobar r. 2. exam. 2. n. 72. p. 301. modo non obstat valetudini. Ibid. n. 102. p. 304. Quando vero damnum proximo inferunt, imputabuntur si prævideantur. Sanch. supra.

^f Quando in ea ultimus finis hominis collocatur. Escobar supra n. 58. p. 298.

^f An comedere & bibere usque ad satietatem absque necessitate ob solam voluptatem sit peccatum? Cum Sæctione negativè respondeo. Ibid. n. 103. p. 204.

^f Gluttony of it self is with them but a venial sin; and they believe that it becomes a mortal sin but onely in some certain cases, and with circumstances very rare, ^f as when a man makes it his last end, saith Escobar. It is true that this excess is very great; and notwithstanding, it seems that this word escaped him, or that he did not consider well what he said himself a little after, ^g It is some sin, but venial, to eat and

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drink as much as one will for pleasure onely, without proposing to ones self any other end, of which he renders this reason; ^h That the natural appetite may be suffered to go according to its own proper motions, and to enjoy the pleasure it finds therein. For according to the common language of Philosophie, as well as of the Holy Scripture, ⁱ to love a thing, to desire it, to look after it, and to rejoyce in it for love of it self, and for it self, is no other thing than to establish it for his last end.

^h Quia licite potest appetitus naturalis suis affectibus firm. Ibid.

ⁱ Frui animo meo mihi bonum est. Frui corpore mihi bonum est.

The Holy Fathers have spoken very earnestly against the Stoicks for their impiety, in saying that their happiness consisted in the enjoyment of their own spirits; and against the Epicures, who placed theirs in the enjoyment of their own bodies. They condemned these two kinds of Philosophie, as making their spirit and their body, their God. What judgement then would they have made of those who say at this day, and teach it to libertines ^k that to eat and drink to ones fill, for the pleasure onely which they take therein, and to give themselves up to their natural appetites, and to enjoy the pleasure which they find therein, is their contentment and their happiness. It is clear that these Saints, following the rule of the Church, would have condemned them, as they did condemn the Stoicks and the Epicures, of making their God of their bodies, and of the pleasure which they have in eating and drinking, and in the actions of their senses; and in doing this they had followed the judgement which Saint Paul had pronounced on persons which appeared yet less criminal than those whom the Jesuits maintain as innocent, whom notwithstanding the Apostle Paul calls Dogs, and saith expressly, ^l that they make their God of their bellies.

^k Edere & bibere usque ad satietatem, propter solam voluptatem: Frui affectibus mei appetitus naturalis mihi bonum est.

^l Quorum Deus venter est. Ad Philip. 3. v. 19.

ARTICLE V. Of Covetousness.

I. POINT.

That the Jesuits authorize all sorts of ways to get wealth; and dispense with restitution of what is procured by the most unjust and infamous ways.

I. Covetousness consists in loving temporal wealth for its own sake. Escobar will not acknowledge this * affection for any vice nor for any fault, if there occur therein no notable excessse, nor any other evil end. ^m What is Covetousness, demands he? To which he answers presently, that it is a disordered love of riches; That is to say, that its irregular either in it self, because it is excessive, or in its end, because one refers it to some thing that is evil in it self, ⁿ for without this he pretends that it is innocent and lawfull, as when one loves wealth for its own sake, without too great passion, and without any evil design.

* c'est à dire en s'arrestant à luy & au plaisir qu'on y trouve. ^m Quidnam est avaritia? Inordinatus divitiarum amor. Escobar, tr. 2. ex. 2. c. 2. n. 29. p. 293.

2. Whatsoever disorder there be in the love of wealth; whatsoever passion one can have for riches, he holds that it cannot be more than a venial sin. If to get them or preserve them, he do no point of injustice, ^o This is certain, saith he, that the disordered love of riches is but a venial sin, if it be not found joyned with injustice, and a will to take or retain the goods of another, without his consent to whom they pertain; or with a hardness of heart unsensible of the miseries of the poor, which hinders from relieving them in their great necessities.

ⁿ Inordinatus quidem amor culpabilis est, non ordinatus, sine adrectum finem directum. ^o Certe in optando

dis divitiis inordinatio nisi conjuncta sit cum injustitia retinendi vel auferendi alienum invito domino, vel cum duritia non tribuendi egeno graviter laboranti, solummodo venialis est culpa. Ibid.

Following this principle, not onely covetousness is no mortal sin any longer, but also it cannot at all be any of it self; and for it to become criminal, it behoves that it part from its own proper matter, and that it enter upon that of injustice. So then we see the whole crime of Covetousness reduced to injustice; but even in this estate and in this extremitie it shall not want protectors amongst these new Divines; they find inventions to justify injustice it self, that they might not condemn covetousness with it.

For it seems that injustice cannot proceed into a greater excess then to sell and buy the honor of women, the lives of men, and Justice it self for money, and yet notwithstanding Fillurim, with many others, justifies this gain, which is gathered by this

y Turpiter accepta ab aliquo pro faciendo actu turpi, qui vel sit contra iustitiam, ut pro faciendo homicidio, vel non sic, ut pro consensiendo in fornicationem, si actus factus sit, retineri possunt. Filliucius moral. 22 tom. 2. tract. 32 c. 4. n. 103. p. 364. *z Ex his sequitur non esse restituenda accepta ab assassiniis, à Lenone, ab infamante, à milite pugnante in bello injusto, à teste dante falsum testimonium.* Ibid. num. 104.

this infamous and criminal traffique, saying expressly, that *y the recompence which one receives for doing any dishonest action, whether it be against justice, as to cause a man to be killed, or against honesty onely, as for committing fornication, may conscientiously be retained, if the action be already done.* Whence he draws this conclusion, which he proposeth as a certain and undubitable truth, that *z that which is received for an assassination committed, for being a pander to the debauched persons; for defaming ones neighbour; for bearing arms in an unjust war, for being a false witness, is not to subject any restitution.*

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a Si solum jus nature spectetur, acceptum ob culpam causam, seu propter opus quod est peccatum, opere impleto non necessario est restituendum, sive opus sit contra iustitiam, sive non. Lessius de just. & jure l. 2. c. 14. d. 8. n. 51. p. 145.

Lessius saith the same thing, and he saith it also generally. *a If one regard, saith he, the Law of Nature, that, which one has received in a dishonest affair, or for an action which is a sin, is not subject to restitution after that the thing is done, whether it offends against Justice or not.* And a little after he addeth; *b And it is more conformable to the truth, that positive right also doth not oblige thereunto.*

So far is it off that injustice hinders Covetousness in these affairs, according to these Doctors, that on the contrary they hold, that it favoureth it. For if these persons have not executed these crimes unto which they were obliged, in taking the money, they will be engag'd, according to them, to render it back, because they gave it them only on condition, that they should accomplish that which they had promised; so that the true means to be able to retain conscientiously that which they have taken, without being bound to make restitution, is to execute readily this crime and this injustice, which serves to cover injustice and its traffique.

c Promissisti scario daturum decem aureos si hominem occiderit: nulla nascetur obligatio nisi postquam facinus non sine labore ac periculo suo in tui gratiam patravit. Tunc enim spectato jure naturali teneris solvere, vel si solvisti, repetere non potes. Layman l. 3. tract. 4. c. 6. n. 8. p. 377.

Layman follows this opinion, *c If you have promised, saith he, ten crowns to a murderer to kill a man, you are not bound to pay it, untill such time as to oblige you to it he hath done this crime, not without pain and danger; but after he has done the fact, common right obliges you to pay him; and if you have already made payment, you cannot constrain him to restore that which he hath received.*

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d Spectato jure naturali teneris.

So that, if after you had done a murder by a man unto whom you had promised ten crowns for his pains, you had Confessed your self unto *Layman* before you had performed your promise, he would have sent you away without Absolution, if you did not give him assurance, that you would speedily discharge your promise made unto him who killed this man to do him a pleasure; and he tells you, for his reason, that *d the law of nature which is undispensable, obliges you to do it.* And to content your mind to engage you yet further to consider his pains, and to pay for this villany of the murtherer, he adds this second reason: *e That the pains which he had taken, and the danger that he had exposed himself to for your sake, deserves very well to be recompensed with money.*

e Propterea quod molestia et periculum ab illo in tui gratiam susceptum, pretio aestimabile sit. Ibid.

f Si cum Judice pactus fueris, ut non sine periculo suo, in tui gratiam suscepto, iniquam sententiam ferat, ea elata, probabilis est opinio Navarre; obligationem saltem naturalem exinde oriri: ut quod ob eam causam à Judice acceptum fuit, restitutioni obnoxium non sit in conscientie foro. Ibid. n. 8.

And a little after, pursuing the same matter, he proposes this Question; *f If you have drawn a promise from a Judge, that he will pass sentence for you unjustly, with any kind of danger to himself; The opinion of Navarre is probable, that this judge having performed his promise, you are obliged, at least by common right, to satisfy him, and he is not at all bound in conscience to restore that which he had received from you.*

800 *Lessius* is also of the same opinion, and assures us that a Judge who hath taken money for an unjust judgement, is not obliged to make restitution, no more than a murderer who hath taken money to commit a murder. ^a It must be observed, ^q Notandum est saith he, that Covarruvias and Cajetan make here an exception, and believe that a Covarruviam & Cajetanum Judge is obliged by the Law of nature to restore that which he hath taken for an unjust sentence, because that the overthrow of Justice and an unjust judgement is a thing that excipere id quod cannot be sold. But this reason is very feeble. For there is no more cause to say that acceptum est à Judge ut inju- one is obliged by the Law of nature to restore that which he hath received for an unjust stam sententiam sentence, than for an unjust murder. ferat. Hoc enim putant jure

nature esse restituendum. Quia injusta sententia & perversio judicii non est res vendibilis. Sed hæc ratio non est firma. Nulla enim est causa cur magis debeat jure nature restituere quod acceptum fuerit pro iniqua sententia, quam pro iniqua occasione. Lessius de just. & jure. l. 2. c. 14. d. 8. n. 54 p. 145.

Therefore we must conclude by the advise of these Divines, who are the most famous amongst the Jesuits, that by the Laws of Justice this Judge deserves a reward for an action of injustice, for which he deserves not onely to lose his soul, but to lose his Office if Justice be done on him: and by consequence that he deserves punishment and reward both at once for one and the same action, and that same also an unjust action. But it must be said to make these things agree together, or to understand this contradiction, that he deserves reward according to the Divinity of the Jesuits, and that he deserves punishment according to the Laws of God, of Men, and of natural equity.

If we consider the crime of Judas, according to this Divinity, who treated with the Jews, to betray our Saviour unto them for money, *Filliucius*, *Lessius*, and *Layman* would have concluded that he was not obliged at all to restore the money which he received, having executed that which he had promised, and in this they would have shewn the world that they had more large consciences than that Traitor himself.

810 And to the end that the Doctrine of these Jesuits may seem yet more strange, and that we may see more clearly that they make sport and play with the truth and with the consciences of men, they assure us ^a that a Judge who hath taken money to passe an unjust sentence is not obliged to restore it, and they assure us at the same time ^b that he who hath received it to pass a just sentence is obliged thereto. ^c That a false witness is not obliged to restore that which he has taken, but a true witness is bound thereto. ^a Nulla est causa cur debeat jure nature restituere quod acceptum fuerit pro iniqua sententia. Lessius

supra. ^b Hinc sequitur 1. Judicem teneri restituere id quod accepit ut justam sententiam ferret. Lessius ibid. d. n. n. 64. ^c Ex his sequitur non esse restituenda accepta à diceute falsum testimonium. Filliucius supra n. 104. Hinc sequitur Judicem teneri ad restituendum id quod accepit ut justam sententiam ferret. Idem de teste qui aliquid accipit ut verum testimonium dicat. Ibid. n. 102.

Lessius observes very well that Saint *Augustin* is contrary to this so strange a maxime; and that he wrote to *Macedonius*, that a Judge who received money to pronounce an unjust Sentence, commits a greater crime than he who takes it to do justice; But he quotes not this great Saint but onely to refute him, without fear that he should rise against him in the last judgement, when he shall judge, with God, not onely the unjust, but also the just themselves, according to the Scriptures.

Layman maketh also a third question, which he answers at the same time; ^d If you have treated, saith he, with a man and promised him money, that he shall not accuse you of a crime which you are to commit, and of which he hath a right to accuse you; this bargain is indeed shameful; but after this crime is committed, you continue both obliged to one and the other, and the money which hath been received ought not to be restored before the Judge hath ordained it; because the right of accusing, whereof he that hath received the money is deprived, may be rated for money. ^d Si cum aliquo pactus sis, pecunia promissa, ne te accuset de crimine patrandi, qui te jure accusare potest, turpis

quidem est pactio; Sed postquam crimen patratum fuit, utrinque obligatio oritur, & pretium acceptum ante Judicis sententiam restituendum non est; Si quidem jus illud accusandi quo ille se privat, pretio æstimabile est. *Layman*, ubi supra.

Ex pretium acceptum ante Judicis sententiam restitutionem non est.

It must be observed, that he saith that *c* he who hath received money to keep secret the crime of another, is not obliged to restore it before that the Judge hath ordained him to do it. He presupposes then that if he be accused before an equitable Judge, he will condemn him to restore it. But how can he do it without injustice, if it be true according to the Divinity of the Jesuits that this man hath a right to the money that he hath received, if he hath got it lawfully, and if he may keep it justly?

Quod si ei qui minabatur accusationem non erat animus accusandi, sed solum terrendi, poteritne id quod sic extorsit retinere? Leiti.

Lessius is of the same advice; and after he had made the same question, he adds also another new difficulty thereunto, saying; *f* And if he who threatened to accuse him had no intent to do it, but onely to fright him, can he retain that which he had drawn from him by this artifice? He fortifies this difficulty by reasons, continuing thus. *g* It seems that he cannot, because he caused the contract by fraud. For he who had given him the money, would have resolved not to have given it him if he had not been deceived. Besides, he hath given it to oblige this man to quit the design, which indeed he never had at all. And for this cause the title upon which he founds the receiving of the money, is null.

l. 2. c. 17. d. 6. num. 42.

g *Videtur quod non possit, quia dolus dedit locum contractui. No luisse enim alter dare nisi fuisset deceptus. Deinde quia dedit ut deponas animum quem non habes. Itaque titulus non subsistit. Ibid.*

Hæc sententia est probabilis, contrariam tamen credo veriorum. Ibid.
i Ratio est, quia etsi non habeat animum, habet tamen jus accusandi, eoque jure uti potest, quod jus est pretio æstimabile, sicut habeat animum eo utendi, siue non. Itaque si quid des ut eo jure non utatur, poterit id retinere. Ibid.

He supports this opinion also by saying that it is *Molina's*, who otherwise is not over-scrupulous. But after all this he concludes in these terms; *h* This opinion is probable, but the contrary notwithstanding is the more true, according to my opinion. *i* The reason is, because this corzenage and dissimulation whereof this man makes use to draw money from the criminal in threatening to accuse him, takes not from him the right which he hath actually to accuse him. The reason is, saith he, because, though he had no design to accuse him, he had notwithstanding power and right thereto, and he might make use of this right which may be valued by money, whether he had a design to use it or not. And for this cause, if you give him any thing not to use his right, he may detain that which you have given him.

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Jus accusandi est pretio æstimabile, siue eo uti intendat, siue non. Unde accedens dolus non est injustus. Escobar in principio Exam. 2. c. 6. n. 36. p. 12.

He quotes *Sanchez* for this opinion, which *Escobar* approves also in the Preface of his Moral Divinity, and grounds it upon the reason of *Lessius*, which is the same with that of *Layman*; because *k* the right of accusing of which he deprives himself, is valuable by money. And he adds, that the artifice of that deceit of him who made use of a semblance of intending to accuse him, to the end he might draw some money from him is not unjust, for that he had indeed a right, though he had no will thereto.

Bauny shews himself yet more favourable to those who would not make restitution. For his brethren dispense from that Duty those who take on them to kill or ruine a person in his goods, by taking money to commit these crimes: and he dispenses also with those who give them these commissions, from the obligation which lies on them to repair the wrong which they have done to their neighbour by these violences. See here the question which he proposes in his summe. c. 17. q. 10. p. 201. Whether one be obliged to recompence the dammages which are befallen our Neighbour by an action which a third person had done at our instance. For example, one hath desired a Souldier to strike or beat his Neighbour, or to burn the Farm of one who hath offended him. It is demanded whether the Souldier failing, the other who had desired him ought to make good all the evil which hath proceeded therefrom out of his own estate?

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He alledges at first, some Doctors who hold that he is obliged to make restitution. But he adds in disavowing them; *l* My judgement is not according to theirs. For none is bound to restore if he hath not violated justice. Doth one do this when he submits himself to another? When he requests a favour, whatsoever desires he had to obtain it by his mean, whatsoever demands he makes to have it done for him, he continues still free to graunt or to deny it; to what part soever he incline, it is his own will which moves him, whether it be the sweetness or the easiness of his own spirit, there is nothing obliges him, but his own good will. If therefore he makes no amends for what he hath

A. I. B. I. C. 1. A. 5. P. 1.

done,

done, if he restore not things unto their former estate, you must not compel him to it, at whose request he was induced to offend the innocent.

He will have one believe that it is but demanding a favour of a Souldier to pray him to beat a man, or to burn a Farm, for to revenge himself on him, that this revenge is no injustice, that so he may dispense with him for the restitution who is the Author and hath caused the thing to be done by another.

Secondly, speaking of the Souldier who outrages a person, or burns his Farm at the request of another, he saith that *nothing obliged him thereto, but the goodness, sweetness, and easiness of his Spirit.* If this action so cruel and so inhumane can pass among the Jesuits for goodness and sweetness, its hard to judge who will pass among them for cruel and barbarous, unless haply they who will not follow their passions.

But if this man who by the counsel of *Banny* finds himself discharged of the obligation to make restitution, be so happy as to meet with *Sanchez*, or some other who is well instructed in his maximes, he may perhaps learn also from him that there is no sin at all in commanding to kill, to burn, or to commit all those other excesses, especially, if he be ignorant or ill instructed in the things that belong unto salvation and conscience. For the same *Sanchez* draws also this conclusion from his principles. ¹ *But he who knows well that an action is a mortal sin, but is invincibly ignorant that it is any sin at all to command it, is excused from all fault in that commandment.*

¹ Deducitur scientiam aliquam actionem esse mortalem, c. 16. num. 19,

ac invincibiliter ignorantem peccare imperando illam, excusari à culpa imperando. Sanchez l. 1. op. mor. pag. 71.

II. POINT.

Divers motives and particular expedients to dispense with restitution, though a man be obliged thereto.

When a person is obliged unto restitution, even by the nature of the action which he hath done, or in the matter in which he hath offended, the Jesuits will yet find many expedients to dispence with him therein.

First, If he have acted without any ill intention. ^m *When is it that he who hath done wrong, is obliged to make restitution,* demaunds *Escobar*, and he answers quickly, *If he have not done it expressly on purpose and with knowledge, he is no wise obliged to make restitution.* There are therefore, according to him no sins but those of malice, which bring after them this obligation. Humourousness and sottishness which is found in the conduct of a head-strong and rash person are a sufficient cause wherefore an innocent person, to whom he hath done wrong, onely because he was not aware of him, must bear the punishment of his sottishness, or his imprudence; It is enough that he knew not, or that he considered not the injustice that he did, to free him from the obligation of making reparation. And though afterwards he comes to be better informed, he needs not trouble himself much thereat, or he may even well pleased therewith, he will find these Doctors who will at once discharge him both of the sin and restitution, by the same principle by which they maintain that he who hath killed his enemy by misadventure, may afterwards be glad of his death; and that he who hath committed fornication or adultery being drunk and out of his wits; may afterward willingly and with delight continue in the thoughts and remembrance, which he doth resume of those crimes, as we have already seen, when we treated of the sin of impurity.

^m Quodnam damnium inferens ad restitutionem teneatur? si non fecit ex intentione, neque scienter, nullam subit restitutionis obligationem. - Escobar Tract. 3. exam. 2. n. 8. p. 348.

2. Ignorance also, of what sort soever it be, doth excuse him who hath another mans goods from making restitution thereof, ⁿ *Ignorance of the fact or of the Law, if it be probable, excuses,* saith the same man; and when a man doubts that he hath another mans goods, and after he hath well considered and examined all things, he finds that it is more probable that the things whereof he doubts are none of his

ⁿ Excusat ignorantia facti aut juris, si probabilis sit. Ibid. c. 4. n. 37. p. 353.

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o Palauus putat own, in this very case he is not obliged to make restitution according to *Palauus*
 ad nihil teneri: ° cited by *Escobar*.
 quia possessio
 omnibus rationibus contrariis non convincentibus præponderat. *Ibid.* n. 105. p. 362.

¶ Notabilis ja-
 ſura decentiæ
 status. *Ibid.* c. 4.
 n. 37. p. 353.

3. P One of the principal causes, whereby to dispence with restitution, accord-
 ing to these Doctors, is, the impossibility of doing it without diminishing ones reti-
 nue and expence, so as to be taken notice of abroad.

¶ Impedio ne-
 quis consequa-
 tur hereditatem,
 officium, aut be-
 neficium quan-
 donam teneor ad
 restitutionem?
 Teneris ex Vas-
 quez quando vi
 vel fraude impedis.
 Non teneris ex Lessio quando precibus,
 blanditiis, muneribus,
 impediſti, quia preces,
 blanditiæ & munera non repugnant libertati. *Ibid.* n. 160. p. 370.

4. Whatsoever wrong one hath done or caused to be done, to ones neighbour
 to hinder his wealth, or to procure him hurt, they dispence with him for making
 restitution, if he have used no violence, but onely prayers, promises, presents to de-
 ceive him or cause another to deceive him, or wrong him. ¶ *I hinder one, saith Es-*
cobar, from obtaining an inheritance, an Office or benefice, when it is I am obliged to
make restitution? He answers: you are obliged according to Valquez when you use
violence, or deceit to hinder him, You are not bound, according to Lessius, when you
have hindred him by prayers, flatteries, presents; because that prayers, flatteries, pre-
sents are not repugnant unto liberty.

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¶ Scio debere
 fieri restituti-
 onem ex actione
 injusta, bello
 scil. furto, u-
 sura, impedi-
 mento boni al-
 terius, homici-
 dio, stupro, &c.
 Rogo quando
 nam restituere
 teneor impedi-
 ens bonum
 alterius. *Ibid.*
 n. 84. p. 358.

He had proposed before in a manner the same question, and he had given the very
 same answer a little above, nu. 84. ¶ *I know well, saith he, that one is obliged, to com-*
pensate the damage that comes by unjust actions, as the violences of war, of theft, of
usury, of hindring another from obtaining some good thing, of murder, of rape, &c. I
demande in what case he that hinders the good of another is obliged to make him restitu-
tion? See here the question; to which he answers in these terms: ¶ If man do any
thing either by fraud, or by lying, &c. for to hinder another, from having that good to
which he hath right, he is bound to make restitution. If he make not use of any evil
way, which is against Charity, or against any other vertue, as if he employed prayers,
flatteries, &c. though he do it of hatred against him, he is not bound to make restitu-
tion. It is upon this principle that Father Banny supports himself principally to main-
tain that the man who employs a Souldier to burn the Farm of another to whom he
bears ill will, is not bound to make restitution.

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¶ Si quis impedit bonum ad quod alter jus habet, actione injusta contra justitiam, nempe vi, fraude, mendacio, &c. tene-
 tur ad restituendum si id faciat actione mala contra charitatem, vel aliam virtutem, nempe precibus, blanditiis, &c.
 Etiam ex odio alterius non tenetur. *Ibid.*

¶ Qui sine vi aut
 fraude, precibus,
 blanditiis, mu-
 neribus impedi-
 vit dignum vel
 dignitatem ab
 officio, beneficio,
 vel similibus, non tenetur illis ad ullam restitutionem;
 etiamsi illud malo animo ex odio faciat. *Lessius de just. & jur.*
 l. 2. c. 12. d. 18. n. 128. p. 128.

This is also the principle of *Lessius*, and *Escobar* testifies sufficiently that he took
 it from him, in making use of his authority to establish it, and he reports it in a man-
 ner in the same terms! ¶ *He, saith Lessius, who without using violence or deceit, but onely*
prayers, flatteries, presents, hath hindred one from entering into an employment, or be-
nefice, or the like things, that is a worthy person, or him that is more worthy, is not
obliged to make restitution to the one or the other, though he did it upon an evil design
through the hatred which he had against him.

¶ *Lessius de just. & jur.* l. 2. c. 12. d. 18. n. 128. p. 128.

In like manner when one would revenge himself, or do wrong to his Neighbour
 in his goods, or undoe him without being obliged to make him any compensation,
 he is onely to take heed that he useth no violence towards them whom he makes
 use of to be the servants of this his passion. And the true means to have no need of
 violence, and to make them resolve themselves on this crime, will be to use prayers
 and flatteries; and to add, if need be, thereunto promises of good recompence, if he
 behaves himself well in his commission, according to the lesson of this Jesuit. I
 know not if *Lessius*, *Escobar*, and *Banny*, will undertake to answer before God, for
 a man to whom they have given this counsel and this expedient for revenging him-
 self on his enemy, as they answer for him in their Fraternity within their Schools,
 and in their books, discharging him from the obligation of making restitution, 890

But

But I am assured that they would never be bold enough, to answer for him before any equitable person, or defend him in Justice. For if they were convinced of having made their neighbour to be beaten, or having their neighbours Farm to be burnt, or to have procured summe other wrong or outrage to be done him by a Soldier, or by any other person whom they should employ, there would be found no equitable Judge, who would not at least condemn them in the whole damage charges and interest of the violence he caused to be done, though he made use of no violence, but onely of prayers, flatteries, and promises; so true it is, as we have already observed, and as we shall here after also see very often, that the maximes of the Jesuits Divinity do not always agree with the most common rules of natural equity, and of humane Justice, any more then with those of Christian and Divine Faith and Justice.

5. But if any Man have been borrowing in all hands to supply his debaucheries, *Escobar* will furnish him with a good expedient, to frustrate all his creditors, and to continue to live in luxury, by renouncing his estate. " It is demanded, saith he, if a man who renounces his estate, may with safety to his conscience retain that which is necessarie for him, and for his Family to live in honor? He doth not onely demand whether he may keep that alone which is necessary for him to live on, but to live without honor. " And he answers, with *Lessius*, that he may, though he have already lost both his honor and his conscience, which *Escobar* also declares sufficiently, adding " that his answer is true, though that the debts for which this man yeelds up his estate, were contracted by ways unjust and manifestly wicked; as when one borrows money of many persons, with a design never to pay it again, because of the yeelding up of his estate which he is about to make.

u Rogo an ecc-
dens bonis tuta
conscientia possit
sibi & familiæ
sue ne indecore
vivat, necessaria
retinere? *Esco-*
bar, *ibid.* num.
163.
w Cum *Lessio*
respondeo possit.
x Quod quidem
verum est licet

debita pro quibus ecclat sint ex injuria & notorio delicto contracto. *Ibid.*

6. The Usurer will also find no lesse favour with the Jesuit. For among many expedients which they will give him to dispence with himself for the restitution he ought to make of what he has ill got, he will find in *Lessius*, that if the things he has got by usury be so mingled with others, their like which belong to the Usurer, that one cannot distinguish them, it must be presumed that the Usurer is become a lawfull possessor of them.

y Si res ille
nomine usuræ
acceptæ, ita
misceantur rebus
usurarii simili-
bus, ut non
18. num. 135.

possint ab eis distingui, tunc dominium censetur transfatum. *Lessius* de just. & jur. l. 2. cap. 29. d. pag. 354.

Escobar extends this answer so far as to reach a Merchant who hath received more than was due unto him, saying that after he hath mingled other mens money which he hath received with his own, if he to whom the money pertained demands it back again, this Merchant is not obliged to restore it him, according to *Vasquez*. " A Seller, saith he, receives in simplicity more money than he ought, and he hath mingled it with his own; is he obliged to restore it, when he who hath given it him comes to him to demand restitution thereof? He does not ask if this Merchant be obliged to see and to certifie himself that he hath received more money than he ought, he supposes without any difficulty that he ought not; he enquires onely, if this being true and known, he be obliged to restore this money which is not his, and which he hath already mingled with his own; and he serves himself of the authority of *Vasquez* to add weight to his resolution. " *Vasquez*, saith he, denies it; he is not obliged thereto neither by any unjust manner, by which he hath received this money, he having received it in honest simplicity, nor by the substance of the thing which he received, because he received it in payment, and so took it on a good accompt, and honest.

z Venditor ac-
cepit bona fide
pecuniam, &
cum sua com-
misset, teneturne
compareute Do-
mino restituere?
Escobar, *ibid.*
n. 107. p. 362.
a Negat *Vas-*
quez de restitu-
tione c. 9. sect.
2. dub. ult.
quia non tenetur

ratione injustæ acceptationis, qui bona fide accepit: nec ratione r. acceptæ, cum pecuniam accepit in pretio & bona fide accepit. *Ibid.*

But if these two reasons founded upon simple good meaning, which serves for a cloak to the greatest crimes that are, according to the Divinity of the Jesuites, as we shall shortly behold more clearly, content you not, and you answer this Casuist, that this Merchant is destitute of honest simplicity, because that he who gave him the

the money came again, and made him know that he had given him more then he ought to have done; he will tell you for your last answer that he is come too late, that the Merchant hath already mingled his money with his own, and by this medley he is become thereof the legal possessour: *ET CUM SUA COMMISCENDO, SUAM FECIT.*

I know not what secret vertue he ascribes to the money of a covetous and unjust man to convert into his proper goods that which is anothers. This is not according to that which they say commonly and most truly, that those of another mingled with our own proper goods, consume them and destroy them. He had spoken more truly had he said that it was not the mixture, but injustice and covetousness that had purchased and appropriated the others money unto this Merchant.

Covetousness and injustice shew themselves most manifestly, 1. In doting upon ones own wealth. 2. In the usurpation of that which is anothers by unlawful ways. 3. When what is so obtained, is retained without a will to restore it. 920

The Jesuits teaching their Disciples to love their own goods, better then their Neighbours lives, say that it is lawfull to kill him, when he attempts to take them from us, as we have already made appear, and shall discover more largely when we come to speak of that commandment of God which forbids murder.

They teach to usurpe and unjustly to invade anothers goods, in maintaining usury, and in justifying or excusing the most part of the treacheries and frauds, which are used in Merchandise or Traffique. They teach to retain and not to restore them as I have made appear already; and by thus much it is easie to judge with what exactness and fidelity they maintain the causes which they undertake; being they have omitted nothing which might favour covetousness, and gratifie the greedy desire which men have for the goods of this world.

ARTICLE VI. Unfaithfulness.

Covetousness carries to injustice, and both the one and the other engage men in infidelity. For as according to Scripture, the just man lives by Faith; that is to say, that the exercise of Faith and fidelity is as it were the bread which nourishes us; as the air which we breathe, and which is the continual employment and entertainment of this life: one may say, on the contrary, that the unjust man lives by infidelity, and that if his life be well examined, and we could pierce into the bottom of his heart, there would nothing be found in his thoughts, in his design, and in all the conduct of his life, but disguisements, deceits, and infidelity. 930

It is not onely true in the Church, that just and honest men live by Faith, but one may also say the same thing of all men who live together in any sort of humane Society. Faith is not onely the foundation of religion and of Christian life, but also that of Estates, of Corporations, and of civil life. It is not properly to live, to live amongst dissemblieg and treacherous persons, no more than to live among enemies, being obliged to keep our selves always upon our guard, and to be in a continual distrust, and disquiet, for fear of being surprized upon every occasion, and of losing our goods, honor, and life.

In the meann while we shall see our selves reduced to this point if we suffer our selves to be conducted by the advice of the Jesuits, and if we regulate our lives by the maxime of their Divinity, which doth openly allow and teach dissimulation, deceit, and infidelity, as I shall make clearly appear by this Article.

Infidelity may be committed first of all in things, by the sale and by the exchange of things. 2. In contracts and promises. 3. In discourses, treaties, and generally in words. I will make three Points of this Article according to these three sorts of infidelity.

I. POINT.

Of diverse sorts of unfaithfulness, and of deceit, which may be committed in things by altering them, selling them by false weights and measures, and taking those which are anothers without his privity.

UNfaithfulness and deceit, of which we speak here, is a true theft disguised and covered with some false pretence of apparent reason. There are many persons who are disposed to deceive; but they to whom there remains some little conscience, are troubled in doing it; the light of nature alone, which is not intirely extinguish'd in them, makethem to see clear enough in the bottom of their hearts, that this is not lawfull, they must needs first deceive themselves, that they may deceive others. And as for the most part, men have not spirit and invention enough for this, they want some body to aide and furnish them with reasons to blinde and persuade themselves that they may with a good conscience do that which even their conscience it self teaches them they cannot do; when they consult and hearken to it without preoccupations.

The Jesuits of all the persons of the world are most capable to do these good offices, and sufficiently inclinable of themselves to pleasure the whole world. It must needs be a very strange and extraordinary case in this matter, if they find not expedients to resolve it to the content of him who consults with them. There is no person of what condition soever he be, who doth prudently make use of their advise, who may not do all his affairs by deceit, and yet not pass for all that, for a cheat, or unfaithful, according to the maximes of their Divinity.

First of all, if a Child be tempted to take something of his Father and Mothers goods secretly, and that the fear of God or Man restrain him in any sort; Escobar takes away this scruple from him, and makes him see that he may do it with good conscience, especially if he do any service to his Father, as there is no child but is obliged to do, and who doth not do it according to his condition, when they are of age and in capacity to do their duties.

He proposes this question: *A Merchant hath a Son whom he employs in the manage of his estate, and who may by reason thereof demand of him as much for his salary as he would give unto a stranger. See here the thesis supposed, and upon which he founds the case. If his Father will not give him that which he earns, may he take it himself in secret? He answers clearly, that he may, according to the proportion of his labour and his industry. He permits him to estimate and rate his own labour and pains, and pay himself with his own hands, deducting onely out of his pretended wages what his Father hath laid out in his education and maintenance; in such manner that this estimation depends upon his own judgement and will, for that he dare not inquire of his Father how much he hath expended therein.*

a just m. est mercedem laboris & industriae suae, computatis tamen in dicta aestimatione expensis quas atanda Escobar tract. 1. c. 120. l. 10. n. 31. p. 163.

a Filius mercatoris patris bona administrat, & potest à patre salarium exigere quantum alicui extraneo deberet. Si istud non possit à patre pretium impetrare, potest sine clam accipere? Potest quidem pater in ipso fecit

Bunny in his summe ch. 10. 2. 4. p. 138. saith the same thing in these terms: *When Fathers for whom their children are employed, and employ themselves continually, do not content them as where children being now grown up are employed by them in their Shops and labour in their Trades or in the field for their Fathers affairs, are not obliged to do this for nothing; they may in conscience exact so much as strangers receive of them. And if it happen that through fear or other humane consideration they dare not take this liberty where there is need, to demand a just recompense of their Fathers, Leonum. 81 addeth, that it is lawfull for them by all sorts of reason, deducting the charges their Father hath been at in their education, to take so much for their labour and industry as they would give to a stranger, unless they intend to serve freely.*

This answer is an Oracle and contains a mystery, which it were not convenient to reveal to all the world; saith my Author; and to cover this mystery, it was needfull, saith he, to pronounce it in Latin, (the last clauses are so in the Original,) that

they might be tempted thereby who understand not that language, and to oblige them to go and demand the knowledge and practice thereof from them that understand it.

b *Adverte, furta esculentorum & poculentorum quæ committuntur a famulis & ancillis, etiam si sensim perveniant ad notabilem quantitatem, non esse peccata mortalia, si furentur ea, ut ipsimet consumant.* Lessius de just. & jur. lib. 2. c. 12. d. 8. n. 48. p. 118.

2. *Lessius speaking of theft, saith in favour of men and maid servants: b Observe, that theft which men and maid-servants commit in meats and drinks are not mortal sins, though insensibly they amount unto a notable quantity, if they steal them onely to eat and drink them themselves.*

c *Coalscenene furta minuta famulorum de rebus comestibilibus quæ claudi non solent?* Minime si non vendenda sed comedenda abripiant. Escobar tract. 1. exam. 9. n. 29. p. 162.

Escobar saith the same thing, and takes it of him. c These petty thefts, inquires he, which servants make of things to eat, and which are not wont to be locked up, can they by accumulation become a great sin? He answers, No, if they steal these things to eat, and not to sell.

I will not stay to make reflections upon these petty thefts, nor to rehearse many other cases in which children may, according to the Jesuits Divinity, take the goods of their Fathers and Mothers, and Servants those of their Master, reserving that to be done in its proper place, when I shall handle that command of God which forbids them, and the duties of children and servants in particular. I will onely here rehearse another passage of *Lessius*, which of it self is sufficient to authorize all sorts of theft which a child, or a servant, or any other sort of person may commit.

d *Crediderim non esse peccatum mortale quando sciret vel bona fide putaret inferior, eum esse erga se Superioris affectum, ut liberter esset concessurus si ipsum sciret tali re egere, vel tale quid desiderare. Tunc enim censetur habere ex voluntate Superioris, saltem virtuali quæ in affectu illo latet. . . . Pari modo in furto non est peccatum mortiferum quando quis scit affectum Domini in se talem esse, aut certe quando Dominus rem parvi estimat; aut ita in aliquem esse affectum, ut nollet illum gravi obligatione teneri.* Lessius de just. & jur. lib. 2. c. 41. d. 9. n. 79. p. 496.

First of all, he saith, *d That he believes not that a religious person sins, at least not mortally, in taking something without asking it of his Superiour, believing that he would have given it him if he had asked it, or if he had known that he had need of it, or onely that he deserved it.* From hence he draws this consequence, and this maxime general, in the matter of theft: *So it is no mortal sin to steal, when he knows that his Master hath the very same affection for him as the Superiour of the Religionary hath for him, or when his Master makes no account of that which is stoln from him, or when he is of such a disposition that he would not have him who had stoln it from him, obliged therefore to any great punishment.*

In these few words *Lessius* hath put together three reasons to excuse, in a manner, almost all sorts of thefts from mortal sin, and hath given liberty to commit them without fear of sinning mortally.

e *Quando quis scit affectum Domini in se talem esse, &c.*

e First of all when any one perswades himself that his Father or his Mother, or his Master, or his friend or his neighbour, or any one whomsoever, might give that which he steals if it were asked, or if he knew that he had need of it. A child may easily promise himself this of his Father, or a servant of his Master, and generally every one whosoever of him whom he believes to have some inclination or affection towards him.

f *Aut certe quando Dominus rem parvi estimat; aut ita in aliquem est affectus ut nollet illum gravi obligatione teneri.*

2. *f When the person from whom something is stoln, makes small account thereof; or hath not much affection for it, or gives not himself much to it, this gives liberty to rob persons that are gentle, prodigal, and good people above all, who because they sit loose from the things of this world do make no great matter thereof.*

3. When a person is of that disposition, that he would be loath that the thief should therefore be subjected unto great pains, as to fall into mortal sin, and by consequence into eternal damnation.

There are no persons so barbarous as to desire to engage him to eternal damnation

who hath robbed him of some thing, and much lesse a Father, a Master, a Friend, a Neighbour, if he be not bereft of all sense, of Christianity, and altogether unnatural. If then mortal sin in the matter of theft, depend on the disposition and will of him that is robbed, as this Casuist pretends, it will come to passe that no Child, Servant, Friend, or other person almost can at all offend mortally in theft.

4. ^B They hold that a Treasurer, a Factor, a Sollicitor, a Servant and such like, may traffique with their Masters money, without his privity and retain the profit for themselves.

g Potestine The-
saurarius vel
Procurator
Principis Domi-
no inficio, cum
periculum domino

ipsum pecunias in suum commodum negotiari? Potest ex Doctrina Lessii, modo nullum incommodum aut

5. They teach that a Vintner who hath better wine then ordinary, for that he may not sel it by reason of some politique order above the common price, may recompense himself therein by mingling water therewith: This is also the opinion of *Escobar*, who after he had reported the opinion of those who condemn this deceit, he adds that notwithstanding their opinion and their reasons, ^h *Lessius* maintains that it is lawful, because those that buy this Wine have no prejudice there-
by.

h Attamen Lessius
posse datus
affirmat, quia
nulla injuria
infertur empic-

vi. Escobar tract. 3. exam. 6. n. 70. p. 423.

Amicus saith the same thing of grain as well as of Wine, ¹ That a man who selleth Wine or Grain which is very good, may mingle so much of water with his wine, and Rie with his Wheat, as will reduce one with the other to the quality of the common Wine and Grain which are sold at same price with his.

i Infertur posse
veaditorem qui
vinum vel triticum
venale ha-
bet optimum,
tantum aqua

in vino & siliginis in tritico miscere quantum sat is est ad reducendum vinum vel triticum ad eam qualitatem cujus est aliud vinum vel triticum quod eodem pretio venditur. Amicus de just. & jur. dispen. 21. Sect. 6. n. 87. p. 282.

6. Tailors also may find their advantage in *Escobar*, who justifies that deceit which is very common amongst them. ^k He demands whether a Tailor, who hath been accustomed to buy Cloath or Silk by command from another for to make his Cloaths, and goes on this occasion most commonly to a Shop of a Merchant, who for this reason sells him a good penny worth, may retain to himself the benefit of his good market? He confesses presently that *Salas* condemns this as a manifest cheat, because the Merchant gives nothing of his own to this Taylor, and that which he makes shew of abating him, is effectually paid by him for whom he bought it. But he concludes at last for the Taylor, with *Phillinius*. The reason upon which they do both ground this is, because this practice is past into a custom: ¹ For, saith he, the Merchant is indeed accustomed to abate something to the Taylor, because he comes usually to his Shop.

k Sartor cui cura
emendi pannos
& serica pro
vestibus confi-
ciendis committi
solet, si unus
mercatoris frequen-
tans invenit
pretia mitiora:
potestne pretii
illius excessum
sibi remissum
retinere? Ne-

gat Salas dub. 45. n. 6. quia mercator revera nihil ei dimittit, sed dimittere mentitur, ad eum alliciendum. Porro Phillinius tom. 2. tr. 35. c. 6. n. 149. affirmat. Escobar tract. 3. exam. 6. n. 60. p. 421.

1 Quia revera assuet

Phillinius reports also another reason in this matter, which is never a whit better. ^m It doth not seem, saith he, that the Taylor sins against Justice in taking this money which comes by the good pennworth which the Merchant affords him: because the Merchants are greatly concerned that Taylors should rather come to their Shops than to other men's.

m Non apparet
ulla injustitia
in accipiendo
illo pretio. Revera
enim magis
refert mercato-

rem ut sartores potius ad suam officinam veniant, quam ad alias. Phillinius supra.

He pretends that because the Merchant finds his advantage therein, therefore the Taylor ought also to have his benefit thereof. It seems to him reasonable that they divide that which comes of this deceit between them, and that the Merchant should give the Taylor that which he hath promised, he believes that he is obliged thereto: and this is without doubt by the same law that obliges him who hath employed a man to commit a murder to pay the murderer what he had promised him,

as *Layman* maintains. Also the *Taylor* may in good conscience receive that which the *Merchant* gives him upon *Fillintius* his words, who saith, ⁿ that he sees no injustice therein. Preoccupation hinders him to see it, which yet is not so strong as to take from him altogether the sense thereof, for the check of his own conscience makes him say after he had approved this traffique, ^o that they must notwithstanding endeavour to break it off, and to counsel *Taylor*s to use it no more for the future.

7. Butchers and Vintners who sell by false weights and measures, will find this favourable conclusion in *Amicus*; ^p *If the Magistrates have regulated the price and the weights of Flesh, and the measures of Wine, so that the price is not sufficient for the charge, and for their pains, and the ways of those who sell these Merchandises, they may diminish the weight and the measure so far, as is necessary to satisfie all these things, That is to say, that if a Butcher or a Vintner be disorderly, expensive, an ill Husband, or an ill Chapman, or suffer himself to be cheated, or buy too dear, the publique must pay for all this; because if a Merchant be an ill buyer, he may be a wicked seller, and cheat in selling, because he was cheated in buying.* ^q *These things, saith he, notwithstanding must not be told all the world, because of the danger there is therein, of falling easily upon injustice, As if that were sufficient, to remedy the evill which he had done himself before in approving it publicquely. It is with the same spirit Fillintius proceeds to say, in the other case which concerns *Taylor*s, that they ought to be counselled not to do a thing which he maintains is lawful for them, ^r and in which he saith that he sees no injustice at all.*

Si publica lege taxatum sit certum pondus carnis aut mensura vini, que non respondeat expensis, laboribus & justo stipendio venditoribus debito; potest ex taxato pondere vel mensura detrabere quantum sufficit ad hæc omnia compensanda. Amicus de just. & jur. d. 21. Sect. 6. n. 87. p. 282. q *Veyum hæc non tam facile evulganda, ob periculum injustitias facile committendi. r* *Nec apparet ulla injustitia in accipiendo illo pretio.*

He might much better have suppressed these questions and maximes, than to hold them thus in secret. And it is no other then to mock the world to give counsell that they be not published, after they have been made publique by writing them and causing them to be printed. One may even say, that it were the utmost favour that could be done these cheats, to conceal that Doctrine which exempts them from sin; because they could not deceive so many persons, if it were known that it were lawful for them to deceive in that manner. One trusts a Merchant that deceives him, because he believes him to be a man of conscience: otherwise he would not trust him, and consequently would not be deceived, if he knew that this Merchant who may be is under the conduct of some Jesuits, or hath consulted these good Fathers about these matters; (upon which its morally impossible that he should not endeavour to be satisfied) may cheat with a safe conscience, and without doing any injustice.

Sanchez goes yet farther; and maintains that as in these occasions one may sell by false weights and false measures; he may also without wronging truth, deny that he hath done it, when he is questioned in justice by a Judge, who hath power to examine him. ^t *When a tax laid on any Merchandise, saith he, is unjust, he that sells too dear or cozens in weight or measure, to the end he may save himself from the injustice of the tax, and bring the Marchandise to be equal to the price ordained; being examined by a Judge whether he hath sold it too dear, or have changed the weight or measure, he may say that he hath not, and assure him that he hath sold after the ordained price, and that he hath observed the weight and measure; intending that he hath not done it in such manner as to offend in selling too dear, or in not giving weight and measure according to the ordinance; because he hath done the one and the other without sin. And also he saith true, when he answers that he hath delivered all faithfully because he hath done as much as he was obliged to do therein; according to the money that he had received, and that he doth not depart herein from reason and Justice.*

Quando taxa alienius rei est injusta si pluvia vendens aut defraudans in pondere aut mensura, ita ut sibi satisfaciatur pro pretii injustitia, & reddat correspondentes merces pretio dicto; potest hic gurus a JUDGE an pluvia vendidit vel defecit in pondere aut mensura, id negare, asserereque se pretio taxato vendidisse, & integre pondus & mensuram tradidisse, intelligendo sic, ita ut pluvia vendens, aut deficiens in pondere aut mensura deliquerit, quippe absque delicto utrumque fecit, atque ita vere dicit se integre tradidisse, nempe quantum tenebatur eo pretio accipio, neque excessisse delinquendo. Sanchez op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 29. p. 28.

Escobar who makes profession to know and to chuse the opinions which are best and most reasonable in every matter, out of all the Authors of the Society, has not forgot this of Sanchez of which he speaks in these terms: *If one thinks and probably believes that the price which is set upon any Merchandise is unjust, and that for this reason he who sells recompenses himself for this injustice by selling by false weights, or by some other way; being afterwards examined by a Judge upon these facts, he may deny it all upon an Oath.* It is not enough with him to permit men to deceive and to maintain their deceit by a lye; but he allows them also to maintain it before a Magistrate by perjury, if the Judge compel him to swear. And he covers all these crimes of cozenage, lying, perjurie, by an equivocation and mental restriction which he teaches this unhappy man, to help him with an invention to deceive the Judge after he hath deceived other private persons; *Intelligendo se injuste negasse.*

Si probabilis est opinio quod taxa alicujus rei sit injusta, & propterea venditor falsis ponderibus, vel alias injustitiam sibi compensat a Judice postea interrogatus potest id totum jurejurando negare.

Escobar Tract. 1. Exam. 3. num. 34. pag. 75.

Finally he permits him to make use of these artifices, provided that he can ground them upon some appearance and probability; *Si est opinio probabilis.* Which will be always easie to do, because in all the most odious and unjust causes, to make an opinion probable according to the Jesuits, it suffices to have the approbation of some one who passes for an able man, as I shall make appear hereafter.

8. The deceits among Merchants are authorized by Escobar in these terms; *A Seller, saith he, knoweth that there will be shortly great store of Merchandise, that money will rise or fall; is he obliged to confess it?* He answers, *that he may affirm that he knows nothing of it.* And if this disguise suffice not to surprize him that does deal with him, he holds; *he may openly affirm the contrary to that he knows.* And that in answering thus, he may well injure the truth, but not Justice. As if a man could injure truth without wronging Justice in an action of justice, and in the common fellowship of men, which is ruined by these wickednesses and falshities, which by consequence comprise under them many injuries against all men in general, and against every one in particular, who hath a right not to be couzened, and not to be deceitfully used, not onely when they deal about things of value, but about simple discourses, which lyers use as traps for those who distrust not their malice.

U Teneturne venditor de futura copia mercium, de monetæ accretione aut diminutione conscientie aperire veritatem? Potest innuere se nescire. Escobar Tract. 3. exam. 6. num. 74. pag. 423. *U Aut potest negative respon-*

dere, lesa quidem veritate, sed non iustitia.

I know very well that this Author grounds himself upon this that he pretends, *that the Merchant is not obliged to tell him the truth.* But I know not what it is that can dispense with him in this case if it be not the disordered adherence to his own proper interest, which seems so favourable to the Jesuits, that they suffer them to conserve them at the charges of truth and sincerity; that is to say, at the expence of humane Society, since without verity and sincerity the confederacy of thieves and robbers themselves cannot subsist. It is many times lawful not to utter the truth; But it is never lawful to tell a lie, and if my Neighbour have not always right to be informed of those things which concern him not, he hath always a right not to be couzened, principally in those things which concern him.

x Quia non tenetur veritatem aperire.

9. There is another sort of cheat among the Merchants which the same Author Justifieth also. *A Merchant, saith he, hinders that others cannot buy Merchandise from them who bring them from far, by forestalling them and buying them up at first hand; so that others are constrained to buy them of him more dear afterwards; is he obliged to restitution; Rebellius holds that he is obliged: but Molina and others assure us that he may be dispensed with herein.* This Author saith nothing what his particular opinion is herein, he contents himself to note that the greater number are those that are of opinion to favour the deceiver; that is to say, according to his principles, their opinion is safe in conscience; as if he would shelter himself under the protection of these Jesuits authority, from the reproach which he saw might be cast

y Alios impedire quis ne merces ab aliis emanent qui eas portant, sed eas emit anticipatè, ita ut alii cogantur postea eas de manibus ipsius charius emere; obligaturne ad

restituendum? Rebellius obligari docet, licet Molina & alii eum posse excusari affirmant. Escobar ibid. num. 81. pag. 425.

upon him for having advanced the Doctrine which opens a door to all the monopolies which are practised this day, which authorizeth the injustice of all those who make hoards of Merchandises, Grain, Provisions, and other things necessarie for ones life for exhausting and ruining the Provinces.

10. Courtiers also and the favorites of Princes may advance their affairs, by making use of the expedient which *Filliutius* hath given them. For supposing that it is lawful for them to buy a good debt a great deal more cheap than it is worth, of him who is in trouble fearing not to be paid, he draws from thence this consequence:

a Hinc insertur
1. posse aulicis
Principem e-
mere creditum
privati hominis
quod habet adversus Principem dimidio minoris vel etiam minus, si prudenter aestimetur minus valere; quia in illo privato creditore parva sit spes illud recuperandi, & vere ita arbitrio prudentis judicetur. *Filliutius* tom. 2. tract. 35. c. 5. n. 107. p. 457.

a That a Courtier who is near unto a Prince may buy a debt of a private person due to him from the Prince, for half the value, and yet at a lower rate if he thinks that it is not so much worth, because of the little hope that this private person had for to be paid, and because it is the opinion of wise persons. 1070

b Si illam facultatem satisfaciendi hospitali impetrafti, postquam minori pretio emisti ab hospitali creditum, licite predictam industriam excogitasti. *Tambur.* in lib. 8. de calogi, tract. 3. c. 7. sect. 8. n. 7.

Tamburin in his book upon the decalogue, which was lately published by the order of the general of the Jesuits, and with the approbation of the Divines of that Society, holds that one may *b* buy in this manner; even the charity which a King hath granted to an Hospital, provided that they be bought before the King give order to pay the summe which he hath promised to the Hospital; adding that *Lugo* allows this purchase to be made even after the order is given to pay this intire summe.

c Circa licentiam ea est varietas sententiarum, ut possit iudex utramlibet partem in judicando sequi, unus litigantium uti gratum sibi magis conciliet ei offert minus. *Requiro* num peccet iudex contra iustitiam illud accipiens, ut sequatur hanc partem potius quam istam? *d* Ex sententia *Lessii* respondeo non peccare contra iustitiam. *Escobar* tract. 6. Exam. 6. n. 44. pag. 743:

11. A Judge that sells justice for money or presents, is discharged from restitution by *Escobar*, who takes *Lessius* for his warrant. He presupposes that *c* the opinions are so divided in some affair that it is in the Judges power to follow which he pleaseth. In the mean time one of the parties makes him a present to gain him to his side; it is demanded, if the Judge sin against justice, in receiving that which is given him to follow one of the two parties rather than the other? See here the case clearly propounded, to which he answers as clearly in a few words. *d* I answer, following the advice of *Lessius*, that he sins not again justice.

It is easie to see what gap this answer opens to the corruption of Justice; there being scarcely any point so clear and indubitable, which may not be made obscure and doubtful, and whereupon consequently one may not imagine that he may take money to judge to the advantage of whether side he will, without being obliged to restore it. 1080

This Jesuit had before propounded the same question, and had resolved it in the same manner in his 3. Tract. *e* Suppose, saith he, that the right of the parties be equal, may the Judge take any thing for judging? *Fagundez* saith that this is Lawfull, not onely to the electors who are to name a man to a majorality, to a Chair, or a Chappel, but also for a Judge, when the right seems equal on both sides, if there be no positive Law to forbid it; because that in this case the Judge may give the advantage to whetever he pleaseth. And this is the reason, because he may do a favour, and this favour may be valued by money, because for the most part he loseth the friendship of one of the parties.

e Suppono causam esse equalem, potestne iudex aliquid accipere? *Docet Fagundez*, dec. tract. 2. lib. 8. c. 26. aliquid posse accipi non solum ab electoribus ad majoratum, cathedram, capellam, sed etiam a iudice quando, ut supponitur, Sententiam profert in casu equali, seclusa lege positiva in contrarium: quia pro suo arbitratu potest cuilibet parti dare victoriam, quare datur locum gratificationi quae est pretio aestimabilis, nupte quae plerumque cum iactura amicitiae alterius partis conjuncta est. *Escobar* Tract. 3. exam. 2. n. 111. p. 363.

It is in the self same manner, and for the same reason, that *Layman* said before, speaking of a man who had been employed as an assassin, *that the pains which he took and the danger whereunto he was exposed to do this favour, is a thing which may be valued by money.* *Lessius* and the same *Layman* make use of the same reason to justify him who takes money, for concealing the crime of another. *Because that the right which he hath to accuse, whereof he deprives himself, is valuable by money.* So that these people subject all things to interest, and set every thing to sale at a price for money, the lives of men, Justice, and even which they call favour, which ceaseth to be a favour when it is bought or sold out. The reason for which *Escobar* proves that judgement may be sold is considerable. *For, saith he, it doth commonly make him lose the friendship of one of the parties.* For according to this strange rule of Justice, a Judge may almost always take money, because it happens almost always that he cannot do Justice to the one party without offending the other; so that he may cause himself to be recompensed in money, by him who gains his cause, for that which he believes he shall lose by losing the friendship of him whom he condemns.

I speak not of these injustices here, but onely so far as they contain unfaithfulness in them, and deceit, reserving it to another place, that is to say, to that wherein I shall handle the duties of Judges, to make appear that the Divinity of the Jesuits extends this power, which it gives them for money, to preferre one party before the other in equal right, even unto that case also wherein the right of him who is to be preferred is lesse probable.

12. Finally he furnisheth the Ecclesiasticks as well as others with expedients to cheat men in their profession, and in the exercise of their charge. I do lay aside an infinite of disguisements and juggling tricks which they teach and practise themselves in the conduct of souls, and in the administration of Sacraments, of which abundance of examples will be found in this extract, particularly when we speak of confession. I shall produce here onely one or two of the most sensible and grosse.

¹ *Dicastillus* assures us that it is the opinion of *Father Sa, Master of Gabriel Vasquez*, one of the most wise Fathers of their Society, Doctor of the University of Alcala, to whom Divinity is greatly obliged; that he sins not at all who saith that he is so noble as is requisite for him to enter into certain orders of religion, or to certain dignities and prebendies. *Because, saith he, the cause for which persons ought to be admitted into a religious order, should be the calling of God, and a desire to be religious.* And as for prebends, it ought to be merit in those who demand them. 1. This great man will have none enter into a religious order for his nobility, as a necessary condition, but he consents well enough that he enter therein by lying and coufenage. 2. If a man may enter into an order of Religion and into Ecclesiastick offices by vocation, as he saith, which is most true; it follows, that if he be permitted to enter thereunto by lying, God calls lyars and cheats into the Ecclesiastick state.

Religio aliqua, vel qualem ad prebendas & dignitates requirit aliqua Ecclesia; quia causa ad admittendum in Religionem debet esse Dei vocatio & desiderium perfectionis, & ad prebendas merita candidatorum. *Dicastillus* l. 2. tract. 20 disp. 6. dub. 5. n. 106.

Escobar propounds this question; *whether it be lawfull in administering the communion, to give to a sinner not disposed, but who is not known for such an one, an Hoast which is not consecrated, to the end he might avoid scandal?* He answers, there are some who holds he may do it. But to make this Invention to succeed the better, he adjoyns thereunto another for avoyding a great inconvenience which without that might happen there upon. ¹ *There are who say that this may be done, saith the Jesuit, provided that this Hoast which is not consecrated be so well hid that no body see it or worship it.* But what means is there to put this Hoast that is not consecrated, into the mouth of him who communicates, that neither he nor those who are near him may see it. And when none do see it, how can you hinder him who receives it, believing that it is the body of Jesus Christ, that he adore it not, since none receive the Hoast without adoring it.

Molestia & periculum ab illa in unam gratiam susceptura precio aestimabile est. Siquidem ius accusandi, quod ille se privat, precio aestimabile est. h. ex parte qua plerumque curi factura amicitia alterius partis conjuncta est.

i Sapientissimus quondam Pater de Sanostrae Societate Gabrielis Vasquez Magister, & de re Theologica in Complutensi Academia optime meritus, dixit non peccare eum qui finxit talem se genere seu genealogia, qualem requirit

k Licetne peccatori occulto, ad indisposito, ad vitandum scandalum particulam non consecratam ministrare? Possit aliqui docent. *Escobar tract. 7. exam. 6. num. 41. pag. 867.*

l Possit aliqui docent, modo

particula ita occultetur, ut nec videatur, nec adoretur.

m *Asi ego cum*
Henriquez l. 6.
c. 22. n. 4.
satius censere
simulare Sacer-
dotem se parti-
culam in os pec-
catorum immisisse.
Ibid.

n *Quod non*
semel absque
periculo scandali
præstiti.

I know not whether *Escobar* have seen these inconveniences which follow upon this new practice. For though he doth not disapprove it absolutely, he gives therein another practice, which likes him better. ^m *For me, saith he, I believe with Henriquez that it were better for the Priest to make shew of putting the Hoast into the mouth of the sinner.* It behoves him to have a slight of hand to do this; and he that knows to play this trick without being perceived, may very well do others. But what means is there to hinder him who is mocked in this sort, and opens his mouth to take nothing, that he should not perceive it, and that he should not complain, and not make any scandal? for this is that which the Jesuits especially fear, to discontent men, and to give them cause of complaint. Notwithstanding this *Escobar* assures us that he hath made use of this expedient many times, and that it succeeded well with him. ⁿ *Which I have done, saith he, oftner than once, without danger of scandal.*

I stay not to examine this conduct, I onely admire at the cunning and rarity thereof. For surely there is nothing like it to be found in the Books of the Saints, who have governed the Church unto our age, though there wanted not sinners who in their view presented themselves to communicate unworthily, and they had at least as much zeal for the honor of Jesus Christ, and for the Salvation of souls as the Jesuits; and it may be said that Jesus Christ himself knew not of this secret, since he made not use of it in giving *Judas* the communion.

But if this deceit hath been found out onely to hinder that Sacrilege might not be committed, doth the sinner who is wholly resolved, and ready to commit it in presenting himself to the communion, cease to commit it before God, when he receives that Hoast which he believed to be consecrated, though it be not at all, as *Herod* endeavouring to put to death the Son of God newly born, committed so many murders of God as he made Infants to be killed with a design to involve our Lord in the universal massacre.

But although this sort of deceit were not criminal in it self; yet it would not cease to be pernicious in the consequences thereof. Where may we presume to finde fidelity among the Jesuits, if we cannot be assured of it in the most Holy actions? will they make us know by this that there is nothing of proof against their wit and subtilty, and that there is nothing so Holy where their Divinity cannot find place for deceit, Treachery.

II. POINT.

Of Infidelity in Promises and Oaths.

SECT. I.

Several ways of mocking God and Men without punishment, and without Sin, according to the Jesuits, in promising that which they never intend to do, and not doing that which they have promised, although they are obliged theretoby Vow and by Oath.

GOD having brought the World out of nothing by his word, and having established Religion in the world upon his promises; men also have not associated themselves, and do not preserve the union and peace, either of states or Religion, but by their faith which they give unto one another, and by their promises which they make unto God. Without the Word of God there would neither be World nor Religion, and if men were not faithful to keep their words, the Church and the World would soon become a desert and a confusion; Cities would be without Government, Kingdoms without Laws, and civil and religious Corporations without discipline; and for that cause there would be nothing but disorder, division, injustice, and treachery. So that one may say, in a sense most true, that the world subsists not onely by the Word of God, but also by that of men; and that if God should withdraw his blessing from his Word, the world would be reduced to nothing;

thing; in the same manner if men were destitute of fidelity in theirs, it would fall into ruine and desolation.

40 Hereby it may be judged what mischiefs and miseries they are capable to cause in the world who teach men to fail of their words, and who study to furnish them continually with new inventions and new subtilties, to bannish sincerity from their words, and fidelity from their promises, upon which is founded all the commerce and all the fellowship which they have one with another in all sorts of professions.

All these inventions and all these subtilties of the Jesuits may be referred to equivocation in words, and want of intention in promises; the one is a means to say what one will, without lying; and the other, an expedient to promise all things, without being obliged.

Filliutius to authorize and facilitate all at once the practice of equivocations, amongst many examples which he brings, sets this down in the first place. ^a They alledge, saith he, commonly some examples of equivocations, as first of all of him that promises something outwardly, without intention of promising. For if one ask him if he have promised, he may say no, intending that he had not promised by any promise that obliged him: and by consequence he may also swear, for otherwise he should be constrained to pay that which he owes not.

^a Affertur solent exempla aliqua, ut primo ejus qui promittit exterius & absque intentione promittendi. Si enim interrogetur

an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo se non promississe promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare; alioquin urgeretur solvere quod non debet. Filliutius tom. 2. tra&. 25. n. 323. p. 161.

50 He pretends that he owes not that which he hath promised, and that he lies not in forswearing it, because in promising and in swearing he had no intention to promise or swear, no more then to perform what he promiseth. That is to say, that because he had covered infidelity and perjury under a shameful disguise and hypocrisie, this latter crime justifies the other two, and he is innocent, because he hath committed three sins at once, of which every one apart had been sufficient alone to make him criminal.

If it be true that men are not obliged neither by their words nor oaths, no more then by the Laws of God and Man, which command them to keep both the one and the other; but onely by the secret intention which they have in promising and swearing; it is clear that we can never be assured of any person, nor give any person any assurance by any protestations or oaths whatsoever. Libertines and cheats may boldly couzen the whole world, following these principles without injustice; and they cannot be justly condemned to perform their words, because they are obliged to nothing, having had no intention to be obliged.

60 Sanchez hath found another means to disingage him who hath truly had an intention to promise, saying that he should be dispensed with to retain that which he had promised, provided that in promising he had onely a design to promise and not to perform that which he had promised. See how he speaks: ^b All the difficulty is reduced to this, to know if he that hath sworn had an intent to swear, but not be obliged in swearing, if he be truly obliged? After he had reported the opinions and the reasons of those who hold that this oath obliges, he adds: ^c The second opinion, which I hold more probable, holds that in this case the oath obliges not at all,

^b Tot a difficultas eo pertinet, quando jurans habet animum jurandi, at nullo latenus juramento se obligandi, an tunc revera obligetur.

^c Posterior sententia, quam probabiliorum puto, ait tunc juramentum non obligare. Sanch. op. mor. l. 3. c. 10. n. 7. & 8. p. 42.

Tambourin proceeds yet farther. For he believes that it is probable that he who doubts whether he had any intention to oblige himself in making a vow or a promise is not obliged to observe his vow or his promise. ^d If you be assured, saith he, that you have made a vow or an oath, and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige yourself, or if the words which you used in your oath contained an invocation of God, at least a tacite one, I believe it is probable that you are not obliged to keep it.

^d Si certo visisti vel jurasti aut ambigis an animum te obligandi habueris per illa verba,

seu per illud juramentum; an tua verba invocationem Dei, que est de essentia juramenti, saltem tacite continerint. . . . Puto non esse improbabile te nequaquam obligari. Tambour. decal. l. 1. c. 3, sect. 7. lit. V. n. 6.

g Scio Valentiam 2. 2. d. 6. q. 6. p. 1. censere: Si promittas animo quidem te obligandi, sed cum voluntate rem promissam nullatenus exequendi, tunc nullam exurgere obligationem; quia si nullam habes voluntatem rei faciendae, nullum emittis votum. Tambur. decal. l. 3. c. 17. sect. 1. n. 4.

^e *Valentia*, by the relation of the same Author, holds that a person even who hath an intention to oblige himself, is not obliged, provided he had no intention to execute that which he promised. There is need onely of common sense, to see evidently that these strange maxims are favourable to cheaters and deceivers, and that they give them all liberty to exercise their cheats; since, according to these principles, all fidelity of promises, and obligation to keep them, depends on their intention and on their will; that is to say, upon infidelity its self; since infidelity is nothing else but an intention and a will not to do that which is promised; and it is by this intention it self that these Divines serve themselves to justify cheats, and make them faithful, by dispensing with them for that obligation which all Laws, Divine, humane, and natural do impose upon them to keep their promise.

h Illud nota: Sic simulate etiam in re gravi verbo tenus vorere, non transgredere peccatum veniale, quia solum est mendacium, nec redundans in gravem Dei irreverentiam Tambur. decal. 3. cap. 12. sect. 1. num. 3.

Tambourin gives also this rule for vows: ^h That to feign in an important matter, and to vow onely with ones lips is but a venial sin; because it is onely a lye which contains no great irreverence towards God. This were to deride a man, to promise him that which we have no design to perform, and the offense will be so much the greater, if the person who promises be base in condition and merit, and much below him to whom he makes the promise; and this Jesuit pretends that a man, who is nothing before God, may promise and vow unto him an important thing, with a formed design not to do that which he promises him, without committing any great irreverence against him. That is, that it is lawful for him to bear a greater respect unto a man then God, and to scorn him without committing any great sin.

But if these two subtilties, to promise without intention to promise, and to promise without intention to do what is promised, be not sufficient to cause cheaterly to prosper, and that it will not so be trusted, these Doctors hold that it is lawful to add an oath. And for this effect

i Juramenta non sunt: in mea fide, in mea conscientia, in fide Christiani, in fide Religiosi, in veritate. Emanuel Sa, Verbo Juram. n. 1. p. 295.

First of all, *Emanuel Sa* saith that there are many ways to speak and to affirm, which pass commonly for oaths, but indeed are none. ⁱ It is no oath, saith he, to say by my faith, or my conscience, on the faith of a Christian, on the faith of a Monk, in truth.

k Alios loquendi modos advenit desiderium non pejerandi; scilicet, possum jurare per Deum, per Christum, jurabo per Deum. Si juro per Deum, quare mihi fidem non praestas. Escobar tr. 1. cx. 3. n. 17. p. 72.

Escobar approving the opinion of *Emanuel Sa*, and advancing it yet higher above him, addeth; ^k That he who desires not to swear indeed may find other forms of speaking, as I may swear by God, by Jesus Christ, I will swear by God; if I swear by God, wherefore do you not believe me? This is not to desire not to forswear a mans self, but to desire to deceive others without being discovered, which hath caused these new manners of speech to be found out, which are no other thing but traps to catch the simple, and those who are not accustomed to disguises, and to the languages of these mastercheats, as he declares himself, adding. ^l That though the ignorant and those who do not look nearly to them, take these sort of speeches for oaths, it is true notwithstanding that they are not, because they assert nothing, and they are imperfect discourses, and have no determined sence.

^l Qui quidem loquendi modi licet imperitis vel incautis juramenta videantur, verè cum nihil affirmant, sed suspensa sit oratio, juramenta non sunt. Ibid.

If these expressions which pass in common usage for true oaths, are not such indeed, as these Jesuits say, they who make use of them to make believe that they swear indeed, are like them who make or put off false money to surprize grosse witted persons who receive them for good; or who make use of a counterfeit deed in a suite, because they are well counterfeited, and may passe for true. And in a manner all these forms of speech, which *Emanuel Sa* and *Escobar* approve, were not invented, but to intrap the simple and the ignorant, as they themselves do testify.

Sanchez employs almost a whole Chapter to rehearse different forms of speech and asseveration, which may passe for oaths though they be none, according to his judgement; as when one says: ^m *It is true, as it is true that I am a Christian, a Priest; if this be not, I have no faith in God, I renounce God:* ⁿ *This is as true as the Gospel, before God this is so: God knows it is so.*

m ut sum Christianus, Religiosus, Sacerdos, vir bonus, ita est. n. 16.

non credo in Deum, vel abnego Deum, non est potestas in Deo si hoc non est; ita coram Deo ita est; Deus scit ita esse, vel Deus videt ita esse n. 20. n Hoc veritas est in scripturis Evangelii, hoc est verum sicut Evangelium, n. 19. Sanch. op. mor. l. 3. c. 2. n. 16. 17. 19. 20. p. 8.

Yet he confesses that Saint *Augustin* assures us that these forms of speech are true oaths; and that he might not condemn them openly, he saith that there is indeed an equivocation in these words, and that for this reason they may or may not be taken for oaths. He saith the same thing of this expression, ^o *On my faith, by my faith, the faith of an honest man, the faith of a King, a Priest, a Religious man: As also of this which is common enough: ^p God be my witness.*

o In fide mea, per meam fidem, regiam, viri boni, aut

notabilis, n. 32. p Tisus est mihi Deus, n. 21.

He concludes from the principles which he hath established in the same place, that ^q *when one demands of a man by the name of God, or by his own proper life, if that which he asks of him be true; and he answers simply yea, this is no oath. And a litte after he teaches to thrust together in one proposition all the oaths that can be made; in such manner that it may appear that one swears, yet without swearing. See the words: ^r It is no oath to say those words which some are accustomed to make use of when they would not swear at all: I swear by all that can be sworn of, by the life of all those things.*

q Non deducitur non esse iuramentum cum quis per Deum vel per propriam vitam interrogatus an ita se res habeat, respondet absolute ita se rem habere

r. num. 22. r 1. Deducitur non esse iusjurandum quod communiter aliqui iuramentum vitare volentes dicere solent; Per totum id, vel per vitam eius quod jurare possum. Ibid. n. 23.

Who can be subtile enough to apprehend that it is possible not to swear in swearing by all things that may be sworn by? we must then learn this secret of *Sanchez*:

^s *For I have learned by experience, saith he, that those who are accustomed to say they swear by all that may be sworn, intend to say nothing else, but that they indeed will not swear by any thing, being it is not lawful for them to swear by any thing without necessity. Thus it is that one becomes subtile by conferences with Jesuits, and learn to make sport with all other men as ignorant of the act of deceiving by lyes and perjuries.*

s Nam, ut capientia didicimus id tantum volunt dicere, cum per nullam rem liceat absque necessitate jurare per nihil iuro, 76.

In the second place, when one is resolved to swear, one may chuse words of double meaning, and make use of a mental restriction, the better to deceive. ^t *The difficulty is, saith Sanchez, when he who swears intends to deceive using words that are captious and have double meaning; or reserving in his minde some condition or some clause to surprize him to whom he swears, and who takes his oath as sincerely made. He first reports the opinion of those who hold that this oath obliges in the sense in which he to whom it is made had reason to take it; to which he adds the authority of some Fathers and Canons which are expresse for this opinion. But notwithstanding all this he concludes, ^u that this deceiver is not obliged beyond his intention by vertue of his oath; and he grounds it onely on this reason; ^w That an oath cannot oblige in conscience beyond the intent of him that swears; and by consequence, he that hath no intention to swear, cannot be obliged to any thing at all.*

t Difficultas est quando jurans fuit in dolo, utens verbis callidis & amphibologicis, aut conditionem aliquam mente retinuit ad deiciendum cum cui jurat existentem in bona fide. Quibus

dam placet iuramentum tunc obligare iuxta sensum quem debite intellexit is cui iuramentum prestitit. u At dicendum est, iuramentum non obligare tunc ex vi & relatione iuramenti, ultra dolosi illius jurantis intentionem. Sanch. op. mor. lib. 2. c. 10. n. 12. 13. p. 49. w Quia iuramentum requirit in foro conscientie obligare ultra jurantis intentionem; atque adeo si jurans non intendat, ad nihil teneri.

All sorts of perjures, as it seems, cannot be authorized more openly, nor can there a more large or easie entrance be made to all manner of false oaths, and there would be no more perjuries in the world, if the most desperate persons that give themselves up to this crime, could believe this maxime as far removed from reason and

common sense, as from justice and natural equity, and imagine that for them not to perjure themselves, nor to be obliged in swearing contrary to what they know, and what they desire to do, it were sufficient to have no intention to swear even then when they swear indeed.

In the third place, if any one be ignorant in the art of making mental restrictions, this Jesuit will teach him that also, and how to use them with addresse in swearing. For having demanded: * *If it were lawful to swear to give a thing, intending it with this condition reserved in minde: I swear that I will give it, if I be otherwise obliged to do it then by my oath.* I must plainly avow that there are some that hold that this reservation is but a cozenage, and that it hinders not at all the oath from being obligatory; but he maintains against them, ^y *that abiding in the opinion that I have already taken up numb. 15. I must say that it is lawful; for it matters nothing that these words cannot bear that double equivocal sense, necessity constraining to make use of them.* This necessity consists in this, that otherwise the man would not be deceived.

x *An liceat tunc jurare retinendo mente hanc conditionem; jure me datum, si secluso juramento sum debitor.* Id. ibid. c. 6. n. 38. pag. 29
y *At intentio nostra sententia n. 15. tractata, dicendum est id licere, quia nihil refert verba eam amphibologiam non pati, & cogit necessitas ea uti.* Ibid.

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And though this oath were made in publique before many persons who would be scandalized seeing it not accomplished, he holds that this should not trouble any man: ^z *For they ought and might believe that the oath was wrested to some other sense, by some slight of wit and mental reservation; which he confirms by the authority of Valentia his fellow Jesuit, supposing with him that the whole world hath read and studied their equivocations and maximes of lyes and perjuries, and that there is none who ought not to know the ways to defend himself against them, as well as to use them.*

z *Poterunt enim & debebant credere juramentum in aium sensum fuisse detortum.* Ibid.

In the fourth place, that none may be ever caught unprovided of equivocations, he teaches this, which may be almost always made use of. ^a *It follows, saith he, that if a promise by oath to pay a certain summe of money, be drawn from a man unjustly and by force, he that swears in this manner may use an equivocation in these terms, I swear to you that I will give this money: intending that he would give it to him to whom he swears, or some other, because these words may receive either of these two senses.*

a *Decimo deditur, si per injuriam extorqueatur promissio jurata alieni jus pecunie danda, licet juranti uti hac equivocatione: Juro tibi me*

1230

numeratum pecuniam, intelligendo ut ille casus tibi regatur a verbo juro, ita ut sit sensus: tibi juro fore ut numerem pecuniam, sive tibi, sive alteri, quod ea oratio patiatur utrumque sensum. Ibid. n. 37. p. 29.

If this form of equivocation seem not subtle enough, behold another: *If in the tongue in which one expresses ones oath, the name of God signifie divers things, it will be lawful to swear by the name of God, taking it in some other signification, according to this rule one may without fear swear by the name of Jesus Christ, because there are others named Jesus besides the Son of God; and that this word Christ is attributed to divers persons in Scripture, and that not onely to Christians, but also to Jews.*

He adds also in the same place a third way to swear by equivocations, which is very easie and very favourable to stammerers that cannot pronounce certain letters. ^b *Likewise, saith he, it is but a venial sin at most to say, uro, which signifies I burn, instead of saying juro, I swear, to make the proposition false and uselesse, though one burn not at all.* And fearing in some sort that it should be too great a severity to condemn of venial sin him that made use of so pleasant a subtilty, he adds: ^c *I believe that it will be no lyes if the word, uro, be taken materially, pronouncing it with a design to signifie nothing in the manner I have opened in the 10. number, speaking of other forms which are used in swearing.* Now in the place whereunto he referes the reader, he saith, that when one is required to make oath unto a person in a case in which he believes that he is not obliged to swear, he may nevertheless do it without fear of perjury, though that he saith be false, and that to cover himself from

b *Similiter non esset plus quam veniale mendacium dicere, uro, ablato i. cum vere non urat.* Ibid.

1240

c *Uno credo nullum fore mendacium si illud verbum, uro, accipiatur materialiter ad nihil significandum, sicut numero 10. diximus de aliis juramenti verbis materialiter acceptis.*

perjury, he make use of one or the other of these two expedients. I. To take the words which he uses in swearing, and which are false in their true and natural sense, in a quite different sense such as he pleases, provided it be true. II. To give no sense at all to his words and to take them materially, that is to say as sounds that signify nothing. He pretends that he that swears in one of these two ways doth no great evil, though that he says be false in the ordinary sense.

But if a man have an intention to assert that which is false, and to confirm it with an oath, he avows, that he sins mortally.

^d But if in his own mind he refer not his words to that which is false, though that be the proper and natural sense of his words, and others cannot for some particular circumstances reasonably believe that this is his intention, so that thereby they are scandalized; and that onely his right, which is to use equivocations to deceive, he makes use of these words to signify some other thing which is true, and which he doth conceive in his mind, he sins not at all mortally. See here the first secret, to which he adds another like it, proceeding in these terms:

^e But, if he take these words onely materially, without design to use them to signify any thing at all, he sins not mortally. He fears to be yet too exact and rigorous in this point. For which cause he corrects and sweetens his answer, saying; I believe that he sins not at all, no not venially, because there is no lye in that which he saith. Strange reasoning! This man confirms by an oath words that are false, and yet he is not perjured; he expresses one thing, and thinks another. And yet notwithstanding according to these Doctors he lies not at all, because that he would not lye, though he lies effectually speaking contrary to his own conscience.

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*Si jurat sal-
sum, velique
illi juramenti
verba referre
ad materiam
falsam confir-
m. adq. illam in
ex externo jura-
mento, est mar-
tale. Si autem
interiori animo
nolin illa ad ma-
teriam falsam
referre; nec
potest ob aliquas
rei circumstan-
tias rationabili-
ter ab aliis pu-
tari id velle, ut*

inde scandalizentur: sed tantum jure suo utens usurpat ea verba ad significandum aliud interius conceptum quod verum sit, non peccat mortaliter. c Vel usurpat ea verba materialiter, nihil per illa confirmare volens, non peccat mortaliter; imo credo nec hunc venialiter peccare, quia nullum est mendacium. Sanchez op. mor. l. 3. c. 6 n. 10. p. 24.

These shifts are so grosse that the most simple and most ignorant may easily perceive them. They are so base and so ridiculous, that they are capable to surprise, and make the most serious break out into laughter, if Christian charity as well as modesty do not withhold and rather draw compassion from their hearts, and tears from their eyes, to lament the blindness of those who invented them, and the lost condition of those who follow them.

But if we would believe these Masters of equivocations, there is no need at all of so many shifts and fallacies, for they declare plainly that those who have not wit enough to understand these disguises and mental restrictions, or not to make use of them upon occasion, may swear plainly without obliging themselves in any sort whatsoever, provided they have no intent to swear, nor to promise that which they swear. ^f I have made a fained promise, saith Escobar, and I have added an oath thereto, am I obliged to accomplish it? After he had cited Lessius alone for the affirmative, he adds; but others deny it. He pronounces nothing absolutely upon this point, but he leaves to his reader his choice of two opinions, testifying for all that sufficiently that the latter is his own; since having onely cited Lessius for the former, he attributes this to many others, there is ground to believe that he concludes according to his guise by plurality of voices, and for the more sweet and favourable opinion. And this onely, that it is the more favourable, and that it is followed by the greater part, is justitious to make it the more probable, and by consequence it may be followed with a good conscience, according to the Jesuits rules of probability.

60

*Ficta promissio
noni juramentum
adjecti, te-
neome adimple-
re? Affert
Lessius, at alii
negant. Escobar
tr. 1. ex. 1. n.
37. p. 76.*

S E C T. II.

The contrivance of the Jesuits to elude vows made unto God, promises and oaths made to a Confessors, and to lye and deceive even in confession.

THese Doctors are not content to teach men to deceive men, but to teach them also to deceive God in their vows, and the Ministers of his Church in the declarations and promises which they make them. So that if God were capable to be deceived he should not escape from these surpsises of the Jesuits.

a Virtute Bullæ potest votum non peccandi commutare. Escob. Theol. mor. tom. 1. lib. 7. c. 20. n. 281.

Votum non fornicandi aut abstinendi à certo actu venereo, potest ex Bullæ indulto commutari. C. 21. n. 298. Votum vitandi aliquod peccatum, non eget magna commutatione. C. 22. n. 318.

Escobar in his great Moral Divinity saith, ^a that one may change by means of a Bull the vow which he hath made not to sin, and so avow not to commit fornication. He saith that even these sort of vows need not be changed into any great things; as if the sin of fornication were no great matter, and did not greatly dishonor God, or if it were lawful to deceive him, taking away a great thing which we have promised him, for to give him a slight thing and of small consequence.

b Vover quis sub peregrinationis pœna non fornicari: immemor voti delinquit; tunc tunc ad pœnam voti? Respondet Sanchez, sum. tom. 1. l. 4. c. 22. n. 18. non teneri, quia oblivio seu inadvertentia inculpata æquipollet ignorantie. Escobat in præmio ex. 2. c. 6. n. 24. p. 9.

The same Author in the entrance of his book where he establishes the principles of his Moral Divinity proposes this doubt; ^b *A person makes a vow not to commit fornication, upon pain of some Pilgrimage; and afterwards not remembering his vow he suffers himself to go on in this sin; is he obliged to accomplish his vow? He makes Sanchez to answer in these terms; Sanchez answers, that he is not obliged, because this blameless forgetfulness is equivalent to ignorance.*

c Potest, qui non vovit, petere debitum ab altero qui etiam se consentiente vovit castitatem. Sanchez. ver. debitum conjug. n. 2. pag. 101.

Cum uterque vovit non petere, possunt copulari, non petendo tamen, cum aliter intelligit alterum, si possit petiturum, ib. d. num. 3.

d Duodecimo deducitur eadem ratione feminam morti proximam ac excommunicatam, eo quod non cogitabit, quem novit ob impedimentum occultum non esse suum, coramque jurare ut absolvetur, fore ut ad apta sanitate recolatur. Possid, iure, intelligendo intra se, si teneor, vel postea placuerit mihi. Sanchez op. 1. 3. cap. 6. num. 40. pag. 30.

*Emanuel Sa proposes two other cases touching the continence and chastity of married persons: ^c A person married, saith he, who hath not made a vow of continence may demand the duty of marriage of another, though the other have made the same vow with consent. And a little after, when the Husband and the Wife have made a vow not to demand of one another the duty of marriage, it is lawful for them to accomplish it effectually, provided it be without demanding it, and the one believes that the other would demand it if at liberty: He would say that the vow was indeed made not to demand this duty, but not, not to use it without demanding it; as if this were not enough to demand a thing, to testify to him who can give it us the desire which we have to receive it. It is in this manner that the Saints do demand from God in the most excellent way what they desire from the bottom of their hearts. It is this desire which the Scripture testifies that God hears and accomplishes, as the most excellent and powerful prayer, where he saith; *Desiderium pauperum exaudivit Dominus. The Lord hears the desire of the poor.* It is then earnestly to demand a thing to testify that it is desired, though it be not demanded in words. And to take and use it without demanding is more then to desire it.*

Sanchez treating of an oath, establisheth certain principles from whence he draws this conclusion. ^d It follows, saith he, that if a woman be excommunicate for departing from her Husband, because she knows of some secret impediment which makes the marriage void, being at the point of death she is obliged, that she may receive absolution, to swear, that if she recover her health she will return to her Husband, she may promise and swear it, intending it in her mind in this manner; if I be obliged, or if it please me then. it is not enough to permit her to retain this condition; If I be obliged, of which she

will take advice in her health. This were perhaps too much to engage her to, it is
 1290 sic also to permit her to add thereto: if it please me at that time; that if she found her
 self obliged, it might be sufficient that she was not pleased therewith to dispense with
 her, for doing that which she had promised and sworn to her Confessor at the point
 of death.

A little after the same Author continuing to speak out of the same principle, ad-
 deth: ^f The same thing must be said of a woman who is separate from her Husband, be-
 cause she knows that he hath committed adultery, which is a just cause of separation.
 For if she be pressed to swear that she will return to her Husband, she may swear that
 she will do it, understanding in her minde; if I be bound thereto.

^f Idem intelli-
 gendum de mu-
 liere non coha-
 bitante viro, eo
 quod conscia sit
 adulterii viri,

ac proinde iustam divortii causam habeat: quippe jurare compulsa se viro cohabitaturam, potest id jurare, intelligendo
 intra se; si ad id tencor. Ibid.

Escobar proposes another case touching confession. ^g A person, saith he, is
 ashamed of some crime committed; he may make a general confession, and accuse him-
 self of this sin amongst others, without saying whether he have confessed it otherwise
 at another time. Because this disguise doth not much change the judgement of the Con-
 fessor. This is nothing but a sleight to deceive a Confessor, and to preserve ones re-
 putation with him, by betraying ones conscience. But this same Jesuit passes yet
 farther, and saith formally, that one may lye in confession. See here his words: ^h A
 person addresseth himself to a Confessor, and saith that he would make a general con-
 300 fession to him: he is not for all that obliged to declare unto him all the mortal sins that
 he hath committed, for although he lye, it is of small concern to the judgement the Con-
 fessor is to make of him.

^g Rubore quis
 afficitur de ali-
 quo crimine;
 potest genera-
 lem confessionem
 facere, & illud
 peccatum suum
 confiteri, non
 explicando an-
 alias confessus
 sit; quia id
 parum variat
 Confessarii judi-
 cium. Escobar

in prooemio exam. 2. n. 73. p. 19. ^h Dicit quis Confessario se velle cum eo confessionem generalem gerere: non
 ideo tenetur omnia mortalia exprimere: quia quantum mentiat; id tamen parum refert ad Confessarii iudicium. Escob
 bar tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 118. p. 818.

But if they who have any sense of God and Religion cannot resolve to use these
 kind of surprizes and disguisements, and these lyes in a Sacrament in which they
 speak to God in the person of his Priest, who holds his place, the same Jesuit will
 give them also another expedient to deceive the Confessor familiarly, that they may
 continue in his good opinion; which is, not to discover to him other then their
 sleighter faults, and to have another Confessor whom they may chose at their plea-
 sure, to confesse to him their great crimes.

ⁱ A person, saith this Jesuit, hath two Confessors, to whom he applies himself, to the
 one he confesseth his mortal sins, and to the other his venial, that he may continue in
 good opinion with his ordinary Confessor. The question is, whether he doth ill? The case
 is important, he must take a sociate to resolve it, that he may be more confidently
 believed. ^k I maintain, saith he, with Suarez, that this person doth no evil at all.
 His reason is not lesse strange then his answer, since he pretends that it is neither lye
 nor hypocrisie to conceal his sins from his Confessor, and to make him believe he hath
 no great ones, though he hath committed such, to maintain himself in good reputa-
 tion with him.

ⁱ Duos quis adli-
 Confessarios,
 quorum alteri
 venialia confite-
 tur, ut bonam
 famam apud
 Confessarium or-
 dinarium tuc-
 tur. Rogo num
 delinquat?
^k Cum Suarior
 assertio non delin-

quere. Quia est confessio integra, nec est vera hypocrisis, nec mendacium. Ibid. n. 135. p. 821.

Emanuel Sa approves this practice, provided it be not common. ^l There are that
 hold, saith he, that it is a mortal sin to have two Confessors in ordinary, to confesse to
 one his great sins, and to the other his small sins, that he may passe with him for an
 honest man, because this is to deceive the Confessor, and to mock him. But there is no
 310 sin in doing this onely once or twice through bashfulness. That is to say, that it is law-
 full to deceive a Confessor, to mock him and make sport with him, provided that it
 be not common, and that it be done onely some times, and upon some motive so
 good as is that of Pride and Vanity, ut probus habearis. That thou mayst be esteemed
 an honest man.

^l Habere ordi-
 narie duos Con-
 fessarios, alteri
 cui gratia di-
 cas, alter-
 rum cui le-
 viis, ut probus
 habearis.
 Quidam dicunt
 esse peccatum
 mortale ob illa-

sum confessorum; secus vero esset si semel aut iterum fiat, ob pudorem, & verecundiam. Emanuel Sa, verbo Confessor.
 num. 16 pag. 76.

Filliucius who examines and handles this case most exactly, acknowledges that many condemn it for mortal sin. Some for hypocrisie, which is a kind of lye, which cannot be a small fault in a matter so holy, and so important as confession is: others, because at least the custom and will to continue in this practice is a note of great corruption, and a very wicked disposition in him who is in this estate, and which cannot be excused from mortal sin. To which may be added the motive which leads to this disguise, which is a Vanity and Pride so much more criminal and unsufferable, in that it is practised upon design, and in an action which ought to be the most sincere and humble of all that are Religious: but notwithstanding all these considerations he forbears not to maintain, with his fraternity, that there is no evil to use this practice so much and so often as one will, or that it is no great evil. ^m *Toss* 1320 will inquire of me, saith he, if it be against the integrity of confession, to confesse onely your sleight faults to your ordinary Confessors, and to have another extraordinary one to whom to confesse your great sins, when you happen to fall into them. I answer, that *Sylvester* saith, that though there be nothing herein that is contrary to the integrity of confession; yet there is mortal sin therein, because of the hypocrisie and virtual lying that is in it. And *Victoria* assures us also that this is mortal sin, when it is done with design to continue in this custom. But we must say absolutely that there is no mortal sin in it, nor any thing contrary to the integrity of confession.

^m *Quæres an sit contra integritatem Confessorum ordinario tantum venialia peccata confiteri, alteri vero extraordinario gravia quæ occurrunt? Respondeo, ceteri Sylvester conf. x. q. 6. dicit esse peccatum mortale ob hypocrisim & virtuale mendacium; & Victoria in Summa, n. 169. asserat esse mortale quando id fit animo perseverandi in tali consuetudine: tamen dicendum est non esse absolute contra integritatem, neque peccatum mortale. Filliucius tom. 1. tract. 7. c. 4. n. 75. p. 175.*

He proves by a pleasant reason that he that treats his confessor in this sort is not properly a hypocrite, and that he deceiveth him not at all properly, a lyer, ⁿ because he relates no falsity neither to one nor other of his Confessors, but onely permits one of his Confessors to be deceived, though there be no deceiver. For he that confesses himself is none according to him, and the Confessor cannot be any, because he could not deceive himself; and he must have, at least, a gift of Prophecie, to be able to divine that one surprises him by hiding his principal sins, and confessing onely his small ones. 1330

ⁿ *Non est proprie mendax, quia dicit falsum, sed tantum permittit alium decipi. Ibid.*

It would be easie to report yet many more examples of like shifts, of like foolish, childish, and ridiculous sleights, by which the Jesuits do teach people to mock God, and the Ministers of his Church, in abusing the Sacraments, and making void their vows, but an occasion to speak hereof yet more to purpose will be presented when we treat of confession, and of the vows of Religion.

III. POINT.

Of Unfaithfulness in conversation, and common discourse,

SECT. I.

An expedient which the Jesuits give for to deceive the World, and to take a false Oath, even before a Judge, without perjury.

THe Jesuits have the reputation commonly to be Masters of equivocations, and one may see it indeed, that it is not without cause. For to establish this kind of knowledge in the world, and to facilitate the practice amongst all sorts of persons, they do all that an affectionate Master can do for his profession, and for his disciples, to make them perfect in his Trade.

1. First of all they give rules of equivocations, then they note divers forms of making them; and finally, to facilitate the knowledge and practice of them, they make themselves some equivocations which they propose as models and examples whereby to teach others to make the like. 1340

2. They determine the occasions wherein they may be made use of; or rather without bounds or restraint, they give liberty in almost all sorts of occasions,

E. I. B. I. C. I. A. 6. P. I. S. I.

to make use of them and some times even without any occasion or reason.

3. They shew how they are to be made use of, and give the method, as well for persons of discretion, as for more simple and more grosse.

4. They give an invention to maintain the possession and use of equivocation, so that there is no sort of person that can by any means whatsoever hinder from making use of them, without any scruple. These four points shall be so many sections of this title, which is of Unfaithfulness in words and common discourse.

S E T C. II.

Rules and Examples of equivocation taken out of the Books of the Jesuits.

First of all they declare that if one inquire whether the Prince be at Court, ^a it is permitted to assure him, without any necessity, and even to swear without any great sin, that he is there, though he be not there, intending that he is there in picture. This is the opinion of Sanchez and Escobar, who declare plain enough that one may affirm it simply without any sin, because they acknowledge it not to be other than a venial sin, to affirm it with an oath without any just cause, *sine justa causa*, so that a small occasion would suffice them, to discharge this oath of all sin.

^a *Jurare verbis equivocis sine justa causa, v. c. quod Princeps sit in aula, intelligendo peccatum affirmatum Lessius, probabilis Sanchez*

negat. Escobar tract. 1. exam. 1. num. 35. pag. 76.

Filliucius speaking of mental restriction which is permitted according to the rules of Divinity; brings many examples which he took out of Suarez, which he gives for a model. ^b Behold here an example, saith he, which Suarez reports. You may

say; I have not eaten of such a dish, intending to say, though the intention of him that asked were to know if you had ever eaten of it. Another example is this; ^c You may say, Peter is not at home: *Petrus non est domi*, which signifies ordinarily that he is not in the house, though he be there, taking this word, *est*, for to signifie, he eats, so that you have a design to say, that he does not eat in the house. And we may judge of other like sorts of speaking equivocally in the same manner.

^b *Talem ait Suarez esse illam: Non comedi, intelligitur de hoc, cum interrogans putat alioqui non comidisse rem illam.*

^c *Item illam: Petrus non est domi, cum tamen revera sit. Verbum enim est, sumitur à dicente pro, comedit. Denique dici potest de aliis similibus. Filliucius qq. mor. tom. 2. tract. 25. c. 11. n. 327. d. 204.*

And a little before, proposing some examples of equivocation in the same place whence they were taken, which I reported before, he hath put this foremost.

^d They are accustomed, saith he, to relate some examples of equivocations, (for to make their Doctrines and rules to be better understood) as in the first place of him who outwardly promises a thing, without an intent to promise. For if one asked whether he had promised or no, he may deny it, meaning that he had not promised with a promise obliging, and with this restriction he may also swear. He presupposes without doubt that perjury cannot be committed more to purpose then to support an equivocation, which is made purposely to hide some deceit and unfaithfulness.

^d *Afferri solent exempla aliquot. Et primo ejus qui promittit exterius aliquid sine intentione promittendi. Si enim interrogatur an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo*

se non promississe promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare. Ibid.

Sanchez saith the same thing, and yet more; and for to be better understood, he reduces the general thesis to a particular case. ^e So often as, saith he, a person who

hath promised marriage to another, whether it were made sincerely, or onely in appearance, is discharged by any reason from holding his promise, being called before a Judge, he may swear he hath not made this promise, meaning he hath not so made it as to be obliged to observe it. And that it may be known what reason he requires for this, he holds

^e *Quoties quis sive vere, sive fecte promittens matrimonium, inamnis est ob aliquam causam ab implendi*

obligatione, potest à Judice vocatus jurare se non promississe, intelligendo, ita ut teneatur implere. Sanchez op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 32. p. 29.

f Non tantum quando causa est eorum non implendi, & etiam quodies sapientis iudicio est probabile, non tenentur servare, quia potest amplectendo opinionem probabilem existimare se lura conscientia non obligatum. Ibid.

g Qui docent cum qui numeros mutuo acceptos solvit, posse à Judice rogatum de mutuo, jurare se illud non accepisse, intelligendo ita ut teneatur illud solvere. Atque idem dicendum est si quacunque alia ex causa ab eo mutuo solvendo liber esset. Atque idem credo si tunc non teneatur solvere, eo quod terminus ad quem mutuum datum fuit non est impletus, vel pro paupertate excusatur debitor à tunc solvendo. Ibid.

This last overture is very favourable to many persons, who by this rule may deny all their debts, having never any money to pay them; and for them that are poor, to cover by this pretence their ingratitude and injustice towards those who assist them in giving them that which was necessary for them. But if these people who have against their consciences sworn that they ow'd nothing, come afterwards into an estate able to pay what they owe, what counsel will the Jesuits give them? on the one side there is no more any pretext which might dispense with them for not paying; and on the other side, if they pay after they have sworn that they ow'd nothing; they declare themselves perjured, and they ruine their honor and credit after they have ruined their conscience; and which is more considerable, they will disgrace the Doctrine of equivocations, and the mystery of those who teach them. It will not be hard to resolve these difficulties by the consequence of the principles of the Jesuits Divinity; but because I have no design but onely to report things, as they are found in their books, and because I have not yet met with this case, I shall be content to propose it onely, leaving it to the Readers liberty to draw such consequences as seem to them necessarily to follow those maxims which we have reported before, or to demand the resolution of the Jesuits themselves.

h Decimoquinto deducitur, cum à quo mutua pecunia petitur, quam revera habet, posse jure jurando affirmare se eam non habere, intelligendo intra se ut mutuo det, quando non tenetur mutuare: Ibid.

h It follows, saith he, that if one demands of a man to borrow money, which he indeed hath, but which he will not, and which he is not obliged to lend; he may swear that he hath it not at all, meaning not to lend him.

i Quare ad veritatem hujus juramenti nil refert an ille teneatur mutuare necne. Ibid.

This clause, that this man is not obliged to lend, is not Sanchez's; but of some other Casuist more religious then he, and in his judgement too scrupulous. Which is the reason that he approves it not, adding, that it matters not as to the truth of the oath, whether he be or be not obliged to lend it.

k Similiter dicendum est si intra se intelligat non habere pecunias in alio loco ab eo in quo revera habet. Ibid.

He gives also another advertisement; how to make use of mental reservation on this same occasion, when one is troubled to put off a person who askes to borrow money, which is to say, and even to swear, if it be needful, that one hath it not, that is to say, not in another place then in that where it is laid up to be kept.

For that which respects examination of Judges, the way to delude and deceive them without oaths which are taken before them, is very easie, according to the same

390 same Author. ^l It follows, saith he, that if a witness be interrogated juridically, if he know a thing; provided they ask him not whether he have heard it spoken, he may swear that he knows it not, having onely heard it spoken. As if it were not true that one knows that which he hath received from persons worthy of credit; though he have not seen it himself.

nescire si solum audivit. Ibid. c. 7. num. 5. pag. 31.

Finally to give yet more free course to equivocations, he would authorise them by the example of Saint Francis. ^m It follows, saith he, that Saint Francis might make use of the equivocation which is attributed unto him, when being interrogated by the Officers of Justice, if a malefactor whom they sought after went that way; he answered putting his hands in the sleeves of his Gown, he is not come this way, meaning not that way where he had his hands. And after he had justified this action of Saint Francis of which there is no witness, nor any likelihood to believe that it was ever done by him, he will yet raise it higher; ⁿ He might also have answered in this manner, adds he, he is not passed this way, intending the particular and determined place where his foot or his hand was.

ducens, dixit sic: Non transit hac, intelligendo de loco in quo manus habebat Ibid. c. 6. n. 42 p. 30. Itaque similiter posset dicere sic: Non transit hac, intelligendo totum individuum quom pede vel manu tangit. Ibid.

040 Layman who is not so passionate as Sanchez, for equivocations, appears not so unjust as he against S. Francis. For he justifies him, or at least wifely if he suffers others to affirm and assure us that Saint Francis never used this equivocation which is ascribed to him, or if he did use it, it was done by simplicity, not believing it to be any evil to do so. Either Saint Francis is not the Author of this answer, which is so attributed to him falsely; or that holy man believed that it was lawful, saith Soto cited by Layman.

The Books of the Jesuits are full of these equivocations, and sometimes of others farther fetcht and more ridiculous. I was desirous onely to represent some few of the more sensible and the more common ones, which they do ordinarily propose to serve for example and model to simple and grosse witted persons. They who desire to know more thereof may read their books themselves.

S E C T. III.

When and on what occasions one may make use of equivocations.

A Mong those who teach to make equivocations, there are some who speak with less passion, and who say they ought not to be used but in necessity, soberly and with great discretion. Others make as it were a party for them, and maintain them indifferently and blindly, giving all liberty to put them in practice, holding that the least reason sufficeth to make use of them; and that when they are made use of even without reason and without necessity, there is in a manner no sin in them, or that it is but very little.

1410 Sanchez expounding the opinion of Soto, who holds that one may make use of equivocations in sport or drollery, saith that it is true, provided that no oath be added there unto. ^o When Soto holds, saith he, that it is no sin to make use of equivocations in making merry and drolling, this he understands to be when it is done without swearing. But it suffices not this professor of equivocations, to say that there is no sin in taking this divertisement, he will have it also to be honest; and therefore it is sufficient to make an equivocation honest, to take divertisement therein. ^p For then, saith he, this honest sport and recreation renders the equivocation

absque juramento id fieret. Sanch op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 22. p. 27. justæ causa exercitius honestum redderet amphibologie usum. Ibid.

p Tunc enim honestus ille ludus recreationis

q At se iuramen- honest. ¶ But if it happen that one swear in this recreation with or without design, tum adfuit, est manifesta culpa propter vanam & indiscretam divini nominis usurpationem: at solum effect venialis. Ibid.

He had already said the same thing more at large before, p. 25. 4. where after he had established this rule: ^r *That one may without lying make use of words which in themselves are not ambiguous, and which have not the sense which he takes them in, &c.* He adds in the following number, ^t *That one may make use of such words, though they be not ambiguous at all, and that in themselves and circumstances present they cannot receive the sense that is given them; but that they may learn and have it only by means of some mental restriction or addition, such as pleases him who pronounceth them: as if any one being alone or in company, whether interrogated, or of his own proper motion; for recreation or for some other motive whatsoever, swears he hath not done a thing which truly he hath done, intending in his minde some other thing which in truth he hath not done, or some other day then that on which he did it, or quite another thing, and circumstance as he pleases, so it be true, he doth not lye indeed; and he shall not be forsworn, but he hath only not said any determined truth, which they could conceive who heard him speak, which was signified by his words, but some other different truth.*

^r Possunt absque mendacio usurpari et si verba ex sua significatione ambigua non sint, nec cum sensum habent, &c. Ibid.

^t Possunt quoque absque mendacio ea verba usurpari, etiam si ex sua significatione non sint ambigua, nec cum sensum admittant ex se, nec ex circumstantiis occurrentibus, sed tantum cum sensum reddant ex aliquo additamento proferentis retento, quodcumque illud sit: ut si quis vel solus vel coram aliis, sive interrogatus, sive propria sponte, sive recreationis gratia, sive quocumque alio sine juret se non fecisse aliquid quod revera fecit, intelligendo intra se aliquid aliud quod non fecit, vel etiam dictum ab eo in quo fecit, vel quodcumque aliud additamentum, revera non mentitur nec perjurus est, sed tantum non dicit eam veritatem determinatam quam audientia concipiunt, ac verba illa ex se significant: sed aliam veritatem dixerunt Ibid. num. 15.

Many observations may be made on this one passage of Sanchez, wherein there are many things for them to learn who are curious of the science of equivocations. I will onely passe over it cursorily and lightly.

First of all he speaks of an equivocation the most strange and distant from humane reason that can be imagined. ^r *One may, saith he, without lying make use of these words, though in their signification they be not ambiguous, and which of themselves, and with their present circumstances cannot bear the sense which is given them.* Whence it follows that these words are indeed not equivocal, but openly false, since they could not bear the sense given them. For an equivocal word is that which hath two senses, or which may receive two senses. And therefore he who makes use of that as equivocal which is not equivocal, and who would give it a sense which it will not bear is surely a liar, signifying one thing by his words, and thinking another.

^r Possunt absque mendacio ea verba usurpari etiam si ex sua significatione non sint ambigua, nec cum sensum admittant ex se, nec ex circumstantiis occurrentibus.

Also Sanchez affirms and testifies sufficiently himself that this word is no equivocation, in saying that it is not ambiguous, for an ambiguous and equivocal word are one and the same thing. So that what he adds, that though these words which he supposes not to be equivocal, could not receive the sense he gives them; ^u *yet they will never the lesse bear it, by adding that which he who speaks them reserves in his thoughts.* This say I is destroyed by it self, the thought of a man which is altogether inward and invisible, cannot at all change the sense of words, which are altogether outward and sensible, nor give them that which they cannot receive: otherwise every one may by his will and according to his phantasie give every sort of words all sorts of senses, and make them signifie any thing. And so it will be impossible for one to understand another, and those of the same country shall be as strangers to one another.

^u Sed tantum cum sensum reddant ex aliquo additamento proferentis retento.

This Doctor gives the same liberty to circumstances as to the substance of words, saying that one may give them by thought alone such sense as one will, in such time, and in such manner, and on such subject and motive as one will, without other motive

or necessity then because he will. ^a As if one, saith he, being alone or in company, whether he be asked or speak of his own accord, for recreation or for some other motive whatsoever it be, swear that he hath not done a thing, which notwithstanding he hath done indeed. It is not sufficient for him to lye formally, he will also joyn perjury to lying, in saying that one may swear that he hath not done that which he hath done; and he would cover this lye and this perjury by the thought of a man onely in what estate and in what circumstances soever he be; alone or in company, speaking for recreation or for other motive whatsoever it be, pretending that he may swear that he hath not done which he hath done, without fear of taking a false oath, provided ^b that he intend onely in his mind some other thing that he had not done.

a At si quis solus vel cum aliis, sine interrogatus, sine propria sponte, sine recreationis gratia, sine alio quocunque faciat iurari se non fecisse aliquid quod revera fecit.

b intelligendo intra se aliud revera fecit.

See here Sanchez first method, which serves for nothing but to learn to lye purely, simply, and without equivocation, by using words that are not equivocal in themselves, at all, and which cannot signify that which one saith, nor that which is in ones mind at all, as he affirms himself. So that such words are contrary to the thoughts which he hath, and he saith really other things then he thinketh; which is to lye formally and simply.

The second method is no better then the former, for he saith one may ^c understand (or supply out of ones mind) that he hath not done the thing on an other day then that on which he did it; or else that he hath not done it in an other place, an other time, or an other company, or with other circumstances of which he gives him choice, leaving him entire liberty to make use of which he pleaseth to deceive without scruple. For his words are clear and general: ^d Or intending, saith he, some quite other thing, and quite other circumstance which he pleases to add; which is true, of what sort soever it be. And with these precautions, if you will believe him, ^e he lye not at all in effect, and is not perjured; imagining and pretending to make us believe that he hath spoken no false thing, and that he hath spoken the very truth, though he say not that which is demanded of him, nor that which the words he uttereth signifie of themselves, but an other truth altogether different; sed aliam veritatem disparatam.

d Vel intelligendo aliam diem ab ea qua fecit.

d Vel intelligendo aliud quodvis additum verum, quocunque illud sit.

e Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est.

This is a true way to be able to justifie all manner of lyes and perjuries; the greatest liar and the greatest impostor may make use hereof to justify and to maintain himself in these crimes, in saying that his meaning was other than his saying; and that so ^f He is really neither liar nor perjured; but onely did not speak precisely a truth, which they understood who did hear him, and which his words signified; but another truth which had no thing common therewith. But that for this they had no cause to complain of what he said to them and answered in this manner, they having no right to question him. For he presupposeth as a general maxime, ^g that when one is not obliged to answer a person, neither is he obliged to answer according to his thoughts. Which he supports by a maxime of logick which saith: ^h That when the general kind of any thing is removed, the special sorts are also removed. This reasoning he saith he learned from Navarre; who saith that when one is not obliged to answer a person, he may answer him in what manner he pleases: he is not obliged to give him an honest, civil, true, sincere, faithful one, but that he may make one in all points contrary; for that we may make him none if we please.

f Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est; sed tantum non dicit unam veritatem determinatam quam audientes concipiunt, ac verbo illo significant; sed aliam veritatem disparatam.

g Quia alteri respondere non obligatus, nec obligatur respondere ad ejus mentem.

h A quo enim removetur genus, omnis quoque species removetur.

There is none that sees not clearly what follows from this, that in civil conversation, especially amongst equals, where one hath no authority over others, nor right to question them nor to oblige them to answer to that which is proposed or demanded of them, every one may say what he will, and understand what he will by his words without apprehending that he lies; and believing that he speaks the truth, because he represents it in his minde though he hide it, or expresse even the contrary in his words. But there is great difference betwixt conceiving or thinking the truth and speaking or signifying it to others. Those who will follow this Jesuit, shall have the truth in their thoughts, but not in their words; they conceive it well, but they do not speak it at all; and in this they are liars and perjured, notwithstanding all their intentions and secret thoughts, for to lye is no other thing then to speak otherwise then a man thinks, and to say one thing having another in his thoughts.

a Quarto quaeritur quale peccatum sit uti amphibologia absque rationabilis causa?

Filliutius qq. mor. tom. 2. tract. 25. c. 11. n. 330. p. 204.

b Respondeo & dico primo, probabile esse quod sit mendacium, atque adeo perjurium si confirmetur iuramento.

c Et quod profertur in rigore habet aliquem sensum verum quem talis intendit.

d Ergo non mendatur. Ibid.

e Non repugnat autem veritati & fidelitati, quia non opponitur illi per defectum veritatis, sed nimiam veritatis occultationem. Filliutius ubi sup.

Filliutius seems at first sight not to agree with Sanchez in this point. ^a It is demanded, saith he, what sin it is to make use of equivocations without any reasonable cause. His first answer is, ^b It is probable that it is a lye, and by consequence perjury when it is confirmed with an oath. But a little after, his inclination which he hath for looseness, and to flatter the lust and corruptions of men, make him say,

^c That it seemeth more probable that in rigour it is no lye, nor any perjury. His principal reason is, ^d because that he who talks and swears after this manner hath no intention, as is presupposed, to speak nor to swear false; though he indeed both speak and swear so. He pretends then, as Sanchez, that the inward will of man alone can change the signification of words, and give to them such as he pleases. It is true that Sanchez gives not this power to the intention alone, without joyning some mental restriction unto it, by which he forms in his mind a true sense, in saying in himself that he will neither lye nor forswear.

e Dico 2. probabilis videri non esse mendacium nec perjurium. Ibid. non habet intentionem dicendi falsum, vel iurandi falsitatem, ut supponimus. Ibid.

d Quia qui sic loquitur & jurat,

Filliutius notwithstanding fails not to approve these restrictions and mental additions of Sanchez. ^e Because, as he saith, he who talks thus follows rigorously the true sense which he hath an intention to give to his words. Whence he concludes absolutely as Sanchez, ^f that by consequence he lyes not at all. And he pretends not onely that he lyes not all, but that what he says, though it be captious and false, ^g yet nevertheless is not repugnant to truth and faithfulness; because it is not opposite to it by way of diminishing it, but onely in concealing it. So that all disguises, all supplies, all deceits and falsities shall be no more against truth nor fidelity, because they are not opposed unto truth in diminishing it, but onely in hiding it. And it must be observed yet farther, that one may make use of these equivocations, and also confirm them by an oath, ^h without any reasonable cause. From which Sanchez is not far, when he saith that one may do it by way of divertisement; and a little afore, ⁱ without any just cause.

h Absque rationali causa. *i* Et si nulla iusta causa ducatur proferens.

This lesson is very proper to fill the world with lyes, deceits, and trecheries, without scruple and without fear of lying, or deceiving any person: because the Jesuits assure us that a man may do all these things without being guilty of these crimes, even when there is no reason nor necessity to make use of these artifices, and they are used onely for divertisement, and to shew the liberty and freedom of ones spirit. So that there will be no more lyes nor cheats in the world for them that have once been at School with them, and who will make use of the strange priviledges which they give them.

SECT. IV.

The Jesuits method to frame equivocations, and to use them commodiously.

IT is not enough to know the rules of any mystery, if it be not known how to reduce them into practice. Of all those who have written of equivocations, there is none who hath advanced farther therein then Filliutius in the place we have cited already. For he gives two instructions and two advices to men of wit, and one to those who are more grosse and simple, to teach them to frame these equivocations; and to make use of them to purpose and with sincerity.

k Quarto quaeritur qua cautela

utendum sit amphibologia. Respondeo & dico 1. assignari possunt duo modi pro personis iudicio praeditis. Filliutius qq. mor. tom. 2. tract. 25. c. 120. n. 328. p. 204.

^k They inquire, saith he, with what precaution equivocations may be made use of? He answers: that two rules may be given, and two methods for persons of judgement,

assignari possunt duo modi pro personis iudicio praeditis. Filliutius qq. mor. tom. 2. tract. 25. c. 120. n. 328. p. 204.

that they may have change, and make use sometimes of one, and sometimes of the other.

The first is to have an intention to pronounce the words materially. That is to say, as if they signified nothing, and to take from them in his minde their proper and natural signification, nor desiring they should have any at all. And to make this method easie to understand, he proposes one example as it were a model by which one may see the use of this marvellous art. For greater security, saith he, when a man begins to say: I swear that it is good that he add, low to himself, this clause and this mental restriction, (this day,) and that he continue after to say all along, I have not eaten of such a thing, So that he saith indeed, I swear that I have not eaten to day, or in such manner. I swear, adding secretly as it were in a parenthesis, (that I say) and after following all along, that I have not done such a thing, for so all the discourse will be true. For he will say nothing but that it is true that he doth say that he hath not done it, although he hath done it.

1 Primus est h. a. bene inventio n. m. profertendi v. ubi materialiter. Ibid. m. Et ad majorem securitatem, cum incipit. v. g. dicere juo, debet interponere submissam restrictionem mentalem (ut hoc die), & deinde addere alia verba, quod non fieri hoc

non commed. ssevem illum. Ibid. n. Vel jura, & interpono (me dicere). tum absolute alia item dicit, vel illud. Sic enim verissima est tota oratio.

The other method which is also for subtle persons, is this. The second method is to have an intention to compose ones discourse, not onely of words which are audibly pronounced, but also of those which are secretly reserved in ones mind, it being free for those who speak to expresse their thoughts wholly or onely in part.

2 Secundum habere intentionem non absolutam orationis materialiter, sed secretam per verba externa, sed s.

mul cum restrictione mentali. Liberum est enim homini exp. invere mentem suam tota aliter v. b. partim aliter. Ibid.

One of these means to frame equivocations is by addition, and the other by mental restriction. I stay not to expound them farther, because Fillinius proponds them onely to persons of judgement, who are capable to understand them, and dexterous to practise them; or rather if they have but a little judgement and good sense, they will in reading them onely sufficiently perceive that these subtleties are ridiculous to be practised.

He gives but one means for simple and grosse-witted persons to make equivocations, for fear of confounding them, and he gives one so easie that there is no person who may not make use thereof. But for slow-witted persons, saith he, who know not of themselves how in particular to frame an equivocation; it is enough for them that they have an intention to affirm or deny that which they say in a sense which contains in effect some truth. That is to say, that for those who have not wit enough to find equivocal terms, nor mental restrictions, it will be sufficient to say one thing, and think another; or even that thinking nothing at all in particular, they onely have a design to affirm or deny something in general that is true. It behoves them onely to know that they may deny all that which is inquired of them, though in conscience and in their natural light they see it is true, believing or supposing that it may be false in some sense unknown to them. And for this it is necessary, saith he, that they be advertised, and that they know at least in general that they may deny that about which they are questioned, in some true sense, though they know not what this sense is.

3 Pro rudibus vero qui nesciunt in particulari concipere amphibologiam, satis est habere intentionem affirmandi vel negandi in sensu qui continet veritatem.

4 Ad quod necesse est ut saltem in universum sciant se posse negare in aliquo vero sensu. Ibid.

After this he must be very dull who cannot make use of this invention, since it is not of necessity, no not to know in particular, nor what he doth nor what he saith, whether it be true or not indeed, and that it is sufficient to believe, or suppose in general that it may be so, and that a nimble witted man may finde some sense in which he can make the words true, which are false in their natural and onely sense, and which by consequence are not equivocations, though he who pronounces them cannot do it.

S E C T. V.

The method of the same Jesuits, to hinder their equivocations from being ever discovered, and that no person may be deprived of his liberty to make use of them. 1520

After they have made the use of equivocations so free, so common, and so easie, that all the world may make use of them indifferently on all occasions, there remains nothing for the Masters of this art, that is to say the Jesuits, to do, but to establish well the practice, and to fortify themselves in such sort against all opposition, that whatsoever precaution they use; no person may be able to hinder them from making use thereof when they will, nor to discover it when they have used it.

This Sanchez hath attempted to do, and in this he hath laboured with great care, and he hath proceeded therein beyond all other who have written on this matter. After he hath established many rules, given many advices about equivocations and the manner to form and make use of them, he concludes with this advice, as the last and most important: ^a That so often as it is lawful in our own defence to use equivocations, they may be used, though he who examines us do presse us to answer him without making use of this very equivocation. That is to say, that so often as you believe that you may use equivocations (which is alway lawful according to this Casuist and his Fraternity, as we have already reported) on all occasions, and even without necessity and reason, though you be admonished not to make use of it, when it is forbidden you, when you are caused to promise and even to swear that you will make no use of it; notwithstanding all these precautions, these defences, these promises, and the oath that you have made, you have always the liberty to make use thereof.

^a Tandem id observandum est, quoties licitum est ad se succedum nisi aliqua equivocacione; id quoque erit licitum, etsi interrogans urgeat excludens illam equivocacionem. Sanch. op. mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 45. p. 30.

^b Atque idem docent de reo qui rogatus de delicto secreto, urgetur, ut dicat sive fecerit publice, sive occulto; sive ipse Judex juridice interroget, sive non, dicentes posse adhuc respondere se non secisse, intelligendo, non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogas, sed ut teneris tanquam Judex rogare. Ibid.

None can speak more clearly and more favourably. Notwithstanding if the practice of this rule seem to you too hard or too large, he will help your understanding by examples which he brings, and your belief, by the authority of other Casuists whom he cites for you, in these terms: ^b The Casuists say the same thing, of a man accused, who being examined upon any secret crime, is prest to answer, whether it be publicly, or privately, whether it be before a Judge juridically or not. For they hold in this very case that he may answer, that he hath not done it, intending his answer not in that manner as the Judge examines him maliciously; but in the manner he ought to examine him in the quality of a Judge.

It is sufficient that a malefactor or a witness form within himself a probable opinion that the Judge who examine him juridically, ought not to examine him in the manner that he doth, for to mock him, and to elude his interrogatories by equivocation; or by confidently denying most clear and certain things, so that this mischief cannot possibly be hindered or prevented by him, what precaution soever he useth.

The Judge is malicious, and he interrogates this malefactor maliciously according to Sanchez, because that in examining he uses the precautions which he believes necessary to draw the truth out of his mouth. This malefactor is not malicious, he answers not maliciously, but reasonably and wisely, according to the Divinity of this Father; because he observes exactly the rules of the equivocations, and omits no juggling slight of mind, to obscure the truth, and to deceive the Judge who interrogates him by lying and perjury.

He brings also another example of the same subject. ^c He holds the same thing, 1540

^c Atque idem docet de rogato a custodibus urbis, aliquam locum peste infectum esse falso ex stimantibus, & rogantibus quempiam an ex eo loco venerit: sive infectus peste sit, sive non, nempe posse ipsum respondere non venire ex eo, intelligendo, non ut vos rogatis, sed ut deberetis rogare. Ibid.

saith he, speaking of Navarre, touching him who is interrogated by a Town-guard, who believe falsely, that the Town from whence he comes is infected with the plague, and demands from him if he came from thence; whether it be infected or it be not infected, he may answer that he came not thence; making this mental restriction in his minde; I came thence not according to the question you make, but according to the question you ought to make. This method is not very favourable to civil government, nor gives it much weight to the authority of Magistrates and their Officers; also it is not very favourable for the establishment of Laws, and for assuring the obedience which people owe unto Princes. When a Sovereign commands any thing to his subjects, there is no private man who shall receive his orders, who may not promise to obey him, though he be resolved to do nothing of that he shall command him, by making use of this mental restriction, and saying in himself; ^d I will do this, not according as you command me, but as you ought to command me.

^d Non ut tu imperas, sed ut debet imperare.

Also inlike manner when he is demanded any thing whereunto he imagines that he is not obliged, to answer according to truth, he may speak contrary to that which he thinks, and to that which is true, by the favour of this equivocation, and of this secret thought which he bears in his minde; ^e In answer, saith he in himself, not to that which you demand of me, but according to that you ought to have demanded of me.

^e Non ut tu ogas, sed ut debet interrogare.

550 One may say, by proportion, the same thing of a child in relation to a Father, of a servant in relation to a Master, of a Monk or any other inferiour in relation to his Superior: and so this rule banisheth absolutely truth and sincerity out of the world, and dispenseth with all sort of persons for the fidelity and obedience they owe to whomsoever it be.

Sanchez joyns a reason to the example and authority, that he may yet more confirm the possession and use of these equivocations. ^f The reason of all this, saith he,

is because, though he who interrogates in this sort reduces his demand to one sole sense, excluding all others, and that the answer hath in it self a reference unto this sense; notwithstanding this is true onely because of the ill intention of him who interrogates, which ought to be imputed the discordance betwixt the Author and the interrogations. It suffices not him to justify him who forswears himself before the civil Officers, or before a Judge that examines him juridically: but he casts this perjury and crime upon the Judge himself. He confesses that there is falsity, and by consequence perjury in the answer of those who make use of these equivocations in the manner he reaches them to illude the intergatories of a Judge; and he notes himself this falsity and perjury, though he expresse it modestly enough, calling it ^g a repugnance and discordance from the answer of the persons that are forsworn, and the intergatories which a Judge or other Magistrate puts to him. And because he will not have this crime fall on them who commit it by his counsel and his order, he casts it upon the Officer or the Judge, ^h to whom must be imputed; saith he, the discordance which is found betwixt the answer and the interrogation. Though both the one and the other are in no wise accessory thereto, and give onely occasion to commit it by forbidding it expressly, and using all the precaution they could to hinder it. So that there is nothing to be imputed unto them on this occasion, but onely that they desired him to speak sincerely, and would hinder him from using equivocations, of which this Jesuit believes he hath right to make use.

^f Quorum opinio est ratio; q i iusti interrogans excludit in ipso omnem alium modum sciendi; & responsio ex se id significat; id tamen verum est ex formali iurique interogatione; cui imputari debet repugnanti in ipsis interrogacione. Ibid. ^g Repugnanti in ipsis verbis & interrogacione. ^h Cui imputari debet repugnanti in ipsis verbis & interrogacione.

60 And this is that, without doubt, for which he imputes the malice to the Judge, that he would hinder the accused from using his right that he hath, and cause him to speak sincerely, where he hath right to speak equivocally, and by consequence to condemn him of injustice and malice who would hinder him from using this right. He then sets the Judge in the place of the malefactor, and the malefactor in the place of the Judge, making the malefactor Judge of his Judge himself, and giving him liberty to judge and condemn him even when he forswears himself in his presence, by answering according to his own fancy, and not according to the Judges interrogatory; and makes him say unto his Judge unawares to him: (for this is the secret and the retentum of the equivocation, which passeth inwardly in his minde:) ⁱ I answer thee not in the manner which thou dost examine me maliciously, but in the manner thou oughtest to examine me as a Judge. Which he testifies yet more clearly, when he saith that all this disguise, deceit and lying of this man who forswears

ⁱ Non ut tu in iniquitate tuarogas; sed ut tenentis iniquam, Judex interrogare.

k Ex formali
iniqua interro-
gantis intentio-
ne, cui impu-
tari debet re-
pugnantia in
verbis ipsis
& interroga-
tione.

l utitur jure
suo respondendo
ad mentem legitimam quæ inesse debet. Ibid. pag 31.

himself, ^k comes from the wicked intention of him that examines him, to which ought to be imputed the discordance which is found betwixt the answer and the interrogation. But he justifies highly the liar and the perjurer saying, ^l he makes use of his right in answering his Judge following the lawful thought which he ought to have, and not following that which he hath maliciously. That is to say, not onely reforming the Sentence of his Judge, but in condemning his judgement, his thoughts, his proceeding, as of a mischievous or ignorant man, who knows not how to execute his charge, and he doth all this lawfully, if we believe Sanchez, as having a particular right which this Jesuit hath given them; *utitur jure suo.*

m Quare idem
confero ob ean-
dem rationem,
quatenus in-
terrogatus
reducitur in-
terrogatus
et ut jurat se
nulla equivo-
catione uti, &
absque omni
profuso equivo-
catione id in-
telligere. Adhuc
enim jurare po-
test, intelligendo
ita ut plane de-
beat loqui &
explicare: vel
aliud mente
concupiendo, quo
verum id red-
datur. Ibid. p. 31.

From these principles and conclusions Sanchez draws this conclusion to establish these equivocations: ^m For this cause I am always of this judgement for this same reason, whatsoever the Judge urgeth who interrogates unjustly, so far even as to make the examinant swear that he doth not make use of equivocations, and that he intends that which he saith without any equivocation. For he may also swear understanding secretly that he doth it as far as he is obliged to speak clearly and to expound himself; or by forming some other thought which may make his answer true. So that what instance soever the Judge can make, or other person that examines him, and conjures him to speak the truth; although he oblige him to promise, and even make him to swear that he will answer sincerely, and not make use of any equivocation; notwithstanding after his promise, and after his oath, he may yet delude the Judge and him that examines him, and answer by equivocation even then when he promiseth and sweareth that he will not make use thereof; ⁿ understanding always that he speaks and answers him as he ought; that is, according to the right he thinks he hath, if he know no other occasion, or if there come in his mind no other sence, to which he may secretly referre his words, to give them some colour and some appearance of truth.

n Intelligendo ita ut plane debeat loqui & explicare. Vel aliud mente concupiendo quo verum id reddatur.

o Quia cum
non teneatur ad
formalem inter-
rogantis mentem
respondere, sed
ad debitam, illa
responsio juxta
debitam ejus mentem vera est. Ibid. pag. 31.

His reason is the self-same which he hath already made ofren use of: ^o because he is not obliged to answer to the intention and the thoughts which he hath who examines him, but to that which he ought to have, his answer is true, following this intention and this thought which he ought to have.

This man doth not say that which he thinks, also he answers not that which he thinks, and which he demands who examines him, but to that which he pretends he ought to ask him, and to the thought which he thinks he ought to have in examining him. And this thought which he imagines that he who examines him ought to have, is his own, and that which he forms in his own minde, to deceive and elude the question of him who examines him. So that he speaks truth in lying, and swears false without perjury; because although he answers contrarily to what he was questioned, and to what he hath promised to answer even with an oath: notwithstanding he answers conformably to his own intention, and to the secret thought which he hath formed in his mind, which is that which he ought to have following his own judgement, not that of him who examines him, which makes his answer to be true. *Illa responsio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera est.*

So when one is urged by his Father, his Superior, or by his Confessor, to tell something which he would not discover unto them, he needs onely to form a thought different from theirs, and to imagine that they ought to have it; and answering unto them comformably to this thought, he shall be covered from lying and falsehood, *Illa responsio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera est.*

The last counsel which Sanchez gives for securing and facilitating equivocation is this:

2. I. B. I. C. I. Art. 6. P. 3. S. 5.

this; ^a It behoves him who will make use of any of these equivocations, which we are about to speak of, to have an intention to give unto his words the sense which they may truly receive, and by consequence he must know that he may speak them in any sense which is true, though he know not in particular what that sense is. That is to say, that a man speaking a falshood so evident, that he himself sees no means to excuse or cover it under any equivocation, which might give it onely some colour of truth, he may nevertheless speak it; and for to put his conscience in surery, it is sufficient for him to believe that which he saith may absolutely be capable of some true sense, though he knows it not.

By this rate Doctrine all deceivers and lyars have gained their cause, and this Jesuit hath given them more than ever they durst hope for, for according to this
 1610 Doctrine they may not onely deceive without punishment; and without being discovered, which is that which they pretend to; but whatsoever deceit, lye or perjury, they use, they lye nor nor forswear themselves at all, though they may believe themselves that they do, seeing clearly that that which they say is not true, and being not able so much as to see how it can be true, provided onely, that they suppose and that they believe in general, that it may be so absolutely in some sense which they do not know.

Sanchez attributes this expedient unto Suarez. But to keep always his advantage, even above his Fraternity, and to hold the rank of a Master in this matter, he proposes also another invention, or at least he stretches that of Suarez, and he expounds it yet more easly. ^b It suffices, saith he, that he hath an intention to give that sense to his words which a learned man hath counselled him to give it, or might understand it in. He wills therefore that he should not trouble himself so much as to know whether the evident falsity which he speaks and which he sees himself, may be covered by any ordinary or easie equivocation; and he believes that it behoves him onely to have an intention to speak in such a sense as a learned man, who is experienced in equivocations, can give him, though it be altogether unknown from common people. So important a matter is it to have the counsel of a man who knows all the slights of this mystery, and who hath proper ones for all sorts of affairs. For we may not onely make use of his counsels when he is present, and when we have time to consult him; but also in his absence when we make our reference
 1610 unto him in all sorts of difficulties which we meet with in this matter, and make use of his counsel and direction to deceive all men without seeing him or speaking to him, purposing onely in our selves to do that which he would do or counsel us; supposing that he would finde out some means by his contrivance, to justify the lye and perjury which we are about to fall into; although we see not any way at all how this which we are about to speak and to swear can be true in any sense, or warranted from lying and perjury, according to any rules of Truth and Justice.

The last ARTICLE.

A general proof that the Jesuitical Authors favour and nourish the lust of men in all things; and the common principle from which they draw all that they say in favour of it.

1620 Beyond all which we have spoken hitherto, it may be known clearly, by a general proof, that the Jesuits nourish and favour as much as they can the lust of men, by considering what they say to the disadvantage of charity. For as charity and lust are two contrary motions and loves which divide our heart, in such manner that it is always possessed and moved by the one or the other; and it hath so much more of lust, as it hath less of charity, lust cannot be favoured more nor established more forcibly in the heart of man to cause it to reign continually through his whole life and all his actions, then by chasing charity away from thence, for to reduce it to such a streight as that it cannot be more diminished, nor have lesse extent, without being entirely destroyed. And for this reason the Jesuits carry themselves so in this particular, and

with such a consent of their Authors, that it seems that a general conspiracy and resolution hath been taken about in, in so general assembly of all their Society.

There are some who pretend that a man is never obliged, upon any occasion, nor at any determinate time, to love God, in all the course of his life, nay, nor even at death. The more religious reduce this great and first commandment to a certain

c Quoniam tempore per se obligat præceptum ebrietatis ad Deum? Escob. tr. 5. exam. 4. n. 8. p. 624. d. Mito sententiam Azorii octo tempora assignantis, & Sanchez unicam. *c* Sequor autem Henriquez tria ad hoc præceptum tempora assignantem. *Primum* quidem est morale principium rationis: *Secundum*, mortis articulus: *Tertium*, tempus vitæ intermedium, saltem singulis quinque annis. *Addo* ex Filliuto, probabile esse non quinquennis singulis rigore obligare, sed sapientium arbitrio. *Ibid.*

At what time, inquirens Escobar, doth the precept of loving God oblige a man in it self? He rehearset divers opinions, and expresses his own in these terms; *d* I pass by the opinion of Azor who alleadges eight times, or eight occasions; and that of Sanchez, who acknowledges but one alone wherein this precept obliges: (he leaves the one as too large, and the other as too severe and too exact;) *e* But I follow Henriquez who observes three times in which this precept obliges. The first is, when a man begins to have the use of reason; the second is upon the point of death; the third is all the time of a mans life between those two, at the least from five years to five years. But I say farther, following Filiucius, that it is probable that this precept doth not oblige in rigour every five years, but at the discretion and judgement of wise persons.

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If a man be obliged to love God but upon one occasion, as Sanchez would have it, or at the beginning of his use of reason, and at death, and now and then during his life, as Henriquez believes; or from five to five years, and even less as Escobar adds, or at most upon eight occasions onely which may happen during a mans whole life, according to Azor, all the rest of his time, that is to say, almost all the life of a man shall be for lust, and one may employ it to love any other thing besides God, that is to say, to love the creatures, temporal things, the goods of this world, without being obliged to turn away his minde and his heart from them to love God; it being certain that the heart of man cannot be without some love, and that that of the world and of the creatures doth occupy all that which the love of God doth not possess.

Amicus not daring to oppose himself absolutely to the opinion of Divines who hold that to satisfie the precept of loving God we are obliged to have actually more love for him than for the Creature, expounds this opinion in such sort that he doth indeed defend it. *f* The second opinion holds, saith he, that it behoves to love God above all things, in preferring him above them, and esteeming him more; but not in loving him with more tenderness. This is the common judgement of Divines, which is true and which ought to be followed. And for to expound this more clearly, he addeth; *g* All preference comes from a judgement by which after we have compared two things, we choose the one and leave the other. For because I judge that the one thing is worth more than the other, I prefer that which I judge to be the better. He distinguishes here two acts; the one is that by which we compare two things together, and the other, that by which we give the preference to that which we judge the better. And he puts appreciative love in the latter of these two acts, which is for all that an act of judgement and of understanding as well as the former. So that to love God more than all the creatures appreciatively or by preference, according to him, is no other thing then to judge, that God is better and more perfect then all the Creatures. But this may be done by the greatest Sinner as well as by the greatest Saint, this judgement being more in the head than in the heart, and proceeding more from knowledge and light of minde than from affection.

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f Secunda sententia docet Deum esse diligendum super omnia tantum appreciative, seu prælative. Est communis Theologorum opinio quæ vera & sequenda. Amic. tom. 4. disp. 29. sect. 2. n. 15. p. 388. *g* Omnis appreciatio nascitur ex judicio comparati uno unius præ alio. Ex eo enim quod judicio unum esse melius & perfectius alio. *Ibid.* num. 18.

Also it is clear that one may esteem them much whom he loves not at all, and also more than those whom he loves. And there is nothing more common then to esteem those for whom one has no true affection at all, but an intire indifference. So that this esteem and this judgement cannot be named love but improperly; he who sets not his love which is due unto God, above all things, otherwise then in this judgement and in this estimation, which makes him prefer him above all things, as deserving to be beloved above all things, doth not at the bottom

A. I. B. I. C. I. A. 7.

attribute

attribute unto him any true love at all, and holds in effect that there is no love due to him at all.

But if these Doctors who know to give to their own words, as well as to those of others, such sence as they please, even that which they have not, and which they cannot have naturally, as we have made appear in the former Chapter; I say, if these Doctors that they may not seem to abolish intirely the commandment of love to God, say that although they place this love that is due to God in the esteem which we ought to make of him above all the creatures; they exclude not for all this from that preference all sort of affection for God, and that they suppose we have always some love for him. They reduce elsewhere this love, whatsoever it be according to them, to so base a degree, that they tellie sufficiently that all their explications are rather to disguise their judgement, than to expound it clearly; and that not daring absolutely to deny the commandment of loving God, they diminish and deface, as much as they can, the love which they suppose to be due unto him.

^h I will prove unto you, saith Amicus, that although the love of God appretiative above all things be in a very low degree; It sufficeth for to accomplish the precept of love towards God. This is to abolish intirely the commandment of loving God, by maintaining that we are not obliged to love him as it doth command, for God doth demand all our love, since he demands all our heart. And Amicus saith and attempts to prove that the lowest degree of love suffices to accomplish the precept of love towards God. And that he might not leave any place to doubt of his thought upon this point, he repeats the same thing in the following number, and he speaks thereof as of a truth which follows from his principles. ⁱ It is manifest, saith he, following the principles which I have established, that this love of God may be had, though it be weak in the lowest degree, because we may have such an opinion and esteem of God, whereupon we may judge him because of his uncreated goodness to deserve to be loved more than all his creatures; and nevertheless be but slenderly moved to the exercise of this act.

^h Quod autem sola dilectio appreciativa Dei super omnia sufficiat ad implendum præceptum charitatis erga Deum, est remississima sit, probatur. Ibid. num. 19. ⁱ Quod autem talis dilectio possit esse etiam si in gradu remississimo sit, constat ex principiis, quoniam possunt

^{mus talem æstimationem de Deo habere, ut propter increatum suam bonitatem præferendus sit in amore omnibus rebus creatis, & tamen non nisi remisse in talem æstim tendere. Ibid. n. 20.}

If this be to love God to judge that he merits to be beloved, the greatest sinners, Infidels, and Devils themselves be capable of this love, and if to love as he commands, it be sufficient to be moved but slenderly, and to have for him an affection weak to the lowest degree; We must raze out or correct the commandment which requires that we love him with all our strength and with all our heart.

Thus these Divines, destroying the love of God in the hearts of men, cause the love of the world to reign there; and reducing the love which is commanded us, to the utmost point and lowest degree that it can be in, they give all liberty to lust, and leave it all the extent of the heart and of the affections.

We need not therefore wonder if they strongly maintain, that it is lawful to love temporal good things, as riches, honor, and pleasure. ^k It is no evil to desire glory and reputation for a good end, as much as one deserves, saith Escobar after Tolet. But Tolet expounds himself better than Escobar, in the place which he cites, where after he had said, ^l The difference which is betwixt Pride and vaine Glory is this, that Pride transports men with a desire and love of their own excellency; and vaine Glory hath a desire to manifest his own proper excellency particularly before others; He adds in favour of vain glory, that ^m to desire it is not a thing bad in it self, but indifferent, as to desire money.

^k Licet gloriam & famam ob bonum finem optare quantum quisque mereatur. Escobar tr. 2. cx. 2. cap. 8. n. 92. p. 303. ^l Differt vana gloria à superbia. Superbia enim appetit excellentiam, vana autem gloria manifestationem excellentiæ, præcipue apud alios.

They cannot better justifie vanity then by avarice, by approving them at the same time and in two words. And that which they say is most repugnant to the judgement of Saint Paul writing to Timothy, ⁿ That those who would be rich fall in

ⁿ Qui volunt divites fieri

incidunt in tentationem & in laqueum diaboli 1. ad Timoth. 6. v. 9.

to temptations and the snares of the Devil. And to that of Saint John, who speaking generally of the world, and of the love of temporal goods which are in this world, gives this advice or rather command from God. *Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world: for if any love the world the love of God is not in him.* This language of the Holy Ghost is sufficiently different from that of the Jesuits. Yet they cease not to pretend that what they say, that one may love the goods of this world, is supported by the authority of the Saints and their examples, and even of JESUS CHRIST himself.

o No'te dilige-
re mundum,
neque ea que
sunt in mundo.
Si quis diligit
mundum, non
est charitas Pa-
tris in eo. 1.
Joan. c. 2. v. 15.

p Num secularis
homo debet ali-
quid amplius
habere monacho,
quam cum uxore
habitare tantum?

hic enim habet veniam, in aliis autem nequaquam, sed omnia equaliter sicut monachi debet agere. S. Chryf. hom. 7. in Ep. ad Hebræos.

q Cum uxoris
co-habitationem
concedit laico
scribit Antistes,
educationem
liberorum, reique
familiaris cu-
ram, modera-
tum dignitatis
& secularis
honoris deside-

rium, liberum sue voluntatis usum, quæstuosos labores: uno verbo, eoque hierarchico, dividuas distinctasque vitas & imaginationes illi permissas admonet. Celot p. 573.

Saint Chrysofome, in his VII. Homily upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, saith, that a secular person ought in all things to live like a Monk, save that he may cohabite with his wife if he be married. *The secular, saith he, ought he to pretend that more is lawful to him then to a Monastick excepting only cohabitation with his wife? It is true that in this point he hath a particular power, but not in other things, in all other things he is obliged to live as the Monasticks.*

Celot alledging these words of Saint Chrysofome, expounds them, or rather corrects them in this sort: *When this Prelate writes that it is lawful for a secular to co-habite with his wife, he would say that it is lawful for him to bring up his children, to take care of the affairs of his Family; to desire dignities with moderation, and the honours of the world; to follow his own free inclinations, to take pains to hoard no wealth; and to close up all in a word, but which is an hierarchique and a Holy one, to lead his life altogether divided and distinct, disparting his affections and thoughts to many different objects.*

uno verbo, eoque hierarchico, dividuas distinctasque vitas & imaginationes illi permissas admonet. Celot p. 573.

Saint Chrysofom saith absolutely that a secular hath no licence more then a Monk, except that he may co-habite with his wife. And Celot saith that he may love and desire the things of the world, though this be not allowed a Monk. *God permits to seculars, saith this Jesuit, a moderate desire of dignities and honours of the world.* That is to say, in most clear terms, that God hath allowed him ambition and vanity so it be not excessive, *he hath permitted him to follow his own proper will, which cannot be done without he be delivered from the dependence which he hath on him, and dispensing with him from saying, with all Saints, They will be done on Earth as it is in Heaven: so that instead of this he permits them to demand that their own will may be fulfilled.*

This estate of free disposing of our wills was that of Adam before he sinned: but now it is that of sinners and of the damned, and God hath not a greater judgement to inflict on a man in this world then to give him up unto himself, and to let him do what he will. For this cause Celot hath happened to speak better then he intended, when he said that God had left to the people of this world, and to the lovers of this world, in favour of whom he speaks, the free disposal of their wills, *liberum sue voluntatis usum.* But this permission is not, as he pretends, a permission of approbation or dispensation which gives them right; but a permission of judgement and of renunciation, which imports and implies punishment and vengeance.

He saith also that God permits secular persons to labour to gather wealth, *quæstuosos labores;* which is the very consequence of his discourse and opinion. For as the servants of God do labour to serve him and to gain eternal wealth, which he hath promised to those that serve him; even so the people of the world serve the world, and labour for advancement in the world, and to get temporal wealth.

r uno verbo,
eoque hierarchi-
co, dividuas
distinctasque vitas & imaginationes illi permissas admonet.

Finally he saith *that to conclude all in one word, but which is hierarchique and holy, God hath permitted them to lead a life divided and distracted, parting their*

interests and thoughts towards a multitude of different objects. I am not astonished at all that he declares so openly, that he who is no profest Religious may divide his minde and life betwixt God and the world; that is to say, that he may love the world as well as God. This saying is worthy him, but not holy nor hierarchique as he assures us. This is rather a profane speech and unworthy of a Christian, and opposite to the hierarchy, being it is contrary to the order and commandment of God, who ordaines us ^a to love him with all our heart, and forbids us to love the world and all that is in the world,

^a Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo,

Nolite diligere mundum, neque ea quae in mundo sunt. 1. Joan. 2. v. 15.

Nevertheless he forbears not to take Saint *Chrysoftome* for warrant of this saying, as if he could cover an error by an imposture. He makes this great Saint to say, or rather he saith for him, against his will, and contrary to his thoughts and expresse words, that it is lawful for a secular person to lead a life wholly divided and severed, parting his affections and thoughts on many different objects. Which agrees not with what he himself hath related of this Saint; that a Christian who liveth in the world is obliged to the same things with a professed Religious, excepting the usage of marriage: *Omnia aequaliter sicut Monachi agere debet*; unless he pretends that it is lawful also for the Monks and Religious, as well as seculars, to part their lives betwixt God and the world.

After he had thus abused the authority of the Saints, he abuseth also their example, to support his false principle, and to establish ambition, usury, and the love of this world and the goods of this world amongst Ecclesiastiques and the Ministers of Jesus Christ, as well as amongst the seculars. For he is bold to assure us that the greatest personages of antiquity, as Saint *Basil*, have suffered themselves to breake out into passions, like those he allows the people of the world, and have appeared vehemently concerned in occasions so important as are the elections and ordinations of the Pastors of the Church. See how he discourses; ^b *We know that humane reasons have often transported the greatest persons, to seek to advance their kindred and their friends to the orders and charges of the Church: and the Ecclesiastical History relates that Saint Basil erected an Episcopali Seat at Zazime, which was but a despicable and poor Town, that he might establish Gregory Nazianzen there, to the end he might make use of him as his friend, against Anthemius Metropolitan of the second Province of Cappadocia. In which if he had considered the glory of God alone, and had not mingled therewith some Earthly desire, St. Gregory had more readily and with lesse resistance yielded himself to the will of Saint Basil.*

^b Magnis etiam viris humanas rationes scimus non raro ejusmodi parentum aut amicorum persuasisse. Et a Sancto Basilio Ecclesiasticae narrat historia Zazimae, vili ac

despecto oppido, erectam Episcopatus Sedem, ut in ea constitutus Gregorius Nazianzenus amici sui partes adversus Anthemium secundae Cappadociae Metropolitanum tueretur. Quo in facto si unicam Dei spectasset gloriam, neque terreni desiderii quidquam admiscisset, facilius sine dubio cessisset Basilio Gregorius. Celot p. 947.

He is not contented unjustly to condemn Saint *Basil*, he makes Saint *Gregory* to condemn him also; supposing falsely that he had opposed him, because he discovered some worldly desire in his design. But by this rule we must say that all the Saints who at the first resisted other Saints, or the Church, or God himself, when they were called to Ecclesiastique Offices and sometimes by miracle, have observed some humane and terrestrial concern in the conduct and vocation of the Church, the Saints, and God himself, upon which they grounded their refusal, and resistance.

After that *Celot* had imposed this infirmity and defect upon Saint *Basil*, he makes application thereof to his design, which is to authorize Lust by the example of so great a Saint, drawing thence this consequence. ^c Saint *Basil* then might create and establish under him new Bishops, whom they call Suffragans, to augment the dignity and authority of his Metropolitan Church. ^d May not another Saint upon like occasion give unto his Brother, his Kinsman, his faithful Friend, the conduct of an ancient Bishoppick?

^c Patuit ergo S. Basilium in Ecclesia sua Metropolitanæ dignitatem amplificare, novos Episcopos sibi

subditos, quos suffraganeos appellamus, constituere. d Non poterit Sanctus alius simili ex causa veteri Episcopatus suam fratrem & consanguineum suum, aut amicum fidelissimum praeficere? Ibid.

1. We may observe in this discourse first of all the rashness wherewith he imposes upon Saint *Basil*, without any ground, to have acted humanely, and to have been carried by interest and a carnal desire, to make *St. Gregory* a Bishop.

2. The consequence he draws from this supposed fact, saying that by the example of Saint *Basil* others may choose their kindred and friends, for interest and humane consideration, to succeed them in their charges of their Churches.

3. The conclusion and end of this reasoning and this example, which is onely to make use of it to authorize and justify the love of the world and the goods of this world, and consequently to let loose the reins to lust, and to give men the liberty to follow it without difficulty and without remorse of conscience.

Pozz proceeds farther unto a greater excess in this same subject, attributing even to Jesus Christ himself this manner of acting altogether humane, and altogether from flesh and blood, in two the most Holy and Divine functions which he hath exercised, which are the distribution of his grace, and vocation to an Apostleship. For in that Saint *John Baptist* was sanctified from the wombe of his Mother, he argues that by stronger reason Jesus Christ hath done the same favour to Saint *Joachim* and Saint *Anne*. Because that Saint *Joachim* and Saint *Anne* were his Grandfather and Grandmother, whereas Saint *John* was but his cousin. See here his words speaking of Jesus Christ. * For to make himself more complaisant towards Mary who was to be conceived without original sin, he delivered her Father and Mother from the original corruption more readily then Saint *John*. And I see not, saith he; why the liberality of Jesus Christ should be greater towards Saint *John*, then towards his Grandfather and Grandmother. Saint *John* being Cousin unto the Virgin: but this proximity being onely in the collateral line, it is lesse then that of Fathers and Mothers and other Ancestors who are in the right line: Saint *John* was the fore-runner of our Lord: but this dignity is not so proper to presse the bounty of Jesus Christ, as that which arises from the quality of Father and Mother in respect of Mary.

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* ut Mariæ
adblandiretur
absque originali
macula concipi-
pente, illius
parentem ab hac
velocius quam
Joannem à ma-
cula heredita-
ria liberavit.
Neque video
quare assessor
fuerit beneficentia Christi in Joannem, quàm in utrumque avum. Joannes erat quidem consobrinus Deiparæ; at multo minor est necessitudo hæc à trasversa linea derivata, quam quæ recto tramite descendit patrum & avorum. Joannes fuit præcursor Domini, hæc tamen dignitas neget minus clementiam Christi, quàm illa quæ sumitur ex patris munere per Mariam. *Reza* Blucidarii. l. 2. tit. 8. c. 3. sect. 2. p. 547.

This is a great rashness, and a reasoning altogether carnal and grosse, to preferre the natural quality of Father and Mother of the Virgin, to the Holy and eminent quality of the fore-runner of Jesus Christ, by which Saint *John* surpassed all the greatest Saints, and all the Prophets. But this is yet a greater temerity, and a thought yet more carnal, to attribute the grace of God to natural conditions of flesh and blood, against the most clear and certain principles of Faith. Finally this is a third excess, to maintain, Saint *Joachim* and Saint *Anne* had so much or more grace and Holyness then Saint *John Baptist*, since it is formally to contradict Jesus Christ, who hath declared that amongst all the Saints who were born before *John*, there was none greater then he. And the foundation of this imagination is no better then it is it self. For he pretends that Jesus Christ entring into the same obligations with his Mother, and making them as his own, ought to give more grace to those to whom the Virgin was more obliged, and more straitly bound according to the order of nature and of birth. See here his words: *It was reasonable that*

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c ut quibus
magis secundum
naturam & de-
bitum cause con-
nectatur (beata
Virgo) illis a-
bundantior gratiam Christi impetiret. L. 3. tit. 10 c. 5. p. 617.

Jesus Christ should give grace in more abundance to those to whom his Mother was more obliged by the Laws of nature, and by the particular engagements of her condition.

And speaking of the vocation of the Apostles, he saith that Jesus Christ *to satisfie the Laws of Flesh and Blood, did choose almost half his Apostles of the number of his kindred according to the flesh.* He cannot say more openly, that Jesus Christ was acted by carnal affection, and by humane considerations, in the distribution of his Graces, and in the vocation of his Apostles to their office, which are two actions of his power the most principal and Divine.

f Hoc cœmi &
sanguini dedit,
ut media fere
parte apostolo-
rum ex cognatis
sanguinis car-
nem pararetur.

The *Religians* proceeded in their heresie no further than this point, to say that God distributed his Grace according to the rules of flesh and blood. The Pharisees who looked narrowly into all the actions of Jesus Christ to reprove them, never found in all his life the least occasion to reproach him that he acted humanely, and with acceptance of persons, preferring his kindred before others. On the contrary, they found always so much indifferency in all his conduct, that they publickly gave this testimony of him: *You respect no mans person, and you have no regard unto men.*

The same Author in the same place pursuing his discourse, discovers more openly yet the thought which he hath of our Saviour in this matter; and makes it more unexcusable, see how he speaks. *But for fear that Jesus Christ should let loose the reins unto ambition, and that the love which he had to his kindred might not appear too excessive, he chose none of them, to make him Prince and Chief of the Apostles: but he chose Saint Peter who was of another Family, and of another Neighbouring Town.* So that, according to the thoughts of this Author, vanity, and the consideration of men did a little hold back the ambition of Jesus Christ; so that if he had not been afraid to discover, and make too much to appear that passion which he had to make great his kindred, as he had already advanced many to the Apostleship, he had also it may be chosen some one of them to make him head of the Apostles. But if Jesus Christ could prefer his kindred before other men to make them Apostles because of their kindred, as this Jesuit pretends, why could not he by the same reason give them the primacy over the Apostles? If it had been too great ambition to do the second, as he supposes, it had been also ambition, according to him, though lesse, to do the former. The extremest point of impiety of the Jews in the time of the Law, and of Tyrants since the coming of Christ, hath been to set Idols in the Temples, and on the Altars consecrated unto God. But this is a far greater excess to set lust, that is to say, the spring of all sins, of all disorders, of all the evils in the world, in God himself and Jesus Christ.

The Holy Fathers have observed that the Devil never found any artifice or means more efficacious to authorize vice, and give it a free course among Pagans, then to let them see the examples of it in the actions of the false gods, it being easie to carry them on to imitate those whom they adored. The Jesuits do the same thing, In a manner more criminal, attributing to the Saints, and even unto Jesus Christ himself, humane motions, and earthly desires, and passions of flesh and blood, and persuading men also that they are not evil, and that they may follow them in their conduct; or rather that they are obliged to do them, since the Gospel teaches us to follow Jesus Christ in all things, in the conduct of our lives, and the regulation of our manners.

We must avow, that it is not possible more to promote lust, nor more to debase the Son of God.

[Non est tibi cura de aliquo, non respicis personam hominis. Mat. 23. v. 16. Et ne autem in consanguineos nimis videatur amor, et ambitioni frangantur, nullam ex illis Apostolorum Principem elegit, sed ex aliena familia vicinæ autem patriæ Simonem Petrum. Lib. 2. tr. 10. c. 4. p. 614.]

C H A P. II.

Of Sins in habit, or habitual Sins.

That there is scarcely any habitual Sins, according to the Jesuits; and that custom of sinning may make a man incapable of sinning. 17

AS in doing evil we accustom our selves thereunto, and in following lusts we cause them to pass into habits, which strengthen and increase more the inclination we had unto evil; the order of reason requires in the design we have, to consider the springs and the principles of sin, to make appear how the Jesuits nourish them, that after we have treated of Lust, we speak also of evil habits.

I propose, for example, of habitual sins swearing and blasphemy: because these sins of themselves produce neither pleasure nor profit, its onely passion which carries men to them, and evil custom which nourisheth them. So that to speak properly and according to their pecuiliar nature, they are sins of passion and habit.

Bauny in his summe, chap. 4. pag. 60. speaking of a person accustomed to swear, who for this reason is always in danger to be forsworn, gives this counsel to their Confessours. *The Confessor to hinder this evil, ought to draw from his penitent an act of dislike, or to speak better, of disavowing this cursed custom. For by this means the oaths which follow proceeding from such an habit shall be esteemed involuntary in their cause. Suarez l. 3. of Oaths, chap. 6, Sanchez in his Summe, l. 3. c. 5. n. 11. and by consequence without sin.* 17

This practice is very easie and very convenient, if it be so that one word of disowning sins, which a Confessor can draw out of the mouth of a sinner, may serve all at once to be a remedy for all the sins which he hath committed, and for the justification of all the sins he shall be able to commit for the future by the violence of an evil habit, so the simple declaration which a man shall make of his being sorry to see himself subject to such a vice, sufficeth to excuse him from all the sins which he shall afterwards commit by that habit which he hath of this vice; as the debauches and excesses of the mouth, immodest speeches, lyes, deceits, thefts, and other such like. And so almost all vices of this sort shall be innocent, there being few persons that are not sorry for being engaged in them, and being unable to avoid them, because of their long accustoming themselves unto them, or who at least do not or will not sometimes disallow them, and testifie some displeasure against them in some good interval.

And yet if this good Father had been well read in *Sanchez* whom he cites, I am confident he would have been render'd yet more easie and complacent in this point. For *Sanchez* acknowledges no particular sin in Oaths that proceed of an habit though no disavowing them be made to excuse them, as *Bauny* requires. See how he speaks herein: *The last opinion which I follow as the most probable, holds that those Oaths which are made without actual application, which of it self were sufficient to a mortal sin, are not of themselves new sins properly and particularly, onely because of the custom of swearing, how great soever it be, and though no renunciation or retractation be made of it.* 179

p Posteriori sententia, cui tanquam probabiliori accedo, ait juramenta prolata sine advertentia formali

& per se sufficientis ad peccatum mortale, non esse in se novum ac proprium ac speciale peccatum propter solam jurandi consuetudinem, qualiscumque sit, & nedum sui retracta. Sanchez op. mor. part. 1. l. 3. c. 5. n. 28. p. 21.

Escobar is not far off from this opinion, where speaking of blasphemy, he demands, *9 If blasphemy be sometimes a venial sins? And he answers absolutely, according to his use; That such a custom whereof one thinks not at all makes sin not to be absque advertentia lethale peccatum non facit. Escobar tract. 1. exam. 3. cap. 6. num. 28. pag 73.*

mortal; But for the most part hinders it from being mortal, as it would be if he did swear without being accustomed. *Filliutius* speaks the same more at large and more clearly. ^a It is demanded what sin it is to blaspheme customarily? I answer, in the first place that when a man blasphemes without having full knowledge thereof, how much soever he be accustomed thereto, he sins not mortally. He takes the reason of this conclusion out of a general principle which he presupposeth as assured. ^b The reason is, saith he, because, as we have said handling free and voluntary actions, to sin mortally it behoves to have a full knowledge, for want of which on what account soever it comes, sin is thereby hindered.

^a Octavo quæra de consuetudine blasphemandi ordine ad malitiam. Respondeo & dico 1. si desit advertentia plena, & ea oriatur blasphemia, etiam si adsit consuetudo blasphemandi, non committitur peccatum mortale. *Filliutius*, mor. qq. tom. 2. tract. 25. cap. 1. num. 27. pag. 173.

^b Ratio est, quia, ut diximus de voluntario & libero, ad peccatum mortale requiritur advertentia plena, & undecunque oriatur defectus istius, excusat à peccato. *Ibid.*

He demands in the same place. ^c If the custom of swearing put a man in the estate of sin? First of all, he reports the opinion of those who hold the affirmative, afterwards he speaks his own in these terms; ^d I say, in the second place, that the custom of swearing without necessity and without utility, but with verity and without sufficient knowledge and reflection, is not of it self a great sin, and puts not a man into a state of mortal sin.

^c An jurandi consuetudo constituat hominem in statu peccati? *Dico 2. consuetudinem jurandi sine necessitate vel utilitate, sed cum veritate & sufficiente advertentia, non esse peccatum grave ex se, nec constituere hominem in statu peccati mortalis. Ibid. cap. 10. n. 313.*

He demands again on the same subject; ^e If perjury, which one commits through natural inadvertence be a mortal sin, because of the custom he hath to forswear. And rejecting the opinion of those who believed it to be a mortal sin, he answers: ^f I say, in the second place, that it is more probable that there is no mortal sin particularly when one forswearth himself without perceiving it at all, and by a natural inadvertence. And a little after he adds: ^g Though he who doth it, hath his will effectually addicted to sin by an evil habit.

^e Sitne perjurium cum in advertentia naturali peccatum mortale ob consuetudinem perjurandi. *Ibid. n. 316.*
^f *Dico 2. Probabilius est non habituali affectu*

esse peccatum mortale speciale, quando est sine advertentia naturali. *Ibid.* ^g Etiam si operans sit cum habitu affectu ad peccatum. *Ibid.*

So that according to the judgement of this Divine; although he swear with full knowledge, provided that it be not against truth: although he swear against the truth and perjure himself, if he have not a full knowledge, being transported with passion, and by the violence of some habit, it is no mortal sin, although he doth swear without necessity, without utility, and by an evil custom contracted by many crimes; and which is yet more considerable; though he also have a will and affection addicted to sin, because of this evil custom. That is to say, that a man may have a will carryed on to sin, and sin actually without sinning, and without being capable of the sin which he commits.

Bauny in the 6. chap. of his Summe, p. 73. speaks of persons accustomed to curse creatures that are without reason, as Gentlemen that curse their Dogs and Hawks; when they have no good Game; Carters their Horses when they put them to trouble; Mariners the season and the wind when it is contrary to them. And after he had reported the opinion of *Navarre*, and some others who condemn these maledictions of venial sin, he adds: *As for me, I believe that I may say with truth, that setting aside choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported in such innocent exercises, it is no fault neither venial nor mortal to curse Dogs, Horses, Hawks, or other irrational things.* So that there is nothing but choler, according to him that causes sin in these curses, he that shall utter them in cold blood and without transport, or who shall make use of them onely as ornaments of language, as he saith, speaking of Oaths, chap. 5. p. 66. or who suffers himself to go on therein by an evil custom, which is become natural, and makes him do it without violence, without transportation, and even so that he perceives it not, he committeth no sin in the most strange curses and execrations,

But to hold to these principles of the Jesuits and others, and to follow their arguments; if it fall out that these same persons who are accustomed to utter these curses, be also transported with choler, their choler will be no sin no more then their curses; especially if it come from a strong habit, and that the emotion be so strong that it trouble and blind the minde.

Layman comprizes in a few words all that Bauny, Fillintius, Escobar, and Sanchez, have said concerning the custom of swearing and blaspheming. He speaks also more precisely and more clearly then they, discharging absolutely of all sin the blasphemies and perjuries which are made by an evil habit contracted by long use, which he assures us of as a certain truth, and which follows necessarily from the principles of his Divinity. See here his terms: ^h It follows from that which I have said, that he who from the impression of an inveterate custom, as it were by a sort of impetuous necessity, is transported to do evil, as to speak words of blasphemy, or perjury, sins not at all; and to speak properly blasphemies not at all, because a man cannot sin at all without rational knowledge and deliberation. Following his principles there are no habitual sins at all, since evil custom not onely doth neither cause nor augment sin, but also diminisheth it, and sometimes takes it wholly away, and a person who blasphemes, forswears, and doth every other criminal thing that can be, sins not according to this maxime, when it comes from an evil inveterate custom, which is become natural, which carryes him on to the commission of all these crimes by a kind of necessary impression, almost without any sensible apprehension.

^h Ex dictis colligitur eum qui ex inveterata consuetudine, velut quodam necessario impetu rem malam agit, v. c. materiales blasphemias profert, vel perjuriam effundit, tunc non peccare, nec proprie blasphemare, quia nullum

peccatum sine rationis deliberatione committitur. Layman l. 1. tr. 2. c. 3. n. 6. p. 20.

So the condition of this man, altogether corrupt and altogether plunged in vice, shall be better then of another lesse vicious, and exempt from wicked habits. This man by often sinning shall be put into an estate of not sinning any more, and into a kind of, for him, happy necessity, which will give him a power to commit all sorts of crimes securely, freely and without being more criminal, or even at all guilty. But if it be true that by multitude of sins a man becomes incapable of sinning, and that multitude of sins make a man innocent; this would be a powerful motive to carry men on to all sorts of vices and excesses, and to set men farther from virtues, whose exercise is more painful, and never brings that advantage of being incapable of sinning, or to have power to commit the greatest sins without sinning.

C H A P. III.

Of Sins of Ignorance.

340 That Ignorance excuses sins committed without knowing them; and even those which are committed afterwards: And that there is properly no sins of Ignorance, according to the Jesuits.

350 **T**HERE is a particular connexion, and as it were a natural consequence betwixt sins of evil habits, and sins of Ignorance. For one of the effects of an evil habit is by little and little to stifle the remorses of sin, and by consequence to remove all thoughts of it, and to take away the knowledge of it. For this cause, having before viewed what the Jesuits say of habitual sin, order requires that we represent their opinion of those which are committed by ignorance.

Ignorance may be considered, either in regard of those sins which are committed without knowledg: of them, or in regard of those which have been heretofore committed, without thinking to do evil. And it may be inquired if the first be true sins: and what is to be done when we come to apprehend that the second are so.

As to the latter point, *Bauny* (in his Summe, chap. 40. pag. 650. and 651) holds that if any one of ignorance and simplicity hath confessed his faults in grosse, without determining of any one in particular, it will not be needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of those faults, if it cannot be commodiously done, because the Confessor is pressed so with penitents which give him not leasure. He would say, that on the Feast-days when the Confessors are pressed it will suffice to make a general confession, without specifying any one sin in particular, as the Hugenots would have it.

After this question he proposes another: *And what may we say of those who in their youth have committed many actions of a vicious nature, which notwithstanding they did not believe to be such?* He answers definitively, that they are not obliged to confesse one word of them, when they know them and understand their nature and conditions, much lesse to reiterate their confessions made already. Whence it follows that *Saint Paul* might have dispensed with himself to do penance for the sins he had committed in his youth before his conversion, being he committed them through ignorance, as he tells us himself: *Ignorans feci incredulitate*; I did them ignorantly in unbelief; and *David* ought not to say: ^a *Lord remember not the sins of my youth and of my ignorance.* A sage Physician will not give this counsel to a patient whom he knows to have of a long time laboured of some hidden disease, which now begins to appear, and to make it self known by the pain to him who had it without knowing of it. He will not counsel him to keep it always hid without speaking a word, but that he discover it speedily, and that he cause himself to be cured.

But this opinion of *Bauny* may perhaps be founded upon a principle which *Filiutius* proposes as probable; to wit, that even criminal ignorance doth not make confession invalid. ^b *It is demanded, saith he, if when ignorance is not directly voluntary, though it be criminal; it make the Confession invalid; though without due form?* He answers that *the opinion which holds it is, is probable.* He would say, that provided a man had no former design to conceal any thing in his confession, though by a notorious negligence, and which renders him guilty of mortal sin, and consequently which renders him incapable to receive the grace of the Sacrament of Penance, he had forgotten one or more crimes, nevertheless his confession is valid. So that if afterwards he call to minde his sins which he had forgotten, he is not obliged to confesse himself thereof, and it suffices that he accuse himself of his negligence. Such confessions, saith this Author, are held for valid, and it suffices to accuse ones self of his negligence.

qq tom I. tract. 7. c. 5. n. 132. p. 183.
gigantia. Ibid.

^b Tales confisiones reputantur valida, & satis est se accusare de ne-

^a Delicta juven-
tutis mee &
ignorantias
meas ne memi-
neris Domine.
Pj. 24. v. 7.

^b Decimo qua-
ritur: An quan-
do ignorantia
non est per se
intentata, licet
sit culpabilis
mortaliter, effi-
ciat confesio-
nem invalidam,
sed informem?
Respondet &
dico probabilem
esse opinionem
quae id affirmat.
Filiutius mor.

c Quia talis confessio est ex intentione dicentis integra. Nihil enim omittit scienter. Ibid.

His reason is ; ^c For if we regard the intention of him who makes this confession, it is intire there being nothing omitted upon design. As if Sin could not be committed without express deliberation and a formed will.

d Quare si contraria sententia practicanda esset, redderetur omnis confessio valde grave. Ib.

His second reason is ; ^d For otherwise it would be necessary to repeat a multitude of confessions. Whence he concludes, that if we ought to follow the contrary opinion in the practice, this would make the charge and the yoke of confession too weighry. Without doubt because that he could not confes so many people, and that he should have therein too much pains, and also would give too much trouble to those who are to confes if he obliged them to examine themselves seriously, or confes themselves over again; when being not well examined they had forgot some notorious crimes. So the commodity of confessors and of penitents are the rules of conscience, according to the maximes of this new Divinity.

So much for sins which are forgotten in confession, or which were not known when they were committed; as for those which are committed, or which may be committed every day; Sanchez proposes a case which he resolves in the same place in this manner. ^e If any one shoot an arrow by which he kills his enemy, supposing invincibly that it was a beast, he is intirely innocent of this manslaughter, though he was in such a disposition, that if he had known that it had been his enemy, he would have killed him with more joy.

e Si quis sagittam projiciat, qua hostem necet, putans invincibiliter esse feram, ab ejus homicidii culpa est omnino liber, etiamsi ita dispositus esset, ut agnoscent esse hostem liberius perimeret. Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 13. p. 70.

He proposes also another in the same place, and resolves it likewise in the same manner : ^f A man enjoys a woman whom he knows to be not his own; or he knows it not, it is his fault, but if he be invincibly ignorant that she is his Kinswoman; he is guilty of fornication, but not of Incest. And if these two men shall afterwards come to know what they did in ignorance, the one may rejoyce in his man-slaughter, and the other in his incest, without being guilty either of man-slaughter or Incest.

f Cognoscens feminam quam novit non esse suam, vel id culpabiliter ignorans, at invincibiliter ignorans esse consanguineam, erit fornicationis reus, non tamen incestus Ibid. n. 10.

g Quæro 5. an delectatio de mortali, variorum somni, ebrietatis, amentie, vel ignorantie excusetur? Filliur. mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 21. c. 8. n. 290. p. 26.

Filliutius will serve them also for security, where proposing the same question, he demands, ^g If the pleasure which is taken in an action of mortal sin, which is done in sleep, drunkenness, or madness, or through ignorance, be voyd of sin? And two lines after he gives an example of this case, ^h As if any one take pleasure in sin which he had committed in his sleep being drunk or mad, or by ignorance of the person whom he supposed to be his wife. Of which he reports many opinions, whereof the first is that which holds it to be unlawful. But he prefers that which assures us that it is lawfull, saying; The second opinion seems to me more probable and absolutely safe. And because he speaks of some actions which may be done without sin, he adjoyns for farther explication of his thoughts: ⁱ That if one would extend this second opinion to pleasure which is taken in an action of it self wicked; but, which being done without sin, in such manner as I have already now explicated it, it seems to me also probable, even in the practice. These people give a marvellous force unto ignorance, because they hold, that it does not shelter onely the most enormous crimes; but it gives also the liberty and power to rejoyce, and take pleasure in them, as good actions, when one comes to know them or call them to remembrance.

h ut si quis delectetur de fornicatione habita in somnis, vel ebrietate, vel amentia, vel ignorantia, cum ea quem putabat esse suam uxorem. Ibid.

i Dico 3. secundam sententiam, si intelligatur de operationibus de se malis moraliter, sed factis sine peccato modo explicato, adhuc videri probabilem, etiam in praxi. Ibid. n. 293. p. 31.

k An invincibiliter ignorans actum internam esse peccatum, cognoscens tamen actum externum esse peccatum, excusetur à culpa, actum solum externum admittens? Sanch. sup. n. 16. p. 71.

Sanchez proposeth also this case, in the place I have already cited; ^k If he who

knew that it were a sin to do an action outwardly, but were invincibly ignorant that it were a sin to commit it inwardly and in his mind, were excused from sin, committing it onely inwardly? And that he might make himself to be the better understood in a matter so important, he illustrates this question by example: ¹ As if a peasant should bear it spoken by a man, reputed to be a pious and knowing man, that it was a sin to steal and commit fornication outwardly; but it was lawful to desire the one and the other. He acknowledgeth ^m that some learned Doctors amongst the moderns believe not that this ignorance doth excuse at all. He reports their reasons, very considerable ones, to the number of five. But he concludeth for ignorance in these terms: ⁿ Though this be probable, I believe nevertheles that it is yet more probable that this interior action is exempt from all sin, because of invincible ignorance.

1 *si rusticus à viro exstimatus pio audivisset fornicationem & furtum externa esse peccata, at licere fornicandi & furandi desiderium. Ibid.*

m *Quibus tam notoricis doctis videtur hanc ignorantiam non excusare. n* *At quamvis hoc probabile sit, probabilissimum credo illum actum internum excusari omnino à malitia, ratione illius ignorantie invincibilis. Ibid.*

And a little after, following the principles which he hath established to maintain ignorance, and the sins which are committed by ignorance, he saith, ^o It follows that he who knoweth that it is mortal sin to commit an action, but knows not that it is a sin to command an other to commit it, through invincible ignorance, is excused from sin in doing it.

o *Secundo deditur scientem aliquam actionem esse mortalem, at invincibiliter ignorantem peccare imperando illam, excusari à culpa imperando. Ibid. n. 19.*

Filliutius, as we have seen in the former Chapter, saith that a man who hath an evil custom of sinning, for example of swearing and forswearing himself, and who is continually in an habitual affection and disposition to commit this sin upon occasions presented to him, *cum habituali affectu ad peccatum*, doth not sin neverthelesse in any manner when he forswears himself without thinking of it, not troubling himself if this want of knowledge or advertency comes from an evil custom, which this person hath contracted, or some violent passion which transporteth him. *Nec refert*, saith he, *quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava consuetudine aut passione*. And makes use of all these considerations and circumstances, however of themselves evil, rather to excuse their sin then to condemn it, ^p *Because passion as well as evil custom takes away the use of reason.*

p *Quia tum passio quam consuetudo tollit actulem usum rationis. Ibid. q* *Au sic peccatum quando videt consummatam esse consuetudinem, &*

After he had resolved on this manner this case so well circumstanced, he propounds another about this evil habite and disposition, and he demands ^q if it be a sin when he sees this evil custom as it were consummate, and perceives how dangerous and wicked it is, and notwithstanding all this he gives way to it, and forswears himself.

adverit gravitatem & periculum eius? Filliutius mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 35. c. 16. n. 318. p. 203.

This case proposed in this manner is very clear, and the evil too evident to be excused openly. Which is the reason that he leaves the question for the present undecided, and propounds it onely as problematique, and containing some difficulty and doubt on either side. *Dubium esse potest*, saith he. But in the issue returning to his principles and rights of ignorance, which he undertakes to defend, he adds: *Sed etiamsi tunc dicatur esse peccatum, non tamen postea quando quis non advertat de novo peccat. Ent* although it may then be called a sin, yet doth he not sin afterwards afresh, when he doth not any longer observe it. That is to say, that though this man possibly may sin, for he doth not affirm he doth, when he is forsworn, and actually remembers and sees the evil estate and evident danger whereunto this evil custom doth bring him: yet when he hath this thought no more, for that this evil custom and passion hath taken it away, he sins no more, whatsoever crime he may commit in this darkness; though he have reduced himself to this miserable estate voluntarily, and that the blindness, which him from seeing what he hath done, comes from the corruption which evil custom and passion have produced in his minde: *Nec refert quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava consuetudine, aut ex passione.*

So that it is not for nothing that this Jesuit would not speak clearly at first, *whether*

^r An sit peccatum quando quis videt consummatam esse cor suam, & advertit gravitatem & periculum ejus? & Advertentia actualis n. cessat ut ign. vincibilis, nec excuset. Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 21 p. 72.

^r whether a man sins when he sees that the evil custom which he hath is consummate, and he perceives the evil estate and danger whereunto it exposes him, and it is with some reason that he leaves the thing doubtful: *dubium esse potest*. Because according to his principles and those of his Fraternity, to sin, at least mortally, it is not enough to see the evil that is done, and the danger incurred in doing it: but he ought to have a full and perfect knowledge; and besides this, both time and means to deliberate on it. This is, according as Sanchez speaks in this matter; ^r It behooves, saith he, to consider actually that which is done actually, for to judge whether the ignorance be faulty and exempt nor a man from sin. And a little after: This is not enough to commit mortal sin to consider and to will with deliberation the evil that is done, but this consideration and deliberation must be full.

Nec sufficit ad mortale quævis consideratio & deliberatio malitiæ objecti, sed debet esse plena. Ibid. n. 22.

It is not sufficient, with him, to have a cognisance of the evil; but he wills also that time be had to deliberate whether to do it or not; and he is not contented even with this, but he pretends that this knowledge and this deliberation ought to be full, in such sort that there be no darkness nor clouds. For if you ask him what he intends by full deliberation and knowledge, he makes use, for explication, of an example of a man who is perfectly awaked in his right understanding, and in this estate

^r illa est quando hunc plene advertit instar perfecte a somno excitatorum.

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^r This full knowledge, saith he, is that by which we see clearly and totally the object with consideration and reflection; as when one is perfectly awaked. For it may come to pass that even when one is awake, he may think so little of that which he doth as may not be sufficient to sin mortally.

Quippe potest in vigilis adeo tenuis

consideratio accidere, ut non sufficiat ad mortale. Sanch. l. 1. op. mor. c. 7. n. 10 p. 2.

His opinion therefore is, that the knowledge which is necessary to most obdurate sinners, to make them consider and see the evil which they do, must be as great and as perfect as it can be in the most virtuous persons, who have not their passions nor their evil habits, and that without this knowledge they cannot sin mortally; that is to say, he will have a man that is in darkness and at midnight to see as clear as he who is at high noon, and a blind man to perceive and judge colours as well as he who hath his eyes sound and intire. For passions and vices, and evil habits are properly the darkness and blindness of the soul: and to pretend farther, as he doth that for want of a full and perfect knowledge, a man given up to vice and accustomed to sin, sins not mortally, is as if he should say, that he could not sin mortally in that estate, and the more this man advances in darkness and blindness continuing this wicked life, by so much he shall be farther off from sin and from power to sin, untill that by the consummation of his evil custom, being also the consummation of his blindness, he be made intirely and absolutely without power to sin.

Layman quotes Sanchez and Vasquez for this opinion, and he embraces it with them: in his first Book, tr. 1. chap. 4. pag. 22. I rehearse not his words for brevity sake.

^u Advertentia ad peccatum mortale requisita debet esse plena & perfecta per firmum iudicium de malitia actus, vel periculo illius.

Amicus is of the same opinion, and saith, that ^u the knowledge and reflection which is necessary to mortal sin ought to be full and perfect, with the judgement assured of the evil or of the danger of doing it. Sanchez demands onely time and means for deliberation with the knowledge of the evil; but Amicus will have one go on to do evil with a firm and assured judgement.

^x Quidnam ad mortale peccatum requiritur? Plena & expressa advertentia malitiæ, aut saltem dubium.

Escobar follows his brethren, where he demands, ^x what is necessary to make a sin mortal? he answers, that there is requisite, a full and actual knowledge, or at least an express and formal suspicion of the evil which is done.

Escobar tr. 2. Exam. 1. c. 3. n. 8. p. 275.

It is not sufficient, according to these new Doctors, to sin mortally that the knowledge

ledge which they pretend to be necessary thereunto be full and perfect; but they will also have it to be particular and determinate. So that if in one action there occurre many wickednesses, many sins, or many circumstances, which augment or multiply sin, they must be known all distinctly. ^a When there occurre, saith Sanchez, in one and the same action two sorts of different wickednesses; it is not sufficient, to perceivc one to make himself guilty of both; But we must have or be obliged to have an actual knowledge of the other. Without this he holds that we are not guilty, but according to the proportion of the knowledge we have, as he saith expressly afterwards: ^b If we know one part of the malice, or if we be ignorant of it by our own fault, it shall be imputed for a sin. Whence he draws this conclusion which we have already reported; When a man sins with a woman whom he knows to be not his wife, but is invincibly ignorant that she is his kinswoman, he is guilty of fornication, but not of incest.

^a Ad unius generis malitiam advertere non est satis, ad malitiam quoque alterius generis contrahendam, sed oportet ad hanc quoque advertere ac debuisse advertere. Sanchez supra num. 8.

pag. 1. ^b Si pars malitia cognita sit, aut invincibiliter ignorata, ea culpa imputatur. Ibid. cap. 16. num. 10. pag. 70.

He stays not there. For it is not sufficient for them that a man hath heretofore known an action to be wicked, they hold that if he hath forgotten it, or if he yet know it, but doth not actually think of it, and does not make reflection upon it, so as to perceive, at the very time when it is committed, that it is evil, he offends not God at all, at least not grievously.

Cajetan retrenches a little the licentiousness of this opinion, declaring that he who by inadvertence or forgetfulness commits a sin, which he knows to be a mortal sin, ceases not to be guilty thereof, if he be not so disposed that if he had thought of it, he would not have committed it. But Sanchez, on the contrary, assures us that this condition is not at all necessary. And after he hath faithfully reported the Doctrine of Cajetan in these terms; ^c He that hath made a contract, which he knows to be usurious, or who doth some other unlawful act, knowing well that it is forbidden, but not remembering it to be such when he doth it, is exempt from mortal sin, provided he were then so disposed, that if he had remembered, he would have abstained from doing it, because he hath a firm resolution to eschew mortal sin. In the sequel of his discourse he enters into a farther explication of the opinion of this Doctor. ^d It seems to him, saith he, that this resolution is required as absolutely necessary, to render the forgetfulness innocent and to excuse the person. But he meddles not with it but onely to refute it, adding ^e that others hold with great reason that this resolution is to no purpose, and we are onely to consider if when we were obliged to observe the commandment we had any thought thereof. For if we had none at all, and that without considering either the right or fact we violate the commandment by neglect, this forgetfulness is innocent and free from all sin.

^c Quinto deducitur quid sentiendum sit de doctrina cajetani, qui 1. 2. q. 6. art. 8. ad finem, & in Summa verbi. Inconsideratio, veris. Adverte tamen, quem ibi sequitur Arvilla n. 1. ubi ait incunctem contractum quem usurarium esse novit, v. l. opus

aliquod prohibitum, prohibitionis conscientium, facientem: ac tunc cum recolat actu, excusari a mortali; quod ita affectus erat, ut si recolisset, vitaret, utpote qui firmum cavendi mortalis propositum haberet. ^d ubi id propositum exigere videtur quo oblivit illa censetur invincibilis, & excuset. Sanchez oper. mor. 1. 1. c. 16. n. 28. p. 73. ^e At jure optimo id propositum nihil referre bene docet Zumel. 1. 2. q. 76. art. 3. d. 2. diff. 6. quippe solum attendendum est an aliqua cogitatio operantis in mentem venerit eo tempore quo preceptum implere debeat. Si enim ea non veniente in mentem immemor juris vel facti preceptum transgrediat, est oblivio invincibilis, & excusat. Ibid.

Corduba approves this opinion no more then Cajetan, and would that at least he who acts in so evil a disposition come not voluntarily thereinto, and that the forgetfulness or inadvertency, which hinders him from thinking of the evil which he doth, comes not by his own fault. But Sanchez finds this also to be too much, and he can no more approve of this than that of Cajetan. ^f There is no more need, saith he, to receive the opinion of Corduba, who saith that when forgetfulness comes not by our fault, it ought to be esteemed as one sort of innocent Ignorance; but not when it proceeds of our fault. For this is not univerfally true; but onely when we have done some thing which hath caused this forgetfulness, foreseeing well the danger where-

^f Nec admittenda est sententia Corduba in q. 1. 2. q. 17. dub. 9. dicentis oblivionem reduci ad ignorantiam

invincibilem quando oblivio non contingit ex culpa. Hoc enim ita univerfally dictum non est; sed quando quis initio causam oblivioni dedit cum periculi advertentia. Si enim periculum non ad erit, oblivio est inculpabilis. Ibid. num. 30.

unto we cast our selves. For if we thought not of this danger, the ignorance can not be faulty.

g Quare stat in causa ignorantie fuerit aliquid peccatum, & tamen in se ignorantia sit invincibilis. Ibid. n. 31.

He repeats a little after the same thing, and he makes a decree as it were without appeal, and a principle unremovable. ^g It remains certain, saith he, that although ignorance comes of some sin as of its cause, it ceases not therefore to be excusable. To which he adds also, for better explication. ^h And in this case, though the cause of ignorance be culpable, yet the ignorance is not.

h Tunc quamvis causa culpabilis sit, ignorantia tamen erit inculpabilis. Ibid.

And for maintenance of this principle, he undertakes to refute Saint Thomas, under pretence of explicating that which he saith; ⁱ An event may be voluntary in its cause. He expounds and at once overturns this rule of right. ^k That ignorance of fact excuses, but not of right. As also the Doctors, who teach, as he confesseth, ^l That ignorance of that which every one is obliged to do according to the rules and Laws of his condition and calling is bleamable, and excuseth not at all. And generally he rejects it in the point of Law and Right; and he takes to him as on his side the Doctors which expound them in their true sence, but not in his. ^m It follows, saith he, that we must understand with discretion what the Doctors and Laws say; that to know and to be obliged to know, are one and the same thing: and when they commonly affirm that when we know or consider, or ought to know or consider, ignorance and inadvertency are indirectly voluntary,

i Eventum posse esse voluntarium in sua causa. Ibid.
k Ubi habetur, ignorantiam facti non juris excusare. Ibid.
l Ignorantiam legum ad statum & officium alicuius pertinentem esse vincibilem, nec excusare. Ibid.
m Ex his deducitur 1. esse sano modo intelligenda jura & Doctores dum equiparant scire & debere scire; passim dicunt esse indirecte voluntariam ignorantiam cum qua vel scivit advertitve, aut debebat scire & advertere. Ibid. n. 24

advertere. Ibid. n. 24

He witnesseth sufficiently that Saint Thomas, with the more part of the School Divines are not for him, in saying that Saint Thomas is received by all; Thomas ad omnibus receptus, n. 25. and that the Laws themselves and those that expound them are contrary unto him. And he thinks himself discharged herein by saying that they are to be wisely understood: *Esse sano modo intelligenda jura & Doctores.*

But if we demand of him also why he takes the liberty to reject so great and so strong authorities? He can onely repeat that which he hath said already so many times: ⁿ That all this must be understood where we have an actual knowledge, full and sufficient to sin mortally, of the evil we are about to do, or of the danger to which it exposeth us, or that at least we have had thereof some scruple or some doubt.

n Hec intelligenda sunt quando adfuit aliqua actualis, plena & sufficiens ad mortale advertentia, ad malitiam obiecti, ejusve periculum, seu dubium aut scrupulus saltem. Ibid. num. 24.

advertere. Ibid. num. 24.

Tambourin hath also expounded all this Doctrine sufficiently at large, according to the principle of Sanchez, establishing two general rules in favour of ignorance. The first is, ^o if any one think by ignorance which is not criminal that a mortal sin is but venial, he sins onely venially, this is Saint Thomas's opinion. We must say the same if ignorance be but a venial sin.

o Si quis ex ignorantia inculpabili putet aliquid esse veniale, quod aliunde mortale est, venialiter tantum peccabit. Ita S. Thomas p. 2. q. 76. & 3. Idem erit si ignorantia sit culpabilis, tantum venialiter. Tambour. l. 1. Decal. c. 1. sect. 3. n. 35.

Idem erit si ignorantia sit culpabilis, tantum venialiter. Tambour. l. 1. Decal. c. 1. sect. 3. n. 35.

I say nothing of the rule which he proposes in favour of ignorance, to observe the abuse he doth to the authority of Saint Thomas; I see no way to excuse his visible visible falsity unless by his ignorance; being he cites this Angel of the School in making him say that which he saith not, and whereunto he speaketh the contrary in his quodlibetary questions, where he saith clearly, ^p that in what concerns, faith and good manners, no man is excused if he follow an erroneous opinion of some Doctor. Because in these things ignorance excuseth not.

p In his vero que pertinent ad fidem & bonos mores, nullum excusabile est sequatur erroneam opinionem alicujus Magistri. In talibus enim ignorantia non excusat. S. Thomas quod lib. 3: art. 10.

In talibus enim ignorantia non excusat. S. Thomas quod lib. 3: art. 10.

The other rule which he proposeth is no less favourable to ignorance and sin then the former. For he saith that if ^a you have knowledge of the Law, and that you are ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it, it is probable you do not incur the penalty. He underprops his principle by the authority of three the most famous Divines of their Society, Suarez, Sanchez, and Coninck: ^b For to incur these penalties, the sinner must consent at least tacitely to that which he is to undergo if he obey not.

^a Silegem scias, sed non penam, adhuc probabile est à te non incurri penam. Ita Suarez, Sanchez, Coninck, apud

Castrop. Tambor. Decal. Tambur. Decal. l. 1. c. 2. sect. 10 n. 12 ^b Ratio est quia ad huc incurtendas rejunxit delinquentem consensisse saltem tacite in penam quam subire debeat si obedat. Ibid.

But because he saw it would follow from hence that those who know not that Hell is the punishment of mortal sins shall be in no danger of going thither; and that in this case it should be ill done to go to Preach the Gospel to those people who have never heard of Hell; and who know not that it is established by Divine Justice to punish sins eternally, he adds, ^c that this is to be understood of extraordinary pains: to the end, saith he, that you may conceive wherefore he that is ignorant perhaps of the pains of Hell, which are the consequences of mortal sin, incur them nevertheless, provided that he know that he commits mortal sin. Which serves onely to elude the difficulty, and to confirm it rather then solve it. For those who know not that there is a Hell, know not commonly that there are any mortal sins, since mortal sin is not called mortal but because it kills the soul, depriving it of spiritual life, which is the grace of God; which is altogether unknown to inhdels who know nothing of Hell.

^c Sed cur distinxit est (extraordinaria?) ut intelligas cur is qui forte ignorat penam inferni annexam peccato mortali, adhuc tamen illam incurrit, dommodo cognoscat peccatum suum mortale esse? Ibid. n. 13.

How many persons are there also even amongst Christians themselves who are so grosse and ill instructed, that they know neither what mortal sin nor what Hell is; or if they have heard of it they know not, nor can tell, when they commit such mortal sins; and think sometimes that they do no ill in the most criminal actions. But according to the rule of these Jesuits, there is no Hell for all these persons, of which notwithstanding the number is but too great, particularly in the Country. And by consequence we cannot complain of their ignorance, nor of their Friends and Pastors for the little care they have taken to instruct them: but rather we ought to envie these persons, and blesse their ignorance; and advertise their Pastors to be careful not to draw them out of it, for fear of opening unto them the gate of Hell, by giving them the knowledge thereof, and making them fall into sin by instructing them and inlightening them, thereby making them know the sins whereunto they are subject.

Bauny acknowledgeth that he who committeth a crime by forgetfulness or inadvertency, having fallen into this forgetfulness and this inadvertency by his fault, though he be not guilty of the action and sin which he doth, yet he sinneth by negligence. He that knows not, saith he, though by his own fault, yet that which he saith or doth not onely was unlawful for him, but also forbidden even under grievous penalties, sins not against the commandment, if he have no knowledge thereof. His sin is not contrary to the precept; but against the diligence which he ought to use to know it. But in this he speaks not according to the principles of his principal brethren, and it is apparent that he would not have advanced thus far if he had well thought thereof, or if he had read Layman attentively, who handling the same question, makes himself this objection. ^d We may say that he who thinks not that that is evil which he is about to do, and forbidden, is notwithstanding obliged to think thereof; and by consequence his action ought to be imputed to rashness and imprudence. This is the same thing that Bauny now said; and he answers in the sequel, that ^e forgetfulness or negligence, which is the cause that we think not of the evil we are about to do, is not imputed for sin, if it be not voluntary, and it is not voluntary if we bethink us not to consider that we are obliged to examine what we are about to do.

^d Dicit aliquis: Qui non cogitat de malitia operis prohibiti, debet tamen cogitare. Igitur cogitatio est temeritatis & imprudentiæ imputatur.
^e Respondeo

quo l'omissio sive negligentia considerationis non imputatur ad peccatum, nisi voluntaria sit. Non autem voluntaria est nisi veniat in mentem cogitare de obligatione examinandi. Layman l. 1. tr. 2. c. 4. n. 6. p. 20.

He avoucheth that he who commits a crime by a faulty heedlessness, and accompanied with neglect, was obliged to consider of the evil he was about to do; but

he saith that it was needful for this that he should have had an other thought to represent unto him that he was obliged to consider of his action and to examine it, and because he had it not, neither his inadvertence nor his crime ought to be imputed to him.

But if it be replied upon him that being he was obliged to examine his own action, he was also obliged to know that he was obliged, and consequently to apply himself to consider that he was obliged to think of what he doth, Sanchez will answer for his comrade, that we are not obliged hereunto, for that the first thought that makes us consider that which we do, or that which we are about to do, is not in our power. ^f To judge, saith he, of good or evil of an action, it is required that we

f ut quispiam circa operis bonitatem aut malitiam consultare possit, opus est ut

occurrat aliqua cogitatio naturalis in nostra potestate non existens, quæ talis consultationis possit esse principium; nec erit in nostra potestate primam hanc cogitationem excutere. Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 21. p. 72.

This is the second time that he tells us that this first thought is not in our power, that we might take better notice of this principle, and the application he makes of it, which is this: ^g When no thought comes in our minds which might represent unto us the evil, or the danger which is in that which we are about to do, or which gives us at least some doubt or some scruple, though our spirit considers the benefit or the commodity of the action, this consideration suffices not to deliberate about moral wickedness, as I have proved, ch. 2. n. 7. and 8. Whence he draws this conclusion: ^h And therefore there can be no sin where the thought of the malice of the action cannot be presented unto us.

g At quamdiu non occurrit intellectui cogitatio aliqua circa objecti malitiam, & circa illius periculum: aut dubitatio aliqua, aut scrupulus, quamvis de illius commoditate consultus intellectus non est principium sufficiens deliberandi de malitia ipsa morali. Ibid.

h Ergo non potest esse culpa quamdiu hæc cogitatio circa malitiam non se offert. Ibid.

But if those who would come out of this ignorance which holds them in sin, inquire of this Jesuit what they ought to do to come to this thought, which they cannot have of themselves, he will send them to Aristotle, who believing with him that it is natural, hath attributed it to fortune. Aristotle, saith he, attributes it to fortune, because it is presented naturally to the minde, without mans contributing any thing thereto by his industry and care.

He might passe onely for a Pelagian if he would content himself to say that this first thought, which is the principle of all the good we do, and of all the evil we avoid, were natural, and that a man might acquire it by the powers of nature; but he passes even beyond Pelagianisme it self, when he saith that we cannot therein contribute so much as our cares and industry, and that it must come to us without any endeavour, and without any preparation, not by God, but by fortune; falling also into the excesse which the Pelagians falsely imputed to the Catholiques, accusing them to attribute grace and good works to fortune and destiny; because the Catholiques maintained that we could not have it by our own proper forces. So that this Jesuit confirms the argument of Pelagians, condemned by the Catholiques, and the error of the Pagans condemned by the Pelagians and Catholiques together.

It would have becamed the piety of a Religious man, and the light of a Christian, to have given at least to God the first thought which is the principle and foundation of all good works, and not to nature, and much less to fortune, whose very name ought to be banished out of the Church, according to the judgement of the Fathers, and left unto Aristotle and the Pagans, who knew neither the providence of God, nor the perfection of his essence, nor the liberty of mans will, and much less that of the grace of Jesus Christ.

It seems that he suffered himself to be transported unto this extravagance, that he might wholly excuse the sins of ignorance. For if the first thought by which we consider that which we do neither come from us nor God, but from fortune; it follows clearly that we are not culpable neither for not having it, nor for not demanding it of God, being it depends not upon the order of his grace, but on fortune, to which there is no appearance that we ought to address our prayers or vows for obtaining thereof. So that we can never sin by ignorance, neither through forgetfulness, nor carelesnes.

Which

Which is confirmed by *Filliutius*, who gives many rules to shew what a man is obliged to do to remove ignorance, and to learn that which he ought to know in his profession: ¹ That we may know what every one is obliged to do to learn that which is necessary for him to know in his condition, therein these rules are to be kept, of which this is the third: ² It happens rarely or never that a man is obliged to prepare himself for grace to come out of ignorance and to render it excusable. That is, to speak properly, that he who knows not what he is obliged to know, is rarely obliged to prepare himself for that grace which is necessary for him that he may learn it, nor to demand this grace of God, because prayer is the principal disposition unto grace, and the first and the most general means to obtain it. Which accords very well with what *Sanchez* now said, having learned out of *Aristotle* that, the first thought, which is necessary to know that which we are obliged to do and to know, comes from fortune, and presents it self naturally to us without our troubling our selves, and so that we cannot by our care and industry contribute any thing at all to the attainment of it: so that in effect it were to torment our selves in vain to labour in a thing which depends not on us, and to mock God to demand it of him, being it comes by fortune, and not by his grace and the order of his will.

Ad cognoscendum ad quid homo teneatur ut sciat necessaria, hæ regulæ servanda sunt.
Filliutius, qq. mor. tom. 2. cr. 21. c. 10. n. 372. p. 44.
k Raro aut nunquam tenetur homo se preparare ad gratiam ut tollat ignorantiam. Ibid.

It may seem that this is the utmost excess whereunto a man can be transported, to excuse ignorance. For if it be not imputed unto us, even not then when it comes of sin, and which is by consequent criminal in it self, though we endeavour not to get out of it, nor take care onely so much as to pray unto God to deliver us out of it, it can never be sin, whence it will follow according to this new Doctrine, that there is no more any thing to be said properly of sins of ignorance, and that *Saint Paul* and *David* were unlearned, and ill informed in the wisdom of the *Jesuits*, in praying to God to pardon the sins of their youth, and their ignorances.

L 2 CHAP.

C H A P. I V.

Of good and bad intention.

2050

THe Jesuits speak very many things touching good and bad intention, to favour mens vices and looseness; nevertheless they may be reduced to two principal heads; whereof the one is, that to do evil there must be an evil intention; and the other, that to do good it is not necessary to have a good intention. They conclude from hence that the commandments of God and the Church may be satisfied by an outward execution of what they ordain, though it be done without intention to fulfil them, or with an evil intent and contrary to the commandment, and even with an expresse intention not to fulfil it: and on the contrary, to render a man guilty of having violated the commands of God, and the Church, it is not sufficient to violate them, but it is required to have thereof a formed design and expresse intention. For the greater facility, I will handle these two points severally, and divide this Chapter into two Articles.

ARTICLE I.

That the Jesuits teach that we may fulfil the Commandments of God and the Church, not onely without intention, but with an intent contrary and altogether criminal. 2060

THis is the expresse opinion of *Banny*, in his Summe, chap. 20. pag. 335. where after he had said with other Casuists, that the Ecclesiastiques satisfie the precept of receiving their office, when they sing or read their hours, though they do it without inward attention or devotion, provided they observe outward modesty, whereof he gives this reason: *For the outward action, saith he, wherewith we attend on God is of the same nature, retinue, and appertains to the vertue of Religion. Then as he who without intention to Idolize it bends his knee before an Idol, is nevertheless guilty of Idolatry: So we are to believe that they pray who recite the office, although without intention, though not without the outward decence and composition that such an action requires.*

So the outward appearance will be more necessary to prayer, and the actions of Religion then the inward motion of piety, since they can subsist without this inward motion, but not without the outward shew. I wonder that he remember'd not this common maxime of the Schools. ^a *To do good all the good conditions must concur, but the least defect is sufficient unto evil.* This perhaps might have kept him from concluding so ill, and he might have considered that there is more required to do good then to do ill, and to an action of Religion then to an action of Idolatry. And if to do good all conditions must concur thereto, by much stronger reason the intent which is the principal and as it were the soul of all the rest.

But *Escobar* saith yet more then *Banny*. For he maintains that it is not onely not necessary for satisfying the precept of reciting the office, to intend it: but also that it is necessarily satisfied in the recital; though the intention be expresse and formal not to satisfie it. For having demanded ^b *if an intention to fulfil it be required?* He answers, that many Divines do now hold that it is probable that this intention is not necessary; and though in reading the office there even be a formal intent not to satisfie our duty, yet we do not fail to fulfil it.

^a Bonum ex integra causa, malum autem ex minimo defectu.

^b Requiritur ne satisfaciendi intentio? Alii probabiliter jam defendunt intentionem ejus necessariam non esse: immo satisfieri etiam ab eo qui cum expressa intentione non facienda pro tunc recitat.

Escobar tr. 5. exam. 6. c. 13. n. 136. p. 677.

He saith the same thing concerning an oath in his first Treatise, where after he hath said absolutely that to be discharged of a promise made with an Oath, it is not necessary to intend it; he adds in the sequel, that *Lessius saith moreover that one is discharged of his Oath, though in doing what he swore to do, he have an expresse intent not to fulfil it.* That is to say, that we may satisfie promises made unto God, with an oath in performing outwardly that which we have promised, though we have a formal will not to fulfil, but to elude it.

non satisfaciendi. Ibid. tra&. 1. ex. 1. c. 7. n. 41. p. 77.

Lessius alledges for reason of this opinion, that when God or the Church commands us any thing, the action onely is commanded us, and not the intention. The reason is, saith he, because that which is commanded us is not, for example, to bear Masse with intent to accomplish the precept, but simply to attend the Masse with attention and devotion; which is performed though it be done with design not to accomplish the precept.

So that according to this marvellous Divinity we may hear the Masse with attention and devotion, though we have a formal design not to obey the Church, and to despise its commandment. They must have a strange Idea of devotion, who believe that it can subsist with so great impiety.

Layman talks more openly, and more boldly then the rest. He saith not onely, with them, that it is not needful that we have a will to obey the Church, in observing her commandments, and that we may do them though we contemn her in our heart: but also that we may accomplish her commands by doing outwardly that which she command, though we have an intention directly opposite to hers. See his words:

If a man fast for vain glory, or to content his sensuality in eating and drinking Wine, and so act contrary to the intent of the Church; yet he doth not violate her commands. And a little after: He that doth in substance, that is to say, outwardly that which is commanded satisfies truly the commandment, though he have no will to accomplish it, but rather contrary.

is Ecclesiasticum jejunii præceptum non violat. Layman l. 1. tra&. 4. c. 4. n. 6. p. 49. secundum substantiam præstat, etiamsi non habeat voluntatem implendi præceptum; immo contrariam habeat, verè satisfacit. Ibid. n. 7.

I know not what Father or Master would be content with such obedience, and that would not take it rather for true disobedience accompanied with contempt; and thereby much greater and more offensive then if by simple negligence that had been omitted which was commanded.

The same Author repeats the example of him who fasted for gluttony, and he adds that of a child who hears Masse by force and constraint, of which he speaks thus: *But what shall we say of a child that goes to hear Masse, on a Festival day, principally for fear of Whipping, and who hath an expresse will not to hear it, if his Master were not with him? the same question respects him also who is induced to fast, principally to satisfie the desire he hath to eat fish: so that if he could not have got good fish, he was resolved not to fast: I answer, that this notwithstanding they both fulfil the Churches command.*

tionem habeat non audiendi si padagogus abesset? Et similis ratio est si oblectatio piscium sit causa principa is jejumandi: ita ut si tam boni pisces non haberentur vellet quis jejunium servare. Respondeo tamen talem implere totum opus quod ab Ecclesia præcipitur. Ibid. n. 12. p. 51.

Filliutius saith in a manner the same thing, concerning the precept of hearing Masse on Festival days and Lords days. *A bad intent, saith he, joynd to that of hearing Masse; as an intent of looking on women dishonestly, &c. is not contrary to the commandment. For this cause he who hears with this intent fulfils it, provided he be sufficiently attentive.*

nose, dummodo sit sufficiens attentio, non est contraria præcepto; quare satisfacit. Filliutius, mor. qq. c. 7. n. 212. p. 128.

Escobar is of the same judgement. For speaking of a man who goes to Church with an intention to hear Masse, he saith, ^h *that another wicked intent, as to behold* *Non obest alia prava intentio, Women immodestly, joyned to the first, hinders not.* *ut aspiciendi libidinosae feminas, p*ri*ori conjuncta.* *Escobar, tr. 1. exam. 11. c. 3. n. 31. p. 180.*

But *Layman* after all this which we have above reported from him, concludes thus: ⁱ *wherefore when you do that which is commanded, though by mistake or ignorance you think you have not satisfied the precept, or that you had even a will not to fulfill it at all, it need not hinder you from taking satisfaction in the effect: because the protestation you made, that you did it not willingly, had no force.* *Quare cum quis quod precipitur impleas, etsi per ignorantiam vel errorem te non implere existimes, vel etiam nolis implere, non potes tamen efficere quoniam impleas: siquidem protestatio facta contraria vim nullam habet.* *Layman, ubi supra.*

He pretends then that a command of God or the Church is accomplished, not onely without any intention to do it; nor onely with intention not to do it; nor onely with an intention directly opposite to that of God and the Church; but also with an expresse protestation of being unwilling to satisfy it, and with a persuasion that it is not satisfied: that is to say, that we may serve God in despite of him and our selves; and be discharged of the obedience we owe God and the Church in doing that which he would not have us to do, and which we are not willing to do our selves, and which we believe is not sufficient to obedience. This conclusion is without doubt very strange but the principle from whence these Divines draw it, and the examples of which they make use to unfold and establish it by, seem, it may be, no lesse. For they say that as he who bends his knees before an Idol ceaseth not to be an Idolater, though he protest he will be none; and he who smites a man without a cause ceaseth not to be an offender, because he protests he hath a contrary design: So he that doth that which God and the Church command him, fulfils the commandment, though he protest that he hath no will to fulfil it.

These are the rare and marvellous reasonings of these Divines, who seem to have undertaken to debase Christians below the Jews, who honored God by outward means, and testified by words and visible actions that they would obey him: notwithstanding God complains of them, and rejects their services as of a treacherous and hypocritical people. In stead whereof these Doctors pretend that Christians may satisfy the commands of God and the Church, not onely with a contrary intention; but also with a protestation that they will not obey, and not honouring God therein so much as with their lips onely, as the Jews to whom it served for reproof of their treachery.

The foundation of all these conclusions is found in *Filliutius*, who speaking of the conformity of our wills with that of Gods, which ought to be the rule of all our thoughts and actions, saith that we are not obliged to will all that which God wills, ^k *and that it is not necessary that our will should be conformable to the will of God, but in respecting the same object and the same reason, at least in general.* By which he would say no other thing, then that it suffices us to be induced to will that we will by any honest reason; and herein we are conformable unto God who wills nothing any otherwise. For thus he expounds himself in the proposition. *Dico 2. in objecto formali, & in ratione volendi in communi, necesse est voluntatem nostram esse conformem cum divina.* *Filliutius, mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 21. c. 11. n. 385. p. 45.*

But this is to give no more unto God then to all reasonable men, even to Pagans themselves. For to will a thing because it seems honest or reasonable is to will that which *Plato*, *Seneca*, and *Aristotle* have willed, which is to be conformable to their will, and to all those who ever made profession of Philosophie and vertue, even amongst Pagans, because they are all agreed in this general point, that they willed nothing, and that nothing ought to be willed, but for some reason which they judged good and honest, though they knew not one another, and their wills in particular were very different, and many times opposite to one another.

According to this rule one may pretend to be conformable to the will of God in the greatest sins, because many times he is induced thereto by reasons which ap-

130 pear good unto him, and which he believes to be honest; as those who persecuted the Apostles believed they did a thing well pleasing unto God; and all those who sin by a false zeal, or by ignorance, and without malice.

Notwithstanding *Fillinius* doubting to have given too much unto God in his answer, he corrects it by this limitation. ¹ *I sayd (in general) because it is not necessary that our will be conformable to Gods in the particular reasons, which he hath to will that he wills.* That is, that we are not in any thing obliged to be conformable to the will of God, nor to will all that which he wills, in the manner he wills it, and provided we have in general some honest reason, we need not trouble our selves farther to know more particularly what God would have us do. And because we should not imagine that he talketh without having well considered what he saith, he endeavours to prove it by four reasons in a few words.

The first is, ^m *because this particular will of God is often unknown unto us.* He would say that as ignorance, as he hath declared before; doth generally discharge us from every sort of obligation; so it dispenses with us from following the will of God, when we know it not; whence it follows that Pagans and Infidels, who as *St. Paul* saith, know not God nor his will, and live in darkness of ignorance, are not obliged to do the will of God, nor to know it; and are to be excused when they blindly fight against it.

40 The second reason is, ⁿ *because when we do know the will of God, there is no precept which obligeth us to will things in the same manner he wills them.* Strange Divinity, that we are not onely not obliged to know the will of God; but that we are not obliged to follow it even when we do know it, that is to say, that we may reject it without sin, and preferre our own before his. I wonder that these Doctōrs never had that in their minds, at least, which our Saviour *Jesus Christ* said in the Gospel, ^o that the servant who knew not his Masters will was to be chastised more favourably: but he that having known it did not do it should be chastised more severely.

cundum voluntatem eius, vapulabit multis, qui autem non cognovit & fecit digna plagis, vapulabit paucis. Lucæ 12. ver. 47.

The third reason is contained in these two words, *nec ratio id dicit*, which signifie that reason doth no more oblige us to conform our will in all things to the will of God, then the Divine command. As if the light of reason did not testify sufficiently, that we ought always to follow the Sovereign Reason and wisdom which is in God, and which is not distinguished from his will. And as the light of nature shews sufficiently, that we are to follow at all times this Sovereign Reason, as the rule of all our actions, and all our thoughts, it shews also clearly that we are not to follow our own wills, unless we will pretend to be more reasonable, and more wise then wisdom it self, who hath established it for a fundamental rule of all our lives, ^p that we should not follow our desire, and that we ought to turn away from our own wills.

^p *Post concupiscentias tuas ne eas, & à voluntate tua avertire. Ecclesiastici 18. ver. 30.*

50 The fourth reason is; ^q *because all that God wills, he wills of charity: but we are not obliged to will all of charity.* It seems that he would say, that God wills, and doth all things in the World for charity; that is, for love of us and our good; but that we are not obliged reciprocally to do all for charity, that is for the love of God and his honor, whence it will follow that we may at least do one part of our actions for the world and for our selves, for other mens and for our own satisfaction.

But after he had maintained that there is no obligation upon us to conform our wills to God in all things, he adds, that he would counsel us notwithstanding to do it as far as we can, alledging for reason, ^r *because a good part of our happiness consists in the conformity of our will to that of God's.* Presupposing that another part of our happiness consists in doing what we will our selves, or in doing what God hath commanded us in such manner as we please.

^q *Quia Deus omnia que vult, ex charitate vult: nos autem non tenemur omnia ex charitate velle. Fillinius: Ibid.*

^r *Quia bona pars felicitatis nostræ consistit in concordia nostræ voluntatis cum Divina. Ibid.*

Antistes uno
 verbo, eoque
 hierarchico divi-
 duas distinctas-
 que vitas & imaginaciones illi permissas admonet. Celor, pag. 573.

Celor expounding this same thing in other terms, and speaking of them that live in the world, and of the priviledge which he pretends God hath given them above the Monastiques, he makes it to be said by a great Saint expressly against his intention, that God hath permitted them to live a life divided and parted; in giving one part of their life to God, and the other to the world, or affairs and pleasure of it.

If it be permitted to lead in this world two sorts of lives different and divided, *dividnas distinctasque vitas*, it must needs be that one of these lives be for God, and the other not for him, else they could not be two lives, nor would they be parted and divided if both these ways belonged unto God, and had relation to him as to their end. It must needs be therefore that one of these two ways, which are not for God, should be for the world. For there is but God and the World, the love of God and of the World, that can divide our heart and our life.

So that, according to this Doctrine, we may divide our hearts and lives betwixt God and the World, and do one part of our actions for the love of God, and another part for the love of the World, and of our selves. These two disorders are in effect but one, and are both contained in this principle of *Fillinius*, of which we have spoken; That we are excused from conforming our whole will to that of God, in willing all that he wills and commands, and in willing it in such manner as he wills it.

There is none who may not see how this principle overthrows the dependance which man ought to have upon God, at least in that which concerns the inward part. For provided that he do that outwardly which God hath commanded, he is little or nothing concerned, in what manner, and upon what motive he do it; they leave this to his liberty, and pretend that God hath given no commandment therein, and even reason it self demands it not of him.

If they would absolutely part betwixt God and Man, they should at least make a more just and more reasonable partition; attributing to God that which is the better and the more noble, to wit, the heart and the intention, instead of giving it to man, and leaving unto God nothing properly but the outside, as if he were not the God of the spirit, but onely of the body.

ARTICLE II.

That according to the Divinity of the Jesuits we sin not if we have not an intention to sin.

IT is one general maxime in the Divinity of the Jesuits, that to sin it is not sufficient to do the evil that is forbidden, or not to do that which is commanded by the Law of God, Nature, or the Church: But it behoves also to have a knowledge of the evil that we do, and an intention to do it. By this rule they excuse the greatest sins, under a pretence that they have a good intention in committing them, which commonly is but imaginary, or that we have no evil intention, though commonly we have so without knowing it.

Banny makes use of this pretence of an imaginary good intention to justify the hatred of our Neighbour, and the good aversion we have from him, so far as to wish him evil, and even death it self. *Banny* in his Summe, chap. 6. conc. 4. pag. 73. We may, saith he, wish evil to our Neighbour without sin, when we are induced thereto by some good motive. Which he endeavours to confirm by reason, and by the authority of the Jesuits. So *Bonacina* upon the first commandment, d. 3. q. 4. n. 7. exempts from all fault the Mother that desires the death of her Daughters, because for want of beauty or portion she cannot match them according to her desire, or perhaps because by occasion of them she is ill treated by her Husband, or injured. For she doth not properly detest her Daughters through dislike of them, but from an abhorrence to her

2280 *her own evils.* The good intention which induces this Mother to desire the death of her Daughters, is no other thing then ambition, and a desire to marry them more advantagiously then she is able; or her impatience which permits her not to bear the evil usage and injuries of her Husband, which seem unto her more unsupportable then the death of her own children: Neverthelesse a good intention of this sort is sufficient, with *Bauny*, to excuse from all fault this Mother who desires the death of her Daughters.

There is no crime in which we may not find such like good intention, and by consequence which may not be excused by this reason. For this cause he proceeds and saith, that he who should maintain an heretical proposition without believing it, who should be a communicant or Auditor (amongst the Hugonots) without having his heart there, but out of pure derision, or to comply with the times, and to accomplish his designs, he ought not to be esteemed an Hugonot therefore, because his understanding is not infected with error. So that, not only ordinary crimes, but heresie it self and Apostacy, and all sorts of impieties, may be excused by the secret intention of the Jesuits School; and we may do all these things without being heretiques or Impious.

2290 If he had not a privilege to propound things quite contrary when he pleaseth; we might represent unto him that what he saith here, accords not with what he said above; that he who bows his knee before an Image is an Idolater, though he have no design to adore the idol, and onely feignes to do it. But it was necessary he should speak so in this place, where the question was how to prove that we might fulfil the commands of God and the Church, in doing outwardly that which they command, though we intended it not; and here where he is in hand to make it appear, that to sin and to make a man guilty of the transgression of the commandments of God and the Church, it is not sufficient to violate them indeed, if he have not an intention and design for it, it was necessary for him to speak in an other manner quite opposite to the first.

A contradiction so formal and manifest in a subject so important to Faith and Religion, as well as to manners, will hardly find shelter under the vail and pretence of a good intention, how specious soever it may be; and it is certain that at the bottom it could not proceed from any but the Father of lyes and errors, in favour of which he seems to have undertaken to speak, as well as of the libertines and profane. For he and his Fraternity who are in the same opinion with him, maintain that we may accomplish the commands of God and the Church, without any inward will, and his opinion is that we cannot fulfil those of the Devil in violating the commandments of God and the Church, if we have not a design in our hearts thereto. So that the Devil must be served more sincerely then God and the Church, and he hath more power and more right upon the inward actions and hearts of men then God and the Church have. For he pretends, with other Divines of the Society, that the Church hath no power over the inward motions of our souls, and that the commands of God are not extended so far as them, and comprize not the intention nor manner in which God wills they should be fulfilled and executed.

2300 But if he who propounds these heretical propositions and publicly perpetrates these heretical actions, ought not to passe for an Heretique, because he believes not that he saith and doth amongst the Heretiques; neither ought he be accounted a Catholick, because he makes not profession of that he believes internally amongst the Catholicks; but rather makes a contrary profession. He is therefore, to speak properly, neither Catholick nor Heretick. But he is worse then an Heretick. He is a time-server, a man of no Religion, who derides both Hereticks and Catholicks, complying with both, for the better manning his affairs, as *Bauny* speaks, and taking up Religion onely as a matter of merriment. See here the motives and the good intentions whereby he excuses their crime who maintain Heretical propositions, or receive the Supper with the Hugonots, without having their hearts engaged thereto.

Emanuel Sa makes use of the same pretence of the intention to excuse an Oath. *It c Furamenta non sunt, in mea conscientia, in fide Christiani, nisi quis intendat jurare. Quia juramentum pendet ab intentione jurantis. Sa, verbo juramentum. n. 1. p. 295.*

is no Oath, saith he, to say by my faith, in my conscience, on the faith of a Christian, if we have not an intention to swear. His reason is, because an oath depends on the intention of him that swears. They may as well say, that a lye depends on the intention of him that lies.

And that is very nigh thereto, which *Fillintius* saith, speaking of a man that lies in using equivocation, without any necessity obliging him thereto, and who swears to confirm his equivocation. For notwithstanding their opinion who hold that this man is to be accounted both a lyer and perjurer as he confesseth, he concludes for the contrary opinion, and saith, *That it seems to him more propable, that in rigour it is neither lye nor perjury.* His principal reason is the same with that of *Sa*; because he that speaks and swears in this sort hath no intent to speak nor swear falsely, though he doth both in effect, and doth it without necessity and without reason, as he saith expressely, *absque rationabili causa.* This maxime is very proper to license the lyes and oaths which Merchants do make use of ordinarily to deceive others, and those who forswear themselves before Judges; and I see not for what else it can be good, but to nourish and justify these crimes and treacheries.

d Dico a probabilius videri in rigore non esse mendacium neque perjurium. Ratio precipua, quia qui sic loquitur & jurat, non habet intentionem dicendi falsum, vel jurandi falsitatem. *Fillintius*, to. 2. lib. 25. c. 11. n. 331. P. 205.

That which *Emanuel Sa* and *Fillintius* say, of an oath, *Bauny* affirms of blasphemy, having recourse to the intention of the blasphemor to excuse his crime. In his *Summe*, c. 5. pag. 66. where he speaks of five sorts of blasphemies, and he saith that the fifth sort of blasphemy is when one names with contumely, reproach and dishonor, the most venerable members of the Son of God. Which yet they seem not to do who use them in their common discourse, as some ornament of their language, saying *Death, Head, Belly,* and yet are nevertheless guilty. *Bonacina* upon the first commandment d. 3. q. 8. p. 2. n. 2. It seems at first sight that he dares not justify these blasphemers, considering the horreur of their crimes; but he afterwards makes use of their intention to excuse them; adding in the sequel: *Nevertheless some whom this Author alledges in this dispute, hold that to call upon these parts (of Christs body) in choler, and not with rage against God, is no blasphemy.*

And two pages after he proposes this opinion to Confessors, that they may follow it in their practice, and that they may know how to deal with them that accuse themselves of blasphemy. *The Confessor*, saith he, ought to inform himself of the penitent, who accuses himself of blasphemy, whether he did it with a formal intention to blaspheme God. And a little after; *to assist them herein, we think that it is in every respect to good purpose, that the Confessor know from his mouth his intention, and what moved him to blaspheme; and if he answers that he was not touched with any despite against God, but against Man, or against Beast, to whom they had a pique, the Confessor shall not repute them to be Blasphemers, nor destitute of Grace.*

This man that blasphemeth against God and against Jesus Christ, though he doth it through transport of choler against Men, or against Beasts, though he doth it without passion, and in cold blood, making use of these blasphemies in common discourse, as ornaments of his language, yet ought not, according to *Bauny*, to be treated in his confession as a blasphemor, though the words and blasphemies he uttereth be contumelious, opprobrious and dishonourable to the most venerable members of the Son of God, if he have not truly had some indignation against God, if he was not touched with some despite against God; if he have not done it with a formal intent to dishonour God; and the Confessor ought to referre himself, in all this, to what the blasphemor shall say, after that he hath been informed of the matter from himself, and hath knowledge of it from his own mouth.

If this be true, as this Casuist assures us; we must of necessity avouch that there are hardly any blasphemies, or that to blaspheme we must have the heart of a Devil; or a damned Spirit, and hate God with a formal will to displease and dishonour him. And when a person is so forlorn as to fall into this miserable estate, if he neither resent nor acknowledge it, as it easely befalls him, because of that blindness and hardness, which is the ordinary consequence and punishment of these great crimes; and pretends not to have this evil intention of dishonouring God by despite, and hatred towards him, which induceth him to blaspheme, his ignorance and freedom from evil intention, will be sufficient to every such person to exempt him from crime, according to the Divinity of these Jesuits; and *Bauny* will absolve him easily, and not repute him, for all this, for a blasphemor, nor as one destitute of grace.

He speaks after the same manner of cursings, in the chap. 6. pag. 47. saying, that to make cursing a mortal sin, it ought to proceed of a will deliberately bent upon the ill which is desired to fall on others.

From the same principle, treating of scandal, in the chap. 46. pag. 719. and speaking of a woman who adorns her self proudly, and who pranks and trims up her self to please her Husband, or to observe the custom of the country, he declares that allbeit the said woman knows well the evil effect which her diligence in adorning her self will work upon the bodies and souls of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious garments; yet she sins not in using them. And to give a reason thereof, he maintains it as a maxime, and general rule, that we are not responsible for the evil effects which are adherent to any action, nisi fuerint intenti formaliter; that is to say, as he expounds himself; unless we effectually seek, will or procure them.

Filliutius speaking also of scandal, proposes the same example and case, and explicates it in the same manner. ^c Though a woman, saith he, knows that a man loves her dishonestly, she sins not how often soever she presents her self before him, and in his view, so that she have not an intention to stir up the dishonest love which he hath towards her.

^e Sexto si femina sciat se turpiter ab aliquo amari, non peccat quod, res se offert e jus conspectui, modo non intendat hunc provocare ad turpem sui amorem. Filliutius, tom. 2, tr. 28. c. 10. num. 232.

specui, modo non intendat hunc provocare ad turpem sui amorem. Filliutius, tom. 2, tr. 28. c. 10. num. 232. pag. 331.

Sanchez having also proposed before this same question, namely ^f whether a woman who presents her self to the view of a man whom she well knows doth love her dishonestly, do commit a mortal sin of scandal, when she hath no intention to stir him up to love her. He reports the common opinion, which condemns this action of mortal sin. ^g The common opinion, saith he, of the Doctors is that she sineth mortally, when without any necessity, but onely for her own pleasure and satisfaction she gads indifferently into every place.

^f An femina conspectui viri se offerens, a quo se turpiter amari novit, peccat mortaliter peccato scandali, quando nullatenus cum ad sui amorem

provocare intendit? Sanchez, op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 16. pag. 19 mortaliter censetur, quando nulla necessitate ducitur, sed ut suae voluptati satisfaciatur, indifferenter hac & illos discurret. Ibid.

^g Communiter eam Doctores peccare

In the sequel he propounds the opinion of those who excuse this woman from mortal sin, though she go abroad without necessity, and know the evil which she must cause by her coming abroad. ^h There are others, saith he, who hold that she sins not mortally, because he that loveth her dishonestly doth rather take this occasion of offence and from his own malice, than she gives it him, by the use of her own right and liberty.

^h Aliis tamen p'acet hanc non peccare mortaliter, quod occasione potius ex propria adaman-

is turpiter malicia sit accepta, quam a muliere data, quae jure suo ac libertate sui concessa utitur. Ibid. n. 17.

Finally, after he hath considered these two opinions, and the reasons on which they found them, he concludes for this latter, in favour of this woman, whom he declares innocent. ⁱ And for that, saith he, though I also believe the first opinion to be probable, but I esteem notwithstanding the latter to be more true, which is, that this woman is not obliged to deprive her self of this liberty which she hath, of going abroad from her house, to stand at her door or window, or to walk in the Town. He demands no other thing of her, ^k but that she have no intention to cause him to sin who loves her. And after this he justifies the offence which she gives him out of a frolick and without necessity, and which she might easily avoid if she pleased.

ⁱ Et ideo quamvis prioris opinionem probabilem credam, existimo veriorum esse hanc posteriorum, ut non ob id teneatur femina sua

se egrediendi domo, standi ad ostium domus vel fenestram, & discurrendi per civitatem libertate privare. Ibid. & ut nullatenus cum ad sui amorem provocare intendat.

So that although this woman knows that she is about to destroy a man by an action which is altogether free, and which she may easily eschew, she shall not be at all guilty for his death, according to the Jesuits, if she had not a formal design to kill him. If any should talk after this rate of the death of the body, and pretend that he who had voluntarily and without necessity done an action which he forefaw would be followed by the death of a man, should nevertheless not cease to be inno-

cent, provided that he had not an actual and express intention to kill him, such a man would be judged worthy to be hated by all men. And these Divines nevertheless fear not to talk thus of the death of the soul, and to testify that they fear less the justice of God than of men.

The principle of all this Doctrine concerning scandal, may be seen in *Bauny*, in the 39. chap. of his Summe, pag. 623. where treating of this matter purposely, he demands: *Whether he who doth some thing from which his action he foresees that others will take matter of offence and sin, ought to accuse himself thereof; and what is this sin to be termed?* He saith frankly, that *Navarre*, and others whom he cites, say that it is scandal: But he adds in his following discourse: *This is not my judgement. See upon what I build. Taking scandal properly and for one special kind of sin, such an one is not guilty thereof, save onely when by a formal design he saith or doth some thing for the ghostly destruction of his Neighbours.* This is the general principle upon which his Fraternity build, as well as he, the foundation of all this matter.

He must be utterly forsaken of God, and in the extremity of black and affected malice who falls into this excess, and into this sort of hatred of his Neighbour, which is proper onely unto Devils; and to reduce the sin of scandal to this disposition is to declare that it is committed no where but in Hell, and to take it quite out of the world; or rather it is to entertain and protect it in the world, by disguising it in such sort as that we may not know when we commit it; and by consequence to give all men licence to commit it freely, and without scruple, in making them believe that they commit it not, in doing these actions.

Bauny also makes use of the pretence of a good intention, to justify Usury. For after he had furnished us with an invention, to palliate and cover it before the eyes of men, by means of three contracts, of which he himself prescribes us the form, he endeavours to hide it from God himself if he could, and also to justify it by a good intention. For greater surety, (saith he, in the 14. chap. of his Summe, p. 219.) it is good that the creditor say to him that is his debtor, that his intention in this contract is not usurious, though he let out his money to him for profit, with protestation on his part that he would do nothing therein against God and his conscience. For hereby he declares that he is determined onely to that which is good and far off from sin. Thus he mocks God and Man, intending to surprize them by such grosse contrivances; as if he could change the nature of things by innervating the terms and manner of expressing them.

It is easie to see the contradiction which is in these words; but it will appear yet more clearly, if we compare that which he saith here with what he tells us elsewhere, in his practise, l. 3. chap. 6. pag. 362. where treating of benefices, he saith, *when any one causeth a benefice with cure incompatible with a dignity to be provided for him, he is reputed to renounce it without any expression thereof in words, c. 1. de consult. in 6. although he make protestation that he will not part with it; because this protestation is contrary to his action.* A man that is in a dignity and who causes a cure also to be provided for him, cannot hold them both, although he would, and protesteth that it is his intention; because this protestation is contrary to his action. And an Usurer who gives his money to interest to make profit thereof, may deliver himself from usury and restitution, by protesting that it is not his intention to make an usurious contract, though in very deed he do make one, and his protestation be contrary to his action.

One of the greatest abuses that these Doctors make of the intention, is in the use of the Sacraments, and particularly of that of penance. When a man is altogether overwhelmed with crimes, which he often doth reiterate, and into which he doth fall many times, they pretend that he needs but a moment to reduce himself into good terms with God, and that one onely word uttered with his lips or drawn thence by a Confessor, will suffice to make so great a change: and provided he say he will mend, and promise it unto the Priest, he shall be obliged to repose himself upon this pretended good intention, and upon this promise, although it may be presumed for the most part that such resolutions proceed onely from the lips, as *Lanny* confesseth in his Summe, chap. 46 pag. 717. of which he brings a good proof, and as it were a certain mark, in these following words: *As it will come to passe, if notwithstanding all this which these people have said and promised for the time past to the said Confessor,*

they do not cease to behave themselves with greater excess and liberty in those crimes than before. And though also we see by experience of what is past, that they will not amend, and that their present disposition it makes also sufficiently appear that they have no true will, he forbears not to maintain that we must believe what they say, *cum ipsi sint sui accusatores, defensores & testes*; being they are their own accusors, defenders and witnesses; though many times it may be presumed that such resolutions come not from beyond their lips. Such are the most part of the resolutions, promises, good intentions of the greatest sinners, upon which notwithstanding these Directors ground themselves to conferre on them the Sacraments, though they themselves judge them unworthy; and to justify the greatest crimes; and which they themselves who commit them, durst not at all take upon them to defend, if these Doctors did not maintain and assure them falsely by this pretended good intention, which they teach them to form in a moment, and by one onely word, in saying onely that they have, or that they would have it.

In which they are fo ingenious, that when they cannot find this sort of good intentions in him who hath done amisse, they go to seek it without him in some other accessary to the action. As if that would suffice to cleat it of malice and crime. Thus *Bauny* exempts from mortal sin, children who rob their parents; *In as much*, saith he, *as the Parents cannot be supposed to be willing to oblige their children not to meddle with what is theirs upon this penalty; there being good reason to believe that they had rather see all their goods wasted by their hands, then their said children out of grace and favour with God.* As if the commandments of God and the sin of those who violate them, depended on the disposition or will of man; and as if those who were offended together with God in the same action which was committed against him and against his Law, by releasing their interest; and remitting the fault which is committed against them, could also as speedily take away and blot out that which is against God and against his Law, principally when he that hath committed it doth not take the pains to ask him pardon, nor to give him satisfaction.

If it be true, as saith *Bauny*, that children sin not mortally in taking the goods of their Fathers and Mothers; why say they not also that they should not sin mortally in attempting their lives also? For the reason they bring for the one proves it as well of the other. His reason is that *parents cannot be thought to oblige their children, not to attempt upon what is theirs under this pain of mortal sin, and eternal damnation*; and we may as well believe that they are not to be thought to desire to oblige them not to enterprize upon their lives on the same pain, it being apparent that if Fathers were true Christians, as they suppose them to be, they would rather like to see not onely all their goods wasted by their childrens hands, but their own lives lost also, rather then see their children in disgrace with God, or in eternal pains.

By this same reason, by which they go about to excuse the theft of children, it will follow that the wicked persecuting honest men; Tyrants spilling the blood of Martyrs, the Jews in putting to death Jesus Christ, sinned not mortally; because it is certain that neither Jesus Christ, nor the Martyrs, nor honest men ever had an intention that those who invaded their goods, their honor, or their lives, should fall into displeasure with God, or into eternal damnation. On the contrary there is nothing that they would not do and suffer to hinder them there from, as may be seen clearly in that the Saints and Martyrs prayed unto God to pardon them that persecuted them, following herein the example of Jesus Christ, who prayed upon the Crosse for those who put him to death, and demanded of his Father that he would not impute unto them the sin of his death,

C H A P. V.

Of the matter of Sin.

A R T I C L E I.

That the Jesuits enhance and debase as they please the goods of this world, which are the usual object or matter of sin; and so nourish vice, and dispense with the Law of God.

THe object and the matter of sin are temporal things, which God having made for man that he might employ them for his service, he turns them into a stumbling block, by taking occasion of offending and destroying himself thereby, by suffering himself to be surprized by the pleasure which he finds therein, or making use of them otherwise then God hath ordained.

The Jesuits are wont to judge of sin by its object, and to measure its greatness by the quantity of the matter, and by the value of the things which induce men to commit it. I will not examine this principle, the defect whereof is easie to be perceived. But I am confident, that there is none that will not finde it very strange, that they having established this rule, which ought by consequence be always inviolable amongst them, they yet do not follow it themselves, but do like those who have two different weights and measures; setting what price they please upon temporal goods, making them sometimes much and sometimes little worth, according to the divers designs they have to gratifie the passions and lusts of men. They debase worldly goods to excuse the sins of those who usurpe them unjustly; and they enhance their price and represent them as very considerable, for to dispense with the Law of God, when we cannot observe it without suffering some losse and some diminution in these very goods.

It is upon these principles, and with this spirit, that *Banny* in his Summe, chap. 7. pag. 80. after he had described envie as a monstrous vice, which sits, saith he, like the *Cantharides* onely on the fairest flowers, after he had said with Saint Cyprian, that it is as it were the worm of the soul, which makes its own hurt of anothers good; and after he had declared universally, that the envious man engaged not a little his conscience and honour, since against all sorts of prudence, by a *Metamorphosis* altogether vicious, he attempts to charge good into evil, and good and wholesome actions into poison; nevertheless he concludes in this sort: *this sin, though Saint Augullin testifies that it is contrary unto charity, nevertheless seems not to me to be mortal.*

Although envie be so pernicious and deformed as he represents it; though it be like the worm that consumes the soul and ruins the conscience, like venom which corrupts good actions and turns good into ill; though it be contrary unto charity, as Saints Cyprian and Saint Augustin say, and as he himself avows with them, yet it seems not to him that it is a mortal sin; and if we will believe him, it ought not be put into the number of the seven mortal sins. His reason is, because the good which is found in temporal things is so slender, and of so little consequence in respect of Heaven, that it is of no consideration with God and his Saints.

By the same reason we may say that theft, slander, and even homicide it self are no mortal sins; because that the goods which are withheld from our Neighbour by theft, the honour we violate by slander, and his very life which we cause him lose by homicide, are all temporals, in which the good that is found is so small and of so little consequence in respect to Heaven, that it is of no consideration with God and his Saints: and by consequence could not be matter of mortal sin according to the Divinity of this Father, nor a sufficient subject to put man out of favour with God. See here how this Author debases the price and estimation of temporal goods to excuse sin. But when he hath in hand to dispense with men for their duty, and the Law of God; then he enhanseth their price, to cause that lust may prevail with us above the Law of God on those occasions, wherein to obey and keep it we must suffer some losse in these goods.

In the 46. Chap. of his Summe, pag. 711. after he had established the conditions necessary to a penitent to be in an estate to receive absolution, he proposes many questions, whereof see here, the first: *From these principles, saith he, it will be easie to answer the questions which follow: The first; those who in their commerce, their traffick, their discourse, their resort, are obliged to see, to speak, to treat with maidens and women, whose sight and meeting makes them oftentimes fall into sin; If they, I say, are capable in this perpetual danger, of being in grace and receiving absolution?*

He saw well enough that this passe was dangerous, and that the answer he was about to make to this question was of it self odious and scandalous: For this reason he causes to march in his front a good number of Authors, as it were to sound the ford, and to be his garde. The first he produces is de Baia, whom he makes mouth to them all, and to answer absolutely, *yea*. He alledges Navarre after, making him to confirm this opinion, and to assure us that *we may not constrain this penitent to abandon that traffick which is so perillous unto him*. He puts Emanuel Sallit, saying that he declareth *that upon the penitents refusal to quit his traffique, we may not refuse him absolution; provided that he and those others, with whom he is accustomed to sin found their refusal upon some good and lawful cause; as not to be able to dispense therewith without giving the world subject to talk of, or that they themselves should thence receive some inconvenience*. For otherwise, say they, (he speaks of others whom he cited) *we cannot refuse them absolution, dummodo firmiter proponant, so that they strongly insist on it*.

After these Authors he is more confident, and speaks with more assurance, p. 712. saying, that though the occasion of sin be as it were certain, *nevertheless because it is not affected nor sought out in a frolick, and without necessity, because we cannot avoid the dangers that are joyned thereunto, without scandal, without concerning therein our honours and our goods, it follows that to persevere therein is no fault, by the fourth rule of right, quod non est licitum in lege, necessitas facit licitum, what is not lawful by law, is made lawful by necessity*.

The same man, in the 5. q. pag. 715. demands *what is to be done with men-servants, and maid-servants, Cousins of both sexes, Masters and Maids, who mutually engage and aid one another in sin, or such as take occasion from the house where they are, or occasions they have therein?* To answer this question, he makes use of the same artifice he made use of in answering the former, which is, to make others to speak and to cover himself under their shadow. *When the relapses, saith he, are frequent and as it were daily, Navarre, in 3. chap. num 31. Grass, l. 1. c. 30. num. 23. Suarez, part 3. t. 4. d. 32. f. 2. holds that they must be sent back*. And a little after: *If notwithstanding, add they, they offend onely rarely together, as once or twice a month, they may be absolved, concurrentibus quatuor prædictis, quorum quatuor scilicet causa notabilis est, quod non possint sine magno incommodo & detrimento separari. Those four things concurring, of which four the remarkable cause is, that they cannot be separated without great inconvenience and dammage*.

See here the Law of God put in billance with temporal goods: on one side, the Law of God forbids sin, and to avoid it commands to flie from the occasions of it; on the other side, commodity, interest, and pretence of honour, ingage in perpetual danger, and in, as it were, certain occasion of sin. In these occasions the good which is found in these temporal things is no longer slender and of no consequence, as Bauny spoke before, to remove envie out of the number of mortal sin; he declares here, on the behalf of Emanuel Sa, that it is a good and lawful cause; and on the part of Navarre, that it is a very considerable occasion; and finally, he doth not onely make use of it as of a good excuse, but he forms thereout a kind of necessity which dispenseth with the Law of God, abusing this text of right: *That necessity* Quod non est licitum in lege, necessitas facit licitum. *makes that lawful which is not lawful by the Law; which is to be understood onely of things which are indifferent in themselves, and not of things which are in themselves, and essentially, naught and dishonest, as these of which I speak are.*

In consequence of this principle and this rule, the Jesuits judging also of sin by the object and matter, when this object is spiritual and the matter invisible, or little exteriorly, the sins can be onely sleight ones according to their judgement. Whence it comes to pass that they acknowledge hardly any mortal sins of curiosity,

idleness, pride, vanity, and other spiritual vices of like kinde, and these vices must passe unto some sensible matter, and different from their own, and in some notable outward excesse, to make them mortal according to them, as we have already remarked speaking of covetousness, concerning which *Escobar* relating the opinions of the principal Divines of the Society, acknowledges no crime if it be not accompanied with some circumstance contrary to Justice: and when he treats of pride, and ambition, and of boasting, he finds also nothing which approacheth so much as near to mortal sin, if this vice do not proceed unto some great excesse against the honor of God or our Neighbour, if by a perversion altogether extraordinary, it do not blinde a man so far as to make him say, with the King of Tyre; *I am God.*

See here the passage entire which deserves to be represented also here, though we have already rehearsed it elsewhere, because it is very remarkable: ^b *If boasting do notably offend against the honour of God, or the reputation of our Neighbour, it proceeds unto mortal sin, now the honour of God is remarkably hurt by pride and boasting, when a man is such a fool, as to say, with the King of Tyre, I am God: and when he boasteth himself like the Pharisee in saying, I am not like this Publican, he offends grievously his Neighbour, namely him whom he so speaks of.*

^b Tunc ad mortale accedet, et quando aut gravioriter Dei reverentia laedetur, aut proximi fama. Fit equidem cum gravi Dei irreverentia, cum in morem Regis Tyri dixerit satanas; Ego sum Deus. proximus autem gravi injuria afficitur quando quis cum Pharisaeo jactat; Non sum sicut iste Publicanus. Escobar, tr. 2. exam. 2. num 9. pag. 291.

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These two cases excepted, and some other such like which he observes, he holds that ambition, vanity, and boasting, cannot proceed unto mortal sin, and that so long as these vices continue that they are of their own peculiar nature, so long as vanity continues simple vanity, pride is simple pride, and they exceed not their own proper matter, they are ordinarily but venial sins.

By consequence of this same principle, sins which are committed against vertues purely spiritual, and against the most Divine and elevated things which we enjoy, such as are the Word of God and his Truth, Religion and the most Holy Functions of Religion, provided they be not extraordinary, are onely venial, and it is the excesse onely that renders them mortal, and this excesse also must not be common.

This made *Emanuel Sa* to affirm, ^c *that it was no sin to make fabulous relations in Sermons to stir up the auditors attention and devotion.* He speaks also more clearly in another place where he saith, ^d *that there are some who hold that it is always mortal sin to tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal point; but others deny it.* And he relates the opinion of these latter, adding onely *that it must be understood onely when the matter is sleight.* If to lye in the chair in points of Doctrine, according to this Jesuit, be but a venial sin, he without doubt would make no great matter of lyes which a Preacher should speak in other matters; and it may be he might give them in this the same liberty that he gives them to tell tales generally, and without exception.

^c Fabellam recitare, ut auditores excitentur ad pie audiendum, non est peccatum. Sa verb. Praedicare. num. 5. p. 378. ^d Mentiri in concione in pertinentibus ad doctrinam, quidem ajunt esse mortale, alii non semper: quod intellige si sit materia levis. Sa verb. Mendacium. num. 2. pag. 494.

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He condemns them not more rigorously who tell lyes in confession: ^e *It is but a venial sin, saith he, to lye unto a Confessor in confessing venial or mortal sins formerly confessed, though after resolution to confesse them truly.* *Escobar* saith the same, and adds some thing. ^f *Suarez* holds, saith he, *that to lye in confessing a venial sin, is but a venial sin, provided that this venial sin be not all the matter of the confession, for in this case the absolution will have no subject, and the Sacrament will be nul.* Others hold the contrary, for that a lye which consists in a sleight and venial matter is always sleight. A lye told in confession, and which makes the Sacrament null in the judgement of

^e Mentiri in confessione de peccatis venialibus, aut de aliis confessis mortalibus veniale solum peccatum est; etiamsi illa antea apud se proposuisset vere confiteri. Sa, verb. Confessio. n. 12. p. 88. ^f Mendacium de peccato veniali, veniale est, nisi illud veniale esset totalis confessionis materia; quia tunc daretur absolutio sine materia, et Sacramentum nullum esset. Suarez, tom. 4. n. 3. par. disp. 22. sect. 10. n. 6. Alii negant, quia omne mendacium de veniali est res levis. Escob. tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 107. p. 816.

this Jesuit and of those whose judgement he reports, seems to him a very sleight thing to furnish matter for a mortal sin, though it destroy a Sacrament, and turn it into an action profane and sacrilegious.

It is easie to see if this be to honour the Truth and the Sacrament of penance, which by a particular reason may be called the Sacrament of Truth, because there a man acknowledgeth that which he is truly, confessing himself a sinner before God, and confessing his sins before a Priest who holds the place of God: nevertheless this Divinity teaches that it is no great matter to lye in this Sacrament; and that fault committed herein ought to be considered according to the matter of the sin rather than by the holiness of the Sacrament; in such manner, that if the matter about which the lye is told be not an important thing in it self, the sin is but sleight, though thereby the Sacrament be profaned, made nul and sacrilegious.

This Jesuit commits yet a greater extravagance against the truth, when he saith that it may be opposed, with a resolution altogether formal, that is to say by pure malice, though it be acknowledged in the heart, without becoming guilty of any great fault. ⁸ To consist with the truth, saith he, which is evident with a formal Impugnare perspicuam veritatem, animo impugnandi & contradicendi, est peccatum grave aut leve juxta materiam gravitatem aut levitatem. design to oppose and contradict it, is great or little according as the truth in hand is of Escobar, tract. 2. exam. 2. cap. 1. num. 14. pag. 292. great or little consequence. He considers not the greatness of the Majesty of God, who is encountred in the Truth, and who is Truth it self; neither doth he any more consider the wicked disposition of him who impugnes the truth by an aversion or contempt which he hath towards it, opposing it by a formal design to resist and destroy it, though he know it evidently; animus impugnandi & contradicendi perspicuam veritatem.

If when the King speaks, any of his Officers should rise up and contradict him publicly in a thing which he knew himself to be just and true, being induced to this excess onely by insolence, and to oppose himself against the King, and to contradict him without cause, it is certain he would be treated as in guilty of high treason, and his action would passe in the judgement of all the world for an unsufferable outrage and contempt of Royal Majesty, though the subject upon which he thus opposed the King were not of great importance. And yet *Escobar* would that it should be accompted but a sleight fault to deal thus with God and his Truth.

One passage alone of *Sanchez*, which I will rehearse here, may suffice to prove that which I have said, that in things purely spiritual, the Jesuits find scarcely any sufficient matter for mortal sin. ^b To perform of vanity, saith he, the most sacred Res quavis sacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere, sacras celebrare, non excudit culpam venialem. actions, as to administer the Sacraments, or to receive them, or to celebrate the most Holy Masse for vain glory, can be but a venial sin, though vain glory be proposed, as tantum est, ut adeo the principal end. He acknowledges that there is disorder in this action, but he pretends that it is of small consequence, and that the injury that is done to God and things Spiritual and Divine in making them subservient to vain glory, is not a thing so considerable as to merit the disfavour of God, and that it conserve for a matter to mortal sin, and a cause of eternal damnation.

Sanchez, op. mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9. Etsi debitus ordo pervertatur, ea tamen perversio non tantum est, ut adeo *Et si debitus ordo pervertatur, ea tamen perversio non tantum est, ut adeo* gravis injuria rebus spiritualibus inferatur, ut poena aeterna digna sit. Ibid.

It is not an easie thing to judge what reason he may have thus to diminish this sin, if he acknowledge that there may possibly be great ones in Spiritual matters. For indeed it will be a hard thing to find greater then this, considered by the light of Faith, then to say Masse for vanity, as the principal end thereof, this is properly to sacrifice to vanity, or to the Devil who is the god of vanity, the body of Jesus Christ, which is horrible onely to think. And if the sacrifice of the Masse may be referred unto vanity without any great sin, so as this Jesuit pretends: then may it also be related to all other vices: that is to say that we may sacrifice and offer up the body of Jesus Christ to all vices, which is a kind of Idolatry unheard of, more criminal in every sort, and more impious then that of all the Pagans, who putting the creatures in the place of God, offer to them other creatures: but he who says Masse for vanity as his principal end, makes vanity a false God, and offers unto

it the true God, in sacrificing unto it the body of Jesus Christ. And yer this sin according to Sanchez is but a sleight one, because the matter of it seems sleight unto him, and there appears unto him nothing grosse in it, that crosses mens fancies, or hurts their interests, there being none but God and Jesus Christ offended and outraged thereby in a manner altogether Spiritual; that is altogether Devillish, and by a sin altogether Spiritual and Devillish, which is pride and vanity. 2420

ARTICLE II.

The consequence and explication of the same subject by two examples, and two sequels which the Jesuits draw from their principles concerning the matter of sin.

1. That God cannot no more than men command or forbid a matter that is in it self sleight, under the penalty of mortal sin.
2. That he that hath a design and will to commit all venial sins if he were able, sins onely venially.

FROM this maxime which the Jesuits presuppose as a principle of their Divinity, that the object and matter of sin ought to serve for a rule, whereby to judge of its greatness; in such sort that when the matter is small, the sin cannot but be small, they draw this consequence: That no Law, civil or ecclesiastick, humane or Divine can render men guilty of mortal sin, when the thing commanded or forbidden them is not great.

a Præceptum de re levissima non obligat ad mortale, etiamsi quis præcipit id velit. Sa, verb. Præceptum. num. 1. pag. 575. Emanuel Sa saith generally, *a* When a sleight thing is commanded, the Commandment engages not unto mortal sin, though this be the intention of him that commands. 2430

b Ad obligationem sub culpa mortali necessaria est gravitas materiae præceptæ vel prohibita, sine qua nulla lex humana obligat sub mortali. Amicus saith the same thing with larger extent: *b* To cause that disobedience may become a mortal sin, the matter which is commanded or forbidden must be great: without this the violation of any humane law is not a mortal sin. Whence he draws this consequence: *c* Though the intention of a Superiour be to oblige in such manner him who is under his charge, so as he should not disobey him without mortal sin, it doth not indeed oblige him in this sort, if the matter of the Law and of the commandment be not great.

c Unde etiamsi superior velit subditum ad mortale obligare, de facto illum non obligabit, nisi materia legis aut præcepti sit gravis. Amicus, tom. 5. A. 5. de lege humana. lect. 8. n. 194. p. 64.

He passes farther, assuring us that God himself cannot make a man criminal by his command, if that he commands or forbids is not of it self great and considerable.

d Nulla lex neque humana neque divina juste obligare potest sub culpa mortali, in materia levi. Ibid. n. 198 p. 63. *d* No Law, saith he, neither humane nor Divine, can make the sin committed in a sleight matter, to be mortal.

It would be hard to prove, by this rule, that Adam sinned mortally in eating the fruit which God had forbidden him; since it follows from this principle that God himself could not forbid him to eat it under pain of mortal sin, the matter if this command and sin being too sleight a thing.

If the Pelagians had known this maxime, it had been very easie to maintain their error, touching original sin and the punishment it deserves; and if the Church had received this maxime, it could not have condemned them nor maintained, as it hath done, that God punisheth justly that sin with eternal punishment, even in Infants which dye without Baptisme; since besides that this sin is much lesse in them, 2440

them, then in *Adam*, because they have not committed it by their own proper will; it cannot be also but very small in it self, if it be considered in its matter which was but an Apple.

It seems that *Amicus* was not far off from this opinion, when he drew this consequence from his principle: *That though God as a Sovereign and absolute Lord might make him suffer an eternal pain, who did disobey him in a slight matter, yet he could not do it as a Judge, because in this quality he is obliged to proportion the punishment to the fault which is not greater then the matter of the disobedience.* That is to say in more clear terms, that God may make use of his absolute power to do unjustly; it being clear that he who makes use of his power without regard of Justice, commits injustice; and if men cannot do in this manner, God can do it lesse; because his power is much more strongly and inseparably united to his Justice then that of men. For it is founded upon Justice, and Justice is the foundation of his Throne, as the Scripture saith. And so to remove Justice from the power of God, and to make this to subsist without that, is to take away its foundation and to overturn it. So that instead of concluding that it might be separate from his Justice, because it is great and Sovereign, the contrary should rather be concluded, it being manifest that it would not be so great, nor so sovereign and Infinite as it is, if it were not inseparable from his Justice, since to be severed from Justice is not true power, but an impuissance, a feebleness and a defect, which by consequence cannot be attributed to a Sovereign great and infinite power.

Also to say as *Amicus* saith here, that God can punish the faults of his creatures, otherwise then in the quality of a Judge, is to testify that he may act without judgement, and not onely without cognisance of the cause; but against the cognisance and light of the truth: and by consequence to despise or neglect truth and Justice, since it is no other then to despise it, not to consider it when it is known.

This is finally to make God like those wicked ones, who say in the Scripture: Our power shall be the Law of our Justice: *Sap. 7. v. 7. Sit autem fortitudo nostra lex Justitia.* Which is proper onely to violence and Tyranny, it belonging to none but Tyrants to measure their Justice by their power, and not to be willing that their power should be regulated by Justice. This is then to overturn the power of God, and to ruine it utterly to conceive of it in this manner, as these new Divines represent it, this is to deprive him of his Sovereignty and infinite greatness, and to render it defective and like that of the Creatures. Also these people regard not the interest of God, whilest they advance his authority in a manner so unworthy of him; but the upholding of their maxims, and the false reputation of their Schools. Whence it comes that when the same interest of their Schools and of their

Doctrine requires it, they abase the same power of God as unworthily as here they elevate it; as shall clearly appear in the subject we handle.

For on one side they take from God the true power, which he hath to command all things great and little, so absolutely that we cannot disobey them without sinning mortally, and without incurring an obligation to an eternal punishment: because this is not accommodable to the principle which they have established, whereby to judge of sin, by measuring its greatness by its matter; and on the other hand they attribute unto God the power which he hath not, and which he cannot have, to torment without sin, and without any cause an innocent person, and to make him even suffer eternal pains for his pleasure alone; and by his absolute authority, because it is the sequel of the same principle, and for to defend it and answer the difficulties and inconveniencies it draws after it, it is necessary that they establish this second maxime: that is to say, that to defend an error and impiety, they are forced to advance another greater then the former.

For this is the property of error, to grow always as it advances, and the extravagancy and the excesses thereof are commonly greater and more visible in its consequences and conclusions, then in its beginnings and principles, whence they are drawn. Without doubt the Jesuits would abhorre these impieties, and many other which they promote, if they looked on them alone and in themselves; but when they see them to be the necessary consequences of their Doctrine, they believe themselves engaged in honour to maintain and confirm them rather then to recal

e unde etiam si possit Deus ut supremus pœnam æternam infligere pro transgressione materiae leviss; non tamen potest ut Judex, quoniam ut Judex debet illas infligere e cum proportione ad culpam, quæ tanta est, quanta transgressio ipsa materiae.
Amicus, Ibid.

g Respondeo
D:um ut supre-
mum Dominum
punire posse
peccatum venia-
le pena eterna.
Amia. tom. 3.
disp. 23. sect.
1. num. 18.
p. 237.
h Nam sicut r-
tione supremi
dominii quod
habet in creatu-
ras, eas etiam si
nullum commi-
serint peccatum
torquere potest aeternis penis: ita iisdem penis torquere posset omnes propter veniale tantum peccatum. Ibid. i Con-
cedo Deum iuste quantum est ex parte sua, quemlibet torquere posse pena aeterna propter veniale tantum, ratione supre-
mi domini. Nego tamen id fieri posse quantum est ex parte culpa. Culpa enim ut iuste puniatur, exigit proportionatam
penam. Ibid. n. 18.

and correct their opinions. Such is the carriage of *Amicus*, when he repeats this the second time, and answers with assurance that *God as Sovereign Lord may punish a venial sin with eternal pain*. And to discover the bottom of this horrible opinion; he proves it by an excess yet greater, saying that he may even eternally damn an innocent. ^h For as in the quality of a Sovereign Lord, he may cause his creatures to suffer eternal pains, though they have committed no sin; he may also inflict the same pain upon one sole venial sin. The more then barbarous injustice and cruelty which this opinion attributes falsely unto God, is so visible that this Jesuit himself is forced to confesse and acknowledge it. For after he had said the third time, num. 18. that ⁱ God might absolutely torment in eternal pains any person whomsoever for venial sins, and on his part it might be justly done, because of the Sovereign dominion which he hath over all creatures, yet confesseth that having respect to the fault and sin, he cannot do it justly: And his reason is, because the punishment of a fault cannot be just, if the penalty be not proportionable thereunto.

So that to cover in some manner an injustice so manifest, he makes use of a marvelous subtilty, saying that damnation and eternal punishment, which God causes an innocent person to suffer, or him who is guilty of venial sins onely, shall not be a penalty but an affliction and a torment. ^k This pain, saith he, so far as it exceeds his fault, shall not be due unto him. Whence he draws this conclusion: And therefore shall not hold the place of a punishment, because punishment is related to a fault as a propriety proportionable thereto. And that which he adjoyns: That it will be rather a torment, which God as Sovereign Lord may cause every creature to suffer though most innocent; serves onely to make more appear the injustice he attributes unto God. For the word *torment* is more harsh, and more odious then that of punishment; because pain cannot be called torment, but when it is extreme and unsupportable. So that if it be unjust to punish an innocent, it is also more to torment him.

k Talis pena quatenus excederet talem culpam, non esset illi debita; ac proinde non haberet rationem poenae quae ordinem dicit ad culpam, tanquam proprietas illi commensurata; sed potius haberet rationem tormenti quod Deus tanquam supremus dominus potest cuilibet creaturae etiam innocentissimae infligere. Ibid.

And if God by his will alone may torment an innocent, it shall be no more true which the holy Scriptures teach us, that God takes from himself onely the motive to do us good, and from our selves onely the subject to do us ill; because both the one and the other shall come of his own will alone; and even herein he shall be the proper Author of evil, and the greatest evil which a reasonable creature can suffer, which are the torments and eternal pains of Hell, if he make him suffer them without having offended him, or for having committed onely some small fault, which is against the universal consent of the holy Fathers, against the Faith of the Church, and against natural right and equity.

So the subtilty of this Author instead of mollifying his opinion and justifying it, hath made it yet more unworthy of God and unmainainable, and teaches us no other thing then that after we are fallen from error into impiety, to maintain both obstinately, we fall easily into blindness and extravagance, renouncing reason itself, and the common sense of all men, to follow vain imaginations and trivial and groundless subtleties.

The second conclusion which we said the Jesuits draw from this principle: That the greatness of a sin ought to be taken from its matter and object, is this, that he who hath a will and a design to commit if he could all venial sins, sinneth onely venially, *Escobar* makes thereof a probleme; proposing it in this manner. ^l It may be held that he who hath a will to commit all venial sins, sinneth mortally; and it may also be said that he doth not sin mortally. The reason for this second part (of

l Habens voluntatem peccata omnia venialia perpetrandi, peccat & non peccat mortaliter. Escobar, Theol. Mor. l. 3. pag. 83.

Escobar, Theol. Mor. l. 3. pag. 83.

this probleme) is the very principle that we now speak of: ^m Because that, saith he, the malice of an inward action of the will is taken from the object towards which it warps, according as it is represented to it by the understanding. But the object of this will are all venial sin, and the malice which the understanding represents unto it is but venial; and for that cause a will to commit all venial sins can be but a venial sin.

objectum hujus internæ voluntatis sunt omnia venialia, & nulla major malitia proponitur à ratione præter venialiter. Et igitur una voluntas peccandi omnia peccata venialia, non potest esse culpa leibalis.

m Non peccat, quia malitia interni actus voluntatis diffinitur ab objecto prout proponitur a ratione Sed venialiter. Et igitur

So that a man may have a will to commit all the venial sins which he can commit in the matter of theft; and all those which can be committed by intemperance, and by all other vices, without sinning otherwise then venially; that is to say, that without mortal sin we may have a will to steal all the goods of the world if we could, taking it at many times, and every time in small quantity; which according to this rule of these Casuists, could not be matter sufficient for a mortal sin; and so in the other vices and sins. The same Escobar in the abridgement which he made of moral Divinity in one sole Book, proposeth the same question, but not any longer as a probleme; but as a resolution and an opinion constantly assented to by the Society. For he professes to relate no others, and to advance nothing of himself, no more then from strange Authors. ⁿ It is demanded, saith he, whether of many venial sins one mortal may be made; and by consequent if one committed all venial sins, which is impossible, if the fault were more then a sleight one? He confesses himself that this case is so extravagant, that it is impossible. Yet he forbears not to propose and resolve it in this sort. ^o Then with Granades, who holds that he who hath a will to commit all at once; and by one sole act all venial sins, sins onely venially. There is some cause to doubt whether the question be more strange, or the answer. For if it be a thing altogether unsufferable, and which would have been grievously punished in the Church heretofore to propose a case and an excess so extraordinary, which no man could not onely not commit, but which even could not come possibly into the heart of the most forlorn in vice; it is not less strange to endeavour to make it be believed that he who would commit this excess which passeth the corruption of all men; that is to say, who would commit more wickedness then either he or any other could possibly act, and would do this deliberately and out of more malice, should commit onely a small sin.

n Rogo, an ex numero venialium exurgat mortale. Unde v. g. per impossibile quis omnia peccata venialia committeret, cui parvum non excuset. Escobar, tract. 2 exam. 1. c. 12. n. 37. P. 385. o Negative respondeo, cum Granado 1. 2. cont. 6. tract. 2. d. 2. sect. 7. docente vol. n.

sem uno actu omnia peccata venialia perpetrare, solum venialiter delinquere.

Who can perswade himself that a person can be in favour with God, who is resolved to offend him as much as he can, so that he may not be damned, and doing all the evil that he is able against him, with resolution to do yet also more if he could do it without destroying himself.

If a child should deal thus with his Father, or a friend with his friend, or a servant with his Master, he would make himself an object of publick hate, and an abomination to the whole world; and there would be no person who would not judge them entirely unworthy of the quality and name of a Son, friend or servant. And neverthelesse these Jesuits pretend that he who demeans himself thus towards God, ceases not to be in truth his servant, his friend, and his son, and that he doth nothing which deserves displeasure, and that he may not be taxed of mortal sin.

Sayber proposes a case which is not far from that of Escobar: He speaks of a man who entering into a Religious Order, had made a resolution not to observe any rule or constitution of that Order, nor of all the counsels or commands of his Superiours, but those things onely which he could not neglect without mortal sin; and for all the rest whereto he thought not himself obliged under the pain of mortal sin as vigils, silence, abstinence, Justes of the Order, and other such like Religious observations, and mortifications of the spirit of the body, he would not trouble himself at all, and would dispense with himself as much as he could. He asks what judgement ought to be made of a Frier who should be in such an estate? whether his resolution and will; which he hath absolutely to violate all the points of his rule, and all the duties of his profession wherein he believed he should not sin at all, or but venially,

nially, should be a mortal sin? whether this would hinder him from being a good Monk, and whether this would be a great fault against the obligation which he had to move towards perfection?

The answer of this Doctor is, that such a man ceased not for all that to be in a good estate before God; and that he should be a good Frier though not perfect, and that he sinned not, at least not mortally, against the obligation he had in the quality of a Religious person to pursue after perfection. One of his reasons is, that because he sins but venially (as he supposes) in violating severally every one of the points of his rule, and the regular observations which he is resolved not to observe, the will which he hath to transgresse them all, is but a will to sin venially, and which hath for its object venial sins onely; and which by consequence it self could be no other then a venial sin.

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We shall consider more particularly this case of *Sanchez* and his answer, in handling the duties of Friers, and perhaps elsewhere, speaking of mortal and venial sin. I was willing onely to mark this here by the by, as a dependence and conclusion of the principle, which is the subject of this Chapter, that the greatness of the sin ought to be estimated from, and according to its matter and subject.



SECOND



THE
SECOND PART
OF THE
FIRST BOOK.

Of the eternal principles of Sin.

*That the Jesuits nourish them that they may gratifie the passions of men,
and by consequence excite them to Sin.*

Hitherto we have shewn that the Jesuits nourish sin, by nourishing men in passions, in evil habits and in vices, in Ignorance, and in a false pretence of good intentions, wherewith they commonly shelter themselves, which are as it were the Fountains and the internal principles of Sin. I must now make it appear that they favour no less the outward principles of the same sin, which are 1. Humaine reason and authority, which furnish arms and expedients to defend them. 2. With customs, which produce examples to support them. 3. The next occasions, which draw men to them, cause them to fall into them, and retain them in them. We will treat of every one of these outward principles of sin, apart, as we have done of the inward.

CHAP. I.

Of the maximes of reason and humane authority.

FAith is not less elevated above reason, then reason is above sense; and it is no less disorder to regulate the lives of Christians, who ought to live by Faith, by the maximes of humane reason, and much less of reason corrupted, as it now is by sin, then to desire to judge spiritual things by sense. This were to transform men into Beasts, and to subject them to follow their senses in the regulation of their life, and to treat Christians like Heathens, to give them no other rule for their conversations and actions, then the maximes of Philosophie and humane reason.

Yet this is it which the Jesuits have done; and all those who read their Divinity, and principally that which treats of manners, will find therein no other principles in a manner but those of the lowest Philosophie and humane reason, and that corrupted. They hardly know what it is to cite Scripture or Councils, and if they rehearse any passages of the Holy Fathers, it is for the most part for form onely or to refute them, rather then to use them for foundations or solid proofs of their opinions, in relying on the authority of these great men who have advanced nothing of themselves in points of consequence, which belong to Faith or manners, which they had

not taken from those who went before them in the Church, and which came not originally from the Apostles, and from Jesus Christ, by the Tradition of the Church. 252

But the Jesuits, far enough from this conduct, make profession to invent and to speak things of themselves, to follow novelty, to make every thing probable, to leave to the ingenious to choose in all opinions. Whence it comes, that making use sometimes of one, sometimes of another, they accommodate themselves easily to the humours of all the world, and have wherewith to content all; how contrary soever they can be. But this also makes them fall many times into contradictions which are inevitable for them who have no other rule but their own proper sense.

These are the things which I shall handle in this Chapter, to shew what a wound they have given unto Divinity, and by consequence thereof to good manners, in substituting reason into the place of faith, and particular and novel opinions to that of antiquity, and the tradition of the Fathers, I shall make apperent.

1. That their Divinity is novel, and that they make profession to follow novelty.
2. That every thing in it is probable, and that they will have the liberty to follow all sorts of opinions.
3. That their School is venal and wholly complaisant to the world, and that they will have wherewith to content all sorts of persons, in answering every one according to his desire.
4. That it is full of contradictions.

I will treat every one of these points severally, dividing this Chapter into so many Articles.

ARTICLE I.

The Jesuits make profession to follow novel maxims, and to contemn tradition and antiquity.

NOvelty hath always been odious in the Church, if at any time it were objected unto the Saints, they did always defend themselves from it as from a calumny, and have had an extream care to advance nothing in the Church which they had not learned in the Church it self; so far that they have believed that it was no lesse crime to introduce or receive new Doctrines then to make or adore Idols. This is the judgement of Saint *Augustin*, upon these words of the 80. Psalm. *Non erit tibi Deus recens*, where he saith that ^a *this new God is an Image of stone, or a false imagination.* And a little after, he unfoldeth his thoughts more at large in these words: ^b *it is not said, thou shalt have no new God without thee: as if he would onely mark the outward and visible forms: but he saith, you shall not have a new God within your selves. That is to say, you shall not bear within your hearts, in your imaginations in the illusion of your error, a new God, contining your selves old and corrupt.*

^a *Deus recens aut lapis aut phantasma est S. August.*
in Ps. 80.

^b *Non dixit, a te, quasi simulachrum formisecus adhibitum;*

sed in te, in corde tuo, in imagine phantasmatis tui, in deceptione erroris tui; tecum portabis Deum tuum recensentem, manens recensentem. Ibid.

All novel opinions contrary to the Tradition and ancient belief of our Fathers, are, to speak properly, nothing but phantasmes, imaginatins and errors: these are as it were so many Idols which some would introduce into the Church, which they would put into the place of Divine truth, which at once is the rule of our life, the object of our Faith, and of our adoration. 258

And as those who make Idols, those who sell, and those who buy them to adore them, are all equally Idolaters: so in the same manner those who invent novel opinions, those who teach them, and those who follow them, are all complices of the same fault: and though these last may be lesse guilty, and are more to be lamented then the others, because they do sin with more ignorance, and wilder themselves by following blind guides; yet they all find themselves involved in the same misery,

Æ. I. B. I. P. 2. C. I. A. I.

and

and subject to the same condemnation, pronounced by the Fathers, and by the Scripture, who condemn this sin, and forbid it as a sort of Idolatry.

According to these principles of the Scripture, and the language of the Prophet and of God himself, we may say there are so many Idolaters as there are writers at this day amongst the Jesuits, there being none of them in a manner who are not jealous of their own proper thoughts, and who have not introduced into Divinity some novel opinion; or who do not make profession to maintain and teach some which have been introduced by their Fraternity, to the prejudice of the ancients who have been always received and followed in the Church until these last times.

Poza hath composed a great volumn which he hath intituled *Elucidarium Despara*, in which there will be found very little, if all that be thrown out which he hath invented himself. It had need to be copied out in a manner whole and entire, to make appear all the ridiculous and extravagant things that it contains, and all the excesses and errors into which he is fallen, pursuing his own thoughts and imaginations; having not taken so much care to given the Verigin true praises, as to produce new and extraordinary, which even in this do dishonour her, and cannot be pleasing to her. Because the praises which are to be given to Saints, as well as the honour which we are to render unto God himself, ought not to be founded on any thing but truth. I will onely rehearse some of the most considerable places of this Author.

He maintains confidently that Saint *Anne* and Saint *Joachim* were sanctified from the wombs of their Mothers, and that there is more reason to attribute to them this priviledge, then to *Jeremy* and Saint *John Baptist*. He confesses, ^d that there are no persons that are for him or against him in this proposition, because none have spoken of it before himself. If there be no Author for him, they are all against him, and the silence of the Saints and all the Doctors that were before him, is a manifest condemnation of his presumption, and of his rashness in so declaring himself an innovator, in an unheard of novelty in the Church in a matter of Religion.

d Nullus est pro me in assertionem hac, sed neque contra me, cum non sit hactenus disputata. *Poza* in *Elucidario* l. 2. tr. 8. c. 3. p. 547.

Molina hath done the same thing, where he hath gloried to have invented the middle knowledge in the matter of Grace and of Predestination, with such insolence, that he is not afraid to say, that if it had been known in the first ages of the Church, the heresie of the Pelagians possibly had never risen.

Maldonat, who is one of the Commentators on Scripture whom they esteem, doth often declare himself the Author of new senses, which he gives the Word of God against the consent even of the Fathers, many times in his books we meet such expressions as these: ^c I would find some Author who was of this opinion, or: all Authors whom I remember to have read, expound this text in this manner, but I expound it otherwise. Which is a manifest contempt of the Council of *Trent*, which forbids to expound Scripture against the consent of the Fathers; and an imitation of the language of *Calvin* and other Hereticks, renouncing the tradition of the Holy Fathers, and all the antiquity of the Church.

c Vellem habere Autorem qui ita sentiret. . . . Omnes quotquot legisse me memini Auctores, sic explicant; ego autem aliter

If *Escobar* could have condemned this confidence of his Fraternity, he would have condemned them onely of venial sin. ^e To introduce, saith he, novel opinions, and new sorts of habits into the Church, is onely a venial sin. He hath cause to talk of new opinions, as of new fashions of Garments, for in the new Divinity of the Jesuits who hold all things probable, there needs no more reason to quit an ancient opinion, then to change the fashion of apparel; and if there be any ill in it, it is very small, and that too must come from some peculiar circumstance, as from vanity or ambition.

e Vellem habere Autorem qui ita sentiret. . . . Omnes quotquot legisse me memini Auctores, sic explicant; ego autem aliter sentio. *Malden.* *e* Novas opiniones, novas vestes exponere, venialis tantum culpa est. *Escob.* tr. 2. exam. 2.

Though this censure of *Escobar* be very gentle, *Molina* and *Maldonat* as more ancient and more considerable in the Society then he, will not submit thereunto, and *Poza* is so far from acknowledging, that there is any ill in inventing new opinions, that he had a design in his Book not to produce therein any other then the inventions and imaginations of his own mind; and for this reason in the entrance and preface he makes an Apology for novelty, in which he hath forgotten nothing that he believed might be of use to make it recommendable, and to give it admission as well into the Church as into the World, imploying for this purpose authority, examples, and reasons.

n. 10. p. 291. *Quia ejusmodi inventionem quis gestit aliorum laudem captare* Ibid.

¶ Patet omnibus
veritas, nondum
est occupata; qui
ante nos fue-
runt, non domini
sed duces fue-
runt; multum
ex illa futuris
relictum est.
Seneca, Ep. 33.
¶ Dum unusquis-
que mavult credere
quam iudicare, numquam de vita iudicatur,
semper creditur. h Non alligo me ad aliquem ex
Stoicis proceribus; est mihi censendi jus. Itaque aliquem iubeo sententiam dividere de beata vita.

It is clear that these passages go to establish a right for reason above authority : which had been tolerable in an Heathen, who had no other guide but Reason, and who speaks of questions and things which cannot be regulated but by Reason. But a Christian, a Monk, a man who interposes himself to write in the Church in matters of Faith, for the instruction and edification of the faithful, to make use of the maximes and terms of a Pagan to ruine the obedience of Faith, and the tradition which is one of its principal foundations, staying off the Faithful from the submission which they owe to the Word of God, and the authority of the Holy Fathers, is a thing unsufferable in the Church of God, this is almost to turn it Pagan, and to give every one a liberty to opine in matters of Religion, as the Heathen Philosophers did in matters of science and morality, wherein they followed their senses onely and proper thoughts.

¶ He alledged also some passages of Catholick Authors, as that same of Tertullian.
i Our Lord Jesus Christ said that he was the truth, and not the custom. And this other of Lactantius : k These deprive themselves of wisdom, who suffer themselves to be led by others like Beasts, receiving without discerning all that which the ancients have invented. That which deceives them is the name of Ancestors. Imagining that they cannot be wiser then they, because they come after them, and because these are called neoteriques. And in the same place. l God hath given wisdom to every man, according to his capacity, and those who precede us in time do not therefore exceed us in wisdom. For being it is given indifferently to all men, they who came first cannot by their possession eject others from it.

i Dominus noster Christus veritatem se, non consuetudinem nominavit. Tertull.
k Sapientiam sibi adimunt qui sine ullo iudicio inventa maiorum probant, & ab aliis peccandum more ducuntur. Sed hoc eos fallit, quod maiorum nomine posito, non putant fieri posse ut ipsi plus sapiant, quia minores vocantur. Lactant. lib. 2. divin. instit. c. 8. l Deus dedit omnibus pro virili portionem sapientie: nec quia nos illi temporibus, sapientia quoque antecesserunt. Quia si omnibus aequaliter datur, occupari ab antecedentibus non potest. Ibid.

He considered not when he alledged these passages, that what these Authors say, is for reproof of those who suffer themselves to be carried with humane customs and traditions, to the prejudice of manifest truth, or who are too credulous and timorous in the inquiry after natural things, which depend on reason; and that they speak not of matters of Faith and Religion, such as those are which he handles in his Book. But if he have perceived this truth, he abuses the authority of these great personages, applying it against their sence, and using it without reason to justify a thing quite remote from their thoughts, and contrary to their judgements and from that of all antiquity, which were easie to be made appear, if it were not a thing too remote from my subject.

¶ He alledged also these words which he attributes to the Council of Constantinople :
m Happy is that man who produces an unheard word, that is a new one. Finally, he cites those words of the holy Scripture : n every learned Doctor is like unto a Father of a Family who brings out of his treasure things new and old.

in Beatus qui profert verbum inauditum, id est novum. Syn. Const. art. 1.
n Omnis scriba doctus similis est patrifamilias qui profert de thesauro suo nova & vetera. Matth. 13. ver. 53.

I passe by this last passage of the Gospel of Saint *Matthew*, which he abuseth manifestly against the sence of the Son of God, and that of all interpreters. But I cannot passe over the remarkable falsity, and visible corruption of the pretended words of the Council of *Constantinople*. For the true words of the Council are: *Beatus qui profert verbum in auditum obedientium. Blessed is he who utters a word into obedient ears.* From which he first cuts off the word *obedientium, obedient*. Afterwards he joins two words into one, and instead of *in auditum, in to the hearing*, which were the Councils words, he makes it say *inauditum, unheard*. In the third place adding corruption of sence unto falsification of words, he saith that this word *inauditum* signifies *new*. But there is no cause to marvel that the desire of novelty leads to falsity, and consequently to errors and heresies.

Azor, and after him *Fillinius* who doth nothing in effect but follow him, speak also very advantageously for novelty, saying generally that the Apostolical Traditions are of humane right, and that by consequence they may be changed. ^o *Divine Traditions*, saith *Azor*, appertain to *Divine right*, and by consequence they are *immutable*: but the Traditions of the Apostles are humane *Laws*, and for that cause the Church may change them. He expounds a little above what he means by *Divine* and *Apostolical Traditions* in these terms: ^p *Divine Traditions* are those which the Apostles have learned from the mouth of *Jesus Christ*, or which the Holy Ghost hath dictated, and they have written by his Command, or by that of *Jesus Christ*. The Traditions of the Apostles are those which the Apostles have instituted in the quality of *Prelats, Doctors, Tutors, and Governours* of the Church. In such manner that according to them, the Traditions of the Apostles are no other then the Inventions of the Apostles, which they ordained themselves, and of their own proper motion, without having learned them of *Jesus Christ*, or the Holy Spirit. This is no more then his words clearly signifie, and the division he makes suffers not any other sence to be given them, since he opposes those Traditions which the Apostles have instituted of themselves; *quas ipsi Apostoli instituerunt*, to those which they have received from the mouth of *Jesus Christ*, and from those which the Holy Ghost taught them, and which he established by their Ministry; *quas ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli receperunt, vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante & jubente, vel Christo Domino imperante, promulgarunt.*

Sancto dictante vel gubernante, vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt. Apostolicæ sunt quas ipsi Apostoli tanquam Ecclæe Prelati, Doctores, magistri & rectores instituerunt. Azor. Ibid.

He makes then of these two sorts of Traditions, as it were, two opposite members, dividing Traditions into *Divine* and *Humane* or *Apostolical*. He calls the first *Divine*, because they draw their original from *God* and his Spirit, who hath instituted them, the Apostles having onely published them by his motion and order; he affirms that the other are humane, and of humane right: *ad jus humanum spectant*, because according to him they proceed from an humane spirit, and not from *Gods*, and that the Apostles who were men, instituted them, and are become their *Fathers* and *Authors*.

If it be true, as he saith, that the Apostles have made these rules in the Church, whether concerning faith or manners, and that they have not received them from *Jesus Christ* nor the Holy Ghost, he hath reason to say that the constitutions and traditions, which he terms *Apostolical*, are onely of humane right, because they take their original and their authority from the spirit of man, and which by consequence may be changed by men; and it may follow also from the same principle, that they are subject unto error; the spirit of a man, how holy soever it be, may always deceive him, when he is the Author and original of his thoughts and actions.

It will follow thence also that the Apostles have governed the Church as *Princes*, and *Politicians* govern their estates and their common wealths, by their wit and reason. It would follow likewise that the Church is not governed by the Spirit of *Jesus Christ*, being they who first governed it, and who are the first modules to all them that followed in that rule, had no other then an humane conduct, in instituting and establishing of themselves that which seemed unto them just and reasonable; not as instruments animated by *Jesus Christ*, but as the Authors and principals thereof, following their own senses and thoughts.

The Jesuits perhaps will not be much troubled to agree to all those things; which are

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^o Ex quo efflu-
tur ut traditio-
nes divine ad
jus divinum spe-
ctent, ac proinde
sunt immutabi-
les: Aposto-
lica vero ad jus
humanum, &
propterea Ecclæ-
sæ autoritate
mutabiles. Azor,
Istæ. mor. 1.
8. c. 4. q. 4.
p. 743. Fil-
linius, tom. 2.
tr. 22. c. 1.
n. 11. p. 65.
^p Divine tradi-
tiones sunt quas
ab ipsius Christi
ore Apostoli ac-
ceperunt, vel
quas Spiritu

common enough in their Society, and maintained by their most famous Writers, who teach that the Laws of the Church are no other then humane; that its power and conduct extends onely to the outward man, and that the Church it self is onely a politic body, as shall be proved elsewhere, when we come to make known how pernicious these maxims are to all Religion, and overturn the power and authority of the Church.

After *Azor* had spoken so basely and so unworthily of the Apostles and Apostolical constitutions, we need not think that strange which he saith against the Ancients and Fathers of the Church, and would have the opinions of the new writers of these times to have as much weight and credit as they, so that if the Fathers sometimes prevail with them against the new Authors, the new Authors do as often and more frequently prevail over the Fathers. It is in the second Book of his Moral Institutions, where

q *Primo quaeritur an opinio probabilior existimetur, ita ut merito preferri debeat, eo quod sit antiquorum sententia, & altera sit recentiorum?* after he had demanded *whether we ought to hold an opinion more probable, because it is from the ancient Fathers; or whether for this reason it ought to be preferred before that of the moderns?* He answers in these terms: *when the opinions are equal themselves, those of the ancients are commonly preferred before new writers: but there is neither law nor reason sufficient to oblige us to preferre them always.* This is no great honour to the Fathers, to say that we may preferre their opinions before those of modern Authors, when the reasons appear equal on both sides, since as much may be said of all sorts of Writers, following the Jesuits rule of probability. 267

r *Respondeo quando revera opiniones sunt pares, saepe antiquorum opinio juniorum sententia praefatur: non tamen lege aut ratione efficaci compellimur ad eam semper antefendam.* Inst. Moral. l. 2. c. 17. q. 1. p. 127.

But the contempt is more manifest in that which he adds, that even in this case there is no obligation to subject our judgements to the opinions of the Holy Doctors of the Church, who in important affairs say nothing but what they learned of it, and that every one hath liberty to follow them, or not to follow them; so it shall be lawful to follow the moderns always, and never to follow the Fathers, when the reasons of the moderns are as likely as those of the Fathers, which will easily appear so to those who judge by humane sense, and natural reason, rather than by the light of Faith, as the Casuists of these times, and the people of the world commonly do.

It will also be lawful to preferre the moderns before the Ancients, even when the ancients are grounded on more strong and solid reasons, according to that maxime of the Jesuits, who say that we may prefer an opinion, which is lesse, before another which is more probable. For this is an infallible consequence of this maxime, joynd to that other, which will have the Fathers, and their opinions, considered no otherwise then by reason and conformity to humane sense, as the Parliament of *Paris* considers the Laws and opinions of the ancient Roman Lawyers, or rather as the hereticks consider the holy Fathers, to whom even they render a little more honour and respect in appearance: saying that they are to be judged, not by reason, as all these new Doctors, but by the Scriptures, though they regard not Scripture but according to their reason, and the preoccupation of their spirits. But they both agree in the overthrow they give the authority of the Fathers, subjecting them to their reason and their fancy, and giving them onely as much force as they please, following the custom of all those who impugn the truths, and most assured and inviolable rules of antiquity and Religion. 268

Reginaldus handling the same question, whether the ancients or the moderns are rather to be believed, when they are found in contrary opinions. He distinguishes upon the Point, saying that *in resolving difficulties that arise about faith the right thereof is to be drawn from the ancients: but those which regard manners, and the life of Christians are to be taken from the modern writers.*

f *Quae circa fidem emergunt difficultates, sunt à veteribus bannitae: quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos, à novitiis scriptoribus.* Reginald. praefat. ad Lect.

It is ordinary with those who have no right to a thing, for which they contest unjustly, to endeavour to have it divided, to the end that they may have at least one half, when they cannot carry all for themselves. It was by this rule that *Solomon*

690 knew that of the two women who disputed in his presence, in the case of the Infant, either pretending that it belonged to her; that she who would have had it cut asunder in the middle ought to have none of it, and was not the true Mother. So the Jesuits cannot better testify that they are deprived of truth, than by their consenting to divide it, in such manner that one half should be to the ancients, and the other half to the moderns, that is, themselves.

But if it belong to the ancients to determine on questions which arise about matters of Faith, it must needs be that they also decide difficult matters of conscience and manners, since the faithful ought to live by Faith, and if we ought to take from the moderns the rules of manners, and not of Faith, we must have another rule of life given us than Faith, if Faith be not the source and measure of good works, nor the principle of Christian life.

Celot undertaking to defend the Casuists of his company, testifies that *Reginaldus* hath done as he said, and having taught moral Divinity twenty years, he always made profession to follow the opinions of the newest Authors; & *quidem recentiorum*. Which he approves and confirms, relating that very passage of the Author which we have just now cited in the same terms as we have produced them: *Celot*, l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. *Quia quae circa fidem emergunt difficultates, sunt a veteribus hauriende, quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos, a novitiis Scriptoribus*. Which shews that this wicked Doctrine is not peculiar to one or two, but comes from the genius of the Society. In whose name this Author wrote, who seemeth desirous to separate us from the ancients, and to hinder us from acknowledging them for our Fathers, that he might set them in their place.

700 If it be true then that we ought to take the ancients for the rule of faith onely, and not of works, the faith which we receive from them will be dead and barren; and if the moderns give us onely the rules of manners, without those of Faith, our life, how good soever it appear, would be no other then Heathen. And if it be pretended that with the rules of manners they give us also them of faith, whether they take them from the ancients, or make them themselves as they do those of manner to give them us, we are more obliged to them than the ancients, or rather we hold all of them, without having any need of the ancients, we receive good life, virtue, holiness, from those who are no Saints, and we hold nothing from the Saints, from whom we receive onely a dead faith, a Faith of Devils as Saint *Augustin* speaks according to Scripture. And to speak truth, the children of the Church receive not their life of the Fathers of the Church, and are not their children, but of the Fathers of this World, and Divines of the last times.

Celot is not contented to follow *Reginaldus* in this point, but he speaks of himself for novelty against antiquity, with a sleightness and contempt unsufferable. ^a What shall we do, faith he, all humane affairs are thus; the ancients lived after their rules, and we after ours. And who shall tell us which are the better? He acknowledges that which is too true, we now live in a manner quite different from that of the ancients, and of the Holy Fathers; and this is that which should oblige us to address our selves rather unto them, then unto the moderns, to learn to regulate our manners, and to live Christian-like. For as in all sorts of professions we seek the best Masters to instruct us; so it is clear that those who have lived holily, and who are acknowledged for Saints in the Church, are more proper to teach holiness and Christian life, then they that are no Saints, as all the new Divines are not, to say no more of them.

There is none but *Celot* who seems not willing to confess that the ancients are better then the moderns, in saying, that we know not whether their conduct and rules be better then that of the moderns. But he should at least have considered, that we may well sometimes give the moderns the name of Fathers, but not of Saints, and that by the Holy Fathers, we understand always the ancients, so that as well the publick voice of the Church as that of the Society it self suffices to convince the blindness of his Pride.

But he is not content to equal himself and his to the Holy Fathers, and ancient Religious who lived in the primitive times of the Church in a holiness and purity altogether extraordinary, he hath also the confidence to preferre himself, in these strange

Quid agas?
Sic se habent
humana omnia,
vix erunt mori-
bis sine antiqui,
nos novitiis utri-
moliis? *Celot*
in pref. l. 5.
p. 240.

b Inique de nostro seculo iudicaverunt qui nostrorum Religiosorum mores ex antiquorum sacris expendunt; ut quod illi faciendum sibi committendumve censuerunt; hoc nos confestim pro voluntate amplectimur aut fugiamus. Plane ut quis maturi ævi hominem ad pueritiam redire compellat, quoniam in illo ætate & flore vitulum & elegantulum nonnihil habebat quod matri arrideret. Celot, Ibid.

terms. ^b They do wrong, saith he, to our age who would judge of the life of the Religions of our times, by that of the ancients: in such sort that what the ancients have believed themselves to be obliged to do or to avoid, we ought also to command or forbid, without other reason then because the ancients have ordained it, this is as it were to desire them to return to their infancy who are at maturity of age, because that in their first years they had somewhat of pleasant and pretty, which flattered the eyes of their Mother. He could not have discovered himself more, nor testified more contempt of these great Saints and first Religious, then to compare the moderns to men grown ripe and perfect, and the ancients to infants, who have nothing at all of solid, but onely a prettiness proper to content the easiness and foolish affection of women. Whence it follows, we are no more to consider the ancient Fathers, then as children, in regard of the moderns, who must be the venerable Fathers of the Fathers themselves; and by consequence they can be no longer their disciples, since it belongs to perfect men to instruct children, and not children to instruct men.

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c Alios tulit potius quam expresse probavit Ecclesia homines seculi fastidio & amore Dei incitatos, statim cursu in solitudinem se abdentes, ut sanctum Paulum, ut in primis annis sanctum Antonium & alios ab Augustino memoratos. Celot, l. 5. c. 4. p. 257.

It seems that it is in this same sense, that *Celot* speaking of *Saint Paul*, the first *Eremit*, of *Saint Anthony*, and many other Saints, who imitated them in flying the corruption of the world, and retiring into the Desert to serve God there, he saith that the Church hath rather tolerated then approved those great personages, and their manner of life altogether Holy and Evangelical. ^c The Church, saith he, rather tolerated then approved formally, those who being pressed on by the love of God, and contempt of the World, retired as it were in haste, and went to hide themselves in the wilderness, as *Saint Paul* and *Saint Anthony*, in the first ages, and others of whom *Saint Augustin* speaks. We tolerate onely that which is evil or disorderly, which comes always from evil or weaknesse. This Jesuit therefore must accuse these great Saints of the one or the other, and that their actions which were all holy passe in his mind for disorders or defects, if it be true that the Church did tolerate them onely, as he saith, and not approve them. But she could not give them a greater approbation then by Canonizing them, and declaring them Saints for that Angelical and admirable life which they led in the Wilderness, as also the Church testifies at this day publicly in its office, and its mysteries, and all the great personages of the Church, the Holy Bishops, the Popes and the Doctors have published their praises, out-vying as it were one another through all ages of Christianity: and *Celot* perhaps is the first amongst Catholicks, that hath had the boldness to debase and dispraise them.

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d Quemadmodum in prisca seculorum hominibus adeo fuit obrutus divinus ignis & rationis, ut cum posteriorum ætatum politis & elegantibus ingenis comparati, vix homines appareant. Celot, l. 5. c. 10. p. 314.

But this contempt and insolence will appear yet more unworthy and unsufferable, when he compares them to those who lived in the first ages of the world, of whom the Poets speak as of savages and beasts, living without Laws, without politie, and without conduct; in such manner that those who came after, being formed and regulated by the reason and industry of the more prudent, there appeared betwixt them so notable a difference, that it seemed that it might be said that the former were not men in comparison of the latter. So *Celot* speaks and pretends in the sequel of his discourse, that ^d as the Heavenly fire of reason had so little vigour amongst the men of the first ages of the world, that comparing it with the beauty and politeness of the spirits of latter ages, it was hard to believe that they were men; In like manner *Saint Anthony*, *Saint Paul*, and the other Hermits who lived in the first ages of the Church, compared with the Religious of this present, cannot without difficulty passe for true Religious; whereas we have cause to wish that these last might be set in comparison with the former, and were all worthy to bear the name of their disciples and children.

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In the mean time he is so firm and resolute in his opinion, that he cannot so much as onely suffer that the examples of these ancient Fathers, of the Monks, should be alledged, being not willing they should be otherwise considered then as children.

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For see how he bespeaks his adversary: *You are troublesome and importunate, alledging unto us continually the examples of those who lived when the institution of Monks was but yet in its infancy. Which he bears so aloft that he fears not to say in expresse terms; That antiquity cannot be attended to without danger. As if the opinions and the examples of the Holy Fathers, and of the first Religious were not onely unprofitable but also dangerous, and that it were more safe to raze them out of the memories of men, then to regard and consider them.*

e Næru durus & importunus, qui ad exempla nascentis monachismi perpetuo provocat. Ibid.

P. 241. Meminerit interim hujusmodi interrogationibus antiquitatem sine periculo respectari non posse. Ibid.

interrogationibus antiquitatem sine periculo respectari non posse. Ibid.

50 But if there be danger to attend unto antiquity, and consider those great Saints who lived in the first ages of the Church, it is dangerous also to write and read their lives; without doubt for fear that those who observe and read them, should thereby become affected with them and imitate them, it being manifest that they are not read nor written, but on this design.

We must also condemn the whole Church, who publickly celebrates and honors their memory, and demands of God for her children grace to imitate them, as she declares often in her office: So that it cannot be dangerous to observe these ancient Fathers and first Religious; and to follow their examples, but onely for those who have introduced so many novelties, both into their Doctrine and into their conduct, that the sole view of antiquity, from which they are so prodigiously departed suffices to convince and to confound them.

ARTICLE II.

Of the Doctrine of Probability.

60 **A** Whole Book may be made of this Article, which is the principal of this Extract, as also the subject which is here handled, is the most general and important of the Jesuits Divinity, in which in a manner all things are probable; as may be seen by *Escobars* six Volumes of *Problematicque Divinity*: which comes to passe not onely by necessity, because they examine and regulate all things by their sense and by their reason, in quitting the authority of Tradition, which onely can quiet the spirit of man, and give him some assurance and certainty in the knowledge of truths, and particularly of those which respect Religion and manners: but also by a particular design of the Society; because desiring to govern all the World, and not being able, without having wherewith to content all sorts of persons, there is no means more easie, nor Doctrine more commodious for this then that of probability, which gives liberty to say and do all that one will; as it shall clearly appear in the prosecution of this Article, where we will first represent the principal opinions and maxims of the Jesuits touching the Doctrine of probability; and in consequence thereof the pernicious effects which it produceth in the Church, and in the world, which shall be the two principal points of this Article.

I. POINT:

I. POINT.

The principal maxims of the Jesuits concerning probability.

THe Doctrine of probability taken out of the Jesuits Books consists particularly in these following points.

1. That the Jesuits Divinity makes all things probable.
2. That they pretend that an opinion is probable; though it be held onely by one single Divine.
3. That of two probable opinions we may choose that which is lesse probable and safe.
4. That we may even follow sometimes one and sometimes the other though they be contraries. Because that these points for the most part depend one on another, and are ordinarily handled together, and in connexion by the Casuists, I will not separate them at all. Yet that I may keep some order, and hinder the tediousness and confusion which would happen if I should amasse in one sole Article all that I have to relate upon every one of these points, I will represent apart the opinions of the principal Jesuit Authors, who treat thereon, beginning with *Layman* and *Azor*, who are the most famous of the Society.

S E C T. I.

The opinion of Layman, and of Azor, concerning probability.

^a Ex duabus probabilibus partibus quaestionis, licitum est eam sequi quae minus tuta est.

^b Quia in moralibus operationibus necesse

non est sequi quod optimum & tutissimum, sed sufficit sequi bonum ac tutum. Layman, lib. 1. tract. 1. cap. 5. sect. 2.
P. 4.

^c Quod autem probabilis opinio tradit, id bonum ac licitum est. Ibid.

Layman establisheth fairly, at first, for a fundamental maxime, ^a that when there are two probable opinions about one question, it is lawful to follow that which is lesse sure: Of which he renders this reason, ^b Because in moral actions it is not necessary to follow the rule which is absolutely the best and most safe; and it sufficeth that it be absolutely good and sure. Now he pretends ^c that what is supported by a probable opinion is simply good and lawful; taking lawful and safe, for the same thing.

^d Probabilis sententia, uti communiter accipitur, ita definitur potest: Quae certitudinem non habens, tamen vel gravi auctoritate, vel

non modici momenti ratione nititur. Ibid. p. 5. ^e Auctoritas gravis hoc loco censeri debet, quae est saltem unius viri docti & probi, qui tamen talem doctrinam non inconsiderate ac temere, sed post perspecta rationum pondera quae in oppositum offerri possunt, amplexus est. Ibid.

But if they demand what will make an opinion probable, see here the conditions which he requires thereto, and the definition which he gives thereof: ^d we may call that a probable opinion, as it is commonly understood, which being not certain and undoubted, is notwithstanding supported by some considerable authority, or some reason which is not slight. He afterwards expounds the definition himself in this manner: ^e that authority which may be judged considerable in this matter, is at least of one learned and honest man, provided that he have not embraced it inconsiderately and rashly, but after he hath weighed and examined the reasons of those who hold the contrary.

^f Po. 70. probabilior sententia censeri debet, qui lex eo loco recepta assistit. Nam Judex in mandatis habet ut secundum leges judicet. Ibid. pag. 7.

In the least temporal affairs we require at least two witnesses, to give a Judge a competent knowledge of what is necessary for him, whereon to form a reasonable judgement; and this Jesuit would have a man to repose himself for eternal salvation upon the word of one man alone, or on an apparent reason. He confesses himself in this place, pag. 8. ^f that an opinion ought not to be received as probable in Justice, nor

serve for a rule unto a Judge, unless it be authorized by the Laws which are received in every place, and that the Judge is obliged to Judge according to those Laws. So that, according to Layman, it is not lawful for a secular Judge to follow his own sence, nor that of one or more Consellers in temporal Laws, but he is obliged to attend to the Laws and Ordinances as the true rule of his judgements; and yet according to the same Jesuit, it is lawful to decide difficulties which respect conscience, Salvation and Religion, by the sence of one single man, or by one single reason, without taking the pains to examine and Judge of it by the Law of God, and by the ordinances and rules of the Church.

After this we need not wonder, if the Jesuits believe that the conduct of the Church is altogether humane and politick. For if it be such as Layman here describes it, it follows evidently that it is even below the conduct of policy, and is not so much as humane or reasonable.

Emanuel Sa and Escobar, who have made an extract, as it were, and choice of the principal Authors of the Society, and the opinions which it approveth, also accord in this point with Layman: Sometimes one single Doctor, saith Escobar, who is of great estimation may make an opinion probable. And demanding a little after, whether an opinion more probable may be left to follow one that is lesse probable? He answers yes, though that also which is left be likewise more safe.

f Aliquando unus tantum Doctor gravis admodum opinionem probabilem potest facere.

Escobar in proemio, Exam. 3. n. 8. p. 24. in uno & tutiori. Ibid. p. 9. p. 25.

g Num liceat opinionem probabilem sequi relicta probabiliori? Licet.

Emanuel Sa expounds himself farther, saying that it is lawful to do that which we hear affirmed by a learned man, or what we see done by honest men, although we have cause to fear they are deceived, and believe our selves that the contrary is more safe for conscience. Aman, saith he, may do that which he believes by some authority or some probable reason to be lawful for him, all be it the contrary be more safe; and it is sufficient for him to have on his side the opinion of some one Doctor of reputation, or the example of honest men.

h Potest quis facere quod probabilis ratione vel autoritate putat licere, etiamsi oppositum tutius sit.

Sufficit autem opinio alicujus gravis Doctoris, aut bonorum exemplum. Sa verb. Dubium. num. 3. pag. 183.

But Escobar raises the price yet higher above him; and sets the last hand as he pretends unto the Doctrine of probability, and that he might extend the licence which he gives men to do whatsoever they would, to the uttermost point to which it may be drawn, he saith in the Preface of his problematick Divinity that opinion is probable not onely when he that invented it, saith that it is, and when it is supported by some probable reason: but it ceases not to be probable, though neither the Doctor who advances it, nor any other say that it is true: for a Doctrine, which no man ever approved or rejected, may please some who shall read it. I will add that albe it even all Authors do positively reject it, nevertheless if any Doctor find that the reason he make use of to prove it is not sufficiently destroyed, the opinion may be held for probable. So that there is place to hope, according to this Author, that the most universally condemned crimes may one day become lawful, since it depends upon any one Doctor that shall find that the principles by which worldly men defend themselves are not sufficiently destroyed. There is no need that the Doctrine of probability make any great progresse to go thither; and we may say that the corruption of the manners and minds of men in this age gives cause to fear that there hath been already some Doctor of that opinion,

i Demum non solum tunc judico opinionem habere probabilitatem, quando ille qui eam suscitavit probabilem esse affirmat, & probabili ratione suffulcit. Verum et si doctrina adducta a Doctore, nec a se, nec ab alio vera esse affirmetur, sed gratia solummodo argu-

menti fuit in illa. Et sane Doctrina que nulli Doctori placuit negative, hoc est quam nullus usque modo probavit, aliter licenti docto placere poterit. n. 27. Addiderim si ceteri Doctores illam reprobarerint positive, si tamen eam non esse sufficienter reprobata[m] alteri Doctori videatur, nec argumentum pro illa doctrina adductum satis esse solutum, probabilem posse reputari. Escobar in p. 24. Theologicæ problematicæ.

Tambourin seems yet to add something more to this opinion, or at least to expound

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k Absolute puto pound it in a more plausible, short, and easie way. *k* He supposes that you are in some trouble, how you are to behave your self; when you have a strong desire to do something, and can find no opinion whereon to relie, and to assure you that it is probable: and to set your conscience in quiet, he answers you, that it is enough that you are probably assured, that the opinion is probable. So that not onely probability is sufficient to excuse sin, but probability of a probability.

l *in omnibus casibus constare probabilitate opinionem esse probabilem: ego hic & nunc prudenter operor, quia dum probabiliter puto hoc esse probabile, satis prudenter illud iudicium in praxi sequor.* Tambur. l. 1. Decal. cap. 3. sect. 3. num. 126.

There is no appearance that the Jesuits would make use of this doctrine in their temporal affairs. And in effect it is not good save onely to give them power to dispose of mens consciences, according to their fancies, and so sport themselves with the Salvation of Souls, by submitting them to the inventions of their spirits and their judgements, as a safe rule for the guidance of conscience, which is a thing never heard of in the Church before them.

l Quando opinionones sunt aequae probabiles jure possumus minus tutam in agendo preferre immo etiam si que minus tuta est, minus probabile habetur. Azor. l. 2. c. 16. p. 126.

l Azor handling the same point, saith ¹ that when two opinions are probable the one as well as the other, we may justly preferre in the practice that which is lesse sure, though we believe it also to be lesse probable. He is not content onely to say, that we may follow the lesse probable: but to heighten the esteem of it above others, he adds that we may follow also the lesse safe. And though he confesses that none ever advanced it so far, saying: *Hac authores non tradiderunt*, he forbears not to propose this opinion; whereof he is the Inventor by his own confession, as a probable opinion and sure in conscience: because albeit he want authority, he believes he hath a good and sufficient reason for it: *Ratione tamen efficaci concluditur*, saith he, following the maxime of his Fraternity, that to make an opinion probable, it is sufficient to have one authority or reason which we believe to be good.

m Quia id bene agitur quod prudenter agitur: sed qui aliorum consilio ducitur prudenter agit: ergo qui in agendo opinionem Doctorum probabilem sequitur, prudenter rem gerit.

This good reason is, that ^m what is prudently done is well done; and we do that prudently which we do by the counsel of others: by consequence he that doth follow the opinion of learned men acts prudently. I leave it to those who make profession of logic, to examine this Syllogisme according to their rules, whether it be in good form or not. I will content my self to say, without digging deeper into this matter, for the clearing up and making it to be better understood, that if to act in the manner this Jesuit speaks of be to act prudently, it must needs be that this prudence comes not from the Father of lights, since it carries us to preferre something before God and our own Salvation, and not to have so much love for him nor for the truth, which we see more clear and certain; as for our own sence, and some secret passion which causeth us to embrace and follow that which is lesse true and sure.

n Affero si quis probabiliter credat se jam confessum de illo mortali, vel de non commissse tale peccatum, vel confessionem prius factam de illo, probabiliter putet esse validam, vel probabiliter tales aut tales circumstantias non esse necessario confitendas; non teneri ad confessionem, etiamsi forte probabilis sit confesse vel peccasse mortaliter. Ratio est quia licitum est cuique sequi opinionem probabilem, etiamsi contraria sit probabilior; quod principium satis receptum est in re morali. Suarez de p. d. 22. lib. 9. n. 6. Henric. l. 5. c. 4. Sanchez, f. l. 1. c. 10. n. 76. Diezkillus de Confessione tract. 4. d. 9. d. 8. n. 134.

n Diezkillus extends this prudence so far as to preferre a probable opinion before that which is certain and safe, even in the matter of the Sacraments. For that it is, saith he, to act prudently: For example, ⁿ If any one believeth probably that he hath already confessed such or such a mortal sin, or that he hath not committed it, or that the confession he hath made thereof is valid, or that he is not necessarily obliged to confess such and such circumstances, he will not be obliged to confesse it, though possible it may be more probable that he hath consented unto mortal sin, or that he hath committed it. The reason is, that it is lawful for every one to follow a probable opinion, though the contrary be more probable, this principle being sufficiently received in morality, as Suarez saith.

If this principle be sufficiently received in the Morals of Suarez and his companions, it is not received by the Saints which governed the Church, or rather by whom the Holy Spirit did govern it; wherefore not to speak of others, Saint

A. I. B. I. P. 2. C. I. A. 6. P. 1. S. I.

Augustin

340 *Augustin saith expressely that* ^o *in things which have reference to the Salvation of the soul, a man shall sin grievously in this, onely that he preferres that which is uncertain before that which is certain. And by the same rule that which is less certain, and assured, before that which is more. For that which is less certain, is uncertain in comparison of that which is more; and the intention of this great Saint as well as of all the rest, is to teach us that when eternal Salvation is concerned, we ought always to take the most certain ways, and that we cannot take too much security in a matter of so great importance: Nulla satis magna securitas ubi periclitatur aeternitas. No security can be enough where eternity is in question.*

o *Graviter peccat in rebus ad salutem anime pertinentibus vel eo solo quod certis incerta praeponere. S. Aug. l. 1. de Baptism. contra Donat. c. 3.*

Finally, this prudence is not so much as humane and reasonable; and we should not approve of it in the conduct of temporal affairs. For if a Physician give unto his patient of two remedies which he hath, the more uncertain and ineffectual: or if a Confessor in his instructions about a suite, or in a Plea of great concernment should make use of evidences and arguments which were more doubtful, and suppress the more certain for any private interest: if an Overseer or a Tutor who hath money to put out, should not lend it him whom he knew to be the most sure and solvent: If all these persons, I say, acted on this manner, would they be esteemed wise, or could we say they acted prudently; or should we have cause to approve or be content with their conduct? It is probable the Jesuits would not make use of such people, nor employ them in their affairs of importance; they are onely the things of God and of Salvation, wherein they find it good for us to act on this manner, and wherein they believe that it is not to act against true prudence.

350 In pursuance of all these maximes which are as it were the foundations of all that they say upon this matter, *Layman* and *Azor* draw diverse consequences to decide many particular questions and difficulties.

Layman assures us ^P that a Doctor may give counsel to him that advises with him, not onely following his own opinion, but following also the contrary which other Doctors hold probable, if it be more favourable or more acceptable. He adds, that he believes that this Doctor should do nothing unreasonable in saying to him who consulteth him, that the opinion according to which he hath answered his case, is held by some learned persons, and that by consequence he may follow it; though he himself believes assuredly that it is false in the theory, and that therefore he may not follow it in the practice.

p *Doctor a terri consulti consilium dare potest non solum ex propria, sed etiam ex opposita probabilitate aliorum sententia, si forte illi favorabilior seu exoptatior sit.*

Layman supra pag. 6. *Immo arbitror nihil a ratione alienum fore si Doctor consultus significet consulti opinionem a quibusdam viris doctis tanquam probabilem defendi, quam proinde sequi ipsi liceat, quavis idem Doctor ejusmodi sententiam speculative falsam sibi certo persuadeat, ut proinde ipsemet in praxi eam sequi non possit. Ibid.*

And that we might better see his extravagance, he saith himself, in the same p. 7.

360 *That though it were probable that a Medicine might help a sick person, it would not follow thereupon that it were therefore probable that a Physician might give him a dubious remedy: but on the contrary, because that the life of the body, and the danger of losing it was in question; he is obliged to choose the means which is more safe. Whence he concludes that the Physicians and Chirurgions are obliged to follow certain and assured opinions, and refuse them which are doubtful and uncertain. And to take away from Physicians and Chirurgions all pretence and occasion of failing in a case so important, he declares that if they find not a remedy that is certain, they are obliged to make use of those they judge most probable. He saith shortly after the same thing of the secular Judges: That a Judge is obliged to judge according to the opinion which, after he hath considered all which is alledged and proved on one or other side, seems to him more probable and more conformable to right.*

q *Etsi probabilis opinio sit medicamentum infirmitati profuturum, non inde sequitur probabile esse quod liceat medicamentum dubium adhibere; quin potius cum agatur de periculo corporis, securior via eligenda est.*

Quare Medici & Chirurgi sequi debent sententias certas & securas, rejectis incertis & dubiis. Ibid. pag. 7. Quod si certa curatio non occurrat, tenetur sectari ea quae probabiliora judicat. Ibid. pag. 7. Judex judicare tenetur secundum sententiam quae inspectis allegat omnibus probabilioris juriq. conformior est. Ibid. p. 7.

In temporal things we cannot use too much precaution, nor take too much security, according to the Jesuits; but in those which concern Heaven and Salvation, it is not necessary to be so exact, and to imploy so much care, according to the same Jesuits. *When the health or life of the body is concerned, or where there is danger of losing that,*
A. 1. B. 1. P. 2. C. 1. A. 2. P. 2. S. 2. P 2 they

they declare that we are obliged to choose the means that are more safe: but when we deal about the Salvation, or life of the soul, and the danger of losing it, they pretend that we may chuse the means and follow the opinion which is less secure. To hold this discourse, and to propose these maxims to the faithful, as the rules of their conduct, is it not to teach them openly to take less care of their souls than of their bodies, of their Salvation than of their health, and to preferre the World before God, and life temporal before eternal?

Layman concludes also, following these principles, that a learned man may give to diverse persons counsels quite contrary, according to contrary probable opinions. Which is very conformable to the prudence of the Jesuits, though this carriage appear very abominable to the Divine wisdom, which condemns a man with two tongues, and him that makes use of two different weights and measures for temporal things, and much more for those which respect Religion and eternal Salvation. But that which he adds as a sequel to the same principles seems yet more strange; that a Confessor may not onely follow the opinion of his penitent, though it be contrary to his own; but that he is obliged thereto, though he believes the opinion of his penitent to be false, and even not to be probable. ^u If a penitent, saith he, follow in simplicity in his conduct an opinion which some Doctors have maintained as probable and sure, and on the contrary the Confessor, whether he be ordinary or substitute, thinks it improbable in the theory, he is obliged to give him absolution, notwithstanding his persuasion. So the penitent shall be the arbiter and guide of the Confessor, and not the Confessor of the penitent: and whereas the penitent ought to submit to the opinion of the Confessor, and thereunto is obliged by all sorts of reason and justice, the Confessor shall be obliged to follow the opinion of the penitent, though he judge that which is false and improbable.

*Os bilingue
deceptor. Prov.
8. v. 13.
Pondus & po-
dus, mensura &
mensura, utrum
que abominabile
est apud Deum.
Prov. c. 20.
v. 10.
u Si penitens
in praxi bona
fide sequitur
sententiam que
à quibusdam
Doctoribus tan-
quam probabilis
& iura defen-
ditur; confes-
sarius vero, seu ordinarius seu delegatus, eandem speculative improbabilem censcat; nihil obstante sua persuasione tenet
absolutionem conferre. lb d. p. 5.*

* Azor draws almost the same consequences from the same principles, and demands whether a Scholar may rely upon an opinion; which he hath learned of his Tutor or Professor, without troubling himself with others, and whether he may follow and teach it in security of conscience. He answers that he may; and he saith the same thing of him that meets with any favourable opinion in an approved Author, he maintaineth that both of them are exempt from rashness, in following or in teaching that which they have learnt, the one of his Tutor, the other of the Casuist, whom he hath happened upon. Whence he concludes that it is easie to finde a good guide, and a good warrant for our actions, without being deceived at all, since the first Author we fall upon is good enough; so that the most ignorant cannot mistake, and the most learned have therein no advantage over them. ^v On the contrary he pretends that ignorant and grosse witted persons are not obliged to examine the reasons, and the foundations of the opinions they would embrace, and that to act prudently, it is sufficient unto them to follow the opinion of a man whom they esteem vertuous and knowing. But those who make profession of learning are obliged to examine, and to weigh the reasons of the Authors whom they would follow, to act prudently.

*x Queritur 4.
an discipulus
jure possit sui
magistri & pra-
ceptoris senten-
tiam sequi, ita
ut eam secutus
probabiliter sen-
tire videatur.
Respondeo posse.
Et idem dicen-
dum est de eo
qui operam na-
vat legendis
authoribus ut
doctrinam sibi
comparat; qui
si quam legerit
apud probatum
quempiam Au-
thorem senten-
tiam sequatur, probabiliter opinari merito creditur: & proinde tunc hic, tum discipulus suum magistrum secutus à temerita-
tis crimine liber est. Azor, l. 2. c. 17. p. 131. q. 4. ^y Si vero rudis & imperitus, ejus non est opinionum fundamen-
ta discutere. Quare ut prudenter factiuret, satis est si boni ac docti viri opinionem sequatur. Si vir peritus & doctus,
debet opinionum rationes & pondera examinare & excutere ut prudenter agat. Ibid. q. 5.*

But if in this he give the advantage to the ignorant above the knowing, he makes them a recompence a little after, in giving to these second all sorts of liberty above the former, saying that a knowing man may form himself an opinion, teach it, practise it, and cause others to follow it, though it be contrary to all that have taught before him, and that no other Author but himself alone hath maintained or doth maintain it, provided he believe he have sufficient reason to maintain it.

A. I. B. I. P. 2. C. I. A. 2. P. I. S. I.

We

• We demand, saith he, if an honest and learned man having some strong and manifest reason against the common opinion; but yet having no received or approved Author, may by this forceable and evident reason form a probable opinion, though it be contrary to the common opinion? He answers, that before God and in conscience he is not guilty of any rashness nor imprudence, because he is grounded upon just and probable reason.

• Queritur quid decendum quando vir bonus & doctus contra communem opinionem nullum classicum & probatum

Auctorem habet; nihilominus tamen habet rationem manifestam & firmam, an probabiliter sentire discretur, si contra communem opinionem senserit urgenti & firma ratione permotus? b. Respondio, in foro conscientie non est cur temere & imprudenter agere videatur; siquidem probabilem & justam rationem & causam sequitur. Ibid. q. 6.

See here the prudence and the rare and extraordinary humility of the Jesuits all at once, and the security they give to their penitents and devout, making them depend for their Salvation upon the imagination of one single man, though contrary to the judgement of all others, without knowing that in all this they do any thing against that prudence or charity which they ought to have towards their Neighbours or themselves.

Nevertheless they are not content to give unto men this strange liberty, to invent new opinions and to follow them against the judgement of all others, they will also have it lawful for them to quit their own opinion to make use of that of another, when it is more profitable and more favourable unto them. • It is demanded, saith AZOR, if it be lawful in conscience to follow others mens probable against our own proper opinion? He relates two contrary opinions upon this question, and he concludes with those who hold the affirmative, saying that this opinion is more probable and true. Escobar is of the same opinion, and he proposeth this difficulty himself. • But it is lawful to accommodate my self with the opinion of another which is probable, quitting my own which is more probable and more sure? He answers in these terms: Yes without difficulty, and acting thus, I act nothing against my conscience, provided I judge that the opinion of others which I follow be probable.

c. Septimo queritur, an cuique liceat in foro conscientie probabilem aliorum sequi sententiam contra propriam opinionem? Ibid. d. Hæc opinio est probabilior & verior. Ibid.

e. Possum probabili aliorum sententia aptare meam, probabiliore ac tutiore relicta? Ita plane, nec sic operans contra conscientiam agam, modo existimem alienam opinionem quam sequor esse probabilem. Escobar in præmio exam. 3. c. 3. n. 10 p. 25.

Pilate acted in this manner when he put Jesus Christ to death, quitting his proper judgement by which he believed him to be innocent, to follow the opinion of the Jews who maintained that he was worthy of death. And I see not how according to these rules of probability he can be condemned for pronouncing sentence of death upon our Saviour: but I see that we may rather justify him, by saying that his judgement was founded upon a probable opinion and more then probable, because it was not of one single Doctors, but of all the Doctors, and all the Priests, and all the best learned, and best esteemed persons amongst the Jews, who by one common consent affirmed it both by their own, and by the publick voice of all the people, that he whom he believed innocent, was indeed a malefactor who deserved death; Matth. 25. v. 66. reus est mortis. For although he have not herein given unto the Judges the same liberty as to others to follow probable opinions; nevertheless there are others who have granted it unto them, as Escobar and Castro-Palao, who hold that he may even follow the lesse probable: May a Judge in his judgement follow a probable opinion, leaving that which is more probable? He answers in two words, that Castro-Palao holds that he may. And passing farther on, he gives him the power to judge even against his own opinion, as did Pilate who condemned our Lord, after he had declared publicly that he believed him innocent.

We may also according to these principles of the Jesuits excuse this Pagan Judge by reason of his ignorance; because not knowing the customs nor the Laws of the Jews, it seems that he could not do better in this juncture of affairs, then referre himself to the Priests and Doctors of the Law, who assured him that according to their Law our Lord ought to dye. Nos legem habemus, & secundum legem debet mori. Joh. 19. v. 7.

From this general maxime, That it is lawful to forsake our own proper opinion, and to apply our selves to that of another, and to follow it, though it seem not so probable,

A. I. E. I. P. 2. C. 1. A. 2. P. 1. S. 1.

probable,

f Decimo quæ-
ritur, an Sacer-
dos qui pœni-
tentium con-
fessiones audit,
possit contra
propriam s'con-
tiam probabili
sententiam s'con-
tentie adherere?
Azor, Ibid.
p. 133.

g Quarta opinio
est in universum assentium integrum esse Pres-
bytero contra propriam pœnitentis opinionem tenere. Et hæc est verior opinio:
quia cum pœnitentis sententia sit p'abilis, imprudenter ac temere Presbyter non agit si eam contra p'opriam sequatur.
Ibid.

probable, Azor draws his answer which he gives to this question: *Whether a Priest who hears Confessions, may reasonably come over to the opinion of his penitent, when it is contrary to his own?* He proposes the opinion of divers Authors, who took in hand to unfold this difficulty by many distinctions: but he relies on that of those who maintain that in every case, without exception and distinction, every Confessor may and ought to submit to the opinion of his penitent. *The fourth* 292
opinion is of them, saith he, that hold absolutely and generally, that it is lawful for a Confessor to follow the opinion of his penitent against that of his own; and this opinion is more true; because the advice of the penitent being probable, the Confessor acts neither rashly nor imprudently in following his against his own proper sense.

To act in this manner is indeed to deny ones self; but it is not to follow Jesus Christ as the Gospel hath ordained, but rather to forsake him, because Jesus Christ is truth and righteousness, which he renounceth that renounceth his own light and his own conscience, to follow the opinion and take the law of a man to whom he ought to give law according to the order of God and the Church.

From this opinion Azor infers that being a Confessor may always follow the judgement of his penitent against his own, that he is obliged thereto when he hath heard his confession, and finds not in it any other private indisposition. *It fol-* 293
lows, saith he, that a Confessor having heard the confession of his penitent, is obliged to absolve him. And although the Confessor believes absolutely that the penitent is obliged unto restitution, and that for this reason he scruples to absolve him; he pretends notwithstanding that if the penitent will not be brought to accord thereto, the Confessor is obliged to believe him, and that when even he cannot believe him, he ceases not to be obliged to absolve him. His reason is, *because he who hears the*
confessions of penitents is obliged to provide for their Salvation: and as the penitent 293
grounded upon some probable reason, may with a safe conscience detain another mans goods, and is not obliged to restore them; so the Priest who hath heard his confession is not bound by any law to order him to restore that which he is possessed of by a good title as he supposeth.

h Ex quo effici-
tur ut tunc tem-
poris Presbyter
debeat pœniten-
tem absolvere,
cum ejus con-
fessionem audi-
vit.

i Quia is qui
pœnitentium
confessiones au-
dit, eorum salu-
tati prospicere debet:
& sicut pœni-
tentis probabilem
sententiam secutus potest tuta conscientia rem alienam sibi retinere; nec ad restituendum ulla lege compellitur: sic etiam
confessionis auditor Presbyter jure non cogitur pœnitenti præcipere ut rem alteri restituat quam bona fide possidet.
Ibid.

So that when all the Doctors and all the Saints condemn a man to restitution, Azor believes that if he can but find one single Casuist that exempts him, he may uphold himself by his advice, and follow it with a safe conscience as a probable opinion, without troubling himself about all the rest, and consequently oblige his own judgement. For he imagines that though a penitent declares that he hath anothers goods, and that his Confessor with all the Doctors believe that he ought to make restitution thereof; yet having one Casuist for him, he is in a probable opinion upon which he may ground his conscience; and so possessing in simplicity anothers goods, he cannot be obliged to quit them. This resolution is without doubt very Christian and very considerable; but the reason he brings for it is no lesse. 294
k *Because*, saith he, he who hears the confession of penitents, is obliged to provide for their Salvation. As if to incite a man to restore another mans goods, were not to procure his Salvation, or as if the actions of Justice and charity were not for Heaven, but for Hell and damnation.

k Quia is qui
pœnitentium
confessiones au-
dit, eorum salu-
tati prospicere debet.

l Quæritur
modo in medi-
cus contra pro-
prium opinionem
tuta conscientia
possit, aliorum probabilem opinionem secutus, medicinam graviter aegrotanti præbere, cum tamen ipse existimet eam esse
lethalem? Respondeo, manifestum esse jure non posse medicum remedium aegroti adhibere, quando dubitat an sit profutu-
rum aut nocituum. Ibid. p. 134.

But the contradiction is yet more observable in the conceits of this Casuist. For after he had opined in this manner in the affairs of conscience and eternal Salvation, see how he speaks of Physick, and of corporal health and life, *It is demanded*, 294

saith he, whether a Physitian may with a safe conscience following the probable opinion of other Physitians against his own proper judgement, give to a man who is very sick a medicine which he believes may kill him? He answers presently, that it is a manifest thing, that it is not lawful for a Physitian to give to his patient a remedy whereof he doubts, whether it will save or kill him. He believes then that it is not to be carefull enough of the health and life of the body, to ground it upon uncertain though probable opinions; and on the contrary, that it is not to have care enough of the eternal Salvation of the soul, not to be willing to establish it upon like opinions. Who sees not hence clearly, that the health of the body is to him more considerable, and more precious then the salvation of the soul, and that he understands well enough that it is a crime to jeopard temporal life contrary to a mans own conscience, but it seems to him to be nothing to hazzard eternal life in that manner. We have seen, above, Layman to maintain this rare Doctrine.

He avows also that ^m it is evident when there happen two contrary opinions, and there be also some other assured remedy, it is not lawful for the Physitian to quit the assured remedy, and to use the patient according to these probable opinions. Which he proves by the rule of right, which saith ⁿ that what is uncertain is to be quitted, and what is certain retained. He had said above in the same case, ^o that in doubtful cases that is to be chosen which is more safe and certain. He then admits this rule in temporal affairs, and acknowledges it for indubitable and visible by the light of nature alone; and they are onely Divine things, and such as concern eternal Salvation in which he will not acknowledge them, and in which he believes that it is lawful to act against common sence, quitting the certain for the uncertain, and dismissing that at pleasure which ought to be preferred before all the world at once, and all the lives of the world; as if he would testifie that he is of the number of the children of this world, who are wiser in their ^p affairs, then the children of light in theirs, as saith the Gospel; he pretends even that these latter ought not be so wise in their conduct as the first, and that Heaven deserves not that we should take so much pain for it as the earth.

^m Deinde perspicuum est quomodo sunt opiniones probabiles sibi contrariae, estque aliud remedium certum, tunc nefas esse medico certo posthabito aegrotantibus secundum opiniones probabiles mederi. Ibid. ⁿ Est enim regula juris, certum tenendum, & dimittendum incertum. ^o Quia in du-

bis tutior & certior pars est eligenda. Ibid. Luc. c. 16. v. 8.

^p Filii hujus seculi prudentiores filiis lucis in generatione sua sunt.

So that this Doctrine is not onely pernicious and corrupt, but also entirely unreason-able, contrary to the light of nature and it self, and proper to deprive men of vertue, piety, and common sence all at once, and to conduct them at length to blindness and atheisme, which may be clearly seen, onely by passing over what we have already reported hitherto, and representing in an abridgement some capital points of this new Doctrine, respecting what we have expressly proved, and especially handling therein the pernicious effects it produceth in the Church and in the World.

^q The Doctors of probability teach us that we may found an advice of conscience, upon an opinion that is simply probable.

^q Potest quis facere quod probabili ratione

authoritate putat licere. Sa, verb. dubium, n. 30 d. 183.

^r That it is a probable opinion which hath onely one single Author, or one reason which we esteem good, to maintain it.

^r Probabilis sententia, uti communiter accipitur, ita defini potest: Quae certitudinem non habens, tamen vel gravi auctoritate, vel non medici momenti ratione

titur. Layman, l. 1. c. 5. p. 5.

^s That of two probable opinions, it is lawful to follow that which we like best.

^s & c. Quando opinio-ner sunt aequae probabiles, possumus minus

^t That we may even follow that which is less probable and less safe, if it be more profitable or more favourable.

curam in agendo praeserre; immo etiamsi quae minus cura est, minus probabilis habeatur. Azor, lib. 2. cap. 16. pag 126.

u Doctor alteri
consulenti
consilium
dare potest non
solum ex propria,
sed etiam ex opposita aliorum sententia, si hæc illi favorabilior seu exoptabilior sit.

u That we may follow them both in different affairs, and even in the same affair also, acting and giving contrary counsels, now after the one, and then after the other.

Layman, Ibid. p. 6.

x Immo arbitror
à ratione nihil
alienum fore si
Doctor consultus

* That even when one believes assuredly that an opinion is false, and that we cannot follow it directly in the conduct of some person, we may send this person to those who hold with it, and counsel him to follow their advice.

significet consentienti opinionem à quibusdam viris doctis tanquam probabilem defendi, quam proinde sequi ipsi liceat, quamvis idem Doctor ejusmodi sententiam speculative falsam certo sibi persuadear, ut proinde ipsemet in praxi eam sequi non possit. Ibid. pag 7.

y Satis est in
omnibus c sibi es
constare proba-
biliter opinionem
probabilem.

y That we are not obliged, that we may follow an opinion with a safe con- 297
science, to be assured that it is probable; but it is sufficient to know probability, that it is probable.

Tambur. 1 pag. 1. 1. cap. 3. sect. 3. num. 8.

z Quid si Con-
fessario falsa
videtur opinio
penitentis?
Debet se accom-
modare, si à
probatioris autori-
tatis probabilis
reputetur.
Escobar, p. 28.
Idem dicitur
dum, &c. quam-
vis Confessarius falsam esse opinionem penitentis existimet.

z Finally, that even a Confessor is obliged to absolve a penitent who refuses to submit to his opinion, because he holds some other which is probable, unto which the Confessor ought to submit himself, though he believe it to be false, and to quit his own.

It is visible that he who can believe these maximes, may do, say, and counsel all things which he will, and all things that may please them who consult with him, and that there can be no affair of conscience so troublesome and so desperate, for which expedients may not be found, nor crimes so black which may not be easily excused or justified.

Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 30. p. 29.

S E T C. II.

The opinions of other Jesuits conformable to the proceeding for making all things probable, and to give liberty to follow all sorts of opinions.

I Have in a manner taken onely out of Layman and Azor what I have reported in the precedent Article; and though that might suffice to know the spirit and the maximes of the Jesuits upon this subject; yet because it is very important, I will not omit to represent also the thoughts of some other Jesuits to make appear yet more clearly the conformity of their Doctrine, and to shew exactly that these maximes are not peculiar to some few amongst them, but common to the most celebrate of their Body, and therefore to all their Society.

298

a Quo pacto
quisque severe
se debeat inter
opiniones con-
trarias de rebu
agez dis in foro
conscientie?
Filliat. mor.
99. t. 2. r. 21.
c. 4. n. 125.
p. 126.

Fillintius inquires, a how are we to behave our selves in the guidance of sciences, when we meet with two contrary opinions? He answers, out of hand, that it is lawful to follow that which is more probable though it be less safe; and he adds

b that it is lawful to follow that which is less probable, though it be also less safe. A little after he expounds what he means by a probable opinion, concluding in this manner. c It follows 1. that we call that opinion probable; that is supported by reasons sufficiently considerable, provided notwithstanding there be no convincing reason for the contrary opinion, of such sort as we cannot, nor believe any other can answer.

b Dico 2 licitum
esse si qui opinionem minus probabilem, et si minus tuta sit. Ibid. n. 128.

c Ex his inferitur primò, opinionem probabilem dici eam que in ritur rationibus alicujus momenti; ita tamen ut pro opposita nulla sit ratio convincens, quam vel ipse si tuere non possit, vel ab alio solvi non posse sibi persuadeat. Ibid. n. 133.

He requires then two conditions to make an opinion probable. That it be founded on reasons in some sort considerable. Which will be easie enough to meet with, there being no person who having formed an opinion, doth not believe but that the

A. 1. B. 1. P. 2. C. 1. A. 2. P. 1. D. 1.

reason

reason he brings to sustain it, is good and often better then that of those who maintain the contrary.

The second condition is, ^d that there be no convincing reason for the contrary. This condition is no lesse easie then the former. For a reason may be convincing in respect of one man, which is not so unto another, and he who favours an opinion may find it good, when he who is of a contrary opinion may think it weak, and an obstinate person will not suffer himself to be convinced by one reason; and at worst he may easily perswade himself, that when he cannot answer solidly the reasons of his adversaries, some other more learned then he may do it. This is that *Tambourin* affirms, upon the Decalogue.

So that by these two conditions all sorts of opinions are easily made probable. For on one side those which of themselves have neither probability nor truth, may become probable, if we can find any plausible reason to sustain them; and on the other side, a proposition most assured and best established by Tradition, by demonstration, and faith it self, will become onely probable considered by humane reason, which is this Jesuits rule to discern of probable opinions. For what reason so ever you can bring to prove it, they who know the evasions of the Schools may elude it by some distinction, or imagine that it may be eluded by some other, and so it shall not be convincing; and by consequence the proposition shall be onely probable by the definition of the Jesuits.

He pretends also that the ^e authority of one honest and knowing man makes an opinion probable, because this authority is a foundation which is not of little consideration. And though his Author be alone in his opinion, they hold that his opinion ceases not to be probable, provided that he believes that he hath reason to sustain it against all others; ^f Because although we ought not easily divide from the common opinion, yet it is lawful for a learned man, if after he hath poised the grounds of the two opinions, he judge that his own though singular is the more probable. And by consequence others may follow his advice and repose themselves on him for their Salvation, especially if they have not been Students and made profession of learning. For this Jesuit assures us, that ^g a man who is not learned may follow the opinion of him that is, though it be a singular one. For prudence wills that he confide in his Doctrin. He onely would have us to take heed that this Doctor so singular in his opinion be none of the ancients. So that if a man knows for certain that one or more of the ancient Doctors have heretofore held and taught publicly a proposition, it must not prevail so far with us for all that as to believe therefore that it is probable, if it be not approved by the Casuists and Divines of our times. ^h It is not lawful, saith he, for one that is not well versed in moral Divinity, to follow all that he shall find in one or two ancient Doctors, if he do not know that it is also the judgement of the moderns. He pretends then that a new Divine may make his opinion probable against the judgement of all others by his own sole authority: and that nevertheless many Doctors of the Church have not together the same credit: because as *Reginaldus*, and *Celot* after him, say in the name of all the Society, ⁱ the resolution of difficulties which concern faith must be taken from the ancients, but that which concerns the life and manners of Christians ought to be taken out of the modern authors.

Etius ejus. Ibid. h Parum versato in moralibus non licet quodcumque in uno vel altero Doctore ex antiquioribus invenerit sequi, non sciat etiam à recentioribus illam sententiam teneri. *Ibid.* num. 136. i Quæ circa fidem emergunt difficultates, eæ sunt à veteribus hauriendæ: quæ vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos, à novitiis scriptoribus.

Ut pro opposito nulla sit ratio convincens.

Inferitur 2. us nius Doctoris probi & docti auctoritatem opinionem redere probabilem: quia non leve fundamentum est ejus auctoritatis. Ibid. n. 134. f A communi opinione non facile recedendum; viro tamen docto qui utriusque partis fundamenta perpenderit, licet, si suam, et si singularem, probabiliorem judicet. Ibid. n. 135. g unus etiam indoctus potest sequi alterius docti singularem sententiam, confidit enim prudenter do-

This seems to be the extreamest debasement and contempt of that can be done to them whom all antiquity and the whole Church have honoured as their Fathers and Masters, not onely to defeat them of this quality, but to set them below the meanest Authors, and the last Divines of these times, to whom is given the power and authority to make an opinion probable, by their single approbation and by their single opinion, secluding that of all others, and this right is refused to the Fathers of the Church, though they be many consenting together in the same judgement, submitting them to the new Divines as their Masters and Judges; in such manner as it is not lawful to hear them, if they be not approved by the moderns. I know not

that the hereticks have said any thing more outrageous and insolent against the Fathers of the Church.

Escobar knows not to be more reasonable in the point of probability than his Fraternity, since he makes profession to report nothing but their opinions. He proposeth this question: ^k when a Superiour and those that are under his charge are of different apprehensions, is the inferiour bound to obey him? The first opinion he relates is that of ^l *Salas*, who holds that the inferiour is bound to obey always whilst he may do it without sin. The other opinion, which he sets latter as the more probable, is that of ^m *Castro-Palao*, who saith that when an inferior believes according to a probable opinion, that the command of his Superiour is unjust, or that he exceedeth the bounds of his jurisdiction, he may disobey him; because it is lawful for all men to follow a probable opinion. 30.

^k Varietas opinionum inter superiorem & subditum adesse; tenetur subditus obedire? *Escobar* in proem. exam. 3. n. 31. p. 30. 1. *Asserit Salas teneri subditum obedire quatenus potest absque peccato. quod pro aceptum bitem opinionem.*

^m *At Castro P. lto; Quando subditus, inquit, nititur opinione probabili sit illicitum, vel extra superioris jurisdictionem, potest non obedire: quia unicuique fas est sequi probabilem opinionem.*

According to this maxime there will be no more Superiours in the Church nor in the World, nor obedience unto them, it being manifest that there is no subject nor inferiour who cannot easily think in himself, that the command of his Superiour is unjust, and find reasons too to perswade himself of it; and others also, or at the least meet some Casuist, who will tell him that it is probable that his Superiour hath gone beyond his power, or hath no reason to command this; and therefore he is not obliged to obey him: So the authority of all sorts of Superiours will depend on the will and the fancy of their inferiours.

He holds not onely that the priviledge of probability may dispense with an inferiour for the obedience which he owes to his Superiour; but also to elevate him above his Superiour, and to oblige the Superiour to obey his subject. He demands ⁿ whether a Confessor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his penitent, and to quit his own which is more probable? His answer is, that he is obliged thereto; because the penitent grounding himself upon a probable opinion, hath a right unto absolution. So absolution and pardon of sins is no longer a grace and favour unto the sinner, according to *Escobar*, but a right; and this right is not founded on the Word of God, but upon the word of man, and upon a probable opinion, and even upon the word of a single man; who may be the Author thereof, and stand single in this opinion, according to the Jesuits. 30.

ⁿ *Tenetur penitentis opinionem probabilem confessor sequi, relicta sua probabiliori? Tenetur, quia penitens habet ius ad absolutionem, opinioni probabilis nitens.*

In proem. exam. 3. cap. 6. num. 27. pag. 25.

But as a probable opinion gives right unto a penitent to demand absolution, so it might seem that a probable opinion should give a right to a Confessor to refuse it, if he judged it neither to be his duty, nor to be in his power to give it him: But *Escobar* maintains that he is obliged to give it him, renouncing his own right as well as his opinion, to submit it to that of his penitent: ^o and if it happen that the opinion of the penitent appear not onely not probable to the Confessor, but that he also believes it assuredly false, *Escobar* will not to refuse to comply with the will of his penitent, and that if the penitent will not submit nor abate any thing of his pretended right, the Confessor must accord to what he demands. For if he pretend to use rigour, and to passe sentence upon this difference, these new Doctors who have established themselves judges in the Church, and of the Church it self; and of the Holy Fathers, will almost all with one voice condemn him to give him absolution; and in case he fail therein, ^p *Vasquez* will declare he sinneth mortally, if he be an ordinary Confessor as are the Parish Priests; or venially, if he be a delegate, as are the Monks. And *Escobar* with others having no regard at all to this distinction, will condemn absolutely them both of mortal sins

^o *Quod si Confessorio falsa videtur opinio penitentis, debet se accommodare si a probatis autoribus probabilem reputetur. Ibid. n. 27. p. 29. p. Vasquez 1. 2. tom. 1. disp. 92. a. 7. n. 4. addit Confessorium non proprium negantem absolutionem secundum opinionem probabilem, solum venialiter delinquere. At credidero mortaliter peccare si de mortalibus facta confessio. Ibid. n. 27.*

S E C T. III.

The opinion of Sanchez concerning the probability of opinions.

WE might produce upon this subject almost as many Authors as there are of the Society, because they have in a manner all written of it, and they are all agreed in the principal questions; so important is this point in their Divinity, of which we may say that it is as it were the foundation, and that there upon their Doctrine and their conduct is built. But there is none that hath more enlarged and cleared this matter, nor by consequence who hath more discovered the spirit of the Society, then Sanchez: For this purpose I thought meet to give him a title apart.

Amongst many maxims which he establisheth as fundamentals in this matter, this is a principal one. ^a *An opinion is probable when it is founded on some considerable reason; provided there be nothing to convince the contrary opinion.* From whence he draws this consequence with Val. ^b *A man may hold an opinion probable, when he is persuaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons used for ground thereof.* And when he is persuaded that neither he, nor any other can answer the reasons he hath against an opinion, ^c *He ought not to believe for all that, if it be held by others, that it is not probable, so that he may not follow it himself.* Of which he renders this reason, which breathes nothing but modesty and humility, ^d *Because he ought not judge of himself alone, that the opinion of others is not probable.*

50

apud aliquem intra opinionis certitudinem quidpiam, quando sibi persuader rationem illius solvi posse aut ab ipsomet, aut ab aliis. c Licet quis rationem peculiarem habeat contra oppositam sententiam quam ipse solvere nequit, & sibi solvi non posse videatur; non ideo censere debet oppositam aliorum opinionem improbabilem esse, ut eam sequi nequeat. d Quia solo suo iudicio non debet aliorum sententiam improbabilem iudicare. Ibid.

And to make all men resolve to pass by all sorts of difficulties and reasons, how strong and insoluble soever they appear, he saith that it ^e *happens dayly that new answers are found to reasons which were believed to be invincible.* And so although one single person or many cannot answer the convincing reasons which are given for an opinion, yet they ought persuade themselves that others may do it; and that so the contrary opinion ceases not to be probable, and by consequence may be followed in conscience.

So that according to this Author it is lawful to put in practice an opinion which we believe false and pernicious, thinking that this own judgement made thereon may possibly be false; so there will be nothing which can be capable to retain these libertine spirits, nor to hinder them from despising all sorts of reasons and lights, how clear and strong indeed soever they be, and that by their own judgement, and after that from doing what they please.

They may extend this liberty much more easily to the most certain truths of Religion, which have not always convincing reasons for them, because they subsist only by authority and faith; and if they had, a libertine ^f *might easily persuade himself that either he or some other might answer them.* And if he should not happen on any person who were able to do it, he might always imagine that it was not impossible to meet some one hereafter; since that, as Sanchez saith, ^g *It happens dayly that we meet with answers unto reasons which we believed invincible.* So these principles and these inventions are very proper to overturn all the truths of piety or Religion.

putabat, aut ab aliis facile solvi.

This same Author demands also, ^h *whether the authority of one single Doctor who docti & probi reddat opinio nem probabil. m? Respondeo, reddere; posse quempiam amplecti opinionem quam a magistro audivit in iis que ad mo es pertinent. Sanch. Ibid. n. 7.*

k Quia opinio probabilis est que non levi mutatur fundamento: ut auctoritas viri docti & pii non est leve fundamentum.

is learned and honest do make an opinion probable. And he answers; yea, adding that in what concerns manners, a man may hold to an opinion which he hath learned of his School-master and follow it. His reason is the same with what Azor and Layman have alledged: ^k Because an opinion established upon some foundation that is not sleight, is probable. But the authority of a learned and pious man is no sleight foundation. Whence it is easie to conclude that there is no Jesuit, especially who are regent, amongst them, whose opinion may not be followed and practised, how new and peculiar soever it appear, and be indeed: because there are none of them who are not believed to have these two qualities of learned and pious, and to whom the Society do not attribute them.

So that when P. Hereau taught in the Colledge of Clermont, that it is lawful to kill a man secretly who slanders us, or who persecutes us unjustly, his Scholars may without fear of offending God, make themselves executors of this horrible Doctrine, though it were suspected by them to be false, because it is so barbarous and inhumane. 307

For they hold that though a Doctor or Regent should be deceived by publishing errors for truths, we may always in conscience follow his opinion, even when he erreth against Divine right. This is that which Sanchez maintains resolutely against them who would restrain this liberty to errors against humane right or Law. ^l I cannot approve, saith he, their restriction who would extend this to errors against humane but not Divine Law, they build upon this that we are not obliged to inquire with so much care the things which are of humane, as those which are of Divine Law. But I cannot approve this reason. And he is not content to say it once, but he repeats it oft, to shew how much this limitation displeaseth him. And his reason is, ^m Because in these sorts of things the authority of a grave and pious person is of great weight. That is to say, that the authority of a Regent Jesuit is great and strong enough to prevail above Divine and humane right, and to carry us against the Law of God. And that so we may follow in conscience the erroneous opinion of a Casuist, though that which he permits and approves be forbidden and condemned by God in the Scripture.

l Nec limitatio Adriani & Cordubensis hoc intelligitur, si sit error juris humani; secus si sit divini: Ductumque quia in rebus humani juris indagandis non tanta diligentia ac in rebus juris divini exigitur: sed non placet. Ibid. num. 7. *m*

Quippe in utrisque est magni ponderis & momenti viri gravitas & pii autoritas. Ibid.

n An ab opinione communi recedere liceat?
 o At melius Vasquez & Azor dicunt licere viro docto qui non parum literis vacavit, & recte utriusque parte fundamenta expendit, suam singularem opinionem probabiliorum judicare & illam sequi. Ibid. n. 9. p. 29. *p* Quod in eo eventu non videatur prudenter operari.

He also enquires ⁿ whether it be lawful to dissent from common opinions? He answers with Vasquez and Azor ^o that it is lawful for a learned man and well studied, and who hath examined the reasons of both sides, to maintain that his private opinion is more probable, and to follow it, though he be single and alone in his opinion, being otherwise it should not be particular: ^p Because he seems not herein to act against prudence, since he hath found some reason that pleaseth him, and seems good unto him: which will easily happen to a proud spirit, who can have no greater pleasure then to imagine that he surpasseth others by his subtilty and his wit. 308

q Nihil repugnat ut duas opiniones à diametro sibi contradicentes idem intellectus probabiles judicet, aut eaque, aut alteram probabiliorum.

But this Jesuit so learned in this matter, and this wisdom of probability, discovers one of the principal foundations upon which it is established, and from which many conclusions may be drawn, saying ^q there is nothing which hinders that one and the same person may judge two opinions, directly opposite to be equally probable, or that the one is more then the other. Whence he concludes in this manner: ^r These things being thus presupposed, the first difficulty is to know whether it is lawful in conscience, to regulate our actions by the opinion of another, when it is not sufficiently safe, and which we believe onely probable, quitting our own which is more safe, and which we believe assuredly to be probable.

Ibid. num. 12. pag. 29. *p* His ita premisis prima difficultas est an cuique liceat in foro conscientie operari juxta aliorum opinionem minus tutam quam probabilem reputat contra propriam tutiorem, & quam sibi probabiliorum esse persuadet. Ibid. n. 13. p. 29.

He at first rejects many Authors who say that this is not lawful, and declares

A. I. L. I. P. 2. C. I. A. 2. P. I. S. I.

^a declares that it is much more likely that it is lawful. His reason is that which he hath already alledged many times, and which he repeats commonly; ^b That he who believes an opinion probable, acting according to that opinion, ought not be condemned as rash or imprudent. And seeing it might be said that this man acting against his own proper light, and quitting an assured opinion to follow one less safe, puts himself in danger to violate the Law of God, and indeed to offend him; which is not to act prudently: He answers ^c that he exposes not himself to danger of sinning formally; that is in such manner that the sin which he commits should be imputed unto him: believing that he need not care if the Law of God be violated, and if God be dishonoured, provided that we our selves be not blamed, and receive no hurt thereby.

^a At multo probabilius est ligere. n. 54.
^b Existimans opinionem esse probabilem, juxta illam operans nec imprudentis nec temeritatis notam incurret. Ibid.

^c Nec sic se exponit periculo peccandi formaliter; id est ita ut illud peccatum ei imputetur.

The second conclusion which he draws from his principles, is, ^d that he who believes that it is more probable that we cannot in conscience follow that of the two opinions which is less probable, may yet follow it himself, if he believe that it is also probable that he may follow it. So that a man believing that he ought always follow the more probable opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the less probable, may notwithstanding this persuasion do the contrary without sin; and follow in effect the less probable, if he believe that the opinion of those who hold that this may be done, is also probable, which will not be hard for him, or rather he cannot choose but believe it, if the Authors who are of contrary judgement be not evidently wicked and ignorant, since one honest and learned man alone is sufficient to make an opinion probable.

^d Secundo deducitur contra aliquos notericos, eum qui in ea esset opinio, ut probabilis reputaret non licere opinionem minus probabilem sequi, ad hoc posse illam sequi, si probabile quoque reputet licere opinionem minus probabilem sequi. Ibid. n. 17. p. 30.

This Doctrine is very convenient for us that we may do all that we please, giving us liberty not onely to live after our sense, but also against our sense and proper light, by following that of another, when it is conformable to our inclinations, that we may follow them without scruple, and passing so from one conduct to another, and making use sometimes of one opinion sometimes of another, to justify all that which we have a strong desire to do: this Doctrine I say would be very commodious for this, if God had not condemned it openly in diverse places of Scripture, where he forbids expressly, as we have above observed, to have two tongues, and to make use of two different weights and measures.

Sanchez declares likewise ^e that it is lawful for learned persons to give counsels against their own proper opinions, following those of others which they believe to be probable. Whence he by consequence draws great advantage and great priviledge for those who profess learning; that is without doubt for the Doctors of the Society, which is ^f that they may give counsels one while following one opinion, and another while following the contrary. Yet he advises them ^g That it were better to follow always the same opinion; above all when the answer is in writing. And the reason of this charitable advice is, lest they should be found out and be convinced of inconstancy and double dealing. For the fear of God, who sees all, is of small consideration with these people, and it is onely that of men which can restrain them. They scruple it not at all to play fast and loose with truth and conscience, and to make use of doubling, and to have double opinions according to which they may give contrary advices. All their apprehension is of being found out and discovered in their doublings; ne varii deprehendantur.

^e Quarto deducitur, licite quoque viros doctos posse contra propriam opinionem aliis consilium sequendo alienam quam probabilem putant. Ibid. n. 19.

^f Quare poterat huius modo juxta unam, modo juxta contrariam opinionem consilium. n. 20.

^g Quamvis melius sit semper

juxta eandem, maxime in scriptis; Ne varii deprehendantur.

But they have an excellent remedy to secure themselves from this reproach which men may cast upon them, which is not to give their advice easily in writing; and this is also the advice which Sanchez gives his associates in this matter, in which he may well passe for a Master.

Hereunto we may also in this matter join another, which is to answer one who demands counsel according to the opinion which we hold and which we teach, and

if he comply not therewith, and that the contrary opinion be more agreeable unto him, to addresse him to others of the Society, who hold it and teach it. But if nevertheless they will make use of the right which they have to follow now one opinion and then another though contrary, and give counsel according to that which is less probable, to oblige those who consult them, the same Sanchez will advise them at least to use this precaution, ^h that giving their advice, whether it be by word, or in writing, they declare that *though the contrary opinion be more probable, yet nevertheless that which they have chosen may be followed in surety being also probable.*

h Hac varietas facile vitari potest. si consuleas sive verbo sive scripto asserat; quamvis contraria opinio probabilior sit, banc quoque tanquam probabilem posse amplecti. Ibid.

There are some that affirm at least that when restitution is in debate, or some case which respects Justice, it is not lawful to follow the more large, and withal the less probable and secure opinion, because this were to do wrong to him unto whom restitution should be made. But Sanchez pretends that ⁱ without standing upon this exception it is generally lawful, and without distinction to follow the lesse probable opinion, and to counsel others to follow it, citing Vasquez, who saith expressly that this is true in all sorts of matters.

i At jure optimo omnes alii Doctores n. 14. allegati aliique prædicta limitatione indistincte tradunt licere opinionem minus probabilem amplecti, ac eam consulere, ut expresse Vasquez l. 2. q. 19. a. 6. d. 63. c. 1. initio dicit in omni materia id procedere. Ibid. n. 22.

Et tradunt licere opinionem minus probabilem amplecti, ac eam consulere, ut expresse Vasquez l. 2. q. 19. a. 6. d. 63. c. 1. initio dicit in omni materia id procedere. Ibid. n. 22.

k Sicut Judex fori externi tenetur sententiam juxta probabiliorem opinionem ferre, ita hi consulere. Ibid.

One of the reasons of them that hold the contrary, is, that ^k as a judge who exerciseth outward justice, is obliged to judge according to the more probable opinion; so the Doctors are obliged to do the same in giving counsel. To which Sanchez answers, ^l that there is great difference betwixt him that exercises outward justice, and he who exercises the inward: because the first is judge between the parties, and is established by the commonwealth to judge that which he believes to be most reasonable; but the second is a Judge at the tribunal of penance, to judge, as a Physician, not betwixt parties, but betwixt Man and God. All this is more proper to destroy his opinion than to confirm it. For if a Judge who renders Justice before men, be obliged to follow that which he believes to be more equitable, how much more is a Confessor and judge of consciences, who ought to follow justice and verity with so much more care and exactness, because the good of consciences and salvation of souls is without comparison more important, and ought to be more religiously preserved than all outward things: if the tribunal of men require so perfect Justice, how much more perfect ought that to be of the tribunal of conscience, which is the tribunal of God himself, where the Priest judges as holding the place of God and of Jesus Christ, who is justice and truth it self. But if we consider him in the quality of a Physician as doth Sanchez, this quality it self obliges us by his proper principles to follow the opinions that are more safe and more united unto truth, since he avows that Physicians are obliged always to embrace this sort of opinions, and to forsake the less probable and more uncertain.

i Etque latum discrimen inter Judicem fori externi & interni; quod ille sit Judex inter partes, & ita constitutus à Republica, ut secundum id quod magis æquum reputat, sententiam ferat. At hic est in foro penitentiae Judex, quod judicium est medicinale, nec inter partes, sed inter Deum & hominem. Ibid.

Finally, if humane Judges be obliged to search out and follow that which is most just, and most safe, because they are Judges betwixt party and party, who sees not that the Confessors and Pastours of souls are obliged to the same thing by the same reason, since being Judges betwixt God and Man, they are also Judges betwixt party and party? For to imagine that God and Man are not true parties in this interiour judgement, were no other than to pretend that the judgement of penance is no true nor proper judgement; nor act of jurisdiction, against the definition of the Council of Trent, it being clear that a judgement cannot be but betwixt two parties. So that it must needs be that there are truly and properly two parties in the Sacrament of penance, or else there is not any proper and true judgement. It is also true by the consent of all Catholicks, that God is both at once Judge and party in this Divine tribunal against the Sinner, and that his infinite Justice is the cause that these two things are not incompatible with him, as they are amongst men, but they

they rather are inseparable, since he always in all sorts of sins is the first offended and the first Judge; unless haply it be so that the Jesuits think that God is no party at all, because they see him not appear before their Tribunals, and because they find no body present himself to speak for him, and maintain his rights and interests against those who confesse themselves unto them, and who consult them. And thence it comes to pass that they are so complacent and so easie to graunt upon their simple petition all that they demand, as if there were no parties, and their affairs were all matters of favour, and absolutely depending on their good grace and pleasure whom they take for their Judges.

Sanchez fifth in his following discourse, which we have now examined. ^a That a Sac est Confessario & Dolori consulto efficitur ut in ordine ad Deum consulens recte componatur. Ibid. it is sufficient for a Confessor, and for a Doctor who is consulted, to reconcile the penitent and restore him to good terms with God. But this stands in no stead, because he cannot make this reconciliation, but by observing the Laws of Justice, and condemning the sinner by an equitable judgement, which according to himself ought always to follow that which is most conformable to reason and equity in humane and temporal affairs, and by much stronger reason in Divine and eternal, which ought to be without comparison more just and regular.

Sanchez fifth conclusion is, ^b that a man who is accustomed to consult divers Doctors until he meets some one who answers him according to his desire, and who is resolved to continue this practice, hath his conscience secured so long as he doth this with a good intension; that is to say, to know if the opinion which favours him be probable. He would say, that if this man had no other intention then simply to content his lust, he should do ill; but because he hath a design to do it by way of probability, - in finding out some one who might tell him, not what he ought, but what he would do, is probable; donec aliquem sibi ad libitum respondentem inveniat: he is innocent and without reproach; ^c because every one, saith he, hath a right to maintain his right, and to look out reasons for it.

Quando recta investigandi ratio; an ea opinio sibi favens sit probabilis. Ibid. n. 24. ^c Quia unicuique jus est juris sui protegendum, & ad id rationes querendi. Ibid.

He pretends then that every one hath a right to desire that what flatters his lust should be probable, and to find out some one who may tell him that it is probable, or who may make it probable: according to this it shall be lawful for all men to seek out approvers of their most unreasonable thoughts and motions; and provided they find but one alone, as there are always complaisant persons to be found, and especially for the great and rich, it shall be lawful for them to do what they will, when they are yet condemned by all others, because according to the Jesuits one alone is sufficient to make an opinion probable.

Sanchez seventh conclusion is the answer which he gives to this question, ^d Whether a Confessor may absolve a penitent against his own opinion? To make this question more clear, he proposes it in this example: ^e As if a Confessor judge a contract to be usurious; and the penitent on the contrary believe probably that it is lawful, and will proceed in it. He saith at first that there are some who hold that an ordinary Confessor, as a Parish Priest, may against his own proper opinion absolve this man, and that it is not lawful for an extraordinary Confessor. But he answers after that ^f both the one and the other may do it.

ritus contractum esse usurarium iudicat: si penitens probabiliter esse licitum, & vult illuminare, utrumque Confessarium posse. Ibid. n. 28.

It is farther demanded whether they be both obliged so to do? To which he answers with the same boldness, maintaining ^g that both the one and the other of these Confessors is obliged to absolve his penitent after he hath heard his confession. His reason is: ^h Because the order of Justice requires that as the penitent is obliged to obey the Confessor, when he commands just and reasonable things; so the Confessor is obliged

h Recta enim iudicii ratio petit, ut sicut penitens confessori recte precipienti obedire tenetur: ita confessorius recte dispositum tenetur absolvere, quia is est sequens opinionem probabilem. Ibid.

to absolve the penitent, when he is well disposed, as he is when he follows a probable opinion.

And he believes that the Confessor is in such manner obliged to absolve this penitent, that if he fail therein, he sins sometimes mortally; and when that happens not, his fault is always great and dangerous, the thing being of great consequence, according to the opinion of *Vasquez* and *Suarez*,ⁱ which he approves, being persuaded by their reason, and because the penitent will have just cause to complain greatly of him, for that being well disposed and confessed, absolution was refused him. Neither can this his fault, being contrary to the institution of the Sacraments and Office of a Confessor, be little.

ⁱ Et ita credo esse, quia ratio proposita ita suadet, ac graviter conquiri jure optimo penitens potest, quod sibi bene disposito, auditaque ejus confessione, absolutio denegatur. Nec levis videtur culpa institutionis Sacramenti ac confessoris muneris contraria. Ibid. n. 24.

Upon this account the holy Fathers and the first Pastors of the Church had committed many mortal sins, in refusing absolution to many penitents who could not want probable reasons to maintain against them, that they were well disposed; unless perhaps the Doctrine of probability being not yet started in those times, the penitents were not so well instructed then as they may be now, to maintain and defend their rights and Privileges which this Doctrine giveth them against their Confessors, and to oblige them to renounce their own judgement supported by the authority of all the Doctors ancient and modern, to submit to the private opinion of the penitent, provided that it be probable, and to do for them, and let them do themselves what they please.

Escobar is yet more resolute upon this point than *Sanchez*. For saying that *Vasquez* holds that if the Confessor be a Monk or some other delegate, and not ordinary, he sins in this case but venially; he is not of his opinion; and he maintains, with others, that absolutely and without any exception at all,^k he sins mortally, if the penitent in his confession have mentioned any mortal sins.

^k At crediderim mortaliter peccare, si de mortalibus facta confessio. Escob. in præm. exam. 3. c. 6. n. 27. p. 29.

If any dared to say that a Physician is obliged to follow the opinion of his patient, though he believe his own to be better and more proper to cure his disease, he would be condemned of folly by all the world. How then dares any say that a Confessor is obliged to be less sincere and less faithful in the conduct of souls, whom he ought to heal of their sins? It must needs be of necessity that as these Doctors assure us that secular Justice ought to be more exact and more fixed to truth in the Judgement, it makes in temporal things, then the sacred Justice of the mysteries of Jesus Christ, in the dispensation of Spiritual Wealth and eternal Truths, on which depends the Salvation of souls. So likewise they must assert that the Physick of souls ought not to be so rational, so just, and fixed upon their true good, as those of the body.

Sanchez proceeds yet farther, and saith, that the Confessor sins mortally or dangerously if he absolve not his penitent in submitting to his opinion,^l Though he is persuaded that it is false,^m when the penitent is learned or instructed in the probability of the opinion which he maintains against him.

^l Imo dicendum est contra Marnuelem n. 28. allegatum, quamvis Confessarius falsam esse opinionem penitentis existimare. m Tandem huc usque dicta locum habent quando penitens est doctus, vel ab aliis instructus de probabilitate opinionis quam sequitur. Sanch. l. 1. c. 9. n. 30. p. 31.

But if the penitent be ignorant, and know not that his opinion is probable, some believe that the Confessor ought not give him absolution in that estate, unless he be upon the point of death; in which case they think that he ought to instruct him,ⁿ declaring to him that his opinion is probable, for fear that he not knowing it should dye impenitent.

ⁿ Tunc enim ait Salas esse instructum de opinionis probabilitate, ne in malo statu decedat. Ibid. n. 31.

But *Sanchez* believes that this is also too severe and unjust, and he repeats it, saying:

L. I. B. I. P. 2. C. 1. Q. 2. P. 1. S. 3.

saying:

saying: ^p As for me I am perswaded that even when he is not in this extremity, he ought to instruct him, and make him know that his opinion is probable. He builds upon this that he ought to consider the Salvation and good of his penitent, who otherwise may despise his Confessor, and do contrary to that which he hath ordained, loving rather to follow his own proper sense and passion, then to subject himself unto the advice of his Confessor: or at least take counsel of some other for the regard of his conscience: which he pretends the ^q Confessor may redresse by teaching him, that the opinion which he maintains so obstinately and without any reason, since he knows it not to be probable, is yet held by some Divines.

He believes also that the ^a Confessor is obliged by his office, and by the Law of Charity which he owes his neighbour and penitent, to give him this charitable advice, this making one part of the obligation which he hath to procure his weal and Salvation; and that he is not to stay until his penitent himself demand it, but that he is obliged to prevent him, when he sees him in danger to fall into sin; as it would happen in this case, where he sees his penitent wholly resolved to despise his advice by mere obstinacy, and being bent to follow his own judgement, and to do what he list in despite of him; ^b As if seeing the sinner addicted to his own sense, disobedient, and too obstinate in his disobedience, the Confessor ought or could judge that he is in a good estate and well disposed to be reconciled unto God; or as if he could hope to put him out of this wicked disposition and obstinacy by acknowledging and declaring unto him, that what he maintains against him is reasonable and may be probably maintained, and that he is ready to give way to him. On the contrary it will come to pass that if he comport himself in this manner, in stead of removing from him this indisposition, he will augment it in him, there being nothing more proper to make a man yet more obstinate and more insolent; and to confirm him in his wicked opinions, then therein to approve and follow him: and by consequence this man shall continue to remain in an incapacity of receiving absolution, since he persists in one of the greatest sins, and one of the worst dispositions of sinners, which is a resolution to oppose himself to his Confessor without reason, and of mere obstinacy and blinde passion, if the Confessor do not come over to his opinion.

Sanchez proposeth also another question in the matter of the Sacraments, which he resolveth according to the same principles. The question is, ^c if in the matter of the Sacraments it be lawful to rule ones self by the opinion which is less probable and less safe, when the validity of the Sacrament is in question. He answers in reporting the opinion and reasons of them who maintain that this is not lawful; but he pretends ^d that though what they say is probable, yet it is more probable that in the administration of the Sacraments it is lawful to rely upon an opinion which is less probable, leaving that which is safe and more probable, notwithstanding the danger of rendering the Sacrament null.

^p Verum ego existimo etiam extra hunc statum eum informandum. Ibid. n. 31.

^q Quod Confessor vitabit se penitentem admoneat.

^a Tunc quia Confessor tenetur ex officio bonum penitentis procurare, ut que consulerentur admonendo: tum quia lex charitatis obligat ad peccatum proximi vitandum. Ibid. n. 31.

^b cum in ejusmodi peccati perpetrandi periculo videt Confessor eum constitutum, cum pertinacem eum videat. Ibid.

^c Favo deductionem quid in ea questione dicendum sit: Aut licitum sit in Sacramentorum administratione uti opinione minus probabili et minus tuta,

^d Quando de Sacramenti valore agitur. Ibid. n. 32 p. 32. ^d Quamvis tamen hoc probabile sit, existimo tamen probabilius esse licere in Sacramentorum administratione uti opinione minus probabili, relicta probabili et tuta, non obstante irritandi Sacramenti periculo. Ibid. n. 33

He requires onely two conditions. The first is, that here in nothing be done outwardly against the custom and ordinary manner of administering the Sacraments. The second is, that it be not prejudicial to the salvation of our Neighbour. For in these cases that more safe opinion ought to be followed: out of these two cases he declares that it is lawful to put the Sacrament in hazzard, and administer it in an uncertain manner, onely to have the satisfaction of putting in practice a probable opinion, making less account of the validity of a Sacrament, and of the respect which is due unto the Sacred Mysteries and the blood of Jesus Christ, then of the goods and advantages of private men, and of the customs and outward forms which they observe in the administration of the Sacraments, as if it were more evil to offend the eyes of men, then those of Angels and God himself, who sees the Sacrament made void by the sleightness and rashness of the Minister.

c Excipitur
tamen ab hac
regula quoad
opinionem circa
jurisdictionem
Sacerdotis ad
audiendas con-
fessiones ver-
santur : atque
opinio probabilis
docet illum ha-
bere : probabi-
lior autem negat.
Talia enim Sa-
cerdos nullo
modo peccabit
audiendo con-
fessiones. Ibid.

n. 35.

f Quia communis error ex probabili opinione ortus, satis est ad gestorum per eum Sacerdotem valorem. Ibid.

g Tum etiam
quoniam in con-
fessionibus sem-
per quispiam
facitur aliqua
venialia cum
mortalibus. At
quilibet Sacer-
dos certam in
venialia juris-
dictionem ha-
bet : & ideo
cum poenitens
non ponat obicem,
et si certa jurisdictio in aliquam materiam partem, erit certus confessionis valor. Et quomvis careat
ille jurisdictione in mortalia, ea indirecte & per accidens virtute illius absolutionis remittuntur, atque excusabitur poeni-
tens ab eis iterum confitendis ratione iusta ignorantie, eo quod juxta probabilem opinionem credatur vera Sacerdotis illius
jurisdictione. Ibid.

But he makes one exception worth the noting. ^c We must except, saith he, from this rule the case in which the opinions differ about the jurisdiction of a Priest, for hearing of confessions; when one probable opinion holds he hath this jurisdiction, and the other which is more probable, denyeth it. For in this case the Priest sins not at all in hearing confessions. It may here be questioned whether the same charity towards his neighbour, which made him before establish the rule which he proposed, have made him also to adjoin this exception to the same rule. But if this be not clear enough by his answer, it will appear with advantage by his reason, which is ^f that an error which hath taken its original from a probable opinion, and which in consequence thereof is become common, is sufficient to authorize and make valid all that which the Priest doth. That is to say, that a false opinion and an error in the fact and practice, may serve for a rule and foundation to the conduct of Christians when it is by use, or rather by abuse, past into a custom. The Son of God saith that it is truth that delivers men, and this Jesuit will have that error and falsehood may deliver them from their sins and save them. 322c

He adjoins also this other reason: ^g that in confessions he that accuses himself of mortal sins accuseth himself also of venial. Now it is certain that every Priest hath jurisdiction of venial sins; and by consequent the penitent for his part putting no bar, and the Priest on his part having an assured jurisdiction of one part of the matter, he is assured that the confession will be valid; albeit the Priest have no jurisdiction over mortal sins, they shall be nevertheless remitted indirectly and by accident, in virtue of the absolution which he shall give for venials, and the penitent shall be dispensed from a new confession, his ignorance sufficing for his excuse, because it is just and reasonable, being built upon a probable opinion, which is the cause he believes that the Priest who absolveth him, hath a right and true jurisdiction. 323o

The Priest is in an error, as he now said, and the penitent ignorant, and yet he believes that the Priest gives absolution, and the penitent receives truly the remission of his sins, marvellous force of error and ignorance, or rather of probability, and of an opinion probable in appearance onely, which gives such vertue to error and ignorance.

Nothing can be spoken more to purpose to conclude that there needs no approbation nor jurisdiction of Bishops and ordinaries to confesse; and this is that which Sanchez regards and pretends in his exception rather than the good and salvation of souls. For if this be truth, which he saith, the Monks without having recourse to Bishop or Pope, may of themselves take liberty to confesse in all things and all sorts of persons. They need onely command their regents to teach that without this their absolution may be valid. For so this opinion becoming probable, it will become lawful. So that putting themselves afterwards into possession, they will acquire some right, and the opinion whereupon this right shall be founded, though false, continuing to be taught by others shall become common as well as the possession; and in progresse of time this inveterate and publick error will suffice to justify and make valid all that they shall do in pursuance of this rule: ^h That an error which hath taken its original from a probable opinion, and so is become common, sufficeth to authorize and make valid that which a Priest doth. 324o

h Quia communis error ex probabili opinione ortus, satis est ad gestorum per Sacerdotem valorem. Sanchez, op. mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p. 32.

After all this, though their opinion were the falsest in the world, and they were assured of it themselves, though they have neither jurisdiction nor approbation, nor priviledges, they would not for all that cease to believe that they have liberty

to confesse all sorts of persons; because that in the most depraved consciences, and the greatest sins that can be confessed unto them, they may always find with ease some one which is venial, for which there will be no need of approbation, every Priest having power to absolve them, and the absolution which he shall give for them will extend it self also to the others how great and enormous soever they may be. All this is the argumentation of Sanchez, which I do onely rehearse and deduce, to make it the more clear.

After this we must acknowledge that the Jesuits are very sober and temperate in their learning; that they use not all the power which their Divinity gives them, and that they give great testimony of their religious modesty, and of the esteem they have for the Pope and the Bishops when they present themselves before them to demand their priviledges; or their approbations to take confessions, it being in their power to attempt and do it themselves, without speaking to them thereof at all.

And this licence belongs not onely unto them but unto all Priests, whether they be Monks or not. For all Priests as well as they having power to give absolution for venial sins, may all also absolve of mortals which are confessed with venial; and so the absolution which they shall give for the greatest crimes that are without approbation of the ordinaries, shall be valid, and they that have confessed them shall be thereof truly absolved, and shall not be oblig'd to repeat their confessions.

Which is wholly to overturn the order of the Church, and of the Sacrament of Penance, to expose it to the most profane and sacrilegious hands of the most wicked Ministers, and to abolish absolutely all the authority of the Bishops, and of the Pope himself, in what concerns the administration of this Sacrament.

From matters of Divinity Sanchez passeth to those of Physick and Law, applying to Judges and Physicians that which we have now said of the probability of opinions.

He puts this question about Physick. *When the opinions of Physicians are divided concerning the remedies which are to be applyed to a sick patient, so that there be no certain one; it is inquired whether a Physician may make use of a Medicine according to a less probable opinion?* He proposeth first the opinion of some that say, that a Physician may in this case follow the less probable opinion. But after he had reported the contrary opinion which holds that this is not lawful, he saith, *that he esteemeth this last opinion more true; not that the Physician doth any injury, or anything contrary to the obligation of his duty, in making use of this probable opinion; but because he fails of the charity which is due unto his neighbour in his need, which wills that we should succour him by the most safe way and remedy that is possible for us.* Which confirms what we said above, that it must needs be, according to his opinion, that the health of the body should be a thing more precious then the Salvation of the soul, and that he esteems the Physicians to be oblig'd to be more charitable and more circumspect then Priests and Pastors of Souls, since he believes that Physicians ought to follow the more probable opinion, and to give to the sick the most assured remedies they can, by the Law of charity to our neighbour who demands it; *qui petit ut certiori medicamento quo possumus ei subveniamus.* Whereas he pretends that Confessors and Pastors of souls are not oblig'd at all thereto, and that they may conduct men by an opinion which they believe less probable and lesse safe, as hath been clearly proved by his own words.

habil, sed contra charitatem debitam proximo indigenti exhibendam, quae petit ut certiori medicamento quo possumus, ei subveniamus. Ibid. n. 41.

As for Judges when the right of the parties is not clear and certain, and when it happens that the Doctors are of different advice about the interpretation and fence of the Law, the opinion of Sanchez is, *that when the one opinion is as probable as the other, it is more apparent that it is in the power of the Judge to chuse which he pleaseth, and to follow it in his judgement.* So that, according to this Divinity, the

quam maluerit opinionem eligere, & secundum eam judicare. Ibid. n. 45.

Quando nihil remedium est certum, s. d. varie inter medicos opiniones versantur circa medicamenta illo morbo applicando; an liceat medicamento uti iuxta opinionem quam medicus minus probabiliter credit? Ibid. n. 40. p. 33.
b Existimo hanc sententiam veriorum esse, non quod sit contra obligationem iustitiae ex medici officio debitam, uti opinione illa pro-

c Quando utraque opinio est aequae probabilis, verum est integrum esse iudici

Judges shall have great power to oblige their friends, since all affairs almost may easily be made probable in the manner they order and handle them now a days; and he adds that which follows upon his principle, ^d *That he may, if it give no scandal, judge one while according to one opinion, and another while according to another opinion.* For if he may choose of two probable opinions that which he pleaseth, it follows thence that he may follow sometimes the one and sometimes the other, according as it shall please him. Which is evidently to make Justice altogether arbitrary, and to expose it to the avarice and passion of wicked Judges, the advice which he gives to avoid scandal, is onely to counsel them that they take heed that men do not perceive this unjust licence, because they would thereby be scandalized, fearing more that men should be offended then Justice and Truth.

d Imo cessante scandalo nunc secundum unam, nunc secundum aliam.

He is more troubled to resolve what the Judge is to do when one of the two opinions is more probable then the other. He cites some Authors who in this very case give to the Judge power to pronounce according to what he likes best, and even to follow that which he believes to be less probable; and to prove their opinion he lends them a reason of which he oftentimes made use before in like cases about other matters; ^e *Because a Judge doth not herein behave himself rashly or imprudently, guiding himself as he doth by a probable opinion.* Which obligeth him to approve the opinion of these Authors, though he dares not follow it: ^f *Because though it be probable, yet he believes it to be more probable, that a Judge is obliged to Judge according to the more probable opinion.*

e Quia nec temere nec imprudenter agit, utpote qui ratione probabili ducitur. Ibid.

n. 46.

f Quamvis autem hoc sit probabile; & probabilius judico eum teneri sententiam serve juxta opinionem probabiliorem. Ibid. n. 47.

g Licitum est sequi opinionem minus probabilem, etsi minus tuta sit.

There are none therefore but Casuists and directors of consciences alone that are absolutely exempt from this obligation. It is of them alone that we are to understand that which *Filiusius* said above: ^g *It is lawful to follow the less probable opinion though it be also less safe.* And it is to them onely that we are to referre all those maxims and conclusions which we have seen him and his fraternity draw from this principle. And though in this they favour indeed those of other professions, in fixing them more unto truth and Justice, and leaving them less liberty to depart from it, yet it is not this they regard particularly; their principal design is to favour themselves, in giving to themselves a power to dispose of the power of Jesus Christ, of his ministry, of the consciences and Salvation of men according to their fancy, and do in the Church whatsoever they please, without considering that there is no greater misery then to love licence, and to be able to do what one will against justice and truth.

II. POINT.

*The pernicious consequences and effects of the Jesuits
Doctrine of probability.*

IF the Tree may be known by its fruit, and if a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, as Jesus Christ saith in the Gospel, we may confidently affirm that the Doctrine of probability is the most dangerous that ever appeared in the Church and in the world, because it overturns all things in them both.

There is no Chapter in this book that proves not this truth; but because it is important, and that there are, it may be, many persons that will hardly believe it, and will not easily observe it, through the whole extent of this treatise; I will represent here some of the principal proofs of the pernicious consequences and unhappy effects of this Doctrine.

1. It favours and nurses up weak and disorderly persons in their mistakes and disorders, sinners and libertines in their bad courses, hereticks in their heresies, and Pagans in their infidelity.
2. It teaches to elude the Commandments of God and the Church, and it overturns Laws Civil, Ecclesiastick, and Divine.
3. It destroys the authority of Princes over their Subjects, of Pastors of the Church over the Faithful, of Fathers over their children, Masters over their Servants, of Superiours in Religious Orders over their Inferiours, and generally of all Superiours over their Inferiours.
4. It introduces independence, and leads to irreligion.
5. It cannot be destroyed nor hindered from having course in the world, if it be once therein received and taught.

Every one of these points are handled largely enough in diverse places of this Book, where may be seen the passages of the Jesuits Authors which I have cited for their verification. Wherefore, to avoid repetitions, I shall often onely give a short touch here, as I passe, of what they say upon the most part of these points, relating upon the rest some other new passages of their Authors. I will also recite some out of one of their principal and most faithful disciples and partakers, *Caramuel* by name. This is the onely exception to be found in all this work, of my design which I have to rehearse onely the Authors of the Society; if yet in this it can be said that I depart from my design, since it is still onely the Jesuits that speak by the mouth of one of their disciples, who doth nothing but deduce and explicate their opinions. But if sometimes he seem to be transported, and to expatiate too far in the licence of their Doctrine, he draws always his conclusions from their Doctrines, and he often supports them by their very reasons; and in all the liberty of his stile and spirit, he advances nothing but what is comprised and contained in the maximes of the Society, which I have represented in the preceding Articles.

It had not been hard for me to have drawn the very same consequences with him. But besides that I make some scruple to aggravate or publish the mischief before it appears and breaks forth of its own accord, it goes sometimes to such an excess that it seems incredible, if they themselves who are the Authors thereof did not both own and publish it. And this hath caused me to take this disciple of the Jesuits for the interpreter of their opinions, as being proper to represent most clearly and most surely the pernicious effects of their Doctrine of probability. But because the matter is of great extent, I will divide them into several Paragraphs, according to the points I even now observed.

S E C T. I.

That the Jesuits Doctrine of probability favours disorderly persons, libertines, and infidels.

1. **I**T favours weak and disorderly persons, and nuzzles them in their looseness, because, according to the rules of this probability, there is no person of any condition who may not easily be excused of the most part of his duties general and particular, continue to live in his disorder and in the abuse which the corruption of the age hath introduced, and exempt himself from alms, from fasting, and from other good works which he may and ought to do, according to the order of God and the Church, that he might come out of his weakneses and disorders, since these holy exercises are the strength and nourishment of the faithful soul.

But all these proofs and others also which might be produced upon this point, are contained in one sole maxime of the Jesuits Divinity, reported by one of their chiefest disciples and defendours: *That all probable opinions are of themselves as safe the one as the other; but the more pleasant although they be less probable are always more profitable and more safe by accident.* That is to say, because of their sweetness which renders them more easie, more proportionable to the inclinations of men; and more favourable to their interest and softness. And it is pretended that they are more safe because they never fail to be received by the men of the world, as more profitable to their lusts and temporal interests, though they raine their conscience and salvation.

a Omnes opiniones probabiles sunt per se et sic benevolentiores esse aliquando sunt minus probabiles, per accidens sunt semper utiliores et securiores. Car-

muel, Comment. in Reg. S. Bened. l. i. d. 61 n. 58. Item Theol. fundam. p. 134.

b Licet et non licet fore propositum variis adeundi Doctoribus, donec inveniam mibi qui ad libitum respondeat.

After this there remains nothing to be added to favour those persons who love their disorders but one, which is, *that they may be in a resolution to consult many Doctors; until they can find some one who answers them according to their desire.* Escobar, after he had left his Readers at liberty, to follow either the affirmative or the negative, saith, *that he holds for certain that it is lawful.*

Escobar, Theol. Mor. l. 2. scd. 2. c. 6. Probl. 7. c. Idem habeo computum.

2. This same Doctrine favours and nourisheth sinners and libertines in their wicked estate, securing them that they are not obliged to leave it, and turn unto God but at the point of death; and that at that time it sufficeth to demand pardon of God; and that to obtain it there needs no more then to say that we are sorry for offending him, in endeavouring to stirre up himself to a regret for his sins; but if he cannot have the sorrow which he desires, and which is necessary, it is enough to desire it, that absolution supplieth this default; and that if he have not the convenience even to confess himself, provided he doth what he can, God will supply the want of absolution and all the rest.

d cum Confessarius audit confessionem hominis in extremis positi, vel ob aegritudinem, vel quia mox sit puniendus à Judice, non curat de proposito non peccandi in posterum, sed solum dolo de contrahendis peccatis. Difficile est enim ab huiusmodi hominibus in peccatis emeritis verum de cetero non peccandi propositum capere. Cum enim non reflectat vi vendum de futuro, ad quod tempus propositum ordinatur? Nulla est necessitas qua conscientiam preat ad talem affectum promovendum. Id docet Suarez, tom. 4. disp. 4. scd. 3. a. 5. e Sicut enim periculosum est hominibus de rebus humanis affectis et honori deditis, petere propositum non vindicandi ipsi illam injuriam. ita propositum non peccandi, si vita duraret, haud petendum est ab his qui ad peccandum proclives fuerunt. R stat enim in his qui si scirent duraturam vitam, nec confiterentur, nec mores mutarent. Petrus Michael de Santoman Soc. Jesu expeditionum spiritualium Soc. Jesu, l. 5. c. 7. p. 78.

As for a resolution to amend and sin no more hereafter, they say it is not necessary; nor needs the Confessor himself be troubled thereabout, nor torment him whom he assists at the point of death; since having no longer to live, he should but speak in vain of this resolution, which referres onely to the time to come; That it were even dangerous to demand it of a man habituate and fixed in his sin, as of

an ambitious person not to revenge himself; knowing that as the affection which this man hath to the world and to his honour will not permit him easily to pardon and forget injuries which are done him, so the custom and inclination which that man hath unto sin holds his will so bound and captive, that he cannot so much as say seriously and truly that he is resolved to forsake it, being also still so disposed, that if he hoped to live longer, he would neither think of confession nor of changing his life.

3. That which conduces very much to nourish wicked men in their licentiousness, and weak ones in their softness, is, that neither of them will take any pains nor labour to part from evil, or to confirm themselves in any good; which yet is necessary, since our Saviour tells us in the Gospel, that there are none but those who use this violence upon themselves that shall obtain Heaven, and that the way which leads thither, as well as the gate which lets in thereto, is strait; so that of necessity we must strive to enter thereinto, and join vigilance unto constant labour to run thither faithfully unto the end.

The Jesuits divert men very far from this way, when they represent it very large and so easie to find and hold, that it can hardly be mist; because according to them whatsoever a man believes or doth following some probable opinion, he always goes on safely towards Heaven, and that the most pleasing and large opinions lead men thither more safely than others. Which is not onely proper to nourish the wicked in their naughtiness, and the weak in their looseness; but to weaken the strongest, and make them indifferent and careless, who proceed with the greatest courage and fidelity in the service of God.

Escobar considering the commodiousness which this Doctrine of probability gives to men to save themselves without labour, and in doing what they will, transported with astonishment and joy, speaks in these terms: *When I see such store of different opinions in Christian morality, it seems to me that the Divine providence doth herein lighten with brightness: because that by means of this variety of opinions we may bear the yoke of Christ more sweetly. Is it not more commodious for a Gentleman that would pass from Valladolid to Madrid, that he may learn many ways, then if he had had but one onely. For it must be either very large, or those who travel therein would hinder one another, and would all have much trouble to hold in it. It is then a manifest conduct of the providence of God, which presents men many ways to regulate their actions, and their manners, so that they may always do well whether they follow the one or the other of the two contrary opinions. Or as he saith in another place; whether they enter into the one or the other of these two entirely opposite opinions, they will go on directly to Heaven.*

Proficito dum video tot diversas sententias in rebus moralibus circumferri, divinam reor providentiam fulgurare: quia ex opinionum varietate, jugum Christi suaviter suscinetur. An non melius viatori plures vias à Vallisoletto in Madridum ex-

poni, quam si unica reperiretur? Certe vel eam nimis latam esse oportet, aut per eam transcuntes impediri, ac cum molestia peragere opus esset. Ergo divina providentia eorum plures moralium operationum vias exponi, rectamque posse inveniri actionem, sive juxta unam, sive juxta alteram opinionem homines operentur. Saulius in select. disp. 44. n. 40. Caramuel tract. supra reg. S. Bened. 60. Escobar, Theol. mor. tom. 1. l. 2. sect. 1. c. 1. n. 23. p. 54. g. ut quamcumque duarum primo diversarum (opinionum) inierint, recta tendant ad superos. In prologo tom. 1. c. 3. n. 13.

It would be very hard to reconcile these maxims with those of the Gospel, where in Jesus Christ speaks but of one way to Heaven, saying ^h that it is very strait; and that there are few persons that find it, and fewer that enter it, walk in it as they ought, and persevere therein: that this way is the truth, which can be but one, and that it is himself that is this truth, and way.

h Quam arcta porta & angusta via est que ducit ad vitam, & pauci sunt qui inveniunt eam.

Math. 7. v. 13. Ego sum via, veritas & vita. Joan. 14. v. 6.

And the Jesuits say that God hath discovered of late times by a peculiar providence many ways to Heaven, that he would have them made the most convenient and easie that they can be possibly, and that the most large and most easie should be the best and most safe: that the world might march in crowds by these new ways unto Heaven; and that though there were no other reason, this alone would suffice still to enlarge and multiply them more, lest men should be therein too much

Proficito dum video tot diversas sententias in rebus moralibus circumferri, divinam reor providentiam fulgurare.

Benigniores est aliquando sunt prababiles per accident, sunt semper utiles & securiores.

*Molina vis-
tori plures vias
exponi, quam si
una tantum ve-
periretur.*

*Certe eam
nimis latam esse
oporteret, aut
per eam transse-
antes impedi-
ac cum molestia
peragere opus
esset.*

*Ergo sup. na
providentia
cautum plures
moralium ope-
rationum vias
exponi.*

*Rectamque
posse inveniri
aet. orem, si e
juxta unam sive
juxta aliam opinionem homines operentur.*

Layman, sup.
duabus opinionibus p
obabilibus non sequitur alteram, potest sequenti monito licite tenere alteram. Caranuel Theol.
fund. pag 143.

crowded, or lest they should stifle and hinder one another in walking together in the same way, especially if it were so strait as our Lord representeth it; that to prevent and avoid also yet more this inconvenience, it was fit that these new ways to Heaven should be not onely different and distant from one another, but that they should be also sometimes opposite. For by this means they which follow it will be in no danger of pressing or inconveniencing one another in any kind, since they can never meet one another in the same way. Finally they teach that for fear of pestering one another in walking continually in the same way, or for some other reason which you please, you may change the way and enter some other, and returning by the same path march quite contrary to what you did, and turn your back on that part you pursued before, and yet never wander or part from the way to Heaven and Salvation. Thus they declare that any way is good to walk to Heaven, whether we march on the right hand or on the left: that we may do what we will by following some probable opinion, change our opinion as we please, do quite contrary to what we have done some little time before, without any fear of departing out of the way to Heaven by all these changes, nor to come into the way of perdition. So that according to the principles of this new Divinity, it is not onely very easie to be saved, but it is as it were impossible to be damned.

Vix doctus diversis secundum diversas sententias opposita consilia dare potest.

Poterunt hi modo juxta unam, modo juxta contrariam opinionem consuerere. Sanchez lu. Qui ex

fund. pag 143.

* Molina in
Concord. qu.
23. 2 4. & 5.
Disp. 1. memb.
ult.

* As *Molina* vaunts himself for having invented that knowledge which he calls the middle knowledge, and affirms that it was unknown to the holy Fathers and to all antiquity, and that none ever mentioned it before him, so far that he hath not scrupled to say that if *Saint Augustin* had discovered it, and the Church in his time had known it, they had not had to great trouble to defend themselves from the Pelagians, and to refute their error and heresie. In like manner *Escobar* rejoices himself, and attributes it to a particular favour of Gods Providence, that he and his Fraternity have discovered in these last days many new ways unto Heaven, which have been unknown to all the Saints of the ages past, to the Church, and to Jesus Christ himself, who hath not spoken thereof in his Gospel, or if he have, it hath been onely to condemn them, and to advertise men to flye from them as the broad ways which lead unto damnation.

This same Jesuit may also say in the transport of his joy, and in the consequence of his principles that if his ways to Heaven so sweet and so easie had been sooner discovered, the Church would not have been so severe in its discipline, nor Jesus Christ in his Gospel, and an infinite of persons might have been saved in following them, who are lost and damned eternally; not being willing to enter into that way which Jesus Christ hath taught, because it seemed to them too hard and too troublesome: and so according to this new Doctrine Jesus Christ hath not been in truth the Saviour of men, since he knew not, or hath not taught the most easie ways of Salvation; and the Jesuits may boast in this point also as in many others, and say that they properly, and those who with them have invented these new ways of Heaven so sweet and so easie by the means of this knowledge of probability, are the Saviours of the world.

4. The Doctrine of probability is also very proper to nourish the infidels in their infidelity. For if it be true that of two opinions we may follow that which is less probable with a safe conscience, whatsoever we represent to a Pagan to convert him, he may still abide in his Idolatry: because although we make the Christian Religion very probable unto him, and he see clearly that it is more probable then his; yet it is very hard, and as it were impossible to convince him in such sort that there should remain no doubt of our faith in his spirit, and no reason which may render his Religion probable; and by consequence he may persist always in his paganisme, without being almost at all obliged on pain of damnation to quit it, that he may receive the faith of the Gospel.

This argumentation is certain and evident after the principles of the Jesuits probability: but it will be less suspected, when we shall know that it is taken out of

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Sanchez,

Sanchez and others cited by Escobar. Sanchez demands when an Heathen is obliged under the guilt of sin to receive the Gospel which is preached unto him. And he answers 1. that according to some it is not enough to make him see that the Gospel is credible, but that it must be made also more credible unto him than his own Sect, though it do not cease to appear unto him also credible. But he answers in the second place that this opinion pleaseth him not at all, and pretends that in this very case a Pagan is not bound at all to embrace the Faith: *Because that when an Infidel is perswaded that his Sect is probable, though the contrary, which is the Christian Religion, appear unto him more probable; it is true that at the point of death when his Salvation is reduced to extremity, and when by consequence he is obliged to follow that part which he judges to be more sure and more probable, he is bound to embrace the true Faith which he believes to be more probable. But out of this extremity he is not obliged, because he judgeth prudently that he may persist in his idolatry.* In pursuance of this rule of probability; that he acts prudently who follows a probable opinion, I believe this Jesuit would not answer for the Salvation of a man who dyes in this estate, since he must then believe that he may be saved without Faith, and in Idolatry, which is the greatest of crimes. So that in saying he acts wisely in persisting in Idolatry, he saith in effect that it is wisdom to walk in the darkness of death, that it is prudence to destroy and precipitate himself into Hell in pursuance of his rules of morality, and grounding himself upon the principles of probability.

constitutus, in quo de extrema salute agitur: ac proinde partem quam tutiorem & probabiliorum judicat, amplectitur, tenetur. Sanch. op. mor. l. 2. c. 1. n. 6. p. 86.

SECT. II.

That this Doctrine of Probability favours the Heretiques, and nourisheth them in Heresie.

THE Doctrine of Probability is no lesse favourable to Heretiques then Infidels, in that the ordinary arms whereof the Church makes use to defend it self against Heretiques, and to assail them, being Scripture, Counsels, Fathers, and all that which we have received from the Ancients by Tradition, the Jesuits and those who with them defend this Doctrine of Probability, find not these evidences for their advantages, and are so far from making use of them, that they fear and fly from them all they can.

They cite in their Schools in their writings in a manner as often the Books of the Pagans, as of the Scriptures; they professe openly to preferre the new Authors above the Ancient; they acknowledge not properly for Masters and Fathers, any but those of their Society, to the judgement and the censure of whom they submit frequently enough the judgements of the Saints which the Church hath always acknowledged for Masters and Fathers.

Divine or Ecclesiastick authority, as well as Faith, have scarce any credit in their Schools; all as regulated and resolved by the authority of men and humane reason; and in all contests and difficulties which they encounter, if they cannot prevail by dispute, they have recourse to those whom they regard as their Masters and Sovereign Judges in all sorts of matters. They appeal to Suarez, to Vasquez, Molina, Lessius, and to others such like, without making almost any mention of Jesus Christ; the Apostles, or the Ancient Fathers, unless for form, and without producing the definitions of the Councils or Traditions of the Church to determine the questions, because they find them, not conformable to their Spirit nor their designs; some can make no use of them because they understand them not, and even will not give themselves the trouble to study them; and the others, because they find not in them what is for their purpose.

Besides they wish they could content the whole World, and answer all persons.

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that consult them according to their humour and disposition. Which obligeth them to look out for a Doctrine that is flexible and manageable, and which may be accommodated to all occasions. The maxims of Faith seem to them too fixed, and the rules of the Church and the Gospel too firm, and the opinions of the Holy Fathers too exact and too unmoveable. For this cause they being not able to make use of them to establish the maxims of which they have need, that they may make their designs to prosper; and fearing on the other hand that they might be made use of against them to overturn their naughty maxims, they find themselves as it were constrained by necessity to do all that they can directly or indirectly to corrupt them, weaken them, and to take away all credit from them. 342

In this they imitate and favour the hereticks of whom they have learned to reject the Holy Fathers, especially in the difficulties which regard manners, and the conduct of life; and to despise Antiquity and Tradition through a blind love of their own novelties and proper imaginations: and they are even in some sort more blameable than the Hereticks; because they renounce the Father and the Tradition upon a pretence of holding to Scripture; and these to follow their new Authors, from whom they declare openly that we ought to take Law and rules for Christians Morals, rather than from the Fathers of the Church.

Que circa fidem emergunt difficultates, esse sunt ex veteribus hauriendæ:

quæ vero circa mores homini Christiano dignos, à novitiis scriptoribus. Celot, l. 8. c. 16. p. 714.

And indeed there hath never been any heresie which hath not had at the least some sort of probability; because there hath yet never been any which hath not had some appearance of truth, without which it could have found no followers, the spirit of man not being capable to follow any thing but truth, nor to be deceived but by the shadow of it. And it often happens that the greatest Heresies took for their foundation the greatest truths, and have built on the strongest reasons. Which shews clearly that if to follow a probable opinion be to act prudently, and if an opinion be probable when it is grounded on the authority of some learned man, or some likely reason, as the Jesuits and those who hold their Doctrine of Probability tell us, there is no heretick who may not maintain against them that he acts prudently whilest he lives in his heresie. 343

It is true that the Hereticks have misconceived the truths of which they would make use, and especially those of the Scripture which they have corrupted in their sense and in their words, that they might fit them to their thoughts and errors. ^b But as according to these new Doctors a probable opinion which hath taken its original for an error, becoming common in proceffe of time become also safe, and may be followed in conscience. So although the Hereticks were convinced to have had their rise from error, they might according to this maxime pretend that time and custom have purged away this defect, and have put them in possession by a good title, which is sufficient to quiet their consciences and justify them before God. And to fortifie them yet more in this their imagination, and to defend it against those that would trouble them, they may say that though it were true that the Catholick Religion were more probable than the Lutherans or the Calvinists, they would yet cease to be probable, though they were not so much, and that of two probable Religions as well as ^c two probable opinions we may follow that which is lesse probable, according to the Jesuits Doctrine, though it were also lesse safe: and with much stronger reason when that which is the lesse probable is the more safe, as they may pretend theirs to be. 344

b Communis error ex probabili opinione ortus, satis est ad gestorum per sacerdotem valorem. Sanch. op. mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p. 32.

c Dico 2. librum esse sequi opinionem minus probabilem, etiam si minus tuta sit. Filliutius, mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 21. c. 4. n. 128. pag. 12.

^d Omnes opiniones probabiles sunt per se æque tute; benigniores est si aliquando sint minus probabiles, per accidens sunt semper meliores ac securiores. Caramuel, sup. For considering this other rule of the Doctrine of probability; ^d that of two probable opinions the more pleasant is always the more safe though it be lesse probable, a Calvinist or a Lutheran may say that he hath more reason to continue in repose and security of conscience in his Religion than the Catholick in his, since it is manifest

that the Doctrine of *Calvin* and *Luther* is more pleasing and favourable to nature and the inclinations of men than that of the Catholick Church, and by consequence it is more safe.

I should have refrained from reasoning in this sort, and drawing these consequences from the Jesuits Doctrine, though they be clear and evident, knowing how far it is from the Spirit of the Church to raise new difficulties in the matters of Faith, and to meet with the objections of the adversaries, then especially when they notably dishonour the truth, and when they are capable of hurting the weak spirited, if the Jesuits themselves and their disciples had not raised these doubts, and proposed these instances, and if they had not put these reasons in the mouths of the hereticks, to teach them to answer those who would presse them to return to the union of the Church.

They go so far as to confesse that these instances and these reasons, of which they acknowledge, that the Hereticks may make use to nourish themselves in their obstinacy, are taken from their Authors, and are no other then the principles and consequences of their Doctrine of probability, without troubling themselves to change or correct this evil Doctrine, no more then to answer the Hereticks, nor to let them see that they mistake their opinions, and the fundamental Doctrines of their Divinity, whereby they testifie that they disapprove not the reasonings of these Hereticks, and that they are not far from believing that a man may be saved in the Religion of *Calvin* and *Luther*.

It cannot be but from this imagination and observations, that one of their principal disciples, from whom I have extracted all these reasons, and all these consequences favourable unto heresie, which we now above observed to be their product, protesteth, *that he hath taken these discourses from good Authors, as are all those of the Society, for the comfort of the Germans and many others, otherwise honest men, whom he is troubled to behold infected with heresie.* For in matter of Religion we can give no consolation nor repose of conscience to any man, but by giving him hope that he may be saved in that whereof he makes profession.

e Ad solamen eorum qui in Germania habitant; & multos viros, aliter probos, infectos dolens heresi

aliquas periodos scribo, & verius ex selectissimis authoribus exscribo. Caramuel Theol. fund. p. 472.

After this protestation, he represents first of all a Man born in heresie amongst the Lutherans and well instructed in Lutheranism. He supposes in the second place that this Lutheran is entred into conference with many Catholicks, and, amongst others, with a Capouchin, one of the chief of their Order, who, to presse him to conversion, represents unto him that it is necessary for him either to renounce Jesus Christ, or to return to the Roman Church. And in the proceffe of his discourse, he teaches him to answer this Capouchin, according to the rules of probability which we have represented above, and he furnisheth him with all the reasons and all the instances which I now deduced, being draw from the same principles. See how he makes him speak:

Christianity is the most probable of all Religions, and it contains in it many Sects, of which some are more ancient, and some others are more novel; some more safe, and some more pleasant; some more diffused, and other more narrow, amongst which the Roman, the Lutheran, and the Calvinist are truly probable. And by consequence being a Lutheran, as I am, it is not true that there is a necessity for me to return to the Roman Church, or to renounce Jesus Christ. For besides the Roman Church, which I acknowledge to be probable, the Lutheran is also Christian and probable, and it is besides more pleasant then the Roman; And by consequence more safe in conscience, according to the rules of probability.

& Christianissima Religio est, & sub ipso dantur sectae antiquiores, juniores, si veriores, benigniores, universales, minus uivocales, & praecipue Romana:

Lutherana, & Calviniana, quae si vere probabiles: Ergo mihi Lutherano non est necessario redeundum ad Romanam Ecclesiam, aut secedendum à Christo. Nam praeter Romanam Ecclesiam, cui probabilitatem non nego, etiam Lutherana est Christiana & probabilis, & multo Romana benignior. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 472.

After that this Author had made this heretick to speak thus, he interrupts his discourse, that he might himself expound that which he said, or rather that which he

A. I. B. I. P. 2. C. I. A. 2. P. 2. S. 2. S 2 made

¶ Vim rationis jam penetras. Jam vides quo respicit hereticus. Tunc primo probabile quod Deus mentiri nequeat. Secundo esse probabile quod revelarit sacram paginam, & si velis, ut sic loquar, distaverit. Tertio esse probabile quod eandem Romana Ecclesia bene exponat. Ibid.

made him say. And to give more weight unto him: *¶ You see, saith he, the force of his reason, and what it is he pretends. First of all, he holds that it is probable that God cannot lye. In the second place, that he hath revealed the Holy Scripture, and even that he endited it, if you will have me expresse it so. In the third place he holds, that it is probable that the Church of Rome expounds the Scripture well.* 347

This is no Lutheran that saith this, it is a disciple of the Jesuits that talks thus for him, that expounds and builds his opinions on the principles of the probability.

1. *It is probable, saith he, that God cannot lye? It is probable that he hath revealed the Scripture, and that the Church interprets it well.* That is to say, that these Articles are no more points of Faith, or that Divine Faith as well as humane is a simple probability, and that these points and these propositions are in such manner probable, that the contrary ceases not to be also probable.

h Et tamen addit: iis non obstantibus harum antitheses esse probabiles. Ibid.

He dares not say this himself, though it follow evidently from his reasoning and his principles; but he makes it to be said by this Lutheran: *h He adds, saith he, that notwithstanding all these reasons, the contrary ceases not to be also probable.* That is to say, that as it is probable that the Church interpreteth well the Scriptures, it is also probable that it doth not interpret them well; that as it is probable that God hath indited the Scriptures, it is also probable that he hath not indited them: that as it is probable that God cannot lye, so it is also probable that he may lye and deceive men. It is true that this Author is not so bold as to maintain openly that these Antitheses are probable on the one side as on the other: *Harum Antitheses esse probabiles.* This is not the language of a Lutheran neither. For at least he will not say that God can lye. Yet he omits not for all that to make him say it; not because it is the opinion of Luther, but because it is a consequence of the Doctrine of probability, which the Jesuits teach, which he lends this Lutheran to maintain his heresie; and he makes him say it, without any testimony that he condemns the impiety of these words. On the contrary he furnisheth him with reasons to support it, making

i Resolutionem hanc sic ille confirmat & dilucidat: Doctrina Aristotelis, inquit, prout nunc traditur in Academiis Italicis, Hispanicis, Gallicis, probabilissima est: nec contra hanc ipsam probabilitatem militat mundi aeternitas, & anima rationalis mortalitas. Nam isti & similes errores sunt expuncti, nec jam traduntur a Christianis

him speak in these words: *i The Doctrine of Aristotle, which as it is now taught in the Universities of Italy, Spain, France, is very probable, and it cannot be objected that Aristotle held that the world was eternal, and that the reasonable soul is mortal, because these errors and others such like are at this day bannished out of this Philosophy, since it hath been taught by Christians. This same Doctrine and the School of Aristotle is divided into three Sects, which are that of the Thomists, that of the Scotists, and that of the Nominals: These are all three probable, all three famous, all three maintainable. If the Dominicans would say that the School of Aristotle, which is in their Order is more ancient then that of the Scotists and Nominals; and therefore that we must follow them or forsake Aristotle, what should they gain thereby. For the Franciscans would deride them, and believe hey, had also as good reason to say that they ought to follow the School of Scotus, or seperate themselves from the Peripateticks. And making application of these examples to the matter he hath in hand, comparing the Dominicans in the pretension they have against the Scotists and the Nominals, to teach the true Doctrine of Aristotle with the Catholicks, who maintain against the Lutherans and Calvinists, that they alone follow the true Doctrine of Jesus Christ, and are in the Church which he hath instituted, he prosecutes it in these terms: *k This form of arguing were very strong and cogent, if there were but one Religion under the**

Philosophis. Hæc ipsa doctrina & schola Aristotelis in tres sectas dividitur, Thomisticam, Scotisticam & Nominalem; omnes probabiles, omnes celebres, omnes plausibiles. Dicant Dominicani: Nostra Schola Aristotelica est antiquior Nominali & Scotistica; ergo redeundum ad ipsam, vel secedendum ab Aristotele. Quid inde? Nam à Franciscanis ridebuntur qui æquæ jure reponent vel admittendam esse Scoti scholam, vel relinquendum Peripateticum. Ibid. k Tunc argumentatio urgeret, cum una sub Christo Religio, vel una sub Aristotele schola demonstrationem produceret. Nam si una secta demonstraretur esse vera, reliquæ demonstrarentur esse falsæ, & in nostro casu aut Barbanotens; omnes hæc religiones, Romanam, Lutherianam, & Calvinianam esse Christianas & probabiles judico, & omnes hæc scholas, Thomisticam, Scotisticam & Nominalem esse Aristotelicas & probabiles censeo: & hæc ob rem ratiocinio illo disjunctivo; vel redeundum est ad Romanam Ecclesiam, vel secedendum à Christo, corvinei aut urgeri non possunt; Ibid.

name of Jesus Christ, or one School under the name of Aristotle, which could prove it self clearly to be the true one; For if it were demonstrated that one Sect were that true one, it would appear by the same means that the other were false. But in our case the Lutheran saith that he holds that the Roman, Lutheran, and Calvinian Religion are all Christian and probable, even as he believes that the Schools of the Thomists, Scotists and Nominals are all Aristotelian, and probable, and that therefore he cannot be convinced or pressed by this dilemma; that he ought either to come back to the Roman Church, or depart from Jesus Christ.

And because this defender of Lutheranism by the rules of probability, knew that antiquity is a strong foundation of Religion, and a puissant proof to shew that it is true, he prevents and eludes this reason, saying for the Lutheran, ¹ that he troubles not himself about antiquity, nor the general Councils, because evident arguments cannot be drawn from them, but onely probable ones, since the School of Aristotle is more ancient then the Religion of Jesus Christ, and the Academies of the Peripateticks had a greater number of Masters and Doctors, then general Councils. And he makes all this to be spoken by a Lutheran; but in the progresse of his discourse he becomes his advocate himself, and speaks thus openly in favour of him: ^m It is lawful for Father Valerian de Magnis the Capouchin, to accuse the Doctrine of the Peripateticks of error and Tyranny, why is it not lawful for a Lutheran to take care of himself, for fear of being deceived by retiring to the Roman Church, and least instead of truth, he find there error as well as in other Sects. ⁿ Wherefore may he not say the Church of Rome is as to truth very probable, and for conscience very safe? But this hinders not, but that the Lutheran Doctrine which he professeth may be also probable, Christian and safe, and even more safe, since an opinion less probable is more safe, when it is more pleasant. Wherefore may he not also say that he is in repose of conscience amongst the Lutherans; and by consequence he is not obliged to return to the Roman Church, or to forsake the Religion of Jesus Christ.

1 Nec antiquitatem ipse & Concilia generalia morabitur. Hæc enim, ut ait, probabilia argumenta & non evidentia ministrant. Quoniam scholæ Aristotelica Christi religione multo antiquior, & scholæ Peripateticæ multo numerosiores magistros habere quàm generalia Concilia. Ibid. m Et sicut Patri Magno doctrinam Peri-

pateticorum de errore & tyrannide arguere, cur non licebit Barfanomeo esse cautiore? ⁿ Cur non licebit d cere Romanam quidem Ecclesiam probabilissimam, atque adeo in foro interno esse securissimam. Et tamen hoc ipso non obstante Lutheranam quam ipse profitetur esse etiam probabilem atque æque Christianam & securam. Imo securiorem omnino, quoniam minus probabilis sententia se benignior, etiam securior est. Cur non licebit addere se esse in quietâ conscientia apud Lutheranos adeoque nec tenei redire ad Romanam Ecclesiam, nec à Christi religione secedere. Ibid.

10 It is not the Lutheran that talks thus, but the disciple of the Jesuits who speaks for him, and furnisheth him with answers, whereby he believes that he may defend himself against those that presse him to forsake his Lutheranism, and with reasons wherewith to comfort himself, according to the design of this whole discourse, and to assure his conscience in his Religion, because it is probable, because therein he finds repose, because being born therein, and having been brought up and instructed therein from his childhood, he hath continued therein and lived in it in simplicity, with intention to serve God and save himself; which are so many principles of the Jesuits Divinity; one that he acts prudently and with a safe conscience in following a probable opinion: the other, that a pretended good intention covers all sorts of crimes; and the third, that to do evil, it is necessary to know that evil is done, and to have a will to do it; so that when we think to do well, as this Lutheran doth, and that following conscience; though erroneous, we accustom our selves to evil, so long till we loose all sense and cognisance thereof, and therein find our repose, we may according to this new Doctrine continue in this estate, without fearing any thing.

And as if this Author kept intelligence with this Lutheran, or as if he were convinced by the strength of his reasons, and could not make answer unto him, he concludes in this manner: ^o It is thus that this Lutheran also argues at this day; and it were well that some one of them that read this, would undertake to refute him. He hath already heard Father Valerian the Capouchin, and he desires to hear others.

o Sic discurre etiam nunc Barfanomeus, & debet à se, lector erudite,

composci. Patrem Valerianum Magnum audire, & alios audire desideras. Ibid.

It is his duty who hath done the hurt to apply the remedy; it is their duty who have put arms into the hands of the enemies of the Church to fight with her, and to nourish themselves in rebellion against it: to take them from them, and to break them asunder in their hands; but this man testifies either his malice in declaring that he will not do it, or his weakness in affirming that he cannot, and in discharging himself upon others, *deberet à te lector erudite comprehendi.*

He doth not condemn even that which he makes the Lutheran himself say; he complains not that he makes evil use of his Doctrine, and of the Jesuits about probable opinions, or that he interprets or applies it ill. He doth not onely not answer his reasons, but he makes them avail as much as he can. He enlarges them, he expounds them, he adds his own to them, if they be not all his: and though he dare not approve them directly and positively, declaring that all he saith is true, he doth it yet indirectly inquiring why he may not so speak? And leaving the question so without answer; he testifies that he hath no true one, and that he agrees that a Lutheran may in this manner defend himself against them that presse him to leave his Lutheranisme, and return to the Church of Rome.

Also before he entred into this discourse, he said plainly that he did it onely to this purpose to comfort the Germans and other honest people infected with heresie. He pretends then to comfort them by the discourse of this Lutheran, and he avouches, that in the matter of Religion and Salvation, there can be no consolation but in repose of conscience, and in the perswasion of being united to the true Church, and in an estate of Salvation; making this Lutheran say that he is in repose of conscience amongst the Lutherans; *se esse in quieta conscientia apud Lutherum*, and that a Lutheran Church is a probable, Christian and safe Church: *Lutheranam Ecclesiam esse probabilem, Christianam, securam.* And so he testifies openly, that one may be saved out of the Roman Church amongst Lutherans and Calvinists. These are the consequences, and fruits of the Doctrine which makes all things probable.

S E C T. III.

That the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability destroys the Commands of God and the Church, and teaches to elude all Laws Divine and Humane, even that which forbids to do unto others that which we would, not have done unto our selves.

IT is easie to prove this by reason, and to make it apparent by evident and necessary consequences, that it is a sequel of this Doctrine. But it seems more to my purpose to shew it by the proper words and examples of the Masters and defenders of this very Doctrine.

^a Proposi alterum casum. Petrus die Sabbati sub mediam noctem, ut primum audivit duodecimam, comedit carnes; & postquam satur excessit è mensa, audivit

aliud horologium significans duodecimam. Die sequenti communicare vult, & sic discurreit: Horologia habent opinionum probabilium virtutem: at ego comederam antequam tale horologium sonaverit: ergo probabile est quod sum jejunus. At opinioni probabili conformare conscientiam possum: Ergo potere communicare. Caram. Theol. iund. p. 139.

He finds no difficulty herein. Wherefore concluding for this man, and for the devotion he hath to communicate after he had well broken his fast on the Lords day, whether it were past midnight when he did eat, or after he had filled himself with victualls on Saturday, if he did eat before midnight, he concludes thus: ^b I would

^b Et volo scire cur communicare non possit; nam stando Doctrinae præcedenti potest. Et ego in hoc toto peccati discursu quod possem negare aut reprehendere, nihil invenio. Ibid.

know wherefore he may not communicate; for he may according to the preceding Doctrine, which renders all thing probable: and as for me I find nothing in this reasoning which I can deny or refuse.

See another case of Escobar which is no lesse strange. ^c You read not, saith he, an heretical Book, or which treats of matters of Religion, but you hear another who reads it upon your request, and upon your motion, we may say, according to the Doctrine of probability, that you incur the danger of excommunication, and that you incur it not; that you have, and that you have not need of a Bull to be granted for your absolution. You may then follow whether of these two opinions you please: but if you be a man of conscience, you will not fail to follow the more safe, which is according to the principles of this learning, that which is more sweet and more large.

Non legis librum hereticum, seu de Religione tractantem, sed audis alium qui te incitante auctoritate illum legit. Incidis & non incidis in excommunicationem; & consequenter eges

& non eges Bullae indulto ut possis absolvi. Escobar, Theol. mor. lib. 7. sect. 2. c. 33. probab. 59. p. 289.

Therefore to assure you yet farther, yet Escobar repeats it again, ^d that you do not incur the danger of excommunication, and that you have no need of the favour of a Bull to be absolved. And his reason is manifest: because to hear read is not to read. So you are exempt from all censure, according to Escobar, though you have made this heretical Book to be read by another; and so you have read it by his eyes, and have been the cause of his sin and your own. This very same thing he expresses in these following words. ^e I hold that this is true, though he who heard another read have induced him to read it. For to induce another to read, is not to read.

Non incurris excommunicationem, nec eges Bullae indulto, ut absolvaris: quia audire non est legere. Ibid. e Hoc verum censeo etiam si quis audit legentem induxerit ad

legendum. Inducere enim alium ut legat, non est legere. Ibid.

And if you would know the principle of this opinion, this is it: ^f the censure which is ordained against him who doth a thing, is not against him who counsels it onely, if it be not express in the Bull. Here the question is not of him that counsels onely to read, but of one who causeth it to be read before him that he may hear it; and for this cause he in effect is the Reader, more then he who lends him his eyes, because he is the Author of the reading, and the other is onely the Instrument.

Et censura contra facientem lata no illigat consulentem, nisi in Bulla exprimatur. Ibid.

^g As for the servant that reads unto his Master, he runs the peril of being excommunicated, saith Escobar, if he be not excused by ignorance. So that a servant that reads to his Master an heretical Book in Latin, or it may be in the vulgar tongue, without understanding more of it then if it were Latin, for want of wit or learning, shall be excommunicated; and the Master who made him to read it of malicious intent, and sucks up all the venom of this naughty Doctrine shall not, and all the force of the Churches censures shall be stayed at the silly servant, who serve for a Buckler to his Masters wickedness.

Incurret vero censuram famulus legens, nisi ignorantia excusetur. Ibid.

The Council of Trent pronounces an excommunication against those who steal Women. ^h Tambourin exempts from the curse, and from all other punishment intended by the Decree of the Council, those who steal or carry them away by force to abuse them and not to marry them.

Respondeo hoc decretum non habere locum in quocumque raptu, sed

in aliquo duntaxat. Quare si quis rapiat mulierem, causa libidinis, & non ad contrahendum cum illa non incurrit predictis Concilii penas. Ita Lessius, lib. 4. num. 70. Sanchez, lib. 7. m. 85. d. 13. num. 4. Tamb.

Escobar proposes also this question about indulgences. ⁱ I know, saith he, that into indulgences there ought to be joyned certain works, as fasting, alms, confession, &c. But I inquire whether when these works which are good of themselves, become by some circumstances venial or mortal sins, they be sufficient also to gain the indulgences? He answers with Granado: ^k that it suffices that the work be good in its kind, though in

Scio debere apponi opera, jejunium scilicet, elemosinae, confessionem, &c. Rogo si ejusmodi opera

moraliter bona ex circumstantiis fiant mala aut venialiter aut mortaliter, sufficiantne ad Indulgentiae lucrationem? k Granadus disp. 4. num. 10. sufficere docet opus esse bonum ex suo genere, licet ex circumstantiis & individuò malum sit. Escobar, mor. Theol. tract. 7. exam. 5. c. 8. n. 59. p. 850.

particular is be naught, by reason of its circumstances. This is a thing unheard of and inirely incredible, that an indulgence may be obtained by a mortal sin. That is to say, that a full remission of all sins may be obtained by a new sin, and by a sin perhaps as great or greater then the others; and so a man may be absolved and condemned together by one and the same action. The paradoxes of the Stoicks are not more strange, and yet this is probable according to Jesuits; because *Granado* and *Escobar* have held it, and it is lawful to follow their Counsel in rejecting the contrary.

Dispensations as well as indulgences, are the graces and favours of the holy Chair; and as the Pope doth not commonly grant indulgences, but with a condition of doing certain actions, which he prescribes for the gaining them, so neither doth he grant any dispensations but for certain causes, which are alledged to obtain them. But, as *Escobar* holds, that indulgences may be gained by criminal actions, so he saith, also that a dispensation may be gained and used lawfully, though the cause upon which it is demanded be false, and that it be grounded on no reason at all. He demands ^l whether it be a mortal sin to demand a dispensation without just cause, and to make use of it in the same manner. He answers that *Granado* holds that it is; but *Sanchez* believes that it is probable, that it is not so much as a venial sin, to make use of a dispensation obtained without cause. His reason is, ^m because the Law having once lost its force, it obliges no more, and it may be rejected without venial sin. That is to say, that because one fault is made, a second may be made without fault. For he affirms that it is a sin at least venial to demand a dispensation without just cause; and he holds that having once obtained it, we may use it even without venial sin. This is as if he should say that having once gotten goods unjustly, we may enjoy them without injustice.

1 Num sit peccatum mortale dispensationem concedere, seu impetrare, eaque uti sine justa causa? *Granado* affirmat. At *Sanchez de matrimonio*, 3. disp. 18. n. 10. probabile putat nec esse veniale peccatum uti dispensatione obtenta sine causa. *Escobar*, Theol. mor. tract. 1. exam. 16. c. 4. n. 32. p. 236. m Quia jam lex relaxata est: unde nec ad veniale remanet obligatio.

n Concedere autem impetrare sine causa veniale alii solummodo putant in gravi dispensatione. *Ibid.*

He adds ⁿ that some believe that it is but a venial sin, to demand or to grant a dispensation without cause, and then onely when the dispensation is of consequence. It appears therefore, that according to these people that it will be no sin, even venial, when the dispensation is not important. And so all the Laws of the Church shall be exposed to contempt and mens malice, who may procure themselves to be dispensed with therein by lyes and falsities, and after serve themselves with those dispensations, without committing more then venial sin, which passeth for nothing with the Jesuits.

After this it will be found less strange which the same *Escobar* saith, that when a dispensation is procured upon any just cause, the cause ceasing, yet the very same dispensation may be made use of. ^o Doth the dispensation cease, saith he, when the cause upon which it was obtaineth ceaseth? He answers, that *Salas* holds the negative, but *Sanchez* holds the contrary. Both these Doctors are capable to make that opinion probable. And therefore we may follow whether we please, according to the Jesuits.

o Cessat dispensationis causam dispensatio cessat? Negative responderet *Salas*, *Sanchez* affirmat. *Ibid.* n. 36.

p Cum quo dispensatum est propter morbum in esu carnis, potest vesci his licet omnino convalescent.

From this principle *Granado* and *Diana* draw many conclusions remarkable in the practick. ^p That a person who hath obtained a dispensation to eat flesh on prohibited days, because he is sick, may continue to eat though he be well recovered. ^q That one who hath procured a dispensation from a Religious vow, because of some infirmity, is not obliged to his vow, no not after he is healed of his infirmity. ^r That an Ecclesiastick who hath obtained a dispensation from reading his Breviary, because of some infirmity in his eyes, is not obliged to read after he is healed.

q Cum quo propter infirmitatem dispensatum est in voto Religionis, postquam convalescit non tenetur.

r Cum quo propter infirmitatem oculorum dispensatum est in onere recitandi horas cisi convalescerit non tenetur legere.

All these things are very probable, if that be true, which *Escobar* hath told us above, that a dispensation may be demanded without any reasonable cause, and afterwards be made use of without sin: they are also even certain and evident, if as he hath said with *Salas*, a dispensation determineth not though the cause upon which it was obtained cease. But this is to prove a lesse disorder by a greater, and

practices which are bad, by a principle corrupt and erroneous: this is to open a door to all looseness and libertinisme, and to despise all the Laws of the Church.

He proposes also a like case: *There being but one Mass said in a Church, a man comes there when they are rehearsing the Preface: it is demanded whether he be obliged to hear the remainder of that single Mass? Sanchez and Suarez say that he is, because this is the principal part of the Mass: but I hold, that it is probable that he is not obliged, because he cannot accomplish the precept of hearing Mass, by hearing that part.* We may conclude by this, that he who cannot pay all his Debt, is not obliged to pay what he can, and that weakness discharges him of what he can, as well as what he cannot.

3600

[Tempore praesentationis quis veniat ad Sacrum audientium quod unice celebratur. Teneturne illam singularis illius Sacrificii partem audire? Sanch. & Suarez.]

tene i affirmat. Quod illi sit praecipua sacri pars: ego autem probabiliter assero non teneri; quia per illam non potest implere praecipuum. De Escob. mor. Theol. tract. 1. ex. m. 11. v. 4. n. 108.

Caramouel reports many like cases, whereupon the resolutions are sometimes so extravagant, that he is obliged to disown them, or at least to dissemble that he approves them; though he affirms that they are conformable to the principles of the Doctrine of Probability, and that they follow necessarily from the Doctrine of Diana, whom he professes to follow throughout, as they both follow the Jesuits, Sequemur agnum, hoc est Dianam, quocumque ierit. These extravagant cases are these: In Monasteries where according to the custom and rules of the Office, on solemn Feast dayes, twelve Lessons and as many Responsals are said, which the whole Community rehearses not, but hears only, there are found 24 Monks in the Quire, by distributing the 12 Lessons to 12 Monks, and the 12 Responsals to 12 others, and causing them read all together, and at the same time, every one his Lesson or his Responsal whereof he hath charge, they will satisfy their obligation, to read 12 Lessons and 12 Responsals. The second is; When two persons say their Breviary together, it is not needfull that they hear one another, but one may begin one verse, before another hath ended that which goes before, because he may at the same time hear what he saith himself, and what his companion saith. For as to the inward attention, he needs not trouble himself for it, because we think not that it is necessary.

3610

[Juxta mores & rubricas Monasticas in Officio solenni habemus 12 lectiones & totidem responsoria quae non recitantur Communice, sed audientium. Ergo si sint 24 inchoantes, & singuli dicant simul lectionem & responsorium, satisficient praecipuo legendi 12 lectiones & totidem responsoria. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 225. & seq. Quando duo loquantur simul, non erit opus ut alter alterum expectet, sed poterit alter incipere antequam alter praecedentem absolvat; quoniam potest simul se & socium audire, nec est cur ad attentionem & assiduitatem recurrat, quia attentionem internam non esse necessariam putamus. Ibid.]

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If then instead of two persons who say the Breviary together, we take so many as there are verses in the Office, every one saying his verse in the same time, they will compleat the Office in as little time as was needfull to rehearse one single verse: they need only to speak louder, and cry out if need be, that they may all hear one another at least confusedly; as the 24 Monks of whom he spoke in the precedent case, who repeated the Lessons and Responsals of their Matines together. For as to the inward attention and understanding of the words, he said but now, that it is not necessary.

3. The third case is, *When we say the Pater noster, and Ave Mary, in the beginning of the Office, it is not needfull to repeat it in all the other Hours of the same, no more than all that which is repeated divers times in the Office.* The reason is, *because we may by one sole action, satisfy divers precepts.* When he concludeth yet further;

[Si semel in una hora dicitur Pater, Ave, & ea quae in horis diversis repetuntur, non debent in aliis]

boris recitari. y unico actu potest homo diversis praecipis satisfacere.

4. That a person who hath been ordered to recite the Rosary, which consists of 150 Aves, and 50 Paters, satisfies this command by saying only once the Pater and Ave.

3620

Though *Caramouel* be very passionately affected to the Doctrine of Probability, and addicted wholly to *Diana*; as well as the Jesuits, to follow them in all things, and through all; so that he testifies after in the cause of *Amicus*, that he defends him blind-fold, and against his own light, in that which he first of all taught, that we may kill a Calumniator, saying with another Divine whom he consulted on that

a Potuisset Amicus hanc resolutionem omis-
sisse; at semel impressam debet illam tueri, & nos eandem defendere.

b An hæc omnia Diana admittet? Non puto.
Quid ergo? Vt hæc omnia debeat deglutire, vel à principali opinione recedere.

c Petrus ingressus navim majoris commoditatis causa contulit secum Diurnale, subscribens Thomæ Sanchez in Sum. tom. 1. 19. n. 8. affirmanti legentem ea que continentur in Diurnali, Officio divino satisfacere. Postquam autem solverunt à portu, mutavit dictamen, & secutus sententiam Johannis Sancio in select. disp. 11. n. 2. assertantis in Diurnali non contineri integrum officium divinum, ac proinde caren-

5. Sanchez holds, c that he hath satisfied the Divine Service, who recites only what is the daily Office. And Sancius on the contrary holds, that the whole Service which ought to be said, being not in the daily Office, he that hath only the daily Office, is not obliged to say any thing at all, because he cannot say all that he ought. These two Opinions are sufficiently commodious considered apart: but they will be much more joynd together, as Caramouel makes appear in this example. He presents to us an Ecclesiastick who makes a voyage by Sea, who going on Ship-board, takes only his Diurnal, following the opinion of Sanchez, that he may have less Service to say; a little after, being at Sea, and now out of possibility of procuring a Breviary, he quits the opinion of the Jesuit Sanchez, to follow that of Sancius, a Jesuit also, and layes aside his Diurnal, that he may discharge himself wholly of the Service, and say none at all. Caramouel approves this conduct, and as a faithfull Disciple of the Jesuits, maintains both the opinion of Sanchez and of Sancius at once. He saith, that this Ecclesiastick may follow the opinion of Sanchez, because it is probable; and that he hath also power to quit it, to follow that of Sancius, because that is also probable; and that he is free to change in this manner, because it is very natural and very reasonable, a man not being in slavery to his own opinions, no more than to those of others. Homo non est suarum opinionum mancipium; but he is rather their Master, and may and ought hold his spirit elevated above them, how probable soever they be, and make himself Judge thereof, or rather serve himself with them as he pleaseth, or reject them without troubling himself so much as to judge of them, or examine them. Whence he concludes, that this Ecclesiastick hath done well and prudently in all his carriage.

zom Breviario, licet Diurnale habeat, non teneri legere Officium divinum, illud non legit. Sed quomodo hanc difficultatem proponit? ut exacte respondeam, opus est omnes circumstantias expendere, &c. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 138. Paulus primo Sanchezii sententiam sequebatur, & bene faciebat, quia est gravis auctor. Ex vi hujus dictaminis potuit sine gravi culpa scrupulo relinquere Breviarium in terra, & solum conferre Diurnale. Secundo asseritur Paulus mutasse dictamen, & hoc humanum est, & rationale: homo non est suarum opinionum mancipium. Cum probabile dictamen mutat, utitur cultus sibi concessi libertate, & bene facit, fidei orthodoxæ dogmatibus demonstrationibusque ac principis per se notis subest ingenium, probabilibus sententiis superest. Ideoque quam libere sententiam Sanchezii apprehendit, tam libere potuit eam dimittere. Potuit igitur Paulus sine conscientie scrupulo mutare dictamen, & valedicere opinioni unius, sequi alterius opinionem. Tertio dicitur Paulus noluisse uti Diurnali, & defectu Breviarii multis diebus quibus in navi fuit horas non recitasse, nec tamen peccavit mortaliter. Operabatur eam juxta conscientie dictamen, quod erat probabile & prudens subnixum Sancio autoritate. Dices quando Paulus ingressus est navim voluit mutare dictamen; ergo voluit non legere. Patet; quia ex mutatione dictaminis inferebatur lectionis omisio: ergo graviter peccavit, quia mortifere peccat qui vult non legere cum potest; & Paulus antequam à portu solveret, poterat conferre Breviarium & legere. Respondeo concedendo Paulum cum ingrederetur navim, voluisse mutare dictamen, distinguo consequens, voluit ergo non legere, hoc est omittere horarum lectionem quam nunc judicatum erat obligatoriam. Nego; illam quam tunc judicatum erat obligatoriam, Concedo. Ergo peccavit graviter, nego subsumptam consequentiam. Ibid. p. 144.

He saith also, that though this Ecclesiastick even then when he took his Diurnal, that he might say what was contained therein, according to the opinion of Sanchez, had an Intention to quit this opinion of Sanchez, as soon as he was got onward at Sea, and to take up and hold that of Sancius, that he might discharge himself of the obligation of saying what was in his Diurnal, as well as that which was in his Breviary, yet he did no evil; testifying that it is no evil for an Ecclesiastick to sport himself with the Church, and its Commands, to elude them, and to perswade himself that he is not obliged at all to say any thing of the whole Breviary: and though this have not been lawfull heretofore, because this opinion was not then invented,

it shall be lawfull in time to come, according to the maxim of these Divines, because *Caramouel* a considerable and learned man maintains it. For he is of himself alone capable to make an opinion probable: and though he have not of himself this credit and authority, *Sanchez* and *Sancius*, whom he cites, and whom he follows, will give it him by a Rule of this Science, which holds, That a Scholar may hold and teach an opinion which he hath learned of his Master, and after that, it is probable and safe in conscience; and that the same will be also so much safer; as it is pleasanter, by this other Rule, that ^d *the more sweet are alwayes the more profitable and more safe, though they are less probable.*

*d Benigniores
etsi aliquando
sunt minus pro-
babilis, per accidens sunt semper utiles & securiores.*

6. But if you make scruple of not saying all the Service, and that you desire only to be discharged of some part of it, because it seems to you to be too tedious, these obliging Divines will bestow on you two Expedients for your contentment.

The first is, ° that you may choose the shortest Office of all the year, as is that of *Easter*, and say it every day without changing, if you have any the least pretence, which may appear a little reasonable. It will be, say they, no sin at all; and if you have no pretence, they hold, that it will be only a venial sin.

e Sacerdos quidam quotidie recitare consuevit Officium Romanum festo Resurrectionis

Dominica proprium, & modo querit an peccaverit; & si sic, qualiter? Respondetur 1. illum Sacerdotem si quotidie contra ullam rationabilem causam Officium Resurrectionis recitet, peccare solummodo venialiter. Respondetur 2. Sacerdotem illum si id quod in casu propositum faciat quotidie ex mediocri & rationabili causa, nunquam ullo modo, ne venialiter quidem peccare. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 520.

So it will be lawfull for an Ecclesiastick to overturn the whole Order of the Church, and Divine Service, singing *Allelujab* in the dayes of *Lent*, and on *Good-Friday*, and saying before God, that *Jesus Christ* is risen, whilst yet he is suffering, and nailed to the Cross; and all this shall be lawfull for him for his pleasure only, and for his convenience, or upon the least pretence in the world.

7. The other is, to say Matines and Lauds in the Evening, following the practice that is of late common enough, with intention to satisfy at once the obligation of this day, and the following. See here how *Caramouel* propounds this case.

^t *I ask, whether he that says the Matines and Lauds in the Evening, satisfies the obligation of two dayes? The first opinion holds, that bare rehearsing the Matines and Lauds in the Evening, satisfies the obligation of two dayes; and it is proved, because that a man may by one sole action, satisfy two different commands, which are directed for the same purpose, and which fall out at one and the same time. There is another opinion quite opposite hereunto, which holds, that in saying the Service once only, two obligations cannot be satisfied. See there's the case, and here's the answer.*

f Peto utrum ille qui Vespere Matutinas & Laudes recitat, duorum dierum satisfaciat obligationi? Opinio prima affirmat simplicem Matu-

litinum & Laudum lectum si fiat sub Vesperum duorum dierum, obligationi satisfacere, & probat, quia una & eadem actione potest Philippos satisfacere duobus preceptis numero distinctis eodem tempore concurrentibus; huic e diametro opponitur sententia altera asserens non posse eadem ratione satisfieri utrique obligationi. Ibid. p. 217.

8 *I have proposed this question to an excellent Doctor, a Jesuit, as a Scholar to his Master, who hath a long time taught Moral Divinity, and who taught it also here at Prague, who told me, that the more pleasant opinion seemed to him probable. I name him not, because I know he had rather live in peace, without being assailed by ignorant persons, than be commended for the greatness of his wit. Let this Author then be the first for this opinion, and Caramouel the second; as it is reasonable that the Master should go before, and the Scholar follow after. It may be others will follow hereafter, and as it is probable of it self, so it will be one day by the authority of men, and*

g Proposui hanc doctrinam eximio cuidam Doctiori Jesuitae Theologiae Moralis à multis annis Professori, & hic Pragae docenti: & respondit sibi videri senten-

tiam benigniorem probabilis. Eius nomen non exprimo. Scio enim illum mille in pace vivere, quum ab ingenii perspicacitate colluctanda. Ergo pro illa sit iste primus auctor, sit securus Caramouel: forte alii accedent, & quae probabilis est ab intrinseco, ab extrinseco erit etiam aliquando probabilis: forte etiam nunc est probabilis ab extrinseco benigna opinio. Est enim nova & solum à nobis tractata: habet pro se duos auctores, & contra se nullum; & quia hoc verum, cur non erit probabilis? Ibid. p. 222.

perhaps it is so at present; for it is wholly new, and I am alone the proposer of it, and it hath two Authors for it, and there are none against it. And being so, why is it not probable? This opinion discharges of one part of the Breviary, and that of Sanchez, being well managed, with that of Sancius, may discharge of the whole in many occurrences.

There is also another more commodious and more easie, which gives liberty to cut off therefrom what we please, or to say or not say it at all absolutely if we please. The foundation of this opinion is, that the Church can neither command nor forbid, condemn nor punish that whereof it cannot take cognisance: Upon this principle Caramonel reasoneth in this manner. ^h *Albeit that the action of him who saith his Breviary in secret, or who faileth thereof in secret, may be known by himself, yet it cannot be known by any other man; a Superiour must be an Angel, and not a man, to know all the secret actions or omissions of this subject. Then this action in the same manner is incapable of being judged, and if so, of being punished, and then also of being commanded. And by consequence it is thus true, that Superiours cannot forbid secret actions or omissions.* There is nothing required, but to be secret and crafty enough to hide himself from men, so that they know not whether he say his Breviary or no, without thinking of God who sees all; nor of the command of the Church, who appoints the Office to be said every day; nor by consequence of the penalties ordained against them that neglect it.

^h Lectio horarum occulta, vel etiam omissio ejusdem lectionis occulta, per accidens est incognoscibilis. Superior enim qui externos subditorum actus vere occultos, & secretos cognoscere, jam non esset homo sed Angelus.

Ergo per accidens est dijudicabilis. Ergo per accidens est impræceptibilis. Ergo per accidens accidit Superiori quod non possit interdicare actiones aut omissiones secretas & occultas per accidens. Ibid. p. 205.

See how these Doctors teach to obey the Church, and to keep its commands; and they believe yet after all this, to have done it great service, and given it cause of being well contented with them: ⁱ *The Church knowing well, saith Mascarenhas, that considerable Doctors do expound the Laws in this manner, and permit these Explications to be taught publicly, and printed, it seems that she approves them, and fits her Laws to them.* This is without doubt to explicate the Laws of the Church clearly, and to leave no difficulty therein; but it is to destroy the spirit of it, and to preserve only an appearance thereof: so that they neither say or demand any thing, but what the particular persons would have. By which it may be judged, what esteem Jesuits have for Civil Laws, and Laws of Princes, there being no appearance that they will give more honour to them, than to those of God, and the Church. For this cause all they say of the one, may easily be applyed to the others, and they must hold of necessity, that they may all equally be contented with a good conscience. I will rehearse only two of their maxims, which contain almost all that can be said on this subject.

ⁱ Cum Ecclesia ferat suas leges ita à gravibus Doctoribus explicari, hoc ipso quod eorum explicationes permittit publice imprimi & doceri, censetur suum præceptum secundum eas considerare. Mascarenhas tract. 5. n. 491.

1. ^k *It may be said, according to Escobar, that the Subjects of a Prince, who refuse to receive without just cause the just Laws which he hath caused to be legally published, do sin; and it may be said also, that they sin not at all.* He speaketh of a lawfull Prince, and he supposeth that the Law which he causes to be published, is just, and that his Subjects have no cause to complain thereof: and yet he pretends that they have liberty to obey, or not. In pursuance hereof, he alleadges Authors and Reasons which they produce on each side, to make both the opinions probable, and to give liberty to follow whether we please. And it is apparent, that if any demanded his advice, he would counsel them to follow the more easie, and more profitable, after the rules of his Divinity; that is to say, that he would incite Subjects to disobey their Prince.

^k Peccant & non peccant subditi sine causa non recipientes legem à Principe legitime promulgatam. Escobar Theol. Moral. tom. 1. l. 5. sect. 2. c. 14. probl. 13. p. 160.

2. This permission to despise the Laws of Princes, is general for all sorts of persons; but it gives also a particular license to Ecclesiasticks, saying, ^l *It may be said that Ecclesiasticks are Subjects, and that also they are not Subjects of necessity and obligation, but only out of respect and good example towards Princes Laws, which regard the Government of their Estates, and which derogate not from the Ecclesiastick State.* The question is then problematical, there being Reasons and Authors on both sides; and though there were none, it is enough that Escobar holds each of

^l Clerici non solum vi directiva, sed & vi coactiva subdiciuntur & non subdiciuntur Principum secularium legibus que spectant ad Reipublica gubernationem, nec cum clericorum pugnant statu. Ibid. c. 15. probl. 19. p. 162.

these opinions, to render them both probable. But as the principles and resolves of this Science are almost all favourable to looseness and disorder, he concludes with some discourses, that, ^m *excepting in the case of scandal, the Ecclesiasticks sin not mortally in violating the Laws of secular Princes, because they are not directly Subjects.* He excepts no kind of Laws, since he speaks of those which are just, and derogate not from the Rights of the Church, not allowing the Ecclesiasticks to be therein Subjects, no more than the Princes themselves that make them.

m Infero Clericos sectis scandalis non peccare mortaliter Principum secularium leges violando, quia legibus hisce directe non tenentur. Ibid.

This is without doubt to make themselves conformable to the example of *Jesus Christ*, and the words which he spake unto *Pilate*: *Non haberes potestatem adversum me ullam, nisi tibi datum esset desuper, &c.* *Thou wouldst have no power against me, if it were not given thee from above*; and to the conduct of the *Saints*, who believed they should have disobeyed God himself, if they had disobeyed Princes, who commanded them nothing against the honour of God, and the Church.

Joan. 19. v. 11.

It were easie to relate an infinite of like resolutions, which the *Jesuits* give in all sorts of questions which respect *Manners and Religion*, to make it appear by sensible examples, that by their *Rules of Probability* they confound all things in the *World*; in *Divinity*, and almost generally in the *Doctrine and Discipline of the Church*. But besides that this truth is found sufficiently proved in this *Extract*, which contains but one part of their corrupted maxims, *Tambourin* will dispence with me for this labour, having publickly acknowledged that which I say, in a *Collection* which he hath made of the principal decisions which are drawn from the principles of the *Doctrine of Probability*, where, after he had reported a great quantity, according to the order of the *Alphabet*, he declares, that there are an infinite of others which he hath not, nor can report, because that would be very difficult and tedious, and the maxims and use of the *Rules of Probability*, extending themselves in a manner unto all sorts of matters, there would need an entire *Volume* wherein to collect and report them simply: *Operosum id ita est & prolixum, quippe per omnes fere materias est percurrendum, ut integrum merito volumen exposcat*; yet I cannot abstain from reporting here also, three taken out of this *Author*, which shew an extraordinary and palpable corruption, and a very peculiar deprivation of reason in those who are capable to approve or follow them.

1. ⁿ *It is probable, saith he, for example, that an Excise is justly established; it is probable on the other side, that it is unjust: may I, being at present established by the King to raise this Impost, exact it according to the opinion which maintains that it is just, and therefore lawfull for me to levy, without doing any injustice: and to morrow, or the same day, being I am a Merchant, may I secretly defraud this very Impost, following the opinion which condemns it of injustice?*

n Probabile est v. c. hoc vectigal injuste esse impostum, probabile item esse impostum juste; possumne ego hodie quia sum

extor. Regius vectigalium exigere ejusmodi vectigal, sequendo opinionem asserentem illud juste esse impostum; atque adeo licere mihi sine injuria illud exigere; & cras, imo etiam hodie, quia sum Mercator, illud occulte defraudare sequendo opinionem asserentem illud à justitia deficere.

2. ^o *It is probable that the loss of reputation may, and may not be compensated with money. May I to day, being defamed, desire satisfaction in money; and to morrow, or this very day, having defamed another, not be willing to allow him the same compensation?*

o Secundo probabile rursus est ablationem fame pecunia compensari, probabile non compensari.

possumne ego hodie infamatus velle ab infamante compensationem in pecunia; & cras, imo hodie, ego ipse alium infamans, nolle famam proximi à me ablatam compensare pecunia?

3. In the third place; ^p *It is probable that a Defendant may use equivocations in Justice. May I being this day Defendant use equivocations, and to morrow being*

p Tertio probabile item reo licere equivo-

care in judicio, probabile non licere. Possumne ego reus hodie equivocare; cras vero creatus Judex urgere reum ut non equivocet? Hæc & innumerabilia ejusdem generis hic in controversiam narratur. In casibus relatis num. 1. 2. 3. atque in similibus licitam esse ejusmodi mutationem concedimus. Tamb. l. 1. Theol. c. 3. sect. 5. num. 1. 2. 3. 21.

chosen Judge, constrain the Defendants not to make use of them? In the process he answers; In this case, and other such like, I grant that it is lawfull to change opinion.

He believes therefore that these persons may do that justly unto others, which they would not have done unto themselves, and which they would free themselves from as much as possible: and he sees not that this is to overturn the prime Law of Nature, and the Gospel, which ordains, That we should do unto others that which we would they should do unto us, and not to do unto others that which we would not they should do unto us; and that this is at once to violate all the Commandments of God, which are founded on this principle of Nature, and all the Law and Prophets, which according to *Jesus Christ's* saying, depend upon this rule, and all the Holy Scripture, which are nothing else but an extension and explanation of this same principle.

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S E C T. IV.

That the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability, ruins entirely the Authority of the Church, of Pastors, and Superiors of all sorts.

TO make this truth appear, we must observe, that there are four sorts of Principles for ruining the Authority of Superiors. 1. By corrupting or destroying the principle of it. 2. By bounding it, and encroaching upon it. 3. By rejecting or weakening its commands. 4. By hindring Subjects from obeying.

The Jesuits by the Doctrine of Probability, corrupt the Authority of the Church in the original of it, in attributing to it no other than a mere humane power. They retrench and destroy it, in not consenting that it may prescribe the inward actions of vertue; they bound it, and encroach upon it, by the irregularity of their Priviledges, which they abuse, to the contempt of the commands and Ordinances of Bishops, and invading their Jurisdiction; they utterly abolish some of their Laws, and they weaken others of them, and there are hardly any unto which they have not given some assault, by the multitude of inventions they have found out to defeat and elude them.

These points are entirely verified in the whole process of this Book, and some of them in entire Chapters. But that which is remarkable, and very proper to justify what I pretend here, is this, that the means and the armes which they and those who follow their opinion, make use of to fight against the Authority of the Church in all these manners, are the maxims of their Doctrine of Probability.

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The Authority of the Church is of it self assured and uncontrollable, being supported by the firm rock of Gods Word: For this cause there cannot be found a means more ready, or more infallible to ruine or weaken it, than to undermine its foundation, and to make it depend on humane reason and authority, submitting its Jurisdiction and its power, to the disputes and contests of the Schools, and rendering in that manner every thing probable that respects its power, that they may afterwards become the Arbitrators and Masters thereof.

It is not needfull here to repeat all that is found in the body of this Book, to prove this truth; it is sufficient only to report some passages of their Authors, and their Disciples, in which they avow themselves, that the Doctrine of Probability doth absolutely ruine the Authority of the Church, and of all sorts of Superiors; and they make it so clear in the examples that they produce, that after they are read, it seems not that any person can doubt thereof.

Hereof see one manifest proof in the case which *Caramouel* propounds in these terms: *¶ A man relying on an opinion sweet and indulgent, but probable, disobeys his Superior in a thing in which it is probable that he is not obliged to obey, but it is more probable that he is obliged. The Superior following the opinion which is more safe,*

¶ *Petrus secures opinionem benignam probabilem non satis facit mandato sui Abbatis in casu in quo probabiliter non tenetur obedire, & probabiliter tenebatur. Prælati subscribens sententiæ severiori judicat illum debuisse obedire, & proinde peccasse. Petitur an possit contra illum procedere & punire tanquam inobedientem? Caram. in com. in reg. S. Bened. l. 1. n. 65.*

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judges that he ought to obey, and therefore that he hath sinned. It is enquired, whether he may act against him, and punish him as disobedient? See here the question proposed according to the rules of Probability. The Superior hath reason to command it; the Inferior hath reason not to obey, both founded on Probability. The person of the Superior is more considerable, and his pretension more just, besides it is more probable. Let us see notwithstanding what will be the judgement of the Doctors of this Science. I answer, saith Caramouel, that the Inferior sins not; and I say further, that the Superior may follow which of the two probable opinions he pleaseth, and by consequence judge that the other is obliged to obey him; but he having followed a probable opinion, is innocently ignorant of this obligation. But the Superior shall be rash if he judges that he sins, because it is not probable that he sins who follows a probable opinion; and so it being probable that this private man hath not sinned, the Superior shall be unjust if he treat him as guilty; for where there is no fault, there is no need of remedy, nor punishment.

Respondet Petrum non peccasse. Adde posse Prælatum subscribere alterutri opinioni, ac propterea censere Petrum habuisse obligationem obediendi. Sed illam

invincibiliter ignorasse ductum opinione probabili, nihilominus temere judicat Prælatum eum peccasse, quia improbable est eum peccare qui sequitur opinionem probabilem, ut num. 59 ostendi. Cum ergo improbable sit Petrum peccasse, injustum erit Antistes si contra illum procedat, quia ubi non est culpa nec medicina est opus, nec poena. Ibid.

There is no person who seeth not that this answer overturneth in a manner all the Authority of Superiors, of what condition or order soever they be, since the reasoning of this Author is general, and comprehends them all. For through the extreme licence which they have at this day introduced, to make almost every thing probable, and to found this probability upon any likely reason, or upon the advice of one single man, as do the Jesuits, it will hardly happen at all that a Superior can make any command, in which some probability occurs not, which may take away his power of causing himself to be obeyed, and to punish the rebellious, who pretend to be innocent, and more just and reasonable than himself.

If this Superior be condemned of rashness and injustice, in following the more probable opinion, he shall be by much stronger reason if he follows the less probable.

So that whatsoever he doth, and on what side soever he turneth, in any difference which he shall have with his Subjects, he cannot avoid condemnation, if he be judged at the Tribunal, and according to the Laws of Probability; and it seems that as this Doctrine was not invented but to favour looseness, and disorder, and vice in all sorts of professions, it hath also for its principal scope, to fight against and to destroy as much as is possible, the persons that are established by God to hold the Word in duty, and all things in order.

This is evident, that the Doctors themselves of this new Science are constrained to confess, that if the principles of their Probability be held to, we must speak no more of Scripture, nor of Superiors; and that they do only delude their Inferiors, having no authority or power at all.

Caramouel considering this principle of the Jesuits Divinity, of which we shall speak hereafter, to wit, that the Church hath not power to condemn inward actions, affirms, that it follows thence not only that the Ecclesiastick doth not ill, who says not his Breviary at all, provided he conceal this; but also that there is no more Authority in the Church: which appears so horrible to himself, that he cries out with astonishment, Good God, if this opinion have success, there will be an end of almost all authority of Superiors; the Inferiors will only obey them when they look on them, and in secret they will violate all sorts of Commandments, Secular or Ecclesiastick; none shall sin in eating Flesh on Fridays, nor in eating three or four times a day on Fasting-days, nor in dispensing with themselves secretly for Divine Service. He acknowledges all these things, he confesses that they are unsupportable excesses, but he confesses that they are true consequences of the Jesuits Probability. These excesses are very great and incredible, but yet they are the legitimate consequences of the Doctrine of Probability.

(Bone Deus, si hæc opinio semel admittetur, actum esset de tota auctoritate Superiorum: subditi obedirent ad oculos, & privatim omnia mandata Ecclesiastica aut Secularia temerarent. Nemo peccaret si secreto comederet carnes die Veneris; nemo qui diebus jejuniis tertio vel quarto: nemo qui secreto omitteret Officium divinum. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 205. & nimia omnia

cularia temerarent. Nemo peccaret si secreto comederet carnes die Veneris; nemo qui diebus jejuniis tertio vel quarto: nemo qui secreto omitteret Officium divinum. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 205. & improbabilia, & tamen legitime illata ex doctrina probabili.

He himself makes no difficulty to testify openly, that he sees well that this Doctrine tends to the withdrawing of all sorts of Subjects and Inferiors, from the obedience of their Superiors, and "to introduce every where the heresie of the Independents, which of late years hath infected England.

u ut video ex hac doctrina oriri in nostris scholis possit independencium illa heresis quæ ab annis pauculis insicit Angliam. Ibid.

To all this he answers but one word, and as it were on the by, at the end of his discourse: * We must therefore search out some reason which is more certain than the more probable, to convict and overturn this pernicious Doctrine. Assist me, saith he, Reader, if thou be'st a Divine, and shew me why the antecedent is not probable, or how the conclusion can be so, or at least shew me some fault in this reasoning; for I desire to be instructed, and I find no Master capable to instruct me.

x Querenda igitur est ratio probabilior certior, quæ hæc doctrinam perniciosam debet. Ergo Theologe Lettor me adjuva: ego vel mihi ostende cur antecedens non sit probabile aut cur consequens sit probabile, aut tandem ostende errorum in argumentationis nostræ forma, quoniam doctor esse desidero, nec ipsos Magistros invenio. Ib. d.

He avows the mischief of this Doctrine which he himself terms pernicious, and also that he knows no remedy for it at all; That is, that it is wholly inevitable. Whence it is easie to conclude, that by the very rules of Logick, unto which he addicts himself, as the principal rule of Truth, the Doctrine from whence issues by infallible consequence so great errors, is truly pernicious, and entirely false; because it is indubitable in Logick, that from a true conclusion, nothing but truth can follow; and likewise that that from whence false and pernicious conclusions may be drawn, must needs be false and pernicious it self; without troubling ones self to seek other reasons to prove it, this same being evident and certain by the light of Nature only, and by the acknowledgement of them who are the Authors and Defenders of this Doctrine.

We need no other proofs to make appear, that this Doctrine introduceth Independency, and the ruine of all sorts of Authority, since the principal Defenders of it acknowledge it; and by the same reason it is entirely opposed to the spirit and conduct of Faith, and leads to Irreligion. For the true Faith and true Religion being nothing but Obedience, and being given us of God to captivate our understanding to revealed Truths, the one and the other keeps our spirit under a perpetual dependance, and voluntary submission unto the Word and Will of God.

But the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability, gives the spirit of man a Sovereign liberty, which submits it self to nothing, and reserves alwayes to it self a power, not only to condemn and approve what it pleases, but also to condemn that which it approves, and to approve what it condemns, passing from one to another, and even from the more probable to the less probable, without fearing to engage it self at all in the least sin; and pretending alwayes to walk in an assured way, and more then probable in the midst of Probabilities, which environ us on every side, since they have made probable almost all the rules of life and humane converse, and have even elevated mens spirits above all these Probabilities, to a Sovereign Independance.

v Fidei Orthodoxæ dogmatibus, demonstrationibus ac principis per se notis subest ingenium, probabilibus sententiis superest. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 138.

Caramouel expresses this in this manner: † The wit of man is subject to the Doctrines of Orthodox Faith, and the evident principles of natural reason, which it cannot resist, but it is above all probable opinions. So that to reduce the substance of this Article into a few words, the Doctrine of the Jesuits Probability withdraws the spirit from all sorts of obedience; from that which is due to Superiors, by giving it power to resist them upon the least appearance of reason; from that which is due unto God himself, by permitting to dispense with a great part of his Commandments; and from that which is due to the Church, teaching to deride its Laws, and elude its Ordinances; from that which is due to reason, by giving liberty to follow that which is less probable, if it please better, and be more conformable to our interests; and also attributing unto it an Empire greater than that of God himself, who can never deparre from that which is most just and most reasonable, and giving it an incomparable power and Independance in the Kingdom of Probabilities.

S E C T. V.

That an opinion probable being once received, all the Prelates of the Church, and all the men in the World, cannot hinder that it should be probable, and safe in conscience, according to the Jesuits.

810 **T**Here is nothing more easie, than to introduce into the Schools a new opinion, and to make it probable according to the Jesuits, and their followers; because they hold, that it needs only one reason by which it may be maintained, or one Author that approves it.

There is also nothing more easie than to cause it to be received in the World; because they believe that the most pleasant, which are those that all enquire after, are the best and most safe.

Finally, there is nothing more easie, than to uphold and bring it in credit, its own pleasantness, and the approbation that some give it, being sufficient to acquire unto it new Partizans, and new Defenders, who will publish it, and induce it unto practice: and so it will have for it the approbation of Divines, the example of private persons, and plausible reasons, which are all foundations of Probability. And being once established in this manner, it will as it were be impossible to destroy and discredit it; and consequently there will be no means to hinder the World from following it, or the Authors who have undertaken its defence, to teach and publish it.

For 1. It is well known what trouble it is to undo things that are passed into custom, and evil things rather than good; and amongst evil things, those which are most pleasing and favourable to the corrupt inclinations of nature, give most trouble in rooting them out, and we hardly ever obtain our design therein.

2. When a custom, which hath taken birth from an evil maxim, is also propped up by apparent reasons, and the authority of those that have reputation of being vertuous and learned, the evil becomes as it were incurable, and without remedy. 320 And this is that which we have seen to happen to the most part of the new and pernicious opinions, under which the Church groans at this day, whilst it endures them.

3. The Authors of these opinions make use of no other armes commonly to defend them, nor admit of others to oppose them, than reason; they submit all to dispute, they examine all by the rules of Logick, by Syllogismes and Subtilties: So that he who is most proper to catch at niceties, and contest about them, carries it commonly, though his cause be the weaker and less reasonable.

4. It is clear, that there is scarcely any that will give way to another in wit and reason, especially in the heat of a dispute; but the opinions which carry men on to looseness and vice, have yet more advantage in this kind of combat, which is made by reason and disputation, that they are there as it were invincible, because of the force which the natural corruption of our spirits give them. It were easie to produce many proofs hereof, if one of the newest, and withall of the most eager defenders of Probability, did not testifie it openly by his words: *He that saith that an action is evil and unlawfull, is obliged unto many things; 1. To make appear, that the reasons which prove the malice of the action be demonstrative; that is, that they be such as whereto no probable answer can be given. 2. And in the second place, he ought also shew, that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawfull, be not so much as probable: which cannot be done, but by giving to every one in particular a solution which is indubitable and evident. 3. In the third place, he is also obliged to make appear, that the opinion which maintains that this action is good, hath not sufficient authority to be held probable. He is obliged to prove these*

a Qui rem dicit esse illicitam, ad multa tenetur. Primo enim debet ostendere rationes que malitiam probent, esse demonstrativas, nempe tales quibus dari responsio probabilis

non possit. 2. Debet etiam ostendere rationes que bonitatem probant, ne quidem probabilem esse ostendet si omnibus ad usum dederit solutionem que evidenter sit vera. 3. Etiam debet ostendere partem illam que bonitatem asseruit, non habere sufficientes autoritates ut dicitur probabilis. Hac omnia tria simul ostendere debet, casus causa etsi duo ex illis ostendat, modo unum non ostendat. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 138.

three things together; and if he fails but in one, though he prove the other two, he will lose his cause.

There needs nothing more to make invincible all sorts of wicked opinions, and which lead men unto looseness and vice, it being certain, that it is impossible to convince them by the rules and conditions which this Disciple of the Jesuits prescribes. For there being no reasons so evident, which the wit of man cannot obscure and entangle by his passion and artifices, it is clear that if evil maxims must be judged by reason and dispute, none will ever be convict, because the animosity of men may always maintain them by contrary reasons.

And if we cannot be assured of any truth, unless we can entirely solve all the difficulties which occur therein, as this same Author pretends, it will follow that there shall never be any thing assured in Morality, nor in Doctrine, nor in Faith, nor in Nature; since it is manifest, that the greatest and most indubitable Truths, are subject to innumerable difficulties, which the most learned and the most ingenious know not oftentimes how to explicate. And so every thing shall be uncertain and probable: There shall be no difference betwixt good and bad Doctrine, and it shall be lawfull for all men to follow what they please in every kind of matter; which is the proper scope of these Doctors of Probabilities.

The evil Doctrine shall have even all sorts of advantage above the good; because according to this Casuist, he that maintains it needs prove nothing of that he saith, nor answer to any thing that can be said against him, but by Probabilities. And on the contrary, he that speaks for truth, and who condemns error, looseness, and vice, is obliged to prove all that he saith by demonstrations, and to answer and refute all that which his adversary can say, with reasons so clear and cogent, that he cannot reply any thing that hath so much as an appearance of truth.

And when he hath entirely disarmed him, and destroyed all his reasons, making him see clearly that they are of no value, and that they are not so much as probable only, he hath yet gained nothing at all. For if you believe this Casuist, he must besides this, take from him all his Authority of every sort, and reduce him to that pass, that he may be able to find none sufficient to support his opinion, and render it probable, which is in a manner impossible; because it suffices as to this, to have one single Casuist that teaches it; and though none have yet ever taught it, he that invents and first maintains it, may make it probable, if he be accounted a man of learning and piety, and there are none but such amongst the Masters of this Science. So his opinion shall be always probable, and though false and pernicious, it shall be shot-free under probability.

b Benigniores est aliquando sine minus probabiles, per accidens sunt semper utiliores & securiores. Caram. Theol. fund. p. 134.

5. This is one rule of these great Doctors, that ^b the opinion more sweet, is always better and more safe, though it be less probable. By this rule the opinions which favour looseness and corrupt inclinations, will be more safe, and their probability always invincible. For if the reasons which are applyed against them, be more forcible and pressing, they will thereby become indeed less probable, but they will not thereby become less pleasing; and consequently they will become always better and more sure, according to the maxims of this marvellous Science.

c Quod omnia que pulchre cogitarunt, jam sunt à junioribus summo studio & ingenio eliminata. Ibid. p. 22.

Que circa fidem emergunt difficultates, ea sunt à veteribus hauriende: que vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos, à novitiis scriptoribus. Celot. l. 8. c. 16. p. 714.

6. But if you oppose against them the authority of the Saints, and Antient Fathers, they will say, that their opinions are very probable, but those of the Casuists of these times are no less probable; that the Moderns carry it even above the Antients, ^c because their best thoughts are cleared up, and perfected by those that followed them. But though the opinion of the Antients be more probable, that of the Moderns being more pleasant, they conclude by their principles, that it is better and more safe. They maintain also, that when the question is about Faith, we may well have recourse unto the Antients, and hold that which they have believed and taught in their Writings; but in matter of manners, and the conduct of life, we must take our rules from the new Casuists.

7. One of the most certain wayes to know that an opinion is bad, are the bad consequences, and pernicious effects which naturally follow thereupon: but this is

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not

not capable to stay the defenders of the Jesuits probability. They acknowledge the dangerous consequences and pernicious effects which issue infallibly from many Novel opinions which they teach, and they forbear not to maintain them at all, and protest that they will maintain them alwayes, because they seem probable, and no person can condemn them. ^d Hereupon follow many inconveniences, saith Caramonel; which arise from these mental restrictions, secret compensations, the liberty which some give to kill an unjust Judge or Witness, the opinion which holds that the Church cannot judge of secret things, and other like opinions: and yet all these inconveniences hinder not but that these opinions, so as they are taught at this day in the Schools, are at the least very probable, and cannot be condemned by any.

d Ad ista incon-
venientia sub-
ornantur ex-
restrictionibus
mentalibus,
multa ex occul-
tis compensa-
tionibus; multa
ex licentia occi-

dendi injustum Judicem aut testem, quam nonnulli concedunt; multa ex illa opinione que docet de occultis Ecclesiam, multa ex aliis. Quibus tamen non obstantibus inconvenientibus, illae sententiae in terminis quibus hodie traduntur in Scholis sunt ut minimum probabilissimae, & a nemine damnari possunt. Caram. Theol. bund p. 549

8. If it be represented unto them, that a good part of these Novel opinions are contrary to the Laws of the Church, and some of them to the Civil Laws also, they pretend that because they be Novel, they are exempt from the censure of the Laws more antient than they, and they could not be condemned or defended, when they as yet were not at all. Thus Caramonel talks of the opinion of Amicus, who holds, that it is lawfull to kill a Defamer: For enquiring, ^e Whether this Doctrine may be received without offending against the Laws Civil and Ecclesiastick? He answers, That the Doctrine of Amicus is Novel, and later than the Common Laws; and consequently the Popes, Emperors and Kings, have not spoken for it nor against it. By this rule all new opinions which introduce errors and abuses, shall be under shelter from the Laws of the Church which went before them, though they be condemned therein: They may be taught without punishment, and followed with a good conscience.

e An eadem
doctrina ad-
mitti poterit
stando juri Ci-
vili & Cano-
nico? Respon-
deo Amici do-
ctrinam esse no-
vam, & legi-
bus vulgatis ju-
rioribus; atque

atque nihil de illa à Pontificibus, Caesaribus aut Regibus fuisse dispositum. Caram. p. 549.

9. ^f And if a Bishop seeing the evil consequences which they cause in his Diocess, would censure and forbid the Books which teach them, this Disciple of the Jesuits will make no difficulty to say, that it belongs not unto him, that if he attempt it he exceeds his power, he will give occasion to persons who profess this Science to complain of him, as doing a thing they cannot suffer; because it is not lawfull for him to condemn Books which are read, approved and commended by learned men.

f Quidam Epif-
copus in Belgio
interdixit An-
tonii Dianae
resolutiones,
juxtaque ut ne-
mo videret,
emeret, legeret
aut haberet: &

Bibliopola solliciti interrogabant possentne liber ille interdici? Respondi illis quod si illos condemnant, hic jam haberent docti aliquid quod patienter tolerare non possent. Non enim libri damnari possunt qui à doctis leguntur, approbantur, laudantur. Caram. p. 89. In hunc scopulum impigit quidam praecipue Antistes. Sed quid faciemus aut dicamus homini incapaci doctrinae. p. 393. Invidiae ignorantiae condonae, p. 89.

But if after this the Bishop yield not to their remonstrances and complaints, he shall not escape their reproaches and injuries, and they will make him pass in their Schools and Books for an ignorant, for an envious and stupid person, and incapable of being instructed, and who by consequence deserves not to be spoken to, nor to have pains taken with him to teach him what he understands not: and so that without regarding his censures and his prohibitions, they need not cease teaching and publishing the same opinions which he condemns.

10. The Pope can have no more power over them in this, than the Bishops, as the Jesuits have testified many times, causing the Books of F. Bauny, and F. Rabardeau, and others, to be reprinted with approbation of their Superiors, and of the principal Divines of the Society, after they had been censured at Rome.

And indeed the reason wherefore they pretend, that their Books and their Novel opinions cannot be condemned, after they have had approbation by their Superiors, and other able men of their Society, is general, and includes the Pope as well as the Bishops: For they say, ^g that it is not at all lawfull to condemn the Books which are read, approved, and praised by learned men.

g Non enim
damnari possunt
libri qui à do-
ctis leguntur,
approbantur,
laudantur.

h Nulla ex prædictis synthesibus aliter potest sua probabilitate privari, quam si contraria transeat in articulum fidei. Ibid. p. 89.

Finge quemcunque casum possibilem præter definitionem Ecclesiæ.

11. And since the Authority of the Churches Laws do not extend to new opinions, which are come after them, since neither the Bishops nor the Pope himself may forbid them, it is necessarily required that all the Church be assembled in a body, to judge of them in a Council. And this also the Authors of this Probability pretend, saying, ^h *That none of their Propositions can cease to be probable; if the contrary become not an article of Faith*: whereupon they desie any man whomsoever, to find another means to condemn a probable opinion, than by an express definition of the Church. For they hold, that a single Casuist may introduce and authorize in the Church a probable opinion, and that the Pope and all the Bishops cannot exclude it, when it is once received and tolerated: That the whole Church must speak to silence one single Regent of a Classis, must make an Article of Faith to condemn a Probability.

12. And yet after all this it is not known, whether the Authors of this Science would submit to the definition of a Council. For according to their maxims, they are not obliged to it, since the whole Church together, no more than the Bishops and Pope apart, can do that which in it self is impossible. Now this is one of the maxims of these Doctors, ⁱ *That it is not lawfull to condemn opinions, any more than Books, which are approved and commended by learned persons*; or to speak yet more clearly, ^k *As it is impossible that an opinion which hath the approbation of many Doctors, should not be probable, so it is impossible to reject it*. And this impossibility is universally acknowledged in all Philology, and this is the first and the greatest of all impossibilities, because it arises from the thing it self, and from the proper definition of a probable opinion: For ^l *a probable opinion is*, according as the Doctors of this Science define it, *that which many persons renowned for their learning do maintain*; so that if it have the approbation of many Doctors, it is also impossible to hinder it from being probable, and by consequence lawfull and safe in conscience; as it is impossible to cause, that they who have approved it, should not have approved it, or that they who were Doctors, and many in number, should not be many Doctors: ^m *Assemble if you will, saith Caramouel, all the men of Europe, learned and unlearned, great and small, they cannot make nor truly judge that 20 is not 20, or that excellent persons, and the chief of the most famous Universities, should not be excellent men*; which all the powers of the World cannot do, nor the whole Church together, to wit, that 20 should not be 20, or Doctors be no Doctors.

i Non enim damnari possunt libri aut opiniones que à doctis approbantur & laudantur.

k Cum impossibile sit probabilem condemnare sententiam, & impossibile eam non esse probabilem cui multi Doctores subscribunt. Caram, p. 393.

l Opinio probabilis est que à magnis & multis defenditur. Ibid. p. 89.

m Congregentur universi Europei, docti, indocti, magni, parvi, non tamen poterunt facere aut vere definire viginti non esse viginti, aut vivos eximios & summorum Academicarum lumina, non esse magnos. Ibid.

n Qui enim propositioni à multis viris doctis asserta veget probabilitatem, hic negat lineæ longitudinem, superficiei latitudinem, & corpori profunditatem: hic negat definitionem definitio competere. Caram. p. 393.

o Respondi si Dianæ libros, Episcopus ille interdixit ut merces, viderint consules & Reipub. Patres ad quem pertineat interdicere merces; si eosdem interdixit ut nocidos per accidens, nullam in partem Dianæ intulit, & suo fuit usus juic. Nemo enim in sua domo tenetur tolerare librum etiam bonum; quia suis sit perniciosus per accidens. Caram. p. 89.

He explicates the same thing in another manner, by a comparison, which serves at once both to prove and clear his thoughts; ⁿ *For to deny, saith he, that an opinion which is maintained by many learned men is probable, is to deny that a line hath length, a superficies breadth, and a body thickness: or this is indeed to deny a proposition, wherein the proper definition is attributed to its subject*. This is as much as to say, that none whoever, not excepting God himself, can any more hinder that which two or three Doctors have asserted from being probable, than make a line without length, a superficies without breadth, and a body without depth; it being indeed in the power of God to destroy the being, but not to change the nature of things; and to cause that which is, not to be, but not to be different from what it is. So that according to the principles of this new Divinity, it is no more in the power of the Church, nor of God himself, to hinder that an opinion approved by two or three Casuists should be probable, and by consequence lawfull and safe in conscience, than to hinder that a man should be a reasonable creature. Because that as to be a man, and to be a reasonable creature, is one and the same thing: so to be a probable thing, and to be approved by two or three Doctors, are not different things according to them. ^o But yet if the Church do censure any one of these opinions approved by these Doctors, they will take this censure for a rule of policy,

or prudence, by which sometimes good things are forbidden, because they may be hurtfull by accident. This is *Caramouel's* answer to one who advised with him concerning Books prohibited by a Bishop.

But if the Church pretend to condemn them as wicked, they will oppose themselves thereto, as to an unjust and unsufferable enterprise, or rather wholly impossible, and would say aloud, ^P That it is not in the power of any one, whatsoever it be, to condemn opinions, no more then Books which are approved and commended by learned men.

Quod si illis condemnare, hic jam habent docti aliquid quod patienter

tolerare non possent, non enim damnari possunt libri (aut opiniones) qui à doctis leguntur, approbantur, laudantur. Ibid.

And after all, when a Council assembled doth expressly condemn them, they will not perhaps submit themselves to their judgement, since they cannot condemn them more expressly than the Council of *Trent* hath condemned the Lutheran errors; and yet notwithstanding this condemnation, a Doctor of these Probabilities abstains not from making a Lutheran to say, that his Sect and his Religion is probable, without opposing him therein. On the contrary he testifies, that he is not far from his opinion, and that it is a consequence of the rules and principles of this Probability, sending the Lutheran to those who hold the contrary, to receive from them an answer unto his reasons, as not finding therein any thing to answer, and believing them to be solid and invincible because probable. For this is the secret and scope of this Science, to make all things probable, that we may do and say what we will, joyning unto Probability a certainty and kind of infallibility, for ensuring this Science, and the consciences of those who follow it; in such manner, that they are secure from the fear of Gods Judgements, the Authority of the Church, and the censure of all the men in the World.

Cui non licebit Barfanomeno dicere Romanam quidem Ecclesiam esse probabilissimam, atque adeo in foro interno esse securissimam. Et tamen hoc ipso non obstante Lutheranam quam ipse profitetur esse etiam probabilem

atque æque Christianam & securam. Imo securiorem omnino, quoniam minus probabilis sententia si benignior, etiam securior est. Sic discurret etiamnum Barfanomenus, & deberet à te, lector erudite, compesti. Carcin. p. 472.

ARTICLE III.

That the Divinity of the Jesuits is obsequious and mercenary.

IT will appear sufficiently that the Divinity of the Jesuits is wholly complacent of it self, in that it is proper to give content to the whole World; and they can, following their principles, quiet all sorts of consciences, in satisfying the desires of all sorts of persons. And in this it is servile and mercenary, because there is no servitude more base, than to flatter the passions of others; and so much the more, because this is not done but because such are slaves to their own proper lusts.

This is clear by what I have produced out of their Books in the former Chapter, and it is a consequence so evident and necessary from their principles, that I might forbear to prove it more particularly. Notwithstanding it will not be unprofitable herein yet to produce some more examples, which may serve to give greater light, and greater clearness to the most simple and incredulous.

Escobar enquires, ^q what must be said to a penitent, or other man, who demands which of two opinions is more probable? He answers, that he to whom this person addresses himself, ought to tell him that which he esteems more probable in his conscience, supposing he demands to know that which is most probable in it self, and in the Theory. ^r But if he desires only to know what he ought to do in the practice, we may advise him to do that which is less probable, and we shall oftentimes do him better service, by advising him to that which is more easie, and which he may do with less danger and inconvenience.

q Petit consultens aut penitens sibi exprimi quæ sit sententia probabilior? *Escob. in proœmio exam. 3. cap. 6. num. 24. p. 28.*

^r *Quod si solum ex practica ob-*

ligatione sciscitatur; potest consulere quod minus probabile judicat. Imo meliorem se geret consiliarium sepe id consultens quod facilius & cum minori periculo seu incommodo prestari potest. Ibid.

Greater obsequiousness cannot be desired, since this goes beyond the thought of the man who demanded the best advice. For instead of counselling him that which is absolutely best, according to his demand, this Author would have us counsel him that which is less probable, provided it be more easie and agreeable to his humour. And to remove from his Director the scruple that he might have concerning a conduct so indulgent and soft, he adds, that this counsel will be better than if he should give him the other: *Meliorem se geret consiliarium.*

A little after, having said that the Confessor is obliged to follow, even against his own sense, the opinion of his penitent, he enquires, ¹ *What shall the Confessor do, if he believes that the opinion of his penitent is false?* He answers, that for all this he ought to comply with him, if he have any approved Authors who hold that his opinion is probable.

Quod si Confessorio falsa videatur opinio penitentis, debet se accommodare si à probatis authoribus probabilis reputetur. Ibid. num. 27.

He saith in the former case, that the Confessor ought to shew himself indulgent towards him who comes to enquire of him what is just and reasonable, in granting him more than he demands; and here he obliges him to comply with another, in giving way to him against his own opinion, and granting him that which will carry him against reason and justice. This is to please all men in all things; not to their Salvation, as St. Paul, but to satisfy their desires and their interests, against the rule of St. Paul, and the Gospel, who teaches us, that this condescension serves none, and is proper to deceive and destroy as well those who offer it, as those who accept it.

The same Author speaking of a man who would not accept of the penance which his Confessor had appointed him, asks ¹ *what must be done if he say that he will stay to do it in Purgatory?* He answers, that the Confessor is not to forbear to impose upon him some slight penance, for the integrity of the Sacrament, and not for the necessity of the penitent. His reason is, ² *because he well perceives that if he impose on him any greater, he will not receive it.* So that whereas the wicked disposition of this penitent, deserves to be treated more rigorously, he requires that he be treated with more indulgence, as if that would reduce him into a better estate, and remove from him his pride and obstinacy.

Præcipue cum agnoscat Græciam non acceptaturum. Escob. tr. 7. exam. 4. c. 7. n. 188. p. 829.

^x *Quid agendum Confessori cum defectum aliquem commisit in confessione contra ejus substantiam?* Filliucius mor. 99. tom. 1. tract. 7. c. 12. n. 369. p. 211: ^y *Tertio qui penitens non sit rite dispositus quas ad dolorem aut integritatem, & id à Confessario agnoscat, sed ob reverentiam aut timorem non est ausus negare absolutionem.* ^z *Generaliter interroget an de omnibus præcedentibus dolcat, & quantum potest si necessarium esset demò paratus sit ad ea confitenda.* Ibid.

Filliucius proposes a like instance in the Sacrament of Penance, saying, ^x *What must a Confessor do when some fault is committed in confessing, against the very essence of the Sacrament?* He distinguisheth first of three sorts of sins against the substance of Confession, (these are his words) of which this is the third: ^y *When the penitent for want of sorrow necessary to his sins, or of having made a full confession, is not well disposed, and the Confessor knows it well, and yet for shame or fear dares not refuse him absolution.* In this case he answers, that the Confessor who hath made this fault, ought to endeavour to make this penitent return to Confession; and after he hath accused himself of the sins which he hath committed since his last Confession, ^z *to demand of him in general, if he be sorry for all his sins past, and if he were not ready to confess them a new if there were need, in the best manner he could, without troubling himself that he makes him commit another new Sacrilege in confessing himself, as at first, without discovering all his sins, and in wilfull concealing of a part; and yet when he hath drawn these words from his mouth, he wills that he be content therewith, and that he give him absolution: Quo habito, absolvat.* n. 372.

He pretends that he is not bound to give himself so much trouble neither, nor his penitent, ^a *if he fears not that some scandal will arise thereupon, or some other*

Si sequatur grave incammodum aut scandalum, non tenetur.

inconvenience. For in that case he gives him an expedient yet much more easie, that is, that he may be content that he hath regret for his sin, in saying in his mind, or with his mouth, that he is sorry, and so he shall leave his penitent in his good persuasion. He pre-supposeth in expounding this difficulty, that this penitent is in a naughty disposition, *quia penitens non sit recte dispositus quoad dolorem aut integritatem*; and that the Confessor knows it, & *id a Confessario agnoscitur*; and yet though no new thing have since happened, besides the absolution which he received in this bad estate, which is made still worse by this Sacrilege; he thinks that he is become well disposed, and that the Confessor may conceive that he is in a good condition, and that he ought to let him rest therein, assuring himself that he shall be justified, and that he shall receive grace by the Confessions which he shall make in time to come; *quia per subsequentes Confessiones justificabitur*; n. 373. though he continue to make them alwayes in the same manner, retaining those sins which he concealed wilfully the first time. He had need to have an extraordinary strong Faith, that can believe that such a man is in a good estate, and that it is lawful thus to play with Sacraments, Consciences, and Religion.

Amicus proposeth a case almost alike; ^b It is questioned, saith he, if a Confessor, who knows evidently that a penitent hath committed a sin, and hath not confessed himself thereof, ought to admonish him of it? He addes, to make himself to be better understood, ^c that the difficulty is only when the Confessor knows evidently, not only that the penitent hath committed this sin, but also that he hath not confessed it. He acknowledges frankly as a certain principle, that a Confessor cannot absolve a penitent when he believes that he is in mortal sin: And after he answers in these terms; ^d In this occurrent the Confessor may judge, that the penitent hath concealed his sin for some good or just reason; and for that he may absolve him with a safe conscience. The reason he makes use of for a foundation to build this answer on, is, ^e that a prudent Confessor may judge probably, that the sin in question is of it self, and indeed, or according to some probable opinion of the penitent, of such a nature, that he is not obliged to tell it in Confession.

non solum evidens est penitentem commississe peccatum; sed etiam illud non fuisse confessum. Ibid. ^d Ceterum in casu proposito potest Confessarius judicare quod penitens commissum peccatum tacuerit iusta aliqua ex causa; ac proinde iuxta conscientiam poterit illum absolvere. *Ibid.* ^e Probabiliter prudens Confessarius judicare poterit tale peccatum esse quod vel re ipsa, vel juxta probabilem opinionem penitentis ipse putat non esse in confessione explicandum. *Ibid.*

This is not only simply to oblige a Confessor to yield an entire submission to a sinner, contrary to the nature of his charge, which requires that he should receive it from him; but also to yield unto him a blind submission and obedience, without knowing even what he thinks: which is not only shameful and extravagant for a Director and a Guide, who ought to conduct, and not suffer himself to be conducted, and follow those who are under his charge, without knowing whither they go, nor what way they take; but it is also unjust in a Confessor, who being a Judge, and a Divine Judge, holding the place of *Jesus Christ*, cannot judge in that manner without cognizance of the Cause, but by Sacrilegious rashness and injustice, concluding that an opinion which he knows not, is probable, and that an action which he hath all the reason in the world to mistrust, is innocent.

Filliucius declares openly, that he desires to oblige men, and comply with their humours, when he saith, that the Ecclesiasticks are not obliged under mortal sin, to have any manner of attention in rehearsing their Office: For reporting the opinion of those who hold, ^f that no man is obliged under mortal sin, to have any inward attention: I answer, saith he, this opinion is probable. He confesseth indeed that the contrary is more probable, but according to his principles it is sufficient that this same is probable, to follow it with a safe conscience, in quitting the more probable. And the reason which induceth him to approve this opinion is, ^g because it is very accommodant and conformable to mans frailty, and to the difficulty which men have commonly to settle their spirits a long time upon one thing. He is not content at all that this opinion is indulgent to the softness and fickleness of men;

c. 8. n. 253 p. 126 ^g Quia satis accommodata est hominum fragilitati & difficultati quam humanae intellectus experitur in attendendo diu uni rei. *Ibid.*

^a Satis est Confessori dolere de peccato commissio, & relinquere penitentem in bona fide. *Ibid.* n. 373.

^b Dabitur an Confessarius qui evidenter habet quod penitentem peccatum commissum, illudque non sit confessum; debeat illum de tali peccato monere? *Amicus* tom. 8. disp. 23. sect. 23. n. 331. p. 233.

^c Solum difficultas est querendo Confessario

^d Ceterum in casu

^e Neminem teneri sub mortali ad attentionem internam. Respondeo & dico primo hanc primam opinionem probabilem esse. *Filliucius* tom. 1. 49. mor. tr. 23.

but he cannot forbear to declare, that it is even for this cause that he approves it, and to testify that the Jesuits Divinity hath for its scope to flatter and nourish vices, instead of fighting with, and destroying them.

Celot having undertaken to defend the Casuists of his Society, saith, that one of the conveniences which may be received thereby is, that it delivers men from scruples which trouble them, that it dischargeth them of restitutions which they believe themselves obliged to make, and gives them expedients to break marriages after they have been lawfully contracted. ^h *A man*, saith he, *agitated by the remorse of his conscience, and all torn with the wounds it hath given him; addresses himself to you: He acknowledges that he must do that which he fears more than death; he desires it also, but can never obtain force to resolve upon it. He would save himself and his wealth both at once, but this is impossible: The desire to save his Soul presseth him on one side, and that of preserving his Estate, his Honour, his Family, presses him on the other side. What shall become of his Wife, of his Children, of his whole Family great and honourable, for a private one? See here without doubt a man in a strange estate, and a sick person reduced to extremity betwixt life and death: He had need of some extraordinary medicine to succour him, and above all with that sweetness which is necessary for a spirit that is almost in despair. A learned Doctor may see some little ray of light, after he hath a long time pondered upon an affair so difficult and encumbered. Omnia ut doctus es versanti tibi radius consilii non incommodi affulget.* But you shall never meet with day, nor entire clearness, untill you seek it amongst the Jesuits, the principal of whom are as the shining Stars and Sun of Divinity, who by their influences will in a moment recover this desperate spirit. *Hunc tibi scrupulum eximant Suarez, aut Lessius, aut Molina; aut omnes tres consulti casum tuum explicent, rationibus stabiliant, securam faciant conscientiam tuam.* After this there is no means, according to *Celot*, to hinder them from kissing their Books, and lifting up their cries of Joy unto Heaven: *Non erumpes in caelum? non triumphabis gaudio? Abstinebit cliens ille tuus ab osculo libris salutaribus imprimendo?*

But he confirms this goodly discourse by an History worthy to be rehearsed: ⁱ *I knew*, saith he, *a certain man who carried a great sum of money by the order of his Confessor; but passing by the Shop of a Book-seller his Friend, he staid there, and asked if he had any new Book? He was presented with a Book of Moral Divinity, printed a while before; which turning over negligently, and without any design, he by accident met with his own proper case, and learned that he was not at all obliged to restitution. Whereupon discharging himself of his scruple, and keeping his Coyn, he returned lighter hearted than he came. This man was condemned by his Confessor to make restitution: He is resolved thereon: He is upon the point of doing it. He had already taken the money which was necessary thereto, and was in his way to carry it back to him to whom it appertained: A novel Casuist of the Society hindered him. See the fruit of this obliging Divinity.*

Scimus reperit aliquando qui summam ingentem pecuniae Confessarii iudicio restituendam desereret, atque ex itinere in amici Bibliothopole officina consulerit. In qua roganti num aliquid novi? oblatum est recens Thologiae Moralis scriptor, quem ille neglectim & omnia alia cogitans cum evoluit, in casum forte suum incidit, & restituendi obligationem solutam didicit. Tum enim vero obiecta scrupuli sacra, venio auri pondere, leviorum domum revertisse. Ibid.

And *Celot* pretends that this fruit was so great, and the happiness so rare for this sinner to have met this Book, which hindered him from making restitution, that he fears not to take it for a principal effect of his eternal Predestination, saying, ^k *It is true that this happened to him by accident, but this accident was no other than the providence of God, the protection of his Guardian Angel, and the effect of the eternal Predestination of this man. God would*, saith he, *that the golden chain of his salvation should be formed not of those eleven hundred links of Gold of which the Poets speak, but of this single occurrent which he happened on in this Book: If this Author had not written, this Reader had not been saved.* And addressing himself to his adversary by a jollity worthy of this Divinity, ^m *I pray you,*

non ex illis centum & mille, sed ex hoc uno pendere voluit Deus. Nisi scriberet hic, non salveretur ille. Ibid. in Amabo te, Petre Amali, tu qui dives es & nullius eges, ne per christi viscera pauperibus invidere librum tuum, quem ipsis aeterna Delectatio, sanguis christi comparavit. Ibid.

saith he, and conjure you by the bowels of Jesus Christ, being rich as you are, and needing nothing, envy not unto the poor a Book which was prepared for them from all eternity, by the love which God had to them, and which was purchased for them with the blood of Jesus Christ.

He testifies that this person who went to make restitution by the order of his Confessor, went to damn himself eternally, if he had not been diverted by this new Casuist of the Society; that this was a trace altogether extraordinary, of the providence of God, a particular protection of his good Angel, and an effect of his Predestination, that he fell upon this Casuist who recovered him into the way of heaven, by withdrawing him from the obedience of his Confessor, and the resolution he had taken by his advice to make restitution: that he had been a lost man, if the Jesuit had not written, and caused his Book to be imprinted; *nisi scriberet hic, non salvaretur ille*. That he had no less obligation unto God, for having caused him to meet this Book, than for having loved him from all eternity, and for giving him his Son Jesus Christ; because indeed this Book is one mark of the eternal love of God towards him, and a particular gift thereof; and finally, that Jesus Christ had bought this Book for him at the price of his blood, as a necessary means unto his salvation; *Quem aeterna Dei dilectio, sanguis Christi comparavit*.

These whimsies and extravagancies would seem incredible, if they had not been printed and represented in the Authors own proper words; and it is certain, that if this discourse were reported, whosoever should hear it, being only found in his wits, without discovering unto him the Author, he would quickly say, and with just reason, that this was neither the discourse of a Monk, nor a Christian, and that he must be under extreme ignorance, or contempt of God, of Religion, and of the nature of Christianity, who could utter such language, which tended only to establish Hereticism and impiety.

Father *Causin* in a Book which he intituled, *An Apology for the Religions of the Society of Jesus*, having undertaken to excuse the unhappy Doctrine which *F. Hereau* taught in their Colledge of *Clermont* at *Paris*; He did not consider, saith he, that there are Doctrines like unto those trees which do no hurt in one Country, and spoil all when they are transplanted into another; and there are Disputations which it may be would be found good in Italy, and in Spain, which when they come into this Realm, look with clear another face; as also certain Maxims that are very good in France, which cannot be relished in Spain. This proves very sufficiently that which we said, that the Doctrine and Spirit of the Jesuits addits it self entirely to the humours of men, and depends on the difference of times and places. For he disowns not the pernicious maxims of *F. Hereau*, but only his carriage of them: he blames him, not for having written contrary to the opinions of the Society, when he taught, that we might attempt against the lives of all men generally, without excepting Princes, and cause Children yet unborn, to dye in the wombs of their Mothers, as we shall make appear in its place; but only to have wanted discretion, and to have offended against that rule of the Society which *F. Celot* relates:

"When there are opinions of any Author whatsoever, that are not well received in some Province or University, and which offend the Spirits of the Catholicks, that they be carefull not to teach them nor maintain them in those places. For when the Doctrine of Faith is not in question, nor the integrity of manners, sage and prudent charity wills that ours comply with the humours of those amongst whom they live."

n Quae opinio-
nes cujuscun-
que Autoris sint, in
aliqua Provin-
cia aut Acade-
mia Catholica
graviter offen-

*deve scientur, eas ibi non doceant neque defendant. ubi enim nec fidei doctrina, nec morum integritas in discrimen addu-
citur, prudens charitas exigit ut nostri se illis accommodent cum quibus versantur. Reg. Prof. Scholast. sect. 6.*

The same *F. Causin* answering to that which was objected against the Society, that the sum of *F. Banny* censured at *Rome*, and many other like Books of his Fraternity, teaching pernicious maxims, were again after the censure of the Holy Chair, imprinted with permission of their Superiors, and approbation of the principal of the Society, he saith, That the Books of their Writers fall sometimes into the hands of some easie Fathers, who out of the high fore-stalled opinion they have of the capacity of their Authors, suffer their Works to pass with great facility.

Indeed it were not reasonable to expect that they who are so gentle and complacent towards Strangers, should be less towards their Brethren. For as for justice, fidelity, and truth towards our Neighbour, or the Publick, they are not accustomed to put themselves to much trouble in what concerns them, and to cover their interests and lusts with the name of charity and sweetness, and a complacency which is in the bottom altogether humane and interested.

But he gives also more power unto Princes, over their Divines and their Books of the Society, than to the Authors of these Books, or their Superiors: *Others*, saith he, *to whom opposition is made, write either at Rome by the commandment of the Pope, or in other Countries at the instance of Foreign severe Princes, who carry things at their pleasure, with a high hand; so that it comes to pass oftentimes, that they have no more power over their Books, than over the Winds or Stars.* So the Books of the Jesuits fall sometimes into the hands of certain of their easie Fathers, who let them pass easily, and their Authors, *whatsoever they advance: otherwhiles they fall into the violent hands of Foreign Princes, who do what they please with the same Books and Authors; so that the Superiors have no more power over them, than over the Winds or Stars.* It must needs be that the Spirit and Divinity of the Jesuits is very manageable, very pliant, and very obsequious, that they may make of it whatsoever they will, or rather whatsoever the Princes and Grandees of the World would have. After this confession they have made themselves, we may say, that they are very near the estate which the Jews were in, when the Prophet objected unto them; *° The Prince demands what he pleases, and the Judge speedily grants it him; and the mighty man doth only declare his desire, and they trouble and intangle his conscience,* heartning him in wicked designs by false reasons, instead of opposing, or redressing and regulating them by the Law of God, and maxims of the Gospel.

o Princeps potulat, & Judex in reddendo est, & magnus locus est desiderium animæ suæ, & conturbaverunt eam. Micheæ 7. v. 3.

This is to acknowledge and declare himself a slave in an abject manner, *to violent powers and strangers*, as this Jesuit talks, to say as he doth, speaking for the whole Society, *that they carry things with a high hand*, as they list, against them and their Divines; and this slavery is yet in this more shamefull, and less excusable, because it is voluntary: since many times they stay not till they be sought out and urged, but they present themselves, and offer their pens and their Divinity, which by rendring every thing probable, is capable to maintain and overturn whatsoever they please; and they must engage themselves in a strange manner, and enter into an extraordinary vassallage, since they declare, that after they have so addicted themselves to the Grandees of the World, and have devoted unto them their Spirits and Learning, that their Superiors have *no more power over their Books, which they compose, and which they cause to be printed, than over the Winds and Stars*, who receive their motions not from Celestial intelligences, but from Terrestrial and Temporal powers. It is easie to judge by this what their fidelity may be, and what reason there is to confide in their Discourse and Divinity so fickle and voluntary, not only for private persons, but also for Princes, since being thus for all, they are for none, and abandoning truth so easily, they will yet more easily forsake men, according as their interests shall require them.

ARTICLE IV.

*That the Jesuits Divinity is subject to contradictions,
and change in opinions.*

They that are not at all informed of the maxims of the Jesuits, wonder when they hear say that they are so little constant and faithfull in their words, and in their actions: others who have some knowledge of their opinions, report, that ordinarily the cause of this proceeds from the Doctrine of equivocations, of which they make profession. But those who know them better, give thereof a reason more clear and more easie, drawn from the principles of their Divinity: For there is no need to have recourse to equivocations to deceive, if we believe we may lye with a good conscience; and it seems foolish to rack ones wits to find a word with double sense, to cover and disguise his thought, if he be persuaded that it is lawfull to speak and do quite contrary to what he thinks, and to quit his own opinion to follow that of another, when he finds it more favourable for him; keeping still the liberty to resume his own, and to follow it when he shall have occasion for it, and so to pass from the one to the other, giving unto the same difficulties contrary advices and resolves, following his own humour, or complying with theirs who demand his counsel.

These are the certain maxims of the Jesuits Divinity, as I have made appear above; after which it ought not be thought strange, that they are so inconstant in all their wayes, that they believe they may affirm and deny, approve and condemn the same things, and that we see nothing but disguises and contradictions in their words and carriages.

One of their most ordinary contradictions, is to acknowledge Truths in their general Propositions, and to destroy them in the particulars and practice.

This may be seen clearly in F. *Bauny* in many places of his Books, as in his *Summe* c. 3. p. 49. where speaking of Penance, he agrees, that if we look for heaven and eternal life, without first doing penance for our sins, it is mortal sin. And in the 43. ch. and 69. p. he declares, that pardon of sin, and correction, are two things inseparable; and that the one is not given, but after the other: *Non datur venia nisi correcto.* And in the 38. ch. p. 589. speaking of a Confessor, and of the cognisance he ought to have of the disposition of a penitent: *In truth,* saith he, *as he holds the place of a Judge in the Sacrament, as saith the Council in the 14 session and 9. ch. he cannot, nor ought pass sentence, but on what he hath a full and perfect cognisance of.* And in the following page he cites the *C. Omnis utriusque sexus*, where the Confessor is spoken of in these terms: *He ought carefully inform himself of the circumstances which respect the sinner, as well as which respect his sin, that he may judge prudently what counsel he ought to give him, and what remedy he ought to prescribe him; making use of sundry experiments to cure his disease.*

a Debet diligenter inquirere & peccatoris circumstantias & peccati, quibus prudenter intelligat quale de-

beat ei prebere consilium, & cujusmodi remedium adhibere, diversis experimentis utendo ad sanandum egrotum.

And in his Practique, book I. chap. 14. pag. 121. speaking of the principal things whereof a Bishop ought to inform himself in making a Visitation in his Diocess, he observes this same, which is taken out of the second Council of *Remes*, under *Charlemain*, and *Lio 3.* in the 16. ch. That they should observe, *how the Confessors judged of the sins of the penitents, and what time of penance they prescribed them.*

b Quinto quomodo confitentium peccata judicant, & tempus penitentiae constituunt.

The other Jesuits acknowledge with him the same maxims, as the fundamental rules of Penance: but after they have acknowledged them in general, they overturn and violate them in their conduct: they even condemn those that would observe them, and establish others quite contrary, without fear of falling not only into manifest contradictions, but also into a visible contempt of those Truths which they have acknowledged, and of rendring themselves by this carriage unexcusable before God and men.

So F. Bauny saith in the 46. ch. of his *Summe*, p. 717. *That notwithstanding great and frequent relapses, a sinner who resorts to the sect of a Priest to put an end to his sins past, dignus est abfolutione toties quoties, deserves to have his pardon, quandocunque nulla notetur emendatio, when he is not observed to have amended his life at all. Never troubling himself to agree this with the rule which he established before, Non datur venia nisi correcto, No pardon without amendment. For he consents not only that a man deserves pardon for his sin, and that absolution is to be given him though he be not amended, quandocunque nulla notetur emendatio; but he pretends also that it ought to be given him as often as he demands it in this estate, toties quoties, though it be believed that he will not correct himself in the time to come, though he promise it: Because, as he saith, such resolutions are presumed to come no farther than from the teeth outwards.*

And in the 40. ch. 650. p. he saith, *That if any one of ignorance and simplicity have accused himself of his faults only in gross, without determining any one in particular, it will not be needfull to draw out of his mouth the repetition of such faults. As if he had a design to recant what he had said above, That a Confessor who holds the place of a Judge in this Sacrament, as the Council speaks in the 14. sess. and 19. chap. cannot pass sentence but of what he hath an entire and full cognisance.*

In the 5. ch. 68. p. *It sufficeth not, saith he, to discharge our duty, to say to a Confessor that we have stoln in notable quantity sufficient to offend mortally, if we do not rate and specify the sum: because he ought to know the condition of his penitent, which cannot easily be done, unless he unfold unto him the value of his theft. And yet in the 39. ch. 616. p. he is not afraid to maintain the contrary in these terms: It is not necessary in Confession to relate the said circumstance, the quantity of the theft, as whether one stole five, or fifty Crowns. It will suffice in rigour to say to his Confessor, that in matter of stealth he hath sinned mortally, taking from another the summe which maketh and constituteth that sin.*

In the 3. ch. 46. p. he saith, *That he who receiveth the Supper, or hears a Sermon without applying his heart thereto, ought not to be esteemed an Hugenot. But in the 20. ch. 336. p. he saith, That he who without intention of idolizing it, doth bend his knee before an Idol, shall yet be held for an Idolater. As if to receive the Supper amongst Hugenots, were not as well an action of an Hugenot, as to kneel before an Idol is an action of an Idolater.*

In the same 20. ch. p. 332. he speaks thus: *Since true devotion is inward, and not in the demeanour, or without, and in the countenance and other-exterior gestures, and that this pretended devotion, destitute of that which is within, is but a vizard and idol of devotion; the case is resolved, that in voluntary distraction and wandring of the mind in praying by obligation, as do Priests, Deacons, and Subdeacons, and Beneficiaries, there is sin; and so they be obliged to begin the Office again, which they have said with so much indevotion. For the will of the Church is, that by this action which it commands them, they should praise and pray to their Creator. And can they do that, having nothing less whilst they pray than God before their eyes? They ought then for to satisfie their duty, begin their Office again, and if they fail to do it, they ought to make restitution to the Church wherein their Benefice is, or to the poor, the benefit they have received according to the rate of their omissions.*

And on the contrary he saith, *That the Church seemeth to him, in the precept of reciting the Hours, to exact of the Priests and those who are obliged thereto, only to honour and praise God: chaunting Psalms and singing, though with voluntary distraction, wherein they continue, provided that they sing tunably and with reverence. Of which he renders this reason in the same place: For the outward action by which we attend on God, is of the kind and appertains unto the vertue of Religion: Therefore as they who without intention of Idolatry bow their knee before an Idol, are notwithstanding guilty of Idolatry; so we must believe that they pray, who recite the Office though without intention, but not without that decency and outward compesure which such an action requires.*

And a few lines after he reasons thus, and draws this practique conclusion: *It follows that the Confessor cannot blame the penitent of a mortal fault, for applying his mind to frivolous things, whilst that his tongue sounded in the Church with others the praises of God, if outwardly he did nothing that was incompatible with this attention.*

tion. 2. He shall not oblige him to repetition of any thing he had said, because pronouncing it in such manner, he hath accomplished the precept; neither is he for all that obliged to make restitution of the fruits received from his Benefice, if it be so that he have any.

And yet he hath not only said the contrary before, but he returns again to it in the 13. ch. 163. p. *The said Beneficiaries shall be obliged to make restitution of the fruits they have received of their Benefices, when they say their Hours but imperfectly, with voluntary distractions which endure the whole Office, or the greater part thereof. Of which he renders this reason: Because not to rehearse his Hours at all, and to do it indecently, without respect, attention and reverence, is all one before God, because he is equally contemned and dishonoured in both.*

It would be hard to find in two Authors, who had different designs to contradict and refute one another, opinions so opposite, and contradictions so visible. For these oppose one another in their principles, in their conclusions, and in their reasons, which serve for proofs, saying quite contrary things, drawing quite contrary conclusions, and propping them with reasons quite contrary; as is visible in the passage I now rehearsed, which need not be any further cleared.

And that which is yet more astonishing, is that they make these so strange changes almost in a moment; and they may be met with sometimes in the same page, and sometimes within two or three lines, as may appear in some of the places which I have cited. But I cannot pass by one important and manifest contradiction of the same Author, which is found in his Practique in the 3. book, 44. ch. 727. p. For after he had said in the precedent page, that *the Ordinary may and ought admonish the Rectors to execute their charges themselves; whereunto if they were not obedient, they might be deprived.* He addes in approbation of this carriage: *And indeed the contrary custom seems to me only an inveterate error, which through length of time becomes greater and more abusive; quia diuturnitas temporis non minuit, sed auget peccatum.*

And yet in the same Book, 43. ch. 715, & 716. pages, after that he had said, that the Rectors are obliged to reside on their Cures, he enquires whether custom may dispense with their Residence? *In this affair, saith he, one difficulty is moved, to wit, whether custom not to reside on Cures, can shelter as well from the sin, as the punishment appointed by the Council against those who fail, which is, that they should have no benefit by such Cures?* He answers, that *Layman and Navarre hold the affirmative, and he confirms it by this reason: Because according to the common axiom, that which the Pope may grant by dispensation or special privilege to any person, custom gives to all a discharge thereof, and that without fear, especially when it is for a long time observed in the Church.* Citing for this opinion a sentence taken from the Const. in 6. c. 1. *Consuetudo vim habet legis; Custom hath the force of a Law.*

It appears clearly that in one place he saith, that *the use of not residing upon Cures, is no other thing than an inveterate error;* and in the other place, that *custom of not residing gives a discharge to all.*

In one place he saith, that *length of time renders the error of Non-residence greater and more abusive;* in the other, that *a custom of Non-residence, frees all from the forfeiture of their Revenue, especially if this custom be of long continuance in the Church.*

It seems that this liberty of maintaining and publishing contrarieties, is granted the Jesuits by their Superiors, with permission to print these Books wherein such contrarieties are found. Therefore it is less strange, that their Superiors pretend to have this right as well as private persons, and make use of it without scruple in occurrents wherein they judge it advantageous to the good of their affairs, as it did appear by the answer of F. Coiton to the Gentlemen of the Parliament of Paris, upon the matter of Santarel's Book, which is well enough known in Paris, and in France. For those Gentlemen objecting to him, that *Viteleschi* General of the Society had approved the Book, he answered together with three other Jesuits that accompanied him as their Provincial: *That the General could not do otherwise, because they at Rome would have him do so.* The Gentlemen of the Parliament demanded of him, if he were of the same judgement, and approved such proceedings?

ceedings? He confessed that as for *Santarel's* Book, he did not approve it at all; but as to the action of the General, if he had been at *Rome* he would have done as he did. Which gave one of the Commissioners occasion to say to them; *You have then one conscience for Rome, and another for Paris*: and to the Gentlemen his Colleagues to say, *God defend us from such Confessors.*

Two or three months after, the Gentlemen of the Parliament having proposed unto them certain Articles, extracted out of the Book of *Santarel*, that they might condemn them, and others contrary to them, that they might approve them; they did both without much trouble. And yet they have since put this Book of *Santarel*, with those of the *English* Jesuits, against the safety of Kings, and authority of Bishops, and against the Discipline of the Church, into the Catalogue of the Books of their Society, though they had declared and protested publickly, that these Books did not proceed from their Society, and that they were falsely attributed unto them. And lately also *F. le Moine* in his Apology speaks thus of these very Books: *We have declared a long time since, that we know not these Authors, which we believe not to be of our Society; and also at this day we may protest in sincerity, that they are as unknown to us as they were before.*

He is not afraid to give the lye to his General *Viteleschi*, and other Divines of his Society, who have approved the Book of the Jesuit *Alegambe*, which ascribes these Books to the very Authors Jesuits, to whom they have been alwayes attributed. But Father *le Moine*, who knew them not at *Paris*, would have known them at *Rome* it may be, if he had been there: and this same sincerity which made him protest that he knew them not in *France*, would have made him in *Flanders* or in *Italy* have declared quite contrary, by the rule of the Society, which wills that they comply with the times, places and humours of all the World.

This manner of acting and speaking is ordinary enough amongst the Jesuits, and they are already so accustomed to contradictions, that they fear no more the reproach which is cast upon them continually for defending vice and error; but they are rather ready to glory therein, and shortly to make publick profession thereof: since *Dicasillus* pretends, instead of blaming *Diana* for contradicting himself frequently in his answers, he doth rather praise and thank him, as for some signal service which he would do the publique, in obliging the World, and complying with the necessities and desires of those who consult with him. *You see, saith he, that this Author is contrary to himself, which happens unto him not once only; and he deserves not to be reproved for it, but rather to be thanked. This man who labours for the publique good, having compleated himself with great reading, complying to the necessity, and even unto the desire of those who consult with him; follows sometimes one opinion, and sometimes another, when both are supported by some probable reason, or the authority of learned men.*

c Ecce hic Autor (Diana) sibi contrarius est; id tamen, quod illi non semel contigit, non reprehensione, sed gratiarum actione dignum est.

Nempe vir pro communi bono laborans, & communi utilitati serviens, plurima lectione dives & copiosus pro occurrenti consultationum & querentium necessitate aut etiam disiderio, jam huic, jam illi parti adhaeret, quanto pars utraque probabilis ratione, & doctorum virorum auctoritate nititur, & in praxi utrisvis operari tutum est. Veluit autem nobis in medium proferre ad hunc ipsum suum quid in una, quid in alia occasione responderit querentibus. Quid quae so utilius pro p axi. Haec obiter, & in fine, ac facessere jubeam nescio quos invidos, qui haec & si quae sint similia erudito viro non v. rentur obijcere. *Dicasillus de Sacra. Euch. tr. 4. dis. 10. dub. 5. n. 110.*

He observes very well, that *Diana* falls into many contradictions, by following and teaching divers probable opinions which were contrary; and that he was induced hereunto by a Spirit of Complacency, and the desire which he had to comply with the necessity, profit, and even the desire of the persons who consulted with him. So that by his own confession there is great alliance, and necessary consequence betwixt Probability, Contradiction, and a Spirit of Compliance and Complacency, which to satisfy the desires and interests of men, hath invented the Science of Probability, and that they may make use of it more freely, and more agreeably unto the will of the people of the World, thus trouble not themselves though they fall into contradictions, whilst they follow all sorts of opinions.

In another place speaking again of *Diana*, he saith, *That he cannot read without admiration, because his learning and his obsequiousness contend for the prize, in eruditione cum benignitate de p imatu certat, dum casus resolvat erudite juxta & benigne, & plures ac varias, imo etiam oppositas sententias ut probabiles sequitur & admittit.* *Dicas. de praen. tract. 8. dis. 9. dub. 8. num. 351.*

his resolves which he gives in Cases of Conscience, with as great benignity and accommodation, as learning: admitting as probable many different, and many times contrary opinions.

Tambourin seems to design to lay the first foundations of this Science, and to dispose mens minds to receive it, when speaking of himself, and confessing that he happens often to fall into contradictions, yet he will not have ^e us say, nor so much as suspect that he is contrary to himself, when we see him approve an opinion which in another place he hath not received; because he hath not done it, but in that either of them seemed probable unto him.

sententiam approbare quam alias non sum amplexus. Id enim tunc solum facio quando utraque sententia probabilis à me judicatur, quod non est mihi adversari, sed docere potius sementias illas posse ad libitum tanto excipi. Tambor. l. 1. Decal. cap. 2. sect. 7.

To authorize Usury, and give it a free course in the World, the Jesuits have found no means more short and easie, than to take from it that name which is so odious, and to say to them who exercise it; that they should not call it Usury any more. Tambourin here makes use of the same expedient to establish the Science of Contradictions; he will not have us to call them Contradictions, nor that we should say that he contradicts himself, when he affirms contrary things, and which destroy one another.

A. I. B. I. P. 2. C. I. A. 4.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

Of Evil Customs.

That the Jesuits allow those which corruption hath introduced into all sorts of conditions, and make use of them to excuse sins and vices.

THE mischiefs and disorders which come from evil Examples and Customs cannot be expressed; and we may say, that these are the most ordinary means, and the most forcible and puissant armes which are employed at this day to destroy Christian Truth and Piety, and to authorize Corruption and Looseness, which abounds so much amongst all sorts of conditions.

We made it appear just now in the former Chapter, that F. Banny excuses by custom, and delivers from all fear and scruple the Parish Priests who are Non-resident. *The custom*, saith he, in his Practique 43. ch. 716. p. 3. book, *gives a discharge from all, and this without fear; especially when it hath been long observed in the Church.*

Tanbourin takes this rule from Castro-Palao, *That in ten years Custom prescribes against Law, or against another custom legally introduced: so, that if they have not been observed during that time, they oblige no more: and whether they were not observed by right or wrong, on a good or bad account, they may be prescribed against by this number of years.* After this we need not wonder if the Jesuits trouble themselves but little about the Laws of the Church, since there are none happily against which they have not prescribed on a good or bad account.

Dicastrinus by the same principle saith, *that the Judges sin in administering Justice on Festival days, unless the custom have prescribed to the contrary.*

Escobar upon this question, "How much sooner may we begin than the hour ordained for saying Matines?" saith frankly according to his opinion, and of the principal Doctors of the Society whom he had read and examined, that we may without scruple begin Matines at three or four of the clock after noon, for the day following, because it is the custom of many at this day. ^bThe usage of Rome, saith he, and the ordinary custom of the Church is favourable unto them. But he ought to have considered, that there are customs which are abuses, and not usages, and that the Church approves not all that it tollerates, and that it is to wrong it to attribute a custom unto it which it hath so oftentimes condemned, and which it doth yet daily condemn by the same mouth of those who follow it, in the most part of the Hymnes which they say at Matines and Lauds, wherein the times to say these two parts of the Office is expressly marked and determined.

^a Quanto tempore potest antevortis Matutinum? Escobar tract. 5. exam. 6. c. 9. n. 55. p. 661. & 662.
^b Usus Romanus, communis que Ecclesie mos suffragatur.

He goes yet further, saying, that ^c*he who saith Matines an hour or two before noon, sins mortally; because this is not the custom. For according to his maxim, if it were once introduced into practice, it were no more sin, no not venial, no more than to say them after noon. See here his words: ^dBut if the custom allow it, Matines may be said at half three, or at three of the clock after noon, without venial sin.*

^c Qui autem hora prima aut secunda ante meridiem recitaret, mortali crimine faderetur. Ibid.
^d Si autem consuetudo tulerit, hora tertia aut secunda cum dimidia post meridiem poterit Matutinum recitari sine veniali peccato. Ibid.

Matines may be said without scruple, according to this Casuist, at four of the clock, because such is the custom; and might also be said at half hour after two, if such were the custom. After the rate then that this custom goes on advancing and gaining time, we may follow it without fear or scruple of sin, and say Matines for the next day before dinner, as well as after dinner: we should thence have this commodity, to have our minds more free to say them, and all the rest of the day for whatever we pleased to do, without speaking of many other reasons which may serve for inducement to so laudable a devotion.

The Jesuits also make use of custom to authorize Duels, and pretend that it is not only lawfull to accept, but also to offer them. And one of the Casuists of the

Society, who taught publickly at *Caen* of late years, after he had endeavoured to justify this brutal madness by many reasons, which we shall represent in their place, concludes in this manner: *These who approve not these answers, know not the manner of living, and the ordinary custom of those who are in the World. For it is lawfull for a man to maintain his Honour by this way.*

Qui hæc responsa non probant, ignari sunt communis

consuetudinis & ritæ. Licet enim homini hæc ratione honorem suum vitari.

There is no custom more wicked, nor more general amongst people of base condition, than to swear, blaspheme, and to break out into curses and imprecations against cattel, men, and every thing that gives them trouble. *Bauny* considering this cursed custom, saith according to his ordinary lenity; *For my part I believe that it may be said with truth, that it is their choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported; it is no fault, neither mortal nor venial, to curse Dogs, Hawks, and other such things as are without reason.*

Bauny Sum. c. 6. p. 73.

The abuse which Merchants ought most to fear and avoid in their Traffick, and which yet is very common at this day, is falshood and deceit, whether it be in falsifying and altering Merchandizes, or in selling them dearer than they are worth, or selling them by false weights and false measures. But *Layman* following this custom saith, *That we must not alwayes condemn the injustice of the Merchants, when they mingle in their Merchandizes things of different kinds, as Rye amongst Wheat, Water with Wine, and Pitch amongst Wax; provided that this do not damnifie them that buy it, and that the Merchandize be good enough of the price it costs, and proper enough for common usage.*

Mercores statim injustitia damnari non possunt, si mercis substantiam alienam, puta tritico se-

cale, vino aquam, picem cere admisceant, modo inde emptoribus nullum damnum inferatur, & merces proportione pretii quo venditur satis idonea sit ad consuetum usum. Layman l. 3. tit. 4. c. 17. n. 15.

And he confirms his opinion by that of *Lessius* and *Lopez*, saying, *that Lessius and Lopez assure us, that if the mixture of the matter, which of it self is of less value, be done with such artifice and industry, that the Merchandize is not less good nor proper for mans use, than it would be without this mixture, it may be sold at the ordinary price, and take more than it is worth; because this gain belongs to the address and industry of the Merchant, and is no wrong to those that buy it.*

g Addit Lessius n. 83, cum Lopez loco citato, si additio materia secundum se deterioris est officio & industria fiat ut

merces non sit minus bona & idonea ad usum, quam sine tali admixtione, posse tunc consueto pretio divendi, & lucrum majus reportari; quippe quod industria esse censetur, & sine damno emptorium percipitur. Ibid.

The ordinary vice of women, and principally of those of Quality, is luxury and vanity. They cannot have a fairer pretence for to nourish, nor a better excuse to justify themselves in the excess they commit therein, and the scandals which fall out thereupon, than to say that it is the custom, and that they do nothing but what is commonly done in the World by women of their condition. *Bauny* approves this reason, and makes use of it in his *Summe*, ch. 46. p. 717, & 718. where he proposes this question: *If maids and women, who exceed modesty and duty, and as we may say necessity of decency in their habits, because they seek out therein curiosities not suitable to their estates, may be thought capable of absolution, when they know that some take thence occasion of sinning?*

He acknowledgeth that many condemn this insupportable vanity, and maintain that maids and women who are so disposed, and will so continue, are incapable of absolution; but he declares against their judgement, and concludes in these terms: *Nevertheless we must say, 1. that the Woman who trims and adorns her self to please her Husband, ought not to be blamed, though she doth it as he saith through vanity and curiosity, and against modesty, knowing well that some draw from thence occasion of sin.*

He saith moreover, *that neither is she more to be blamed, if she trim her self in this sort with scandal, when she doth it to satisfy the custom of the Countrey, and not to be singular, unlike and inferiour to those of their own sex.* He would then that the pretence of pleasing her Husband, and a disorderly and shamefull custom, should give liberty to a woman to break out into all sorts of luxury and vanity, without

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being

being blameable; and that custom hath power to change the nature of things, to cause that it shall be lawfull to transgress the bounds of modesty, that vanity shall be no longer vanity, that luxury shall not be longer luxury, and that scandal shall be no longer scandal.

He continues speaking in this manner : 2. *I say, though this said woman had knowledge of the bad effects which her diligence in trimming her self would cause in the body and soul of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious clothes, nevertheless she sins not in making use thereof. The reason is, Because to prevent the offence of another, this woman is not bound to deprive her self of what the Law of the Countrey, and nature it self permits. That is to say, that as custom makes luxury and vanity lawfull for her, so it makes scandal also lawfull for her; and that the abuses which happens very frequently in this point, by the corruption of the World, are just and true Laws, and proper to regulate all things in a Countrey.*

I might speak here of Usury and Symony, which are two vices so common at this day, that the Jesuits cover them much easier than others, because that custom hath made them publick. But I refer these disorders to be represented in the places proper for these matters, that I may avoid repetitions.

C H A P. III.

Of the Occasions of Sin.

That the Jesuits retain men in them, and that according to their maxims there can be no next occasions of Sin.

ONE of the most important, and most necessary counsels which can be given to a person who would avoid sin, is that he fly the occasions; and if we observe it, we shall find that the most ordinary cause why the most part of those who have some good desire and care for their salvation, attain not to a true and solid conversion, or fall back after a while, is because they have not received this advice, or have not been faithfull in the observation of it.

This is such, that the Jesuits acknowledge well indeed the importance and necessity thereof, but they abolish it in their practice. They acknowledge in general with all Divines, that they who would receive the Grace of God, or preserve it when they have received it, are obliged to depart from the next occasions of sin, which would indubitably destroy them. But when question is made about proceeding to particulars, they grant and accommodate things in such manner, that according to their advice and guidance there are not any next occasions of sin, and there cannot even be any at all; or if happily against their proper rules they be constrained to acknowledge some, instead of withdrawing men from them, they nourish them therein, by furnishing them with store of reasons and pretexts to continue therein with a safe conscience, so that according to them there never will be found any who shall be obliged to quit or avoid them.

It is by this conduct that *Sancius*, handling this point, speaketh in these terms:

I have said formerly, that no person is obliged to avoid the next occasions of sin, when thereby some great loss will befall him: in this case it cannot be said, that he wills this occasion, but permits it only; because that he withdraws not from this occasion, is not that he would absolutely abide in it, but because he would decline the damage which this withdrawing would bring on him.

Dictum est supra quod nullus tenetur occasionem proximam vitare cum magno suo detrimento; nec

tunc dicitur velle occasionem, vel permittere, cum non abigere occasionem qua oritur quia vult penitus in ea permorari, sed quia vult non incurere damnum quod abjecta occasione obveniret. Sancius in Select. casp. 10. n. 20.

These words are general, *none is obliged, nullus tenetur*; and they comprehend all sorts of persons, even Ecclesiasticks and Religious, with whom this Jesuit dispenses in the Law of the Gospel, which obligeth them not only to lose all the things in the World, rather than suffer the loss of their souls; but also to cut off their armes and feet, and to pluck out their eyes if they offend them, that is to say, if they be occasions of sin.

The loss for which this Jesuit pretends, that *none is obliged to eschew the next occasion of sin*, how great soever it be, cannot be of things so dear as eyes, nor so necessary as hands and feet: For this cause if our Lord will have eyes pull'd out, and feet and hands cut off, by stronger reason doth he oblige to suffer all other loss to avoid offence, and to withdraw from the occasions and danger of being lost by offending God.

Tambourin saith almost the same thing, and attempts to justify it by the same reason, maintaining that if any one cannot quit the occasion of sin without causing of scandal, or without suffering some damage spiritual or temporal, he is not obliged thereto; because then it may be judged morally, that this is not to seek an occasion voluntarily, but to suffer it. He determines not at all this damage spiritual or temporal, testifying that of what sort soever it be, small or great, it is sufficient to retain a man in the next occasions of sin with a good conscience.

If the reason of these Authors had been good, to wit, that he who to avoid loss, continues in the next occasion of sin, neither wills nor loves this occasion of sin;

but suffers it, because he loves it not for it self alone, but for the benefit that comes to him therein, or for the evil which he would avoid, we must say that we cannot be guilty in any occasion of sin, and that we shall never be obliged to avoid it, but when it is affected and sought out for its own sake: which hardly ever happens, men not breaking out unto evil, but for the benefits which are annexed unto them in deed, or in appearance, or to deliver themselves from other evils which they fear more.

We cannot find a more proper example to clear up this, than that which *Sancius* himself presents us with in these following words: ^b Hence it comes, saith he, that a man is not obliged to cause his Concubine to depart out of his house, if her company be very advantageous unto him, in regard of his gain by Traffick. Which he confirms, saying the second time, ^c That he is not obliged to put her away, if in putting her away he lose any great benefit, and that it suffices him to resolve not to sin any more.

b Inde nec tenetur domo ejicere concubinam, si concubinato sit nimis utilis ad lucrandum bona temporalia, media negotiorum. *Ab. d.* ^c Concubinam ejicere non erit obnoxius, si ex ejectione magnum emolumentum non esset accepturus. Sufficeret enim propterea d. inceptis non peccare. *Ibid.*

This is to justify one vice by another, and to make use of covetousness and interest to nouse a man up in fornication. But besides this reason he produceth yet another, which is, ^d If the Concubine be very usefull to the fornicator, to cherish him, and to keep him in good humour, so that without her he lives in melancholly, and hath great distast of the food which is prepared for him, and cannot easily find another Maid-servant who may be proper for him, he cannot be obliged in this case to put away his Concubine, because his satisfaction in these circumstances are more worth than any temporal good.

d Imo si Concubina nimis utilis esset ad oblectamentum concubinarium dum deficiente illa nimis agere vitam & alia epule & edio magno officerent concubinarium, & alia famula ad id nimis difficile inveniretur, ejicere illam non erit concubinarium obligandum: quia oblectamentum, dictis circumstantiis consideratum, est majoris aestimationis quam quodcumque bonum temporale.

We then may say boldly, that if temporal good and profit, pleasure and diversion suffice to dispense with an Whoremaster to keep his Concubine, there will never be any obliged thereunto, because there will never be any who can want such pretences, which nevertheless appear so just unto this Jesuit, that he doth not only suffer this Whoremaster to keep his Concubine for these reasons, but he maintains also, that ^e for these same reasons if the Concubine die, or withdraw her self, it will be lawfull for him to take another Maid-servant, what fear soever he have of falling into sin with her, if he cannot find some other who is as capable to assist him in his affairs and conveniencies. For if this reason dispense with him for not putting her away whom he hath already taken, it will also give him a right to take her whom he hath not as yet.

e Ob quod fas erit cuique de novo admittere feminam ad suam famulatam, quantumcumque metuat labentis periculum, si aliam non inveniat parvis qualitatibus illis in rebus que sibi sunt maxime utiles. Si namque ob hanc causam jam receptam expellere non constituitur, eodem jure de novo admittere illam erit concessum. *Ibid.*

There remains nothing more now to this sort of Divines, but to pretend that it is lawfull for them to find out and direct themselves some Concubine to some distressed Whoremaster, who cannot live without one, or to exhort him that hath one not to forsake her, for fear least he should be kill'd with melancholly.

Banny is not more severe in this point than *Sancius*, maintaining, ^f That absolution may be given a woman who entertains at her house a man with whom she offends frequently, if she cannot handsomly send him away, or if she have any reason to retain him, provided she resolve firmly to sin no more with him.

f Sequitur ex dictis absolvi posse feminam que domi sue virum excipit cum quo sepe peccat, si cum non potest honeste inde ejicere, cum causam aliquam habet cum retinendi, dummodo firmiter proponat se cum eo amplius non peccaturam. *Banny Theol. mor. part. 1. tract. 4. de penit. q. 14. p. 94.*

The principle of this conclusion is, that ^g in exposing her self for so just a reason to the danger of sinning, she doth not directly nor expressly will the occasion of sin; but ^g in exposing her self for so just a reason to the danger of sinning, she doth not directly nor expressly will the occasion of sin; but

g Quia cum est justa causa exponendi se peccati periculo, peccatens nec occasionem vult expresse & actu, nec peccatum ex ea consequens, sed commodum suum, nempe privationem damni in fama, honore, pecuniis; quo bono non frueretur si occasionem perditam omittetret aut vitaret. *Ibid.*

the commodity, that is to say, the conservation of her repute, of her honour, or her wealth, wherein she would have suffered loss if she had quitted or avoided the occasion of sin. This is doubtless to have great care of her salvation, and to love God very well above all things, to expose her self voluntarily to evident danger of offending him for any the least temporal interest. This reason of *Banny* is the same which *Sancius* expresseth in other terms; which testifies, that these are not the opinions of some particular persons, but that have overspread the Society it self, and that they are fixed to its spirit and conduct.

But *Banny* discovers another principle of this Doctrine, which is, that ^h it is ^h Occasiones not a next occasion, nor which ought to be avoided, but only when it is mortal sin, or proxime sunt id when it is of such nature as causeth men fall commonly into sin; so that the Confessor solum quod ex may judge prudently by his experience past, and the present circumstances and dispo- se est peccatum sitions, that the person who addresses himself unto him can hardly at all, or rarely be quod ex genere found in this occasion, without offending God mortally. suo & natura est tale, ut fre-

quenter homines similibus conditionibus ad mortale inducunt, & experimento constat talem effectum in illis habere ut plurimum, unde Confessoris contendere prudenter potest nunquam aut raro tali occasione peccatorem usurum sine mortali culpa, habita ratione tam loci, quam temporis & aliorum circumstantiarum que ad peccatum inducunt. Ibid.

And a little after he saith, that ⁱ if the occasion of sin be not evil in it self, nor into all sorts of persons, but only for some one particular person, it ought not be put ⁱ Deinde cum into the number of actions that are evil in their own nature, and forbidden unto all, occasio peccandi so that they should never be permitted to do them. non ex se, nec omnibus sit mala, sed hinc

causum, non potest in classem eorum operum redigi qua ex natura sua, & à quocunque fiunt, semper sunt mala & nunquam admittenda. Ibid.

He will have it then that there is no next occasion of sin, and that it is not to be avoided, if it be not a mortal sin it self, or at least if it be not evil in it self, and for all sorts of persons, and if it do not induce men naturally unto sin, so that it makes them fall therein alwayes, or almost alwayes when they meet therewith. So that the places, the treatments, the company; the converse which induce men to lewdness and debauchery, cannot be next occasions to sin according to this Divinity: and those who are in wicked places, without giving themselves over unto evil, shall not be engaged in the next occasions to sin, and shall have done nothing which is forbidden them by the rules of purity, and the Laws of God. So that when he saith in the same place, ^k that ordinarily they are not to be absolved who are in the next occasion of sin; he would say nothing else, but that he is not to be absolved who is actually in sin, or in some practice which is commonly inseparable from it, and from which he never parts without sin.

^k Quo supposito, dico primo regulariter absolvendum non esse qui est in occasione peccandi proxima.

But he will not have this rule to be so general, that it should have no exceptions, whereof he makes out one in these terms: ^l I say ordinarily, because there are that hold, that it is lawfull for all those who will endeavour after the salvation of souls, to expose themselves unto the danger of sin. And he alleadges for example those who would go into naughty places to treat debauched women, that they might there possess them with some horroure of their sin; pretending that this is lawfull unto all indifferently, cuique licere, licere singulis. Albeit they expose themselves to evident danger, and that there is all the probability in the world, that they will sin themselves with those women, having already many times proved by experience, that they cannot defend themselves from the force of their temptations, and that they suffer themselves to be drawn unto sin.

^l Dixi regulariter, quia ex multorum sententia cuique licet se exponere periculo peccandi, cum de aliena salute, eaque promovenda agitur. Ibid.

um peccati ingenerandum meretricibus, etsi metus sit; ac vero etiam verisimilitudo non parva eos peccaturos, eo quod malo suo sæpe sunt experti blandis muliercularum sermonibus ac illecebris flecti solitos ad libidinem. Ibid.

We find not in the Gospel this marvellous charity, which causeth us to expose our salvation for that of anothers, and which induces us to be damned with them. The Apostles and Martyrs were ignorant thereof, having given the life of their bodies to save men, but not that of their souls; because they had learned of *Jesus Christ*, that it was to no purpose to gain the whole World to loose a mans soul,

soul, and that it is a ridiculous way to go about to withdraw debauched persons from sin, by committing sin with them.

Bauny speaks of the same point in *French*, as in *Latine*, and he is firm in the same opinions, because they could not be more enlarged. For in his *Summe*, c. 46. p. 711. after he had demanded, *If they who in their Traffick, Commerce, discourse, resorts, were obliged to see, to speak, and treat with Maids and Women, whose sight and treatments do cause them frequently to fall into sin, were capable in this perpetual danger of being in grace, and receiving the Sacrament?* He answers with *Baia*, they may, so that the cause which draws and induces them at such times into evil, be not of it self a mortal sin, non est de se peccatum mortiferum; and therefore cannot be held to be of the quality of a next occasion disposing unto evil, such as the penitent ought then necessarily avoid, to possess and receive grace in the Sacrament.

It must be considered, that it is presupposed that the danger is perpetual, that it causes often to fall into sin, that this sin is of that sort which is committed by men with maids and women; and yet Bauny, who himself asserts and advances these things, maintains at the same time, that we are not to hold a danger of this nature to be in the quality of a next occasion disposing unto evil.

This same *F.* in the 717. page, demands, *what must be done with Men and Maid-servants, Cousins of both sexes, Masters and their Maid-servants, who mutually draw and assist one another in sin, or take from the house wherein they are motives thereunto, from the opportunities they have therein?* To which he answers, that if they offend but rarely together, as once or twice in a month, they may be absolved.

It were easie to relate many like cases which the Jesuits resolve in the same manner; but I omit them for fear of being too long, to come to a point more important, which discovers the principles whereupon they found their answers, and the conditions they require unto a next occasion of sin. See here the Principles which Bauny relates in this manner.

1. *The occasion is the next, when it is of it self of a vicious nature, as are all mortal sins.* In his *Summe*, 46. ch. 709. p. It is not such, saith *Baia*, whom Bauny alledges for his warrant, *quando non est de se peccatum mortiferum, when it is not of it self a mortal sin;* p. 711.

2. In the second place, though a thing be evil and vicious in it self, and serve for a next, and as it were certain occasion of sin; yet according to Bauny, it is not such in effect, that is to say, it is not the next occasion to sin, when it is not sought, and the Will is not bent thereupon: 710. p. Which he expounds more clearly, when he saith a little after, that albeit the precept of flying the occasions of sin is negative, and that by consequence it obligeth alwayes, *this is only with this condition, not to affect and seek humerously, and without necessity that which induces unto sin;* 712. p.

3. In the third place, he maintains, that a thing is no next occasion to sin unto a man, if it be not so forcible that it ravisheth him in some sort, and causeth him almost every time it presents it self, to fall into sin; *si non adsit assiduitas peccandi.* Which Bauny translates and explicates in this manner: *If the said occasion do not force, as I may say, the sinner to fall at every season, alwayes, and at all times;* 711. p.

4. In the fourth place, although a person be engaged in some place, company, exercise, which causeth him often to offend God, they say he is not for that obliged to leave it, if he be retained by any temporal consideration, as that of wealth, of honour, and even of pleasure it self; *si adsit aliqua notabilis causa non se separandi*, saith *Baia*, and which Bauny translates better than he thought for, when he rendred it in these terms: *Provided he have some specious cause which obligeth him to continue in the said occasion;* 710. p. It matters not, whether this cause be just or not before God, so it be specious before men. For speaking of this *specious cause* which may oblige men to continue in the nearest, and as it were certain occasions of offending God, he expounds it thus: *As when they cannot dispence therewith without giving the world matter to talk of, or that it would be an inconvenience to them;* 712. p.

5. In the fifth place, they assure us that a man may with a safe conscience abide in the most certain, most ordinary, and most violent occasions of sin, when any temporal interest or commodity engageth him therein, provided he form within himself a resolution not to offend God in that estate: *Dummodo firmiter proponat non peccare*; p. 712. provided that he is displeas'd with what is past, and purposes not to fall therein again for the future; 715. p. though he have often made the like resolutions and protestations which have been vain and without effect; *quandocumque nulla videtur emendatio*, as *Sancius* speaks in *Bauny*, p. 717. and though even in deed there be no appearance, that he who made these promises and these resolutions, will do what he promises, and hold to what he resolves, as *Bauny* saith after *Diana*, p. 716. and though many times it may be presumed that such resolutions come no farther than from the lip outward, as saith the same *Bauny*, 717. p.

60 *Sancius* agrees very well with *Bauny* in all these points, or rather *Bauny* with *Sancius*, from whom he seems to have taken the greatest part of what he hath said about these next occasions of sin, as having found none more large-upon this matter, as appears clear enough in what we have related of this matter from him.

Layman also establisheth the same principles, and requires the same conditions in the occasions of sin. And after he hath declared, that by the command of God we are obliged to fly the next occasions, he adjoyns these restrictions and exceptions: ^m Unless, saith he, the evident danger, and next occasion of sinning mortally, cannot be removed without some notable damage to body, goods, or reputation. For in this case God counsels indeed to suffer this loss, to secure the salvation of our souls, but he commands it not.

^m Excipe nisi proximum periculum, seu occasio peccandi sine gravi incom-

modo corporis, fame, aut fortunarum, tolli non possit, tunc consilium quidem est minorem illam jacturam majori bono securitatis anime posthabere, sed nec preceptum. *Layman* l. 5. tract. 6. cap. 4. num. 9.

Whence he draws this conclusion for the resolving of this very case, which *F. Bauny* had already propounded as above: ⁿ That they are to be absolved who will not quit a charge, an employment, a traffick, or an house wherein they are in the next and imminent danger of sinning, because they cannot do it without difficulty. His reason is, because the next occasion of sin being not sin, neither doth it impose any necessity of sinning, and takes not away liberty. That is to say, that if a man be not in danger to lose his wits and liberty, he is not obliged to avoid and fly from occasions of sin, how powerfull or evident soever they be. So that it is folly that is to be feared in these occasions, rather than sin, which also cannot be committed when wit and liberty is lost. So that it is clear, that by this Divinity there can be no next occasion of sin had, wherein we may not engage and abide with a good conscience, and without fear of sin; for how violent soever it be, if it leave only wit and liberty, these Doctors hold that it is no sin to continue therein, because we are not obliged to forsake it; and if it takes away wit and liberty, we cannot sin though we continue therein, because sin supposes liberty.

ⁿ Quare absolventi sunt qui officio, negotiatione, domo in qua peccandi periculum prope imminet, discedere nolunt, quia sine maxima difficultate non possunt; quia occasio peccandi in se peccatum non est, neque necessitatem inferit, aut animi libertatem au-

Escobar who boasts to be the mouth unto 24. of the most antient and prudent of the Society, speaking of the next occasions of sin, saith, ^o That he calls that the next occasion of sin, whereupon it arrives rarely that a man abstains from sin, the circumstances considered. And as if he apprehended that he should be accounted too scrupulous and too severe, if he would hereby withdraw persons from venial sin, he gives this advertisement: ^p But yet the sin which arises herefrom must be a mortal one. For a venial sin is accounted as nothing by this Jesuit, and by the most part of the rest of them.

^o Proximam illam occasionem appello, qua circumstantiis spectatis, raro quis a peccato assoler abstinere. *Escob.* tract. 7. ex. 43

cap. 8. num. 226. p. 236.

^p Certe peccatum ex hujusmodi occasione exurgens debet esse mortale.

80 ^q Furthermore, saith he, the occasion ought to be such, that it happen never or seldom that he sins not when it presents it self. So that to put or hold ones self into such an occasion, is not so much to be exposed to the danger of sinning, as to cast himself into sin it self, since he is engaged into a necessity of falling therein, which he hardly ever avoids. Which agrees very well with what *Bauny* saith,

^q Praterca talis debet esse occasio, qua nunquam aut raro non delinquatur.

¶ I. 15. l. 1. p. 2. c. 3.

that

that that is the next occasion of sin, which is of it self and of its own nature vicious, as all mortal sin is; and with that which *Layman* saith also on the same subject, that we are not obliged to quit a Society, or Occupation, which is the cause that we do frequently offend God, ^r when the occasion of sin is not sin of it self, or when it imposeth no necessity, nor taketh away liberty.

^r Quando occa.

se peccandi in self,

se peccatum non

est, neque necessitatem infert, aut animi libertatem aufert.

I. J. B. I. P. 2. C. 3.

A N

An ABRIDGEMENT of the Doctrine of the
JESUITS, about the next occasions of Sin.

1. According to the Divinity of these Jesuits, a thing is not the next occasion to sin, unless it be vicious, and a sin of it self.

non est. Layman. *Quand elle n'est pas de soy & de sa nature vicieuse, comme seroit tout peché mortel.* Bauny.

2. Though it be such, none are obliged to forsake or fly it; it is sufficient that it be not sought of humour, and with a formed design to offend God.

peché oblige, dit Bauny, ce n'est que sous condition de n'affected & rechercher de gayeté de cœur & sans nécessité ce qui porte au peché. *Intelligendum est præceptum hæc quis ultro ac voluntarie se in peccandi periculum conjiciat, aut in eo persistat.* Layman.

3. To continue therein in quiet and safety of conscience, it is sufficient to be engaged by some temporal interest of wealth, honour, pleasure, and ones own satisfaction.

ne pouvoir s'en dispenser sans bailler sujet au monde de parler, ou qu'eux mêmes en recussent quelque incommodité. Bauny. *Nullus tenetur occasionem proximam vitare cum magno detrimento. unde nec tenetur domo ejicere concubinam, si concubinatio sit nimis utilis ad lucrandum bona temporalia mediâ negotiatione. Sancius. Imo si concubina nimis utilis esset ad oblectamentum concubinarij, ejicere illam non erit concubinarium obligandum.* Sancius.

4. Resolving to continue and to engage therein upon so good motives, it is sufficient so say with ones self, that he will not offend God, and that he form this resolution, though he knows by his own experience that he cannot contain himself.

num emolumentum non esset acquisiturus. Sufficeret enim proponere deinceps non peccare. Sancius. *Dummodo firmiter proponat non peccare; quandocumque nulla noietur emendatio.* Sancius cité par Bauny.

5. How strange an impresson soever the places, company, and persons who give occasions of sin, do bring upon the Spirit of a man, holding him continually, and causing him almost alwayes to fall into sin, provided this occasion force not, nor bring to the point of necessity; so it do not absolutely deprive of wit and liberty, there is no obligation to fly it, or withdraw from it, though we have often fallen under it in time past; and believe not we shall be able to defend our selves in time to come.

pour ainsi dire, le pecheur à tomber à toutes heures, tous les jours & en tout temps. Bauny. *Talis debet esse occasio qua nunquam vel raro non delinquatur.* Escobar.

He that would or can hold to these principles, and guide himself by these maxims, shall alwayes find with ease reasons and pretences with a safe conscience to continue in all companies, occupations and practices, even the most dangerous and wicked that are, which offend God continually, without being obliged by any person to forsake them. And it is sufficiently manifest, that according to these principles it will be hard, and even morally impossible to meet with any next occasions of sin, there being none at all more evident, than those which these Doctors excuse and justifie.

THE LAST CHAPTER.

Of the Accessaries of Sin.

IT cannot be doubted, but that the help which sinners have one of another in the execution of their wicked designs, is one of the outward principles of sin.

There are few crimes which are committed without the assistance of others, and which can proceed without a Servant, a Friend, a Merchant, or some person who favours and furnisheth with money for their execution. Though the Holy Scriptures, and all the most common rules of Morality, do condemn all these voluntary instruments of sin, the Divinity of the Jesuits nevertheless forbears not to excuse them. I will only rehearse some of the principal decisions of *Tambourin*, because he is the last Author that I know of, who hath written on this, and who hath taken care to collect almost all that is corrupt in their Morality.

1. For Servants, he excuseth those of Usurers, Dishonest, and Duellists, who serve them in the execution of their sins. ^a If a Servant, saith he, by the command of his Master, who is an Usurer, tells the money, carries it, receives it, Books it; if by command of his Master, whom he knows to be going to commit adultery, he saddles his horse, attends at the gate, makes the bed, makes ready meat, serves at the table of his Whore, accompanies her and conducts her to the place where his Master is, to commit this sin, if he opens her the door, if he reverence this prostitute, if he carry Letters and Messages which contain Civilities only, if he carry Presents to her with a Collation, and perform all other services which a Servant commonly doth for his Master, — he is not only to be excused because of his servile condition, but also because of the fear of loss; if for example he fear that his Master will be angry, or turn him out of his house. He is to be excused, if he go to tell the woman with whom his Master goes to commit adultery, that he will be found at home at such an hour: or to his Masters enemy, that at such an hour he shall find him at such a place: If by the command of his Master, he follows a Damsel to see or enquire where she lives; if by his command, he not only open the door, but show her where his Master is; if he aid his Master to get up by the window, to enter into the place where he is to commit that sin. Wherefore takes he such pains to particularize such infamous actions, if it be not for fear least a Servant should make any scruple upon any one of these circumstances, and that the Master not being well served, should fall short of executing his design, or for fear this poor Servant should put himself by his scruple in danger of being frown'd upon by his Master, for having hindred him from committing this crime.

Si jussu heri usurarii pecuniam numeret, deferat, recipiat, referat in libro; si ejusdem jussu quem scit ire ad adulterandum sternat equum, jossu mere comiteretur, mereque expectet ante fores, sternat lectum, cibo, condiat, ministratque concubinae, eandemque mere as sociat duccendo ad locum ubi dominus peccaturus est, januamque aperiat eidem ingressurus: si honoret suam heram meretricem, si deferat scripta & incernuntia solius urbanitatis plena; si deferat munuscula & esculenta, praestetque alia officia quae alius famulus aequae praestaret. num. 18. Non ex sola famularum ratione, sed metu detrimenti. V. G. torvis aspiciatur oculis, domo expellatur, excusatur: si referat adulterae vel inimico tali hora ad domum heri vel ad dictum locum accedat; si jussu heri insequetur puellam visurum vel requisiturum ubi ea habitet; si jussu ejusdem non aperiat modo januam, sed doceat ubi herus sit; si dominum adjuvet ad ascendendum per fenestram quo ingrediatur in locum ubi peccaturus sit. num. 19.

But if you be not satisfied with the excuse of this Servant, this Father will furnish him with another, founded on the direction of his intention, which may serve him as he saith himself, ^b to discharge many persons of sin, at least of mortal sin; which is that in the cases propounded, the servant pleaseth not himself in the sin of his Master, and that he do him the services whereof we have spoken, for some good end, as for the just reward which he expects. It is not very necessary to advertise servants to have this good intention; and if it be capable to excuse them, it is true that they need fear nothing on this part, if this answer will serve them: that their Masters sins please them not, but so far as they receive some profit and benefit thereby.

Ratione scendendi multos a peccato scitem mortifero, modo, ut in casu proponitur, non placeat eis peccatum, & faciant obsequia praedicta ob aliquem bonum finem, puta eo quod exhibeant illa officii sui causa. Tambur. l. 5. Decal. cap. 1. sect. 4. n. 30;

But what this Father makes use of to excuse a servant, he also allows as lawful to a friend. ^c *If my friend, saith he, will have me carry presents, to be given on the account of dishonest Love, unto his Concubine, to whom he sends them, I may carry them without sin, if I have an esteem for the love of this man, and that I would not lose it, because in this case I have a just cause of fearing a considerable losse.*

c Si amicus meus velit ut ego feram munuscula & similia turpis scilicet amoris iacis multa,

qua ipse mittit ad suam concubinam, possum sine peccato deferre . . . si tibi magni sit ejusmodi amicitia, ac vere timeas amittere, quia tunc notabilis momenti justus metus accedit. Ibid. n. 18, 19, 20.

The friendship of an Adulterer is very considerable in the judgement of this Divine and this Jesuit, and preferrable to that of God himself, being he wills that against the command of God a friend may contribute to his crime, for fear onely of putting himself in danger of losing his favours, he may by the same motive carry on the behalf of this friend presents to a Murderer, or to an Impostor, to stir them up by false witnesses to dishonour or kill whom he pleaseth; and it will not be easie, according to this detestable Doctrine to condemn him, that gives his friend a Sword to kill himself, if he intreat him; if it be not that perhaps the life of the Body is more precious, and more considerable than that of the Soul, and that it is more lawful to co-operate to this then to that, or to contribute to an adulterie then to an homicide.

As for the Merchants, they may according to this Author co-operate as much as their vocation, or rather their Lust and Interest will permit them, to the sins of Idolatry, Whoredom, unlawful gains, and of all sorts of debaucherie. ^d *We may, saith he, sell an Infidel a Lamb which we know he will use in Sacrifice to an Idol; we may sell a woman Paint, which we know she will use to draw young men to unchaste Love; we may sell Dice and Cards to them we know will abuse them to unlawful gaming; Cooks may provide meat to be eaten on Fastdays, whether they believe that they who demand it, are lawfully exempt from fasting, or not: we may sell or hire a House to women of bad lives, and to publique Usurers, and even according to Sanchez, without any cause that may excuse this action. They that sell victuals to those that would break their fast, if they fear upon their refusal to lose their custom, are excused; because it is seldom that these persons are induced to fast by your refusal, to sell Wine to those who drink drunk with deliberate purpose. There are that require a more considerable cause than that of having the price of their wine; so wit that their Customers will be diminished very much by this refusal. ^e *If you sell to those whom you know will sell again fraudulently, by mingling Water with the Wine, or diminishing the measure, you may do it lawfully when it would be trouble to sell it to others, or when you should suffer damage thereby. We may do all things, saith this Father, and others also more criminal, and more detestable, which he mentions afterwards, when we have any reason, and some of them even without any reason. And the strongest reason, or rather the onely reason which he alledges is Interest, which is the most general principle of the Jesuits, as it is the subject and most universal retainer of all humane passions, which they have undertaken to excuse and flatter.**

d Potest quis vendere agnum infideli, quem scit usui fore ad sacrificium idoli, fucos mulieri, quos scit emi ut ad turpem amorem illius peruncta juvenes alliciat: alcas & taxila los eis qui in ludo illicito sunt illis abusuri: canpones possunt ministrare cibos in die jejunii, tum quando dubitant an ad se divertentes a jejunio excusentur, tum quando putant eos non excusari. n. 34. Potest

*quis vendere, vel etiam locare domum meretricibus vel usurario publico: immo id potest fieri ex Sanchez l. 1. in d. c. 8. n. 20. etiam nulla excusante causa, n. 35. Qui vendunt esculenta solentur jejunium excusantur si timeant diminutionem emptorum, cum raro ex tua denegatione jejunio sint vacaturi. n. 36. Ad vendendum vinum scienter se inebriant, causam majorem aliquam praeter ipsum vini merum pretium, exposulant Castropal. Sa, Sanchez, timorem ne multum sic diminuantur emptores. Tambur. l. 5. Decal. c. 1. sect. 4. n. 33, 34, 35, 36. ^e *Si vendas iis quos scis per fraudem, miscendo aquam vino, vel demendo de mensura, aliis esse revenduros, sunt licite poteris quando tum nisi iis venderes diffidulter, vel cum tuo damno aliis vendere cogeres, aut si aliis sine tuo damno aque posses, cur ex charitate non debeas. Santh. Castrop. Diana, Meroll. num. 37.**

After the Merchants, we must not forget the artificers, who may serve very much the sins of other men. ^f *In a great and pressing necessity, saith Tambourin, such as is the great poverty of an Artificer, he sins not in building the Temple of an Idol, or in selling an Idol it self. Joyn hereunto, that he sins not in providing also a sacrifice, and selling a Lamb to be sacrificed to an Idol, as he said before: That is to say, that he may provide for an Idolater, every thing that is necessary for him to sacrifice*

f urgentissima existente causa, ut esset magna paupertas artificis, peccatum vitaretur fabricando, vendendo

de idolum, templum, Castrop. Tann. num. 38.

unto the Devil ; so that there remains nothing, but to cut the throat of the sacrifice, and to burn it ; farther, he may reach him the knife to cut its throat, and help him, and hold the Torch whilst he puts fire to it ; by the same reason, that a servant may according to this Jesuit, hold the Ladder and Foot of his Master, when he gets up at a Window to commit Adultery, for the onely gain which he gets in helping him, and which he loses if he fail him.

After this it may be judged what these Artisans may do to serve other sins, if it be lawful for them, to furnish with the object it self of the greatest sin, which is the Idol and Temple where it is adored, without fearing the curse, that the Scripture pronounceth against those who do these things, as well as those that put their trust in them : to wit, *that they shall become like unto their works : similes illis fiant qui faciunt ea.* 446

g *Pingentes*
cupia, histriones
eadem rep. asina-
tantes, ex quibus
moraliter scitur
multos peccato-
rum, si eo lucro

It is not to be wondred at any more, if they say as this very Author in favour of other sins ; ^s that those who Paint filthy things, and those Comedians who represent them, though they be morally assured that many will take occasion from thence to sin ; yet if they have need of the gain which this exercise brings them, they may continue it With a good conscience.

rumos, si eo lucro indigeant ad victum, non recusavem licere. Tambur. l. 5. c. 1. sc&. 4. n. 28.

It is always gain and interest that rules in the School of the Jesuits, which presides in all their decisions, which concern manners, and makes them favourable to all the most corrupt and intamous professions.

h *Potere ab*
usurario pecu-
niam mutuam,
si mutuo non
indigeat, sed
eam pecuniam


Finally for fear lest Sinners should want persons to lend them money, to furnish them in their debauches, they permit them to borrow of the Usurers. ^h If you require to borrow money of an Usurer, though you have no occasion for it, but to expend on your vice, it is probable that this is lawful for you.

postulet ut illicite expendat, licere probabile dicimus. Ibid. num. 44.

He said before that we may without any reason, let out our House to an Usurer, to exercise Usury therein ; and here he saith, that the crime for which we would imploy the money we borrow of him, is a good reason for him to exercise his Usury. Who can after this ever want a reason to do whatsoever he would, and for committing the greatest excesses ; since after this Divinity one crime may serve for reason to commit another.

D. T. B. I. P. 2. C. 4.

The end of the First Book.



T H E
S E C O N D B O O K

Of the Inward and Outward

Remedies of SIN.

T H E F I R S T P A R T.

Of the Inward Remedies of Sin.

WE have hitherto observed how the obsequious Divinity of the Jesuites favoureth, and nourisheth all the Causes of Sin; whether they be inward, as Lust, Ignorance, and ill Habits; or outward, as ill Customs, the Occasions of committing it, and the Maxims of the World, and of corrupted Reason, which authorize and justifie it. We come now to behold how they oppose, and (as far as may be) overthrow all the Remedies thereof; whether they be inward, which destroy it in the Soul when it hath committed it, and which hinder from committing it; as the Grace of Jesus Christ, Penitence, the Sacraments, and good Works; or outward, which of themselves make only a Discovery thereof, as the holy Scripture, and the Commandments of God, and the Church, which may also hinder us from committing them outwardly, by restraining and binding Concupiscence in some sort by the threatenings and punishments appointed by God against Sinners. According to this Division this Book shall have two Parts; the one shall be of the inward Remedies, and the other of the outward.

CHAPTER I. *Of the Grace of Jesus Christ.*

ARTICLE I.

That the Jesuits destroy the Grace of Jesus Christ by their Divinity.



Shall be so much the shorter in this Chapter, as the Subject thereof is more large and boundless, it being most true, that the Doctrine of Christian Manners depends on the Grace of Jesus Christ, and refers unto it as its Principle, as *S. Austin* saith, that the whole Scripture is nothing but Charity, and relates thereto as its end.

I will not enter upon the Disputes which they have raised above these sixty
 Tome 2. Book 2. Part 1. Chap. I. Artic. I. A a years

years upon this Subject, troubling the Church with their Intrigues, and by their passion in maintaining the Novelty which they acknowledge and boast they have invented. My mind and my design too do equally estrange me from it. I shall only, as I pass by them, touch upon some points which do more visibly testify, that their Divinity and their Carriage are entirely opposite to the Grace of Jesus Christ and the Gospel.

The Grace of God is given us, either to do good, or to defend us from sin, and withdraw us from it when we are fallen thereinto.

1. To fight against the Love of God, is to fight against the Grace of God, which causeth us to do good; for that good is not done but voluntarily and by love, not by the love of the world, nor of our selves, which is always vicious; but by that of God, which is the spring of all the good which we receive and do.

Father *Ant. Sirmond*, *Molina*, and other Jesuits maintain; some, That we satisfy the love we owe unto God, by loving him three or four times in our life: and others, That we may pass over our whole life without any thought of loving him, and be saved after all this; as I shall make appear in handling the command of loving God.

2. This is to fight with the Grace of God that withdraws us from sin, to teach that he who is fallen into sin, is not obliged to ask grace of God, or to seek out means to rise again from it with speed, nor even to accept them when presented and offered. Yet this is asserted by *Amicus*, *Escobar*, and *Celot*: and (1) this last expounding himself more clearly than the rest, proceeds so far as to say, that when God himself first seeks him out that hath offended him, and endeavours to draw and cause him to return unto him, by preventing and stirring him up by inspirations and good motions which he bestows on him, he may refuse them without rendering himself guilty of any sin, though he believe that his eternal Salvation depends on these good thoughts and good apprehensions which he so insensibly rejects.

1 Qui animæ confessionis præcepto postquam satisfecit, in peccatum letale præcipitatus est, si conscientie stimulos insensibiliter rejectis.

ad Sacramentum poenitentiae extra ordinem urgentis (quod consilium est) neglectu retundit & hebetat; eoque in statu decedit à vita: ignis sempiterni præda fiet, non quod omnia confessione peccatum contraxerit, sed quod alterius peccatorum mere invenierit. In refundendis communibus illis consiliorum moribus, id tantum Christiano perit meriti, quod opere consulto acquisivisset, & solo minor apud Deum, quod major esse noluit. Fateor sane in hujusmodi acceptatione usuque consilii salutis cardinem non raro versari quo tempore dicas oportet gravissimo se obstringere peccato, ego nullum præcise agnosco. *Celot. l. 9. c. 7. Sect. 7. p. 816.*

3. This is also to fight against or destroy that very Grace which withdraws us from sin, to pretend that a sinner may re-enter into a state of Grace, and dispose himself to receive it by the Sacrament of Penance (which is particularly instituted to that end) by means of dispositions and actions altogether natural, which come not from Grace, which only can prepare her self a seat and subject, and dispose the heart of man to receive it. And for all that the principal Divines of the Society are of this opinion, as *Escobar* teacheth us, who pretends to be but the Interpreter, as we shall see in the Chapter of Penitence.

4. This is finally all at once to combat both these sorts of Graces, whereof one causeth us to do good, and the other withdraweth us from evil; and to oppose them in a manner injurious unto Jesus Christ, who is the Author of all Grace, and to the Law of the New Testament, which God hath made choice of

1 Ante legem gratiæ & antiquam magnam Dei misericordiam in ea instituerentur Sacramenta quæ

attritos justificarent, illisque vi Sacramentorum conferretur charitas supernaturalis, sicut sine Sacramentis confertur contritis; sane longè frequentius sub letali culpa tenebantur homines Deum ex charitate naturali diligere, quàm Christiani in nova lege, dum ex charitate supernaturali diligere teneantur. *Molina tom. 6. de just. & jure tr. 5. disp. 59. p. 3166.* 2 Hoc autem præceptum contritionis lege Evangelica commutatum est in præceptum confessionis. *Amicus tom. 8. disp. 9. sect. 3. n. 68. p. 96.*

as they, because he loves us more than them: or that the excess of his mercies towards us, and the excellent means which he hath given us to convert us, ought to make us less sensible of the sins we commit against him, and to cause in us less displeasure against them.

I note only these four points as I pass, to make it appear how the Jesuits Divinity overthrows the foundations of the Grace of Jesus Christ, because I shall speak thereof more largely afterwards when I come to handle these points in particular; and I will insist at present only upon some passages which are more formal and proper for this matter.

Amicus compriseth in one sole passage all that can be said against the Grace of Jesus Christ in not acknowledging the wounds and weakneses which original sin hath brought on us, without which this Grace is unprofitable and superfluous. For comparing our Nature, such as it is now corrupted with sin, with the same as it would have been if God had created it without grace, in its purely natural condition. He speaks in these terms: (1) *The powers of Nature are now the same that they would have been then, because that original sin, which is now in fallen Nature, and had not been in pure and simple Nature, hath not at all diminished the natural powers of man, but hath only taken from them the supernatural powers of grace, by means whereof nature might more easily have exercised those honest actions which would have been natural unto them, though in that estate (where he supposeth that it had been pure, that is to say, without grace and without sin) it had not had greater facility to exercise these same natural actions, which it hath at present with original sin; because original sin hath not diminished the powers of Nature, as hath been said already; but they remain sound and entire from sin, and it hath not introduced into Nature any inclination unto ill, which man should not have had in the estate of pure Nature.*

1 Vires naturæ sunt nunc quæ fuissent tunc, quia per peccatum originale quod natura lapsa supra puram naturam addit, nihil virium naturalium sublatum est in homine, sed tantum sublatae sunt vires supernatura-

les gratiæ, quibus natura facilius exercuisset suos actus honestos naturales, quos tamen non facilius exercuisset tunc sine peccato originali, quam illos exerceat nunc cum eodem peccato originali: quia peccatum originale nec diminuit vires naturales, ut dictum est, cum illæ integræ manserint etiam post peccatum, nec ponat in natura positivam aliquam inclinationem ad malum, quam homo non habuisset in pura natura. *Amicus tom. 6. disp. 5. sect. 6. n. 253. p. 33.*

It is clear, that if nature be not hurt by sin, as this Jesuit saith, it hath no need of the Grace of Jesus Christ, since as Jesus Christ himself saith, they that are not sick have no need of the Physician, nor of his Grace; and the prayers of the Saints and of the whole Church, which demand of God incessantly by Jesus Christ to deliver them from their evils and infirmities, would be false and unprofitable; and so they should be no more prayers, but crys and mockeries, and and deridings of God.

Amicus doth not absolutely deny that we have inclinations unto evil, and in this he testifies himself to be a man; but in denying that this inclination comes from original sin, he neither speaks as a Monk nor a Christian. If it come not from original sin, but from the foundation of nature, as he pretends, in as much as he saith, that it had been in the estate of nature, if it had been created without sin: *Peccatum originale non posuit in natura aliquam positivam inclinationem ad malum, quam homo non habuisset in pura natura*; it must come from God who is the Author of Nature; and by consequence God should be the Author of evil and of sin, and this inclination unto evil should have been in Jesus Christ, because he took our nature with all its natural properties: for whatsoever is not contrary to God as Creator, neither is it contrary to him as Redeemer; and nothing of that which comes immediately from the hand of God alone is unworthy of Jesus Christ.

So this Jesuit destroys with one dash of his Pen Original sin, the Incarnation and Grace of Jesus Christ. But he doth it no less openly when he saith a little before, that (1) *man created in the estate of pure nature, that is to say, simply without sin, had been able to satisfy simply and in rigour of Justice for venial sins,* by

1 Pôtuisset homo in pura natura condignè pro suis venialibus satis facere. *Amicus ibid. n. 249. p. 52.*

1 Et quidem perfectius quam nunc.

one act of natural love, (1) *and that he had done it more perfectly then now.* To make his comparison hold, he must presuppose that a man may at present satisfie fully and in rigour of justice for venial sins without grace, as he saith he might have done in the estate of pure nature, in which he had had no grace, or else he ought to pretend that in this estate of pure nature a man might have been able to satisfie God more perfectly without the help of grace, then he can at present with grace; which is not only false and erroneous, but also extravagant.

2 Potuisset Deus conferre gratiam & gloriam hominibus dependentibus ab actionibus honestis virtutum naturalium, qui nullum ex se connexionem habent cum gratia & gloria ordinis supernaturalis.

He dishonours it also when he saith, that (2) *God might give grace and glory unto men, because of the honest actions of natural vertues, though they had not of themselves any relation to grace or glory, which are of a supernatural order.* That is to say, that God could save men by actions purely natural: and so that man could deliver himself from sin and misery, without having need of Jesus Christ, and that by consequence his labours and death were superfluous and exacted from him without any necessity. And as S. Paul saith, that if Justification might have been by the Law, Jesus Christ had dyed in vain; we may also say, that if man might be justified and made happy without Jesus Christ, and have grace and glory by his own powers, and by natural actions and vertues, Jesus Christ hath dyed in vain.

Amicus de Incar. disp. 13. n. 6. p. 201.

He declares yet more openly his thoughts upon this Point in the Treatise which he made of Merit, where speaking of the Pagans morally honest actions, he maintains that they were pleasing unto God, and true dispositions unto faith; (1) *The*

1 Nam est difficultas de hujusmodi operibus factis à gentili sine ulla fide tam actuali quam habituali, nihilominus juxta ea quæ supra diximus dicendum est ejusmodi opera à gentili facta placere Deo tanquam dispositiones remotas ad fidem.

Amicus tom. 3. disp. 35. sect. 4. n. 107. (1) *The difficulty is greater, saith he, when these actions are done by a Pagan, who hath neither actual nor habitual faith; yet we must answer, according to what I have said already, that these actions done by a Gentile are pleasing unto God, in that they are remote dispositions unto faith.* He is not content to say that these natural actions of Heathens are remote dispositions unto faith, but he affirms that they may also be the next dispositions unto Justification. (2) *Not only good actions which proceed from actual or habitual faith are pleasing unto God; but those also which suppose, and serve for near or remote dispositions for receiving the same faith, and consequently of justifying grace, as the actions of Pagans of which he speaks.*

2 Non enim solum Deo placent opera bona quæ ex fide sive actuali, sive habituali procedunt; sed etiam quæ proximè vel remotè ad eandem fidem disponunt, eaq; mediante, ad justificationem. *Ibid.*

3 Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. Hebr. 11. v. 6. 4 Cæterum Paulus vel intelligitur de complacentia affectu qui fundatur in merito de condigno: vel cum negat sine fide aliquid placere Deo, intelligit de fide, non tantum per modum principii, sed etiam per modum termini. *Ibid.*

He expounds himself yet more clearly on that passage of S. Paul: (3) *Without faith it is impossible to please God.* For seeing that he evidently condemns his opinion, he evades it by expounding it in this manner: (4) *We must extend these words of S. Paul unto that complacency which is founded on perfect merit, which we call commonly of condignity: or else when he saith, that no action can please God without faith, he understandeth not only that faith which is the principle of this action, but also of that which is its term or effect.*

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And because these expressions, *per modum principii, & per modum termini* are not common, he expounds them in the sequel, applying them unto his subject:

1 Bona autem opera fidei præcedentia, licet nequeant placere Deo tanquam procedentia ex fide, quam nondum in subiecto supponunt; placent tamen ei ut dispositiones proximæ, vel saltem remotæ ad fidem consequendam. *Ibid.*

(1) *Though good works which go before faith cannot please God, as arising from faith which as yet is not in him that doth them, yet they please him as the next dispositions, or the remote at least for obtaining faith.* He then openly declares that the moral and natural actions of Heathens and of Infidels may be the next dispositions unto Faith and Justification; that is to say, that a sinner may be justified or disposed unto Justification by actions purely natural. *Escobar* saith it also

openly when he puts that amongst probable opinions which holds, (2) *That it is sufficient for Baptism that attrition be natural and conceived by the powers of nature*; that is to say, that we may be saved without actual grace, and that contrary to the formal words of the Gospel, *we may come unto Jesus Christ without the Fathers drawing us*. According to these Authors such actions are pleasing unto God, though they proceed not from faith as their principle, because they end in faith as their effect, and it sufficeth that good works be joyned unto faith in one of these two sorts, to make good this passage of *S. Paul*, (3) *That it is impossible to please God without faith*.

2 Sufficit ut naturalis sit, seu viribus natura concepta. Escobar. tom. 1. lib. 11. Problem. 80.

3 Sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. Hebr. 11. v. 6;

The Pelagians and Semipelagians have never said more, and they have not declared it so openly, being content that the natural motions of the Will should be only remote dispositions, or conditions for obtaining faith, though moral and natural works had not also the same priviledge; which notwithstanding this Jesuit doth attribute unto them, and even the quality of the next dispositions also. Which is to grant the Pelagians more then they even demanded, and to make the Grace of Jesus Christ unprofitable and superfluous, overturning the Scriptures, and declaring that mans nature is sound and without sin, and to have no need of Physitian nor Redeemer, since it may by it self and by its natural actions have the Grace and the Faith by which men are saved.

Though the Jesuits dishonour Jesus Christ sufficiently in fighting in this manner against his Grace by which he saves men, they dishonour him yet incomparably more in himself and in his person, in taking from him all the qualities which constitute him a Saviour, and attributing unto him others quite contrary, so as to make him capable of sin, as we shall see presently.

ARTICLE II.

That Jesus Christ might have sinned, might have been subject unto vices, might have fallen into error and folly, according to the Jesuits Divinity.

JESUS Christ being God and Man both together by an ineffable Union of the Divine Nature with the humane in the person of the Word; as man he is reasonable; as God he is Reason it self, and by his personal propriety he is uncreated and eternal Wisdom; and so we can find nothing more unworthy and remote from him then folly, by reason of the particular opposition it hath to humane and divine nature, and to the person of the eternal Word, which make Jesus Christ God and Man. *Amicus* forbears not to say, that the Son of God might have taken the nature of man in an estate of folly, or have suffered it to fall into folly after he had assumed it.

He propounds the question: (1) *Whether the Son of God could have taken on him the nature of man without wit, or have suffered it after he had taken it to fall into folly?* He at first reports some reasons to prove the opinion which holds, that this cannot be done; but afterwards he declares his own judgment, which is, (2) *That the opinion which holds it possible is not only probable, but altogether true according unto him*. And he builds upon this Reason, (3) *That the Word might take humane nature destitute of all outward sense*. In which case it would also be deprived of all use of reason, which as he proves by *Aristotle* depends on Phantastic, and on outward and inward senses.

1 An Verbum potuerit naturam humanam de mentem assumere, vel in ea assumpta amentiam permittere? *Amicus tom. 6. disp. 24. sect. 4. n. 128. p. 361.*

2 *Affirmans tamen pars non modò probabilior, sed omnino vera est mihi. Ibid. n. 129.* 3. *Quia Verbum potest assumere naturam humanam spoliatam omni sensu externo. Ibid. n. 130.*

This Reason is not very worthy of a Jesuit who should be concerned in the Grandeurs of Jesus Christ, as in those of his own Society who have taken their name from his. But this is not much to honour Jesus Christ, to take sense from him that they may also take reason from him, and to debase him below the beasts, that so they might set him below the most inferior of men, who had no

more reason than was necessary to make him not to be a beast.

1 Ergo non est cur ex hoc capite repugnet Verbum amentem naturam assumere, aut attentionem in natura jam assumpta admittere: sicut non solum potest assumere naturam omni sensu externo privatam, sed etiam talem sensum privationem in assumpta jam natura admittere. *Ibid.*

n. 130.

2 De secunda non est dubium quin poterit esse in Christo. Nam sicut potuit Verbum assumere naturam irrationalem incapacem omnis scientiæ; ita & rationalem omni scientia spoliatam, tam actuali quam habituali. *Amicus tom 6 disp. 24. sect. 4 n. 114. p. 359.*

3 Tantum de prima est controversia. Prima sententia affirmans potuisse de potentia absoluta talem errorem esse in Christo—est Vasquez disput. 60. &c. *Ibid.*

And, building upon this Principle, he concludes in the process of his Discourse, (1) *That there is nothing this way that can hinder the Word from taking the nature of a fool, or after he hath taken our nature to suffer it to fall into folly, as he cannot only take a nature deprived of all outward senses: but also suffer it to fall into this privation after he hath assumed it.* He is not content only to say, that the eternal Word might suffer under folly; but he saith also, that he might have assumed it voluntarily, as he assumed humane nature. That is, that this proposition, the impiety and blasphemy whereof is horrible only to be thought, might have been true: God is a fool, and that with a voluntary folly, which is accounted the worst of all.

He ought to have considered, that folly is a disorder of the body and the Soul, and of the highest part of the Soul, which is Reason, and that all disorder is inconsistent with the Wisdom of God, as well as sin is inconsistent with it, because it is a voluntary disorder and a true folly according to Scripture: and if the reason of Jesus Christ had been disorderly, it is manifest that his Will might have been so too; and that as his Will could not be so by sin, which is the folly of the Will, neither could his reason be so by folly, which is, as we may say, the sin of the Understanding, as some Philosophers esteem.

Errour is yet a greater evil than folly, because folly takes away reason, but error is the cause it is ill used. Now it were better to be wholly deprived of any thing, then to abuse it; as it were better not to have wit, then to abuse it in deceiving; not to have it strength, then to abuse it in committing violences and murders; and yet *Amicus* forbears not to maintain with others, that Jesus Christ was capable of erring, and that he might erre in deed.

For the explication of this opinion, he distinguisheth two sorts of errors, whereof one respects the things we are obliged to know, and which he calls *Error pravæ dispositionis*, because it includes a wicked disposition, from whence it proceeds as from its cause: the other respects such things as we are not obliged to know, which consists in a simple privation of knowledge; *error simplicis negationis*. He saith (2) *of this second sort of error, that there is no doubt but it might be in Jesus Christ. For as the Word might have taken the nature of a beast incapable of all sort of rational wisdom and knowledge, so it might in like manner have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all wisdom and knowledge, as well actual as habitual.*

He is not content only to maintain a proposition so strange and impious; but he would also have it pass as undubitable, as if it were not lawful only to doubt of it, *non est dubium*. But behold his blindness! we need only consider what he saith of the other species of error, which consists in being ignorant of that which is our duty, or to have an apprehension of it contrary unto truth. He dares not absolutely affirm, that this sort of error might have been in Jesus Christ; he contents himself to relate the opinion of *Vasquez* and some others (3) *Who hold, saith he, that this sort of error might have been absolutely in Jesus Christ; and this opinion is that of Vasquez.*

Certainly he doth great wrong to doubt of this sort of error, after he had said, that we may not doubt of the other. For if it be certain, as he pretends, that the eternal Word might have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all kind of knowledge and wisdom actual and habitual, it follows manifestly that he might have taken it destitute of all that knowledge of things which every reasonable nature is obliged to know, as of the knowledge of God and of the first principle of Reason; since this sort of error is necessarily contained in the other.

Which follows also clearly from the other opinion of the same Jesuit, that Jesus Christ might have taken on him the nature of a fool. For folly is not only an ignorance of principal duties, but of all truths also, according to the very definition of the Philosophers who say, that it is a general blindness of mind in all things, *mentis ad omnia cæcitas*. So that if Jesus Christ might have been a fool in humane nature, he might have been generally ignorant of all the duties of humane and reasonable Nature, and of all the principles of Reason. And *Amicus* shew himself as weak a Logician as Christian, in doubting of this last Article,

after he had said, that we might not doubt of that general Maxime, whereunto it is inseparably and visibly annexed.

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One of the Reasons of the Jesuits who teach that Jesus Christ was capable of that error which hath respect unto his duty, which they call an Error of a depraved disposition, *error prave dispositionis*, and which is not only a simple ignorance and simple privation of light, but an opposition to the truth, and an apprehension contrary to its Rules and Laws; is, That Jesus Christ might according to them have taken the nature of an Ass, as they express it in these very words: (1) *The Word might have taken upon him the sottish and blockish disposition of the nature of an Ass; and by consequent he might have taken the error of humane nature.* Which can serve for no other thing then to make this opinion more incredible: whether we regard the impiety of these strange words: *Potuit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturæ asinæ*; or we regard the consequence which is ridiculous: *Ergo & errorem naturæ humanæ.* For the blockish disposition of an Ass is not an ignorance of his duty, because it hinders not an Ass to know and perceive all that which he ought to know and perceive according to his nature, and much less is it an apprehension opposed unto truth, which the nature of an Ass is incapable to know. And so though it were true that Jesus Christ might have been united to the nature of an Ass, it would not have followed, that he might have been united to a reasonable nature engaged in error, and in error contrary to his duty.

1 Foruit
Verbum assu-
mere stolidi-
tatem naturæ
asinæ: ergo
& errorem na-
turæ humanæ.
Amicus ib. n.
116.

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The second Reason of *Vasquez* related by *Amicus*, is, (2) *That it is no more repugnant to the divine Word to erre or to speak a thing false in it self by the nature which he hath assumed, then to be tormented and dye in the same nature.* I will not stay to examine this Reasoning, nor to tell what the difference is betwixt dying and erring or speaking falsehood, to make appear that the one is unworthy and impossible in regard of Jesus Christ, and not the other. I shall do no other thing but briefly represent, according to my design, what these Jesuits say.

2 Non ma-
gis repugnat
Verbo per na-
turam assum-
ptam errare &
falsum mate-
rialiter dicere,
quam in ea-
dem assumpta
natura crucia-
ri & mori. Igi-
tur si poruit in
natura assi-
mpta cruciari &
mori, posset
per eandem
errare & fal-
sum materialiter
dicere.
Ibid. n. 116.

Vasquez saith, that as Jesus Christ might suffer and dye, so he might likewise erre and speak false, even in the things he was obliged to know, and which appertained, as *Amicus* expounds himself, to his condition and duty. This is to say plainly enough, that Jesus Christ might sin, not only in his humane nature, but in his God-head it self. For though a man may sometimes erre and speak false through ignorance, this ignorance excuses him not in things which he is obliged to know, since it is of these that the Gospel saith, that the servant who knows not his Masters will shall not go without punishment, though he shall not be so rigorously punished as he who hath known and neglected to do it. Now these Jesuits say, that Jesus Christ might have erred and spoke falsely in the things which appertained to his duty, and which he was obliged to know, and by consequence according to them he might have sinned and deserved chastisement according to the Scripture.

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But though it were so, that Jesus Christ as man and in his humanity might erre and speak false without sin in some thing which he was not obliged to know, this could not be said of his God-head which knows all things, and which ought to know all things; and so could not be exempt from sin, if it erred or spoke false by the humanity of Jesus Christ, since all the words, thoughts, and actions of this humanity are truly and properly the actions of the Divinity and of the Word who produces them by it as by its instrument, according to the Fathers. So that if the humanity of Jesus Christ could erre, it would be the Word that should erre, and should be the Author of this error and falsehood, and should truly sin speaking against his light and lying voluntarily: which the Jesuits would not be much troubled to consent to according to their Principles, though it be a thing horrible to imagine only.

3 Major est
difficultas de
habitibus vi-
tiosis à tali na-
tura antea
contractis; an
illi perseve-
rare potuissent
in natura as-
sumpta? *Ibid.*
sect. 2. n. 42.

For in effect they maintain that Jesus Christ is capable of sin, as well as error, as also that he might have been subject unto vice. *Amicus* saith well, that the Word could not have assumed an humane nature that was in an estate of actual or habitual sin; but he adds (3) *That there is more difficulty in what concerns the vicious habitudes which this nature might have contracted before it was united to the Word; to wit, to know whether they might yet continue in it after its union with*

I Affirmat the Word. And to clear up this difficulty, he saith that, (1) Vasquez affirms that 20
 Vasquez disp. also, and that though he be of the same opinion with himself concerning the habitual
 61. cap. 6. qui, sin which the humanity might have contracted before that it was united unto the
 quamvis nobis. Word; yet he believes, that the Word in assuming this humane nature, might also
 cum sentiat Word; yet he believes, that the Word in assuming this humane nature, might also
 quoad peccat have assumed the vicious habits which had been found therein

antea contra- But I see not that it would be less dishonour to Jesus Christ, to hold him ca-
 ctum, quoad pable of vicious habits, then of actual or habitual sine. For vicious habits are
 habitus vero the springs of sin, and consequently contain in them a greater corruption then
 vitiosos, putat the sins themselves, and the sins are comprised in them, as in their spring and
 eos assumi po- principle; so that he who is capable of the one, is necessarily and infallibly ca-
 tuisse cum na- pable of the other.

Ibid. sect. 2. Thus the Jesuits do formally attribute sin unto Jesus Christ: also they de-
 n. 42. clare him capable thereof, when they demand, whether the humanity of Jesus
 2 Dico 1. Christ, being become a sinner, Jesus Christ cou'd have satisfied for that sin, ei-
 potuisset Ver- ther in the same humanity, or by laying that down, and assuming some other.
 bum in alia The propounding only of these questions is so strange and injurious to Jesus
 humanitate af- Christ, that it offends the faith and ears of the faithful. Amicus fails not to
 sumpta con- answer them as seriously as if they were very important, and of great edification.
 dignè satisfac- (2) I hold, saith he, that the Word taking another humane nature, might in rigour
 cere pro pec- of justice satisfy for the sin of the humanity he first took, and after laid down.
 cato prioris And a little lower, he saith that, In this case Jesus Christ could have satisfied in
 humanitatis à 20
 Verbo dimis- rigour of justice for the sin of his humanity.

sa? Amicus And as if these questions were much for the advantage and glory of Jesus
 tom. 6. disp. 6. Christ, before he speaks his apprehension upon them, he protests (3) That he
 sect. 5. n. 137. proceeds to handle the question in both the senses which he supposed; but that he
 In tali ca- doth it, that the vertue and efficacy of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ may appear
 su potuisset with more splendour. He believes then, that to make the satisfaction of Jesus
 Christus con- Christ more apparent, he ought to make him a sinner; and that to give more
 dignè pro pec- splendour to his vertue, he ought to engage him in crimes of his own, as if it
 cato suæ hu- had not been sufficiently great and illustrious by his infinite innocence
 manitatis sa- and purity.

tatisfacere. I will not speak at all of the blasphemous and impious suppositions which
 3 In utroq; they make on this subject, when they say, (4) That if by way of an impossible
 sensu propo- supposition it were granted, that Jesus Christ might have slain himself, this murder
 sita hypothesi and this crime would have been of the same order with the satisfaction of Jesus
 disputanda Christ. There is no need that I insist on these so abominable imaginations and
 est, ut vis & expressions, since that which they affirm of him absolutely is no less.

efficacia Chri- To prove that Jesus Christ might have sinned effectually, they say, that he
 sti satisfactio- might have had of himself and in himself an obligation to undergo the punish-
 nis eluceat. ment of sin. (5) Some new Doctors, saith Amicus, answer that the obligation to
 Ibid. n. 133. punishment, not only temporal but eternal, is not inconsistent with the nature assumed
 4 Occitio by the Word.

Christi ab ipso Obligation unto punishment is a propriety and necessary consequent of sin,
 Christo sibi and the obligation to eternal pain, the propriety and necessary consequent of
 per impossibile mortal sin. For it is impossible, that he who sins mortally, should not be ob-
 illata, tuisset lished to eternal punishment; and it is also impossible, that he should be obliged
 ejusdem ordi- to eternal punishment, who hath not sinned mortally: both the one and the
 nis cum satis- other being equally contrary to Justice, and by stronger reason to the Justice of
 factione Chri- God. Whence it comes, that they who say, that an obligation to eternal pu-
 sti. Ibid. n. 17. nishment might befall the humanity of Jesus Christ, suppose of necessity that this
 5 Respor- humanity hath sinned mortally, and that it may even be actually engaged in
 dent docti ali- mortal sin whilst united to the Word in Jesus Christ, it being impossible, that
 qui recentiores he to whom sin is remitted, should be lyable to eternal punishment, and that
 non repugnare God can punish him eternally to whom he is reconciled, and to whom he owes
 in natura af- eternal life, as he owes it to all the just, and much more to the Man-God who is
 sumpra rema- his eternal Son.

nere reatum This opinion is maintained by some Casuists, as saith Amicus, but it seems to
 pœnæ, non so- him very rude, and especially to Suarez, taking it generally, and in its whole
 lum tempora- extent.
 lis, sed etiam
 aternæ. Ibid.
 disp. 24 sect. 2.
 n. 56.

extent. For this cause, that he might sweeten and moderate it, he makes a distinction betwixt pain temporal and eternal, saying, that Jesus Christ might well be lyable to temporal punishment, but not unto eternal: (1) *Because, saith he, eternal punishment is necessarily remitted with the sin and the guilt.* Whence it follows, that if Jesus Christ were obliged to eternal punishment, he should be actually in mortal sin by the assertion of Suarez himself, who for this reason durst not say, that the Humanity of Jesus Christ could be obliged unto eternal punishment.

But he is at least constrained even by this same reason to affirm, that Jesus Christ might sin venially, since they hold, that he might be lyable on his own account unto temporal punishment, and that the obligation to temporal punishment cannot come but from venial sin, as the obligation unto eternal punishment cannot come but from mortal sin.

Which agrees well with that which Amicus saith, that Jesus Christ might absolutely sin (2) *by a physical and next power of sinning, which would not be incompatible with the union which the humanity of Jesus Christ had with the Word whereof he was partaker, if the repugnance came not from the decree of God.* And if you would know what he means by a physical power of sinning, *potentia physica peccandi*, he expoundeth it himself, saying, that it is (3) *that which proceeds from the internal principles which are simply necessary unto action; that is to say, unto sinning.* So that according to his opinion, Jesus Christ had in himself a power of sinning, and the internal principles necessary to sin, and if these principles had not their effect in him; that is to say, if Jesus Christ did not actually sin, it was not because there was any thing in him that was repugnant thereunto; *non repugnaret ratione unionis & sanctitatis à Verbo participatæ in humanitate.* But this came to pass purely and simply from the will and protection of God, and from his Decree which he had made not to permit Jesus Christ to fall into sin: *si non repugnaret defectu divini decreti.*

intrinsecis ad operandum simpliciter necessariis. *Ibid.*

In this manner Molina, Suarez, and some others expound the Impeccability of Jesus Christ, as Amicus saith, (4) *maintaining that the Impeccability of the humanity of Jesus Christ is the same with that of those who are confirmed in grace, which is not physical, but moral.* That is to say, that Jesus Christ was not properly impeccable, but by the grace and mercy of God, as the Saints might have been in this world as well as he, and are also now in Heaven by the same mercy. And by consequence that Jesus Christ was of himself capable to sin even as they, and that he had sinned effectually without the extraordinary succours and graces he received from God.

It is from this same Principle that Amicus saith with Vasquez and many others whom he nameth not, that it were no inconvenience to affirm, that this proposition is true: *The Word was capable of sin.* For making himself this objection: (5) *It cannot be said without contradiction, that the Word by the very communication of the properties of the two natures which are in Jesus Christ, should be naturally capable to sin.* Now this may be said, if a physical and natural power to sin may subsist in the humanity which the Word hath assumed. He answers to this objection, (6) *by denying the major, because there are many, and amongst them Vasquez, who hold, that it is no absurdity to say, that the Word by the mutual communication of the two natures, is capable of sinning.*

communicationem idiomatum physicè peccabile ab ipsa potentia physica peccandi, si ea posset cum humanitate unita Verbo manere. Ergo, &c. *Ibid.* n. 102. 6 Respondeo 1. negando majorem. Multi enim, inter quos Vasquez disp. 61. cap. ult. non reputant absurdum Verbum per communicationem idiomatum denominari peccabile. *Ibid.* n. 103.

1 Respondet Suarez dis. 33. sect. ult.

versus finem, concedendo de reatu poenæ temporalis, negando de reatu poenæ æternæ, quoniam poenæ æterna necessaria tollitur cum ipsa culpa. *Ibid.* n. 57.

2 Dico 4. potentia physica proxima peccandi, si non repugnaret defectu divini decreti, non repugnaret ratione unionis & sanctitatis Verbo participatæ in humanitate Christi. Amicus *ibid.* n. 43.

3 Quæ constituitur ex principiis intrinsecis ad operandum simpliciter necessariis. *Ibid.*

4 Qui docent impeccabilitatem humanitatis Christi fuisse eandem cum impeccabilitate quam habent confirmati in gratia, quæ non est physica, sed moralis. *Ibid.* n. 70. p. 352.

5 Objicies 4. implicat Verbum etiam per communicationem idiomatum denominari physicè peccabile. Denominaretur autem per

And by consequence we might say according to this Divinity, what is horrible and dreadful only to think, that the Word had or might have been mischievous and wicked, and that the Devil might have had him under his power as his

Captive and Slave, because the Devil is the Prince and Master of sinners according to Scripture.

There have been Hereticks that have maintained that Jesus Christ was not God; and others, that he was a man of the same nature as we; but there was never any that acknowledging that he was God and Man both at once, imagined that he was capable of sinning, and falling under the power of the Devil, as the Jesuits affirm and testifie, by attributing to him a next and natural power of sinning, of being in error, and even of that which proceeds from a wicked disposition and deordination, *error pravae dispositionis*: to retain and keep wicked habits; of being subject unto vices, of being obliged to temporal punishments, and even of eternal for his own sins, as we have now seen in their own proper words.

1. If Jesus Christ might have sinned, he could not have been the Saviour of men, nor delivered them from sin, because hereunto it was necessary that he should be himself incapable of sin, according to the Doctrine of the Church and of the holy Fathers.

2. If sin might have been in Jesus Christ, then sin is no more sin; because sin being no other wise sin then as it is against the will of God, if Jesus Christ, who is the Son of God, and God as well as his Father, could sin, sin would be voluntary unto him, not only according to his humanity which did or should commit it; but also in regard of his Divinity and divine person who should permit it, or take it unto him voluntarily in the Humanity which should be personally united unto him, as well as the other qualities and actions of this humanity which are proper to him, and appertain unto him in some sort more than unto the humanity it self.

3. But if God could will sin, or be partaker thereof by assuming it, or permitting it voluntarily in a nature which should be united unto him; God should be no more God, because he should be no longer the supream Truth, which is more inconsistent with sin, which is nothing else but error, injustice, and malice, then light is with darkness.

4. This is not the way to withdraw men from sin, to attribute it unto Jesus Christ. But to move them unto horror and detestation of so strange an opinion, it is sufficient to consider, that it tends to destroy both the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, and even his Divinity it self. For as in dying voluntarily in his humanity, he did put sin to death, and destroyed the Empire of the Devil, who was the Author of his death, because he suffered this death unjustly, being innocent, and having no sin at all; this opinion on the contrary attributing sin unto him, makes him dye at once both in his Humanity and Divinity, and subjects him to the power of the Devil to favour and revive sin.

CHAPTER II.

Of Repentance.

Repentance is a remorse and sorrow for offending God; and herein it is the proper and natural Remedy of Sin; since as it is committed by pleasure, so it must be blotted out by sorrow. This sorrow is a vertue which appertains to Religion; and it is also one part of the Sacrament of Penance so necessary and so considerable, that it hath given even its name thereunto. We separate not here these two considerations; and that we may treat more largely of Penance, we will consider it as a Sacrament: and because that in this quality, besides grief for sin, it contains also Confession, Absolution, and Satisfaction, we will treat here of every one of these by way of preoccupation of what should have been said in the Chapter of the Sacraments, distributing them into so many Articles.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE I. Of Sorrow for Sin.

That according to the Jesuits we may be justified by the Sacrament of Penance by a natural sorrow, and even without any true sorrow for sin.

The first step of a Soul that returns unto God, is the knowledge and remorse it hath for offending God: (1) *I will arise and go unto my father, and say unto him; Father, I have sinned against Heaven and before thy face,* saith this child after he had departed from the obedience and guidance of his father, when he began to resolve himself to return unto him. The Jesuits consent well unto this Catholick Truth; they do truly affirm, that we cannot absolutely obtain pardon of sins without acknowledging with sorrow that we have committed them; but when they would expound what sorrow this ought to be, they speak of it in such manner as destroys it in effect. For they are not content to say, that the least degree of sorrow is sufficient to blot out all the sins in the world; but they do also maintain, that this sorrow ought not of necessity to be supernatural; and some proceed so far as to say, that without any true sorrow for offending God, we may be reconciled unto him, by being only grieved that we have not the sorrow which we ought to have.

Fillinius demands, (2) *If there be any particular degree of sorrow necessary unto contrition?* And he answereth, (3) *That there is no certain particular degree which is necessary.* His reason is: (4) *Because that the Scriptures and holy Fathers allow remission of sins to him that is truly converted unto God, without limiting the degree. Whence it follows, that we ought not to limit it.*

God wills and demands oft in Scripture, that for obtaining pardon of sins, we should be converted unto him with all our hearts. Whence the holy Fathers have taken occasion to say, that we ought not to limit or bound the grief of a sinner who is converted, since it ought to be with all the affection of his heart, and that it cannot be too great nor equal the demerit and indignity of sin. And this Jesuit on the contrary saith, it must not be limited, because it cannot be too little, and that it is always great enough to blot out sin. See the conformity of his spirit with that of the holy Fathers and Scripture.

It seems that he would correct his error in the answer which he makes a little after to this question: (5) *Whether the sorrow of contrition ought in degree to surpass all other sorrow?* For he answers, (6) *Yes, as to appretiation at least.* But he doth only hide his error under the obscurity of his words, as will appear by the explication he gives himself to this word *Appretiation*. For he saith that, (7) *This appretiation or estimation proceeds not from any high degree of charity or love.* That is to say, that this sorrow needs not be great in it self, nor arise from any great charity; but it is said to be great by reason the cause of it is great, since it is God, or which is the same thing, because of the excellency of the Motive thereof; *propter excellentiam motivi*, or in more clear terms; because God who is the Object and Motive thereof is great, though it be in it self very weak and small, as is also the Charity from whence it proceeds.

And when he saith, that the sorrow for offending God ought to be *appretiatively* greater than all other grief which we can have for any temporal loss, he intends to say no other thing then that it ought to be greater in the thought and esteem of the sinner, in such manner that he judge and acknowledge that God is greater than all other things, and that by consequence the loss of God is more considerable than all other losses; though indeed this sorrow be much less and more feeble in his heart than that which he hath for other losses and evils. Whence he draws this consequence which clears up his thoughts yet more.

(8) *This is the reason why he may have more trouble and grief of mind for the loss of his father or of his son,* then for having offended God. For this hinders not but that he may believe, that God deserves to be more loved than a

1 Surgam & ibo ad patrem meum, & dicam ei: Pater, peccavi in cœlum & coram te. Luc. 5. 18.

2 Quarto non requiratur certa intentio ad contritionem? Tom. 1. tract. 6. cap. 9. n. 231.

3 Dico non requireretur certum gradum intentionis. Ibid. 234.

4 Tum quia Scripturæ & Sancti Patres conversioni in Deum promittunt remissionem peccati absque limitatione intentionis: ergo nec nos limitare debemus. Filli. mor. qq. 10. 1. tr. 6. c. 9. n. 234.

5 An contritio debet esse intentionis? Ibid. n. 237.

6 Respondeo & dico debere esse intentionis: sed non quoad appretiationem. Ibid. n. 237.

7 Dico ejusmodi appretiationis five existimationis non sumitur ex intentione gradualis charitatis vel dilectionis. Ibid.

8 Quare poterit dolere magis de morte parentis aut filii. Ib. n. 238.

1 Quia minima gratia est sufficiens ad remissionem omnium peccatorum; & ad minimam gratiam sufficiens minima contritio tanquam dispositio.

2 Quare an hic dolor debeat esse verus & realis? Respondet probabile esse dolorem existentium sufficere. Tr. 7. de Confess. cap. 6. n. 150

3 Num necessarius sit dolor supernaturalis? Sufficit naturalis, qui tamen supernaturalis existimetur. Escobar tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 39. p. 805.

4 Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in poenam illius malum temporale immisit,

father or a son ; and by consequence to be more resented when he is lost by sin, though in effect he have more affection for his father or for his son, and he be more moved by the loss of them than by offending God : and yet in this disposition, according to this Jesuit, he ceases not to be in a good estate, and to obtain the pardon of his sins, how great and in how great number soever they be, provided he have the least displeasure that he hath committed them : (1) Because, saith he, the least grace is sufficient for the remission of all sins, and the least contrition is a sufficient disposition for the least grace.

He demands also concerning the sorrow which is necessary to obtain pardon of sin in the Sacrament of Penance ; (2) Whether this sorrow ought to be true and real ; or it be sufficient we are perswaded that it is, though it be not at all ? His Answer is, That it is probable that it is sufficient that we believe it to be such. That is to say, that to obtain pardon of God in Penance, it is not necessary to have a true sorrow for offending him, so that we believe we have this sorrow.

Escobar also demands in the same matter, (3) If it be needful that sorrow be supernatural ? And he answers, That it suffices to be natural, so we believe it to be supernatural. As if a Creditor were obliged to discharge his Debtor, when he had given him Brass money for Gold, provided he imagined that he gave him good Gold.

He speaks yet more clearly upon this Point a little after, saying, (4) That if a man be touched with remorse for his sin, because God, to punish him for it, hath brought on him some temporal evil, this remorse is sufficient ; but if it have no respect unto God, it is not sufficient. It is clear that this grief is altogether natural, and common to good and bad, or rather proper unto them that love the world, who are so much more touched with regret and displeasure when God takes from them their temporal goods, as they love them more : whereas good men have little or no resentment thereof, because they love them not, if their vertue be solid ; as appears by the Example of Job and many others. So that this grief comes properly from the love of the world, and the adherence we have to the goods of this world : and yet according to the opinion of Hurtado the Jesuit reported by Escobar, it is sufficient to blot out sins, though it be it self a disorder and a sin.

sufficit ; si autem doleat sine ullo respectu ad Deum, non sufficit. Ibid. c. 7. n. 91. p. 813.

5 Qui peccatum detestatur propter poenam, plus actu detestatur poenam quam culpam, cum poena sit ratio detestandi culpam. Amicus tom 8. disp. 3. sect 1. n. 5

6 Negotij huiusmodi actum non esse honestum, quia non tenemur semper actu plus detestari culpam quam poenam. Ibid.

7 Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in poenam illius malum temporale immisit, sufficit.

But if any object unto him what Amicus doth to himself ; (5) That he who detesteth sin because of punishment, doth indeed detest the punishment more than the sin, the punishment being the motive and reason that incites him to detest the sin : which is to love himself more than God, and to prefer his own interest before the honour of God, since he is touched more by the loss which he makes, or the temporal punishment that he suffers, than the sin which displeaseth and dishonoureth God ; He will answer without doubt as the same Amicus, (6) That he cannot agree that this act is not good and honest ; and he will serve himself of this reason : That we are not always obliged to detest actually the fault more than the punishment. From whence he will conclude, as he hath done already, (7) That if a man be touched with remorse for his sin, because God, to punish him for it, hath brought on him some temporal evil, this remorse suffices to blot out his sin, if it be true, as the same Amicus pretends, that we are not always obliged to do otherwise ; and this sorrow be good, honest, and regular.

This being so, we must say, that the world is at this day filled with persons of great vertue and true Penitents ; since amongst so frequent and common miseries, there are hardly any that are not afflicted with loss of their goods, their happiness and their repose, and who will not easily confess, that their sins are the cause. So that according to the Rule of these Jesuits, the most covetous, most ambitious, and most voluptuous will be the greatest Penitents, because they are more touched with regret than others for the loss of their goods, and for having deserved it by their sins.

Escobar might well have seen these consequences from his and his Master Hurtado's opinion, since they are so evident, but they have not startled him, for with-

cut standing upon them at all, he insists only upon one Rule of Suarez, whom he affirms to be of the contrary opinion, and to reject his; (1) *Because it would follow thence that the sinner might dispose himself to receive the Sacrament and the benefit of the Sacrament by the powers of nature only.* But he confesses he makes no great account of this reason. For he answers only in saying with *Hurtado*, (2) *That if the sinner grieve for his sin without any regard of God, it is not sufficient.* That is to say, provided the sinner have some thought of God, and regard him in some manner as the Author of his punishment which he is apprehensive of; that grief he hath for offending him will thereupon immediately become supernatural, and a sufficient disposition to blot out his sin.

But if this be true, not only persons that are most addicted to the world; but also Devils and damned Spirits will always be in a disposition to be converted. For in their greatest pains, as they are troubled to endure them, so are they also for having offended God; not because their sin is displeasing unto God, but because it is the cause of their torments. So that knowing that it is God who torments them, but that it is sin only that makes way for him to torment them; they hate not sin otherwise then as they hate God, and they have the same aversion for them both, as being the intire and total cause of their punishment, which is the principal motive of their grief. Such is the displeasure of those of whom *Escobar* speaks, who are troubled that they have offended God because of the punishments he sends them for their sins; and yet he pretends that this displeasure is sufficient to justify a sinner in the Sacrament of Penance.

Filiarius also demands particularly, (3) *If this true sorrow ought also to be supernatural, or whether indeed it be enough that it be natural, that the Sacrament may be effectual?* He relates after his use two contrary opinions, of which the one saith, that this sorrow ought of necessity to be supernatural; and the other maintains, that it suffices that it be natural. He concludes for the latter, saying,

(4) *That it appears to him more probable.* One of his reasons is, that if it were necessary to have supernatural sorrow for the obtaining pardon of sin, it would so fall out, that many confessions at this day would be void, for want of this sorrow, and which for that cause ought to be repeated: which would be troublesome to Confessors, and the Penitents are not to be obliged hereunto, if the obligation be not indubitable and evident.

But though a person were assured that his grief is purely natural, yet he holds that the Sacrament would not cease to be valid, though it were useless and ineffectual to him: (5) *For this grief, saith he, is not that which Jesus Christ hath instituted as a necessary disposition to receive the fruit of the Sacrament, according to the Council of Trent, though it be sufficient for the essence of the Sacrament: Because Jesus Christ would not so rigorously oblige us to reiterate the Confession, when that which is essential unto the judgment which the Priest is obliged to exercise may be found therein, as it is found in effect when the Confession is entire and the sorrow true, though it be only natural.*

positionem ad fructum, ex Tridentino. Est tamen sufficiens ad valorem Sacramenti, quia Christus noluit obligare ut tam rigide tenetetur ad iterationem, quando adsunt necessaria essentialia iudicio: adsunt autem omnia cum est integer & verus dolor. *Ibid. n. 154. p. 186.*

So the Sacrament of Penance shall not be only altogether humane, being composed of parts all natural, as are confession and sorrow: but we may also fulfil the Command which Jesus Christ hath given us to receive the Sacrament of Penance by actions meerly humane, yea, and unprofitable, since they make the Sacrament without effect, and disordered since they prophane it; for it is certain, that he who knows his sorrow for his sins is only natural, as this Jesuit supposes, and who confesseth them by a motion meerly humane and natural, transgresses the institution of Jesus Christ, as the same Jesuit himself acknowledges, and sins in prophaning the Sacrament, and rendring it unprofitable. So that he shall be acquitted of the obligation of receiving the Sacrament by a voluntary impenitence, and by the prophanation of the Sacrament of Penance. And by consequence the Commandments of Jesus Christ as well as of the Church

1 Quia aliàs sequeretur peccatorem posse se disponere ad Sacramentum & illum affectum, ex solis naturæ viribus. *Ibid.*

2 Si auctem doleat sine ullo respectu ad Deum, non sufficit. *Ibid.*

3 Quæro autem dolor hic verus debeat esse supernaturalis; an vero sufficiat naturalis ad valorem Sacramenti. *Filiarius. mor. qq. t. 1. tr. 7. c. 6. n. 153. p. 185.*

4 Dico 2. probabiliorẽm videri secundam sententiam. *Ibid. n. 154. p. 185.*

Quia mihi non constat de obligatione evidentẽ, non sunt homines obligandi ad iterandas confessiones. *Ibid.*

5 Non enim pertingit ad eum gradum quem Christus instituit ut necessariam dis-

may be accomplished by Sacriledges according to the Jesuits, which they boldly affirm, as we shall see more at large in its place; but it is not for all that less horrible and incredible.

After he hath reduced sorrow for sin to an imaginary or meer natural being, he demands, (1) *Whether it be necessary that this sorrow be extended to all the sins that are confessed?* He answers presently, according to the common opinion, that grief as well as confession, ought to be extended to all sins. But he adds to temper this Answer, that if the Penitent be sorrowful only for some part of his sins, and do this purposely, or by an ignorance that is criminal and entirely unexcusable, and that knowing his own indisposition, he forbears not to persist therein voluntarily, the confession will be null. (2) *But if he be not guilty of this ignorance or inadvertence, or that he be not fallen into it but by some venial fault, or even mortal, but common and ordinary, the confession shall be valid.*

1 An requiritur ut dolor sit de omnibus peccatis confessis? *Ibid. n. 156.*
 Respondeo 1. requiri ut sit de omnibus.
 2 Si verò ignorantia vel inadvertentia sit inculpabilis, vel culpabilis venialiter tantum, aut etiam mortaliter, sed communi modo, erit valida. *Ibid. n. 157.*

If we consider *Baunys* discourses, he will seem at first to reject this Doctrine. For in his Treatise of Confession in his Sum, Chap. 42. pag. 674. After he had said in the entrance, (3) *That by the word Contrition, we understand one of the essential parts of the Sacrament, which in the propriety of its signification contains two things, remorse for sin, and a purpose to amend,* he declares in the following page, *That to the end this remorse may be such as it ought to be to make it an act of contrition; and by consequence an essential part of the Sacrament, as he said at first, It should incline him to the hatred of sin, not for any shame he hath for committing it, (as the Philosophers did heretofore) for this motive is temporal, and unprofitable to eternal life, as may be seen in Antiochus, 2 Maccab. chap. 9. nor yet for having lost his goods. For to be thus touched with resentments of what is past, is one sort of avarice, and very shameful avarice; not for having deserved by sinning the flames of Hell, this sorrow is servile, and though it be good, though it be religious and holy, it takes its original from self-love which edifies the City of Babylon, and not of God, as S. Augustine in 4. of the City of God, chap. 28. and therefore not compatible with this action whereof we now speak.* Which he confirms in his Chap. 45. pag. 193. saying, *that contrition respects properly his own interest, and the particular good of him that acts it.*

It may seem that he could not speak more strongly, nor more clearly against the Maxims of his Fraternity; but he will quickly return to them, and he hath testified already little constancy in this very passage, wherein he falls into a contradiction which manifestly destroys that which he seems to establish, and establisheth that which he seemeth to destroy.

For he declareth, *That the grief we have for deserving by sin the pains of Hell, is not only servile, but doth also take its original from self-love which edifies the City of Babylon, so that it comes not from God; as also it regards him not at all, because it regards properly private interest, and that of him who acts it.* Whence it follows evidently, that God hath not instituted it as an essential part of the Sacrament of Penance, it being impossible that that which comes not from God at all, and which respects not God at all, should be instituted by God to serve to compose a Sacrament: that what edifies the City of the Devil, should be proper to edifie the City of God, as the Sacraments do; and that what takes its rise from self-love, should give and produce the love of God and his grace, as the Sacraments produce it, according to all Catholicks. Which is so clear, that this Jesuit himself hath concluded, *That this sorrow is not compatible with this action whereof we speak; that is to say, with contrition or sorrow, which is an essential part of the Sacrament, according to his own words.*

But all this hinders not but that he saith at the same time in the same place, that this sort of grief which he so much debases and rejects as an instrument of the City of the Devil, is good, religious, and holy, without coming from God who is the Spring of all Holiness, all Goodness, and of all Religion; that it may be good, holy, and religious, taking its rise from self-love, which is the Spring of all sin and vices; and finally that it can be good, holy, and religious, edifying not the City of God, but Babylon, which is the City of the Devil, in which there is nothing but confusion, corruption, and impiety. But this is not yet enough for this

this good Jesuit, he will make a more ample reparation to the fear of the pains of Hell, after he hath so much dishonoured it. He declares in the same Chapter pag. 687. *That the grief which hath for its object the deserved pains of Hell is sufficient with the Sacrament for a mans justification.* He is not content to make it holy : but he makes it sanctifying and justifying, and even in the Sacrament ; which appertains not to many the most excellent and most perfect works. So that according to his Divinity, the fear of Hell, and the sorrow which proceeds from it, is one of the most marvellous and most prodigious things in Christianity, containing in it so many contrary qualities, whereof some debase it to the City of the Devil and to Hell, and the other elevate it unto Heaven, and give it one of the first ranks in the City of God, which is the Church ; some make it prophane, and others make it religious ; some make it impure and contagious ; and the others divine and sanctifying.

He proceeds yet farther on in favour of this sorrow which he hath represented in so monstrous a manner, saying, that even those who have it not, may receive grace in the Sacrament of Penance, provided only that they desire it, and that they are grieved that they have it not. Fourthly, saith he in the same Chapter, pag. 685. *To settle a Soul in peace, who apprehends that he hath not the contrition which is necessary to the expiation of his sins, he must be told that he may supply that by his will to have it, or by the remorse he hath for not possessing such as he desires to have, and such as he should have, perfectly to satisfy God.*

He hath taken this Maxime from *Emanuel Sa*, who saith, (1) *That the sorrow which we have for not having sorrow enough, is sufficient with the Sacrament ; as also dislike of sin with a resolution to avoid it for time to come, though this dislike come from the fear of punishment.*

Escobar follows him also in this Point, as he affirms, he asks, (2) *Whether sorrow for not having sorrow enough be sufficient with the Sacrament ?* He answers, (3) *Sa following Navarre, assures us that it is sufficient.*

Whence it follows, that the fear of the pains of Hell, and the grief which it produceth, is so priviledged and so powerful amongst the Jesuits, that though it arise from a corrupt fountain of self-love and the confusion of the Devils City, yet it cannot only purifie the greatest sinners, and conduct them to the City of God and to Heaven ; but that the wishing only and desire to have it, though indeed it be not had, hath the same efficacy, and produces the same effect ; not in a feeble and uncertain manner, but in the Sacrament of Penance, wherein the vertue of the blood of Jesus Christ operates with an advantage which is not to be found in the most holy exercises and best works.

He who grieves for his sins for fear of damnation, if he love not God, at the least he fears him : but he that hath not this grief neither, testifies that he hath neither love nor fear for him ; and yet he will have it, that in this estate he may be reconciled unto God: that is, that he may return unto God without any good motion, and come to him without making only the first step, since the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom and of a good life.

Bauny in the same place relates another opinion of some Casuists in these terms : (4) *If a man being at the point of death, endeavours to do what he can ; and having in his mind only an act of attrition present, he saith unto God these words : Lord, have mercy on me, with design to pacifie him, he shall be justified, God himself supplying the want of absolution.*

This is the true thought of Libertines and debauched persons, who are accustomed to say when they are pressed to be converted, and to think on death, that they need only one good *Peccavi* to obtain pardon for all their sins. It is true that *Bauny* saith, that he approves not this opinion, *Because it is founded only on the mercy of God, and not on any good or solid reason.* But it is enough to vent it into the world, that he proposeth it as being maintained by some Casuists ; since that he thereby testifies that it is probable, and may therefore be followed with a safe conscience, according to the Principles of the Divinity of his Society.

Father *Anthony Sirmond* hath been yet more bold. For he makes no bones to say, that attrition alone, when more cannot be done, sufficeth to deface all sins,

1 Dolor sufficiens est cum Sacramento dolere quod non satis doleas : itemque displicentia de peccato, cum proposito cavendi, etiam si displiceat ob timorem poenae. Sa verba contritio. n. 5.
2 Num sufficiens cum Sacramento dolere est, dolere quod non satis doleas ?
3 Sa ex Navarrio asserit sufficientem esse. Escobar tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 122. p. 819.

4 Quod si quis in articulo mortis conatur facere quod in se est, & nihil aliud occurat quam actus attritionis quo dicit : Domine miserere mei, cum animo placandi Deum, hic justificabitur supplente Deo absolutionis necessitatem.

be it at the point of death, or when the Sacrament is to be received or administered. *There are, saith he, who refer this to the extremity of life; He speaks of the obligation to exercise the love of God; whereunto is opposed the small appearance that so great a Commandment should be given us not to obey but so late. Neither am I of opinion to be perswaded, that upon every reception or administration of the Sacrament, that we ought of necessity excite in our selves that holy flame of love, to consume therein the sins of which we are guilty; attrition is thereto sufficient with some strong endeavour after contrition, or with confession when there is convenience for it.*

We must not dispute after this, whether attrition be sufficient to receive the Grace of the Sacrament of Penance. This Jesuit gives no place for this difficulty, pretending that attrition alone is sufficient to restore a man unto grace, provided only, *That he endeavour after contrition, or that he confess himself when he hath convenience.* So that for him who hath not this convenience being in mortal sin, he maintains that attrition is sufficient, and that he may himself all alone blot out his sins, be it at the point of death, or when he comes to receive some Sacrament. And that he may leave no cause to doubt of his opinion, nor of the vertue he ascribes to attrition, he saith, *That it alone is sufficient to take away sin.* For he establisheth, as it were, two ways to return from sin to grace; attrition alone with endeavour for contrition, and attrition with confession; giving, as it were, the choice unto the sinner of which he please. He will have it then that attrition alone without the help of contrition, will suffice to take away sin. He believes indeed that confession is good with attrition; but it is to him *that hath convenience for it.* He affirms also, that a strong endeavour after contrition is commendable; *but he is not of opinion to believe that we ought of necessity excite in our selves this holy flame of love, to consume therein the sin whereof we are guilty.* He confesses that this is the best expedient, the most safe and perfect; but he pretends that we may dispense with it, *and that attrition is sufficient thereto.*

It is remarkable that he speaks of attrition in the self same sense as Father *Banny*, though it be not entirely in the self same terms. For he speaks of attrition which ariseth from self-love, and which is without any love of God, as his words evidently testifie: *I am not of opinion to believe that we ought of necessity excite in our selves this holy flame of love, to consume therein the sin whereof we are guilty.* He excludes then the obligation and necessity of exciting in us the love of God to destroy mortal sin. So that when he saith, that attrition is sufficient, he intends that attrition which is without the love of God: the attrition and regret for offending God, which takes it rise from love of ones self, and not of God, as *Banny* saith.

Dicastillus extends also the effect of this attrition yet farther. For he saith, that this alone is sufficient to cause that one may suffer Martyrdom; that death and torments undergone, not through a Principle of Charity and Love of God; but only through fear, are capable to justifie and make everlastingly happy the greatest sinners. There is not then any remedy more universal than attrition, by the opinion of these Fathers; since, as we have now made appear, it hath so many different effects, Martyrdom it self not being excepted, which we hitherto believed to have been an effect of love, and that not of any sort neither, but strong and powerful; *majo rem charitatem.* We must not only say of this fear altogether earthly and servile, what the Scripture saith indeed of the most noble: *Initium sapientiae timor: Fear is the beginning of wisdom:* but we ought also to add; *Consummatio sapientiae timor: Fear is the compleating of wisdom;* since it causeth us to produce the most Heroick act of Christian Religion, and conducts us even into Glory; *ad conferendam gratiam & gloriam:* and contrary to what the Apostle saith; *When my body is in the midst of flames, if at the same time my heart be not inflamed with this heavenly fire of divine love, all these torments are unto me unprofitable: Si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habeam, mihi nihil prodest: If I give my body to be burnt, and have not charity, it profits me nothing.* This Jesuit would have it that death which the Philosophers call *terribilium terribilissimum,* sufficeth with attrition only; that is to say, by the motive of fear alone, and without any mixture of love,

it is capable to purge away all blemishes, and to bestow glory on the most criminal person of the whole world ; *ad conferendam gratiam & gloriam.*

THE SUM

Of the Doctrine of the Jesuits related in this Chapter, concerning the sorrow which is necessary to blot out sins in the Sacrament of Penance.

They hold that the least degree of sorrow is sufficient for it.

That it were better this grief were supernatural ; but if it be not, it is enough that we believe it is ; when we know that it is only natural, we are not for all that to be sufficiently disposed to receive the Sacrament of Penance, and to fulfil the command for receiving it, though we receive no fruit thereby.

That though it be true that we have no real remorse for sins, if we only think we have, we may obtain pardon and receive grace by confessing in this estate : That for greater assurance we ought always put forth a strong endeavour to excite this contrition ; but if we cannot bring our heart unto sorrow by any other way nor by other motive than that of the apprehension of the pains of Hell, or the loss of temporal goods ; the one or the other of these motives, though they respect only our own interest, and come not at all from God, but take their original from self-love which edifies the City of *Babylon*, is sufficient to dispose us for absolution and justification.

That if after we have done what we can, we see we have laboured in vain, and that we cannot draw from our hearts that sincere and necessary dislike of our sins, we must be sorry that we cannot have it, and say at least with our mouths, if we cannot say it with our hearts ; *Lord, I have sinned, have mercy on me ; Peccavi Domine, miserere mei* : that this suffices for a right receiving of the Sacraments, or even for to dye well without Sacraments, if we have not convenience to receive them, that God will do the rest, and supply the want of Priest and of absolution.

And finally, that this very fear sufficeth to conduct a Soul right into Heaven by the way of Martyrdom.

See here the Maxims of the Jesuits, according to which there is no need neither of the Grace of God, nor of the Spirit of God which is charity, nor of true sorrow for offending, nor even of the Sacrament of Penance it self to have remission of sins.

L'attrition est suffisante pour consommer le peché. Sirmond. Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in poenam illius malum temporale immisit, sufficit. Escob. Estre touché de ressentiment du peché pour avoir perdu ses biens, c'est une espece d'avarice & d'avarice tres-honteuse. Pour avoir en pechant mérité les flammes d'enfer, c'est crainte servile qui prend son origine de l'amour propre, qui edifie la cité de Babylone & non de Dieu, comme témoigne S. Augustin au 4. liv. de la Cité de Dieu chap. 28. Bauny. Et toutefois il ne laisse pas de dire en suite que cette même douleur, laquelle a pour son objet formel la peine méritée de l'enfer, suffit au Sacrement pour la justification de l'homme. Dolor sufficiens est cum Sacramento, dolere quod non satis doleas. Sa & Escob. Pour loger la paix dans une ame qui apprehende de n'avoir pas la contrition nécessaire à l'expiation de ses pechez, il luy faut dire qu'elle y peut suppléer par la volonté de l'avoir, & le regret de ne la pas posséder telle qu'elle en a desir. Bauny. Qui in articulo mortis conatur facere quod in se est, & nihil aliud sibi occurrit quam actus attritionis quo dicit : Domine miserere mei, cum animo placandi Deum, hic justificabitur, Deo supplente absolutionis necessitatem. Opinion rapportée par Bauny : il cite Victoria & Lessius. L'attrition avec effort pour la contrition, ou avec la confession qui en a la commodité, est suffisante pour consommer le peché dont nous serions coupables, soit avant la reception ou collation des Sacremens, soit à l'extremité de la vie. Le P. A. Sirmond.

Non requiritur certus gradus intentionis. *Filius.*

Minima gratia est sufficiens ad remissionem peccatorum ; & ad minimam gratiam sufficit minima attritio tanquam dispositio. *Filius.*

Sufficit dolor naturalis, qui tamen supernaturalis existimetur. *Filius. & Escob.*

An hic dolor debeat esse verus & realis, qui tamen sufficiens existimatus. *Respondeo & dico t. probabile esse dolorem existimatum sufficere. Filius.*

ARTICLE II. Of Confession and Accufation of Sins.

2040

That the Jesuits do destroy the integrity thereof.

THe sinner in Confession is as a sick Patient, who presents himself to the Priest as to his Physician, and discovers unto him his sickness, that he may appoint him the remedies which he shall judge necessary for the healing and Salvation of his Soul. For this cause he ought to be faithful, and make him see the bottom of his heart, not contenting himself only to tell him his sins piece-meal, and to specify as much as he can their number and their circumstances; but also by noting out to him the passions unto which he is subject, and the evil habits which have been the sources of these disorders. The Divinity of the Jesuits diverts men from acquitting themselves sincerely in this duty, and from fulfilling the integrity of confession in all points.

1. *Bunny* saith, *That if any one of ignorance and simplicity confess his faults only in gross, without determinately expressing any one in particular, there's no need to draw from his mouth the repetition of those faults, if it cannot conveniently be done, because [the Confessor] is pressed with Penitents that give him not leisure for it.* In his Sum, Chap. 40. pag. 650.

1 Interdum tamen si appareat magna hominis ruditas, confessarius contentus esse potest enarratione peccatorum à proxima confessione commissorum, præcedentium autem rudaliqua cognitione, præsertim si aliorum penitentium copia adfit. *Layman* l. 5. r. 6. c. 9. n. 4. p. 117.

Laym in proposes the same case; and though at first he propounds that this blockish person, who through ignorance accuseth himself only of his sins in general, is obliged to confess himself anew, if he comes to know the obligation he hath to declare them in particular; yet he maintains afterwards, (1) *That if the Confessor see that he is a man very ignorant, he may content himself to cause him tell those sins which he hath committed since his last confession, and to receive of him the imperfect and general knowledge of the time past, especially if he have many other Penitents.* 2047

The Confessor then, as often as he finds himself pressed with Penitents, must presently become a Prophet, to discover of himself the sins which are not declared to him but in general, and to prescribe the true remedies by a light extraordinary, and which comes immediately from God; or else he must deal with his Penitent at adventure, as a Physician that being not at leisure to consider his sick Patient, dispatches him in haste, and appoints him the first thing that comes in his mind; without having taken so much pains as to inform himself of the particularities of his sickness, because he hath many other Patients to visit, who will not suffer him to stay with this, and look to him more nearly; and in the mean time he would persuade him that he is cured, and that he may return to his ordinary employments.

Bunny proposes a second case like to the former. He demands, *What is fit to be said to them who in their youth have done many actions vicious in their own nature, which notwithstanding they believed not to be such? He answers, That they are not obliged to say one word of them when they apprehend and know their nature and conditions; and much less to repeat their past Confessions.* He seems to have a design to oppose himself to the word of the Prophet, who beseeches God not to remember the sins of his youth and of his ignorance, acknowledging them to be true sins, and that he ought to ask pardon for them of God, though he had committed them by ignorance: and this Jesuit on the contrary wills that they be not confess, nor pardon asked for them from God, as if they were innocent actions. 2048

2 *Qui confessus fuit peccatum quod nec ipse nec Confessarius sciebant esse mortale, vel certe de eo dubitabant. Postea—novit esse mortale, non tenetur iterum confiteri—quia ad sunt omnia necessaria ad substantiam Sacramenti, ad cuius valorem non requiritur quod Confessarius manifestè noverit peccatum esse mortale. Dicastillus* n. 353. & 354. d. 12. d. 10. r. 8. de Pœnit.

be be obliged to confess it anew? He resolves this case without fear, and faith, (1) That he is not obliged, because it is not necessary that the Confessor know the quality of the sin, whether it be mortal or venial. Ignorance amongst Jesuits is a most advantagious thing. If you know not that an action is not a sin, though in process of time you do learn to know it, you are not at all obliged to confess your self of it; and knowing that it is a sin, you know not of what nature it is, mortal or venial, you are in no wise obliged to declare it to a Priest.

It is in favour of this ignorance so advantagious and so profitable, (2) That he frees Penitents from examining their consciences, at the least so exactly, although it may well fall out, saith he, that by examining your self more exactly, you may discover some new sins, you are not thereunto obliged for all that. It were even to be wished for Penitents, that they had bad memories, that they might before God be discharged of their sins without the Sacrament of Confession. If you say to this Jesuit, that the Penitent may relieve his memory by setting down his sins in writing, he will answer you, that he is not obliged thereunto. If you add, that having of en cause to distrust his memory, he may go frequently to Confession, he will give you the same answer: and so it may oftentimes come to pass, that a Penitent of this sort covered with sins, may cast himself at the feet of a Priest as an innocent, without accusing himself of any crime, though he have indeed a Soul altogether polluted therewith, because he hath been so happy as to have a wretched memory.

Fillinius takes the thing yet higher, and proposes the question more generally. He asks, (3) Whether when ignorance is not absolutely voluntary, though it be criminal, the Confession continue to be valid, though it be out of form? His answer is, That it is probable. And he adds, that if the omission come only from this, that we are not prepared nor examined before we present our selves to Confession, it is not necessary to repeat what we have omitted; and the Confession is valid notwithstanding.

It is true that he saith after, that the contrary opinion is the safer; but he forbears not for all that to prop up this as much as he can by authorities & reasons, that he may make it more probable, and to give more liberty and more repose to the consciences of those that will follow him. He makes use of two considerable reasons.

The first is, That otherwise many Confessions must be refused. That is to say, that we are not to trouble our selves to remedy a mischief, because it is too great, and that if it were not so universal, it were good to oppose it, by obliging those who had forgot their sins to confess them the first time; but that this is not now necessary; though the forgetfulness or ignorance which is the cause of this omission of sins, and which causeth them to commit this sin, be malicious and criminal: licet ignorantia sit culpabilis mortaliter. In regard that this abuse is become so common, that the greater part of those who confess themselves, doing it without great resentment and without much preparation forget frequently one part of their sins; and so there would be too much trouble to the Confessors and Penitents to repeat their Confessions so ill made. This is that which he saith clearly in his second reason, with which he concludes in these terms. Wherefore if we were to follow the contrary opinion in practice, which obliges to repeat an imperfect Confession, this would make the burden of Confession too heavy.

2. They teach, that it is not always necessary to declare the circumstances which change the kind of the sin. Dicastillus brings for Example of this Doctrine a calumny. (4) It seems to me, saith he, that he who hath hurt his neighbour notoriously in his reputation by publishing falsities, and against all manner of justice, is not obliged to accuse himself to have published lyes; but it is sufficient to accuse himself to have unjustly taken away his reputation.

quod illius famam denigraret, teneatur circumstantiam mendacii explicare, vel sufficiat dicere, se injuste infamasse alterum? Videri potest hoc ultimum sufficere. Dicast. n. 172, d. 3. d. 9. tract. 8 de Penit.

1 Ex quo fit ut post diligentiam non teneatur quis, licet fortasse conjiciat fore ut tandem per prolixissimam aliquod aliud peccatum occurrat. Dicast. n. 869. d. 10. d. 9. n. 8. de Penit.

2 Quod autem non teneatur quis scribere, etiamsi lubricam habere memoriam, jam alibi diximus, præsertim d. 7. num. 244. Ibid.

3 An vero qui lubricam habet memoriam teneatur peccata scribere, verius puto non teneri.... Non obligatur quis ad utendum mediis quæ non sunt ordinaria & communia, unde inferunt quod etiamsi sit mortale periculum oblivionis, sicut non teneretur statim confiteri ne memoria peccatorum, ita nec illa scribere. Idem n. 244. d. 14. d. 6. n. 8. de Penit.

4 Utrum qui læsit alterum in fama graviter injustè dicendo falsum aliquid

1 Quamvis non explicitis circumstantiis aggravantibus, non possit Confessarius judicare de ea gravitate aut levitate. Et quamvis concedamus aliquando peccata mortalia ob circumstantias notabiliter aggravantes... gravius sauciare animum & periculosiora fieri. *Dicastill. num. 213. d. 3. d. 9. tract. 8. de Penitent.*

2 Certum planè circumstantias mutantem speciem necessariò exprimendas, cum addant novam malitiam moralem. Rogo an idem afferendum sit de circumstantiis notabiliter aggravantibus? *Affirmat Suarez 3 part. tom. 4. d. 22. sect. 3. Negativæ tamen sententiæ cum Vasquez 3 part. tom. 4. q. 91. d. 3. num. 3. Escobar in præmio exam. 2. num. 39. pag. 12. & 13.*

3 Commisi furtum mortale toties, non exprimendo furti quantitatem. *Ibid.*

3. (1) They hold also, that we are not obliged to relate in Confession the circumstances which aggravate the sin, though they agree that for this reason a Confessor cannot make a faithful judgment of the greatness of the crime, and that these kinds of circumstances make the most deep and dangerous wounds in the Soul. *Bauny* speaks thus in his *Sum*, Chap. 39 pag. 616. *It is not necessary in Confession to relate the said circumstance: it is sufficient in rigour to say unto the Confessor, that in the matter of theft he hath sinned mortally; taking such a sum as makes and constitutes this sin.* *Escobar* is also of the same opinion, he declares that it is also the opinion of the most famous *Casuits* of the Society, of whom he pretends to be only the Transcriber. (2) *It is altogether certain*, saith he, *that in confession those circumstances are necessarily to be expressed which change the kind of the sin; because they joyn there to a new moral wickedness.* He asks, *If the same thing must be affirmed of them which aggravate and augment it notably?* He answers, *That such is the opinion of Suarez.* But he holds the contrary with *Vasquez*. His reason is, because we are not obliged by the Precept of Confession but only to declare all mortal sins; which may be done without discovering these circumstances, though they make the sin notably greater. * So that according to him, whatsoever theft a man have committed, it suffices unto a good confession thereof to say: (3) *I have sinned so often in the matter of theft, without expressing the quantity of the theft.* I might here insist a little upon this, to represent how this *Maxime* destroys the integrity and sincerity of confession, and at the same time cherisheth theft, not obliging him who hath stoln ten thousand Crowns to accuse himself otherwise than he who hath stoln ten. But he that propounds this destroys it himself, teaching the quite contrary, and proving it by a solid reason in Chap. 5: of his *Sum*, pag. 68. where he saith, *That it sufficeth not the Penitent to acquit himself of his duty, to say to his Confessor, that he hath stoln in a notable quantity to offend mortally, if he do not rate and specifie unto him the sum, because he ought to know the estate of his Penitent; which he cannot easily do, if he unfold not to him the quantity of the theft.*

But if any would object unto this good Father this so manifest contradiction, he will believe that he is discharged thereof by saying that both the opinions are probable, because there are Authors for the one and for the other; and as we may follow both, so we may teach both.

4. They hold also, *That it is not necessary to the validity of the Sacrament, that the Penitent in his confession count the number of vicious desires, thoughts, and dishonest affections which he hath had and reiterated since the time that he was addicted thereunto*, Chap. 40. pag. 667. And fearing more to offend the sense and imagination than the conscience of those who have any fear of God, he addeth in Latine, *Sufficit dicere, toto mense, v. c. amavi Mariam; etiamsi possit numerus exprimi.* It sufficeth to say, for a whole month, for example, I loved *Mary*; though the number might be expressed. Which is so strange, that he dares not absolutely answer for this opinion, confessing that the practice hereof is dangerous. But he refers himself to *Lessius* and *Salas* who approve it, saith he, as probable; and by consequence he declares that it may be followed in practice, seeing he believes that we may follow every probable opinion in our practice; and so we may do that in conscience which he dare neither warrant, nor so much as express in French, for fear of offending chaste minds and ears.

4 Quamvis probabilissimum sit.... circumstantias

notabiliter aggravantes, quia mutant notabiliter iudicium Confessarii, esse in confessione aperiendas; tamen probabile etiam est.... fidelibus hanc necessitatem minimè imponendam, *Tambour. n. 111. sect. 18. cap. 1. lib. 2. meth. confess.*

not impose this necessity upon the faithful. And it is by means of this liberty of following the less probable opinions, that he saith, (1) *That he who denies the Articles of the Faith, or doubts of them voluntarily, is not obliged to specify the Article which he denies or doubts of; but that it is sufficient to accuse himself (2) of being fallen into Heresie: that neither is he obliged to discover whether it was before or since his Baptism; but it sufficeth to say, that he is fallen into Heresie. (3) A Blasphemer, to the same Father goes on, is not obliged to unfold the nature of his blasphemy, it is sufficient that he make known the number; and it is not needful to express whether it be against God, the Virgin, or the Saints. Neither is he obliged to unfold the customariness of it, how inveterate soever it be.*

He who takes pleasure in the sins which he hath committed, and (4) whereof he is confessed, saith Emanuel Sa, is not obliged to specify these sins, it is enough for him to accuse himself to have had complacency in his ancient crimes. And this definition was found so wicked, that by the report of Tambourin, in the Edition published at Rome of this Jesuits Works, this passage was cut off. (5) *You have wronged your singular benefactor; I see nothing that can oblige you to declare this circumstance which offends only against gratitude directly; so I believe, saith Tambourin. (6) He that sins mortally by desiring to abuse a woman whom he knows to be married, or to have made a vow of Virginity; who entertains himself with filthy thoughts, and takes pleasure in these dishonest entertainments, is not obliged to declare that this woman who hath been the object of his sin, was married or a Nun; it sufficeth that he accuse himself to have sinned against Chastity. These are Dicastillus words: Tambourin is of the same judgment: nec explicandum an cum nupta vel Moniali. (7) The same is to be said if this man be married. Hurtado assures us probably enough, that he is not obliged to discover this circumstance.*

phemiarum, nec explicare opus est fuisse contra Deum, vel beatam Virginem, vel Sanctos. *Idem n. 17. sect. 1. cap. 2. lib. 2. meth. confessionis.* 3 Qui ex inveterata consuetudine jurat, excusatur communiter a consuetudine confitenda. *Ibid. num. 23. sect. 3. lib. 2.* 4 Sa verbo Confessio, num. 16, qui declaraturus est de peccatis præteritis alias confessis, id solum oportet confiteatur, non autem exprimere quænam fuerint illa peccata. Verum id fuit in editione Romana delerum. *Idem num. 8. cap. 3. lib. 10. partis decalogi.* 5 Injuriam contra insignem tuum benefactorem, cum solum sint contra gratitudinem..... non apparet unde hæc sola afferre debeat diversitatem specificam quæ sit ex obligatione gravi subdenda confessariis. *Idem n. 13. sect. 2. cap. 6. lib. 2. meth. confess.* 6 Qui delectatur simplici actu de copula cum ea quam videt aut scit esse conjugatam, etiamsi positiva quadam repulsa non regeter rationem conjugatæ, sed circa illam abstractivè se habeat..... solum tunc malitiam contra castitatem contrahit, non vero malitiam adulterii. *Dicast. n. 630. d. 8. d. 9. tract. 8. de Pœnit.* 7 Conjugatus si morosè delectetur, non obstringi in confessione explicare se esse conjugatum affirmat Hurtado..... hæc Hurtado satis probabiliter. *Tamb. n. 4. sect. 1. cap. 7. lib. 2. meth. confess.*

If from simple complaisance, and thought only you pass on to execution, and you do commit Incest; (8) you are not bound to declare in what degree, whether it be with a Mother or a Cousin German.

The same is to be said (9) of a Whore; when she hath had commerce with a Priest, Profest, or Novice Jesuit.

(10) He that hath prepared poyson to rid him of his enemy, or who hath drawn upon him with a design to kill him, is not obliged to say: I have killed or poysoned my enemy; but it is sufficient that he say, I have prepared poyson for him, I have drawn upon him to kill him. *Secunda sententia probabilior refertur esse necessarium explicare effectum secutum.*

(11) *A son who robs his father, and hath taken from him a considerable sum, is not obliged to declare whom he robs; it is sufficient in general to accuse himself to have taken the goods of another.* As if this Wretch had offended against Justice only, and had not sinned against the respect which all Laws oblige him to render unto him from whom after God he holds all. (12) *It is not necessary at all, amongst the Jesuits, to know the quality or the greatness of the sinner, though it be even necessary to understand the quality or the greatness of the sin whereof he accuseth himself.* If a Prelate, if a Superior

voto obnoxius erat, peccasse. *Idem n. 31. sect. 5. c. 7. l. 2. meth. confess.* 10 *Dicast. n. 19. d. 1. d. 6. tr. 2. de Pœnit.* 11 Hinc est ut etiam quando tam gravis est materia, ut peccet erga patrem peccato furti, non teneatur id explicare in confessione, sed satis est si se accuset de furto gravi. *Idem n. 564. d. 8. d. 9. tr. 8. de Pœnit.* 12 Absolutè afferendum est non debere eam circumstantiam explicari. *Id. n. 378. d. 8. d. 9. tr. 8. de pœnit.*

of a Monastery, sin against Chastity, they are not obliged to make known their dignities. If a Governour of a Province, or a Magistrate established for hindring robberies, favour them, take part with them, or is the chief himself that pillages and robs the people; If a man who hath the charge to preserve publick goods, commit the crimes which he himself ought to repress; none of these persons ought to declare the obligation which is on them to hinder and punish these crimes, it is sufficient that they accuse themselves when they find themselves guilty of committing them in their own persons. *Dicaftikus* reason is pleasant.

1 Licet Gu-
bernator con-
stituatur ad
hoc ut impe-
diat furca, non
tamen ut im-
pediat sua, sic
ut fiscalis de-
bet ex munere
suo denunciare
delicta contra
bonum publi-
cum, non tamen
sua, sed
aliorum, & cu-
sios vineæ de-
bet manifesta-
re fures, non
tamen seip-
sum; quia hi
homines con-
stituuntur in
ordine ad alios
in officio con-
tinendos, non
in ordine ad
ipsummet
delicta impe-
dienda. Quæ
doctrina mihi
placet. *Ibid.*

(1) *A Magistrate*, saith he, or any other person intrusted for the publick safety, is indeed obliged by vertue of his Charge to hinder the evil which others might commit; but not that which he may do himself; *quæ doctrina mihi placet*. That is to say, that he who is established to see the Laws of the Church or of a Prince observed, and to punish those who violate them, may himself without being wanting to his Commission, or rather by vertue of his Commission, violate the very same Laws. (2) *Diana assures us that a Priest who hath smitten some Laick, so as to shed his blood, or kill him, is not obliged to declare his quality of a Priest.* *Diane* 2057 *adhæreo*, saith the same *Jesuit*.

But see here an Example which surpasseth all the rest, and which tends to hide from a Confessor the most enormous Sacriledges, without sparing the respect which all the faithful, and especially Priests, ought to have to the body and blood of Jesus Christ. (3) *If a Priest whilst he carries the holy Sacrament, calumniate and defame his neighbour, or rob him, and take from him his goods, it is not necessary that he declare this circumstance in Confession.* And see here his reason: *I see not herein*, saith he, *any great irreverence*; and in the meantime it had been great and criminal, if he had done the same thing in the Chamber of a King, or in his Presence, the King looking on, and certainly knowing his crimes.

Dicaftikus is not more respectful to this divine Sacrament, (4) *The irreverence and the sin of him who approacheth unworthily to the Eucharist, are so much greater*, saith *Vasquez*, *as his soul is charged with more enormous and greater number of mortal sins*; and nevertheless the same *Vasquez* teaches, that he is not obliged to declare in Confession the number of these crimes. And this Doctrine pleaseth me, adds *Dicaftikus*; *For it is enough to accuse himself that he did participate of the Eucharist, being in the state of mortal sin.*

7. 381. 2 *Utrum Sacerdos vel sacris initiatus percuciens aliquem Laicum, debeat explicare eam circumstantiam, quando saltem est percussio cum effusione sanguinis.* Negat *Diana* p. 2. t. 7. r. 8. etiamsi ad mortem sit percussio..... *Diana* adhæreo. *Idem* n. 382. *ibid.* 3 *Si Sacerdos portans sanctam Eucharistiam, intamaret, suraretur, tam gravem irreverentiam non video.* *Tambur. n. 42. sect. 5. c. 7. l. 2. meth. confess.* 4 *Observant Vasquez & communiter Doctores ed gravius esse peccatum suscipiendi indignè, quò quis pluribus & maioribus peccatis est irretitus. Non tamen putat Vasquez esse necessario explicandum in confessione an cum multis vel cum paucioribus quis accesserit. Quæ doctrina mihi placet. Sufficit enim si explicet se in statu peccati mortalis accessisse.* *Dicaft. n. 37. d. 2. d. 9. tract. 4. de Euch.*

For what concerns evil habits and relapses into the same sins, *Bauny* inquireth, whether frequent and ordinary relapses be circumstances whereof the Confessor ought to be instructed by the Penitent in his Confession? And after he had related the opinion of those who hold, that the Penitent is obliged to tell these circumstances, and that in such case it is expedient to defer the absolution; he answers, that nevertheless according to his apprehension, the contrary opinion, as being more conformable to reason, and favourable to the Penitent, ought to be held and followed in the practice, Chap. 59 pag. 621, 622 The reasons upon which he foundeth his resolution are considerable. The first is, that this is more agreeable to reason: as if humane reason, especially in an estate wherein it is corrupted by sin, were the Rule of a Christian who ought to live by faith. The second; that it is more favourable to the Penitent also: That is, that it is more favourable for entertaining his pride and his vanity, as he expounds it himself sufficiently. Afterwards he brings for his third reason; That a Penitent cannot inform his Confessor concerning his lapses proceeding from an inveterate habit, without manifesting unto him his past offences with shame for his weakness, and pronounces definitively, concluding in these terms: Therefore he is not bound.

But one part of Repentance consisting in the confusion which a Penitent resenteth for having offended God; this is not to be too favourable to him who hath a true design to do Penance, and to be converted, but to dispense as much as is possible with repentance, by delivering him from the pain and confusion which he might have had in discovering his weaknesses to his Confessor.

He saith the same thing in his Moral Divinity, save that writing in Latine, he talks also more freely and boldly. * For he is not content to say, that although frequent relapse into the same sins is a very notable circumstance; the Penitent is nevertheless not obliged to declare it, whether it come from an evil habit, or from the next occasions in which he is engaged; but he maintains also (1) *That a Confessor hath not so much as a right to interrogate the Penitent touching the custom of sinning, if he be not obliged thereto by some important reason, which happens seldom; that he hath not a right neither to put the Penitent to confusion, when he knows he is accustomed to commit some sin; but that he ought forthwith to absolve him if he put forth some act of sorrow for his sins past, with a resolution to amend.*

So that if a Confessor demand of some person who accuseth himself of some great sin, if he have formerly committed it; whether he have fallen therinto often, and whether his relapses come from the next occasions, or from the habit he hath of this sin; the Penitent according to *Banny* may elude all these interrogations: if he had not rather lye according to some others, or say openly that he is not obliged to answer to these Articles; and if his Confessor press him very sore thereto, he may say that he is grounded on a probable opinion; and his Confessor shall be obliged to rest satisfied therewith, and to give him absolution readily, according to the words of this Casuist; *debet eum statim absolvere.* How horrible is this Divinity!

And which is altogether admirable in the Doctrine of these Fathers, in the very same time that they say that the Penitent is not obliged to answer unto these Articles; (2) *Non tenetur ei dicere illam circumstantiam,* and that the Confessor cannot constrain him thereto; & *tunc non potest cogere illum Confessorius;* he assures us that the Confessor who is of contrary judgment to that of his Penitent, may examine him on these very Articles. *Respondetur posse Confessorium interrogare de iis circumstantiis.* The one then may interrogate, and the other may refuse to answer; the one hath a right to take cognizance of these Articles; and the other hath a right to refuse it him; the one in asking performs his office, and the other in being unwilling to answer, doth nothing against his duty: In a word, they are both in equal safety of conscience; the Penitent in disobeying his Confessor, who holds the place of a Father unto him and of God himself; and the Confessor in neglecting his Charge, and betraying his own conscience to follow that of a sinner whom he sees to be both in error and obstinacy.

sam habeat, raro accidit. Deinde non est in ejus jure afficere poenitentem dedecore cognita consuetudine; sed debet eum statim absolvere, si dolorem de peccatis concipit cum proposito futurae emendationis. Banny Theol. mor. p. 1. tract. 4. de poenit. q. 15. pag. 137. 2 Dicastillus n. 194. d. 3. d. 9. tr. 8. de poenit.

The end and principal care of these Fathers, as it appears by their discourse, is to excuse the Penitent as much as they can from punishment and shame; that is, to hinder him from repenting truly, which consists particularly in the punishment and confusion which he receive from his sin, for repairing the pleasure which he hath had, and the dishonour which he hath done to God in committing it.

It is also for this end, and upon this design, that *Dicastillus* furnisheth his Penitents with this new Method, to make Confession by dividing one and the same sin into many parts, and to accuse himself thereof at several times. (3) *He that hath made a vow to observe the Commandments of the Decalogue; may in the same Confession say apart, that he hath fallen into fornication; and a while after, not to have observed a vow which he made in a matter of consequence.* By this way the very great confusion which the Penitent might have by the enormity of his crime, is diminished.

se fornicatum fuisse, & subinde in decursu fateri se fregisse votum in re gravi. Dicast. n. 171. d. 2. d. 9. tract. 8. de poenit.

¹ Dubitatur 12. an circumstantia recidiva sit confitenda? Tenuerit poenitentem consuetudinem peccati confiteri si a confessario interrogatur. *Tamen Vasquez, Henriquez, &c. maxime si hæc oritur ex proxima peccandi occasione quam poenitens tenetur referare. Contrarium docet Saucius in selectis disput. 9. num. 6. Et hæc opinio priore videtur esse probabilior & sequenda in praxi, quia Confessorius jus non habet interrogandi poenitentem de consuetudine peccandi, nisi ejus rei gravem causam habeat.*

³ Qui fecit vorum v.g. servandi sextum decalogi præceptum, potest separatim in eadem confessione dicere

5. There is another case in which, according to these people, a Penitent may also retain and conceal his sins, to wit, *If he can reasonably apprehend that telling all to his Confessor without concealing any thing, his friends, or himself may at any time be concerned in their goods, their bodies, or their honour, I believe that in this case, saith Bauny in his Sum, Chap. 4. pag. 655. It would be lawful for him to suppress and conceal the offence, which being known of his Confessor, might cause unto the Penitent such effect as he imagines ought to follow the confession thereof. And a little after he gives the same liberty to him who fears that by declaring his sins, his Confessor will be made to use him hardly, to hate him therefore, to be offended at him, cause him to remove from the place where he dwells, or deprive him of some convenience he receives by him.*

This man shews himself here also very favourable to the Penitent; he is not contented to excuse him from the shame which he might have had in discovering all his faults and his weaknesses; he would not that for this he or any of his friends might one day, that is, at all be concerned in their goods, bodies, or honour. And if he can have but some reason to fear that this may fall out, or that his Confessor after the knowledge that he hath given him of his conscience and of his sins, will use him ill, and hate him, or be offended with him, that is to say, will use him with more severity, or ordain him to do something that may be displeasing to him, though it be for the Salvation of his Soul, or will remove him from the place where he dwelleth, because perhaps it is the next occasion of sin unto him, or will deprive him of some commodity that he may receive from him; in all these cases, and for all these reasons, it shall be lawful for him, according to the opinion of Bauny, to suppress and conceal the offence which known to the Confessor, might cause unto the Penitent the effects which he imagines ought to follow from his confession thereof, if he chuse not rather to satisfy the duty of his confession, and at the same time avoid all the inconveniences which may arrive upon the knowledge of his sin which he gives unto the Priest, by making use of *Dicastrillus's* expedient, (1) *And tell his sins in general without particularizing their kind, adding that he remembers not of what kind his sins were.* And all this he may say without any lye, making use of the Doctrine of mental Reservation. For it is true that he knows not the kind of his sin to declare it unto him upon this present occasion, and he will not declare it, and he believes that he hath a right not to do it, because he would not that the Confessor should know his estate and his bad disposition, to avoid correction, penance, and the confusion he might have sustained thereby. So that the pride and vanity of this man, give him a right to a twofold prophanation of the Sacrament of Penance, in concealing his sins voluntarily, and in covering this criminal silence and disguise with an affected and artificial lye.

It is easie to perceive that it sufficeth to imagine that some one of these effects may arise from confession, to have liberty to conceal sins from a Confessor, or not to discover them but very generally, the greatest sinners, and persons most addicted to the world, will always find some one of these reasons and pretences, to speak nothing but what they please in confession, and to suppress their most notable crimes.

My design obliges me only to represent these excesses; but if I had undertaken to refute them, and to make these good Fathers see their extravagancies, I should not desire to make use of other reason or authority against them, and especially against Bauny than his own. For speaking of the Confessor, and of the Cognizance which he ought to have of his Charge, and of the conscience of his Penitents, in Chap. 38. pag. 589. *Of a truth, saith he, as he holds the place of a Judge in this Sacrament, as saith the Council in the 14. Session and 9. Canon, he neither can nor ought pass sentence but upon that whereof he hath a full and entire cognizance.* And a little after making use also of the Authority of the Council, he adds: *In the Canon omnis utriusque sexus, he is called a Physician of Souls: if he know not their wounds, how can he heal them, and after the manner of a Physician, pour oyl into the wounds of the wounded? more medicorum superinfundere vulneribus sanciati.* Whence he draws this consequence of the Council and with the Council it self: *He ought therefore, saith the Council cited in the Chapter we last mentioned,*

1 Si dicat in genere aut specie non completa taceendo illam circumstantiam, sic ergo possit dicere se fecisse peccatum mortale, & fortasse dicere in tali genere, sed non recordari cujus speciei, quod verum est intelligendo de noticia quæ possit tunc deservire ad confitendum in ea occasione. *Dicastr. n. 180. d. 11. d. 9 tract. 8. de penit.*

tioned, *omnis utriusque sexus, diligenter enquire after the circumstances of every sinner and sinner, whereby he may understand what counsel to give, and what remedy to use, proving divers experiments to heal the sick; diligenter inquirere, & peccatoris circumstantias & peccati, quibus intelligat quale debeat ei præbere consilium, & cujusmodi remedium adhibere diversis experimentis utendo ad sanandum aegrotum.* And in the sequel from the express Authority and Reasoning of the Council, he concludes his discourse by way of an Interrogation. *In the ignorance of so many infirmities of the Soul, and remedies to be applyed for healing it, who can reasonably promise himself the happiness to be able to relieve the sick?*

If according to *Bauny*, the Confessor in quality of a Judge, whose place he holds in the Sacrament of Penance, neither can nor ought pass sentence but on what he hath full and entire cognizance of. If in the quality of a Physician of Souls, he cannot reasonably promise himself to relieve his Patient, that is his Penitent, nor to heal his wounds, if he know them not, if he know not his disposition, his infirmities, and the circumstances of his sins and of the estate wherein he is. It must needs be that when the same *Bauny* hath said, *That it is sufficient to confess sins in gross, without determining any one in particular, that it sufficeth in rigour to make the Confessor understand that one hath sinned mortally in the matter of theft, without declaring how much hath been stoll: That it is not needful to tell the number of vicious thoughts and dishonest affections, though he could do it if he list: That a Penitent may in Confession conceal his sins and his relapses which proceed from an inveterate habit, for fear of manifesting his past offences, with shame for his weaknesses: That he may suppress and silence the offence, which known by the Confessor, would cause the effects which he imagines might follow the confession thereof.* Since, I say, *Bauny* hath said all these things, it must needs be that according to the Principles which he hath established, or rather according to those of the Council which he hath alledged, he cannot pretend that the sinner confessing himself in this sort, can hope from the Confessor a remedy or relief for his wounds, or remission for his sins; and by consequence we must say, that he plays with confession and conscience; and that he teaches sinners and worldlings to commit Sacriledges instead of Confessions, and to deride the Confessor and God himself, whose place he holds.

Escobar is not content to say, as *Bauny*, that sins may be concealed in confession, he maintains also that it is no great sin to lye unto a Confessor when he examines the Penitent; see how he speaks: (1) *Is it a mortal sin to lye in confession? He answers; If the sin in question be only a venial sin, the lye is but venial.* He doth indeed say, that there are some who make a distinction, believing that if the sinner accuse himself but of one only venial sin which he hath not committed, he sins mortally. (2) *Because for that time there being no matter for absolution, it would be given in vain, and the Sacrament would be null.* But he adds, that there are who receive not this distinction: and the reason he brings for it, is: (3) *Because every lye which is made in the matter of a venial sin is a slight thing, and hurts little or not at all the judgment of the Confessor.*

1 Mentiri in confessione est peccatum mortale? Mendacium de peccato veniali veniale est. *Escobar* tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 107. pag. 816. 2 Quia tunc daretur absolutio sine ma-

teria, & Sacramentum nullum esset. 3 Quia omne mendacium de veniali est res levis, & parum lædit Confessoris iudicium. *Ibid.*

He testifies that it would be more difficult to exempt him from mortal sin, who should lye in a mortal sin; nevertheless he gives an expedient, and he relates some case in which he thinks it may be done. He asks, (4) *Is it necessary that a general confession be entire? He answers in these terms; It is not necessary so to be in regard of the sins which have been confessed before. A person, for example, saith unto a Confessor, that he hath a design to make a general confession; it is not needful for this purpose to tell all his mortal sins; for though he lye, this concerns not at all the Judgment the Confessor is to make thereof, because it is not of his Jurisdiction.*

4 An Confessio generalis integritatem requirat? Quoad peccata alias confessa non requirit. Dicit quis Confessario se velle cum ipso

confessionem generalem gerere; non ideo tenetur omnia mortalia exprimere. Quia quamvis mentiatum parum tamen refert ad Confessarii iudicium, cum ad ejus forum non pertineat. *Ibid.* p 818. n. 118.

1 Objicies confessionem debere esse integram de jure divino. Responderetur integritatem confessionis debere esse integritatem formalem, non materialem; nempe solum debere dici omnia quæ possunt explicari coram legitimo iudice absque causa quæ id excuset. *Di cast. n. 115. d. 7. d. 9. tr. 4. de confess.*

Dicastillus seems more nimble and subtle on this occasion than *Escobar*. For allowing the same liberty to Penitents, not to declare other than venial sins, or some part of the mortal sins they have committed, he maintains that confession ought always of necessity to be entire: see here how he intends it: Confession at that time, though imperfect and maimed, ceaseth not to have all requisite integrity, which exacts nothing but a declaration of the sins which may be discovered to the Priest who hears them, and not of those which you conceal from him upon some ground. So that a Penitent who accusing himself of some sins omits the rest, either because they have been confessed already, or because he remembers them no longer, that he may tell them to the Confessor, or because the cognizance of them is reserved to the Bishop, (1) ceases not to make an entire confession; not indeed as to an integrity which they call material; but as to a formal integrity, which alone is necessary for the Sacrament. That is to say, provided I perswade my self that I have some reason to hide my sins from the Priest, it is sufficient for me to make a good confession, to declare some unto him: and who is it that may not imagine that he hath some reason? See the Spirit of the Society, to allow God the names, and to give men the things: it is by this means that they agree Religion and the World, the obligations of Christianity with the lusts of men. So they furnish means to obey the orders of Jesus Christ, and at the same time to flatter the concupiscence of sinners, and to entertain them in the greatest crimes, by discharging them of that sincere confession which ought to be their true remedy.

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2 Mentiri circa materiam non necessariam, ut sunt peccata venialia, negando quod factum est, sic non est mortale. *Filliut. t. 1. mor. qq. tr. 7. cap. 4. num. 112. pag. 180.* 3 Mentiri in confessione de peccatis venialibus, aut de aliis confessis mortalibus, veniale tantum peccatum est, etiamsi ille antea proposuisset apud se vere confiteri. *Sa verb. Confessio. num. 12. pag. 88.*

Fillinius had before *Escobar* taught that which he saith of lyes made in confession about venial sin. (2) To lye, saith he, in a thing which is no necessary matter of confession, as are venial sins, in denying that which is done, is only a venial sin. *Emanuel Sa* is of the same opinion, and he maintains that the case is the same in mortal sins which have been confessed already. (3) To lye in confession, saith he, in matter of venial sins, or of mortal which have been already confessed, is but a venial sin, though the design were at first to confess them.

I might here relate also other expedients which the Jesuits give to surprize and deceive a Confessor; but I shall do it more commodiously in an express Chapter speaking of Penitents, and the advice necessary unto them for their confessing themselves aright. I will conclude this Article by a resolution which *Escobar* gives to a difficulty which he propounds. (4) I have already taught you, saith he, that the confession which was null and invalid ought to be repeated; is it also to be repeated when it is made upon some other principal design, then to obtain pardon of sins? His Answer is, No, provided that remission of sins be propounded at the least as the less principal, and herein is no mortal sin, because there is always an intention to receive the Sacrament, and all that which is necessary to make it valid.

4 Dixisti debere repeti confessionem quando fuit invalida. An iteranda ex eo quod facta fuerit alio fine principaliter quam ob remissionem peccatorum? 5 Non dummodo, remissio intendatur saltem ut finis minus principalis, & in eo non peccetur mortaliter: quia in eo casu est intentio recipiendi Sacramentum, & omnia ad ejus valorem requisita. *Escob. 7. ex. 4. num. 119. pag. 818.*

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He believes then that it is but a small sin to prefer some humane and temporal consideration to Salvation and pardon of sins; that it is not to prophane the Sacrament to refer it principally to a temporal end; that this is not to dishonour God much, to testify the little respect which is had for his grace and friendship, even then when it is demanded, by preferring some temporal thing before it, which is respected as principal design, propounded and desired to be received by means of the Sacrament of Penance much rather than his amity and reconciliation with him, which he makes a shew to desire after he had so despised it, pre-

tending to repair thi contempt by another contempt, and to return into favour by a motion so little sincere, and so injurious to his infinite greatness elevated above all Creatures. If a Malefactor guilty of high Treason, should present himself before a King in this manner, confessing that he was more moved with some petty interest, than with his crime; and so much as not speaking to him, nor demanding of him his grace, but only after he hath testified his passion for this particular interest, he would be judged of all the world unworthy to obtain the grace which he demands, and worthy to be chased from the Kings presence, and punished for this insolence as much or more than for any other fault. Yet they would have this treatment, which is unworthy of man, to be worthy of God, and that God should be content with a kind of honour which a man would hold for an injury.

ARTICLE III. Of Absolution.

That the Jesuits make it depend on the Opinion and the Will of the Penitent, rather than the Disposition and Judgment of the Confessor.

Absolution is a Judgment which the Priest pronounceth on Gods behalf in favour of the Penitent, by which he forgives him his sins, after the cognizance which he hath received from himself, of the remedies which he hath applied, and his good effects and holy dispositions which they have produced in him to establish him in the Grace of God.

The Divinity of the Jesuits ruins this part of the Sacrament of Penance, as well as the other, taking from the Priest the authority and quality of a Judge and Superior, and subjects him to the Penitent, in such manner, that he must follow him in the Judgment that he ought to make of his sins and of his estate, and of his disposition to receive absolution, and obliging him to bear himself according to what he says and wills, and to give him absolution as oft as he demands it, though the Confessor judge him unworthy and intirely uncapable thereof.

From these Maxims it is that *Bauny* in his *Sum*, Chap. 45. pag. 702. saith, that the Confessor before he absolve the Penitent, shall examine him if he have no more to say; if he be sorry with all his heart for offending God; if he purpose to serve him well and faithfully for the time to come, by avoiding all mortal sin, which being said thus universally and in common, is sufficient for receiving Sacramental absolution.

Nay, we may be excused from examining him in this manner. *Dica-stillus* easeth the Confessor of this trouble. (1) *It is not always necessary*, saith he, to put these questions to him, especially if they be persons well instructed, and who come freely and without contraint to the Tribunal of Confession.

So all the disposition requisite for receiving absolution, is reduced to words, and those also universal, and to resolutions made in general; upon which the Confessor shall be obliged to relye and to believe all those who shall offer him such discourse, and make him such promises, because they are their own accusers, defenders, and witnesses; *cum isti sint sui accusatores, defensores, & testes*; though oftentimes it be supposed that such resolutions come but from the teeth outwards; as the same Farther *Bauny* hath written a little after, pag. 717.

Emanuel Sa saith the same thing, and more also: (2) *We may absolve*, saith he, *him who resolves to abstain from sin, though he himself believe that he shall not hold his resolution*, though he be assuredly perswaded of it; *certè sibi persuadeat*. (3) saith *Tambourin*. How then can the Confessor believe that the Penitent is well disposed, and that he hath a true resolution to correct himself, which is solid and capable to produce its effect, since the Penitent himself believes it not, and is rather perswaded of the contrary, even with certainty? And this being so, how can he be absolved in this estate?

1 Penitentem affirmanti se habere retractionem & propositum non peccandi, credendum est, nec ramen necesse est id semper ab illo ininterrogare, maxime quando personæ factis alioquin instructæ sunt, & confessionem nullo modo coactæ. *Dica-stillus. de Penit.*
2 Absolvi potest qui proponit ab-

stinere à peccato, etiamsi credat se proposito non staturum. *Sa verb. Absolutio. num. 12. pag. 5. 3 Tambourin. num. 753. cap. 1. lib. 1. meth. confess.*

1 *Dicaſt. n.*
362. d. 21. d.
6. tr. 8. de Pœ-
nit.

2 Item ab-
ſolvi poteſt
qui ex ratio-
nabili & juſta
cauſa non vult
amittere pec-
candi occaſio-
nem, modo
proponat fir-
miter non
peccare, eti-
amſi aliquoties
ſit relapſus.
Ibid.

3 Qui ſapius
quidem in ea
occaſione lap-
ſus & non de-
ſeruit occaſio-
nem, jam vero
extraordina-
rio propoſito
& dolore ta-
tus accedit ad
confeſſionem,
& poſſit abſol-
vi, licet non
proponat de-
ſerere occaſio-
nem. Solet
dici ſatis eſſe
tunc quod
poſſit ſperari
emendatio
quin cogatur
deſerere. *Dica.*
n. 335. d. 19.
d. 6. tr. 8. de
Pœnit.

4 *Abſolvi*
poteſt qui di-
cit ſe dolere
de peccatis &
vult abſtinere
Ibid. n. 13. p.
6.

5 *Adhuc*
poſt ullius e-
mendationis
experimen-
tum.....abſque
voluntate tol-
lendi occaſio-
nem... poteſt
*abſolvi. *Dicaſt.**
n. 354. d. 19.
d. 6. tr. 8. de
Pœnit.

6 *Quando*
juſta & ratio-
nabiles cauſe

non tollendi prædictam occaſionem ſubſiſtunt, etiamſi ſapius reincidat pœnitens, non cogendus eſt illam tollere occaſionem, nec privandus abſolutione, etiamſi ſapiffimè recidivus; quin potius hortandus ut ſæpè veniat ad confeſſionem. *Ibid. n. 576. d. 29. d. 10.*

Neither do they require any greater aſſurance on the part of the Conteſſor than of the (1) Penitent, and they would have abſolution given to the ſinner, how inveterate and habituate ſoever he be in his ſin: *non obſtante conſuetudine*, though he knows certainly that the Penitent will relapſe thierinto; *etiamſi certo ſciet eum lapſurum.*

Emanuel Sa aſſures us alſo, (2) *That he may be abſolved who for ſome juſt and reaſonable cauſe will not quit the occaſion of ſin, provided he make a firm reſolution not to ſin any more; though he have already relapſed thereinto many times.*

Dicaſtilus goes yet farther. For without taking a pretence from any juſt or reaſonable cauſe, he ſaith generally, that a ſinner may be abſolved who hath fallen frequently into ſin, without obliging him to quit the occaſion, and without his taking up of himſelf any reſolution to do it.

Emanuel Sa ſpeaks of a perſon that is reſolved to continue in the occaſion of ſin, not by neceſſity and againſt his will, but voluntarily, becauſe he hath ſome ground which ſeems juſt unto him, and which he will not forego, as if he feared to receive thereby ſome prejudice in his goods or honour. He believes that in this eſtate he may receive abſolution, provided only he take up a reſolution to ſin no more; that is, that he ſay only ſimply, that he will not ſin any more, as he ſaith himſelf a little after; (3) *That he may be abſolved that ſaith, that he is ſorry for his ſins, and deſireth to abſt. in from them; though notwithstanding all theſe reſolutions he frequently fall therein, becauſe he continues in that occaſion which he will not forſake, and that ſo he cannot promiſe himſelf reaſonably more from this laſt proteſtation than from the precedent, and he ſeeth clearly by many experiences, that his reſolutions are without foundation, and have only an appearance, by which they have often deceived him; and yet this Jeſuit pretends that he and his Conteſſor alſo may truſt therein, and eſtabliſh thereon the foundation of his Salvation, without offending againſt the Rules of the Wiſdom and Prudence of the Spirit of God, which ought to guide an action ſo important.*

Banny ſpeaks in the ſame manner, alſo more clearly and more freely of thoſe who are engaged in the occaſions of ſin, and in the wicked habits which make them fall and relapſe many times into the ſame ſins. He inquires in his Sum, Chap. 46. pag. 717. *If notwithstanding all that they have ſaid and promiſed in times paſt to their Conteſſor, they cannot forbear to break out into exceſs and greater liberty in the very ſame faults as before, they ought to be admitted to the Sacrament, and may be abſolved?* He ſaith firſt, that there are ſome who hold, that abſolution ought to be deferred for ſome time: but in the proceſs he makes this queſtion: He who ſhould do the contrary, ſhould he ſin? To which he answers clearly in two words: *That is not my opinion.* And at laſt he concludes in this manner: *That the Penitent purpoſing with true affection, and reſorting to the feet of the Prieſt to put an end unto his ſins, dignus eſt abſolutione toties quoties, deſerves to receive pardon, quantumcumque nulla notetur emendatio, though he amend not.* He is not content to ſay, that abſolution may be given to this man, he pretends that it may not be reſuſed him, ſince he deſerves it. *dignus eſt*; and that though he relapſe every day into the ſame crimes, in caſting himſelf only at the feet of the Prieſt, and ſaying to him, that he hath a deſire to be reformed, he ſhall deſerve to receive abſolution every day and, more frequently, if he deſire it, *toties quoties*, though he relapſe immediately, without ever being amended; *quantumcumque nulla notetur emendatio.*

This deciſion is one of the moſt common of the Society. *Dicaſtilus* teaches it clearly, and ſaith, (4) *That after it is experimented that he amends not at all, and after it is known that the Penitent hath no will to quit the occaſions, abſolution may be given him.* (5) *And when there is ſome reaſonable cauſe why the Penitent ſhould not ſeparate himſelf from the occaſion of ſin, though the Penitent have relapſed into it very frequently, he is not to be obliged to avoid it, nor to be deprived of abſolution;*

though his relapses be very frequent: he ought on the contrary be exhorted to come frequently to Confession. Tambourin who takes up this fancy also, renders this reason capable without doubt to convince every reasonable Spirit. (1) Absolution may be given him the first time; therefore, concludes he, it may be given him also the second time. And so infinite times, *toties quoties*, say others.

If these people be well disposed to receive absolution, or deserve it, I know not where to find any one unworthy of it, and who may be refused it, because all those who demand it after Confession, would, or at least say to their Confessors, that they have a will to mend.

See here without doubt a great ease for sinners. But if they break out with so much more liberty, giving themselves up unto sin, as they see there is facility of remedy, what must be done? May absolution be refused them, or for some time deferred? *Dicastillus* saith, No, (2) and that it may be given them, though they fall into sin through hopes of obtaining absolution.

Another Maxime altogether common in the Jesuits Schools, is, that a Confessor is obliged to give absolution to a Penitent who demands it of him upon some probability that he is sufficiently prepared to receive it, though the Confessor be perswaded of the contrary. (3) He may be absolved, saith Sa, who follows a probable opinion, though contrary to that of his Confessor.

Layman speaks also more clearly, more absolutely, and more universally in these terms: (4) If a Penitent follow in his practice with simplicity an opinion which some Doctors hold to be probable and safe, and his Confessor, whether ordinary or delegate, believe that this opinion considered in it self and in the Theory hath no probability, notwithstanding this persuasion he is obliged to give him absolution.

And because he sees the confusion that it would make to put the Malefactor into the place of the Judge, he represents himself this inconvenience which follows upon his Principles, and makes this objection himself (5) The Confessor is the Penitents Superior; and by consequence the Penitent is obliged to quit his opinion to follow what his Confessor ordains. He answers in this sort: (6) I answer that he is not absolutely his Superior, and that he hath not a right to command him in all things; but only in what hath reference to the sins wherewith he charges himself at the Tribunal of Penance. To speak this in more clear terms, the Confessor ought indeed to pronounce the Sentence of Absolution on the Penitent; but he is to take it from the mouth of the same Penitent, like a Cryer that publishes the Decree of some Court. Because the Penitent who appears before the Tribunal of Penance as the Malefactor, is also the witness in his own affair, and his own chief Judge: that it belongs to him to inquire after his sins, to examine them, and to judge of their greatness and of the punishment which they deserve: that having done this, there remains nothing for him to do but to present himself before the Priest, and to cast himself down at his feet to confess himself, and that accusing himself for his sins, he hath nothing else to do but to present unto him his process already made up with his Judgment, to the end that he may follow it, as it is already concluded and decreed.

rarius est poenitentis superior; ergo poenitens deposita propria opinione, Confessarii præcipientis opinionem amplecti tenetur. Ibid. 6 Respondeo non esse superiorem simpliciter, neque jus præcipiendi habere in omnibus, sed solum in ordine ad peccata quæ ad tribunal poenitentiae deferuntur. *Ibid.*

I see very well that the Confessor is not absolutely nor in all things superior to the Penitent, as this Jesuit saith, but only in what respects the sins which he hath confessed. But in what consists this superiority, if the Penitent having discovered his fault, he ought not to refer it to the light of the Confessor to judge of the quality of his sins, the convenient remedies, and the time necessary to heal them, and of his disposition to receive absolution? For if in every of these points, and particularly in that which presupposeth and contains them all, which is absolution, the Confessor ought to submit to the opinion and will of the Penitent, he is no more his Superior in what respects even those sins of which the Penitent hath accused himself. It is the Penitent who is true Superior, and the Confessor holds the place of an Inferior on his part, since he is bound to obey him and follow

his opinion against his own. Which comes all to one with what I have already observed, that upon this supposition that the Confessor pronounceth Sentence of Absolution, taking it from the mouth of the Penitent, as a publick Cryer doth from the mouth of a Chief Justice of some Court; and by consequence the Confessor is not the Judge but the Cryer, and absolution is only a simple declaration.

1 Sanchez
l. 1. in Decal.
c. 9. n. 28 apud
Escobar l. 2.
Theol. mor.
sect. 2. prob. 28.

2 Ex dictis
deducitur
Confessariorum
semper posse
& debere con-
tra propriam
opinionem
pœnitentem
absolvere,
quando ille
probabili opi-
nionem du-
ctus putat ali-
quid sibi lici-
tum esse, quod
Confessarius
iuxta suam o-
pinionem pu-
tat esse illicitum.
Amicus
tom. 3. disp. 15.
sect. 2. n. 90.
p. 212.

3 Alioquin
gravissimo o-
nerem pœni-
tentem ob-
stringeret ad
iterum sua
peccata alteri
confiteri. Ibid.

4 Deduci-
tur à posse
medicum
aliorum opi-
nionem secu-
rum dare &
græto medici-
nati quam ip-
se privata sua
opinionem pro-
babiliter pu-
tat illi noci-
turam. Ibid.

5 Potest, i-
mo debet Con-
fessarius sequi
opinionem
probabilem
pœnitentis
contra propriam
sententiam
sive probabi-

The opinion of *Layman* were probable, if it might be said, that a Judge were obliged to refer himself to the judgment of the Malefactor, sending him back absolved when he pleases, though according to the Laws he deserved death; or a Physician that of his Patient, treating him as a sound man because he desires it, and because he is not sensible of his disease, though the Physician believe he is in danger of death. For this is in effect that which *Layman* pretends, when he saith, that a Confessor who is truly a Judge and a Physician, is obliged to give absolution to a Penitent, because he demands it, though the Confessor be perswaded that he is not in an estate to receive it: (1) *non obstante sua persuasione tenetur absolutionem conferre.* Sanchez obliges him even unto this under the pain of mortal sin.

Amicus saith the same thing in other terms: (2) *It follows, saith he, from what I have said, that a Confessor may always, and that he is even obliged to absolve the Penitent against his own proper opinion, when the Penitent following the Maxims of a probable opinion, believes that he may do that which the Confessor believes he may not do according to his.* He relates for it this reason a little after: (3) *For otherwise he would oblige the Penitent by too great rigour to confess his sins also to some other.* And to confirm his Answer, he gives this example (4) *of a Physician who according to him may follow the opinion of others, and give to a Patient a medicine, which he believes may hurt in his particular case.*

He could not have chosen a more proper example to make the excess of this Doctrine appear. For who will believe that it is lawful for a Physician to cause his Patient to dye, by giving him for a remedy that which he believes to be poyson, that he may render this observance to other Physicians that are not of his opinion, or even to content the sick who desires and demands this remedy which the Physician believes is not proper for him, and may cause his death; like as this Jesuit pretends that a Confessor may and ought to give absolution to his Penitent, because he demands it, and believes he hath reason to demand it, though the Confessor be perswaded that he is not in an estate to receive it, and that he cannot give it him but to his condemnation. But if this opinion which this Penitent hath contrary to that of his Confessor be prejudicial to a third party, wherein for example the making restitution is in debate, may the Confessor absolve him, permitting him to act according to this opinion? *Escobar* after he had made a Problem of this Question, ranks himself on their side who say, that the Confessor is obliged to absolve his Penitent, and judges even that the contrary opinion is hardly at all probable.

Tambourin a faithful Scholar of the great Masters of the School of the Society, makes use also of the Example of a Physician and a Judge; but in a different manner, and quite opposite to *Amicus*; and more proper to evidence the excess of their Doctrine. (5) *The Confessor, saith he, may and ought to follow the probable opinion of his Penitent, against his own judgment, although it be more probable... And though in the world a Judge and a Physician be obliged to follow the more probable opinion, it is not so with a Confessor; because it is sufficient for him that his Penitent have the dispositions which are for receiving grace, which he may have following a probable opinion; and by consequent a Confessor is obliged to give him absolution by conforming himself to his opinion on pain of mortal sin.* After this the Confessor will take heed not to be wanting therein, and the Penitent needs fear nothing.

lem, sive probabiliorem.... Et quamvis in rebus humanis sive iudex, sive medicus deberet opinionem probabiliorem sequi; tamen Confessario.... satis erit si pœnitens rectè ad prædictam justificationem dispositus appareat, id quod satis habetur sequendo opinionem probabilem. *Tambour. n. 1. sect. 1. c. 9. l. 3. meth. confess.* Debet id sub mortali. n. 2. Obligatur sub mortali conformare se opinioni probabili. *Ibid.*

But to oblige him under so great a pain, of what sort ought the Penitents probable opinion to be? See the Rule this Jesuit prescribes him: (1) *That the Confessor may be obliged to follow it, it must be probable, either because of the reasons on which it is built, or because of the authority of those who follow it. If the opinion of the Penitent have none of these probabilities, but only seem probable to the Penitent, the Confessor shall take heed that he neither do nor resolve anything rashly, that he examine it diligently, to see if he can find any Author who hath approved it, and if he find any, that he conform thereto, and give him speedy absolution. He cannot herein use more precaution, so fearful the Jesuit is, lest his Penitent should be sent back without absolution.*

Amicus proposes also a difficulty about Absolution. (2) *It is doubted whether a Confessor who knows evidently that his own Penitent hath committed a sin which he hath not confessed, ought to advertise him of this sin? He answers and concludes, That in this adventure the Confessor may judge that the Penitent hath some just reason to conceal his sin, and for this he may absolve him with a safe conscience.*

Fillinius proposes the same case: (3) *If the Confessor, saith he, be entirely assured that his Penitent hath forgotten some sin, he is obliged speaking generally to examine him thereof to make his judgment entire and perfect.* He saith not that this is for the benefit and Salvation of the Penitent, that he might make him confess his crime, and make him capable to receive pardon, but because of the integrity of the judgment, that it may have all its parts; that is to say, that he may have an examination and answer of the sinner upon which judgment may be made; because all judgment ought to be composed of the hearing of the guilty and sentence of the Judge, who cannot pronounce sentence before examination. He requires not then that he should examine, but to observe the forms of judgment, what answer soever the sinner make: (4) so that if he deny his fault, and will damn himself, he declares that the Confessor is bound to absolve him, and make shew to believe him: That if he cannot absolutely believe him, (5) *because he is assured that he lies; he maintains that notwithstanding this assurance, if he knows the sin of the Penitent only by some secret way, he is obliged, having examined him prudently, to judge according to what is said and proved in this inward Justice of Confession.* That is to say, that he is obliged to absolve him, though he see that in absolving him, he accumulates to the highest his fault and his lye by a Sacrilege. Strange absolution, which doth more effectually condemn! Cruel and dreadful charity, which casts a Soul into Hell for fear of offending against carnal prudence and the interested complacency of wicked Confessors! The same proposes another case. He supposes an Usurer to have many times promised his Confessor to make restitution, and hath always deceived him. He falls sick, and seeing himself in danger of death, he makes again the same promises, but without setting upon the duty of restitution, though he have means, and may do it at that very same hour. He asks what ought the Confessor do in this extremity? And he answers, (6) *That the man being at the point of death, though it were better not to absolve him if he do not first make restitution according to his ability: yet the Confessor is not obliged hereunto, provided that he probably believes that his heirs will do it.* It is by this Maxime then men are absolved daily, and all sorts of persons deceived at the point of death and during life in such manner as astonishes and offends all honest persons. For to what use to a dead Usurer is the restitution made by his Heirs, if he had no will to do it himself? and how can it be said that he had a will to do it, if he would not do it when he might easily, and it was only his own fault? Certainly as the Confession which his Heirs should make for him would be unprofitable to him, if he were not willing to confess him-

1 Opinio debet esse probabilis in se sine tamen per rationes intrinsecas, five per autoritatem extrinsecam autorum—si ergo opinio penitentis nullam ex his probabiliter habeat, sed solum ipsi penitenti apparenti probabilis. diligens sit Confessarius in examine talis sententia, an forte sit probabilis saltem extrinsecè propter autoritatem alicujus autoris, & si invenit esse talem, illi se conformet. num. 4.

2 Si dubitas an Confessarius qui evidentiam habet quod penitens peccatum commiserit, illudque non sit confessus, debeat illum de tali peccato monere. *Amicus tom. 8. diff. 13. sect. 13. n. 331. p. 235.* Caterum in casu proposito possit Confessarius judicare quod penitens commissum peccatum tacuerit iusta aliqua ex causa, ac proinde turâ conscientia poterit illum absolvere. *Ibid.*

3 Si constet Confessori penitentem oblivisci alicujus peccati, per se loquendo, tenetur interrogare ob integritatem ipsius iudicii. *Filliut. tom. 1. qq. mor. tract. 7. cap. 12. num. 360. pag. 210.* 4 Quod si interrogatus neget, regulariter tenetur illi credere. *Ibid.* 5 Quod si evidens illi sit penitentem mentiri, si tantum id sciat via secreta, post prudentem interrogationem tenetur judicare secundum acta & probata in illo foro. *Ibid.* 6 Si esset in articulo mortis, etsi præstat non absolvere nisi restituat cum possit, tamen ad id non tenetur Confessarius, modo sit illi probabile hæredes id facturos. *Filliut. t. 2. qq. mor. tr. 34. cap. 3. num. 155. pag. 549.*

self before death, when he might: so the restitution made by them would be unprofitable for him, if he had no will to do it himself, when he might without difficulty. And the Confessor that relyeth on what the Heirs will do, though it be uncertain whether they will do it or not, seeing he contents himself with a simple probability; *modo sit illi probabile heredes id faciuros*, and distrusts not the will of the dying man, though it be clear & visible, testifies evidently that he cares no more for the conscience and the Salvation of the sinner, than for the holiness of the Sacrament, and that he subjects and abandons both to the complacency of men, and the interests which engaged him thereunto.

Sanchez having put the question, whether absolution ought to be given to persons who by their negligence and fault knew not the Mysteries and things necessary to Salvation, first relates the opinion of *Azor* in these terms: (1) *When they have been advertised once or twice, and they have been able to learn that which they know not, and by consequent cannot be exempt from fault, he holds that absolution cannot be denied them nevertheless, provided they repent of their past negligence, and take a firm resolution to cause themselves to be therein instructed.* But he after gives his advice, and concludes yet more favourably and more generally, saying: (2) *I believe that in the practice we may seldom or never deny absolution because of ignorance of the Doctrine of Christianity.* This would also be without all reason and against all manner of Justice, if the Confessor should be so rash as to refuse absolution, since that, *Tambourin* saith, after *Azor* and *Vasquez*, (3) *If the Penitent be a blockish person, not knowing that he was hereunto obliged, his ignorance is without fault.*

I Quod si
semel & ite-
rum admoniti
sunt, & discere
potuerunt, ac
proinde culpa
non liberentur,
ait absolutionem
adhuc denegandam
non esse,
dummodo
præteritæ
negligentiæ eos
pœniteat, &
firmiter
proponunt fore ut
discant. *Sanchez*
oper. mor.
l. 2. c. 3. n. 21.
pag. 92.

2 Et quidem
in praxi
existimo nunquam
aut rarissimè
denegandam
absolutionem
ob doctrinæ
Christianæ
ignorantiam. *Ibid.*

3 Vel ex
rudibus — &
supponuntur
inculpabiliter
non advertere
ad tale onus.
Tamb. n. 3. sect.
1. cap. 5. lib. 3.
meth. confess.

4 Inftar
omnium sit Sa,
verbo, fides,
qui sic habet
necesse esse

explicitè credere fidei mysteria quæ publicè in Ecclesia celebrantur, sentiunt multi cum S. Thoma, alii excusari multos ignorantia. *num. 4.* 5 Satis est si ei proponantur à Confessario ea mysteria quæ tenentur explicitè credere necessitate mediæ seu finis, ut sunt mysteria Trinitatis & Incarnationis, ut vel sic actum ea explicitè credendi eliciat. *Ibid. num. 23. pag. 93.* 6 In eo enim statu non ita volet æger, ut procurando eum addicere, defatigandus sit. *Ibid.*

ARTICLE

ARTICLE IV. Of Satisfaction.

That the Divinity of the Jesuits destroys this part of Penance.

IF the Jesuits be very indulgent to the pride of men, as we have already seen, in doing all they can to spare them in the shame and confusion they have in discovering their sins by Confession, they are no less to their laziness and effemina-
 0850 cy, in discharging them of the penalty they ought to undergo in Penance, which is imposed on them to make reparation for their faults, by supplying them with divers expedients, either to elude or not accomplish them after they are imposed on them, or to refuse them when they are imposed.

(1) *Dicaillus* advances this Proposition as a general Principle; that it is not necessary that Penance should be proportioned to the crime, and that it may be greater or less according to the qualities of the sins. If you oppose to him the Councils and the Fathers, (2) *He will affirm after Vasquez, that they would have a proportion held therein, and that it was the use of their times; because Christian charity then ruled the hearts of the faithful, they assigned different penalties according to the different qualities of crimes, following the fervour and piety of those primitive times.* If you reason against him, that the Confessor having the quality of a Judge, ought to proceed by the ways of Justice, which puts some kind of equality betwixt the fault and the punishment; (3) *He will agree with you that it is so in humane Tribunals; but he will pretend that it is not the same thing in the judgment which the Priest exercises in the Tribunal of Penance, which without this proportion ceaseth not to be just and true.*

It is not then of ignorance that this Jesuit opposes so openly the Oracles of the Holy Ghost, and the decisions of the Church. The first Preacher of Repentance made a Precept for it, which hath not been prescribed against by following Ages: (4) *Bring forth then fruit worthy of repentance;* and a Jesuit in these last times which we may well call the dregs of all Ages, comes to tell us, that we need not bring forth fruit worthy of repentance. *S. Paul* saith, (5) *That he preached to Jews and Gentiles that they should turn unto God, and bring forth fruit worthy of repentance;* and a Jesuit tells us at this day, that this is not necessary. The Council of Trent ordain, (6) *That Confessors should impose penances agreeable and according to the quality of their crimes;* and a Jesuit assures us, that this is not the season; that this practice had been good in the primitive times of the Church. After this excess there is no bar can stop the spirit of a Jesuit any longer, when he takes in hand to flatter sinners, Scripture it self and the Church assembled have not force enough for this, and notwithstanding all their Ordinances, a Penance, be it what it will, always suffices to obtain pardon for the greatest crimes.

Amicus demands, (7) *Whether he on whom it hath been imposed for penance, to hear two or three Masses, may satisfy his obligation by hearing them all at once upon different Altars.* He answers with *Sanchez*, that this is lawful, and that this opinion is probable; (8) *Because the Confessor hath not commanded any thing but to hear two or three Masses.* He never troubles himself about the intention of the Confessor, which in this case he cannot reasonably doubt of; he neither obliges the Penitent to inform himself of it; perhaps out of discretion and for the honour of the Confessor, for fear that learning it of his own mouth, and being not disposed to obey him, since he can without that discharge himself of his Pe-

quid illud fuerit, in quo non est servanda proportio qualis esse debet inter culpam & poenam, ut iudicium sit verum & iustum. *Dicaill. n. 747. d. 9. d. 9. tr. 8. de poenit.* 4 Facite ergo fructus dignos poenitentiae. *Mat. 3. Luc. 3.* 5 Judaeis & Gentibus annuntiabam, ut poenitentiam agerent & converterentur ad Deum, digna poenitentiae opera facientes. *Act. 26.* 6 Pro qualitate criminum convenientes satisfactiones. *Trid. c. 8. sess. 14.* Condignam pro modo culpae poenitentiam. *c. 8. sess. 24.* 7 An qui pro poenitentia debet duas aut tres Missas audire, satisfaciatur si omnes in diversis altaribus eodem tempore simul audiat? 8 Affirmat *Sanchez* in *Summa l. 1. c. 14. in fine.* Quae sententia probabilis est, quia praecipuum Confessoris non est nisi de duabus aut tribus Missis audiendis. *Amicus t. 8. disp. 16. dub. 14. n. 112. p. 272.*

1 Præcipitur imponenda diversa poenitentia pro gravitate majori aut minori intra eandem speciem. *num. 196.*

2 Rectè solvitur hæc objectionem Vasquez respondens olim quidem ita fuisse in usu.... fervente charitate.... Ex quibus satis constat non necessitate Sacramenti, sed fecutos fervorem illorum temporum, e jusmodi poenitentiae assignare illorum Canonum & poenitentiarum aurores. *Dicaill. n. 197: d. 3. d. 9. tr. 8. de poenit.*

3 Et quidem inhumanis iudiciis, quamvis nequeat esse justa & delicto proportionata sententia quareus damnatur ad aliquam poenam, nisi cognoscat culpa: tamen sententia absolutionis & remissionis rei se præsentantis & deferentis & petentis veniam, esse potest remittendo quic-

nance, according to the probable opinion of *Amicus* and *Sanchez*, he might not offend yet more by a manifest disobedience; he chuses rather that the Penitent should dissemble and not acknowledge to understand the intention of his Confessor, that he might without scandal elude his Commandment.

The same Jesuite in the same place saith, that Penance given for satisfaction of sins may be discharged, by an action which is in it self a mortal sin (1) *The work of Sacramental Penance*, saith he, when it is done with a wicked intent and even to commit a mortal sin, ceases not to be good enough to discharge the command of a Confessor about satisfaction for sins confessed, provided the substance and body of it be performed. *Dicastillus* is of the same judgment, being he saith that Penance enjoyned may not only be performed by accomplishing it in an estate of mortal sin, (2) without committing the least sin, even *Venial*; but also for an end which is Criminal; which is to say, that it may be satisfied by a sin and by a Sacrilege. It would be a strange discourse amongst men if it should be said that satisfaction may be done to a man for injuries done him, by acting new ones against him, and that old debts might be paid by running farther in debt to the same person. But this which seems extravagant towards men, appears reasonable to the Jesuites towards God; and they believe that he will take that for good money, which passes for false and ridiculous in the world.

Ipsa satisfactionis. Ibid. n. 37. p. 262. 2 Verum puto non esse peccatum mortale—imo absolute nullum peccatum existimo esse. Dicast. n. 150. d. 10. d. 14. tr. 8. de penit. Tandem concedunt communiter Doctores per penitentiam in peccato mortali impletam, adhuc ex sine mortali satisfieri precepto Confessarii. Efficitur enim opus quoad substantiam quod Confessarius precipit, & eo ipso est Sacramentalis pars. Ibid. n. 154.

Bauny after he had concluded according to many Doctors, that he who refused at the Sacrament to accept a Penance, at least a slight one, imposed on him for his faults, was not in an estate to be absolved; after he had represented the reasons of these Doctors, of whom there are some who hold this Doctrine so assured, that they say, that it is a point of Faith that a person in this estate is incapable of Absolution; he saith, to sweeten this apparent rigour, that he who is of a contrary opinion, may yet give it him; though the other opinion were a point of Faith. In effect he obliges us not to follow it, and it being sufficient that the other according to him is probable, and that some Doctor holds it; yea, though no body hath yet proposed it, a Learned and Pious Confessor, as all those of the Society are, may render it probable enough by holding and practising it.

It is true that after all this Father *Bauny* declares, that nevertheless he dares not counsel the practice of it. Not but that he believes that may be practised, and that he would not be backward to advise it, since he approves it openly when he saith, that he who were of an opinion contrary to the first which he hath related, might give absolution to a person that would not accept of any Penance; and that which he dares not advise, he makes other Casuists to say, whom he cites, who believe it probable, of which he relates the reason, and fortifies it the best he can, speaking for them in these terms: since all may, say they, delay to satisfy for their sins till another life, they are not obliged to prevent that time, as they should be if to avoid sin they ought to accept that which the Confessor appoints them for satisfaction unto one part of their faults. But if of complaisance and not to dispute against their Confessor, they will submit themselves freely to that which he ordains, they may afterwards do nothing at all, according to that which *Tambourin* saith; (3) That it is probable that a slight Penance, for great sins, obliges not the Penitent at all to accomplish it. That is to say, that a Penitent of the Jesuites may either openly reject all that his Confessor saith to him, and imposeth on him by way of remedy and satisfaction for his sins, or he may make himself sport with it in private, neglecting to do it after he hath promised it.

3 Pœnitentia Sacramentalis si levis sit, licet pro peccatis gravibus imposita, non obligat ex probabili opinione. Tamb. n. 1. Sect. 5. c. 7. l. 3. 1. p. decalogi.

Escobar is of the same opinion, though he temper it a little. He speaks of a Penitent that refuseth the Penance which the Confessor would give him, and he makes this question in favour of the Penitent: (1) *What shall he do if he say he will submit to the pains of Purgatory?* He answers in giving this advice to a Confessor: (2) *That he should not forbear to impose some slight Penance to save the integrity of the Sacrament.* That is to say, to keep the outward Form and Ceremony; so that he make thereto some satisfaction though ineffectual, and which may be rejected by the Penitent; and nevertheless he wills that care be taken to observe this rule, above all when it is perceived that the Penitent is not in humour to do Penance. *Præcipue cum agnoscat gravem non acceptaturum;* (3) *Or when the Confessor knows that he hath not done what was appointed him and which he hath accepted of, because it seemed unto him too painful.*

1 Quid si affirmet se vel le Purgatorii poenas subire? 2 Levem adhuc poenitentiam imponat ad Sacramenti integritatem. *Escobar tract. 7. exam. 4 n. 188. p. 824. 3 Si*

Confessarius ex circumstantiis confessionis advertat poenitentem sæpe alioquin acceptatam poenitentiam gravem non implevisse, posse aliquando vel levem satis, vel minus gravem quam alioquin oporteret, injungere. *Dicastil. n. 17. d. 2. d. 14. tract. 8. de poenitent.*

Tambourin is not so rigorous; he would not have any at all imposed on him, how slight soever it may be; on the contrary he gives this advice to the Confessor: (4) *That he should send away without Absolution him who refuseth the Penance which is appointed him, desiring to submit himself to the pains of Purgatory; for being it was the opinion of so great men, it is not credible, saith he, that the Council of Trent did intend to condemn an opinion followed by so great Personages reported by St. Anthony Sanctarel.* It is not probable, saith this Jesuite, that the Council of Trent would condemn so great Authors; but these great Authors find probability enough in their Divinity to condemn the Council of Trent, by authorizing that which it expressly forbid.

4 Opinio quæ docet poenitentem non teneri acceptare poenitentiam, etiam post Tridentinum videtur probabilis; quia non videtur Tridentini

num damnare voluisse opinionem quam doctissimi viri sequebantur, citati à Patre Antonio Sanctarel. Ex qua opinione sequitur quod si esset poenitens aliquis qui nollet acceptare, paratus in Purgatorio solvere, non esset hoc præcisè censendus indispositus, nec propter hoc solum esset sine absolutione dimittendus, quia sequitur opinionem quam tanti viri sequuntur. *Tambour. n. 7. Sect. 1. c. 2. l. 4. meth. confess.*

So that the Confessor instead of removing from this hardened and insensible man, his disobedience and presumption which he hath when he should be in the greatest Humiliation and Obedience, shall be obliged on the contrary to cherish and confirm him in this pride and impenitence.

If this imagination of this Jesuite be reasonable, we must say that the Saints who governed the Church heretofore, understood nothing in the Administration of the Sacrament of Penance, since by a reason quite contrary to his, they diminished not the Penance and satisfaction of Penitents, till they found them extraordinarily touched with the sense of their sins, and ready to do all that they ordained for their expiation, and even when they were already engaged and advanced in the exercises of Penance, and resolved to go on to their uttermost extent.

The rule of these Saints was to diminish sometimes the rigour of Penance on them who believed that they could not be too rigorous towards them: and the rule of these Jesuites is on the contrary, to give some slight Penance to those who refuse to receive one that comes any thing near to what they deserve for their crimes.

This is indeed to favour the impenitence and obstinacy of sinners, since according to *Dicastillus*, because of the evil disposition wherein they are found, the Confessor is obliged to require of them a very slight satisfaction, and (5) *that it is even expedient for the more enormous crimes to impose a Penance much better*

5 Expedit quando gravitas peccato-

rum est magna, leviolem adhuc poenitentiam imponere quam facultas aliàs poenitentium, exigeret, ut ad frequentandam confessionem alliciantur, vel ab ea frequentanda non deterreantur, id totum cedit in utilitatem poenitentium, quibus longè utilius est frequentius confiteri, quam alia opera poenalia exercere; imo moderanda est multum poenitentia, quando prudenter timetur fore ut ejus difficultate deterriti, vel profusè omittant, vel deserant inceptam. *Dicastil. n. 49. d. 3. d. 14. tract. 8. de Penit.*

1 Ego experimento didici plenimque lenitate conciliari animos pœnitentium, & allici ad frequentiam confessionis, in qua frequentanda efficacius invenire remedium pro pœnitentibus recidivis, quam onerando illos pœnitentiis quas magna ex parte non implent. At paulatim reperitâ Sacramenti gratiâ, tandem emergunt unde alias nunquam videbantur emerfuri. *Ibid.*
n. 53.

low what they might do according to their estate and condition, that by this sweetness and benignity they might more frequently attend the Sacrament of Penance, or at the least not withdraw themselves from it, and all this for their benefit: because it is incomparably more profitable for them to confess frequently, than to accomplish painful and laborious satisfactions. (1) As for me, saith this Jesuit, I have found by experience that a sweet treatment causes the Tribunals to be frequented, and this multiplication of Confessions is more profitable for sinners, than burdensom satisfactions which the Penitents do not execute for the most part. For by little and little by the multiplied force of the grace of the Sacrament of Confession, they retire from sin, wherein without this they would have always continued.

This way without doubt is very sweet, but it is also very dangerous, in flattering sinners it easily deceives them, and by inducing them to confess frequently, it exposes them evidently to commit as many Sacriledges as they make Confessions, with a contempt of Penance which they therein betray, and in the disposition and resolution which they take not to make any satisfaction unto God, or not to accept any but very slight for the greatest crimes which they have committed.

This shews that it is not without reason and design, that the Jesuits have changed the name of the Sacrament of Penance into that of Confession, being after they have destroyed inward Penitence, which is a sincere and supernatural sorrow for sin, as I have elsewhere made apparent, they also entirely abolish exterior penance, which is satisfaction as they declare here, and reduce all the Sacrament so far as concerns the Penitent, to confession and declaration of sins only.

They declare also with sufficient evidence, wherefore they labour with so great care to sweeten and multiply Confessions, in saying, that their Tribunals are more frequented, that is to say, that their Authority and Empire which they assume over consciences, establishes and extends it self by this sweet way contrary to the Laws of the Church and of Repentance, and opens them an easie way to usurp upon the Jurisdiction of Bishops, without speaking of other advantages and profits may thereby arise unto them.

2 Si irrationabiliter gravis pœnitentia fuit? Non tenerur implere, quia nec Confessarius ligare cum potuit, nec pœnitens intendit sese illigari. *Ibid.*
n. 191.

Escobar is so little inclined to condemn the wicked disposition of an impenitent sinner, that on the contrary he approves and justifies it, in demanding, (2) *What is to be done if the penance be too great and unreasonable?* For he answers, *That the Penitent is not obliged to accomplish it, because the Confessor could not oblige him thereto; and it was not the intent of the Penitent neither to oblige himself in that sort.*

He pretends that the sinner may set bounds to the power of a Confessor as he pleaseth, and to make void his opinions, and render them unjust by his fancy only, causing all his penances to pass for unreasonable and excessive, which are imposed by him against his liking and humor: which is the most clear and most dangerous of all injustices. For if it be unjust that a man should be Judge in his own proper cause, how much more unjust is it that a guilty and criminal person should be so, and that his judgment should be preferred before that of a learned, just, prudent, and disinterested person, such as a Confessor is supposed and ought to be, who is not only a humane Judge, but a Divine, holding the place of God himself, and exercising the power of Jesus Christ? Who sees not then that to prefer the judgment of a Criminal in his own cause before that of such a Judge, is not to despise a man, but Jesus Christ himself, and the power of God, and to justify a contempt which is unsupportable by the meanest Judge amongst men, and will pass for extravagant in the judgment of all?

3 An possit per alium impleri pœnitentia? Possit asserit Suarez, modo justa adsit causa. *Escobar* iv. 7. ex. 4. n. 182. p. 228.

They are not content to give unto Penitents also the liberty to do what they will in the Sacrament of Penance, and to receive for just, or reject for unjust, as they please, the judgment of the Confessor, and the penance which he imposes; but they will also that even after they have accepted and have acknowledged that it is just and necessary, it is lawful for him not to perform it, and to transfer it on to others. For *Escobar* puts the question, (3) *Whether may my penance be accomplished by another?* And he answers, *That this is the opinion of Suarez, provided*

50 vided there be some just reason for it. As if specious reason and pretences on these occasions, wherein it is easie to deceive others after we are deceived our selves, would ever be wanting. This is also to relieve those who commit the greatest crimes; that is, the rich and delicate persons and carnal, who would have Confessors to search out for them agreeable penances, and which hurt and trouble the least that may be the repose and ease of their body. (1) For these persons are very delicate, saith Dicastillus, and cannot resolve to afflict their bodies by the austerities of a severe penance: wherefore it is to good purpose to ordain unto them Masses and Misses for a full satisfaction.

1 Sic etiam Missas & elemosinas prescribere consilium fuerit divitiis alioquin nimis delicatis qui non habent animum subeundi alias corporis afflictiones. Dicast. n. 78 d. 5. d. 14 tr. 8. de penit.

And for a yet greater discharge of the Penitent, they will that the Confessor give Penance to him by way of counsel, without absolutely obliging the Penitent to accomplish it. (2) Ought penance, saith Escobar, be imposed with an obligation to accomplish it? He answers, That Suarez holds that penance is alway Sacramental, though it be imposed by way of counsel. And that the same Author proposes also another accommodation which is very easie, and which no man can refuse, to wit, to give for penance something formerly commanded; so that penance for sins may be accomplished by doing that which we should have done: however, though we had not sinned, and which the most innocent are obliged unto.

2 Estne imponenda pœnitentia sub obligatione? Sufficiens esse Sacramentalem, si per modum consilii imponatur, docet Suarius. Ibid. Qui addit opus alioqui præceptum

60 Finally, the last sweetning of penance is to advertise the Penitent only to do some satisfaction for his sins, without determining any thing in particular, and leaving him to his choice to do what he will. (3) Is it lawfull for a Confessor, saith Escobar, to leave it wholly to the liberty of the Penitent to do what penance he pleaseth? He answers with Suarez, That it is not always necessary to impose upon him any particular work, and principally to spiritual persons; but it is sufficient to say I impose on you for penance all that which you shall do of good or suffer of bad this day or this week.

posse aliquando in pœnitentiam injungi. Ibid. 3 An possit Confessarius pœnitentiam omnino liberè faciendam arbitrio pœnitentis imponere? Ex Suarii sententia affirmat. non semper requiri ut aliquod opus in pœnitentiam imponatur, præsertim spiritualibus personis; sed sufficere si dicat: Impono tibi pro pœnitentia quicquid hodie vel hac hebdomada boni feceris, vel mali pallus fueris.

It is hard not to be a Penitent in this manner, and not to do penance for the greatest sins, unless we will renounce the common life of Christians, and resolve to trample under feet all the Commands of God and the Church, so as to do no good in a whole day or week. And though it should happen that we could do no good, yet could we not be exempted from receiving some displeasure and suffering some evil. So that following this Method, it is impossible for those very men who would do no penance, to be impenitent.

Filliutius contains in one single question all those of his Fraternity we now related, and also those which may be made in this matter, and he resolves them in two words in favour of impenitent sinners. His question is concerning the precept of Satisfaction: (4) Whether it be true that there is any such precept? And the better to make the difficulty to be understood, and the answer which he ought to make, he saith first, (5) It must be observed that this is a question which rises upon an obligation that comes from a natural and not a positive precept, as that which the Confessor imposeth in the Sacrament of Penance; for of that we shall speak when we treat of Satisfaction.

4 Quæro de præcepto satisfaciendi, an tale præceptum detur. 5 Pro responsione notandum, quæri obligatio-

nem ex vi præcepti naturalis, & non ex vi positivi à Confessario impositi in Sacramento pœnitentiæ. De hoc enim cum de satisfactione. Filliut. t. 1. mor. qq. tr. 6. cap. 9. n. 213. pag. 159.

He declares that he intends not to speak of the command which a Confessor may give his Penitent in imposing penance. For neither he nor his Brethren make any great account of that, as we but now made appear: but he inquires only whether there be any natural command or obligation to satisfy God; that is to say, which arises from the duty of a reasonable creature that hath offended God, and despised his Commandments, and that respect and love which he owes him.

1 Dico 1. After this he answers clearly and without any fear, that (1) *in his judgment non videri datum esse tale præceptum de satisfaciendo in hac vitâ pro pœna temporali; quia tale præceptum nec colligitur ratione necessaria, nec autoritate. Ibid.*

But if it be objected unto him, that God remitting sin and eternal punishment, will at the least that some temporal satisfaction be made to his justice. He answers, that (2) *God punishing sins in Purgatory, when satisfaction is not made in this life, the sinner may without injustice refer satisfaction unto the other life.*

2 Cum Deus puniat in Purgatorio peccata quantum diu in hac vita non est satisfactum, poterit peccator sine iniustitia differre satisfactionem in alteram vitam. *Ibid.*

And if you press him farther by the obligation that is on a sinner towards God, and by the acknowledgments he owes him for pardoning his sins, or by the law of Charity wherein he is bound to God and to himself; he will say

3 Lex charitatis propriæ vel divinæ non violatur; quia licet differat in alteram vitam, non propterea perdit beatitudinem, nec divinum amorem; & licet aliquantulum retardet, tamen est damnum reparabile. *Ibid.*

that (3) *this law of Charity which is due to our selves or God, is not violated herein: for though the sinner defer satisfaction until the next life, he loses not by this, neither blis nor the love of God; and though he retard the enjoyment thereof, yet the loss made by this delay may be repaired.*

So that none are obliged to do Penance in this world, and Jesus Christ ought not to threaten them who do it not with a death like unto theirs, who were overwhelmed and pressed to death by the fall of a Tower, because it is lawful to defer it till after death; and so they who will not do it here being not guilty, they have no cause to fear any thing because of this from God who doth not punish the innocent.

I stay not here to examine the reasons of this Jesuite, that I may not be too tedious. I say only that the principle which he establisheth that, (4) *according to his judgment there is no natural precept which obliges us in this life to make satisfaction for temporal pains, without doubt takes away all footing for all doubts and difficulties which might arise on this subject; but withal it entirely abolisheth satisfaction and Penance by taking away the obligation to do it in this life; which is that I have affirmed to be amongst those points of the Jesuits Divinity which I have undertaken to discover.*

4 Dico 1. non videri datum esse tale præceptum de satisfaciendo in hac vita pro pœna temporali.

I adde that by destroying Penance, he ruins at the same time the whole Gospel which began by Preaching Penance, and contains in effect no other thing, since the whole life of a Christian is nothing else but a continual Penance, according to the Council of Trent, and all the Fathers.

So we see that all the places of the Scripture and of the Fathers which speak of Penance are addressed to the living; and it would be very hard to find any directed to the dead, and which commands or counsels them to do Penance for their sins; the Scripture and the Church having always taught until this time that it is impossible, because it is impossible to fast after death, to weep, to wear Sackcloth and Ashes, and to do other like Exercise, in which the Scripture it self and the Church it self have established the Penance and satisfaction which we owe unto God for our sins: *Emandemus in melius que ignoranter peccavimus, ne subito præoccupati die mortis queramus spatium penitentiae, & invenire non possimus. Let us amend and correct those things in which we have ignorantly offended, lest being suddenly surprized by the day of death, we seek space for Penance and cannot find it, saith the Church at the entrance of Lent, which is the time which it proposes to all men, sinners and innocent, perfect and unperfect, great and small to do Penance in this life; and for it to be remittable to the other world, is to abolish it entirely, and ruine together with it the whole Gospel and all life of Christianity.*

ARTICLE V.

Rules of Conduct for a Confessor according to the Jesuits.

THE principal Rules of a Confessor towards a Penitent according to them are; 1. To examine him, if it be needful. 2. To give him necessary advices. 3. To sound as much as they can his inward disposition, and to see if he be grieved for his sin. 4. To ordain wholesome Penance for him. 5. To give him Absolution if he be in an estate to receive it.

From all the maxims of the Jesuits Divinity which we have but now related concerning the Sacrament of Penance and all the parts of it, it is easie to judge in what manner they would have a Confessor demean himself in the Administration of this Sacrament, and what Rules they ought to observe for discharging every of these Duties.

I. POINT.

Rules to examine Penitents according to the Jesuits.

THOSE that need to be examined are, 1. Children. 2. Ignorant and Blockish People. 3. Great Sinners.

1. For Children, the Jesuits would not that they should be scared, nor any scruple made about the sins of their youth, though they be great, and they have never yet confessed them; whether it be because they have forgotten them, or because they knew not that they were so great as they learnt afterwards. For they hold that they are not obliged to confess them even after they have received this instruction.

^{i.} What is meet to be said to those who in their youth have committed many actions of a virtuous nature, and

which nevertheless they believe not to be such? That they are not obliged to speak one when they understand and know their nature and conditions, and much less repeat their past Confessions. *Bauny in his sum, Chap. 4. P. 150.*

2. If a Peasant or a grossly Ignorant Person knowing not how to confess himself, say that he hath never accused himself but in gross without noting out any sins in particular; the Jesuits will not that he should be made to repeat his Confessions, and accuse himself anew by unfolding his sins by parcels, especially when they have other persons to confess, who give them not leisure, though the ignorance which hinders them from knowing and confessing their sins be criminal, and renders them guilty of mortal sin, or the ignorance of the Confessor himself be the cause. Likewise they teach generally, that when the Penitent hath made an imperfect Confession, he is not obliged to repeat it, and he fails not for all that to receive the Grace of the Sacrament by virtue of the following Absolution and Confession.

2 That if any by ignorance or simplicity have not confessed himself of his faults but only in gross without determining any one in particular, it is not needful to draw out of

his mouth the repetition of those faults, if it cannot be done conveniently, because we are pressed by Penitents which give not leisure for it. *Bauny in his Sum, Chap. 4. pag. 150.*

Licet ignorantia sit culpabilis mortaliter non est necessitas repetendi confessionem, ac proinde valida est. Filiutius tom. 1. mor. qq. tract. 7. cap. 6. num. 132. pag. 185. Henriq. Fagund. addunt rusticos omnes, qui confitentur aliquando sine explicatione numeri & diligentia, cogendos non esse repetere confessiones factas antea cum indoctis Confessariis. Dicastillus tract. 8. de poenit. d. 9. d. 2. num. 57. Poenitens qui priorem confessionem fecit informem, non tenetur repetere..... certissimum & absque controversia est ipsum confequi per posteriorem absolutionem gratiam. Idem tractat. 2. de bapt. d. 1. d. 8. n. 203.

3. When a great sinner confesseth himself, they hold that he needs not give himself the trouble to inform of all the particularities of his life and crimes, and that the more he is laden with sins, he is the more slightly and less exactly to be examined. And behold the reason: The examination must be such as may not

3 Levius & minus exacte interrogandus est circa singula qui plura beget

habiti peccata quam qui pauciora; quia cum solum requiratur diligentia & examen humanum; hoc autem sic illud quod non generat ex se fastidium & iudicium huius Sacramenti, consequens est ut minus distincta notitia requiratur ab eo qui vel propter peccatorum multitudinem, vel aliam ob causam difficilius possit exactam notitiam reddere. *Tambur. lib. 3. method. confess. cap. 9. sect. 5. num. 11.*

Commilitum mortale toties, non exprimendo furti quantitatem. *Escobar in prom. ex. 2. num. 39. pag. 12. 15.*

It is not needful in Confession to tell the said circumstance of the quantity of the theft: it suffices in rigour to cause the Confessor to understand that we have sinned mortally in the matter of theft, by taking from another such sum as constitutes that sin. *Bauny in his sum, Chap. 39. pag. 616.* It is not needful for the validity of the Sacrament that the Penitent in his Confession tell the number of vicious desires, dishonest thoughts and affections which he hath had or reiterated during the time he hath been addicted to them. Sufficit dicere toto mense v. c. amavi Mariam, etiamsi possit numerus exprimi. *Bauny in his sum, Chap. 4: pag. 667.*

Si utrique parti probabiliter adhæret, non tenetur confiteri. Potest enim sequi probabilem partem quam maluerit. *Dicast. tr. 8. de pœnis. d. 9. d. 7. num. 277.* Si quis probabiliter putet se jam confessum fuisse, non tenetur confiteri, etiamsi certo sciat se mortaliter peccasse. *Ibid. num. 292.* Qui habet rationes probabiles quod non peccaverit mortaliter, & similes, imo probabiliores rationes quod peccaverit, non tenetur ad illud confitendum. *Tambur. lib. 2. method. confess. cap. 1. sect. 3. num. 9.* Qui probabiliter, imo certo scit se mortaliter deliquisse, habet tamen rationes probabiles, imo & probabiliores se illud non esse confessum.... nec tenetur ad illud confitendum. *Ibid. num. 16.* Afferendum non esse obligationem prædictam, sed posse omnia peccata simul dicere non explicando, an antea fuerit illa confessus.... Si Confessarius id interroget quando nulla est obligatio ex parte pœnitentis, non tenetur respondere Confessario interroganti; sed dicere, ego hoc peccatum confiteor, quidquid sit an confessus furtim, aliud non tenetur explicare. *Dicast. tr. 8. de pœnis. d. 9. d. 2. num. 146.*

Qui generaliter confitetur, potest sine alia explicatione admiscere nova cum antiquis, etiamsi id de industria ad regendum tempus quo peccatum commisit, ne Confessario id innotescat, faciat, quia utitur jure suo. *Tambur. lib. 2. method. confess. cap. 1. tr. 8. sect. 1. num. 2.* Afferendum est posse omittere quæcumque velit. *Dicast. tr. 8. de pœnis. d. 9. d. 2. num. 162.* Non tenemur atque ad id possumus omittere aliqua peccata etiam mortalia, sed aliâ rite manifestata, est communis & certa Theologorum opinio.... Quod si pœnitens dixerit se velle generaliter confiteri, & deinde non omnia proponat, respondeo nec tunc mentiri.... Imo etiamsi mentiretur, peccaret solum venialiter. *Tambur. lib. 2. method. confess. cap. 1. sect. 2. num. 7.*

beget a disgust of the Sacrament. Whence it follows that we must exact a less perfect knowledge of him, who for the multitude of his sins or some other cause can difficultly render an exact account: That if he be a Thief, it is sufficient for him to say, I have sinned mortally in the matter of theft, without expressing any farther the sum which he stole: If he be a debauched and wicked person, it is not needful to press him to tell the number of the dishonest thoughts and desires which he hath had, though he might do it easily, that it sufficeth that he say for example; *I loved Mary a whole month, toto mense amavi Mariam*: That it belongs to the Confessor to supply and divine the rest, and that he ought to observe this rule in other sins: That if the Penitent have omitted in his Confession any sin which he believes probably to be no sin, the Confessor cannot oblige him to discover it, because of two probable opinions the Penitent may chuse whether he pleaseth: and if the Penitent believes more than probably, if he be assured that it is a sin, provided he believe probably that he hath confessed it, the Confessor cannot oblige him to accuse himself of it; and all this is true, though he believe more probably that he hath sinned mortally, or that he hath not confessed it at all,

If this sinner signifie that he would make a general Confession, he is not obliged to declare the sins he hath already confessed, and those which he hath committed since his last Confession; and if his Confessor pretend to oblige him thereto, this would be very frivolously done, for he might receive his answer from the Penitent in these words: I accuse my self of this sin, whether I have or have not confessed it already, I am not obliged to confess more unto you. And this is true, though he make such a medley of new and old sins, with design to hide from the Confessor the time when he committed these new crimes, because he hath a right to do so. The Confessor is not obliged to examine him whether he have told him all, and whether he have forgotten any sin; because the Penitent, though he have declared that he would make a Confession of all the sins of his life, may omit what he pleaseth without any lye; and if this be any kind of lye, it is but a venial one. This opinion is certain and commonly received in the Schools.

II. POINT.

II. POINT.

Of the Advice which a Confessor ought to give his Penitent according to the Jesuits.

1. **T**hey will not that he speak to him or advise him of any thing, if he thinks he will not believe him.

2. If he knows that the sinner is in an ill estate, as for example, that he lives in Whoredom because his Marriage is null, they say he is not to speak to him of it, if he thinks that it will be to no purpose.

3. Though he be assured that his Penitent hath committed a crime which he hath not at all confess'd, they permit him to dissemble it, and to absolve him, in a pious perswasion that he hath some reason wherefore he doth not confess it.

4. Yet they accord that he may examine him upon this sin, provided he do it prudently, and press him not too much, for fear of making him lye; and if it fall out that being examined, he lye and deny this sin which the Confessor knows evidently, they will that he forbear not to absolve him notwithstanding his sin and his lye.

5. That he do not make things too difficult for him, and that he do not propose to him the pains and the difficulties which he foresees will happen to him in correcting himself; but that it is sufficient to entertain him with a general discourse of the filthiness of sin. See here an advice worthy to be observed, and of utmost consequence for the comfort of Confessors unto such as are most engaged in affairs, and especially of Kings, which renders their condition much less perillous than it hath been believed to be hitherto. When a Penitent is obliged under the pain of mortal sin to something so hard, that we have cause to believe that he will not think well of it, it belongs to the prudence of a wise Confessor to omit it, and to refer his advice to some more proper time, fearing lest the Penitent being terrified thereby, withdraw himself from Confession. **HOC NOIETUR PER MAXIME, PRO CONFESSARIIS PRINCIPUM.** This is most of all to be noted for the Confessors of Princes.

6. Though a Penitent have only a general and ineffectual will to amend, and the Confessor cannot judge probably that he will refrain from relapsing quickly into his sin, he ought not to forbear to absolve him, according the Jesuits.

habet quod pœnitens peccatum commiserit, illudque non sit confessus; pœset judicare quod pœnitens commissum peccatum tacite it iusta alius ex causa: ac proinde tua conscientia poterit illum absolvere. *Amicus tom 8. disp. 18. sect. 13. n. 331. p. 285.* 4 Si constet Confessori pœnitentem oblivisci alicujus peccati per se loquendo teneatur interrogare; quod si interrogatus negat, regulariter teneatur illi credere: quod si evidens sit pœnitentem mentiri, si id Confessarius scit tantum via secreta, post prudentem interrogationem teneatur judicare secundum: et & prebata in illo fore. *Fillius tom. 1. mor. qq. sr. 7 cap. 12. n. 360. pag 210.* 5 Ad explorandum propositum, non premissi Confessor d. fluctua. es multas in peccatis vitandis, unde pœnitens constituitur in periculo non habendi effectus propositum in futurum. *Fillius ibid. num. 356.* Idem est dicendum quando pœnitens sub peccato morali teneatur ad aliquid adeo d. fieri e ut non cedatur tunc equo animo recepturus.... Poterit enim tunc prudens Confessor relinquere illum in sua bona fide quæ a peccato excusat, & monitionem in tempus opportunius differre, ne scilicet terrius pœnitens a confessione se abstinere, majusque detrimentum patiat. Hoc noceat permaximè pro Confessariis mercatorum & Principum. *Tanbur. lib. 5. meth confess. cap. 1. num. 7.* 6 Non est necesse ut Confessor sibi persuadeat aut probabiliter judicet futurum ut pœnitens a peccato abstineat; satis est quod existimet pœnitentem quando est absolvetur d. habere propositum illud generale quod diximus. *Fillius. ibid. num 356. pag 210.*

7. If a sinner have been a bad liver of a long time, and because he hath been bred up in and accustomed unto sin, he cannot easily withdraw from it, nor even make a true and sincere resolution to do it; but confess himself for fashion or rather of necessity than of any true sense of his sins, seeing himself in danger of death, and if he believed he could live any longer, he would never think any more of so much as either confessing or amending, the Jesuit confessing him in this estate and this disposition, shall not so much as speak to him only of a resolution to amend and live better for time to come, believing that this is not necessary for him, since there remains not time for him to live in, and that he cannot so much as promise

1 Quando Confessor nullum sperat fructum ex admontione, sed prius animi inquietudinem, rixas vel scandalum, dissimulare debet. *Escobar sr. 7. ex. 4. n. 155. pag. 825.*

2 Cum pœnitens est in statu de malo, ut invalidi matrimonii, si quidem de veritate huius rei dubitet pœnitens, illum debet Confessarius aperire: quod si non procurram speret admontionem, vel in proprium damnum verentiam, potest & debet recitare. *Escob. ib. n 74 p. 810.*

3 Confessarius evidenciam

7 Cum Confessoris iudicium confessionem hominis in extremo pelici vel tribu agnitionem, vel quia sic modo puniendus a Judice, non curabit de propositi non

peccandi in posse... Difficile est enim ab his modis hominibus in precibus enuritis verum de cetero non peccandi propositum sperare... Cum enim non refectur vivendum de futuro, ad quod tempus propositum ordinatur? Nulla est necessitas que conscientiam premittit ad talem actum promendum. Ita docet Suarez tom. 4. disp. 1. sect. 3. a. 5. Ceterum quidem his... qui quidem si scirent duraturam vitam, nec confiterentur, nec mores mutarent.

to change his life, being accustomed and addicted unto sin, but he shall content himself to give him absolution after he hath heard his Confession.

8. That he be careful never to speak to his Penitent out of Confession of what passed betwixt them in Confession, though they were necessary to the salvation of the Penitent, believing that it were better to leave him in danger of perdition.

9. That if it happen that the Confessor make any fault in confession, as if he have not ordained restitution of anothers goods, whether he did it of forgetfulness or of fear, they believe that he may not speak any more unto him of it, when he is once retired out of his presence, without his express leave. And certainly this would be a thing very harsh and inconvenient for a Confessor to be obliged to advertise the Penitent to his own shame, giving him to know that he was mistaken.

10. That if he knows that the Penitent hath not told him all his sins, or if he sees clearly that he hath no sorrow for them at all, and that he is incapable to receive absolution, which nevertheless he hath not refused to give him for fear or shame, and that after considering in himself he apprehends his fault, they pretend that it is not lawful for him to speak to him about it to endeavour reparation therein.

11. That all which may be done in these and other like occasions, is to demand permission of the Penitent, and to intreat him that he would be pleased to allow him to speak one word to him concerning a certain thing which passed in the confession he made to him; and if the Penitent declare that he is not pleased therewith, they forbid him to proceed farther or speak any more of it.

Petrus Michael de Sauroman Soc. Jesu expeditionum spiritualium, Soc. Jesu lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 78.

8 & 9 Confessarius commisit defectum in confessione, quia vel penitentem ad restitutionem non obligavit: potestne cum ipso loqui de supradicto defectu? Minime sine expressa ipsius licentia. *Eseob. tr. 7. exam. 4. num. 194. pag. 850.* Grave censetur incommodum cum meo rubore, & ostendendo me errasse monere penitentem. *Tamburin. lib. 3. method. confess. cap. 8. sect. 2. num. 2.* 20 Quid agendum Confessori cum defectum aliquem commisit in confessione contra ejus substantiam, cum penitens, v. c. non est recte dispositus quoad dolorem aut integritatem, & id a Confessario cognoscitur, sed ob verecundiam aut timorem non est ausus negare absolutionem? Setis est Confessori dolere de peccato commisso, & relinquere penitentem in bona fide, quis per subsequentes confessionis justificabitur: quod si defectus fuit ex parte penitentis, & consequenter sit in mala fide, cogitare poterit cum per alias confessiones quod bono faceret, justificatum iri: Item tunc penitentem excusatum fuisse ob integritate ob infamiam vitandam aut scandalum. *Fillius. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 7. cap. 12. num. 369. pag. 211.* 11 Quod si penitens extra confessionem a Confessario rogatus ut licentiam sibi concedat ut in defectum in confessione commissum aperiat, & ille nolit licentiam concedere; an possit tunc Confessarius illi defectum aperire? Negat Diana, tr. 4. de Sac. resol. 87. & alii apud ipsum, & sane probabilius, cum in nullo casu absque expressa licentia penitentis liceat de peccatis in confessione auditis extra confessionem non solum cum aliis, sed etiam cum ipso penitente loqui. *Amicus tom. 8. disp. 14. sect. 4. num. 29. & 30. pag. 239.*

III. POINT.

Of the inward Disposition of the Penitent, and of sorrow for sin according to the Jesuits.

AS it is necessary that the Confessor know as much as lyes in him the inward disposition of his Penitent, and the regret which he hath for his sins, that he may give him absolution, he must also learn of the Jesuits:

- 1. That the least grief is a sufficient disposition to this Sacrament.
- 2. That it matters not whether it be natural or supernatural, true or apparent only, and provided the Penitent perswade himself that it is as it should be, it sufficeth.

1 Minima gratis est sufficiens ad remissionem omnium peccatorum; & ad

minimam gratiam sufficit minima contritio tanquam dispositio. Ergo, &c. *Fillius. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 6. cap. 9. num. 234.* 2 Quæres 7 an hic dolor debeat esse verus & realis, an vero sufficiat existimatus? Probabile est dolorem existimatum sufficere. *Fillius. tract. 7. de confess. cap. 6. num. 151. pag. 185.* Num necessarius sit dolor supernaturalis? Sufficit naturalis, qui tamen supernaturalis existimetur. *Eseob. tr. 7. exam. 4. num. 39. pag. 805.*

3. That if any Penitent be much addicted to some crime; that he press him not to exert some act of sorrow for this sin in particular. For it is to be feared that he will not detest it sincerely when it is represented single and alone; whereas he will find little or no difficulty to detest it in general and with others.

4. That if the Confessor can find in his Penitent no mark of sorrow, he may demand of him only if he be sorry that he hath offended God; and if he answer that he is, he ought to believe him, and give him absolution upon his word.

5. That though the Penitent himself tell him that he feels no sorrow in himself, and that he cannot have any, he ought to encourage him, and to quiet his mind, to tell him that it is enough that he desires to have this sorrow, and that he is grieved that he cannot grieve; and after this give him absolution. That if it be his fault that he sorrows not for sin, and that he hath not so much as a desire for it, he ought not be apprehensive for that neither, the Sacrament will always have its effect, and if not presently, yet in process of time when the Penitent shall remove this impediment, and endeavour himself to produce sorrow for his sine.

3 Unde quando advertis poenitentem cum valde sicu- cum imini ad- dictum, ne in- culeas doloris actum circa il- lud peculiare peccatum. Pe- ricu um enim suberit ne illud ex animo de- stetur, dum e- jus specialis memoria refri- scatur, quod in univcrsum & simul cum aliis detestandi diffi-

calitatem vel nullam sentite, vel exiguam. *Tamb. lib. 1. meth. confess. cap. 1. sect. 2. num. 5.* 4 Quando Confessor non habet signa sufficientia doloris, debet interrogare, an ex animo cœstetur; & si affirmat, potest & debet credere. *Filius. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 7. cap. 12. n. 253 pag. 210.* 5 Sufficientes cum Sacramento dolor est dolere quod non satis del. as. *Sz verb. contritio pag. 118.* To repose a Soul in peace which apprehends that he hath not that contrition which is necessary to the exoition of his sins in the Sacrament, he must be told that it may be supplied by the will he hath to have it, or the regret he hath for not possessing such as he desires, which might perfectly satisfy God. *Bauny in his Sum Chap. 42. pag. 685.* Absrendum omnino est Sacramentum poenitentiae in forme causae tempore sequenti suum effectum si tollatur indispositio quae causa fuit ut in principio est & us non sequeretur. *Dicaftih. tr. 3. de pœnit. d. 6. d. 6. n. 115.*

IV. P O I N T.

Rules for imposing Penance or Satisfaction according to the Jesuits.

1. **T**hey declare unto the Confessor that the Penitent may refuse the penance he ordains for him, and therefore that he ought not be severe, but sweet and obsequious, by imposing on him one which is sweet and slight.

2. That if he absolutely refuse penance, saying, that he will suffer the pains of Purgatory, he may absolve him; that he omit not for all that to impose upon him some slight thing by way of penance to preserve the integrity of the Sacrament.

3. That to avoid the difficulties and contestations he may have with his Penitent, he may appoint him for penance some slight thing which he is already obliged to do.

4. That he may also content himself to ordain for satisfaction what good or evil he doth or suffers on the week or day of his confession.

5. That it sufficeth to say to him in general; that he do something for satisfaction for his sins, and leave him in liberty to do what he pleaseth, without ordering him any thing by commandment, but only by counsel.

1 Si irrationabiliter gravis poenitentia fuit, non teneat implere, quia nec Confessarius ligare eum potuit, nec poenitentis se se in- tendit il ligari. *Escob. tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 191. pag. 289.* 2 Quod si affirmet se velle Purgatorii poen- nas lubere, se- vem adhuc poen- nentiam im-

ponat ad Sacramenti integritatem, cum præcipue agnoscat gravem non accepturum. *Ibid.* He that refuseth at the Sa- crament to receive any penance at all, the very slightest that may be imposed upon him for his faults, is not in an estate to be absolved: but he that is of the contrary opinion, may give it him, because all may attend to satisfy for their sins in the other life. They are not then obliged to prevent that time as they should be, if to avoid sin they were ob- liged to accept of what their Confessor hath ordained for satisfaction for one part of their faults. *Bauny in his Sum; Chap. 46. pag. 708. & 709.* 3 Docet Suarius opus aliquo præceptum posse aliquando in poenitentiam injungi. *Escob. tr. 7. exam. 4. n. 180. pag. 828.* 4 Impono tibi pro poenitentia quidquid hodie vel hac hebdomada boni feceris vel mali passus fueris. *Ibid. n. 181.* 5 An possit Confessarius poenitentiam omnino libere faciendam arbi- trario poenitentis imponere? Ex Suarii sententia affirmo non semper requiri ut aliquod opus in particulari imponatur. Sufficienter esse Sacramentalem satisfactionem si per modum consilii imponat, docet Suarius. *Ibid. n. 180. & 181.*

6. Dico
quero de præ-
cepto satisfaci-
endi pro peccata
temporeli, an
tale præceptum
debet? Dico 1.
1. mor. qq. tract. 6. cap. 8. num. 213. pag. 214.

6. That if he have any scruple by reason of this so great condescension, and 2112
have apprehensions that he ought not to use it, he must learn for quieting his con-
science that there is no precept divine or natural which obliges to do penance in
this life for the sins which we have confessed.

1. mor. qq. tract. 6. cap. 8. num. 213. pag. 214.

V. POINT.

Rules of the same Jesuits for giving Absolution.

1. Quando
Confessor
non habet signa
sufficientia do-
loris, debet in-
terrogare an ex
animo detestetur;
& si affi-
met, potest
& debet cre-
dere. *Filliut.*
1. mor. 1. qq. mor.
11. 7. cap. 12.
num. 355. pag.
210.

1. **W**hen the Confessor sees no true marks of repentance in the Penitent, and believes he is not disposed to receive absolution, the J. suits assure us that it is sufficient to stir him up to say, that he is sorry for his sins, and that after that word he ought to be absolved.

2. Absolvi
potest modo
proponat firmiter
non peccare,
etiamsi aliquot
ies sit relapsus.
*Emanuel Sa
verbo absolutio
n. 11. pag. 5.*

2. That though he hath frequently promised amendment without any effect; yet if he promise again to do it as formerly, he must be absolved.

3. Si non
obstant tunc
ce qu'ils au-
roient dit &
promis pour le
passé au Con-
fesseur, ils s'au-
roient laissé de se
porter avec excès &
liberté plus grande
dans les mêmes
fautes que devrnt:
on les doit recevoir
au Sacrement? C'est
la question que *Buony*
propose en sa *Somme*,
chap. 46. pag. 717.
Et après avoir dit qu'il
y en a qui tiennent
qu'il faudroit différer
l'absolution à ces
personnes, il aj. ūt.
Qui seroit le contraire,
pecheroit-il? Ce n'est
pas mon opinion. 4. B
un y dit encore au même
lieu que le penitent,
vero proposito affectu,
qui se resour aux
pieds du Prestre de
mettre fin à ses
pech. z paitiz, *dignus est
absolutione, toties quoties*,
userit d'en recevoir
pardon, *quandocunque
nullus notetur e
mentatio*, bien qu'il
ne s'amende, & bien
souvent qu'il est à
presumer telles
resolutions ne passer
pas le bout des
levres. 5. Absolvi
potest qui proponit
abstinere à peccato,
etiamsi credat se
proposito non statim
peccandi occasi
nem, modo proponat
firmiter non peccare,
etiamsi aliquoties
sit relapsus. *Sa
verbo absol. n. 11. p. 5.*

3. That if he relapse again, and add also new faults to his first, breaking out unto the greatest excess and liberty, so that he hath less hopes of his conversion than at the beginning; yet if he promise barely to amend, absolution ought not be refused him.

4. B un y dit encore
au même lieu que le
penitent, *vero
proposito affectu*,
qui se resour aux
pieds du Prestre de
mettre fin à ses
pech. z paitiz, *dignus
est absolutione, toties
quoties*, userit d'en
recevoir pardon,
*quandocunque
nullus notetur e
mentatio*, bien qu'il
ne s'amende, & bien
souvent qu'il est à
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peccandi occasi
nem, modo proponat
firmiter non peccare,
etiamsi aliquoties
sit relapsus. *Sa
verbo absol. n. 11. p. 5.*

4. When the Confessor knows that the promises of the Penitent are fraudulent 2113
and hypocritical, and come only from his teeth outwards, he may nevertheless
absolve him so often as he repeats unto him the same promises.

7. E quidem in
peccato ultimo
nunquam aut
rarissime deneganda
absolutionem, ob
doctrinæ Christianæ
ignorantiam. *Sanch.
op. mor. lib. 2. cap. 3.
num. 21. pag. 91.*

5. That if it happen that after so many faults and relapses the Penitent acknowledging his own weakness and the small disposition he hath to be truly converted do freely acknowledge to his Confessor that he believes that he hath not the power to refrain from relapsing, or to perform what he promises, this ought not to hinder the Confessor from giving him absolution, if he demand it.

7. E quidem in
peccato ultimo
nunquam aut
rarissime deneganda
absolutionem, ob
doctrinæ Christianæ
ignorantiam. *Sanch.
op. mor. lib. 2. cap. 3.
num. 21. pag. 91.*

6. That if he be engaged in occasions of sin, which are the causes of his relapses, and his Confessor represent unto him the danger hereof, and induce him to withdraw himself from them: but he will not part from them, and he hath some reason to abide in those occasions themselves, he shall not forbear to absolve him.

7. E quidem in
peccato ultimo
nunquam aut
rarissime deneganda
absolutionem, ob
doctrinæ Christianæ
ignorantiam. *Sanch.
op. mor. lib. 2. cap. 3.
num. 21. pag. 91.*

7 That he ought not to make any difficulty to absolve them that know not the Faith nor things necessary for their Salvation.

VI. POINT.

And immediately after he cites son e Confessors who say: Id peccatum mortale est, cum hoc sit in finem mortiferum; & bonum esse si bonus sit finis uni

7. There is yet herein another very subtle expedient to hide sins in confession, which hath some reference to the former, which is, that as you may hide them by parting your confessions to many Confessors, so you may also hide a sin by parting it into two. See here the case: *He that hath sworn chastity or poverty, saith Escobar, may satisfy the precept of Confession, by saying apart that he hath committed fornication or theft, and then adding that he hath twice violated his oath in things of importance.* For unless the Confessor suspects that he intends to deceive him, he will not understand by this that he hath violated the vow of Chastity.

leviora, aliter graviora explicare ad retinendam exultationem. Qui Confessor ordinarius a. i. o. levius solum peccata manifestat, prius alii Confessario graviter exponens, confessionis non laedit integritatem. Ex. gr. foenina carnis pisculo maculata, pudore detinetur n. Confessarium ordinarium adeat; laudabiliter incognito Confessario grave peccatum rederat, ne subicendi criminis periculum subeat, graviter subtraxerim confessorios qui tu-

8. If this be not enough, you are permitted to tell as many lyes as you need to deliver you from the shame which confession of sins might procure unto you. *Escobar* avouches that it is a probable opinion that it doth not offend against the integrity of Confession, if one having committed a mortal sin immediately after he hath made his Confession, whereupon he hath not yet received absolution, he say that he hath some other time committed this sin, and hath been absolved thereof. He adds at length, that this opinion about which he is in suspense, will become more probable, if we content our selves to say the Penitent may speak in this manner: *It is many years ago that I committed this sin, but I have not confessed it, because I forgat it innocently.*

9. For venial sins, they hold that we are not only not obliged to confess them: but that being examined by a Confessor we may lye, and say that we have not committed those which we have indeed, and that the fault which may be in this lye can be but slight. They say the same of mortal sins which we have confessed already; so that if the Confessor examine us, we may lye, and say that we never committed them, without sinning but slightly.

10. That when different opinions arise about any thing which appertains to Confession, as concerning restitution, the disposition necessary for receiving absolution, the obligation to quit the occasions of sin, and other such like, the Penitent may chuse that which is most large and more favourable to his corrupt interests, though it be less probable and less safe, and that he may oblige the Confessor to follow this opinion which he chuses, or at least to leave him to his liberty to follow and act according to this very opinion, though the Confessor be of a contrary opinion, and believe that which the sinner demands to be dangerous and unlawful.

os ordinarios alumnos alienam aliquando ditionem ineuntes, imprudenter quidem objurgant. *Escobar tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 4.* Nullum esse peccatum existimo vel saepe confessarium extraneum adire. *Ibid. problem. 21.*

7. Vi eo cum qui juravit aut vovit castitatem aut paupertatem praecipio posse sacri facere confessionis, si separatione perit fornicationem &furtum, addaque se bis juramentum in re gravi violasse. *Escobar lib. 4. Theol. mor. sect. 2. problem. 1. tom. 1.* 8. Commisit quis mortale peccatum non longe a confessionis hodiernae tempore a quo absolutus non est: ac ut minus pudoris instantiam, dicit dum confitetur peccatum illud quondam fuisse commissum etiam confessum: haec simulatio confessionis integritati est & non obest. Integritati confessio is non obest, &c. Primam sententiam sine serupulo admitterem, ac probabilioris partem esse judicarem, si poenitens solum temporis simulationem gereret, factus multis abhinc annis haec aut haec peccata commisi, quae quidem ex oblivione inculpabili falsus non sum.

9. Mentiri in confessione de peccatis venialibus, tunc de aliis confessionis mortalibus, veniale solum peccatum esse, tametsi antea illi propius sit apud se confiteri. *Sa verbo confessio n. 12. pag. 88.* In confessione mentiri de peccato veniali veniale est. *Escobar tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 107. pag. 816.* 10. Si poenitens uni probabili sententiae adhaeret, Confessarius vero contraria probabilioris ex parte, quid? Poenitentis sententiam probabiliori probabiliore relata se debet Confessarius conformare. *Escobar tr. 7. ex. 4. n. 7. p. 810.* Si poenitens in proxi bona fide sententiam sequatur quae a quibusdam Doctoribus aequam probabilis ac rata defenditur; Confessarius vero seu ordinarius, seu delegatus eandem speculativè improbabilem censat, non obstante sua persuasione tenetur absolutionem conferre. *Layman lib. 1. tr. 1. c. p. 5. sect. 2 n. 10. pag. 7.* Ex dictis deducitur Confessarium semper posse & debere contra propriam opinionem poenitentem absolvere, quando ille probabiliori opinione ductus putat aliquid sibi licitum esse quod Confessarius juxta suam opinionem putat illicitum. *Amicus tom. 3. disp. 15. sect. 4. num. 90. pag. 212.*

11. Imperfectiones, quales est divinis inspirationibus non correspondere, quibus excitebatur ad ni-

11. That it is not needful to confess that we have not conformed our selves to those divine inspirations, by which we have been excited to flye the too great care of bodily commodities, promotions unto dignities, &c. That these things are no matter of penance, because they are not sins: That the Penitent is not to be permitted even to accuse himself for not being sufficiently examined, nor for not having had so strong grief for his sins as he might have had, nor for not

loving God so strongly as he might have done, because these things and such like are no sins. This is the Doctrine of *Iannerus* reported by *Escobar* in his Problems, and by consequence put in the rank of probable opinions, which serves not only to abridge Confessions, but to take away many scruples, by permitting us to have as much care as we please of our bodies; and if God would turn us from it by his grace, to resist it without fear of offending him.

See here one part of the Jesuite Rules about the Sacrament of Penance, and the Duty of Penitents and Confessors, by which it is easie to judge whether sinners by following them may become great Saints, and Confessors Martyrs, and whether the one or the other will work any great miracles.

Certainly if these Rules so loose and soft be followed, it is no matter of wonder to see at this day such throngs of people crowding so frequently to Confession, we should rather wonder there are so many Priests who will undertake the Office of Confessors. It is true that if the condition of such become contemptible and servile by a conduct as so base and so dishonourable as that which the Jesuits have prescribed them, their duty also, as well as that of the Penitents, is amended become so easie, that following the Maxims of these new Doctors, there needs nothing else but to know, to speak, to confess well, and to have good hearing and a clear apprehension to perform worthily the Office of a Confessor.

men sufficiens non præmisit, quod intente non doleat de peccatis prout posset, quod Deum non dilexerit to a quâ valet intentione; quia cum hæc & similia peccata non sint, non debent in confessione exponi. *Escobar tom. 2. lib. 140. problem. 5.*

miam e rea corporalia comoda sollicitudinem fugiendam, ad fugiendam dignitatem promotiones &c. non sunt Sacramenti penitentia maneria, quia peccata non sunt.

Sic Tannerus l. 2. d. 4. q. 1. d. 4. n. 70. Salet us in lect. d. 1. a. n. 4. & d. 6. n. 4. & d. 7. n. 4. & 11. alserens quidem hâud permitterendum esse penitentem se accusare quod ex-

CHAPTER III. Of Prayer.

That the Jesuits destroy Prayer, in teaching that the Laity and the Ecclesiasticks themselves may satisfy their obligation to Prayer by praying without attention, without reverence, and even with voluntary distraction, and diverting themselves with all sorts of wicked thoughts.

Men fall into sin by being induced thereto by temptation, temptation cannot be surmounted but by the aid of God, the means to obtain his help is Prayer; so that if the life of man, according to the Scripture, be nothing but a continual combat against temptations, it follows that it ought also be a continual prayer to obtain necessary help and strength for the combat. This obligation is natural, because it is founded on the infirmity of nature, and the Son of God hath made thereof an Evangelical Precept: (1) *That we ought always to pray, and never to cease*; which he saith, not only by way of counsel, but by way of precept which obligeth of necessity, as is observed by the Catechism of the Council of Trent. But Father *Tambourin* tells us, (2) *That it is in the precept of prayer as in that of faith, hope, and charity, that there is no certain time wherein this precept obligeth directly, but that there is some wherein it obligeth indirectly, to wit, when it is necessary to acquire some good, or to remove some evil, which we observe that we cannot acquire or avoid without the help of God: that thence it follows, that he who prays not to God in a temptation against chastity, sins only against chastity, because he sins not in omitting prayer, but because of the danger he is in to violate chastity.*

1 Oportet semper orare & nunquam deficere. *Lec. 18. 1. Catechismus Conc. Trid. de necessitate orationis.*

2 Quando nam obligat naturale preceptum orandi vel adorandi?

quod supr. cap. 151. num. 8. de precepto fidei, spei & charitatis, non dicitur scilicet certum tempus & determinatum in quo directe obligat; sed esse illud in quo obligat indirecte necessitas boni acquirendi, aut mali avertendi, quæ acquiritur aut avertere sine Dei auxilio nos non posse tunc animadvertimus. Sequitur omittentem tempore tentationis orare, non peccare nisi contra castitatem, quia solum ex periculo violandi castitatem culpabilis est talis orationis omisso. *Lessius lib. 2. Tamen sentiremus hæc preceptum obligare, non est nobis in eo explicando diu immorandum, cum illud facile ab omnibus impleatur. Quis enim tam perditus est, ut aliquando Pater & Ave non recitet? Tamb. lib. 2. decal. cap. 4. sect. 2. num. 5.*

H:

He thinks not that we are at any time directly obliged to pray unto God any more then to love him, to believe on him, to hope in him; but indirectly by adventure, and as it were by accident. That is to say, that according to him, God hath not commanded us Prayer, Faith, Hope, and Charity for their own sakes, but only to help us in the exercise of some other vertue, or to surmount some temptation, when they are absolutely necessary thereunto: as a good Physician appoints not purging, bleeding, and other remedies for themselves; but only when they are necessary against the diseases and incommodities which we cannot be freed from but by their assistance.

So that Faith, Hope, Charity, and Prayer according to this Divinity, have no more part in the conduct of a Christian life, than purgation and blood-letting in the conservation of the natural life and health; and that as a Physician who hath prescribed a Purge, obligeth not the Patient to love it, nor to take it for its own sake, but simply to take it for the need he hath of it; in the same manner God commanding Prayer, Faith, Hope, and Charity, obligeth not Christians to love these vertues, and to exercise them for their own sakes, but only for necessity sake, and as it were by force upon such occasions in which they cannot dispense with them, without putting themselves in danger of losing life and Salvation, by sinning against other vertues. And as a man of a strong complexion who is not subject to be sick, though he be subject to some slight infirmities, may pass over his whole life without purgation or phlebotomy; so a Christian who is of a good and moderate natural disposition, and hath no violent passions, and is not subject to strong temptations, may pass his whole life without ever being obliged to pray unto God, to love him, to believe on him, nor hope in him; and yet he shall not for all that cease to be a good Christian, according to this new Divinity, nor to live well, nor to go to Heaven, and to deserve it by a good life.

The Prophet saith, that the just man lives by Faith: *S. Paul*, that we are saved through Hope; and *S. John*, that he who loves not abides in death; and that to obtain and preserve life and Salvation, we ought to pray without ceasing. And the Jesuits maintain on the contrary, that we may live justly, avoid death, and obtain Salvation without loving God, believing or hoping in him, and without ever or rarely praying to him in all our life time:

It suffices to relate these excesses barely which are unheard of in the Church, and as it were Monsters of error and impiety, and neither Comparisons nor Expressions can be found capable to represent them, neither can we call them otherwise than the universal overthrow of the whole Christian Religion, since they destroy Prayer, Faith, Hope, and Charity, which are its foundations, support, and perfection.

There is nothing which the simple light of Nature doth better make known unto all men, than the attention they ought to have to whatsoever they say, especially when they treat of important affairs, and with persons eminent in dignity and merit: but they redouble their respect and their attention when they beg any singular grace or favour from them, and there is no prudent man who would not condemn him of extravagance and folly, who should therein speak in any other manner, and who would not judge that he merited not only to be refused, but also to be punished for his rashness and insolence.

In the mean time the Jesuits hold that this carriage which appears so unsupported towards men, is good enough and sufficient towards God, and that the prayers which he ordains to be made unto him may be without affection, reverence, attention, and even with voluntary thoughts the most criminal that can be. Which is yet so much the more strange, because men may be deceived and not know the secret wandrings and irreverences of those who speak unto them: but all is visible to God, and he sees better the most secret dispositions of hearts, than we see the outward motions of bodies and faces. So that the insolencies which are committed inwardly before him, are no less known unto him, and are no less criminal, than those which are externally committed before men. Which yet hinders not the Jesuits to hold, that prayers made without sense of piety, without inward reverence, and attention, and even with a wandring spirit, voluntarily

luntarily distracted, and wholly replenished with impure and prophane thoughts, sufficeth to fulfil the obligation unto prayer.

Filliutius demands, if (1) to accomplish the Law which commands us to pray unto God, it be necessary to have attention, and what kind of attention this ought to be? Before he answers, he advertises the Reader, (2) That he intends to speak only of Canonical hours, which are recited upon obligation, and not of prayers which are made by private devotion. For in that case we are no more obliged to attend to what we say, than to any other sort of vocal prayers, and this obligation goes not further than to venial sin. That is to say, that whatsoever distraction we may have in the prayers which we make upon devotion, and not by particular Commandment, it can be no more than a venial sin; and for those which are rehearsed upon obligation, as are those which Beneficiaries and Religious persons say in reciting their office, this Author saith, that there are two opinions, the first which holds, (3) That none is obliged upon pain of mortal sin to an inward attention in saying his office, provided he rehearse it outwardly and entirely. And though he follows not this opinion absolutely, yet he passes it for probable, adding thereto in the process for his first Answer, (4) That according to his judgment this first opinion is probable. But if it be probable, then we must conclude, according to the Jesuits, that it may be followed with a good conscience, and it will become also more probable by the approbation which this Author bestows on it.

Escobar expounds himself yet more upon this point. (5) I know well, saith he, that it is only a venial sin through negligence to suffer ones self to fall into distractions during the office. Now it is demanded, whether it be a greater sin to indulge ones self therein voluntarily, and whether he be obliged to say the office over again. His Answer is, (6) That according to Azors opinion, which is also his own, it is a mortal sin when it is done through contempt; but the command of the Church is nevertheless thereby fulfilled, and we are not obliged to repeat the office, as hath been said above. So that whatever distraction there be in rehearsing the divine office, though it be voluntary, if it come of negligence and not of contempt, it is but a venial sin; and when it proceeds from a deliberate will and formal contempt, though it be a mortal sin, we fail not of satisfying the Church, and discharging our duty; that is to say, that the Church may be contented by despising it, and God satisfied by mortally offending him.

Coninck saith in a manner the same thing, speaking of the Mass and the manner it ought to be heard. (7) If there be no scandal nor contempt, saith he, distraction is not of it self a mortal sin, though it appear outwardly. And a little after he discovers the principle of this conclusion, saying, (8) That to satisfy the Commandment of the Church it is not necessary to have any inward devotion. Whence he draws this other conclusion more express than the former: (9) Hence it follows that he who is even voluntarily distracted during the whole time of the Mass, satisfies the Precept of the Church, provided he have such presence of mind as sufficeth him to assist at the Mass with some outward respect, as he ought.

efficiunt tener? Escobar tractat. 5. exam. 6. num. 157. pag. 679. 6 Azorium securus estero peccare ex cetero - p u mortaliter; satisfacere tamen Ecclesie precipienti, nec teneri iterum recitare, ut diximus supra. 7 Si ablit scien- dalum aut contemptus, d i t r a c t i o ex hac parte non est peccatum mortale, etiam si exterius appareat. Coninck 3. parte q. 83. art. 6. n. 247. pag. 186. 8 Non est necessarium ut quis satisfaciat precepto Ecclesie, ut habeat internam aliquam devotionem. Ibid. n. 301. 9 Hinc sequitur cum qui etiam voluntarie est toto tempore Sacri distractus, modo sufficienter sibi presentis sit, ut Sacro cum externa reverentia debite assistat, satisfacere precepto Ecclesie. Ibid. num. 302.

And because he perceived that it might be replied against him, that there was no apparent ground to believe that we might satisfy the Church by offending God, or that instead of a religious action which it commands when it ordains Mass to be heard, or the divine office to be recited, it would accept of a crime, and that also such a crime as is an irreverence and kind of contempt of Religion, he prevents this objection, and saith, (10) That though the exterior act without the interior be not a true action of vertue, and may have reference unto some wicked

1 Quæro eni & quæ attentio sit necesse est ad præceptum? 2 Pro responsione notandum agere nos de his canonice, quando recitantur ex obligatione, non autem de privata devotione. Tunc enim non est major obligatio attendendi quam in quacunque oratione vocali, & ad summum obligat sub veniali. Filliut. mor. qq. tom. 2. tr. 23. cap. 8. n. 252. pag. 126. 3 Prima neminem tenent sub mortali ad attentionem internam; modo integre recitetur exteriè. Ibid. 4 Respondeo & dico 1. primum sententiam probabiliter esse. Ibid. 5 Scio vagari in hoc ex negligentia in officio veniale solum peccatum esse. Rogo an si ex parte officii sit graviter delinquens, & ad repetendum 6 Nec re- fert quod actus exterius sine interio non potest habere rationem vere virtutis cum possit fieri ob malum finem.

quæ possimus præceptis Ecclesie satisfacere per actum qui non sit vera virtus, imo qui sit peccatum. Ibid.

end, this matters not ; because the Commandments of the Church may be satisfied by an action which is no act of true vertue, but which is in it self a sin.

But if this Answer content not, and it augment the difficulty in stead of resolving it, he adds, not to clear up this difficulty, but to shew how firm and settled he is in this opinion, (1) *That the outward act of prayer, which is done with the outward circumstances which it ought to have, is a true exterior action of the vertue of Religion, though it be done with voluntary distraction, and which is it self a sin, imo qui sit peccatum.*

According to this Maxime, if Herod had secretly killed Jesus Christ whilst he adored him, as he contrived his design when he learnt of the Wise-men that he was born, and if he had observed all the Forms and all the outward Ceremonies of adoration, at the same time giving only some signal unto his people to murder this Infant, as Judas saluting and kissing the same Jesus Christ with outward respect, and ordinary testimonies of affection which he ought him, marked him out to the Souldiers who were come to take him ; this Jesuit might have said of this Tyrant killing Jesus Christ in the very act of adoration, and of Judas betraying him by a kiss, that which he saith of Ecclesiasticks and Christians offending God mortally in prayer ; (2) *That the act of adoration and salutation, as well as that of prayer, which is done with all the outward circumstances which ought to be had, is a true outward action of Religion.*

And because such a religious action was never heard of before, and that it is a difficult thing even so much as to conceive this sort of adoration, he expounds it by an example quite contrary. (3) *Altogether the same, saith he, with the outward adoration which is rendered to an idol, and as it is a true and outward act of adoration and of Idolatry, though he who makes this adoration outwardly, hath no intention to adore the Idol ; so he who prays unto God, or who adores him outwardly without intention to pray or adore ; but rather on the contrary with an intention to dishonour and offend, imo qui sit cum peccato, doth exercise according to this Jesuit a true outward action of prayer and adoration appertaining to the vertue of Religion.*

It might seem at first sight that this is the utmost point of disorder whereunto it were possible to fall in this matter ; but Father Banny descends yet lower. He demands, *if the Chanons fulfil their duty, and earn their dividends, who being assistants in the Quire during holy Service, pass their time in scandalous discourse, and in employment altogether vicious, as in laughing, scoffing, &c.* That is, in doing and saying other things which we dare not express openly, and which yet is comprehended in what he saith, *that they pass their time in an employment altogether vicious.* Though he concludes not for the affirmative, yet for all that he testifies sufficiently that it rather shame and fear of men that hinders him from declaring himself, and he makes it well appear that he is not far off from this opinion, in that he contents not himself only to report and propose it as probable, and to say, that we may follow and advise it with a safe conscience ; which is truly to approve it : but he approves it yet more formally by supporting it with all the reasons he can. See here how he talks : *Because we are not assured of the intention of the Church, and that the Texts of c. 1. de Cler. non res... of c. Licet 32. of the title de Prebend. make no mention save of their assistance in the Quire, and because the custom every where received exacts of the Chanons no other thing that they may receive their dividends, but that they be present, I esteem them without blame and reproach, who in favour of their Penitents hold this second opinion.*

Here are four reasons to be observed, upon which he concludes that they are not reproachable, who maintain that the Chanons satisfy their duty as far as the Church obligeth them therein, and earn their dividends by assisting in the Quire with irreverence, and that even outward also, *by laughing, scoffing, and spending their time in employments altogether vicious.* 1. Because it is enough that they are present. 2. Because the custom every where received requires no other thing of them. 3. Because this opinion is favourable to Penitents. The Jews and Pagans themselves who have any knowledge of God, will perhaps be ashamed to speak

in this sort, and to say that we may pray to him and serve him in so prophane and unworthy a manner.

His fourth reason is, *because we are not assured*, saith he, *of the intention of the Church*. It is apparent that he hath taken this reason from *Filius*, who to confirm the opinion which he holds, that whatsoever voluntary distractions we can have in prayer, and in the divine Office, there is therein no more than venial sin, makes use of this very same reason. For after he had brought for proof of this opinion, (1) *that it is sufficiently accommodate to mens frailty, and to the difficulty of holding the spirit of man a long time attentive to one object*; he adds, (2) *That for this cause it is likely that the Church had no intention by its precept to oblige men to a thing so difficult, that the greatest part of men cannot observe*. He would say that when the Church commands the faithful to pray unto God, and to the Ecclesiasticks to recite the divine Office, and to both of them to be assistant at Mass on Festival days, *we are not assured*, that it forbids voluntary distractions and wicked thoughts wherewith they voluntarily please themselves: *we are not assured*, that it would that we should at least demean our selves with some outward reverence, or whether indeed it have not left to all a liberty to laugh, scoff, and pass their time in scandalous discourse, and in an employment altogether vicious.

1 Quia satis accommodata est hominum fragilitati & difficultati quæ humanus intellectus experitur in attendendo diu uni rei.

2 Verisimile est autem Ecclesiam non esse obligare ad rem arduam, ita ut major hominum pars eas servare non possit. Filius.

tom. 2. mor. 99. tra. 23. c. 8. num. 253. pag. 126.

Now if these Jesuits had said as some of their Fraternity, that the Church had not power to forbid the greatest part of these things, which respect the thoughts; though their opinion had been false, it had for all that been less criminal and less injurious to the Church. For to say, that it cannot command us to pray to God with reverence and attention, is to hurt its Authority: but to say, that it is not its intention, or that it would not, or only to doubt whether having power it would, and whether it desires we should bear that reverence and attention which God demands in prayer, is to violate its Holiness, to give it an intention far distant from that of God, to deny that it is guided by the Spirit, and to make it accountable for all the crimes which are committed in this kind; because having power it forbids them not, as *Filius* and *Bauny* suppose. For otherwise it were in vain that they should trouble themselves to know its intention and will in a point which depends not at all on its will.

But though there were some one to be found who might doubt of this, or who of gross ignorance knew not the intention of the Church in this matter, it is not lawful for Father *Bauny* to make use of this pretence to favour an opinion which leads unto Libertinism and Irreligion, and we need not seek more clear testimony to destroy this error than his own, since he declares in Chap. 20. of his Sum, pag. 332. *That being true devotion is in the heart, and not in the carriage, or without, in the fashion and other outward gesture, and that this pretended devotion without is but a vizard and an Idol of devotion*; it is a resolved case, that in the voluntary distraction and wandring of the mind in praying by obligation, as do Priests, Deacons and Subdeacons, and Beneficiaries, there is sin; and so they are obliged to repeat the Office which they have said with so great indevotion. For the will of the Church is, that by this action which it commands them they should praise and pray unto God their Creator. And do they this whilst they have nothing less during their singing, than God before their eye? They ought then to fulfil their duty begin the Office again, and in default thereof, if they be Beneficiaries they are bound to restore either to the Church where their Benefice is, or to the poor the fruits they have received, according to the rate of their omissions, as may be collected from the Bull of Pius V.

He pursues the same matter, and declares once more in the same place what is the intention of the Church in the Command which it give Ecclesiasticks and Beneficiaries to recite the Office. *The Church intends not*, saith he, *to make the Ecclesiasticks, Possessors of the fruits of their said Benefice, if they earn it not by their labour. The disposure thereof is conditional, if they perform the prayers with which they are charged, doing them to the praise and honour of God. And can we say with truth that they deserve to be his servants, or put into the rank of those who render him the worship which his Majesty requires of them, when they have their lips only occupied in his service, and not their heart, because it is filled with unprofitable thoughts*

and very remote from the greatness of his Majesty to whom they speak? pag. 333.

He had already said the same thing in Chap. 13. pag. 165. where he makes of it a conclusion, promoting it not only as his opinion, but also as a manifest and certain thing. 2. Saith he, *The said Beneficiaries are obliged to make restitution of the fruits received from their Benefices when they say their hours, but imperfectly with voluntary distraction which endures throughout the whole Office or the greater part thereof.* And after he had cited many Authors who are of this opinion, he gives this reason for it: *Because that not to recite their hours at all, or to do it indecently with out respect, attention and reverence, is all one before God, since he is equally despised and dishonoured in both,* pag. 165. 2133

Can we speak more clearly or more absolutely on this subject? *It is a resolved case, saith he, that prayer which is made without attention is but a vizard and an Idol of devotion; that the Ecclesiasticks and Beneficiaries who recite the Office with voluntary wandering and distraction of mind are obliged to begin it anew, and in default of doing this they are bound to restore the fruits received: that the will of the Church is, that by this action which it commands them they should praise and pray unto their Creator: That the Church doth not intend to make the said Ecclesiasticks Possessors of the fruits of their said Benefices, but on the condition that they pray unto God, praise and honour him: that they honour him not at all, but rather dishonour and condemn him when they have only their lips occupied in his service, and not their hearts, because it is filled with unprofitable thoughts.*

Who would not say after this, that this Father is so perswaded of these things, that he holds them almost for Articles of Faith, or at least for indubitable truths, whereto the whole world ought to consent? And who would believe that he could say at the same time, *That we are not assured of the intention of the Church upon the same things: that he could imagine that they were without reproach and blame who hold, that Beneficiaries and Chanoins satisfie their duties, and earn their dividends, who assisting in the Quire during the holy Service, pass their time in scandalous discourse, and in an employment altogether vicious, as in laughing, scoffing, &c.* 2134

To which of the two opinions of this Jesuit ought we to hold; or rather how shall we know which is his opinion, what he saith, and what he thinks? He saith all, and he saith nothing, because he unsays and contradicts himself. He is of what opinion you please, and he is of none. But if mens last words be more considerable than their first, and if we may rely on them as their last resolution, there is cause to believe that this Father hath related so clearly the judgment and intention of the Church concerning the abuse of those who pray and recite the Office without intention and without respect, only to overturn it, and to testify the little account he makes of it, because he hath confidence a little after to say, that we may prudently presume that *it was not the will of the Church to oblige Priests, Beneficiaries, and others to the divine Office with so great severity, that they sin mortally, if they have not an inward attention thereunto; since it seems not in its precept for reciting the hours, to erect any other thing of the Priests and others who are bound thereunto, but to honour and praise God; which they do in singing Psalms and chaunting, though with voluntary distraction, and in which they continue, provided that this be done, and they sing tunably and with reverence,* pag. 534.

But the Argument he makes, and the Example he brings to establish his Discourse, and to confirm this strange Opinion, is remarkable. *For the outward action, saith he, wherewith we attend on God, is of the Diocess, and an appurtenance of the verue of Religion. Wherfore as he who without intention to commit Idolatry, bends his knee before an Idol, is held for an Idolater nevertheless: so we must believe that they pray who recite the Office, though without intention, yet not without outward decency and composure, such as that action requires,* pag. 335: 21350

Coninek makes use of the same Reasoning and the same Example in this same matter, as we have seen above, and there is cause to believe that Father Bauny hath only copied and translated him: but the one and the other ought to have called to mind that it is much easier to do harm than good; and that what is evil in it self is always evil, to what intention soever it be done. But to do good

it is not sufficient to do a thing which is good in it self, if it be not well done, that is, with good intention, according to this Rule: *Bona bene agenda.*

The Reasoning which Father *Bruny* takes up at length upon this Point, is as false and ridiculous as his Example. *And that this is true, saith he, may be collected from this, that it imports not a little to the glory of God, that we address our selves to him with outward respect, which edifies the people, and obtains his favours from Heaven, whereto prayers are useful, though said without attention.*

We need not seek Reasons to make appear the extravagance of these words; it is sufficient to make it known, to represent what the same Jesuit, pusht on by the force of the truth, saith, Chap. 16. pag. 165. *That not to recite the hours at all, and not to do it decently, is all one before God, since he is equally dishonoured and condemned in both.*

After he hath advanced these so strange Maxims which overturn Religion and Prayer, which is as it were the first-fruits and most common exercise thereof; and after he hath established these Maxims by such Reasons and such Examples, he draws from thence practical Conclusions as pernicious, which he bestows on Confessors and Directors, to serve them as a Rule in the conduct of Souls, and in the resolution of all doubts and difficulties which may be proposed unto them in this matter.

According hereunto, saith he, the Confessor shall not reprove his Penitent as for any mortal fault, for having applied his mind to frivolous things, so long as his tongue resounded the praises of God with others in the Church, if in outward appearance he did nothing that was incompatible with this action, pag. 335.

He shall not oblige him to the repetition of any thing said in that manner, since in pronouncing them in that sort he hath fulfilled the precept, nor yet to make restitution of the fruits received from his Benefice, if he have any.

Which very thing he himself condemns but two pages before, saying, *That Ecclesiasticks who pray with voluntary distraction and wandring minds, ought for the performance of their duty, begin their Office anew; and in default of so doing, if Beneficiaries, they are bound to restore unto the Church where their Benefice is, or to the p or the fruits received according to the rate of their emissions, as he collectis from the Bull of Pius V.*

So his mind appears floating betwixt error and truth, which dazles his eyes, and constrains him to acknowledge and confess it; and it would be hard to judge what may be concluded of Propositions so different and contrary, if he did not himself discover throughout his Book a design he hath to let the Reins loose unto the corrupt inclinations of Nature, and to give men liberty to follow their desires and lusts, as well in Civil as Religious matters. For there is nothing but the consideration of man, and the fear of scandal that holds him back a little, and hinders him from doing it so openly; and this fear and this carriage engages him continually in these manifest contrarieties which are inevitable unto those who would flatter men and corrupt the truth.

Here would be a proper place to speak of the Dispensations which the Jesuits give Ecclesiasticks from reciting the Office upon Reasons so slight, and oftentimes so ridiculous, that they themselves unto whom this obligation seems most grievous and troublefom, durst not demand them, if they did not by offering them unto them, prevent them, and in some sort force them to receive them, by assuring them, that they may make use of them with a safe conscience, though their own, altogether corrupt as it is, reproach them for it, and that the light of Nature only suffices to discover that they ought not do it. But because we have already produced some in the Treatise of Probability for Example sake, I will content my self to add only one more here in this place out of *Tambourin*, who saith, (1) *That he who is perblind, or any other who hath any disease in his eyes, if he fears to lose his sight by little and little in reading, is not obliged to read his Breviary. But if this perblind, or otherwise of weak eyes, do voluntarily read Fables or Histories whilst he dispenses with himself for reading his Breviary, doth he sin? I answer, that he sins not against his obligation of saying his prayers. But I am assured he sins in reading these Fables to the prejudice of his health; which yet*

I Hinc luscus & quicunque ex oculis laborat. si timeat legendi vim ea legendo paulatim deperdere, non legat. 14. Quid si hic luscus, vel ille valedudinarius legat voluntarie fabulas vel historias, omittit autem officium, peccabitne? Respondeo non peccatum contra obligationem recitandi officium, peccatum non ambigo illum, quia tabulas cum sanitatis decremento legit: quod tamen detrimentum saltem notabile ratio eveniet, quia hinc lectionibus quantum ex hoc capite recreatur animus, non tantum opprimitur. *Tambour.* l. 2. decal. c. 5. § 8. n. 14.

will rarely happen; because that sort of reading is recreative, and hurts not much. This Ecclesiastick who hath eyes to read Fables, and hath not to read his Office, will easily be confirmed in so good a disposition by *Tambourin*. This Jesuit is not troubled at all to dispense with the obligation of rehearsing his Office, because of the weakness of his sight: and though after that he durst not openly justify him that weakens it yet more by reading of Fables: yet to leave him this liberty nevertheless, he pretends that he will not weaken it by this reading, as by that of the Breviary, or at least that this will rarely happen; *quod detrimentum saltem notabile raro evenit*. And the reason is, because he recreates his spirit, and finds pleasure in reading Fables, supposing that he cannot take any in that of his Office. Which agrees very well with what he and his Fellows do commonly call the Divine Service, the Charge, the Burthen, the Drudgery, *onus diei*, the load of the day. Whence it comes, that they teach the Ecclesiasticks, to discharge themselves thereof the most they can, as of some burthensom and odious thing; assuring them, as we have made appear, that they sufficiently satisfy their obligation and the intent of the Church, in reciting them externally without any attention, with voluntary distraction, and busying themselves with all sorts of extravagant, dishonest, impious thoughts, and even with design not to satisfy the Precept of the Church. 2139

CHAPTER IV. Of Good Works.

That the Jesuits Maxims destroy them.

Good Works may be destroyed two ways; either by inclining men to do them ill; or by diverting them from doing them at all. It would be easie to prove that the Jesuits teach to do them ill, in this that they maintain, that such may be done as are truly good without any succour of Grace, and that we may do those which are meritorious of eternal life without respect had unto God or eternal life, and without once thinking thereof, provided that in doing them, we be not under mortal sin. But because this Point is more subtle, and I have spoken thereof already before; I will not insist on it here, contenting myself to make appear, that they excuse and justify those who do no good Works at all, though they be able, testifying unto them, that they are not bound thereunto; and by this means they divert men from the practice of them, removing from them the obligation, and abolishing the Commandment as much as in them lyes.

Escobar after he had acknowledged, that there is a Commandment which obligeth us by divine and natural light to do alms, inquires, (1) *When this Precept obligeth?* He answers, *That in extream necessity we are obliged to do alms of such things as are not necessary unto life, though they be needful to support us in our condition.* His Reason is; *Because the life of our neighbour ought to be preferred to the decency of our condition.* He presupposeth, as he expounds himself before, that by extream necessity we are to understand that on which the life of man depends. So that if he be not assisted, he will surely dye; and in this estate he believes that we are obliged to give of what we have superfluous, and which may help him to live more commodiously. This is no great excess of Charity to give for saving our neighbours life what is not at all necessary unto us. 2140

But he extends not this Charity much farther, demanding concerning the same subject, (2) *If he that hath more than he needs for to live according to his condition, be obliged to help the common necessities?* He answers, *That it is probable that he is obliged thereto; but it is more probable that he is not obliged.* That is to say, that a person that hath abundance, and who after he hath satisfied all his own necessities and those of his family, hath yet a superfluity, is not obliged in a publick Famine to give unto the poor, nor to any one whomsoever, if he see him not in evident danger to dye with famine: (3) *For otherwise, saith this Jesuit, there would be very few rich men saved.* As if he had a design by this reason to oppose the

Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 1. Chap. 4. Artic. 5.

judgment,

1 Quando nam hoc obligat p̄ceptum? Respondeo quæstioni, teneri nos elemosynam exhibere in necessitate extrema ex rebus vitæ superfluis, licet statui sint necessaræ; quia proximi vita superat mei status decentiam. Escob. tr 5. ex. 5. n. 43. p. 632.

2 Qui vero & statui habet superfluis, teneaturne communibus necessitatibus subvenire? Probabile est reari, probabilius non teneri. Ib. n. 47. p. 633.

3 Ad hæc enim pauci divites salutem consequentur. Ibid.

judgment, and expreſs the word of Jeſus Chriſt, who ſays by way of admiration, (1) *How hard is it for them who have wealth to enter into the Kingdom of God!* Obſerving how few rich men were ſaved, by reaſon of the great difficulty of their Salvation, things ſo difficult are always rare: and on the contrary this Jeſuit pretends that there are many ſaved, and that it is not hard for them to be ſaved, which they may do according to him, without making uſe of the principal means which God hath given them, which is the exerciſe of Charity, ſince he diſpenſeth with them in the obligation of doing, except in extreame neceſſity, which is very rare.

Nor will he have them always bound therunto even in extreame neceſſity; as when it is needful that they retrench ſomething of what is of uſe unto them for to live commodiouſly, and in honour and reputation in the world. For he demands, (2) *If a rich man be obliged to aſſiſt his neighbour who is in extreame neceſſity with a notable diminution of what belongs unto his condition?* And to answer with more aſſurance in ſo important a Point, wherein the life of a man in extremity is concerned, and who is in danger to give up the Ghoſt for want of aſſiſtance, he makes uſe of the Authority of two of his Fraternity. (3) *I have already answered,* ſaith he, *that he is not obliged according to Coninck, to whom he adds Tolet who gives this important advice upon this ſubject, we muſt not eaſily condemn rich men who do no alms, ſince the Doctours accord not when it is mortal ſin not to do them.* (4) *Tambourin adds thereto a reaſon which ſecures Confefſors, if it be good, and which makes that abſolution can never be reſuſed to a rich man becauſe of his hard-heartedneſs towards the poor. So it is,* ſaith he, *that rich men bring always ſome apparent reaſon for which they reſuſe to do alms.* An apparent reaſon is ſufficient to this Father to elude the Law and the Word of God, as if God were to be contented or deceived as well as men by vain appearances.

Escobar a little above, n. 154. doubts not at all, but conſtantly aſſures us, that rich men commit no mortal ſin at all in not giving even of the ſuperfluity of their wealth unto the poor who are in a great and preſſing neceſſity. (5) *I am aſſured,* ſaith he, *that a rich man ſins not mortally in not giving alms to the poor of what he hath ſuperfluous in their great neceſſity.*

Tolet, whom he alledgeth, ſaith, (6) *That when there is no great neceſſity, when we can aſſiſt our neighbour without notable diminution of our wealth, honour, or life, we are therunto obliged under mortal ſin; but if we cannot do it without notable diminution in theſe things, we are not obliged.* He would have the rich do their alms at a ſmall charge, and without incommodity, or at leaſt without feeling the inconvenience which they may receive in doing them.

He ſpeaks yet more clearly in *lib. 8.* where he inquires, (7) *Whether in common neceſſities, we are obliged by the Commandment to do alms of our ſuperfluities?*

And after he had ſaid, that this is the judgment of *S. Thomas* and of *Cajetan*, he adds: (8) *For all this the common opinion holds the contrary, and there are that ſay even that we are not obliged thereto under mortal ſin, even in a great neceſſity.* Whence he takes his foundation to eſta bliſh this general Concluſion. (9) *That none is obliged under mortal ſin to give of his ſuperfluities, unleſs it be in extreame and very great neceſſities.* All his reaſon is, the Authority of the Caſuiſts of that time, as he ſaith himſelf. *I am of this opinion, becauſe this is the common opinion of the Doctours, and I dare not declare them guilty of mortal ſin whom ſo many great Doctours do excuſe.*

1 Quam difficile qui pecuniam habent in Regnum Dei intrabunt. Luc. 18. v. 24.

2 An dives teneatur pro-mo ſubvenire, etiam in extrema neceſſitate conſtituto, cum gravi preiudicio ſtatu detrimere: Traſt. 5. ex 6. n. 155. pag. 652.

3 Ex Conſtitutione confirmavi. Addo ex Toledo, cum Doctores non conveniant quando peccet mortaliter qui non facit elemoſynam, non facile condemnandos divites qui non largiuntur. Ib.

4 Quamvis Conſtitutione abſolutionem a peccatis diviti non facile negare debeat, quod communes pauperum miſerias per elemoſynam ſublevare monitus reſuſcit; cum quia de obligatione hanc & quæſiſſet, Doctores non conveniunt; cum quia ſemper dives aliquam cauſam in ſpecie præſentat cur reſuſcit. Tambour. lib. 5. decal. c. 1. ſect. 1. n. 18.

5 Scio in gravi pauperum neceſſitate divitem non dando ſuperflua, non

peccare mortaliter. Ibid. n. 154. 6 Extra extremam neceſſitatem ſi quis ſine detrimento vitæ, honoris, aut rei, aut cum parvo detrimento poteſt alium juvare, teneatur ſub mortali: ſi vero abſque notabili prædictorum detrimento non poteſt, non teneatur. Tolet. lib. 4. Inſt. ſacerd. cap. 10. num. 5. pag. 635. 7 An ex ſuperfluis teneamur facere elemoſynam in communibus neceſſitatibus ex præcepto? Tolet. lib. 8. cap. 25. num. 2. pag. 1242. 8 Tamen communis opinio tenet contrarium. Ino aliqui ſunt nec etiam in gravi obligati ſub mortali. 9 Sic ergo altera conſuſio. Nullus ſub mortali teneatur diſtribuere ſuperflua extra extremas & graves neceſſitates. Ibid. n. 3.

1 Iam te-
neo propter
commune
Doctorem sen-
tentiam, nec
audeo obligare
sub mortali eos
quos tanti Do-
ctores excusant.

2 Cum in-
ter Doctores
non conveniat
quando peccet
mortaliter qui
non facit ele-
mosynam, non
facile condem-
nandi sunt di-
vites qui non
faciunt. *Sa verb.*
Eleemos. n. 2.
pag. 201.

3 Extra ex-
tremam neces-
sitatem eleemo-
sinam sub mor-
tali peccato
non esse præ-
ceptam dicunt.
Ibid.

4 Istam te-
neo propter
commune
Doctorem sen-
tentiam, nec
audeo obligare
sub mortali
quos tot & tan-
ti Doctores ex-
cusant.

5 Et si Scho-
lasticorum
communis sen-
tentia eos ex-
cuset, tamen
Doctores Sancti
eos damnant,
ita ut profecto
sententia
probabilis illos
obligari sub
præcepto. *Tolet.*
l. 8. c. 35. n. 3.
pag. 1242.

6 Vides tot
Sanctos dam-
nare superflui
retentionem,
multum ergo
timendum est.
Ibid.

Dicastillus saith, (1) *That this Author holds that we may fulfil this Precept of Alms, by lending only without giving any thing; another may add, that it may be satisfied by lending upon usury, and there are some who say it already in effect, though they express it not in the same terms. For to authorize Usury, they teach them that make profession thereof, to say to those who borrow money of them, that in lending unto them their intent is not usurious, but altogether designed to do them good; that they pretend that it is only to do them a pleasure, and to exercise Charity that obligeth them to lend to them.*

Emanuel Sa saith the same thing, and almost in the same words. (2) *The Doctores being not agreed when we sin mortally in not doing alms, we must not easily condemn the rich who do them not at all.* And a little after citing *Tolet* in the place before alledged with some other Casuists, and reporting that Judgment, he concludes thus: (3) *They say, that unless in case of extream necessity, alms is not commanded under mortal sin.* That is to say, that unless we see some person that hath his Soul in a manner hanging on his lips, or who is in evident danger of death, it is no great sin for him that is able to assist him to abandon him. This is, to speak properly, to discharge men from the obligation of giving alms, these extream necessities never falling out in a manner, and there being few persons who see any such in many years, or not at all in their whole lives: and when such an one by great accident is presented, we are not obliged any farther to provide for them, according to these Doctores, if we have not wealth to spare, and riches that are superfluous; and there being hardly any person who believes he hath such, or who indeed hath such, so much doth Covetousness, Luxury, House-keeping rack men at this day, and makes all men in a manner necessitous; so the obligation of giving alms shall be abolished, and there shall hardly be any person found who shall think himself obliged to assist his neighbour to what necessity soever he be reduced.

But the words of *Tolet* are considerable, and discover also with advantage the solidity of this Doctrine. (4) *I am, saith he, of this opinion, because it is the common judgment of the Doctores: and I dare not engage him in mortal sin whom so many great Doctores excuse.* He calls the Casuists of these last times great Doctores, and he dares not depart from their opinion, though he avows after that they are themselves departed from that of the holy Fathers, who were the Doctores and Masters of the Church before them, which hath proposed them as such to all the faithful of latter Ages, and by much stronger reason to Priests and Divines who ought to be the most perfect amongst the faithful. For he acknowledges, that although the Scholasticks discharge the rich from the obligation they have to give alms of that which they have superfluous; the holy Fathers for all that, and the common judgment of Antiquity obligeth them thereunto. (5) *Though the common opinion of the Schol-men excuse them, saith he, yet the holy Doctores condemn them. So that it is very probable that they are obliged thereunto by Precept.*

He is not content to say in general, that this is the Judgment of the holy Fathers: but he cites many passages of *S. Ambrose*, *S. Jerom*, *S. Austin*, *S. Basil*, and of *S. Chrysostom*, who place in the rank of those who rob or detain unjustly the goods of others, all them who give not to the poor what remains of their wealth after they have provided for their just and true necessities. *You see, saith he after he had named all these Fathers, (6) so many of the Saints who condemn them that do not their alms of what they have of superfluity. There is therefore herein much cause to fear.* He might have added to the Authority of these Fathers that are the most illustrious and the most famous of the Church, that of all the rest, for they all agree in this Point, so that there is not one found to say the contrary.

So that if there be one Point of Doctrine established on the ancient and universal Tradition of the Church, this is as clearly as any other; and if that which is established upon this Tradition, ought to pass for indubitable amongst Catholick Divines, and amongst all the Faithful, as it hath always certainly been until this present, we cannot call this Doctrine into doubt, without wounding the Authority of the Church and the foundations of the Faith; and to say it is

probable, as *Tolet* saith: *Professio sententia probabilis est*, is not of much better effect than to say that it is false, because this is to hold always for doubtful the ancient and universal Tradition of the Church, and to give men liberty to decide Points of Divinity, and to expound Scripture against the consent of the Fathers; which is expressly forbidden by the Council of *Trent*.

Another that hath not read the Fathers, might be excused by his ignorance. But this excuse hath no place in *Tolet*, who forsakes them after he had cited them: and which is yet more unsupportable and more injurious to these great Saints, he renounces their Judgment after he had acknowledged it, to follow that of the new Divines of our times. (1) *If the School-men*, saith he, *did not agree so unanimously as they do in this very Judgment, by which we may in some sort excuse these persons who give not in alms what they have of superfluity. we must without doubt have condemned this sparingness*, so as the holy Fathers condemn it, as he saith himself: *Vides tot Sanctos damnare superflui retentionem*. He pretends then that the holy Fathers on one side condemn those who give not in alms what they have of superfluous; and on the other hand the new Scholasticks excuse them, we must hold to the Judgment of these later, if we will believe this Jesuit, and follow his Example.

But if it be lawful in this manner to oppose the new Divines to the ancient Tradition in this Article, and in this opposition to prefer the Judgment of the Casuists before that of the holy Fathers, instead of judging and correcting the Moderns by the Tradition of Antiquity; it will be lawful to do the same thing in all other Points which concern Manners or Religion; and so there shall be nothing fixed in the Doctrine of the Church, and Antiquity shall be no more a mark of Truth and Faith; but Novelty shall be more considerable, though until this present it hath passed for a Vice and a mark of Errour.

But for all that he hath over-reached in saying that this new Opinion which he holds is the common and unanimous of the School-men, he having himself acknowledged at his first setting out, that *S. Thomas* and *Cajetan* were not for it, who are not of the least consideration; and no more is it that of others, the more ancient School-men especially; which doth the more heighten his excess. For if all the School-men had been of one and the same advice upon this Point, that of the holy Fathers being contrary to theirs, it would without doubt be a great rashness to quit the Fathers to follow the new School-men. But these being divided upon this Point, and the Saints on the contrary being all of one and the same Judgment, so that there is not one single one who therein contradicts the rest, the insolence and presumption appears yet more insupportable, to prefer the opinion of one part of the new Divines to the common and universal Judgment of the holy Fathers, and one part also even of the most famous School-men.

The Jesuits then hold, that the Rich are not obliged to give alms but only of their superfluity, and they will not oblige them thereunto neither but in case of great necessity. But if you demand of them what they understand by superfluous things; *Tambourin* will answer you, (2) *That there are some who maintain with probability, that the things which are necessary to advance and exalt us unto a better condition are not superfluous. After this opinion it will rarely happen that we can have superfluous goods*. He might have said even that this would never happen at all, observing the corruption which reigns at this day in the world, where we see that the ambition of men is insatiable as well as their covetousness, and that desiring always to advance themselves, they labour also perpetually to enrich themselves; so that these two passions grow always together, and have no bounds, how great wealth soever they possess, their greediness cannot be filled nor satisfied, but they travel continually to heap up more, persuading themselves that they never have sufficient to furnish them or their expences and designs, so far are they from believing they have any superfluity to give in alms. And so they shall not be obliged to give alms according to this Divinity which obliges them not even in extrem necessity, but in case they have somewhat superfluous.

1 Et nisi esset unanimitas Scholasticorum sententia non possunt excusari modo aliqui tales homines, absque dubio damnanda esset talis retentio. *Ibid.*

2 Aliqui contendunt probabiliter eas quæ sunt necessarias ad acquirendum meliorem statum non esse superfluas. *Gransd. 22. controv. 4. d. 2. l. 4. n. 18. lege Lugo, &c.* Ideo raro quis in hac sententia dicitur habere bona superflua. *Tamb. l. 5. Decal. c. 1. scilicet. n. 14.*

1 Hæc est
 p:obabile faci-
 unt posse extre-
 mē indigentem
 surripere pretio-
 sa, & conse-
 quenter ex vi
 hujus opinionis
 debere ea divi-
 rem elargiri.
 Sed quia con-
 traria opinio
 probabilis est,
 ideo poterit di-
 ves illam sequi,
 & illa non ma-
 dere. Nec dat-
 tur bellum ju-
 stum ex utraq;
 parte absolute;
 sed ex vi dua-
 rum opinio-
 num probabili-
 um, quod non
 esse inconveni-
 ens omnes do-
 cemus. *Tamb.*
l. 5. Decal. c. 1.
sect. 1. n. 12.
 2 Fortè in-
 ter Christianos
 pauci sunt qui
 propter defect-
 um operum mi-
 sericordiæ cor-
 poralium dam-
 nentur, cum
 nemo ad illa re-
 neatur sub pec-
 cato mortali,
 nisi in extrema
 & gravi neces-
 sitate proximi,
 quæ rarius ita
 contingit. ut
 hunc vel illum
 in particulari
 graviter obli-
 get. *Lessius l.*
12. de perfect.
div. v. 22. n.
 142.

After this if you ask what shall become of the Poor, *Tambourin* gives them an expedient to get out of necessity, which is to steal from the Rich. (1) *All this which I have related, saith this Father, makes us see that a man extremely poor may steal precious things, and that by consequence the Rich is obliged to give him them. But because the contrary opinion is also probable, the Rich may pursue him, and not give his Riches to the Poor: not that this war can be just on both sides speaking absolutely; but it is so by vertue of two probable opinions; which is no inconvenience, as we do all teach.* He calls the combat which is betwixt the cruelty of the Rich who refuses to give alms unto the Poor, and the infidelity of the Poor which prompts him to steal from the Rich, a war. I confess that he hath reason for this, as well as for that he acknowledges that this war cannot be absolutely just on both sides, since cruelty as well as theft is a kind of injustice. And he gives also testimony to the truth without thinking thereof, and destroys his own proper cause by adding that this war between the Poor and the Rich, or rather betwixt cruelty and theft, being unjust of it self, is nevertheless made just by vertue of two probable opinions which maintain it; one, that the Rich is not bound to give alms to the Poor, and the other, that the Poor may steal from the Rich. This is the use and particular advantage of this marvellous Science of Probability, according to this Jesuit, who is one of its principal Defenders, to be able to justifie crimes by abolishing the Commandments of God and the Exercise of good Works.

After this excess we shall be less surpris'd with that which *Lessius* saith, though it be very strange; (2) *It seems that amongst Christians there are few who are damned for not having exercised bodily mercy, none being obliged thereunto under mortal sin, unless in the utmost and greatest necessity of his neighbour, which happens very rarely, so as to impose any great obligation on any particular person.*

Tolet and others say, that there is no obligation to assist a neighbour but in some great and extream necessity; and *Lessius* adds, that this great and extream necessity cannot happen but very rarely; *in extrema & gravi necessitate quæ rarius ita contingit.* Whence it follows, that we are not obliged to do alms and other works of mercy, but in extream necessity, that is to say in effect, that we are seldom or never obliged; since this necessity doth scarce ever happen. Besides to say even in this case, that there is no great obligation upon us to assist our neighbour, and to say that there is none at all, is the very same thing; because the matter being very great, in regard that the lives of men in great extremity are therein concerned, the obligation to assist them must needs be great, or none at all. Also it will appear less strange to say, that we are not at all obliged to hinder the death of a man when we can conveniently, than to say that we are indeed obliged thereunto; but it is only a venial sin to fail in this obligation, and to suffer him to dye.

So that these Jesuits say in effect, that we are not absolutely obliged to succour our neighbour, even in the extreamest necessity, what convenience soever we have to do it; and being not obliged in such necessity, it follows thence by stronger reason, that we are not bound thereunto upon any other occasion. And by consequence the obligation to give alms is entirely abolished in all sorts of persons, times, and occasions.

But *Lessius* doth yet farther discover this pernicious Doctrine of his Company, adding that even then when this so extream and rare necessity doth happen, no person is particularly obliged to provide against it: for that the obligation to assist our neighbour in this estate of extream necessity being general and common to all those who have means to do it, every one may put it off from himself unto others; in such manner that we cannot say, that this man or that man in particular is obliged thereunto: *quæ rarius ita contingit ut hunc vel illum in particulari graviter obliget.* That is to say, that the Commandment to assist our neighbour in extream necessity is general to all those who are of ability: but it doth ordinarily oblige none in particular. And so according to *Lessius* Divinity a poor man being in extremity may dye of hunger in the view of many persons who may and ought assist him, whilst they expect and attend one another, no one of them being

being particularly bound to satisfy an obligation which is common unto them all together.

And it is from this Principle that he concludes, (1) *That it is apparent, that amongst Christians there are few who shall be damn'd for failing to exercise the works of corporal mercy*; notwithstanding that the Scripture in divers places, and Jesu Christ in the Gospel testifie expressly, that the greatest part of men, and even of Christians shall be damn'd for not giving alms and assisting their neighbour in his necessities. For having declared, that there shall be few Elect and few saved even amongst those that are called, that is amongst Christians; he declares also, that in condemning them at the day of Judgment, he will only reprove them for the default in alms and works of mercy, saying unto them: (2) *Depart from me ye cursed into eternal fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels, because I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, I was thirsty, and ye gave me not to drink.*

Lessius observed this difficulty, and he represents and objects it to himself; but a consideration so powerful taken from the express word of Jesus Christ, and from the sentence of eternal death which shall be pronounced against those who shall fail of performing the works of mercy, was not sufficient to divert him from his opinion. For without troubling himself with what Jesus Christ saith, he replies in a way and expression which contains more of contempt than respect due unto the Word of God. See here his terms: (3) *It is to no purpose to alledge that our Lord in the 25. Chapter of S. Matthew representing the form of the last Judgment, speaks rather of works of mercy than of others. For he doth it only to stir up men, and particularly those of the common sort who are not capable to comprehend spiritual things, to exercise these good works in this life. Now this reason cannot have place in the last Judgment, because then there will be no need to stir up men unto works of mercy.* He declares plainly, that the Gospel is false, and speaks false things to deceive the people and ignorant. For if it be lawful to have this opinion of what Jesus Christ himself saith concerning his last Judgment, and the circumstances, and the words of that Judgment which he will pronounce concerning mens eternal life and death, it will by stronger reason be lawful to have the same thoughts of other places of the Gospel which are not so important, and generally of all, since one cannot be more true than another. So we may elude the whole Word of God, when we meet therein any thing that doth not agree with our opinions, and we shall give occasion particularly in this Subject to those, who will conceive with *Origen*, that the pains of the damned shall not be eternal; to say, that Jesus Christ hath not said that they shall be so, but only to divert men from sin, and to cause them to fear by proposing unto them infinite punishments, according as this Jesuit saith, that he neither threatens nor condemns those who fail to do works of mercy, but only to intimidate men, and particularly those of the Commonalty, and to stir them up to employ themselves therein, being incapable of other more elevated actions.

Being all good works are comprised and contained in alms, fasting, and prayer, according to the Scripture, it seems that having here treated particularly of alms, I ought also to speak of fasting and of prayer, because I have said that the Jesuits destroy and corrupt all good works in general.

But because I have spoken expressly of Fasting in the explication of the Commandments of the Church, of Supplication in the Chapter of Prayer; and also in that of Ecclesiastick Duties, and the obligation which we have to say Divine Service, I will be content to send the Reader thither, to avoid tediousness and repetitions. In reading those places we may find that the Jesuits are no less favourable to mens effeminacy than to their interests, and that they are as large and indulgent in freeing them from all the pains of fasting and prayer, as in exempting them from the obligation of giving their goods and doing alms; testifying by this so obsequious Doctrine, and so base and loose a conduct, that all their study and care in a manner tends to the establishment of the Kingdom of Lust, by favouring the corrupt passions and inclinations of men, and in consequence thereof to destroy true Christian piety, both in its fountain which is Charity, and in its effects and fruits which are good Works.

1. Fortè inter Christianos pauci sunt, qui propter defectum operum misericordiarum corporaliu demerentur.

2. Discedite à me maledicti in ignem æternum qui patet estis diabolus & Angelis. Quis Esurivi enim & non dedistis mihi manducare; sitivi & non dedistis mihi bibere, &c.

Mat. 25 v. 41.

3. Ne referat quod Dominus Mat. 25. formam judicii describens meminerit potius operum misericordiarum quam aliorum; id enim fecit ut homines præferat plebeios qui ad majora & spiritualia parum sunt comparati, in hac vita ad ea excitaret. Hæc autem ratio cessat in extremo judicio; quia tunc homines nec erunt amplius ad opera misericordiarum excitandi.

Lessius ibid.

CHAPTER V. *Of the Sacraments.*

AS the principal Questions which respect the Sacraments, depend on the Institution of God and the Church, and ought by consequence be resolved by Authority and Tradition, the Jesuits who follow most usually their own sense and reason both in Divinity and Philosophy, make almost as many faults as steps in this matter. 21550

My design is not, as I have already declared, to report generally all their Errors, no more than to refute any one in particular fundamentally; but only to represent some few of the more visible and more extraordinary in every matter, that by these, Judgment may be made of others which are more in number and many times greater than those which I report.

I will bestow the greater part of this Chapter on Confirmation, because I shall not meet with other occasions to speak there: as of other Sacraments, of which for the same reason I shall here speak only some few things.

ARTICLE. I. Of Baptism and Confirmation.

I. POINT.

That the Jesuits take away the necessity of Baptism; and destroy the dispositions required thereto.

1 Præceptum Baptismi obligat & non obligat ad hoc ad eum recipiendum quam primum commode possunt. Escobar lib. 11. probl. 109. Qui hoc tempore

Baptismi legem ignorant, sed tamen legis naturalis præcepta observant, possunt & non possunt sine Baptismo salvati.

2 Gravis merus excusat & non excusat à præcepto divino recipiendi Baptismum sine poenitentiam.

3 Ego quidem aliquando putabam instance divino præcepto recipiendi Baptismum aut poenitentiam, & tyranno prohibitionem receptio-

nem sub mortis conminatione, adhuc esse recipienda, ut certa quoad possit salus redderetur. 4 Ac jam primæ hæreo sententiæ dum vides suscepto Sacramento omne damnationis periculum non cessare, cum omnino certum non sit fuisse citè susceptum seu ministratum. Escob. lib. 1. Theol. mor. sect. 2. esp. 7. probl. 29.

ESCOBAR in his first Book of Theological Problems proposes these questions as Problematical; that is to say, in which the two contrary opinions are probable and safe in conscience. (1) *Whether the Precept of Baptism obligeth those who are of age to demand it, to receive it as soon as they can conveniently? If now they who know not the Law of Baptism, but live according to the Rules of the Law of Nature, may be saved without Baptism?* He proposes this also: (2) *Whether great terror may excuse from observing the Divine precept which obliges to receive Baptism or Penance?* 21560

After he hath concluded after his ordinary manner that it doth, and doth not excuse him: that is, that herein you may follow what opinion you please; he adds: (3) *As for me I sometimes thought that the divine Precept which commands us to receive Baptism or Penance urging us, and a Tyrant forbidding us to receive it upon pain of our lives, we cease not to be obliged to receive it, that we may make our Salvation certain so far as in us lyes.* So that if God on one hand command Baptism on the pain of losing eternal life, and a Tyrant on the other hand forbid it on the pain of losing temporal life, the Jesuit permits us to obey the Tyrant rather than Jesus Christ, against the very word of Jesus Christ who saith in the Gospel, that he who would save his Soul, that is, his life, shall lose it; and contrary to that of S. Peter, which being an explication of that of Jesus Christ, is also more express and more clear in our case; that we ought to obey God rather than men even in peril of our lives; according as this Apostle did indeed expose his by preaching Jesus Christ against the prohibition of the chief Jews.

The reason for which this Jesuit saith that he adheres to this opinion, which denies the precept or obligation of Baptism when one cannot receive it without being exposed to the danger of death, is very considerable: It is (4) *Because I see, saith he, that after this Sacrament is received, all peril of damnation ceaseth not, since it is not altogether certain that the Sacrament hath been well received or well administered.* 21570

He grounds then the necessity and obligation to receive Baptism on the effect it worketh rather than on the Command which ordaineth it to be received: and because that this effect which is to be delivered from sin and damnation is not always entirely certain, so that we may in some sort doubt thereof, even after we have received the Sacrament, the obligation to receive it according to him is also not entirely evident and assured, but uncertain; which suffices him to make the obligation of the divine Precept to receive Baptism questionable when a Tyrant forbids to receive it on pain of life; and to form two probable opinions both safe in conscience, whence he follows and maintains that which dispenses in these incident cases with the precept and obligation of Baptism.

He saith the same thing of Penance, and by the same Principle and self same Reason which he makes use of to abolish the obligation to these two Sacraments, it will be easie for him to ruine also when he pleases not only the precept and obligation to other Sacraments, as that of Confirmation and the Communion; but also generally of all the Commands of God and the Church, or the obligation to obey them when a Tyrant shall forbid them on pain of life, there being no Command so important, nor whereof the effect is more assured than that of Baptism. So that if because the effect of Baptism is not always so certain, that we cannot absolutely doubt thereof at all, this Jesuit pretends that the Precept of Baptism though divine, obliges us not at all when we are menaced with death if we receive it; it is clear that any other precept whatsoever it be shall never oblige us, so that we shall not have liberty to dispense with it in this same circumstance: and so the Doctrine of Probability, as we have already observed on divers occasions, overturns and ruines in divers manners all the Commands of God and the Church.

The dispositions necessary for worthy receiving Baptism cannot be more destroyed, than by putting them amongst Problematick questions, as doth this Author with others whom he cites of his Company: (1) *Whether contrition be necessary to Baptism, or attrition suffice? Whether we ought to believe that this attrition is true contrition? Whether this attrition ought to be supernatural, or natural be sufficient? If it be enough that we believe that we have attrition; and that it be only supernatural outwardly?* That is to say, that it be supernatural only in that it comes from God who excites it, though it be natural in it self. If these questions be Problematick, that is to say, doubtful and probable. It is probable that a man may save himself by the powers of Nature only, because a man may demand Baptism upon the last gasp of life by a purely humane motive, according to that probable opinion which maintains that this motive is sufficient.

After so gross an error against Faith, that which the same Author saith concerning Witnesses will seem little considerable: but yet I cannot omit it, because it shews that the Jesuits accommodations go so far as to give Hereticks a part in the Ceremonies of the Church. He proposes this Question: (2) *When we cannot find a Catholick to be a witness, may we take an Heretick?* He answers, (3) *That the opinion which permits this, for which he cites Layman, appears unto him probable enough; for, saith he, this Heretick may be converted unto the Faith: and though he be not converted at all, he may teach the Catholick Religion to his God-son, as a vicious Preacher may persuade unto vertue. So an Heretical God-father receiving a Child from the Font may promise to instruct him as he ought. Which is especially true, if the Priest do admonish as he ought the Father and God-father of their obligation to instruct him that is baptized in the Catholick Faith which he hath received*

In adulto ad baptismum recipiendum, requiritur & non requiritur contritio de peccatis præteritis, sufficit & non sufficit attritio. Escobar 1. 2. l. 11. problem. 78.

Attritio quam habet adultus peccator ad fructum baptismi recipiendum, debet esse & non debet esse existimata contritio. Probl. 79.

Attritio sufficiens ad recipiendum gratiam baptismi, debet & non debet per naturalis esse. Probl. 80.

Ad deum baptismi sufficit

& non sufficit attritio existimata. Probl. 81. Attritio naturalis quoad substantiam, & supernaturalis ex rite, sufficit & non sufficit ad baptismum cum fructu sub adulto peccatore recipiendum. Problem. 82. Quando Catholicus reperiri non potest, qui susceptoris in baptismo munus obeat, hæreticus potest & non potest admitti. 3. Fateor primam sententiam satis esse probabilem, quia est regulariter in quantum est hæreticus, non tamen est simpliciter docendi alium incapax; tum quia potest ad fidem converteri, tum opus sit alium instruere; tum quia licet in hæresi perseveret, si eam Catholicam docere poterit, sicuti potest peccator concionator persuadere virtutem, licet ipse sit à virtute alienus; ergo potest Patrus hæreticus levando de sacro fonte baptismatum legitimum promittere instructionem; quod maxime verum habet, si Sacerdos ut debet, parentes ac patrum de obligatione instruendi baptismatum in fide Catholica per baptismum suscepta moncat. Escobar tom. 2. lib. 11. Probl. 150.

by Baptism. We must have very much faith, or rather none at all, and as little reason, to believe and imagine that the Faithful may be made believe that an Heretick who hath lost the faith may be received and be proper to communicate it to an infant in Baptism: so that the Church may or ought receive him as a surety of the promises which the infant is to make by his mouth, who hath satisfied his own; and that this is not to treat unworthily the most holy things and to profane them, to commit them to an excommunicated person.

Tambourin may pretend himself exempt from one part of this reproach, because he maintains, (1) *That it is more probable that in Baptism there is no vow nor promise made to obey the Faith.* But I know not whether he pretend that those who receive Baptism or those who answer for them to whom it is administered, do therein make use of the Art of Æquivocations. For there is no other means not to oblige ones self to obey the Faith when one protests solemnly to believe in God, and for ever renounce the Devil his Works, and Poms.

II. POINT.

That the Jesuits divert the Faithful from Confirmation, by discharging them from the Obligation to receive it.

1 Probabilis est ex Sanch. l. 4. m. d. c. 1. n. ult. in bapti mo nullum fieri votum sui promissionem de obedientia fidei. Tamb. meth. confess. lib. 2. cap. 2.

2 Olim ob frequentes persecuciones videtur fuisse præceptum divinum obligans vel semel in vita, vel in necessitate confessionis habitæ opportunitate.

3 Cessante necessitate, videtur expirasse præceptum & abrogatum consuetudine. Filliut. tom. 1. mor. qq. tr. 3. c. 2. n. 40. & 41. p. 55.

4 Dico 3. probabile esse per se loquendo non fuisse datum præceptum hujus Sacramenti. Ibid. n. 42.

AS for what concerns Confirmation, *Filliutius* treating of the Obligation to receive it, saith, (2) *That it seems that heretofore because of the Persecutions which then were frequent, there was a Commandment from God which obliged to receive this Sacrament once in the time of life, or at least when there happened any necessity of confessing the Faith, if convenience were had for it.* He forbears not to say a little after that according to his advice; (3) *The necessity being past, the Commandment hath been abrogated and extinguished by custom.*

He believes then that custom, that is to say, the will and negligence of men is capable to abolish the Commands of God, without regard to the protestation which the Son of God himself makes in the Gospel, that Heaven and Earth may change sooner than his Word, and that one sole letter or single point of the Law shall never be defaced. The Jesuits may well despise this Word, and craze this Law out of their Writings and out of their Books, but it shall abide eternally in the Book of God which is the Gospel, who shall condemn them at the day of Judgment who have taught as well as those who have done contrary to what he saith.

The Errour of this Jesuit is a Principle for the destruction of the Gospel and all Religion. For if customs of men and length of time may destroy one Commandment of God, it may also destroy all the rest, and Christian Religion shall depend upon the times and the fancies of men; it shall be altogether voluntary and temporal, and not eternal, and founded on the unmoveable Rock of Gods Will, but on the moveable sand of mans.

But as these people play with the Word and Commandments of God, making them depend on the Creatures, they also sport themselves with their own opinions by overturning them as soon as they have established them. For the same *Filliutius* who acknowledges that there was at the beginning in the Church a divine Command to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation, testifies a little after that there was never any such. So there is nothing certain according to these Doctors, neither in the divine Law and Word, nor in their own imaginations. (4) *I say in the third place, saith he, that speaking absolutely it is probable that there never was any Precept to receive this Sacrament.*

He speaks generally of any Commandment whatsoever, acknowledging none neither from God nor the Church for the Sacrament of Confirmation, making us see also that the Doctrine of the English Jesuits who took away all sort of obligation to receive this Sacrament, came not from themselves only; but from the Spirit and School of their Society, as well as the other errors of their Books condemned by the Faculty of *Paris*, and by the Authority of the Clergy of *France*.

Escobar discovers yet more clearly this Doctrine of his Company in his Problems, amongst which lie places these, (1) *Whether there be a Divine Precept to receive Confirmation?* where having reported the two contrary Opinions, he tells his own in these terms: (2) *I believe there is no Precept neither Divine nor Ecclesiastick to receive Confirmation.* And as if it had not been sufficient to have said it once, he repeats it the second time also, confirming his error. After which he proposes this other Problem: (3) *Whether it be a Venial sin to fail of receiving Confirmation?* He concludes that (4) *Except in the case of scandal or contempt it is not of it self any scandal to omit it.* He contents not himself with this neither; but that he might have occasion to repeat this scandalous Proposition, he makes this other question: (5) *Whether the faithful are obliged under the pain of Venial sin, to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation before that of the Eucharist or of Marriage?* And he answers that they are not at all obliged. In his other work wherein he hath collected the Opinions of the 24 Elders who represent the Society, he demands, (6) *What Obligation have we to receive Confirmation?* and he answers, *that there is none that comes either from any Commandment, or from any necessity of this Sacrament it self.* He generally takes away all sort of obligation and necessity from this Sacrament, reducing it into the rank of things free and indifferent. And to testify this yet more, he adds that one may without sin, at least without any great one, have a formal will not to receive it at all, *sponte omittere*, provided it be without scandal and contempt.

1 Datur & non datur recipiendæ Confirmationis præceptum divinum.
 2 Existimo nullum dari nec divinum, nec Ecclesiasticum præceptum Confirmationis recipiendæ.
 Escob. 10m. 2. lib. 12. Pr 31.
 3 Datur & non datur ullum recipiendæ confirmationis præceptum.
 Probl. 32.
 4 Omittere Confirmationem peccatum veniale est, neque peccatum est veniale.

Probl. 33. 5 *Sab veniali fideles tenentur & nec sub veniali tenentur ante Sacramenti Eucharistiæ & matrimonii susceptionem Confirmationem recipere. Probl. 34.* (6) *Quænam suscipiendi obligatio? Non est necessitatis necessitate mediæ, neque necessitate præcepti. Escob. tr. 7. ex. 3. n. 3. n. 11. p. 794.*

As if it were not enough to despise so great a gift of God as that of this Sacrament to refuse it voluntarily without cause. There is no King nor Man of quality who would not hold it for a contempt to refuse in this manner any gift though much smaller, especially if he offer it to some person of low condition, who should shew so little regard of the honour he doth him.

Mascarenhas who wrote after the rest, follows in this point the opinion of his Brethren, and speaks also more clearly and resolutely then they, supposing himself to be fortified by their Examples and supported by their Authority. (7) *There is not absolutely, saith he, any sin, no not a Venial one, in neglecting to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation: because amongst the common Laws of Christian Religion there is none that commands it; and it cannot be any sin, no not a Venial one, which is not against some Commandment.* He acknowledgeth neither obligation, nor precept, nor any sort of necessity for receiving Confirmation, which is hard to reconcile with the Faith we ought to have in this Divine Sacrament, which contains so great an abundance of Grace and fulness of the Holy Ghost. For if one should say that he might withdraw himself from it through honour and respect, not esteeming himself worthy of so great a gift and bounty of God, he would therein testify at the least some esteem for this Sacrament of the Holy Ghost. But to maintain that one may withdraw from it of his own will only, and without any reason, and without troubling himself about the Graces and Blessings which he might receive therefrom, is to testify manifestly that we make no great account of it, and that we would reduce it to the rank of things indifferent. And how can men be diverted from it more openly then by making them believe that they may overlook it, and neglect even the occasions that are convenient for receiving it, without making themselves guilty before God of the least sin?

7 Omittere hoc Sacramentum absolute loquendo, nec etiam peccatum veniale est; Et ratio est, quia nullum de hoc datur præceptum de jure communi, & nullum datur peccatum nec veniale, nisi sit contra aliquod præceptum.
Mascarenhas tr. 1. de Sacram. in genere, disp. 4. 6. 5. p. 47.

But because this wicked Doctrine is entirely opposite to the consent of the Holy Fathers and Councils who acknowledge the necessity of Confirmation, the Jesuits have found out a new invention to defeat their Authority herein. They answer that the (8) *Popes and Councils which are alledged against their*

8 Pontifices & Concilia

In contrarium adducta loquuntur de necessitate non præcepti, sed utilitatis. Escobar supra n. 22. p. 796.

Opinion, speak not of a necessity of command, but of a necessity of benefit. There is no Commandment so express, nor so clearly expressed neither in the Scripture, nor in the Books of the Church which may not be eluded by this new unheard of and ridiculous Distinction. For hitherto none ever spoke of a necessity of benefit, it being clear that what is only beneficial (as is Confirmation with the Jesuits) is not necessary: and that to joyn in this manner a necessity to utility or an utility to necessity, is to form a kind of Monster composed of two contrary parts, whereof the one destroys the other. According to this distinction we may say that whatsoever is in the Church and in the Scripture, is necessary, because there is nothing there which is not profitable; and all the most free Counsels themselves being profitable may be said to be necessary.

But to shew yet more clearly that this necessity of utility is but a vain word which they have invented to obscure the light of the Ancient Doctrine of the Church, it is manifest that according to them it is impossible there should be any true necessity of any kind for the Sacrament of Confirmation, since they hold that it is not commanded by any law of God or the Church, and that the Grace which it confers may be obtained not only by other Sacraments, but also by every sort of good works and exercises of Religion, as appears by the Books of English Jesuits condemned by the Clergy of France, and since publickly owned by the Jesuits in the Book of Alegambe approved by their
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General.

Escobar also expounds his thought more openly, demanding; (1) *If he who bath convenience to receive this Sacrament, which he cannot easily another time obtain, being not willing to receive it sin by contempt? And he answers in one word, No.* Which is so much more considerable, because a little after he saith of this Sacrament, after the opinion of one of his Brethren, that where (2) *the disposition is equal it confers more Grace then Baptism or any other Sacrament, except that of Orders.* So that according to the principles of the Jesuits we may without any considerable neglect, indifferency, or contempt, refuse all the Graces that are contained in all the Sacraments of the faithful, when God offers them by his extraordinary mercy, and we may receive them without any inconvenience, since they will that we may refuse in that manner the Grace of Confirmation which they hold to be greater then that of all the Sacraments.

There are two occasions upon which the Sacrament of Confirmation seems to be most necessary, that of persecution and peril of death, and that of receiving holy Orders. *Escobar* speaking of the first, saith: (3) *I think that it may happen sometimes by accident that a man may sin Venially through rashness, in exposing himself unto mortal danger without receiving Confirmation, when it may easily be had.* He will not that we are obliged to receive Confirmation even then when we are exposed to danger of death during persecution and being in danger to
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lose the Faith through Torments, though we might easily receive it, and so

fortifie our selves by the incomparable Grace of this Sacrament.
3 Puto esse aliquando per accidens peccatum veniale temeritatis sine confirmatione facile suscipiendis periculis mortis tradi. *Ibid.* n. 23. p. 796.

But he cannot hinder truth from speaking by his mouth against himself. For being constrained to avow that there is at least Venial sin in refusing or neglecting to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation in this extremity, he is obliged by the same means to confess that this sin is greater, since it is a constant maxim with him and his Fraternity, that we ought to judge of the greatness of an obligation and sin by that of their matter. And so Confirmation and the Grace of Confirmation being so great that according to him it surpasseth that of all the Sacraments of the Faithful, and the necessity of receiving it in the case he proposeth being so great that therein salvation and peril of renouncing the Faith are concerned, if we be not fortified with the Grace of this Sacrament, it must follow of necessity that the sin which we commit in voluntarily neglecting and rejecting it will be great, or none at all:

And Mascarenhas makes use of this very reason to prove that there is neither any necessity nor precept which obligeth us to receive Confirmation. (1) *This matter, saith he, being of great importance, if there were any Commandment for it, it would oblige under mortal sin; and there being no such obligation, as we have said before, there is then no precept in this point: And consequently it is no sin at all not to receive this Sacrament.*

1 Con-
firmatur, quæ
cum hæc res in
se sit gravis, si
de illa daretur
aliquod præ-
ceptum obli-

gans sub mortali: sed non obligas ita, sicut dictum est supra; ergo signum est de hoc nullum dari præceptum: Mascarenhas tract. 1. de sacram. in genere, disp. 4. cap. 5. pag. 47.

It must be observed here, that the Jesuits have acknowledged at first a precept for receiving Confirmation, and have contented themselves to confine and restrain it to the first ages of the Church, in which persecutions were frequent, pretending that it is expired in these our times. Afterwards they have said that if this precept did yet oblige at present, it was not with so great rigour as that it should be any great sin to go against it; and that the Fathers and Councils that had ordained the Faithful to receive this Sacrament, had ordained it only by way of Counsel and not of Precept. 3. From thence they have inferred that it can be at most but a Venial sin to omit Confirmation and neglect the Precept of receiving it. 4. They also at length wipe out even that Venial sin, that they may entirely abolish the Commandment for this Sacrament, and perhaps the Sacrament it self if they could, so much passion and injustice do they express in fighting against it.

It is by this way and by these degrees that they have introduced many Noveltyes, Errors, and loose Principles, both into the manners and doctrine of the Church, which they maintain publickly at this day as Truths and Rules of Christian Piety.

As for the other case in which it seems that we are yet more obliged to receive Confirmation, to wit, before we present our selves to take Orders; Escobar demands, (2) *If it be necessary to take Confirmation before Orders?* He saith at first that there are some who hold it a crime to fail herein, but he afterwards expresses his own opinion in these terms: (3) *I am not afraid to say that to receive the rasure without having before-hand received Confirmation, is but a Venial sin, a very slight one; and that it is a greater, but yet still a simple Venial one, thus to receive the lesser Orders.*

2 Num Or-
dinibus neces-
sario præmit-
tenda Confir-
matio? Escobar Ibid. n. 25
p. 796.

3 Asseruc-
tim receptionem prius Tonsturæ absque prævia Confirmatione, non excedere culpam venialem levem; Ordinum verò minorum veniale commissum gravius. Ibid.

He puts the same question again a little after in a Chapter which hath for its Title: (4) *The practice in the matter of the Sacrament of Orders, drawn out of the Doctors of the Society of Jesus: in which he demands, (5) whether he who is to be ordained, ought first to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation?* He acknowledges that Tolet judges that they who do otherwise sin mortally, and are irregular because of the express command of the Council of Trent, which is conceived in these terms: (6) *That those who have not received the Sacrament of Confirmation be not received unto the rasure: which hinders not Escobar from declaring that (7) others say that the words of the Council are not to be taken rigorously; but that it only counsels Bishops not to promote unto Orders those who have not been Confirmed.* Whence he concludes with them who hold this opinion, (8) *that it is then probable that both he who confers and he who receives Orders before Confirmation sin only Venially.*

3 Asseruc-
tim receptionem prius Tonsturæ absque prævia Confirmatione, non excedere culpam venialem levem; Ordinum verò minorum veniale commissum gravius. Ibid.

4 Praxis
circa materiam
de Sacramento
Ordinis ex So-
cietatis Jesu
Doctoribus.
Ibid. p 888.

5 An Or-
dinandus debe-
at prius Sacra-
mentum Con-
firmationis ac-
cipere? Ibid.
n. 32.

This is sufficiently to despise the Sacrament of Confirmation, not to vouch-

Tonsura non Initientur, qui Sacramentum Confirmationis non susceperunt. Concil. Trident. sess. 21. cap. 4.

7 Alii negant adeo strictis verbis uti Concilium Tridentinum, sed solum consulere Episcopis ut non confirma-
eos non promoveant. 8 Probabiliter ergo tam suscipiens quam conferens Ordinem ante ordinandi Confirmationem, venialiter delinquit. Ibid.

6 Prima

safe to take the pains to receive it for preparation to holy Orders, then when it may so easily be given by the same Bishop who confers the Orders. But this is also a greater contempt of the order of the Church, of the Authority of an Oecumenick Council, and of all Ecclesiastick Tradition and Discipline, not to fear at least to violate it by a voluntary withdrawing from, and neglect of these so formal words of the Council of Trent; *Primâ Tonjurâ non initiatur, qui Sacramentum Confirmationis non susceperint.* As if these words did not contain an Ordinance, but only a counsel and simple proposition. Which is a very easie way to overthrow all the Decrees of Councils and the Church, and to render them entirely unprofitable.

Here we must take notice of the spirit of these Divines, and the licence which they take to play with Sacraments and Consciences. They debase Confirmation as much as they can, and carry themselves with visible passion to the diminishing of the vertue of this Sacrament, which is the accomplishment of Baptism, without which the grace of Baptism continues imperfect, and Christians are not such but only imperfectly, according to the Fathers; and on the other hand we see them carry indifferently all the world to confession and the Communion with so much ardour and importunity, that they make it the head point of their direction, as the greater part of those who follow their conduct make it the principal part of their devotion.

Which thing is so much the more considerable, for that if we pre-suppose even with them that there is no command which obliges us to receive Confirmation, so also neither is there any that obliges us to confess oftner then once a year; and this precept of Confession is not at all for Venial sins, which notwithstanding are the matter of the Confessions which they reiterate and cause to be reiterated so often by devout persons and those who desire to live Christian-like; and nevertheless if they knew any one who should divert Penitents from their Tribunals, or who should only say to them that it was not necessary for them to confess so often when they have only Venial sins which may be blotted out by other ways, they would doubtless condemn him, and hold him more to blame, then if he had committed some great crime; and yet they make no scruple to turn away all the faithful indifferently from Confirmation, by this reason only, although a false one, that there is no obligation nor necessity on them to receive it. 217

But if any will say, that the custom of confessing and communicating frequently is received in the Church, and those who make a special Profession of Piety ought to follow it, and cannot neglect it without testifying that they condemn it with pride; we must confess by this reason that we are much more obliged to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation, and we cannot neglect the opportunities thereof without discovering greater pride and contempt against this Sacrament, since it is manifest that the order, custom, and use of receiving it, is much more ancient, more authorized, and more generally and religiously observed in the Church, than that of frequent Confession of venial sins, this practice becoming common only of late times; and that of Confirmation having been generally received, and holily observed from the beginning of the Church and in all latter Ages, so that there hath never been found any one Saint, pious Person, or Christian living Christian-like, who hath dared to reject it, or who hath withdrawn himself voluntarily from it until our times, wherein the Jesuits have begun to introduce this new Doctrine and new Practice of Devotion. 2172

But it is easie to see by the Spirit and ordinary Carriage of the Jesuits, that that which carries them on to aggravate with so great care the obligation, and necessity of Confession and of the Communion, and on the contrary to diminish that of Confirmation; to push on Christians indifferently to these two first Sacraments, and to keep them at distance from the last, is this, that they are not Bishops to confirm men, as well as they are Priests to confess and communicate; and that in recommending with so much importunity Confession and the Communion, they make themselves necessary; and in diverting the Faithful from Confirmation, they advance the design which they have to make Bishops unuse-

ful, and to withdraw the people from their guidance, that they may be their Masters therein, and reign in the Church without any hindrance.

ARTICLE II. Of the Eucharist and Penance.

What sort of Dispositions the Jesuits demand for these two Sacraments, and that they teach men to prophane them by Sacriledge.

AS the Jesuits incline all sorts of persons indifferently to confess and communicate, it behoves them that they may bring them on therunto to make the practice and use of these two Sacraments very easie. We have already seen in the Chapter of Penance that they have so sweetned the yoke of Confession, that to confess well there needs in a manner nothing but to know how to speak and declare ones sins, though in many cases they give liberty also to conceal one part, and though one do accuse himself in general, without specifying any in particular, they oblige him not absolutely to repeat his Confession.

And as for their Penitents who confess frequently, they permit them almost any thing, even to deceive them and lye in Confession, without believing they commit any great fault, provided it be only in a matter of venial sin: that if they have committed mortal sins which they are ashamed to discover, they may by the advice of these directors confess them to other Priests to preserve their reputation with their ordinary Confessor. They will also make their Penance as easie as their Confession if they please. For if they be not in a humour to perform it, that they may give them neither trouble nor scruple, they will impose it on them only by way of counsel, or without prescribing them any thing in particular, they are content to say unto them; *Impono tibi pro penitentia quicquid hodie vel hac hebdomada boni feceris, vel mali passus fueris. I impose upon you for Penance whatsoever good you shall do, or evil you shall suffer this day or this week.*

If a person over-run with crimes address himself to them, and be troubled to make known the bottom of his Conscience and to discover the corruption of his Heart, by declaring his wicked inclinations and habits, they will not press on him in this point, no more then to tell them in particular the number of his wicked desires, impurities, and secret crimes which move in his spirit and in his heart, though it were easie for him to do it if he would; they content themselves if he say, *Amavi Mariam toto mense, toto anno. I have loved Mary a whole month, a whole year.* But if he also startle at Penance, they will give him so slight an one that he cannot refuse it; they will even leave him to his choice, if it be needful, and they will remit him to do his Penance in the other world.

After this they must wholly renounce all devotion, who will not go to confess themselves to the Jesuits; and it seems that he who refuses can have no other pretence then to say that he hath no devotion; and he may adde that he cannot have any for Confession as the Jesuits represent it, and that he cannot believe that he confesses himself as he ought, if he confess as they say he may.

But after all this, though one will not be devout, if he be a Catholick he must at least confess himself at *Easter*, that thereupon he may communicate: the Command of the Church is express, and to fail herein were to decry and declare himself to be a man of no Religion. The Jesuits have therefore provided for this also; they have made the observation of this Precept so easie, that the most debauched and most impious may discharge this duty according to them, without being obliged not only to change their lives, but to interrupt the course of their debauches for the time only while they go to Church, and return after they have presented themselves to a Priest to whom they may tell only what they please of their sins, and do also what they list of all that he saith to them. For it is a common opinion amongst these Doctors, that we may satisfie the Command

which ordains that we should at least confess our selves once a year by any manner of Confession whatsoever it be, provided that we can say that it is a Confession, though it be a Sacrilege.

They say the same thing of the Communion, and hold that we may satisfie the Command of the Church in communicating unworthily and receiving the Body of Jesus Christ after we have confessed in the manner now related, or without any Confession at all, though we believe we are in mortal sin, and overrun with crimes. But because I shall handle these two Points in their proper place, expounding the Commandments of the Church according to the Maxims of the Jesuits, I will not speak thereof here at all, and I will rest satisfied only in representing some of the dispositions with which they hold, that we may communicate worthily and receive the fruit of the Communion. They grant indeed that our conscience must not be charged with any crime, but they hardly require any thing farther.

It is from this Principle that *Fillius* speaking of dispositions for this Sacra- 21760
ment, saith at first, that we ought to be in a state of Grace, and free from mortal

1 Non requiritur autem necessaria id: prioris ad actualis devotio:

2 Ex quo etiam colligitur voluntarie distractum secluso co tempore, quia culpa non est mortalis, non ponere obicem. *Fillius* tom. 1. mor. qq. 17. 4. c 6 n. 163. 164. pag. 87.

3 Non requiritur carentia peccati venialis. *Ibid.*

4 De actuali peccato veniali quod committeretur ipsam communionem, etiam probatur non ponere obicem; quia tale peccatum non facit indignum. *Ibid.* n. 165.

5 Alioquin talis peccaret mortaliter: quia qui indigne suscipit, iudicium sibi manducat & bibit. *Ibid.*

sin, but in the sequel he declares that there needs no other preparation. (1) *First*, saith he, *it is not necessary to have actual devotion.* Whence he draws this consequence: (2) *That he who is voluntarily distracted in the Sacrament, provided he contemns it not, puts no obstacle to the effect of the Communion, because he sins not mortally.* Supposing there is nothing but mortal sin alone which makes a man indisposed for the Communion, and to receive the effect of the Eucharist. He adds a little after, (3) *That it is not also necessary to be without venial sin, whatsoever it may be, even voluntary, wherewith one actually and deliberately employs himself at the holy Table; and when even after he hath received the Body of Jesus Christ, and holds it yet in his mouth, instead of adoring it, he dishonours and offends him expressly by some venial sin whereunto he casts himself at that very season, this shall not be incompatible with the Communion, and shall not give any stop to its effect; according to this Jesuit.* (4) *As to actual sin, saith he, which is committed in the very Communion it self, it hinders not at all from receiving the Grace of the Communion, because this sin makes not the person unworthy of the participation of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ, because, according to him, there is nothing but mortal sin that is capable of causing this unworthiness.*

He may say by the same reason, that he who should be so rude as of meer hu- 21770
mour to juggle the King, and lose all the respect he owes him, whilst he sits with him at his Table, should not thereby render himself by this insolence unworthy of the honour which he had done him; or that a Child who was resolved to do his Father all the displeasure he could; and should actually do it, Parricide only excepted, should not be so unworthy but that he might receive him to his Table, and give him the utmost testimonies of paternal affection. For this is in effect that which he maintains when he declares that there is nothing but mortal sin which renders a man indisposed for the Communion; and that no venial sin, though voluntary, nor even that which is purposely committed whilst the Body of Jesus Christ is actually received, can render him who commits it unworthy of the Communion nor of the fruit of the Grace which it confers; he thinks also that he hath found a good reason to support his opinion, when he saith, (5) *That otherwise he who communicates in this disposition sins mortally, because he who receives unworthily the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ, eats and drinks his own damnation.* As if we could not communicate unworthily without sinning mortally. This is on one side too rigorous to think that all indispositions in the Communion should be mortal; and on the other side too large to believe that all sorts of venial sins, even voluntary and affected, should not be indispositions to this Sacrament. All that which renders the stomach incapable of receiving food or of digesting it, is not mortal; and yet though the food received in this estate kills not the person, yet it ceases not to weaken him, and to cause in him those diseases which sometimes bring him to his end. 21780

But foreseeing that it might be justly objected unto him, that his opinion is univ-

universally condemned by the Holy Fathers and Councils, there where they represent the great purity wherewith the Body of Jesus Christ ought to be received in the Communion; he saith to prevent this objection: (1) *That if the Holy Fathers seem to demand more, we must take that which they say as a counsel, or as an exhortation to communicate with more fruit and benefit.* There is nothing more easie than in this manner to defeat all Authorities and all the Ordinances of the Fathers and Councils. There is nothing so formal in the Scripture itself which may not be eluded by this distinction, making every thing pass for counsel which appears contrary to our sense, and too rigorous to the flesh, that so we may dispense therewith without scruple.

He relates amongst others the Council of Trent, daring even to pretend that it is for him in this Point: (2) *Because, saith he, we can collect no other thing from Scripture and from Councils than that he who communicates ought to try himself.* Now the Council of Trent, sess. 13. teacheth us that this proof consists in this, that no person who believes himself guilty of mortal sin, ought to approach unto the Eucharist without being confessed first of all. It is indeed true that the Council demands this. It ordaineth that they who perceive themselves guilty of any crime should purifie themselves from it by the Sacrament of Penance, before they approach to the Communion; but it declares beyond this, that every man penitent or innocent ought to be informed of the dignity and holiness of this heavenly Sacrament, and to take heed (3) *not to approach unto it to receive it without profound reverence and great holiness.*

This is not to be in great holiness, but simply without great evil, to be exempt only from mortal sin; and none can say that this is to have a profound reverence for Jesus Christ, to offend him voluntarily in receiving. And yet though the Council forbids to communicate without very great holiness and profound reverence, *Filiutius* ceases not to pretend that we may communicate worthily in committing venial sins whilst we do communicate, and persisting in them voluntarily.

And to remove all scruple from them who are fallen into crimes, and yet have a desire to communicate, he puts this question: (4) *For how long time ought he to forbear to communicate who hath sinned mortally?* His answer is, (5) *That he who hath remorse for his sins, and who hath confessed them, may absolutely communicate, though the very night before, or even a little before the Communion he have sinned mortally.* He demands no other interval between the crime and the Communion, than that which is necessary unto Confession, into whatsoever disorders and abominations we be plunged before, pretending that we may pass in an instant from the most enormous sins to the Altar and participation of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ: that is to say, from Hell into Paradise, and from the estate of a Devil to that of an Angel, since he that eats the bread of Angels ought to participate of the estate and purity of Angels.

p4g. 94. 5 Respondeo eum qui contritus est & confessus posse per se communicare, etiamsi præcedente nocte vel aliquo ipatio ante mortaliter peccaverit. *Ibid.*

He must be both a bad Divine that holds Maxims so opposite to the judgment and perpetual discipline of the Church, and a bad Philosopher who imagines that the spirit of a man can so easily pass in an instant from the most violent deordination of passions, to the peace and purity of contrary virtues; and he must also be a far worse Christian to be so little touched with respect and love to Jesus Christ and his neighbour, as to expose the one so rashly to so great contempt and so unworthy usage, and the other to so visible a ruine and damnation. And if he be not absolutely impious and a Libertine who holds an opinion so horrible, he must be at the least more bold and impudent than the impious and Libertines themselves, who without doubt, dare not maintain publickly what this Jesuit maintains, and have not the confidence at any time to talk thus before considerable persons who have any sense of piety, but that they know these discourses are found amongst the Books of the Jesuits.

Mascarenhas proposes the same case with *Filiutius*, but with much greater extent, and confidence, and clearing of all the difficulties which may arise from

1 Quod si Sancti Patres viceantur plus exigere, intelligendi sunt vel in ordine ad utilitorem & magis fructuosam sumptionem, vel quoad consilium. *Ibid.* num. 165.

2 Quia ex Scriptura & Consiliis tantum colligitur debere eum qui communicat se probare. Tridentinum eundem sess. 13. docet hanc probationem in eo consistere, ut nullus sibi conscius peccati mortalis absque confessione ad Eucharistiam accedat. *Ibid.* num. 164.

3 Ne absque magna reverentia & sanctitate ad percipiendum accedat. *Conc. Trid. sess. 13. cap. 7.*

4 Quæro quanto temporis spatio renetur communicacionem diffire qui peccavit mortaliter? *Ibid. tract. 4. cap. 8. n. 214.*

i Qui habuit voluntariam & mortaliter peccaminosam pollutionem, sine cum complice, sine sine illo, si habeat debitum illum dolorem, præmissa confessione poterit in eadem die communicare. Mascarenhas tr. 4. de sacr. Euchar. disp. 5. cap. 7. pag. 239.

2 Tota difficultas est utrum Confessorius debet consulere his sic voluntarie & mortaliter pollutis, ut illo de a Communionem se abstineant, non ex præcepto, quod ut dictum est nullum datur, sed ex consilio propter reverentiam debitam tanto Sacramento? Ibid.

his resolution. (1) *He, saith he, who is fallen into voluntary and mortal pollution, be it that he have committed this crime all alone or with some other, may communicate the same day, confessing himself first of all with necessary grief. That is to say, with a sorrow natural or supernatural, true or held for true, though it be not, the one or the other being sufficient with the Sacrament, according to this Divine, as we have made appear when we spoke of Penance and Confession; and he holds himself so well assured in his answer, that he doubts not but that a man may with this disposition alone communicate worthily.* (2) *All the difficulty in this case, saith he, is to know if the Confessor ought to counsel these persons that are thus fallen into mortal and voluntary pollution, to abstain from communicating the same day, not because of the Precept, because there is none that forbids it, as we have now shown; but by way of advice, because of that reverence which is due unto so great a Sacrament.* He acknowledges, (3) *That the common opinion of the Doctors is that the Confessor ought to give this counsel. But he declares at the same time that it is not his, and that the opinion of Sancius pleases him better, to wit, that this counsel ought not to be given these persons; but rather to incline them to communicate, provided they be well disposed thereunto by Confession.*

And he would not only that a Confessor should not divert them from the Communion; but he pretends also, (4) *That he is obliged to incline them to it, that he may not deprive the Penitent of the Grace of this Sacrament and many other effects.* And this obligation, according to him, is so strict, that the Confessor makes himself guilty, reus erit, if he deprive a Penitent of the Communion who is worthy of it, as he is of whom the question proceeds.

3 Ordinariè respondent auctores affirmativè; nihilominus tamen mihi magis placet opinio Joannis Sancii in suis selectis, disp. 23. n. 30. asserentis hoc non esse consulendum, imo potius consulendum quod communicent, dummodo sint per confessionem ritè dispositi. 4 Deinde etiam consulendum ne penitentes defraudentur gratiâ hujus Sacramenti & aliis plurimis effectibus. Ideo reus erit qui dignum penitentem Communionem defraudat, & ille talis dignus est.

If a Confessor is guilty for not inclining unto the Communion those who are fallen the same day into voluntary and mortal pollution, *S. Paul* will be much more so in the judgment of this Divine when he counsels married persons to abstain from the use of Marriage, which though lawful, renders married persons indisposed unto prayer; which will be false: And by consequence the counsel which he gives them upon this Principle, to live in continence that they may pray, will be ill founded and rash, if the crimes of Luxury hinder not those who have committed them, from going the same day to the Communion, and gives not power unto a Confessor to counsel them to abstain from it, it being manifest that the Communion requires a greater purity and preparation than prayer.

The Church also must have been many Ages in error, when it did not only counsel, but also command by many express Canons, that those who were fallen into mortal sin: of impurity and others, should be deprived many years of the Communion, what remorse soever they testified for their crimes.

The reason of this Jesuit is, that wrong would be done unto this sinner by depriving him of the grace and fruits of the Sacrament: *Ne defraudetur gratia hujus Sacramenti & aliis plurimis effectibus.* He supposes that he is truly converted in a moment, being one step out of his debauches, and that he is entred all at once, without doing any thing else but confessing himself, into the dispositions necessary for receiving the grace and effects of the Communion: which is notwithstanding at the least very doubtful, there being cause to fear rather that the Communion might turn to his condemnation, than to presume that he shall receive the fruits and blessings which it communicates unto those who receive it worthily.

This consideration for all that and this fear touches not nor astonishes this Jesuit. For though it were manifest that this sinner were not re-entred into the Grace of God by Confession, and that he should commit Sacrilege by communicating in an estate of mortal sin; he pretends that however, though he received

not at the present the grace and other effects of the Communion, he yet should not for all that wholly lose them; but they should be held in reserve and kept for him until such time as he should receive more purely. This is that he signifies when he saith: (1) *That he who approcheth unto the Eucharist with some hindrance contrary unto Grace, hath a right to receive it when the hindrance is removed; and by consequence the Sacrament produces its effect so soon as the hindrance ceases.*

Whence it follows that a man by Sacriledges acquires right to the Grace of the Sacraments instead of drawing down the curse of God upon him, and that the more Sacriledges and Profanations he commits, the more treasure of Grace he heaps up, instead of heaping up treasures of wrath, and depriving himself more and more of the rights of the Children of God, by withdrawing himself farther from him.

But we need not mark more particularly the incredible absurdities and impertinences of this Doctrine, since he who produced it himself avows a good part of them, and confesses freely, (2) *That it follows thence that if a man after he have communicated many times in a bad estate come to be converted, he shall receive in an instant all the Grace that was due to so many Communions, though they were celebrated in an unworthy manner.* This is an horrible way to become a Saint in a moment by sacrilegious Communions, and a puissant reason to incline the greatest sinners frequently to commit and reiterate them, because they will be so many provisions of Grace, which will produce an abundance capable to replenish the Soul in all parts as soon as it is pleased to turn it self; so that they shall surpass in Holiness many of those who have lived in innocence, when they were plunged in vices.

He alledges for one reason of so many impieties and impertinences, (3) *That herein will appear with more advantage the mercy and clemency of Jesus Christ, and the vertue and efficacy of so great a Sacrament, which will in consequence thereof become more frequent and honoured.* It is without doubt that the Communions will be more frequent, if the greatest sinners be admitted and even invited thereto, by making them believe that though they commit Sacriledges, they acquire a right unto the Grace of the Sacrament which they prophane. But to pretend that Jesus Christ is honoured by these kinds of Communions, is to pretend that he is honoured by Sacriledges: and to place his mercy in this, is to imagine that it consists in the prophanation of the most holy Mysteries and in the loss of Souls. It appears indeed therein very great as well as his patience; but it is in that he supports those who commit these Sacriledges, and those who authorize and provoke men to commit them by their wicked Doctrine.

He farther affirms, (4) *That it follows from this Doctrine, that a man may become most holy in an instant because of many Sacriledges which he hath committed; and so much the more holy as he hath committed more of them; and yet more holy, if he have communicated or said the Mass ten or an hundred times a day, contrary to the Rules of the Church, which appears in it self incredible.* It is true that this is incredible, so extravagant and impious is it. But this Jesuit attempts to make it credible and reasonable by a Chimerical and imaginary distinction, saying, (5) *That this man will not become in an instant most holy by having committed many Sacriledges, but for having communicated many times.* As if many Communions made in mortal sin, and many Sacriledges were not the same thing. He adds that (6) *If he become so much more holy, by how many more Sacriledges he hath committed, this proceeds not directly from the Sacriledges, but by accident. For this increase of Grace and Holiness comes properly from the great number of Communions which he hath celebrated; and it happened by accident that these Communions were Sacriledges.*

credibile apparet. Respondes in tali casu non fieri hominem repentinissime sanctissimum propter plura sacrilegia commissa, sed propter plures communiones. Et si eo sit sanctior quod plura fuissent sacrilegia, hoc non sequi per se, sed per accidens. Per se enim tale augmentum gratiæ & sanctitatis provenit ex pluribus sumptionibus Eucharistiæ; & per accidens est quod tales sumptiones fuerint sacrilegæ. *Ibid.*

1 Ille qui cum obice accedit, habet jus ad gratiam tubulato obice. Ergo ablato obice hoc Sacramentum producit effectum. *Mascarenhas* 1r. 1. de Sac. in gen. diff. 4. cap. 5. num. 211.

2 Non obstat quod si aliquis qui multoties cum peccato communicaret, postea converteretur — acquireret sibi totam illam gratiam debitam tali Sacramento toties sumptio bene & licite communicaret.

3 Nam in hoc ipso magis apparet misericordiam & clementiam Christi Domini, & virtus & efficacia tantæ Sacramenti, quod maxime per hoc extollitur & amplificatur.

4 Dices cum P. Luce. sup. 9. sect. 6. n. 208. in fine; Ex hac doctrina sequeretur quod homo fieret repente sanctissimus propter plura sacrilegia, & eo sanctior, quod plura fuissent sacrilegia, & multo sanctior si singulis diebus contra leges Ecclesiæ decies vel centies celebrasset; quod ex se in-

If we may not say according to him, supposing that these sacrilegious Communion produce Grace, that they are the Sacriledges, but only the Communion that produce it, neither according to him may we say that this man hath sinned in communicating, but only in committing Sacriledges, nor that any Communion do hurt sinners, but only the Sacriledges which they commit in communicating: for the Communion of it self hurts none, and is not evil of it self; but only the abuse and the Sacriledge which they adjoyn to it by their fault.

The reason by which he props this rare subtlety is ridiculous. He saith that it is by accident that these Communion become Sacriledges. But although it be true that the Communion in it self and in general contains not Sacriledge therein, and that it comes by accident which befalls it; nevertheless it is true that these particular Communion made with these particular circumstances, and in this estate of mortal sin, contain Sacriledge therein, in such sort, that it is impossible to separate them; and it is the same thing in this particular Communion, to be a Communion and to be a Sacriledge. And so it is not by accident that it is a Sacriledge; but of it self and of its proper nature. And by consequence as it may be said truly that this Communion makes a man guilty and kills him, 21870 though it kill him not as a Communion in general, but as a Communion sacrilegious in particular: so we may say with truth that this Sacriledge sanctifies not the man, if it be true that this sacrilegious Communion gives him right unto Grace, though it give him not this right as Sacriledge, but as a Communion.

I speak not here of Extream-unction; for that my design being only to represent the Maxims of the Jesuits Morals, the excess which they commit in the matter of this Sacrament doth respect the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church rather than Manners.

I might very well treat here of Orders and Marriage, and thereby make the corruptions and abuses appear which they have introduced and cherished in married persons and Ecclesiasticks: but because this may be done more conveniently and more to purpose, as in its proper place, when we speak of the Duties of these two Estates, I will speak here only a few things concerning Priests, so far as they are the Churches Deputies to administer the Sacraments and Word of God unto the Faithful, and to offer unto him in the name of the Faithful the publick Sacrifice and Prayers. Where I shall make appear particularly the corruption which the Jesuits introduce into these estates.

ARTICLE. III. Of the Sacrament of Marriage.

WE may consider in Marriage the dispositions that precede, the consent of 21880 the Parties, the blessing of the Church which establisheth it, and the use which follows thereupon. We may sin many ways in these three things; but the Jesuits know how to take away or diminish these sins by their obsequious Divinity.

The first disposition unto Marriage is to have no impediment which may make it null or unlawful. Concerning this *Tambourin* establisheth these Rules.

1 Si facta diligentia dubites de impedimento dirimenti ad ducendam aliquam sine dispensatione ducere. Ita Merolla, Sanch. Si dubites an indigeas aliqua dispensatione in impedimento dirimenti ad contrahendum matrimonium cum aliqua, & in similibus, potes tibi persuadere eam non indigere, & consequenter posse te matrimonium inire. Si vero certus es te indigere dispensatione, sed dubitus an illam obtinueris, praevalet indigentia certa contra dubium dispensationem. At si certus es de indigentia seu impedimento, & item certus quod obtinueris dispensationem, sed ambigis an dispensatio sit valida, quia dubitas an causa in periculis dispensationis taciò vel falso expressa, sit finalis, hoc est ut sine illa adhuc fuisset concessa; vel quia dubitas an Superior qui est in certa possessione superioritatis in aliquem, sit Superior legitimus necne, validane erit judicanda dispensatio? Praesumendum esse validam. — Utraque opinio saltem propter auctoritatem extrinsecam probabilis est. Tambur. lib. 1. cap. 3. sect. 6. verbo dispensatio num. 1, 3, 5.

1890 the assurance of the need which you have prevails above the uncertainty of the dispensation. But if you be assured that you have need of a dispensation, and that you are engaged in some impediment of Marriage; as also that you have obtained a dispensation, and you doubt whether this dispensation be valid, because you doubt whether a cause which hath not been expressed in your demand of the dispensation, or which hath been falsely alledged therein, is such that without it the dispensation had not been granted; or because you doubt whether the Superiour who hath granted it, and who is in possession of the superiority be legitimate; may we judge in this case that the dispensation is valid? Some believe that it ought to pass as null; others on the contrary that it ought to be held for good: The one and the other of these opinions are probable because of the authority of those who hold them. That is to say, that there are none but those who would put themselves to fruitless trouble, who will take any care to see whether they obey the Church, and to demand of it permission to do that which it forbids; since in the most important commands, and most assured obligations, the least suspicion and the least doubt we can have of being acquitted thereof, whether it be of having had a dispensation, or of having had a just and reasonable one, suffices to put the conscience in repose, without taking care of any other thing.

According to these Maxims and this reasoning of our Jesuit, a man who doubts whether he owe a sum of money or a rent, or who being assured that he owes it, doubts whether he have paid it, or who knows certainly that he doth owe it and hath not paid it, and doubts only whether he to whom he owes it hath gotten it well, or whether there were not some defect in the contract, in all these cases and in all these doubts, shall not be obliged to pay.

910 I know not whether the Jesuits observe these Rules or this Conduct towards their Creditors: but I cannot believe that they would have their Debtors observe them towards themselves; and yet they teach men to demean themselves in this manner towards God, assuring them that upon a simple probability and doubtful conjecture they may transgress the Commandment of God and the Church, without troubling themselves about the faults which they may fear they have committed in failing therein of their duty, no more than about the dispensations for their exemption for the future.

A Rape is one impediment of Marriage, according to the Council of Trent, which excommunicates and condemns unto a perpetual infamy those who have committed this crime, or who have been accessories thereto. (1) *Dicaillus* following the opinion of *Sanchez*, believes that the Canon and all the Penalties it ordains, respect the men only and not the women who are guilty of this crime of Rape; because in the Council it is *Raptor*, and not *Raptrix*, and *this odious Decree ought not to be enlarged*. For it is an odious thing in the Divinity of the Jesuits to condemn crimes. *Tambourin* hath taken the same care to restrain this Decree. (2) *If any one*, saith he, *steal a woman to abuse her, and not to marry her, he incurs not the penalty of the Council*. The reason, saith this Father, is because the Council pretends only hereby to provide for the freedom of Marriages. He must be therefore less punishable who is more criminal, since to commit a Rape to abuse a woman is an action more lewd and more criminal than to steal her to marry her, it being impossible to expose her to greater extremity than to abandon her after she hath been abused. As if he who steals a woman and abuses her, did not hinder a woman from being married, as she might have been before, and did not reduce her to a necessity of being married to him that will accept of her.

1 Sanchez referens B:si: & Rebell. putat illud decretum Trid. non se extendere ad foeminam rapientem virum, quia Tridentinum tantum loquitur de rapto, non de rapto, & o-diosum & scen-nole non est ad rapticem ex-tendendum. Dic. Sil. de ma-trimonio tract. 10. disp 7. d.

58. num. 666. 2 Quare si quis rapiat mulierem causa libidinis, & non ad contrahendum cum illa non incurrit predictas Concilii poenas— Ratio est quia Concilium nil intendit praeterca nisi libertati matrimonii providere. *Tambur. lib. 7. decal. 6. sect. 2. num. 11.*

This Author finds also another means to exempt from the condemnation of the Council of Trent those who steal women. (3) He saith that if any carry away a woman whether she will or no to cause her to be married unto his friend, his friend knowing nothing thereof, neither the Ravisher, nor he for whom the woman was stoln, incurs the pains ordained by the Decree of the Council, which

3 Ignorance Celsare adole-scence abducta est ab ejus ami-co quaedam in-vita puella, ut

idem Cæſari illa puella in matrimonium tradereu — Si neque per ſe, neque per alium Cæſar puellam rapuit ipſe raptor non eſt, atque adeo ſcenas non incurrit ex Sanchez : amicus etiam nec incurrit, quia non eſt raptor pro ſuo matrimonio, de quo loquitur Tridentini decretum ; quod cum ſic odicſum, non eſt extendendum ultra verba. Unde vides in hoc caſu, tum amicum hunc, tum adoleſcentem illum pro quo rapta eſt mulier, valide poſſe matrimonium inire cum eadem muliere etiam non ſeparata. *Tambur. lib. 7. cap. 6. ſect. 2. num. 16.*

Children have an obligation upon them by the Law of Nature not to marry at leaſt without demanding the conſent of their Fathers and Mothers. *Dicaſtilus* ſaith, (1) *That he finds it hard to admit that children are obliged under the pain of mortal ſin to advertiſe their fathers and mothers of their Marriages ; and to demand their advice : he ſees not the foundation of ſo ſtrict an obligation.*

For what reſpects Marriage conſidered in it ſelf, though the Council of *Trent* ordain that for the future clandestine Marriages ſhould be null, and aſſures us that the Church hath always deteſted them, *Dicaſtilus* ceases not to be favourable unto them. (2) He ſaith, *That it is no ſin to make clandestine Contracts of Marriage, and that they are not comprised in the prohibition made by the Council againſt clandestine Marriages.*

The Church declares ſufficiently its intent and the thoughts of the Council of *Trent* upon this Point in the Ceremonies which it preſcribes and would have obſerved in the Betrothing for the Publication of the Bains, he ſaith, (3) *That we are not obliged to obſerve them, when any notable damage would follow thereupon ; that we are not obliged to demand a diſpenſation, though we might conveniently demand it of the Ordinary, and he were ready to grant it—That this is not only law-ful then when the damage is certain, but alſo when we have ſome probable ſuſpicion.*

The Order of the Church for the Bains is expreſs, as for the Betrothing ; this Jeſuit would aboliſh the one and the other, which are as it were the Preparatives unto lawful Marriage, and the Precautions againſt the clandestine, that he might better favour and authorize them againſt the prohibition of the Council which condemns them. In which he doth like them who ſeize on the Suburbs and Avenues of a City which they would carry by force. For after what he lately ſpoke thus for aboliſhing the Bains and authorizing clandestine Contracts of Marriage, he maintains, (4) *That not only clandestine Marriage is valid even amongſt the Inhabitants of a Country where the Council of Trent is received, when they go into another Country where it is not obſerved, that they may marry in ſecret ; but that this Marriage is lawful, provided that in other things they obſerve the ancient Laws, though they have purpoſely changed place, that they might be diſcharged from the Law of the Council of Trent by which they were obliged in their own Country.* We muſt ſay then according to this Caſuiſt, that it is lawful to make Marriages which the Church doth nulliſie, and which it never approved in thoſe very times in which it ſuffered them. For theſe ſorts of Marriages have been here ; tofore indeed valid, but they were never lawful, on the contrary they have been always cenſured in the Church.

Quæ præter in talibus ceſſionibus nulla requiritur diſpenſatio, etiamſi ordinarius poſſet commode adiri, ſitque paratus diſpenſationem concedere— non ſolum quando eſt certum, ſed etiam quando eſt probabilis ſuſpectio. *Ibid. diſp. 3. dub. 27. num. 212.* 4 Addendum verum eſſe valide, eſſi matrimonium ab incolis loci in quo Tridentinum viget, in loco, in quo non viget, etiamſi eo tranſierit cum ob finem clandestine contrahendi— & non ſolum valide, ſed licite poſſe fieri, ſervando in aliis jus antiquum, quamvis cum ob finem tranſierit, ut non obligaretur Tridentini decreto, quo obligabatur in proprio loco cuius erat incolis. *Ibid. dub. 6. num. 42.*

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But if the Jesuits make Marriages good which are null, on the contrary they make those null which are good. (1) *I say*, saith Tambourin, *that it is probable that a Marriage contracted by some slight fear unjustly induced, is null in conscience; and even some fear justly raised probably may nullify the Marriage.* It must then be affirmed, that Marriages to which persons are condemned by the Judges; which Fathers cause their Children to make; which Masters make of their Servants, and Princes of their Subjects, are null, because commonly these Marriages are made with some sort of fear. And the same thing must be said of the Professions made by Monks and Nuns, and consequently of all sorts of Engagements and Contracts. Nevertheless it is apparent that the Jesuits make use of fear as well as hope sometimes for a motive to engage young persons in their Society, and they would not refuse a donation or foundation which should be made to them with some fear, without doubting whether it might be null.

2 Dico esse probabile matrimonium metu levi inchoatum ad hoc inchoatum celebratum nullum esse in foro conscientiarum. Tamb. lib. 1. decal. cap. 2. sect. 6. n. 12.

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For what concerns the use of Marriage, albeit the bodies of married persons are not in their own power, according to the words of Scripture, (2) *Dicasillus* forbears not to permit a married woman to retain to her self the price of her Adultery. The reason *Tambourin* brings for it is considerable. (3) *The Husband*, saith he, *is not so master of the body of his Wife that he hath a perfect dominion over it, but he hath only the power to use it according to the Law of Marriage with exclusion of all others; which certainly takes not from the woman power to gain something, though not without sin, by prostituting her body.* This reason is worthy the Proposition which it is brought to prove. For it is a manifest contradiction to say that a husband hath a right to use the body of his wife with exclusion of every other, and that nevertheless the woman may sell the use of the same body unto another, if in selling this use she sell not that which belongs unto her husband, she doth no injustice, and she doth not properly commit adultery, and her sin will not be more than a simple fornication.

Ex metu quoque justè inchoatum hujusmodi matrimonium nullum esse non fore improbabile. sect. 7. n. 3.

This Author makes no difficulty to say, (4) *That it is no more than a venial sin expressly to exclude from the use of Marriage the end of having children, & to desire even to have none at all; without considering that the begetting of children being the end of Marriage, to use it without this end, and even against this end, excluding it positively by a contrary desire; is to abuse Marriage voluntarily, is to profane a Sacrament, is to reject and contemn the blessing which is especially given to obtain children: it is finally to live with a woman in Marriage as out of Marriage, abusing her to satisfy a brutal passion, and for sensual pleasure alone, as debauched persons abuse women single or married who abandon themselves unto them; and yet all these excesses are but a Peccadillo according to this Jesuit.*

2 Non solum publica meretrix, sed etiam occultæ & maritæ potest retinere pretium fornicationis & adulterii. Dicastill. lib. 2. tr. 2. disp. 6. dub. 1. n. 18.

collit uxori facultatem acquirendam, licet cum peccato, ex turpi sui corporis concessione. Tambur lib 7. decal. cap. 3. sect. 3. num. 22. 4 Expresse excludere finem multiplicandæ prolis, imo etiam cupere filios non procreare, veniale est. Tambur. lib. 7. cap. 3. sect. 5. num. 7.

3 Ratio mihi videtur esse quia vir non est ita dominus corporis uxoris, ut in illud perfectissimum dominium habeat: sed solum ita ut illo uti queat in debito conjugali omnibus aliis exclusis; quod certe non

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When we doubt of the validity of a Marriage, and have cause to apprehend that it is null, *Dicasillus* gives an invention unto persons whom the fear of God withholds, from the use of Marriage until such times as they are cleared of their doubt. (5) *If a woman*, saith he, *believes that it is probable that there is some impediment to her Marriage, because it is probable for example, that her first husband is yet alive, and it is also probable that he is dead, she may give and require the duty of Marriage, because it is lawful for her to follow a probable opinion.... and even though it be more probable that the Marriage is null, because none is obliged to follow the more probable opinion, and it suffices to follow a probable one.* Therefore the Judges ought to take good heed that they condemn not easily husbands who have two wives, or wives who have two husbands, for they need only some probable reason to justify them, and there is nothing so easie as to find one, especially for things which we passionately desire and love; and when the Magistrates will

5 Si conjux putet probabile quod sit impedimentum, propterea quod putet v. g. probabilem opinionem vitæ prioris vitæ, & similiter probabilem opinionem mortis, atque adeo probabi-

lem assensum valoris, potest reddere & petere: quia licitum est sequi opinionem probabilem. Imo etiam si probabile sit matrimonium non valere. Neque enim tenetur sequi opinionem probabilioris, sed satis est cum probabili operari. Dicast. de matrim. tr. 10. disp. 8 dub. 14. num. 174.

not take these Maxims of Probability for Rules in their Judgments, nor the Doctors of this new Science for their Masters, the Confessors nevertheless will be obliged to follow them in their direction of Consciences by the same Law that these Censors, or rather Corrupters of Manners, impose upon them to submit themselves to the fancy and pleasure of their Penitents when they have some probable authority or reason to support them.

This Jesuit continues to advance and extend the marvellous vertue of Probability, whereby to introduce disorders into Marriage-affairs, giving reasons to justify them, of which the most brutish could never have had any imagination.

1 Qui habet probabilem opinionem nullitatis matrimonii—si simul habeat probabilem opinionem valoris, poterit etiam petere: imo satis probabile est possit etiam negare; ita ut quando negat, se accommodet opinioni quæ dicit nullam esse matrimonium; quando vero petit, se accommodet opinioni quæ dicit esse validum. *Ibid.* num. 175.

He saith, (1) That he who hath a probable opinion of the nullity of his Marriage, and also a probable one of the validity of it, may demand the duty of Marriage, and also it is as probable that he may deny it; so that when he shall refuse it, he shall follow the opinion of those who hold that his Marriage is null; and when he demands it, he shall follow that which holds that his Marriage is good. If the wife as well as the husband would make use of the right which Probability gives her in this doubt concerning the nullity of their Marriage, they should live in very good intelligence during this disorder of Marriage, whilst each of them for their own part refuseth that which the other demands, and would take by force, grounding themselves on a probable reason. The same debate will hereupon happen betwixt a man and his wife through the conduct of this Science, which the same Jesuit saith it may cause in another case betwixt a poor man and a rich, whilst the rich refuses upon a probable opinion to give alms unto the poor, and tells him that he is not obliged therunto, and the poor steals from the rich upon another probable opinion, which maintains that he may do it in his necessity. These are the productions and the fruits of the Doctrine of Probability, which confounds all things both in Religion and in the World.

It is not necessary to report here all the Casuists filthy Questions and shameful Resolutions about the Use of Marriage, by which they teach and approve the profanation of this Sacrament. It may be seen sufficiently by what I have now related, how far their impudence may go. They who would see some Examples thereof, need only to cast their eyes upon the Chapters that treat of Impurity and the Duties of married persons.

ARTICLE IV. Of them who administer the Sacraments.

That the Jesuits permit Priests to administer the Sacraments, to say Mass, and to preach, principally for vain glory or lucre of money, and in an estate of mortal sin.

1 Obligatio administrandi Sacramenta, aliisque sacras functiones peragendi potest ac non potest vendi.

2 Primam sententiam approbo sequorque, si suscipiatur obligatio administrandi Sacramenta,

aliterumque sacrarum functionum perficiendarum cum oneribus corporalibus accidentaliter annexis. v. c. quando Sacerdos obligatur ad ministrandum tali in loco distanti, tanto tempore, tali hora, ut specialem sit molestiam passurus. *Escobar Theol. mor. tom. 1. lib. 8. problem. 86.*

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When the Jesuit-Authors speak of Priests who officiate in Parishes, such as are Chaplains, Vicars, and Rectors themselves, who sometimes say Masses of Devotion for those who desire them, one of the terms they make use of to express the esteem they have for them, is to call them hireling Priests, *stipendiarios Sacerdotes*. And as they give them this goodly name of Servants and Mercenaries, so they inspire them with the conduct and spirit of such, in teaching them to set price on their Masses, and to make thereof a kind of traffick, by treating with those for whom they say them, or with those at whose charge they are procured to say them, in such manner as a Servant treats with his Master for his wages, or an Handicraft for his salary with him that employs him.

Filliuius speaks of Priests in these terms, and with as much respect when he puts this Question: (1) *If a Rector who hath received pay for many Masses, may retain any part thereof for himself, because of the care he hath taken thereof, and for some other reasons, distributing the rest to the hireling Priests, whom he procured to say the Masses?* In the sequel he answers, (2) *That he shall do nothing against Justice, if he retain some part unto himself, by reason of the care and pains he takes, or because the payment surpasseth the ordinary rate, or because it is the highest degree of the just price.* That is to say, that a Parson may receive the money from all persons who will give it him for saying Masses, and then cause those Masses to be said by other Priests, wherewith he had charged himself, and take something from every of them for the care and pains he takes to cause those Masses to be said in that manner, and to receive the money for them; *ratione sollicitudinis & laboris*. And since it is not usual to present so little to a Rector as they would give to an ordinary Priest, the Rector may give to every Priest that is under him as his wages, according to the language of this Jesuit, so much as they usually get for saying Mass, and keep the rest for himself, without being blamable herein for committing any injustice or unfaithfulness. In a good Town a Parson that were in reputation, and who would exercise this pious traffick, might make himself rich.

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Emanuel Sa gives and approves this same expedient saying: (3) *He to whom a sum of money is given to say Masses, may hire other Priests the best cheap he can to help him say them, and retain the over-plus to himself.* *Filliuius* saith we may keep Priests at hire, *Emanuel Sa* affirms that if we have none, we may hire others to say the Masses which we have undertaken, and make the best bargain we can with them, and retain the rest to our selves.

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This is also *Amicus* his opinion, when he saith, (4) *That a Priest who hath received great salaries to say Masses, may cause them to be said by other Priests, to whom he may give the just price only which is usually given, and withhold what is over and above for himself.* If this be not to raise an Excise upon Priests and their Masses, it is at least to make a traffick like Undertakers of Work or Merchants who set Labourers at work, putting it out unto them at as low a rate as they can, and taking what remains unto themselves; and yet there is nothing in this which is not just and honest according to the counsel of these Jesuits.

Amicus gives another expedient to Priests, that they may not lose their Masses. He puts this Question: (5) *If a Priest may take money for a Mass which he hath said already, but reserved the application thereof to himself?* He resolves this difficulty by a distinction. He will not allow that a Priest who hath said a Mass for no body, should have power to keep the merit of it in reserve to be applied when he shall be desired to say one; but he holds it good, that when he saith Mass, he actually apply the fruit thereof to the first who shall present himself to demand a Mass of him. This is a good Maxime to husband Masses so well that you may never lose any one at all, and to engage mercenary Priests to say Masses every day without fear of losing their labour, by having some always laid up in readiness for those who shall first present themselves unto them. It is thus that the Jesuits

est. Amicus tom. 7. disp. 33. sect. 8. num. 284. pag. 466. 5 An possit Sacerdos accipere stipendium pro Missa quam jam celebravit. cujus tamen applicationem sibi in futurum reservavit? *Ibid. num. 285.* Potest Sacerdos de presenti applicare effectum Sacrificii illi qui de facto ab illo Sacrificium petiturus est. Quo pacto licitum est *Ibid.*

1 An Parochus qui multa stipendia accepit pro Missis, possit, si ea distribuat in stipendiarios Sacerdotes, partem aliquam sibi retinere pro sollicitudine vel alijis causis?

2 Respondeo & dico 1. non esse contra justitiam, si ratione sollicitudinis & laboris, vel quia est pingue stipendium, vel quia est summum intra latitudinem justitiae, aliquid sibi retineat. *Filliuius tom. 1. mor. 47. tr. 5. cap. 6. num. 106. pag. 125.*

3 Cui datur summa pecunie pro Missis à se dicendis, potest alios pro minori pretio conducere qui adjuvent, & reliquum sibi retinere. *Sa verbo Missa n. 45. pag. 516.*

4 Potest Sacerdotem qui pingua stipendia pro Missis dicendis accipit, procurare per justa stipendia minora per alios Sacerdotes Missas offerri, retinendo sibi quod supra justa stipendia super-

remove Covetousness from Priests, and cherish in their Souls the piety and reverence they ought to have towards the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ.

Emanuel Sa offers us a third expedient, of which he would not be accounted the Author, but proposes it as coming from other Casuists, who hold, saith he,

(1) *That we may take two alms for one and the same Mass*; or at least, which comes to the same thing, *that a Priest may with one and the same Mass discharge the obligation he is under unto many persons for whom he hath promised to say one.* He speaks also of others who teach, (2) *That a Priest, though he be rich, may take two alms for one Mass, if they be necessary to him for maintaining his honour.* And though he doth not positively approve all these opinions, yet neither doth he condemn them, and he leaves men at liberty to follow them, by proposing them as probable and maintained by some Doctors.

Fillinius speaks also of this expedient, but he condemns it. (3) *We cannot, saith he, receive more than one entire payment for one Mass.* Nevertheless he teaches us another in this case more subtle and ingenious, which is, (4) *That the Priest may apply that part of the Mass which belongs to himself, to those for whom he is obliged to say the Mass.* Which thing *Tambourin* confirms by this excellent Reasoning:

(5) *The Priest may appropriate that part of the Sacrifice which by custom is applied to the Faithful.* He may therefore apply to the Faithful the fruit of the Mass which is reserved for himself. *Fillinius* in the process of his discourse examining with another Casuist what is the value of that part of Sacrifice which belongs to him who saith the Mass, that the Priest may not take for it more than it is worth, saith: (6) *That he ought to give his part in three for one entire Mass.*

Whence he draws this practick Rule which he bestows on those he calls hiring Priests: (7) *That those who are hired to say more Masses than they can discharge, may make use of this expedient.* See here a pretty way for mercenary Priests to get money, by selling their part in the Sacrifice and participation of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ, which they receive in saying Mass, for lucre of getting more, chusing rather not to participate of the vertue of the Sacrament, and to have a little more silver.

As the Jesuits do thus teach Priests to say Mass out of covetousness; so they do not much condemn those who say it of vain glory. *Emanuel Sa* tells us, (8) *That there are some who hold that it is mortal sin to preach or say Mass principally for vain glory, and that there are others who deny it.* He repeats almost the same thing in another place, where he saith only, (9) *That there are some who hold that it is no mortal sin to preach principally for vain glory or for money, never mentioning them who hold the contrary opinion, that he might render that which he propoundeth more probable, and give more liberty to follow it.*

Sanchez and *Tambourin* speak more generally yet, and withal more precisely where they say, (10) *That it can be no more than venial sin to perform the sacred actions, as to administer or receive all the Sacraments and to celebrate the Mass, for vain glory as the principal end, or for some sordid and dishonest gain.* It seems that as there are in the world some sorts of commerce which persons of honour may exercise without derogation to their quality, so they would introduce some into the Church which should not be incompatible with piety nor the quality of the most considerable and dignified persons. For those who account that it will not become them to sell the Sacraments or the Mass for money, may yet according to the advice of these Jesuits give them away for worldly honour and reputation amongst men.

7 *Quod servare poterunt, qui cum receperint multa stipendia, non possunt pro omnibus satisfacere.* 8 *Vanae gloriae causa praecipue praedicare, aut Missam celebrare peccatum esse mortale quidam aiunt, alii negant. Sa verbo vana gloria, num. 2. pag. 693.* 9 *Non esse autem peccatum mortale, si quis ob gloriam aut pecuniam principaliter praedicet, aiunt nonnulli. Sa verbo praedicare, num. 4. pag. 578.* 10 *Res quantumvis sacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere, Sacrum celebrare, non excedit culpam venissem.* *Sanct. op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 3. num. 1. pag. 9.* Vel lucrum, *Tambur. lib. 2. msth. Missa cap. 1. sect. 1. num. 6.*

1 Daas e-
leemofynas pro
una Missa acci-
pi posse. Unica
Missa posse Sa-
cerdotem multis
quibus promissu
satisfacere. Sa
verbo Missa, n.
44. pag. 516.

2 Etiam a
divite Sacerdo-
te posse duas e-
leemofynas ho-
nestae sustenta-
tionis necessa-
rias accipi.
Ibid.

3 Ratione
unius Missae
non posse sumi
nisi unum ad-
equarum sti-
pendium. *Filli-
nius. tom. 1. qq.
mor. 17. 5. c. 6.
n. 181. p. 124.*

4 Sacrifi-
cantem posse
partem Sacrifi-
cii sibi debitam
applicare iis pro
quibus tenetur.
Ibid.

5 Fructum
mediae Missae
qui dari solet
aliis sibi potest
applicare Sacer-
dos, ergo etiam
fructum speci-
alissimum
quem sibi ap-
plicare solet,
potest applica-
re aliis. *Tam-
bur. l. 3. meth.
Missa cap. 1.
sect. 3. n. 6.*

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But whether we refer the Sacraments to money or honour, it is always a true traffick; and if those who set a price of money on them seem to vilifie and debase them much, those who make them serve their vain glory, do use them more unworthily, and profane them much more; because it is certain that vain glory is a vice and a sin greater and more odious in the sight of God than Avarice, and this crime is yet more inexcusable when it is pursued voluntarily, and when the glory of the world and esteem of men is propounded as our principal end; and yet Sanchez pretends, and Tambourin also, that herein no other than venial sin can be committed. *Res quantumvis sacras principaliter ob vanam gloriam efficere, ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere, Sacrum celebrare, non excedit culpam venialem*, saith Sanchez, *si propter finem venialiter peccaminusum quis principaliter celebraret, v. g. ob vanam gloriam, vel lucrum venialiter malum, solum venialiter peccaret.* These are Tambourins own words, who rehearcs this passage out of Sanchez.

Tambour. meth. Miss. lib. 2. cap. 1. sect. 1. num. 6.

Escober who cites the same Sanchez and follows him, puts his opinion not amongst the problematick, but amongst those which are received without dispute. *If any one for example, saith he, fast, pray, administer or receive the Sacrament by a motive of vain glory, though he do these things or other their like principally for vain glory, he doth only slightly injure holy things.* It is but a slight wrong unto Jesus Christ to make him serve vain glory, thence it follows that Sacriledges are no more crimes, but small offences; it being clear that to refer the most sacred actions of Religion, even the Sacrifice of the Mass it self unto vain glory as its principal end, is, it may be, the greatest profanation that can be committed, and the greatest Sacrilege, and not only a Sacrilege, but an horrible Idolatry, since this is not only to establish a creature, but a vice for ones supream end. It is properly to sacrifice unto vanity, and to refer the Sacrifice of the Mass to the Devil as to his chief end. For we sacrifice not unto God but by offering and relating the same Sacrifice unto him in the same manner. A strange kind of Sacrifice and unheard of amongst the Heathens! For this is not to sacrifice one creature unto another, as they did: but it is to sacrifice unto a creature and even to a vice God himself and the Son of God, by offering and referring thereto Jesus Christ as to the principal end. Where we must observe what Escober addeth: *Provided, saith he, that he place not his end in this vain glory, this is an exception wholly absurd and which destroys it self.* For it is a contradiction to say that an action is done principally for vain glory, and that nevertheless vain glory should not be its end; the end of an action, and that for which it is principally done being one and the same thing.

V. g. si quis propter vanam gloriam j. j. n. Sacramenta recipiat vel ministrat, Sacrum faciat: quia quamvis autem similia principaliter gerat propter vanam gloriam, dummodo tamen in hac vana gloria non instituat finem, ejusmodi sacris rebus levem irrogat injuriam. Escober. l. 4. Theol. mor. cap. 3.

If it be not enough to permit them who administer the Sacrament to celebrate it with an evil intention, Escober will also give them leave to cooperate with the sins of those who receive it unworthily. (1) *We may, saith he, administer the Sacrament to one that sinneth publickly, provided he do not receive it publickly through contempt of the Sacrament or of Religion, but for some other end, and that he threaten us with death or loss of reputation, or to do some great wrong to us in our goods.* He adds to confirm this opinion, (2) *That this is rather to permit sin in another for some just cause, than to cooperate therewith.*

1 Potest Sacramentum peccatori publico exhiberi, dummodo non ex contemptu Sacramenti vel Religionis, sed ob alium finem vel etiam publice Sacramentum recipere, & mortem vel infamiam, vel grave fortunarum detrimentum minetur.

I know not whether Pilate followed this probable opinion when the fear of falling into disgrace with Caesar, wherewith he was threatned, obliged him to deliver Jesus Christ unto his enemies: but I know very well that we cannot say that he cooperated not to the sin of them to whom he abandoned him.

Dicastillus saith that this is the opinion of Suarez, and that it pleaseth him entirely, *tota predicta doctrina mihi placet.* But because he saw well that the whole world would not follow Suarez his advice herein, he furnisheth those who find themselves engaged to administer the Sacraments to such as sin publickly, and yet have some respect for holy things, so as not willingly to prostitute them with other ways that are no better than the former. He takes them from Sanchez: (3) *To give an Host not consecrated for a true one.* Sacrilege is very common amongst the Jesuits who permit these cheats and tricks in all the Sacraments,

2 Eo enim in casu permittitur potius electius peccatum ex justa causa. Escober tom. 1. lib. 7. probl. 93. 3 Licet ministrare hostiam non consecratam pro consecrata. Dicast.

tr. 4. de Sac.
Euch. d. 9. d.
21. num. 49^o.

1 Conveniunt communiter (Doctores.) opus non esse ut minister confiteatur peccati mortalis præmittat confessionem Sacramentalem ante admittitrationem Sacramenti. *Dicastill.*
tr. 2. de Sac.
d. 3. d. 10. n. 200.

2 Nec Episcopum consecrando Chrisma, Ecclisiam, aut calices, aut concionando in peccato mortali, secluso scandalo peccare mortaliter, imo nec venialiter. *Ibid.* n. 207.

3 Sacerdos aut alius quis ministrans Sacramentum in urgenti necessitate, non peccat mortaliter; imo nec venialiter. *Ibid.* n. 214.

4 Tunc ergo qui sic baptizat, probabile est non peccare mortaliter, etiam si sit in peccato mortali, quia à vicis prudentibus non censetur

gravis irreverentia. *Ibid.* n. 220.

no one excepted, and whereof they relate many examples, to which they give their approbation.

Finally the Jesuits teach very commonly, that we may administer and receive our selves the Sacraments, and perform the most sacred Functions being in an estate of mortal sin, without committing any new crime. (1) *It is not necessary,* saith *Dicastillus*, *that he who finds himself guilty of mortal sin, should confess himself before he administer the Sacraments.* He is not content to lay now this Proposition thus in general, he establisheth it by many particulars which he proposeth. (2) *A Bishop in performing the functions of his ministry, which are all holy, being in an estate of mortal sin, sins not save venially.* (3) *He that administers the Sacrament of Baptism, be he Priest or Laick, sins not mortally.* His reason is: (4) *Because in the judgment of the prudent there is not herein any great irreverence.* (5) *A Confessor may also hear Confessions in an estate of mortal sin, without crime and without offence, provided he produce some act of contrition before that he give Absolution.* This Jesuit yet may in some sort be excused on this occasion. For though he permit a Priest to hear Confessions with a conscience wholly laden with sins, without producing so much as any act of sorrow at all, yet he will not permit that he give Absolution in that estate, at least not without endeavouring to exert this act. See the reason he brings for it: (6) *The Priest doth not properly administer the Sacrament of Penance, save when he gives Absolution, and not when he barely heareth what the Penitent saith.*

I know not whether this distinction be allowable or not, and I would willingly demand of him whether a Judge be only then a Judge when he passeth Sentence, and whether he execute not his Office when he receives, for Example, the depositions of Witnesses? Also *Tambourin* without having regard to this Chimerical distinction, decides the case clearly, (7) *That he sins not in administering the Sacraments; because that otherwise a Confessor should be in a strange perplexity in this case; he sins if he gives Absolution; if he refuse to give it he sins also against justice, because he wrongs his Penitent who hath a right to Absolution.* Now all the Doctors are of judgment that no such perplexity is to be acknowledged. (8) *Tambourin also permits a Priest to say Mass in this estate on an Holy-day, that others may participate therein. Not but that he may lawfully abstain if he follow the contrary opinion which is also probable.* And after he had induced Priests to approach unto the Altar so unworthily to celebrate the Sacrifice, *Dicastillus* will not yet oblige him thereupon to betake himself to some Confessor so soon as he can. And for that he perceived well that the Council of *Trent* might be objected against him, which in the 7. C. of the 15. Sess. ordains that he who hath said Mass without confessing himself, should confess himself shortly after; he expounds the Council to save his Doctrine by saying, (9) *That it obligeth only Priests who have said Mass in some great and urgent necessity.* If then he say Mass being in mortal sin without necessity, he shall not be obliged; yea, though he also did it maliciously, he should not be obliged; *ex mera malitia.*

5 De audiente confessionem in peccato mortali cum animo se conterendi antequam absolutionem impendat, docet *Dian.* p. 1. tr. de circ. R. 47. cum *Henrig.* l. 6. c. 18. n. 6. & ex utroque *Lugo* n. 18. non esse mortale. *Idem* tr. 1. de Sac. d. 3. d. 10. n. 243. 6 Ratio vero est quia tunc Sacerdos non administrat Sacramentum, sed quando absolvit. *Ibid.* 7 Peccaret tunc Sacerdos tum absolvendo, quia absolveret in mortali, tum non absolvendo, quia negaret jus penitentis, id quod esset pari perplexitatem, quam omnes Doctores nunquam corcedendam esse facentur. *Tambur.* lib. 3. meth. confess. cap. 5. sect. 3. num. 15. 8 Ut in die festo alii Missam audiant, sive Parochus sive non Parochus..... Nim quamvis opinio contraria sit probabilior, quia non apparet in relinquente tunc Missam notabile damnum, & aliunde præceptum de audienda Missa non obligat nisi debito modo, hæc tamen saltem propter auctoritatem extrinsecam Doctorum eam approbandum..... probabilis est: non obligatur autem in tali casu Sacerdos celebrare, quia potest tenere prædictam opinionem quod non possit. *idem.* 9 Qui ex mera malitia celebrat sine confessione, an non comprehendatur illo præcepto, & teneatur statim confiteri? Responderetur negative. Ita *Lugo* num. 150. & est communis sententia, quia Concilium solum loquitur de eo qui ob urgentem necessitatem sine confessione celebrat. *Dicastill.* tract. 4. de Euch. d. 9. d. 9. num. 155.

And

And they find so little irreverence and so little evil in administering the Sacraments, and offering Sacrifice in this manner, that they even permit the Faithful to exact of them these Functions without any necessity, although they also know that they are in an estate of sin. (1) *It is lawful for every one, saith Dicastillus, to demand and receive the Sacraments of a Priest who is in the estate of mortal sin, though he be not his Parish-Priest, nor be designed for it, nor so much as disposed to administer them unto him, if he find it more for his convenience and benefit than to demand it of others.* It is as easie a matter to receive the Sacraments as to administer them, there is no more preparation for the one than for the other. And if these Maxims were well grounded, we might complain of the rigour and severity of the Jesuits, seeing the Sacraments are not yet so frequented as they ought to be, since in what estate soever we receive or give them, there is so much gain, and nothing to lose.

*I Licet cui-
cunque petere
& recipere Sa-
cramentum Sa-
crdote existen-
te in mortali,
etiam non Pa-
rocho, nec pa-
rato alias ipsum
conferre, si pe-
centi ea rece-
ptio futura sit*

commodior vel utilior, quam si ab alio peteretur. Idem 1748. 1. de Sacram. d. 3. d. 13. num. 295.

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THE
SECOND PART
OF THE
SECOND BOOK.

Of the Outward

Remedies of SIN.

*That the Divinity of the Jesuits abolishes or
corrupts them.*

THE Physitian labours for his Patient when he prescribes what he ought to do, as well as when he presents unto him what he ought to take for his Cure. Whence it comes that they say commonly that he hath given him a good Remedy, when he hath given him good advice how to remove the Disease whereof he is sick. So that not only the things which he prescribes, but the prescriptions themselves are remedies; but with this difference, that what he prescribes, as Purges and Medicines, are the inward remedies, because they act upon the disease it self, and have an internal vertue proper to destroy it when they are taken effectually: but the prescriptions are as it were external remedies, because they act not immediately upon the disease, but only upon the mind of the diseased by the knowledge they give him of his disease, and of what he ought to do for his cure.

We must say the same thing, holding the Rules of Proportion, of our Souls diseases and remedies. We have already observed that Grace, Penance, good Works, and the Sacraments are the internal remedies of sin, because they have a divine and internal vertue which the Spirit of God hath impressed upon them to expel sin from the Soul, or to prevent its entrance thereinto. And we say here that the holy Scripture, the Commandments of God, and those of the Church are the external remedies of the same sin; because though they act not immediately upon sin, they act upon the mind of the sinner; and if they change not his will internally, they touch his mind and conscience externally by the knowledge they give him of sin, and by the fear which they impress upon him of the punishments with which God hath threatned those who commit them.

We have seen in the former Part of this second Book, that the Jesuits destroy the internal remedies of sin; we shall see here in this, how they abolish or corrupt the external: and so it will appear that they favour and cherish sin as much as they

they can. This second Part shall have three Chapters. The first shall be of the Corruption of Scripture. The second of the Commandments of God. And the third of the Commandments of the Church.

CHAPTER I. Of the Corruption of Scripture.

That the Jesuits corrupt the Scriptures divers ways.

130 **T**HERE are only three things to be considered in the holy Scripture; the Letter, the Sense, and the Authority. And accordingly we may distinguish three different manners of corrupting holy Scripture. 1. In the Letter, by adding, taking away, or changing something in the sacred Text. 2. In the Sense, by false Expositions. 3. In the Authority, by debasing the Author, and diminishing the belief that is due unto him. Now let us see in what manner the Jesuits have corrupted and yet do every day corrupt the holy Scripture.

We might compose great Volumes of Passages which they have altered by false Interpretations, yea, may be of all places wherein Canonical Writers and Jesus Christ himself have spoken with any vehemence and vigour concerning the Holiness of our Mysteries, the Duties of a Christian, and the narrow way to Salvation, we should be troubled to find one whereunto they have not given some blow, haling them from their natural sense by Expositions false and contrary to the general Consent of the Fathers and Tradition of the Church, that they might accommodate them to the relish and lusts of worldly men. I will relate only some few to serve for Example.

S. Paul saith, writing to the *Corinthians*: (1) *Though I had faith to remove mountains, and had not charity, I were nothing. And though I should distribute all my goods to the relief of the poor, and though I should give my body to be burnt, if I had not charity, it would avail me nothing.* But Father *Celot* being resolved to maintain the contrary, saying that we may suffer Martyrdom profitably, and do those other works whereof the Apostle speaks like a Christian, without any motion from Charity: to defend himself from this passage so strong and so

140 He saith that this must be extended to the habit, and not to the act and motion of Charity, meaning that the actions of which S. Paul speaks, may be meritorious, holy, and perfect, though they be done without love to God, and though we never think of him, provided we be in an estate of Grace. So that he maintains that a man who is in the estate of Grace, cannot act otherwise than by this Charity whereof the Apostle speaks. See his words: (2) *I say that the Apostle in this place demands only the habit of Charity, Petrus Aurelius on the contrary holds that it ought to be extended unto the act.* And a little after: (3) *It is true that the Scripture commends the act of Charity, that it directs and advises us to it, and prefers it before all other things; but it commands the habit as being continually necessary.*

ego; negat Petrus Aurelius, & actum vult intelligi. 3 Actum profecto laudant, suadent, & omnibus præferunt Scripture; ac habitum charitatis tanquam rem semper necessariam expetunt. *Celot. lib. 3. cap. 3. pag. 125.*

If S. Paul speak in this place only of the habit of Charity, he requires it in vain of the *Corinthians*, seeing they had it, as he himself supposes, calling them just and holy; it is in vain that he exhorts, that he advertises them, that when they suffer any persecution, when they give alms, when they perform any other good work, they should do it of Charity, since they, having the habit of Charity, could not act otherwise than by Charity, this habit having necessary influence upon all their actions, as *Celot* pretends.

150 *Coninck* speaks also more clearly to this Point. For he saith that to be a Martyr, it is not necessary to have an actual will, nor so much as a virtual one; but that it sufficeth to have an interpretative and habitual one according to the language of the Schools. And he explains this term of an interpretative and virtual

1 Si habuerim omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil sum. Et si distribuero in cibis pauperum omnes facultates meas; & si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. 1 Cor. cap. 13.

2 Eo loco habitum charitatis postulari ab Apostolo sic

1 Qualis est in eo primo qui fugiens tyrannum à quo compellitur ad impia, in fuga subito occiditur. Secundo in eo qui sollicitatur ad defectionem fidei, quia hanc recusavit, dormiens occiditur. *Cornick 3. p. 9. 66. de baptis. a. 12. n. 136. p. 80.*

2 Imo videtur sufficere ut in odium fidei occidatur, etsi de confessione fidei nihil prius cogitav. *ctv. c. si subito hostium incursum deprehendat: ut dormiens, & in odium fidei occidatur. Ibid.*

3 Ne refert quod talis forte si ei mors proponeretur prae timore negaret Deum; quia hæc conditionalis propositio nihil ponit in re, acque ita nihil obest. *Idem pag. 139.*

4 Potest quis magis eligere mori quam negare Christum impulsus solo metu gehennæ. *Idem d. 1. num. 118. pag. 77.*

5 Ecce quia pro ejus amore sanguinem sumo tulerunt, ideo cum Christo exultant sine fine.

6 Si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, christitatem autem non habuerit, nihil mihi prodest. *1 Cor. cap. 15.*

Father Anthony Sirmond in a Treatise of the Defence of Vertue, part 3. pag 54.

one by these Examples: (1) Such an one as that of a person flying from a Tyrant who would force him to some impiety, is slain unexpectedly in his flight: or at least of him who being solicited to renounce the faith, is killed in his sleep, because he refused to do it.

And because it may be said that these persons had a will to maintain the faith, and to dye for it, since the one fled for fear to lose it, and the other refused to renounce it, and so they are faithful in their will to dye for the faith; he declares that neither is this at all necessary, and that (2) it sufficeth that they be killed out of hatred to the faith, though they had not formerly so much as a thought of confessing it, as it happens when in sudden Eruptions of Barbarians one is killed in his sleep through hatred of faith.

So that he believes that one may be a Martyr, and merit the reward of Martyrdom, not only without any act of Charity, but also without any act of Faith, and without so much as any natural and reasonable act, dying without any apprehension and without any thought had before-hand of dying for the Faith.

Perhaps it may be imagined that he grounds himself on the preparation of the heart of this man, believing that God regards the good disposition which he had unto Martyrdom. But neither doth he demand so much as that. And he presupposeth on the contrary, that if it had been put to his choice either to dye or renounce God and Jesus Christ, he would rather have been ready and in more danger to abandon the Faith. (3) It matters not, saith he, though if death had been proposed unto this man, the fear it would have brought on him would possibly have forced him to forget God, because this conditional supposition produces no real thing in this man; and so it cannot hurt him.

He believes then, that to be a Martyr it is not at all necessary to have so much as a conditional will to dye for God, if occasions were presented, that the contrary disposition rather to forsake God than to lose his life on this occasion cannot hurt him; and by consequence that it is not bad, nor hinders a man from being in an estate to receive the Crown of Martyrdom if he dye without ever thinking of it in this disposition by the hand of a Tyrant.

But he discovers the ground of this Doctrine when he saith, (4) That a man may resolve with himself in this case to dye rather than forsake Jesus Christ by fear of Hell only. That is to say, that without charity or love of God, the fear of the pains of Hell only, may make a true Martyr, contrary to S. Paul, and contrary to the consent of all the Saints, Scripture, and Church, who declare publickly when the Feasts of the Martyrs are celebrated, (5) That it is because they shed their blood for the love of God and Jesus Christ, that they joyce eternally with him. And by consequence that he who sheds not his blood for the love of God, shall have no part in the joy of Jesus Christ, and loseth his labour, as S. Paul saith: (6) Though I give my body to be burnt, and have not charity, it profits me nothing.

The Father Anthony Sirmond eludes also these very words of the Apostle, by maintaining that he means only to say that if a man be in mortal sin, all these things, that is to say, Faith, Alms, and Martyrdom, are of no benefit. Whence he concludes, That S. Paul requires not nor could require any thing but habitual charity, only exempt from all mortal sin. 3 part. p. 51. of the Treatise of the Defence of Vertue.

He is not content to say that S. Paul requires no other disposition to Martyrdom, than to be exempt from mortal sin, though there be no motion of charity, nor any will to dye for God; but he adds also, that the Apostle could not require any other thing. And as if to require any other thing were rigour or unreasonable injustice, he concludes with this exclamation: What! would you oblige the Martyrs going unto Martyrdom unto some act of Charity? That is to say, that according unto him it is a thing not only far off from justice and reason, but also without all appearance thereof, to imagine that the will to dye for God should be necessary unto true Martyrdom.

This same Jesuit hath corrupted another passage of the 3. Chap. of S. John, whereof the Council of Trent makes use to explicate the Nature of meritorious

good Works, saying they are such, because they are wrought in God; *quæ in Deo sunt facta*. By which words the Holy Fathers and the best Interpreters of the Holy Scripture and of the Council of Trent, have understood works done by the motion of Gods Spirit, which is that of Charity. But he will not endure it, and is so far transported as to tax them as weak men, and subject to imaginary visions who are of this opinion. *As to that which some represent*, saith he, tr. 3. pag. 45. *that the Council doth include herein the motive of Charity, because that it demands that they be wrought in God, it is a meer imagination.* It may be he never read the Council, or it is likely he took no notice that it expounded it self, in saying that good works ought to be wrought by a vertue and grace which Jesus Christ inspires continually into his Members; in such manner as the Vine continues life and vigour to its branches. (1) *For Jesus Christ*, saith the Council, *communicating vigour continually to those who are justified, as the head communicates unto its members, and the Vine unto its branches, and this vigour preceding, accompanying, and following always their good works, which without it could not in any sort whatsoever be pleasing unto God and meritorious, we must believe that there is now nothing more wanting unto persons justified which might hinder us from judging reasonably that the works which are thus wrought in God, have satisfied his Law so far as the condition of this present life may permit, and that they have merited eternal life, which they shall in due time receive, provided they dye in this estate of Grace.*

1 Cum enim ipse Jesus Christus tanquam caput in membris, & tanquam vitis in palmis, in ipsos justificados jugiter virtutem influat, quæ virtus eorum bona opera semper an-

recedit & concomitatur, & sequitur, &c. Sine qua nullo pacto grata & meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis justificatis amplius deesse credendum est, quoniam minus plene illis quidem operibus quæ in Deo facta sunt, divinæ legi pro hujus vitæ statu satisfecisse, & vitam æternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratia decesserint, consequendum, verò promeruisse censentur. *Council. Trid. Sess. 6. cap. 16.*

It is clear that this vertue and this vigour which the Council saith that Jesus Christ communicates incessantly to those who do good works, is not an habitual vertue, or a simple habitude, as this Jesuit pretends; but that it is actual, and it is a motion by which he applies unto them, and causes them to act. For it is actual Grace, as is manifest by the expression of the Council, saying that it prevents, accompanies, and follows all good works; which is properly the description of actual Grace according to the Scripture, the Judgment of the Fathers, and even of the School-Divines themselves; and appertains not to a habit which prevents not good works, but leaves the will in an indifference to the production of them, and it must be the will which prevents and applies this habit, in such manner that without this the other cannot move of it self, and abides always without acting. And so the Council agrees very well with S. Paul, the one saying that our good works should be done in Charity; and the other, that they ought to be wrought in God, that is to say, in the Spirit and by the Spirit of God, who is no other than the Spirit of Love and Charity, and the words of the one expound the words of the other. But I see no means to reconcile them to this Jesuit, for he can no longer pretend that the Council and S. Paul require only habitual Charity with an exemption only from all mortal sin. The terms of the Council by which it expounds it self, may also serve for exposition unto S. Paul, being so clear, that it is impossible to obscure them.

He corrupts also a third passage, which is in the second to the *Corinthians*, whereof the Apostle speaks in these words: (2) *For the tribulations which we endure in this life being momentary and light, produce in us a far more incomparable, full, solid, and eternal glory.* And Father Sirmond pretends that he calls the tribulations and afflictions of this life light, because they have not in them the weight of the love of God to command them. That is, that they are light then when they are undergone without love: by consequent weighty and burthensom when they are born for love to God. These words of S. Paul were never thus expounded in the Church; and it is to fight with common sense to say, that love is a weight and load which makes things heavy and burthensom which are done upon the motion thereof.

2 Id enim quod in presententi est momentaneum & leve tribulationis naturæ, supra modum in sublimitate æternæ gloriæ pondus operatur in nobis.

All the Saints and Interpreters who have spoken of this passage, have conceived that S. Paul calls these present afflictions light; because that the grief they cause

is light in comparison of the Joys which they merit, as he saith that they endure but a moment in comparison of the Eternity of Glory which is the recompence thereof. But that they should be called light, when they are born without love, as if love did hinder them from being so, is that which never entred into the thought of any Interpreter ancient or novel. And if it were so, the afflictions of S. Paul could not be light, or we must say that he suffered them without love: The afflictions of the greatest Saints also could not be light, but rather they must have been more weighty and burdenson, when they have been entertained and supported with most Charity; and on the contrary theirs who suffered without love or without thoughts of God, and against their wills, should be light and easie, which doth equally contradict Faith and Reason.

It is needless to lose time in refuting these Paradoxes and Extravagancies. There is no Divine nor prudent man that sees not even by natural reason and experience, that on the contrary it is love and the motions of the affection which renders things light, easie, and even sweet and pleasant, though they be in themselves troublefom and difficult. Which is yet more true of the love of God than of that of the Creatures, that being infinitely exalted above this in vertue and force, as well as in dignity.

This Jesuit contents not himself to abuse the words of S. Paul in this manner; but he aspires unto the fountain, and attempts to corrupt it also as well as the streams. The first of the Commandments which God gave in the old Law, and which he hath repeated in the new, is: (1) *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart.* And Father Sirmond is not afraid to maintain that we are not obliged by this Commandment to love God. For God, saith he, tr. 2. p. 16. *commanding us to love him, is satisfied in the main that we obey him in his other Commandments.* And as he saith also, pag. 28. *A God so loving and lovely, commanding us to love him, is satisfied that we obey him without loving him.*

1 Diliges
Dominum
Deum tuum
ex toto corde
tuo.

It is easie to destroy all the Commandments by this Method; there being none more important, nor more clearly explained, nor osiner repeated in the Old or New Testament than this. When God saith: *Thou shalt love me with all thy heart,* if it be lawful to say that he intends something else than what he saith, and that he would not oblige us to love him, though he saith it with an expression so clear and strong, there can be nothing certain in the whole Word of God, and we may in this manner elude all the Commandments, pretending that he desires not that of us which he demands, or that he would not oblige us in good earnest to that which he testifies to be his desire.

But the reason of this Father, why God would not have us to love him, is excellent, *because he is loving and lovely,* as if love desired any thing so much as reciprocal love, or could be otherwise acknowledged and satisfied than by this love. He ought also at least to consider that God is not only *amiable and loving,* but also a great lover of truth and sincerity: and that so there can be no apparent ground to make him a liar or dissembler, in commanding men to love him without desiring to oblige them thereunto.

This Jesuit corrupts also this same passage and Commandment in another manner, saying: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, &c.* signifies no other thing, than; thou shalt love him if thou wilt without being obliged thereto: *because the Commandment to love God is a Command of pleasure in respect of affection love; but a Command of rigour in respect of effective love and the execution,* p. 21. He would say that God by this Commandment demands the outward actions, and not the affection; that he commands us to produce the effects of love without obliging us to have this love, and that he is content, provided we do the things which he commands, though they be done without loving him or thinking of him. No wise man would be served in this manner of his children or of his friends, nor of his slaves themselves, and who would not scorn such services?

He hath also invented a third gloss, which is no other than a consequence of the former, saying: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,* signifies, thou shalt love him freely and without any obligation. For God, saith he, *the*

God of love will be loved freely and without any obligation; and if he threaten, it is that he may be obeyed. But if we love not them freely whom we love of duty and upon obligation, we must say that a Son loves not his Father freely, because he is obliged to love him by the Law of God and Nature: and if that which is done of duty be not freely done, it follows that the Religious Orders keep not their vows freely, nor the Faithful any of the Commandments of God, because they are thereunto obliged.

But if he threatens, saith he, it is that he may be obeyed, and not that he may be beloved. We must believe then that there are no penalties nor threats against them that never love God. Which neither agrees with what S. Paul saith: *He that loves not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be accursed*, 1 Cor. 16. nor with that which S. John saith: *Qui non diligit manet in morte*, 1 John 3. *He that loveth not abideth in death*. The one threatening them with death, and the other with a curse who love not Jesus Christ.

There remains yet his last corruption of this very word of God of Jesus Christ: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*. That is to say, thou shalt not hate him at all: *For albeit his sacred love be not kindled in our hearts*, saith he: Pag. 17. though we love him not at all, and the motive of Charity do not incline us to do that which he commands us, yet we cease not for all that to obey the Commandment of Love, in as much as we do the works of Love. So that herein we may see the goodness of God; he hath not so much commanded us to love him, as not to hate him; either formally by an actual hate, which were indeed devillish; or materially by the transgression of his Law.

This excess is visible enough of it self, and needs not be represented more particularly, and it might easily be apprehended to be the extreamest that can be committed on this subject, if there were not found another yet greater in this little Book, which is as it were the foundation of all the rest. For he talks of the love of God as a thing odious and servile; and he represents the Commandment of loving God, as a yoke and servitude unsupportable, attributing it to the particular favour and grace of Jesus Christ that he hath delivered us, as he pretends, from the obligation of serving God in love, that our services might be pleasing to him, and meritorious unto eternal life. And to justify this his imagination, which scents strong of impiety, he abuses these words of Jesus Christ: (1) *If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed*: which speak manifestly of freedom from sin, as appears by what goes before. See here how he expounds this passage. *If the Son make you free*, saith he himself in S. John, *you shall be free indeed*. Yea, I hope, we shall by his own proper testimony, yea even from that very strait obligation wherewith some would charge us, which is to love God in every point which hath any reference unto merit. He pretends then that Jesus Christ hath not only delivered us from sin, as is formerly affirmed in this place; but also from the obligation even of loving God himself, and of serving him in love, which appears unto him too rigorous. Which hath reference to what he saith, *tr. 2. p. 24.* that God neither could nor ought command us to love him, but only to serve him. See here, saith he, *how God hath right and might command us his sacred love, he hath right to command us so far as concerns the effect, but not in what concerns the inward affection*. It must needs be therefore that according to the opinion of this man the love of God, or the Commandment to love God is some evil or unreasonable thing, if he could not command us it, since it is certain that God may command every thing that is not evil, unjust, and unreasonable.

To so many remarkable corruptions of divers passages of Scripture, he adds also one to justify the rest. For amongst many objections which he propounds, and makes to himself, drawn for the most part out of the Scripture which enjoyns us to do all things for the love of God, if we expect any recompence from him for them; he relates this taken out of S. Matth. *cap. 10. vers. 41.* *He that receiveth a Prophet in the quality of a Prophet, and a righteous man in the quality of a righteous man, shall receive therefore the reward due unto a Prophet and to a righteous man*. Also he that giveth a glass of cold water to the meanest Disciple of Jesus Christ, shall not lose his reward, provided he give it to him as a Disciple of Jesus Christ.

1 Si vos
Filius liberave-
rit, vere liberl
eritis. Joh. 8.
v 36.

Tr. 3. p. 60.

Christ. That is to say, for respect unto Jesus Christ, and for his love, as these words do signifie sufficiently of themselves, and as the Holy Fathers and Interpreters dounderstand it.

See here his objection which he resolves magisterially, and by an interrogation, as it were for instruction rather than answer. *I agree it, saith he, tr. 3. pag. 71. & 72. But what is it, think you, to treat a Propbet, a righteous man, and a Disciple of the Son of God, as a Propbet, a righteous man, and a Disciple of the Son of God? It is to honour him, invite him, do him good, and give him entertainment, whether it be to receive some instruction from him, or to imitate his good example, or to learn his Oracles, or for other good considerations, of which yet not one is so heightned as to reach the purity of the love of God.*

He afterward makes this his opinion and answer more clear by an example and by a comparison. *I would gladly know of these Interpreters, (saith he, he speaks of those who say that to receive a Disciple in the name of a Disciple, is to receive him for love of Jesus Christ) whether a man who is prosecuted by his Creditor, and who seeing one of his Agents coming to demand payment of the debt, goes to meet him, invites him, makes much of him, that he might win him over to him, and obtain some forbearance; I would gladly know whether this Debtor receive this Solicitor as coming to him on the behalf of his Creditor, and whether the good entertainment he makes for him comes from a good heart and pure love which he hath for him who sent him, pag. 73.*

Without doubt he hath reason to say that a poor man who seeth a Solicitor or a Serjeant coming to him to demand money of him on the behalf of his Creditor, goes readily out to meet him, and receives him as coming on the behalf of his Creditor, for otherwise he would not have regarded him at all; he hath also reason to say, that if he invite him, use him kindly, and make any entertainment for him, this proceeds not from any good will; but rather as from force and constraint, and that he doth not this for the love of the Solicitor, nor for his sake who employed him; but for love of himself and respect to his own interest, to try to gain the Solicitor and win him by his means. He could not have exprest his opinion better, and I should have been troubled to find a more apposite comparison and clearer words to exprest the excess thereof, than those whereof he himself makes use. He would have us say then that when Jesus Christ saith in *S. Matthew, c. 10.*

Qui recipit Prophetam in nomine Prophetæ, mercedem Prophetæ accipiet; & qui recipit justum in nomine justî, mercedem justî accipiet; & quisque eorum dederit uni ex minimis istis, calcem squæ frigidæ tantum in nomine discipuli: Amen dico vobis non perdet mercedem suam. Math. 10. v. 41.

(1) *That he who receives a Propbet in the quality of a Propbet, shall receive a Propbets reward; and he that receives a righteous man in the quality of a righteous man, shall receive a righteous mans reward; and whosoever shall give only a cup of cold water unto the least Disciple in the quality of a Disciple, verily he shall not lose his reward;* he intends to say no other thing but that we should receive Propbets, righteous men, and Disciples, and all those who come on his behalf, in such manner as a poor man receives Serjeants, Purservants, and Solicitors who come to demand money on the behalf of his Creditors.

Finally he concludes his answer in these words: *Some for want of a right understanding have taken these words and such like from the mouth of our Lord in the Gospel, in nomine meo, propter me, as if they could signifie no other thing in our tongue, than for the love of me, and to please me. What an absurdity is this! how can they take them in that sense in the 16. of S. Mark, where it is said, In nomine meo dæmonia ejicient, In my Name shall they cast out devils: and in the 5. of S. Matthew, where the words run thus: Mentientes propter me, Lying for my sake. It is our Lord who speaks.*

Since it is our Saviour who speaks, he ought to have heard him with more respect; and if he did not understand his words, he should at least not have made him speak the quite contrary to what he saith. But he wants yet more humility than understanding. For if he had never so little submissiveness and docility, we might send him to the Holy Fathers and Interpreters of Scripture, to learn the sense of this passage. But there were cause to fear that seeing they all

take it in that manner which he condemns, and hold that this which our Lord saith *in nomine meo & propter me*, signifieth that which he doth for the love of God and to please him, his zeal would transport him against so many Saints and great Personages, and make him exclaim; *What absurdity is this!* or as he doth elsewhere: *This is a meer vision.* For these are his common answers when he hath no better. So expunging out of Gods Law all command and obligation to love him, he reduces all Religion to this, to serve him in keeping the other Commandments and doing good Works outwardly.

290 But *Lessius* will not have Christians obliged to external good works themselves, nor unto those which are the principal and most recommended in the Scripture, to wit, the works of mercy. And perceiving this strange Doctrine to be condemned by the mouth of Jesus Christ himself, who in the 25. of *S. Matthew* brings no other reason for the sentence of life or death eternal which he will pronounce at the end of the world upon the Elect and Reprobates, than the accomplishment or omission of these works; he chose rather to contradict and elude this last and dreadful sentence, than by correcting his errour to submit himself thereunto, for he is not ashamed to say that the reason which Jesus Christ alledges, and whereupon he grounds his judgment is not true, and takes not place in the matter wherein he alledges it, that is to say, in the last Judgment. *It is not to purpose,* saith he, *to alledge that our Lord in the 25. of S. Matthew, representing unto us the form of the last Judgment, speaks of the works of mercy rather than others.* For he doth it only to stir up men, and especially the common people who are not capable of comprehending spiritual things, to exercise these works in this life. Now this reason cannot take place at the last Judgment; because then there will be no need to excite men unto works of mercy.

I Nec refert quod Dominus Matth. 25. formam judicii describens meminert potius operum misericordie quam aliorum. Id enim nim fecit ut homines, praesertim plebeios, qui ad majora & spiritualia parum sunt comparati, in hac vita ad ea excitaret: haec autem ratio cessat in extremo judicio: quia tunc homines non erunt amplius ad opera misericordie excitandi. *Lessius de perfect. divin. lib. 13. tract. 22. pag. 142.*

330 I will not stay here to examine this excess, which will appear strange enough of it self to them who are not void of the common resentments of Christianity; because it will be more proper to do it elsewhere. We will only observe in this place, that one Jesuit hath undertaken to fight and destroy Gods first Commandment, and another his last Judgment.

They who can have the patience to behold a multitude of Expositions of Scripture, Councils, and Holy Fathers, false, extravagant, unheard of, and many times impious, need only read *Pozza's* Book which he entiauled, *Elucidarium Deiparae*. A Volume as big as his would be needful to represent all his excesses. I have related some of them in the Chapter of Novelty and elsewhere, which I repeat not here, to avoid tediousness.

Father *Adam* hath surpassed all his Brethren in the same excess. For he destroys not only the letter and the sense of Scripture, he fights with the Authors themselves whom God hath made use of to impart them to us. He decries them and deprives them of all that authority and credit which is due unto sacred Writers, and who were no other than the hand and tongue of the Holy Ghost, by attributing unto them weaknesses and extravagancies; and affirming by an horrible impiety, that following their own imaginations and passions, they are sometimes transported beyond truth, and have written things otherwise than they were, and that they did neither conceive nor believe them themselves in their consciences.

310 It will not easily be imagined that this conceit could ever come into the mind of a Monk I will not say, but of a Christian who had not entirely renounced the Faith and Church, if this Father had not written it in manifest terms, and more forcibly than I can represent it, in a Book whereto he gives this Title: *Calvin defeated by himself.* In the third Part of this Book, Chap. 7. he saith, *That it is not only in criminal matters that zeal and hate inflame a Soul and transport it unto excess and violence; but that the Saints themselves acknowledge that they are not exempt from this infirmity: And flagrant passions sometimes push them on to actions so*

strange, and ways of expressing themselves so far removed from truth, that those who have written their lives have called them holy extravagancies, innocent errors, and Hyperboles more elevated than their apprehensions, and which expressed more than they intended to say.

He adds also in the same Chapter, and in the progress of the same discourse, That this infirmity is not so criminal, but that God did tolerate it in the person of those Authors whom he inspired, and whom we call Canonical, whom he left to the sway of their own judgments, and the temper of their own spirits.

He compares the Saints and Fathers of the Church to persons full of passions and violence, he excepts not the Canonical Authors themselves, and he makes them all subject to the same infirmities, and the Canonical Authors also to the greater and more inexcusable. For if they be vicious in others, they are yet more in these, in whom the least faults and the least removes from the truth, which in ordinary persons were but marks of infirmity, would be as notorious and criminal as the greatest, because they would be imputed unto God whose words the Canonical Authors have only rehearsed: and it is as unworthy of God, contrary to his nature and power to depart a little as much from the truth.

It is therefore manifest, that what this Jesuit saith tends directly to destroy all Holy Scripture, Faith, and Religion. For if the Canonical Writers could exceed and depart a little from the truth in one single point, they were subject to do it in all the rest. So their discourse is not of divine Authority, neither are their Books the Books or Word of God, because God is always equally infallible, and can never go beyond or depart from the truth in the least, whether he speaks himself or by the mouth of his Prophets.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Commandments of God.

ARTICLE I.

Of the first Commandment, which is that of Love and Charity.

THIS first Commandment of Love contains in it, and requires of us three things; to wit, that we love God above all Creatures; our selves for God; and our neighbour as our selves. These three coming from one and the same trunk and root, shall make three Articles of this Chapter; and I will handle all three severally, that I may more distinctly represent the Jesuits opinions upon every obligation of the first Commandment, and to make it evidently appear that they destroy it in every part.

I. POINT.

Of the Command to love God.

I will relate nothing here save only from Father *Anthony Sirmond*, because he seems particularly to have undertaken to destroy this Precept, and because he hath said upon this Subject alone all that may be found in the worst Books of his Fraternity. 1. That he abolishes the Command of loving God, and reduces it to a simple counsel. 2. That according to him the Scripture hardly speaks at all of divine Love and Charity, and that our Lord hath very little recommended it. 3. That he declares that the love of God may very well consist and agree with the love of our selves. 4. And that it is nothing else but self-love.

SECTION I.

That there is no Command to love God, according to the Maxims of the Jesuits Divinity.

Our Lord speaking of the double Commandment of Love saith, *That all the Law and the Prophets do depend thereon: In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet & Prophetae*, Matth. 22. He saith not that the command to love God doth depend on, and is contained in the rest; he saith on the contrary, that other Precepts are contained in this of love, and depend on it. He saith not that to love God is to serve him, and do what he commands in any sort, though it be without love; he testifies rather, that to love him with all our heart is to serve him and fulfil all his Commandments; because the desire to discharge our duty which is contained in love, supplies the place of all outward services which we cannot but would perform if we were able.

The Jesuits on the contrary teach that the Command to love God depends on, is comprised in, and confounded with the rest. They say that to love God, so much as we are or can be obliged by God himself, is only to obey him in his other Commands, though it be done without love: That it is sufficient love of God to do nothing against him: That to discharge our duty and what the Holy Scripture ordains in this point, it suffices not to hate him: As to what remains, it is left to every ones liberty in particular to love him if he list, and when he pleases, so that no person in the whole course of his life can ever be obliged by the Precept of loving God above all things: so that he should not sin at all against this Commandment, *who never put forth any inward act of love*, as Father Sirmond affirms in his Book of the Defence of Vertue, tr. 2. pag. 15. So that though indeed it would be a happiness to love God actually more than all things, yet provided we offend him not, he will not damn us, pag. 16. And finally that it is in this manner that God might and ought command us his holy love, pag. 24.

These passages and many others besides which I have related in the former Chapter which treats of the Corrupting of Holy Scripture by the Jesuit-Authors, are so clear, that there needs no explication for understanding them. They are so express and formal, that without drawing any consequences from them which they do contain, they that read or hear them only, may easily perceive that they tend directly to abolish the Command of loving God. Nevertheless because we have to do with a people who pretend to measure all by, and attribute very much to their own reason, I will also make use of it as they do, and I will imploy their own against them or rather with them, that I may the better detect their opinions upon this Point, and make appear more clearly the false Principles whereupon they teach that there is no absolute Command to love God.

The first Discourse of Father Anthony Sirmond is this: *If there be a Command to love, it obligeth to the observation thereof, by its own Authority*, I mean, it obligeth us to love God.

Now during the whole life of man there is neither time nor occasion wherein we are obliged to love God; because as he saith, pag. 16. *God commanding us to love him contents himself, as to the main, that we should obey him in his other Commands: and that because God hath not obliged us absolutely to testify our affection to him otherwise than by yielding obedience unto him*, pag. 18. And because though we have no love for him effectually, we cease not for all that to fulfil in rigour the command of love by doing good works: so that we may see here the goodness of God. He hath not commanded us so much to love him as not to hate him, pag. 19. And because a God so loving and lovely commanding us to love him, is finally content that we obey him, pag. 28. And by consequent, according to this Jesuit, there is no absolute Commandment to love God, since we are not bound to the observation of it by any Authority of its own, as he pretends.

Another Argument taken also out of Father Sirmond is this: Every Command

mand carries some threatning with it, to keep them in their duty to whom it is made, and then some penalty or punishment against those who violate it. Now the Commandment which God gave us to love him, contains neither threat nor punishment, at least no grievous one. And by consequence we cannot say that this is a Commandment truly so called.

The first Proposition of this Syllogism is certain and evident of it self. But beyond this you shall find also in Father *Sirmond*, tr. 2. pag. 20. & 21. where he distinguishes of two sorts of commands; the one of *indulgence*, which requires something without strict obligation thereto; the other of *rigour*, which absolutely obligeth to what it hath ordained. And to express himself more fully, he adds afterwards, *that he commands as much as is possible, but without threats, without adding any penalty, at least any grievous one to him who disobeys. His command is all honey and sweetness: or to speak more properly, this is only an advice, when he adds a penalty or commination of death, then it is given in rigour.*

The second Proposition is his also, and more expressly than the former in the 2237 14. page of the same Treatise, where after he had said by way of inquiry: *If there be any command to love God, it must oblige by its own Authority to its observation.* He puts this Question: *And some one may demand: And to what is he obliged by his transgression? Sins he mortally against this Precept, who never exercises this inward act of love?* And he answers thereupon in these terms: *I dare neither affirm nor deny it of my self.* Indeed the answer he was about to give to this question was too impious to proceed from the Mouth or Pen of a Jesuit. He had need to use or rather to abuse the Authority of some great Saint to cover it, and to make him say by force and against his judgment, what he durst not propound of himself. *S. Thomas*, saith he, 22. q. 44. a. 6. *seems to answer no: and to be content for avoiding damnation, that we do nothing otherwise against sacred love, though we never in this life produce any formal act thereof.*

S. Thomas speaks not of this in the place he quotes, but speaks rather the contrary. And how could *S. Thomas* say that no man is ever obliged to love God at all in his whole life, since the whole world knows that he held, That all men are obliged to turn unto God and to love him as soon as they begin to have the use of reason.

Notwithstanding this he forbears not to repeat the same thing and to confirm it also in these terms, speaking of Charity and the Love of God: *He commands us not, as we have said, if S. Thomas may warrant us, to love God under pain of damnation. It is sufficient for him to save us that we habitually cherish it in us by the observation of his other Laws,* pag. 77. and in the 24. pag. *God would be loved freely, if he threatens, it is that he may be obeyed.* And also, pag. 16. *To love God actually more than all, O the felicity! If not (that is to say, though we never have the felicity to love him actually) provided we do not otherwise offend him, he will not damn us.*

Whence we must conclude according to these Principles and Reasonings, that there is not absolutely any true Command which obliges us to love God, since that which he hath given us himself contains neither threat nor penalty, at the least no grievous one against them who fail therein, if you will believe in him rather than *S. John*, *S. Paul*, and the Son of God himself, who say the contrary in so many places of Scripture.

SECTION II.

That according to Father Sirmond the Gospel speaks hardly any thing at all of Divine Love and Charity, and that Jesus Christ hath not much recommended it.

After Father *Sirmond* had reduced this great and first Command of God to a simple advice and no more; this advice is also of so little consequence in his Judgment and according to the mind of Jesus Christ himself, if you will
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believe this Jesuit, that, he hath scarcely mentioned it in the whole Gospel. You will be troubled to find, saith he, pag. 162. tr. 2. that he hath spoken manifestly of this divine practice, if it be not at the conversion of Magdalen, and in his Sermon at his last Supper, where he exhorts us to love him.

In these two places, which he observes as those alone wherein our Lord hath spoken of the practice of the love of God; he will not have him therein to recommend it as necessary, but only that he commends it and exhorts us to it, as a good thing; that is to say, that he advises, but commands it not.

And in this he testifies that he hath read the whole Gospel very exactly, and that he hath very well dived into the sense of the words of Jesus Christ, saying to his Apostles at the last Supper: (1) *The commandment which I give you, is that you love one another.* He discovers also by his discourse, that he understands perfectly well what the Gospel and new Law is, which according to the Divines after S. Thomas is no other thing than the Law of love and love it self. So that when he saith that love is scarcely spoken of through the whole Gospel, it is as if he should say that the new Law is not spoken of in the new Law, nor the Gospel in the Gospel.

But to shew that he speaks not hereof without having considered it well, he observeth that of 32 Parables, which is the most frequent manner of Christs discourse, he applies but one for the recommendation of the love of our neighbour, in the person of that distressed poor man abused by thieves betwixt Jericho and Jerusalem, pag. 121.

After he hath read the Gospel so exactly as to number the Parables contained therein: as he hath observed only two places wherein our Lord speaks of divine love, so he hath found but one wherein he speaks of the love of our neighbour. So that S. Paul had no reason to say, writing to the Romans, (2) *That love is the fulfilling of the law, and that he who loveth his neighbour hath fulfilled the law.* For if love be the accomplishment and fulfilling of the Law, it will follow that love is extended through the whole Law, otherwise it could not fulfil nor comprehend it all. And so it would neither be the fulfilling nor accomplishment of it: and if the love of our neighbour fulfil and accomplish the Law, the love of our neighbour must contain and be contained in all the Law, as the Soul fills and contains and is filled and contained by the body; which caused S. Austin to say, (3) *That the whole Scripture old and new is, and commends nothing but charity.*

If we will not submit to the Authority of S. Austin and S. Paul, we should at least give way to that of Jesus Christ, and acknowledge his error; or raze out of the Gospel, so many passages wherein he recommends so expressly and clearly the love of God above all things, and that of our neighbour, by making thereof an express Commandment which he calls his, and the Commandment proper to the new Law, as when he saith in the 13. of S. John: (4) *A new commandment give I unto you, that you love one another as I have loved you.* And in Chap. 15. (5) *This is my commandment that you love one another.* And a little after: (6) *I command you to love one another;* and many other places there are wherein he speaks of charity and of the command to love God and our neighbour as a Commandment which is not only proper to the new Law, but which contains also the whole Law new and old; as he expressly declares in S. Matthew, where speaking of the double Commandment to love God above all things and our neighbour as our selves, he saith, (7) *That all the Law and Prophets depend on these two Commandments.*

1 Hoc est præceptum meum ut diligatis invicem. Joan. 15. v. 12.

2 Plenitudo legis est dilectio; qui diligat proximum, legem implevit. Rom. 13. v. 10.

3 Non præcipit Scriptura nisi charitatem, nec culpatur nisi cupiditatem, & eo modo informat mores dominus.

4 Mandatum novum do vobis, ut diligatis invicem sicut dilexi vos. Joan. 13. v. 34.

5 Hoc est præceptum meum ut diligatis invicem. Joan. 15. v. 12.

6 Hoc mando vobis ut diligatis invicem. Ibid. v. 17.

7 In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet & Prophete. Matt. 22. v. 40.

SECTION

SECTION III.

The mixture and agreement of Self-love with the Charity invented by Father Sirmond the Jesuit.

IT suffices not Father Sirmond to have taken away and dash't Charity as much as he could out of the Law of God, the sacred Scriptures, and the heart of man; he sets upon it in its own nature, and he seems to desire to drive it from it self, first in mingling it with, and secondly in changing it into self-love.

He mixes it with self-love when he saith tr. 2. pag. 47. *The more that charity possesseth it, the less doth the Soul think of any other thing than to love; and the more it takes to heart the interests of God, the less it cares for its own peculiar: but all this is accidental unto charity, whereof the highest perfection may subsist in a heart altogether inclined to and concerned to the utmost for it self, without falling short of what it owes unto the principal object of its affection, as it comes to pass among the Blessed, who eschewing all sorts of evil, provide for all that which concerns them, and yet are not the less belonging to God.* 22420

If it be true that to lay to heart the interests of God, and to care for them more than our own be accidental unto charity, as this Jesuit pretends; S. Paul understood not what charity was, and he hath spoken very improperly of it in 1 Cor. 13. where making the most express and exact description of this divine vertue that we have in the Scripture, he places this amongst its qualities and properties as the Centre and Principle of all the rest, and as the heart of this divine vertue, that it seeks not its own interests, *non querit que sua sunt*. And this Jesuit pretends on the contrary that, *the highest perfection of charity may subsist in a heart attentive to all its own affairs: that is to say, in a heart whose affections are fastned to the things of this world; as he expounds himself sufficiently by the words following; and concerned to the utmost for himself, by referring to himself and his private interest whatsoever he loveth in the world, and even in Religion it self, in the exercises of piety and good works which he may do.*

1 Qui amat animam suam, perdet eam.
Joan. 12. v. 25.
2 Nolite diligere mundum, neque ea quæ in mundo sunt.
1 Joan. 2. v. 15.
3 Qui diligit mundum, non est charitas Patris in eo.
Ibid.

Our Lord saith, (1) *That he who loveth himself shall lose himself.* S. John forbids us on Gods behalf (2) *to love the world or any thing that is in the world,* and he declares openly, (3) *That the love of God is not in him who loves the world.* And Father Sirmond maintains on the contrary, that all this agrees well together, and that charity in its highest perfection may subsist in a heart and person who is chiefly concerned for himself; and that this person may have his heart inclined to all his own concerns; that is to say, affectionately addicted to all worldly affairs, without failing in what he owes to the principal object of his affection. 22430

He expounds this conceit by the example of the Blessed: *As it comes to pass, saith he, to the Blessed who declining every sort of evil, provide for all their own concerns, and yet are not the less appertaining to God: That is to say, that the Blessed have great care of their interests, taking heed that no evil beide them, and that the good they enjoy escape not from them, and all this without diminishing their love to God.*

4 Nolite solliciti esse dicentes: Quid manducabimus? Quid bibemus? Aut quo operiemur? Hæc enim omnia gentes inquirunt. Scit enim Pater vester quia his omnibus indigetis. Quærite ergo primum regnum Dei & justiciam ejus, & hæc omnia adjicientur vobis. Matth. 6. v. 31.

Our Lord would not have us careful of any thing in this life but to serve God, leaving unto him the care of our selves, all that concerns us, and even that which is most necessary for us. (4) *Be not solicitous, saith he in S. Matthew, saying, What shall we eat, what shall we drink, wherewith shall we be cloathed? For the Heathen inquire after all these things; and your Father knows that they are necessary for you. Seek first the Kingdom of Heaven, and its Righteousness, and all this shall be given unto you as an advantage.* And Father Sirmond on the contrary will have the Blessed themselves in Heaven to be careful of their interests, putting from them all sorts of evil, and providing for all that concerns them. And yet he pre- 22440

tends that they serve God never the worse: because they may be all at once for God and themselves; so that according to him *Charity at the highest point of perfection, such as it is in the Blessed, may subsist in a heart which is most deeply concerned for it self.*

SECTION IV.

*The changing and transforming of Charity into Self-love by
Father Sirmond.*

WE have now made appear that Father *Sirmond* mingles and confounds Self-love with Charity in the hearts of the Blessed themselves; we must now see how he changes and transforms also love of God into self-love, and acknowledges no other Charity but that of Self-love.

He makes as it were a Party upon this Point, for which he doth not at first declare himself; but propounds its reasons and foundations.

1. He makes a person who desires to love God, but fears to mistake by loving himself instead of God, to speak in this manner; *I fear that having made me for his own sake, I only love him for my self*, tr. 2. pag. 83. In his following Discourse he encounters this fear, saying, that when we desire God, we desire not God for Gods sake; but we desire God to and for our selves. From whence he taketh occasion to say unto this person as it were in drollery: *But say you do desire him for his own sake, do you not desire him for your self? Truly if you reject this consideration, I by your leave shall not do the same*, pag. 84. And this person replying that he doth not reject it neither; that he desires God indeed, but that he doth desire him that he may be his, and refer all to him; *because he is his Creature and a participation of his Being*; that he would be his, that he might be more obedient and entirely dependent on him: he answers him as it were to disabuse him: *Consider that to be of God and to depend on him, seems not a motive proper to incline you to desire the enjoyment of him*, pag. 85.

That is to say, that they who love God with an hope to enjoy him one day, as all good people in this world do love him, or those who already do enjoy him by loving him, as the Blessed in Heaven, love him not nor desire him, that they may depend on him and be his; but to the end that he may be theirs, and after a sort refer himself unto them.

He confirms and establisheth this Principle by another like it, which is, that *none can love any thing besides his own proper good, and that whosoever loves hath necessarily a regard to himself*, pag. 86. And a little after he grounds his Principle on another Argument which he puts into the mouth of those who are of the Faction of Self-love against Charity, making them to say, that *as good is the object of love, even so the private good of every one, is that which the love of every one regards*. Whence he infers without interrupting his discourse, *that if I can desire nothing but under the appearance of good, so no more can I do it without appearance of my own good, I of mine, and you of yours*, pag. 87.

And for fear we should stop him in his Career, representing unto him that all this is well in Self-love, which the Philosophers call Love of Concupiscence and Love of Interest; but that this cannot be said of Love of Friendship, by which a friend respects and desires the good of his friend whom he loves without interest; or at least that it is impossible that this should take place in the love of God and Charity, of which *S. Paul* saith in express terms, (1) *That it seeketh not its own*; he prevents this objection, and cuts up by the root this difficulty, by saying or making them of the Faction of Self-love which he maintains to say; *that it is Nature that doth this, and that Charity which elevates and perfects it without destroying it, ought to keep close to it*, pag. 88. That is to say, that Charity ought to follow the motions of Nature corrupted as it is at this day, and stay there. For it is Nature that inclines us always to love our selves and for our selves: and that so Charity gives the same inclination, and works the same motion in the heart it filleth; so that in charitable love as in natural, *the private good of every one is that*

which every ones love regards, so that no person in any sort whatsoever can desire any thing which is without appearance of some private good to himself in particular; that it is Nature which doth cause this, which being immutable in its Laws which are confirmed and not destroyed by Grace, Charity is to be kept within those bounds.

It is true that Father *Sirmond* hath propounded these things in the name of another; but this is only to conceal himself, having not the confidence to appear 224 as the first Author of such strange things; but he was not able to contain himself to the end. For after he had made others speak, and say all that he had in his mind, he declares that he approves all their opinions. *I am content*, saith he, pag 90. that all they maintain take place even in Charity, that it cannot be inclined towards any object without observing and seeking therein the proper good of him whose heart is inflamed therewith.

He that would undertake to change and transform Charity into Self-love, could not do it more clearly, than by attributing Nature and its motions and the definition of Self-love unto Charity: and Self-love cannot be more naturally set forth, than by saying with this Jesuit, that it is a weight or motion of the Soul which cannot be inclined to any object without observing and seeking therein the private good of him whose heart is therewith inflamed. So that when he saith that he is content that this should take place in Charity, he avows that Charity and Self-love are one and the same thing.

After this we have less cause to be astonished that he hath said, as we have seen above, that God neither ought nor could command the love of Charity; and that Jesus Christ is come from Heaven to Earth to set us free, and deliver us from it as a slavery and yoke unsupportable. For indeed God could not command Self-love; and Jesus Christ is come into the world only to fight with and destroy it.

In this the consequence and connexion of the Principles of the Jesuits Divinity 224 is very observable, and we may observe the opposition also which they have to Faith and Christian Piety, since they destroy and entirely abolish Charity which is the foundation and top-stone, the Soul and Spirit of Religion.

II. POINT.

That the Jesuits by destroying the Charity which man oweth unto God, destroy also that which he owes himself.

AS to love any one is to desire his good; so to love ones self is to desire good to ones self. Whence it follows, that God being the only true good of man which can render him content and happy in this and the other life, no man doth truly love himself but after the proportion of his love to God, the force and motion of the love which he hath to God inclines him to desire, seek him, and do all he can to find and unite himself to him as his end wherein at length he finds his repose and happiness.

So that to make appear that the Jesuits destroy the true love that a man owes to himself, I need only to continue to shew that they destroy that which he owes to God, adding unto what I have already reported from Father *Sirmond* upon this Point, some opinions of other Authors of the Society. If it seems to the Jesuits that Father *Sirmond* may find his justification in the conformity of his opinions with those of his Fraternity; we shall also find therein what we pretend; that is, to make appear that his opinions upon this subject are not peculiar unto himself, and that all that he hath said against Charity is taken from the grounds of the Societies Divinity.

Dicastillus the Jesuit speaks in the same manner of the love which God obliges 2249 us to bear towards him. (1) *The love which God exacts of us, is*, saith he, properly a will to accomplish his Commandments.

And *Tambourin* relying upon the same foundations, reasons thus about the love

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i Dilectio quam Deus exigit à nobis, propter voluntas est implendi ejus mandata, quatenus hoc bonum illi & gratum est. *Dicastill. de poenit. 17. 8. disp. 2. dub. 5. num. 135.*

we owe unto our neighbour : (1) *As it is certain that we ought to love our neighbour according to the Commandment of the Gospel in S. Maith. chap. 22. You shall love your neighbours as your selves ; so it seems to me also assured that there is no obligation to love him by an internal act of the will which is expressly terminated on him—For it is enough that you love God, and that you desire to accomplish his will, wherein the love of our neighbour is comprised. Whence it is, that if you hate him not, and observe for his sake the outward works of good will, you love him sufficiently.* See here the very consequences of Father *Sirmond*, drawn from the same Principles.

Filiarius expounding in what manner we are obliged to love God, that we may love him above all things, saith that this ought not to be extended in such manner as that we ought to have in our hearts a greater and more strong love for God than for the Creatures. His reason is ; because if this were so, we should be greatly troubled, and scruple oftentimes to know whether we loved God as we ought. By this way, saith he, (1) *we may better provide for the repose of the consciences of pious persons, who without this would be always in doubt of their love they bear unto God, if it ought to be in a higher degree than the love of any creature whatsoever.* He had spoken truer, if he had said that this opinion is favourable to the laziness and lusts of men, and not to their conscience, which it destroys by procuring to it a false repose, which causes it to sleep securely in misery and death. Finally he pretends that we are not obliged to love God in any higher degree than the Creatures.

Amicus saith the same thing, and brings the same reason for it ; (3) *That a man would be always in trouble to know whether he bore love towards God in a higher degree than towards any creature.* It seems these people have taken for their task, not to teach men their duty, and to carry them on to the performance of what they ought, but rather to dispense with them therein when they find any trouble or difficulty to perform it. Which thing they do in the greatest part of the most important Precepts of Christianity. For men believing them to be too perfect and difficult for them, look for nothing but to be dispensed with in their obligation unto them ; instead of representing unto God their inability, and to pray him to give them force and grace to bear themselves therein as they ought.

Amicus enlarges himself yet farther on this reason. For speaking of two ways of loving God above all things ; to wit, by loving him as much as we can by his common assistance, or by loving him indeed at the least more than any creature : (4) *The one and the other manner, saith he, make the Precept of loving God morally impossible, and leaves him who labours to fulfil it always in doubt whether he have accomplished it or not.*

esse anxius an intensiori actu amaverit Deum quam ullam creaturam. *Amicus tom. 4. diff. 29. pag. 388.* 4 Uterque modus reddit præceptum servatum moraliter impossibile, & semper dubium operantem de ejus impletione. *Ibid.*

If it be impossible to love God as much as we can, or more than any creature, as this Jesuit pretends, it is impossible to love him with all our heart and all our might, and to love him as much as can be above all things, and to love him more than any creature, is but the same thing. He would say then that it is impossible to keep the first Commandment of God, in the manner God himself hath enjoyned us to observe it. Which is not only simply to destroy it, but to reduce it, as we may say, below nothing, by maintaining that it is not so much as possible ; since God cannot command that which is impossible, as he himself cannot do it.

We are not to wonder, if presupposing that it is impossible to love God as he hath commanded us, he conclude that we are not at all obliged thereunto. But he draws also from this same Principle many other Conclusions, whereof he makes so many Maxims and Rules of Christian life.

1. He saith that it is sufficient to love God *appretiatively*, (by way of *Valua-*

Talis dilectio appetitativa seu præstativa essentialiter comparativa est; quia præfert Deum in amore omnibus aliis amabilibus. *Ibid. num. 16.*

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1 Sicut autem certum est nos obligari ad proximum diligendum, juxta illud Matth. 22. Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum ; ita tibi certum videtur non adesse obligationem diligendi per aliquem alium internum expresse tendentem in ipsum proximum. S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 26. a. 8. in c. Sum. c. 5. d. 1. s. 4. n. 4. Connick d. 24. d. 4. Satis enim superque est si ames Deum, eisque voluntatem velis esse equi. &c.

2 R. Etis consultatur conscientis piorum hominum, qui semper aliquod dubitent de sua dilectione, si deberet esse intensior amore cujusvis creature. *Filiarius tom. 2. mor. 99. 17. 22. cap. 9. num. 283. pag. 92.*

3 Qued nimium semper homo debeat

1. Secunda sententia docet Deum diligendum esse super omnia tantum appetitativè seu prælativè, non autem intensivè, quæ vera est & sequenda. *Ibid. n. 15.*

tion) more than all other things, that is to say, as he expounds himself, to prefer God and his love before every Creature and its love.

2. Quoniam possumus talem estimationem de Deo habere, ut propter incretam suam bonitatem preferendus sit in amore rebus omnibus creatis; & tamen non nisi remisse in talem actum tendere.

2. That unto this it is not only not needful to have more love for God than for the Creatures; but that it is sufficient to have one single degree of love to God, how small soever it may be. 22520

3. That God commands us no more when he commands us to love him above all things.

4. That this is sufficient in effect to enable us to say that we love God above all things, and that we are ready to quit and lose all things rather than offend him, and therefore to accomplish the first and great Command of Divine love: And that to love God more, is an advice and not a command; and by consequence no man is obliged thereto.

I undertake not to examine here these Maxims and Arguments, because I have already said something of them in another place. I represent them here, only to discover according to the design of this Chapter, that the Jesuits have taken in hand to blot out of the Gospel the principal and greatest Commandment which obligeth us to love God with all our heart, and with all our soul, and with all our might; and they say on the contrary, that we cannot love God so little as not to satisfy this Commandment.

God declares that he will be loved *with all our heart*, that is, with all the extent of our affections; *with all our might*, that is to say, as much as we are able. 22530

Amicus on the contrary pretends that he ought to be content that we love him as little as we please: because to love him more, (1) *and to a certain degree is only an advice*: It sufficeth that we love him much under what we could, if we would; (2) *because the least degree of love is enough for him, and for to satisfy this Commandment.*

Ibid. num. 20. 3 & 4. Quod autem vi hujus præcepti ad nullam certam dilectionis intensiorem tendatur, constat ex dictis, cum nec usquam sit, nec ex aliquo revelato deducatur. Ibid. n. 21. Unde negandum est certam intensiorem in actu dilectionis esse sub præcepto, sed tantum sub consilio. Ibid. n. 21. 1 Intensio dilectionis non est sub præcepto, sed tantum sub consilio. 2 Sola dilectio appetitiva super omnia sufficit ad implendum præceptum charitatis erga Deum, etiamsi remississima sit. num. 19. Etiamsi non nisi remisse in talem actum tendat.

7 If this Jesuit had resolved to make a Party against God, and to contradict and contend with him openly, he could not speak with more violence and evidence: and unless he would quite abolish and destroy the Command which God hath given us to love him with all our heart and all our strength, he could not diminish and debase it more than to reduce it to the last extremity, saying: *Ad implendum præceptum charitatis erga Deum, sufficit dilectio, etiamsi in gradu remississima sit.*

But he stays not there, and as if he had feared, that he had granted too much unto God in allowing him the least part of our heart and affection, he expounds his thoughts more clearly, and to pacifie the consciences of pious persons, who might fear they had not the love they ought to have unto God, if they should be obliged to love him in that very manner the Jesuit speaks of above all things; he adds, that when God commands that we should love him above all things, we must not extend this word *all things*, to the rigour in its utmost extent and according to its natural sense, so that it should comprehend under it all Creatures; but that we must understand by *all things*, only those which are evil, contrary unto God, and capable to destroy the friendship which we have with him by Grace and Charity, that is to say, mortal sin only. 22540

Cum dicitur dilectio Dei appetitiva super omnia, non necessario intelligitur super omnia quæ amicitia Dei adversantur, cujusmodi sunt omnia peccata mortalia. Ibid. num. 16.

So that according to this Maxime no person is obliged to love God more than any Creature, since there is no Creature evil, nor contrary to friendship with God; but rather appointed by the Ordinance of God himself to help us to know and love him. And so according to the Jesuits we may love all Creatures more than God; and which is more strange, without violating the Commandment which appoints us to love God above all things.

If we believe Amicus then and his Brethren, there will be nothing but sin, and that mortal sin also, above which God ought to prevail in our esteem and affection; because that only destroys the friendship we have with him. And if God command us any thing in this matter, and a kinsman, a friend, or any whosoever

desire the contrary, we may according to this new Philosophy refuse God what he desired of us, to content a kinsman, a friend, or other person, without offending the friendship we ought to exercise towards God, provided that this refusal be not in something expressly commanded, and of such consequence that we cannot fail thereof without sinning mortally.

550 It is easie to judge whether this be to love God above all things, and not rather to love all things above God: and whether an Idea more base and unworthy of him can be had, than to imagine that we are not obliged to prefer him above any thing besides mortal sin only, and that we may love all things more than him without sin.

After he hath brought the love we owe unto God to this point, *Filiarius* adds that we are not obliged to love him in this manner above three or four moments in our life, whereof the first is, when we begin to have the use of reason; the second at the point of death, and the third to love him actually from five years to five years during life. The rest of the time he allows us to love God or the World, as we please, considering the love of God (except at these instants which he hath set down) as a work of Supererogation for which God is beholding to his Creatures.

This obligation also would be too severe and too hard, it would not be sufficiently proportionable to the weakness of our natures. Whence *Dicaſtilus* concludes, that God would have repentance separated from the love of God, to make it more easie. So that whereas, according to *S. Paul*, fear did render the yoke of the old Law unsupportable, *quam non potuerunt portare patres nostri*, and love makes the new Law sweet; *jugum meum suave est, & onus leve*; we must say, according to the Divinity of these Fathers, that the old Law was incomparably more sweet than the Christian, because fear reigned in that, and love the most difficult of all, *pre ceteris arduus*, in this. Or to speak conformably to their Principles, they are both equally sweet and easie to practise, since under the one and the other we are equally dispensed with for the love of God, and fear bears sway in both.

Molina quite overthrows the Divinity of the Apostle. For after he hath established fear in the place of love in the new Law, he substitutes in the old Law love in the place of fear, pretending that it is in this that we may truly say thereof, *quam non potuerunt portare patres nostri*; and that this is the special privilege of ours above the old. For this cause this obligation to love God only three or four times in our life, seems to him also too severe. This had been well under the old Law; but at present that we are under the Law of Grace, we have Sacrament which may supply the want of charity and love to God. (1) Before the Law of Grace, saith this Jesuit, and before God by a singular mercy had yet instituted Sacraments capable to justify those who approach unto them with attrition, so that they might receive by the vertue of these Sacraments supernatural charity, as they do who being contrite do receive the Sacraments, men were much more frequently obliged under the pain of mortal sin to love God by the motion of supernatural love, than Christians are under the new Law.

570 And confessing that under the old Law they were obliged to love God by a love of supernatural charity, every time that they found themselves in any danger of death, he maintains, (2) That Christians who live under the Law of Grace, are not obliged under the pain of mortal sin to love God so often with a love of supernatural charity to obtain life, and avoid death eternal, because it is sufficient for them to have attrition, receiving at the same time some Sacrament of the new Law.

saue longe frequentius sub lethali culpa tenebantur homines Deum ex charitate supernaturali diligere, quam Christiani in nova lege cum ex charitate supernaturali diligere teneantur. *Molina de just. & jure, tr. 5. disp. 59. num. 5. pag. 3166.* 2 Non ita frequenter sub reatu lethalis culpæ tenemur Deum ex charitate supernaturali diligere ad effectum comparandæ æternæ felicitatis, interitumque evadendū sempiternum, quoniam satis est nos accipi suscipiendo simul Sacramentum novæ legis. *Ibid.*

Primum est initium moralis d. seu sus. secundum 7. arcibus mortis, tertium est tempus intermedium vitæ, saltem quinq; quoque anno. *Filiarius tom. 2. mor. 99. tr. 22. cap. 9. num. 286. & 290. pag. 93.* Videtur accommodata fragilitati humana, cum conscientia etiam ante adventum Christi est. Talis ligata illi est ut qui omnium maximus & præ ceteris arduus. *Dicaſtil. de peccit. tr. 8. disp. 2. dub. 4. num. 106.*

1 Ante legem gratiæ, & antequam ex magna Dei misericordis in ea instituerentur Sacramenta quæ attritos justificarent, illisque vi Sacramentorum conferretur charitas supernaturalis, sicut sine Sacramentis conferretur contritis,

Pro quo tempore urgeat ejus obligatio? An statim post peccatum commissum? Secunda sententia negat, etiam si

occurat opportunitas, & facile fieri possit. Respondeo & dico 1. tenendum cum secunda sententia. Fillius.

tom 1. 97. mor. sr. 6. cap. 8. num. 198. & 199. pag. 157.

2 Quibus temporibus per se obliget contritio ex jure naturali? Ibid. num. 205.

Respondeo & dico 1. si respiciatur lex justitiæ qua homo tenetur satisfacere Deo pro injuria peccati, sic non videtur obligari, nisi quando adest periculum mortis. Ibid.

3 Si respiciatur lex charitatis erga Deum, jure naturali obligat ante mortem. Ibid. num. 206.

4 In universum intra annum non videtur obligare: quolibet septennio vel quinquentennio, est probabilis, ut alibi dicam de charitate. Ibid. n. 208.

5 Si respiciatur lex charitatis propriæ, probabile est obligare etiam extra articulum. Ibid. num. 206. 6 Ob auctoritatem autem Doctorum quos citavimus in præcedenti quæsito, non est improbabile quod non obliget. Ibid.

Amicus saith the same thing of the Commandment of Contrition, for our conversion unto God after sin. But I will not stand here to alledge or make reflection on what *Molina* saith, because it is spoken of elsewhere. I will only add, to clear up the conformity of the Jesuits upon this Point, that which *Fillinius* saith. He demands, (1) *In what time we are obliged unto contrition, and whether it be so soon as we have sinned?* And after he hath reported two opinions, of which the second, saith he, denies that we are so soon obliged, though we have convenience, and that we may easily do it, he concludes in these terms: *I answer and say in the first place that we must follow the second opinion, which holds that we are not obliged.*

He descends also yet farther in particular, and demands (2) *on what occasion the Precept of Contrition obliges by the Law of Nature?* Whereto he gives three Answers. The first is, that if we regard the Law of Justice by which a man is obliged to satisfy God for the injury which he hath done unto him by sin, in this manner he seems not to be obliged to contrition and sorrow for his sin, but only when he finds himself in danger of death. 2258

His other Answer is, (3) *That if we respect the love which is due unto God, we are obliged unto it by that Law of Nature before death.* That is to say, that though in rigour and without any injustice a sinner may remain in his sin and aversion from God until his death; notwithstanding he ought of charity to prevent that time, and to love God sometimes without attending for this extremity, if he will not ask him forgiveness as soon as he hath offended him, nor even for many years after; it is reasonable that at least he pass not above five or seven years before he do it. This is the charitable advice which *Fillinius* gives him in these terms. (4) *Speaking generally it seems that a man is not obliged thereto within one years time; that he should be obliged thereto within five, or from seven years to seven, is very probable, as we shall see elsewhere, where I shall speak the same thing of Charity.* He holds that a sinner after he hath passed five or seven years in his sin, and in a voluntary aversion from God, and all others in like manner who have passed over so long a time without once thinking of loving God, will be obliged, the one to ask God pardon, and the other to love him at least after so long a time. If this be probable, as he saith, the contrary is also: and by consequence of two probable opinions we may follow which we will with a safe conscience, according to the Jesuits Divinity, a sinner may persist in his sin and in his aversion from God, and every other man in his insensibleness, without having any motion of love unto God, after he hath already past seven years without thinking of him. 2259

The third Answer of *Fillinius* is, (5) *That if we regard the Law of Charity which every one owes unto himself, it is very probable that he is obliged to have contrition and sorrow for sin before the article of death.* And as if he feared lest this should also torment some consciences, and give them too much trouble and scruple, he adds: (6) *For all that, because of the Authority of the Doctors whom we have quoted in the former question, it is probable that he is not obliged thereto.* That is to say, that a man who is in mortal sin, may with a safe conscience, according to this probable opinion, persist voluntarily all his life in a state of enmity against God, and delay his conversion until the point of death, demanding only forgiveness of God when he is ready to dye, and can offend him no longer, without doing herein any thing against the charity he owes to himself, any more than against that which he owes unto God.

I can hardly believe that a Jesuit would approve a Child who should deal with his Father in this manner as he saith we may carry our selves towards God; and I know not whether he would counsel any of his Brethren who had a mortal disease to suffer it five or seven years, or even until he should see himself nigh unto death, without calling for the Physitian, and without applying any remedy

remedy thereto, and whether he believes he may do this without danger of killing the body of his Brother by this delay, and his own Soul by so remarkable a negligence; especially if he had an assured remedy whereof it was only his own fault if he did not make use.

I know well at the least, that if herein he pretend not to offend against the Laws of Justice and Christian Charity, he shall transgress those of the Society, who have so well provided for the health of all their Brethren, that instead of delaying to the extremity, they have ordained to cause the Physician to visit them from time to time, though there be none of them sick. What kind of prudence must this be which hath so great care of the health and life of the body, and so little of the Souls?

Father *Celot* is not content to say as *Fillinius* and others, that a sinner is not obliged to seek God after he hath offended him; but even that God himself preventing and seeking, as we may say, his friendship by the inspirations and good motions he bestows on him, he may refuse and reject them effectually, without herein making himself guilty of any fault. He saith also the same thing of them who make profession of living well, and of all those who of deliberate purpose reject the inspirations and graces by which God inclines them to do any good work, though both the one and the other knew that their Salvation would depend upon these inspirations, and that through neglect of receiving them, and complying with them, they might be lost eternally. (1) *I acknowledge*, saith he, *that Salvation depends many times of this counsel, and the use that is made of it, you must say* (he speaks to his Adversary) *that in this case he that will not follow it, commits a great sin. But as for me I hold that he commits none at all.* A man that suffers himself to dye of hunger, without being willing to take bread or any other nourishment that is presented unto him, when he might easily do it, would pass in the judgment of all the world for a self-murderer: and he that suffers his Soul to dye, or rather who kills it, by refusing knowingly and even resolvedly, the graces and inspirations sent him by God, on which he knows that his eternal life and Salvation depend, shall be innocent in the judgment of these Jesuits, *Quo tempore dicas oportet gravissimo se obstringere peccato; ego nullum præcise agnosco.*

I Esteor certe in hujas acceptatione usque consilii salutis cardinem non raro veritari: Quo tempore dicas oportet gravissimo se obstringere peccato qui committat. Ego nullum præcise agnosco. *Celot lib. 9. cap. scilicet 7. pag. 816.*

T H E S U M

Of the Doctrine of the Jesuits concerning the Love of Charity which a man owes unto God and to himself.

They say that when God commands us to love him, he intends only that we should serve him, though it be without love; that he desires no other thing but that we obey him by doing outwardly that which he enjoyns us; that he would have us also to keep the other Commandments, though in keeping them we love him not; that it is sufficient not to hate him, to fulfil the Commandment of loving him, and by consequence to be saved.

God hath commanded us to love him with all our heart and all our might; that is to say, so much as we can. The Jesuits say on the contrary, that it is lawful to love him as little as we will, and much less than we might if we would, and that this suffices; because according to them the least degree of love may satisfy this Commandment.

As God loves us always, and doth us good without intermission, so he would also that our love and acknowledgments should be continual and without bounds. But the Jesuits maintain that we may pass over whole years without loving him; and that by bethinking our selves thereof once in five or seven years, we are quit: yea, that though we have never actually loved him at all through our whole life, it suffices to discharge us from this obligation we have to love him, to think thereof at the point of death; nay, there be some who do hardly acknowledge even this obligation.

God is not content to be loved in a slight way, he will be loved as God, and

as

as he deserves, above all things. The Jesuits say on the contrary, that we may love all things more than God, because according to their Divinity the least degree of love suffices to acquit us of what we owe him.

And when God saith that he will be loved above all things, they hold that he would say only above all things that are evil and contrary to his friendship, that is to say, above all sorts of mortal sins, which only can overturn and destroy the friendship which men have with God:

As man cannot find his bliss but in God, so he loves not himself truly, but so far as he loves God, seeks, adheres, and is united to him by love: but the Jesuits dispense with him for this genuine love which he owes himself, by discharging him of that which he is obliged to bear towards God. 226

They say moreover, that being departed from God; he may continue in that estate without troubling himself about returning to God and himself; and that when God seeks him first by his inspirations, he may refuse and reject them, and abide in this estate of enmity and voluntary aversion from God until the point of death; and so expose himself to the danger of perishing eternally, without making himself by this guilty of any fault, and without being deficient in the love he owes himself, any more than in that he owes God.

III. POINT.

Of the Command to love our Neighbour, that the Jesuits utterly destroy it.

Father Bauny in his Sum, Chap. 7. pag. 81. expounds the Command to love our Neighbour in these terms: *By Charity we are obliged to resist unto him who may have offended us, that we retain no animosity against him, and according to the convenience of times and persons give him proofs of the love we bear him. He quotes some Divines from whom he hath taken what he saith; and he adds reason grounded on the Example and Authority of the holy Fathers. For love, saith he, which we bear towards our brethren, ought to resemble that which the members have one towards another, as writes S. Austin in the 15. of his 56 Homilies. Si enim sic nos amare voluerimus, quomodo se invicem amant membra nostri corporis, perfecta in nobis charitas potest custodiri.* And making application of this Example taken out of S. Austin, and which S. Austin took out of S. Paul, *Let us see then, saith he, what it is the members of the body do naturally one for another. They love and agree mutually, and sympathize with one another in misery. Quando sanum est caput, congaudent omnia membra, & placent sibi de singulis cetera membra, &c.* 2264

See here the duties of Charity towards our Neighbour, which he acknowledgeth with the Divines and holy Fathers, and then he establisheth the command and obligation: *It is even hereunto that God and Nature obligeth us, saith S. Ambrose in the first Book of his Offices, Chap. 28. And therefore, Secundum Dei voluntatem & naturæ copulam invicem nobis auxilio esse debemus, certare officiis, velut in medio omnes utilitates ponere, & adjumentum ferre alter alteri, vel studio, vel officio, vel pecuniâ, vel alio quolibet modo, ut inter nos societatis augetur gratia.*

Perhaps it will be wondred at, at first, that I having undertaken to represent only the Errours of the Jesuits, have rehearsed these places of Father Bauny, as if I had something to reply against them. But I do not pretend to reprove him for producing the opinion of the holy Fathers with those of the School-Divines, that he might establish one of the principal points of Christian Morality. I have no other design than to make him see clearly the excess wherewith he is transported by voluntarily despising the Doctrine of the holy Fathers after he hath acknowledged it, since he hath confidence to say afterwards: *I believe nevertheless that to fail in these things is no mortal sin, unless in case of scandal, pag. 81. He means that it is no mortal sin to be deficient in that which God and Nature obligeth us unto, as he said but now: that it is no mortal sin, as he saith also in the same place, to have such an hatred against our neighbour, as not to be willing to keep company with* 2265

Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 2. Artic. 1.

him,

him, to have such and so violent an aversion from him, as upon no terms or occasion, to be willing to speak with him nor help him in his business, nor at all to forgive him when he acknowledges his fault, and offers satisfaction. For he declares roundly, that to be deficient in all these things which he hath related according to the opinion of the Fathers and new Divines themselves, is no mortal sin unless in case of scandal: that is to say, in the language of this good man, that provided men be not offended at these things, the violation of Charity and the Law of God is of little consideration.

He speaks also of Envy with the same spirit, citing also S. Austin and S. Cyprian, but only to despise their Authority also, by openly preferring his own opinion before that of these great Saints. For after he hath related the words of S. Cyprian, who wondring at the nature of Envy, crys out: *Qualis est animi tinea zelare in altero felicitatem, in malum proprium bona aliena convertere, illustrium prosperitate torqueri?* He adds speedily after, as thinking strange at S. Cyprians wondring, and correcting the opinion of S. Austin whom he quotes likewise: *This sin, though by the testimony of S. Austin it be contrary to Charity, yet seems not to be mortal,* pag. 80. And the reason he opposes to the Authority of these great Saints, is: *Because the good which is found in these temporal things, is so slender and of so little consequence for Heaven, that it is of no consideration with God and the Saints.*

I let pass this reason of which I have spoken in another place, to relate that which he adds also concerning the sin of Envy. *It is no more mortal,* saith he, *when a man gives way to such desires upon some good motive, ex bono motive.* He expresses a little before some of these desires which he doth not only discharge of mortal sin, but which he justifies absolutely, and would have to pass for innocent, saying that *we may wish evil to our neighbour without sin, when we are urged to it by some good motive,* pag. 77. And to expound and support his opinion, he makes use of the Authority of Bonacina writing in these terms: *So Bonacina upon the first Commandment, disp. 3. q. 4. n. 7. exempts from all fault the mother who desires the death of her daughters, quod ob deformitatem aut inopiam nequeat juxta animi desiderium eas nuptui tradere; or indeed because for their sakes she is ill used by their father: quia occasione illarum male secum agitur à marito, aut injuriis afficitur. Non enim proprie filius detestatur ex displicentia ipsarum, sed in detestationem proprii mali,* pag. 77.

He brings also another Example on the same subject: *also one may without fault desire some evil to befall a wicked man, as death; non quidem optando quatenus malum ipsius est, sed quatenus boni rationem habet.* This good or this appearance of good which serves for motive to desire the death of a man without offending God, is expounded by Emanuel Sa in this sort. (1) *You may desire the death of an enemy who might do you much hurt, not of hatred to him, but to avoid the damage and hurt which he would do you. You may also rejoyce in his death, because of the good which you receive thereby.* Jesus Christ was far off from this Doctrine, when in the Gospel he forbids us to render evil for evil, and commands us on the contrary to do good for evil: But this Maxime justifies the greatest part of the enmities and mortal feuds that are in the world. For commonly we desire not the hurt, and especially not the death of another, but to deliver our selves from some evil, or to reap thereby some good, and he must have lost all regard of God and Nature, who should desire any evil or death it self to befall a man out of a meer frolick, without occasion, reason, or hope of any good.

I might here also represent that the Jesuits dispense with the obligation of assisting our neighbour, except only in extrem necessity, and that they cherish the licence of committing, without fear of punishments, thefts, murders, impostures, cheats, and breaches of trust in all sorts of condition. For all these abuses and all these sins are against the Command which God hath given us to love our neighbour as our selves, and never to do unto him what we would not have done unto us. But because all these things have been largely proved in other places, I will speak no more of them at present.

I will add only for conclusion unto this Chapter, that which Amicus saith upon Tom. 2. Book 2 Part 2. Chap. 2. Art. 1.

a que-

1. Potes optare hosti tibi aliqui valde nocituro mortem, non odio, sed ad vitandum damnatum. Item de morte ejus gaudere ob bonum inde secutum. Sa verbo charitatis, num. 8. pag. 65.

I An vi hu-
jus præcepti te-
nemur ad ali-
quum actum
charitatis erga
proximum?
An vero huic
præcepto satis-
ficere possimus
per solos actus
externos mila-
ricordix & be-
neficentix,
quando necessi-
tas & ratio pos-
tulat? *Ami-
ca tom. 4. diff.
28. sect. 1. n. 3.
pag. 377.*

2 Hæc sen-
tentiæ probabi-
lis est, quam ex-
presse tradit
Bernardus,
Serm. 50 in
Canticis. *Ibid.
num. 14.*

Eaque non
obscurè colligi-
tur ex illis ver-
bis, Matth. 7.
& Lucæ 6.
Quæcunque
vultis ut faciant
vobis homines,
& vos facite illi.
Ibid.

3 Manda-
tum novum do-
vobis ut diliga-
tis invicem sic-
ut dilexit vos.
Joan. 13. v. 34.

4 In hoc
cognoscunt om-
nes quia disci-
puli mei estis, si
dilectionem ha-

bueritis ad invicem. *Ibid. v. 35.* 5 Quæcunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, & vos facite illi. 6 Probatur autem hæc sententiæ primo, vi hujus præcepti non tenemur diligere proximum aliter vel plus quam nos ipsos. Atqui nos ipsos non tenemur diligere actu interno charitatis. Ergo nec proximum. *Ibid. num. 15.* 7 A fortiori eandem sententiæ docemur qui actum internum charitatis negare esse necessarium In impleendo præcepto de diligendo Deo super omnia. *num. 14.* 8 Multi damnarentur ex eo quod hujusmodi actum internum charitatis erga omnes homines non elicerent, quod est argumentum ab absurdo & improbabili. *Ibid. num. 18.*

a question which he proposeth concerning the command to love our neighbour; 226
to wit, (1) *Whether by vertue of this Precept we be obliged to some act of Charity towards our neighbour? Or whether we may satisfie it by acts of mercy and bounty exercised towards him when necessity and occasion require?*

After he hath quoted the Divines who hold the affirmative, and related their reasons to the number of five which are very considerable, he cites *Suarez, Coninck*; and some others who are of the contrary opinion, with whom he concludes in these terms. (2) *This opinion is probable.* He attributes it also to *S. Bernard*, saying, *That S. Bernard teaches it expressly in his 50. Sermon upon the Canticles.* Which we should have more reason to wonder at, if he had not also the confidence to say that he learnt it of *Jesus Christ*, and that it was drawn and did evidently follow from these words of *Jesus Christ* in the 7. of *S. Matthew*, and 6. of *S. Luke*. *Do unto men whatsoever ye would they should do unto you.* As if *Jesus Christ* commanding us to do good unto our neighbour, did dispense with us from loving him from the bottom of our hearts, or as if he had not commanded the one as well as the other; and yet more expressly to love him than to do him good, as it may appear in many places of the Gospel, as in the 13. of *S. John*.

(3) *I give you a new Commandment that you love one another as I have loved you.* And in the following verse: (4) *All the world shall know that you are my Disci- 226
ples, if you love one another.* And without alledging other passages of Scripture upon this point, that alone which this Jesuit abuses to shew that God commands us only to serve and not to love our neighbour, doth absolutely prove our obligation unto both. For as there is none who desires not to be relieved in his necessities, so there is none who desires not to be beloved and to be served with affection, and there are many who had rather not be served at all, than without affection and with regret, or with indifference. When God then commands men and saith: (5) *Do ye unto men whatsoever ye would they should do unto you,* he commands as well to love as to serve, because there is none that desires not you should do to him the one as well as the other.

He proves his opinion also by this reason: (6) *We are not obliged by this Precept to love our neighbour otherwise or more than our selves. Now so it is we are not obliged to love our selves with a love and internal act of Charity. And by consequence we are not obliged neither unto our neighbour in that manner.*

He alledges another Reason and Argument in this manner: (7) *Those who deny that to accomplish the Command to love God above all things, it is needful to exercise any act of love and charity towards him; by stronger reason may hold this other opinion.*

Finally, his last reason is, (8) *That if we were obliged to love our neighbour, 227
multitudes of the world would be damned for never exercising this inward act of Charity towards all men, which is a very severe point, and not at all probable.* It suffices

that a point appears difficult for it to be rejected of them who profess a complacent Divinity, and an easie devotion, how clear and evident soever it be in the Gospel: and the same reason serves them to hold it for a thing indifferent or an advice only, whatsoever is contrary to the senses, and which gives them any trouble, though it be expressly commanded.

I stand not any longer upon this last reason no more than upon the two former, because I have spoken sufficiently thereof before. It suffices to observe that this Jesuit establishes here one error upon two others, and that he pretends with his Brethren, that we are not obliged to love our neighbour, because we are not obliged to love our selves, any more than to love God by any Command: and by consequence that he and his Companions by their own confession destroy and

abolish entirely the two Commandments of Charity, and the love of God in the second degree, which regardeth our neighbour, as well as in the first, which respects God himself.

IV. POINT.

That the Jesuits allow of Magick and Witchcraft.

IT would never be believed, if we did not read it in their Books. *Tambourin* saith, (1) *That he who knows another hath made a Covenant with the Devil to hide a treasure, may make a sign opposite to that which hath been made to commit this treasure to the Devils custody, that the Devil may keep it no longer.* As if the Devil had not still what he demands, whether the treasure be committed to him to keep, or he be hindred from keeping it, whilst the marks and superstitious Ceremonies whereof he is the Author are observed. It is not the treasure put into his custody that he demands; but the heart and soul of him who believes in him, and who makes use of his superstitions to oblige him, or prohibite him to keep a treasure.

The same Father puts a question, whether it be lawful to undo one Charm by another? He answers, (2) *That if I demand absolutely that he who hath set the Spell should take it off, knowing that he can, either with or without a new Charm, yet believing or knowing certainly that he will do it with one.* I answer, saith he, *that it is at least probable and safe in conscience that it may be lawfully demanded.* This is as it were to send a Messenger or a Deputy to the Devil, and to cause him to be requested for what we dare not demand our selves, and to make use of another mans Magick as ones own, since we know certainly that he can do nothing without the help of the Devil.

He saith after *Sanchez*, (3) *That they are not superstitious who heal the sick by Charms composed of Psalms and other Prayers, and who by stroking and prayers heal them of incurable diseases.* They call these persons Saviours, saith he. These diseases being incurable, it is clear that they who heal them, as he saith, by stroking and prayers, must needs act by an extraordinary vertue and more than humane: and as they are not Saints, that so we might believe that they have the power of God in their hands, it is visible that they employ that of the Devil.

It is also lawful, according to this Father, (4) *to make use of sacred words to keep dogs from barking, to stanch bleeding, and to heal diseases, provided we attend on the event without firm confidence therein, and cut off all vain Ceremonies, if there be any.* This without doubt is a worthy use of the Word of God, to employ it only to keep Curs from barking; and this is without doubt to sanctifie the profession of Thieves, to teach them to pray unto God when they are about to enter into a house to rob, that by their prayers they may hinder the dogs from bawling and wakening the people.

nibus confectas curant infirmos qui suo tactu vel orationibus etiam incurabiles morbos pari modo sanant, hos saluatores vocant. *Ibid.* num. 30. sect. 1. 4 Verba sacra pro latratu canum, proque effluente sanguine, & pro morbum expulsiōe, amota certa expectatiōe, & vanis, si forte adsint, ceremoniis, sunt hec. *Ibid.* num. 20. sect. 1.

To avoid Witchcraft in these prayers, *Tambourin* requires two conditions. The first that the event be not attended with certain confidence nor the effect of these prayers, allowing it to be lawful to desire it, and to attend on the power of the Devil as probable, and to have a probable commerce with him, and to hope that he will help us, provided we be not wholly confident of it, the Devil not performing always what he would, no more than what he saith and what he promiseth. The other condition is, *that the vain Ceremonies be cut off, if there be any.* But the Devil regards not to employ vain and Pagan Ceremonies in Magick, when it is more advantagious for him to use those of the Church. 1. Because thereby he profanes the sacred signs of our Religion. 2. Because thereby he

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hides his malice better, and more easily surpriseth the simple by marks and appearances of piety.

But that none may scruple to consult Astrologers about what shall befall them, *Tambourin* assures us, (1) *That he hath seen men of extraordinary piety and learning make no scruple to demand from Astrologers the figures of their birth, and productions of things which should happen unto them.* This alone suffices to render their vertue suspected, and entirely to ruine it, since this was to approve and authorize a profession condemned by the Scripture & Church, and to cherish worldly men in a profane curiosity which leads them to consult Diviners and judiciary Astrologers, about things to come, which depend on God alone, and not on the vain observations of these Impostors.

Tambourin adds, (2) *That he would not condemn him at least of mortal sin, to whom an Astrologer having predicted that he should be advanced to some Prelacy, if he resolved thereupon to go to Rome with some hope, but not with entire certainty to obtain the dignity foretold him.* Without doubt this is a very Ecclesiastick mission, and altogether divine, to go to Rome to obtain a Prelacy, being induced thereunto by a Diviner or an Astrologer, that is to say, by the illusion of a Spirit humane or diabolick which governs these Foretellers, who having first deceived them, doth by them deceive and blind others by their own ambition and folly.

There can be nothing more proper to authorize this pernicious Science, and to give it free passage through the world, than to say that it is capable of conducting Church-men in the greatest and holiest Charges of Religion. But this is clearly enough to justify and declare it innocent and lawful, and to confirm those who profess it in their error, to maintain that the gain they get thereby is just and lawful, as *Saucius* doth when he saith: (3) *That if an Astrologer have not done what he could to know by the help of the Devil what he could not know otherwise, whether the thing happened, or happened not, he is bound to restore the money he received: but if he have done what he could to know of the Devil what would happen, he is not bound to restore what he received; because he hath taken pains for this money.... For the pains, care, and industry of this Sorcerer hath its valuation, and may be estimated by money; and in this case he is not responsible for damages, nor obliged to restitution of expences; but he is then only obliged thereto when he is not well skilled in the diabolick Art.*

1 *Viduo vires pietate & de cetera non mediocres ab Astrologis sui natalis figuram, suosque particulares futuros eventus non cum serupulo exposcentes. Ibid. n. 19. sect. 1.*

2 *Certe cum cui prae dicitur modo dicto Praetura, non condemnatum, saltem de mortali, si adire Romam velit ad aliquam sub aliqua spe, non vero certitudine expectandam. Ibid. num. 20.*

3 *Si nullam operam apposuit ut arte diaboli id sciret Astrologus quod nullo alio pacto scire potuit, sive effectus eveniret, sive non, tenetur pretium restituere danti: Si vero Astrologus ille vel*

divinator operam suam apposuit, & arte diaboli res ita evenit, non tenetur pretium restituere, quia ipse suam operam, etsi corruptam, apposuit— quia illa diligentia a mago illo apposita est pretio xitimabilis, nec in hoc casu tenetur damna & expensas consulenti restituere, sed tantum quando nullam operam impendit, aut ejus diabolicae artis ignarus est. Saucius in Summa, lib. 2. cap. 38. num. 96.

He condemns him not then unto restitution, but only for not being sufficiently employed in the study of this impious and horrible Science, and for not having intelligence enough with the Devil. This extravagance appears incredible, but it is a just punishment on him, for that he could imagine that it was just that those goods which the Lord hath made for them who adore him, should serve for recompence to the Worshipers of the Devil, and that they could get them justly by doing of all injuries the greatest unto him who is thereof the Sovereign Master,

ARTICLE II.

THOU SHALT NOT SWEAR BY GOD IN VAIN.

That the Jesuits destroy this Commandment by diminishing, excusing, weakning the sins of Swearing and Blaspheming.

BAny treating of Blasphemy in Chap. 6. of his Sum, pag. 69. acknowledges that we see but too many people who by utmost infidelity renounce God; but he adds also shortly after, that the rashness of the tongue or mind in fits and sallies of choler, which are the cause a man is not master of himself, excuse from mortal sin, this extream infidelity of those who renounce God: and this same excuse may serve in a manner for all those who are transported to renounce or blaspheme God, there being few who do it in cold blood.

He hath written also in the same Page, That by a most pernicious abuse it is become a custom in the world to affirm doubtful things by these words; As true as there is but one God, which cannot be considerately uttered without the sin of blasphemy. He acknowledges the Commandment neither to swear nor blaspheme, and the sin committed in the violation thereof; but he abolisheth it as speedily, adding that this sin is mortal when there is an intencion therein *equandi humanam veritatem divinam*, to equalize the truth of humane things to Gods.

This Clause is remarkable; *When we have an intencion*. For it presupposes that when we have not this intencion, there is no mortal sin. And to expound and establish this Doctrine yet farther, he brings this reason: Because this is against his sacred honour, and the reverence which we owe him, to compare uncertain and mutable things to the constancy and eternal duration of his immutable and divine Essence: (Sanchez in the 1. Part of his Sum in the Book of an Oath) and by necessary consequence to attribute unto him that instability which is contrary to his perfection and holy Nature, and so to blaspheme, pag. 70.

He always measures blasphemy by the intencion of him that commits it; so that, according to him to conclude that any person offends mortally in uttering these words: *As true as there is but one God*, or other such like, it is necessary that he have an express intencion to attribute instability unto God, and that he believe that God is as mutable and inconstant as the Creatures. Which they do not for all that, saith he, who by this form of speech, would not compare any thing unto God, but only shew indeed that the thing is true in a certain manner, as it is true that God is. And by consequence they blaspheme not by the Principles of this Father; As if the sin of Blasphemy could not be committed, but when by an error of the understanding, or a false opinion of God, or by affected malice, or a formed design to destroy and dishonour him, he is blasphemed. If this be so, then to be Blasphemers we must become Hereticks, or rather Atheists, or Devils.

He expounds himself yet more clearly upon this very matter in the 66, 67, and 68 pages of the same Chapter, where giving out Rules of Practice for a Confessor, he saith, *That he ought to inform himself of the Penitent who accuses himself of blasphemy, whether he have done it with a formal intencion to dishonour God; and whether he were maliciously affected towards God; and whether he blasphemed him out of hatred; whether he were touched with any despite against God.* And he adds in the sequel, *That if the Penitent answer that he hath not been touched with any despite against God, &c. the said Confessor is not to reprove him for a Blasphemer, nor deprived of Grace, because he hath used blasphemous words.*

And in the 66. page, after he hath said, *That it is a sort of blasphemy, when we name with contempt, shame, and dishonour the holy and most sacred Members of the Son of God*, he adds in favour of these Blasphemers: *Which they seem not to do, who make use of them in their common discourse as ornaments of speech, saying, Death, Head, Belly, &c.* He confirms his opinion by the Authority of some who hold after Bonacina, that to name these parts in choler, and not through any indignation

against God, is no blasphemy. His reason is, because in these words; By the Head, by the Belly, nothing is uttered concerning God which is false, since it is true that God being become man hath these members; though, as he said in the beginning, these members be named with contempt, reproach, shame, and dishonour to the Son of God.

If he could excuse this crime of all sin, as well as of Blasphemies, and make it wholly innocent, it may be he would do it. But not daring to undertake that, he doth at least what he can to diminish it, making use of Laymans Authority, who by his relation, saith, *That this is a sin of irreverence against God, which is but venial when it is without perjury, scandal, or danger of swearing false.*

At the end of the same p.66. continuing to give his advice and Rules of Practice to the Confessor, he saith, *That he ought to examine his Penitent whether he have an ill will and despite against his Creator.* And in the beginning of the following Page he declares that his advice is, *that if the Penitent declare that his choler hath transported him to these scandalous words, we may be persuaded that in uttering them he hath sinned only venially.* He saith also a little after, *That we must make the like judgment of those who without consideration do use them; that is to say, that they sin only venially.*

Finally, he acknowledges none for Blasphemers properly but those who voluntarily, of set purpose, and knowingly name these sacred members of the humanity of the Son of God, if they do it out of formal contempt, wittingly against the truth, in which case it is a mortal sin of blasphemy or perjury.

I let pass all these passages without making any reflection thereon; neither do I represent them with all their extent, having already related part of them in the Chapter of the *Intentoen*, where they may be seen. I have here only touched them in my passage, that I might make appear what is the opinion of Father Bauny concerning Blasphemy, and that to find it such as he sets it forth, and with the conditions he requires in it, we must go into Hell. For we may speak and judge of things by his Principles and Arguments, that he hath taken blasphemy from the face of the Earth, by multiplying Blasphemers, and giving them liberty to blaspheme freely, and means to excuse themselves from all the blasphemies they can commit, if they know how to make use of the Rules which he hath taught them. 2279

One will say that he useth no blasphemous words but as ornaments of his language. Another may say that he did it through choler and despite against some one whom he will, and not out of any evil affection or indignation he had against God. The most part may say that when they let flye blaspheming, cursing and despitefully railing against their Creator, passion and choler transported them unto these scandalous words. And if they be all examined, as Father Bauny counsels a Confessor to examine them who address themselves unto him, saying, *That it is very pertinent to the purpose that be may learn of them, and know their intention from their own mouth, and what hath moved them to blaspheme, he will, it may be, find none who will not answer that he did it not through any formal intention to dishonour God, or through any hatred which he had against him, nor through any formed design to reproach, contemn, and dishonour God, or Jesus Christ, or his most holy and sacred members.* And thus there shall no more Blasphemers be found in the world, we must no more have recourse to the Ordinances of the Church, nor of Princes and to punish Blasphemers, nor count that amongst the Commandments of God which forbids blasphemy; since according to the Divinity of this Father, there will be none in effect, they will be only sins of irreverence and venial. 2280

The other Jesuits seem more moderate on this subject: but if they appear in this less to blame, they are, it may be, more indeed, and they are much more dangerous than Bauny. For the vice that proceeds to extremity, and is visible in its excess, is only for them that have no conscience; but it surpriseth and insensibly engages those who have yet some fear of God, when it is propounded with some temperament, and when it is covered with some pretence which serves as a reason to commit it without scruple.

Escobar, by Example, in his Moral Divinity, places amongst Problematick Questions, whether all blasphemy be mortal sin. And though he rank himself

indeed amongst them that hold the affirmative, yet he forbears not to say that it is no blasphemy when (1) *a Lover calls his Mistress his Goddess and his Idol.* For after he had related divers opinions about this question, according to his custom, he joyns himself to those who excuse it from blasphemy, and saith, (2) *If this Lover speak before persons of indifferent discretion, he ought not in any sort be esteemed a Blasphemer, because it is clear that it is only flattery; but if he speak before gross witted persons, he would not altogether exempt him from a grand material blasphemy.* If this reason take place, there will be no blasphemy at all, unless he who hears it, believe that he who utters it, speaks according to his judgment, so this shall be only a material blasphemy; that is, the matter of blasphemy only. So that there will be no true blasphemies but what are uttered by Infidels and impious persons who believe they speak truth when they blaspheme. And according to this Rule the *Tyrians and Sidonians* blasphemed not when they said unto King *Herod* to flatter him, that he spoke as a God and not as a man: And this proud King ought not to have been eaten of worms, as he was by the just Judgment of God, for suffering these blasphemous words, since the flattery was altogether manifest.

This reason may be made use of for a foundation of the Proposition of *Tambourin* and *Azor* who hold, that to say, *This is as true as the Gospel, or this is as true as God, is no blasphemy:* And their reason is, because it is visible that this is an excess against the divine Truth. That is to speak properly, that this is no blasphemy, because it is visible that it is one.

Sanchez saith that he who swears lightly and unconcernedly, without thinking on what he saith, or through vanity, sins only venially. (3) *The oath, saith he, wherunto the third condition is wanting, to wit, judgment, when men swear without necessity, or without the respect and reverence that is requisite, is but a venial sin; because the irreverence herein committed is not great, being only a sin of vanity, or of superfluity.*

Fillinius saith the same thing, and almost in the same words: (4) *If judgment only be wanting to an oath; that is to say, if it be uttered without necessity or utility, there is in it some fault.* And a little after: *An oath is not a mortal sin, if it be without contempt.* We must not then say any longer in the Commandment that forbids Swearing; *Thou shalt not swear by God in vain;* but only thou shalt not swear falsely; since that, according to these new Divines, we may without great sin swear in vain and out of vanity, without necessity, profit, occasion, or reverence, which in swearing is due to God whom we take for Judge and Witness.

Fillinius's reason is, (5) *Because though this oath, thus made without necessity or reverence, be in some sort against the Authority of God; nevertheless because it destroys it not in it self, as a lye destroys his truth, and is not contrary unto him otherwise than as it renders him not all the respect that is due unto him, it is but a venial sin.* As if it were a small matter to fail of our respect towards God, and to demean our selves irreverently towards him, and not to be troubled for offending against his Authority, provided we do not absolutely destroy it.

Illoque committitur. Tale juramentum non est mortale, si desit contemptus. *Fillius. tom. 2. qq. mor. tr. 25. cap. 11. num. 332. & 333. pag. 205.* 5 Licet aliquo modo sit contra Dei auctoritatem, tamen quia non fit contra illam in se, sicut destruitur veritas ejus per mendacium, sed tantum fit contra illam, non tractando illam cum debita reverentia; ideo tantum committitur culpa venialis. *Ibid. num. 333.*

This Author considers not that to destroy truth in our selves, is no less a mortal sin, than to destroy it in it self, which is impossible. For we are obliged to have it in us as our life, by loving and honouring it: and to chase it from us by contempt or negligence, or by preferring other things before it which please us more, can be no other than a mortal sin, since this is truly to kill our selves, and it in us.

And for the Authority of God, it is certain that we cannot indeed deprive him of it, any more than of his Power; and to deny it, were to become a Fool or an Atheist. Since then it cannot be destroyed in it self, nor in the opinion and judgment of men that have their reason sound, there remains but one way to de-

1 Amans
suisum, suum vo-
citat idolum.
2 Si coram
mediocriter ob-
prudentibus ob-
loquatur, nul-
latus blasphemie nota as-
ciendus est hu-
juncti utens
locutionibus:
quia amanti a-
perta est adula-
rio: ac coram
cunctis, haud
cum omnino &
gravi materialis
blasphemie pic-
culo liberarim.
*Esob. tom. 1.
Theol. Mor. lib.
4. probl. 21.*

3 Juramen-
tum cui desit
tertius comes,
nempe judici-
um quod atten-
det ad necessa-
riam jurandi
causam & debi-
tam reverenti-
am, est sola ve-
nialis culpa; si-
quidem solius
vanitatis & su-
perfluitatis pec-
catum est.
*Sanct. op. mor.
lib. 3. cap. 4.
num. 35. p. 17.*

4 Si desit
juramento tan-
tum judicium,
hoc est, si fiat
absque necessi-
tate aut utilita-
te, peccatum a-

810

820

830

stroy it so much as may be, which is by contempt, and irreverence which is committed against it by using it indifferently without respect to confirm what we say, swearing without necessity or occasion, and even of meer vanity. So that if in this case and these circumstances the sin committed against the Authority of God, and the reverence which is due unto him be a slight one, as these Jesuits say it is, it seems that there can never be any great one, according to them in this matter.

Fillinius proceeds farther, and maintains, that to swear, not only without occasion and reverence; but also upon some bad occasion, as to affirm by oath that one hath committed murder or adultery, is but a venial sin. (1) *For though we make use of this oath in the relation we make of a mortal sin, as when we say: I swear that I have committed this murder, or this fornication; yet this may be done without any complacency in this crime, and only out of levity and without cause. Wherefore it is but a venial sin.*

He adds that though a man who swears thus, should take pleasure in the crime he relates, and should scandalize and defame another person in his relation, this oath according to *Suarez* would not be mortal; which he also believes as probable with him. For after he hath said that the more rational Casuists hold, that (2) *if any one reporting a mortal sin wrong the honour and reputation of his neighbour, as by saying, that he hath committed adultery with an honest woman, or if he take pleasure therein, if he swear to affirm that which he saith, it is a mortal sin;* he opposeth unto theirs the opinion of *Suarez*, as probable. (3) *For all that Suarez, saith he, in the place now quoted, n. 8. maintains that it is no mortal sin, if it be considered only as an oath; because this oath regards not the matter of this discourse, as bad, but only as true: And by consequence there is none, at the least no mortal sin therein; which is probable enough.*

And because this reason of *Suarez* is metaphysical enough, *Fillinius* relates another, or rather expounds the same in another manner, and makes it more intelligible, (4) *Because this defect, saith he, speaking of the injury done unto God by the man who takes him for a witness of the adultery he hath committed, is not contrary to the end of an oath. For it may serve to confirm the truth; and he takes not God for a witness of a false, but at the most of a wicked and dishonest thing, as we have said; and this in it self is no great injury against God. By this reckoning we may say that a child should do his father no great wrong, nor a servant his Master, nor wife her husband, to produce and take him for witness of her debauches, provided they were true; unless we will say, that the honour of God is less considerable than that of men, or that God ought to be insensible of all injuries and indignities committed against him.*

Sanchez discharges of sin, at least mortal, all those who swear of custom, (5) *of what sort soever it be, saith he, though they have not yet recanted it. If they in swearing have not so much presence of mind as to perceive what they say and do; and what evil they cause, as the most prudent have, who have not this evil habit; so their vice and wicked custom of swearing shall not hurt them; but on the contrary upon this occasion it shall be favourable unto them. For if they had it not, they would perceive what they did in swearing, and would make themselves Criminals. But because the evil custom of swearing which they have contracted, and wherein they persist still voluntarily, blinds, and hinders them from perceiving the crime they commit; it secures them from it, according to this Doctor.*

1 Quia licet juramentum hoc adjungatur narrationi peccati mortalis; ut juro me commisisse tale homicidium, vel fornicationem; tamen non fit cum complacentia in illo ex necessitate, sed tantum fit sine causa & leviter, quare non excedet culpam venialem. *Ibid. n. 336. pag. 205.*

2 Si quis narrer peccatum mortale, infamando proximum; ut adulterium cum muliere honesta, vel complacendo in illo, tunc juramentum additum videtur mortale. *Ibid. num. 337.*

3 Atamen *Suarez* loco citato, n. 8. defendit à mortalibus, si tantum habeatur ratio juramenti: quia non cadit supra illam miseriam quatenus mala, sed tantum quatenus vera. Quare nec erit peccatum, sal-

tem mortale, quod est satis probabile. *Ibid.* 4 Quis ejusmodi defectus nec est contra finem juramenti. Potest enim confirmari per illud veritas, nec facit Deum testem mendacii, sed ad summum rei malæ & indecentis, ut diximus. At id per se non est injuria gravis. *Ibid. num. 336.* 5 Quævisunque illa sit, & nondum sit recitata. Atque ita ut sint peccata lethalia, requirit talem advertentiam, qualis est necessaria in homine non sic ad jurandum assuetum. *Sancti. op. moral. lib. 3. cap. 5. num. 28. pag. 21.*

By this reason if a man being in a dangerous way, should pull out his own eyes, and then fall into a precipice, he might be excused by this, that he could not see when he fell.

By all this which hath been said unto this present; it is clear that the Jesuits
Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 2. Artic. 2. excuse

excuse them who swear and forswear through an evil habit ; who swear rashly and without reason , vainly and without necessity, in wicked and scandalous matters, which tend to the dishonour of our neighbour by defaming him, and of God by taking him for witness of crimes and debauches, of which in swearing they boast themselves. So that there remains nothing in this matter but swearing and forswearing with full knowledge and black malice, to be a crime, and which properly retains the name of an oath and perjury in the Schools of these Fathers.

Escobar puts this Question: (1) *Is it lawful to suborn any person to swear a false thing, which he notwithstanding ignorantly believes to be true?* And after he had said that Azor is not of this opinion, because it is not lawful to cause that evil to be done by another which we cannot do our selves, he adds: (2) *But this is the opinion of P. Hurtado.* He might also have joyned Sanchez to him, who holds the same opinion; (3) *If some one presents himself to me, saith he, without my solicitation to swear that which he in simplicity believes to be true, though I know well that it is false: if notwithstanding it serve to prove some other thing which I know to be true, and conduces to binder that I be not deprived of my right, it is lawful for me to take his offer.*

The reason of Escobar is, (4) *Because in this case we engage not our neighbour in a thing which is formally evil, since he sins not in swearing.* We may say by the same reason, that it is lawful to cause a Fool to kill another man, because he sins not in killing him.

He demands also, (5) *Whether it be lawful to cause him to swear whom we fear will swear false.* In the disposition wherein this man is supposed to be, it is one and the same thing to require him to swear and forswear; since we know that the one is inseparable from the other; and because we dare not require both together, we need only, according to these Doctors, make an abstraction in our minds, and separate the one from the other in our thoughts, and only require him to swear, without considering the perjury he is about to commit.

Filliutius hath put the same Question, and answered it in the same manner (6) *I hold, saith he, that any one may upon a lawful cause request a man to swear, though he probably fear that he will be forsworn.* And this answer is but a conclusion drawn from a Principle he had minted before, saying, (7) *That this thing is not evil in it self, to require an oath of a person whom we know will forswear himself, so that some conditions be observed.* Amongst these conditions, one of the principal is, (8) *That somewhat of value be in question, and that there be some just cause to require this oath, as the necessity of our affairs or benefit we hope therefrom; otherwise it would be against Charity to expose and engage our neighbour in such an occasion.*

He believes not that it would be against the Charity we owe our Neighbour, to cause him to kill his own soul by perjury when we pretend some temporal interest in it; but then only when we pretend nothing, nor receive any profit from it.

Filliutius saw this difficulty very well; but he forbears not for all that to persist in the maintenance of his opinion, saying, (9) *That yet this is not against Charity, because it obliges us not to avoid the sin of another man by our own loss.* This Maxime agrees well with the Word of Jesus Christ who saith, that it were better to be cast head-long into the bottom of the Sea with a Mill-stone about our neck, than to offend our neighbour, and to induce him to sin. They consider neither truth which is prejudiced, nor God who is offended by perjury, nor the Soul of our neighbour who kills himself by his perjury; but only the private interest of him who causes him to swear, which they are not ashamed to prefer before all these things.

que intercedente legitima causa, petere juramentum ab eo quem probabiliter timet esse perjuratum. *Filliutius tom. 2. moral. qq. tract. 21. cap. 11. num. 447. pag. 206.* 7 Non esse intrinsece malum, petere juramentum ab eo quem scimus perjuratum, dummodo serventur aliquæ conditiones. *Ibid. num. 346.* 8 Utc sic aliqua justa causa id preendi, necessitas videlicet, vel utilitas, alioqui esset contra charitatem proximum constituere in tali occasione. 9 Nec propterea est contra charitatem; quia hæc non obligat ad vitandum peccatum alterius cum proprio damno.

1 Licet inducere aliquem ad jurandum falsum; quod tamen ipse juraturus est ignorans verum putet? Escobar tr. 1. exam. 3. cap. 7. num. 21. p. 74.
2 Affirmat auct. Petrus Hurtado.
3 Si absque inductione aliqua mea ille se offerat ad jurandum quod bona fide putet esse verum; etiam si ego falsum norim, & condicatur ad probandum quod scio verum esse; & ne jure meo defrauder, licet utique acceptare. Sanchez. op. moral. lib. 3. cap. 8. num. 10. pag. 35.
4 Quia proximus tunc non inducitur ad esse sum formaliter malum, cum jurando non delinquit. *Ibid. Escobar.*
5 Licet petere juramentum ab eo quem scimus esse falsum juratum?
Licet, dummodo non petatur ut jurat falsum. *Ibid. num. 33.*
6 Dico 4. posse quemcumque.

Who dares excuse him who should induce his brother to do an action which he knew was capable to procure his fathers death and his also, because he might from thence draw to himself some profit or advantage thereby? Nevertheless the Jesuits allow this to all sorts of persons in reference to God and their Neighbour: that is to say, in reference to their brother and father, saying, (1) *That it is not a thing evil in it self to intreat a person to swear, who, we know very well, will forswear himself.*

1 Non est intrinsicè malum petere juramentum ab eo quem scimus pejeraturum.

2 Ut non liceat juramentum à pejeraturo petere, quamvis ille ad pejerandum paratus sit, seque sponte offerat.

3 Ac concurrenti justa causa, nulla est culpa. *Sanch. op. moral. lib. 3. cap. 8. num. 6. pag. 34.*

4 Sed major est difficultas quando ille pejeraturus non erit actu paratus, ac necessitas est in presente. *Ibid. num. 7.*

5 Dicendum est licere concurrenti justa causa necessitatis ejus juramenti, quamvis aliter sit pejeraturus, nec esset paratus ad pejerandum. *Ibid.*

6 Ratio est quia non petitur ab eo perjurium, sed juramentum. Nec lex charitatis obligat cum proprio notabili detrimento ad vitandum id proximi peccatum. *Ibid.*

7 Quia potest quispiam causam aliterius agere, & ratio administrationis petitur exigi id juramentum;

& nisi petatur, arguetur perjuracionis exiſtimate, aut negligentis administrationis. *Ibid.* 8 Insuper potest deferri hoc juramentum confirmando contractui qui alias infirmus erit. *Ibid.* 9 Num liceat per falsos Deos ad jurandum inducere? Determinate inducere, mortale est; petere vero juramentum ab eo qui per falsos Deos est juraturus, peccatum non est. *Escob. tr. 1. exam. 3. num. 57. pag. 79.*

This opinion is Sanchez's also, who after he had said that there are some who hold, (2) *That it is not lawful to induce him to swear, who will forswear himself, though he be very forward, and offer himself voluntarily thereto;* he adds, speaking after his own opinion, and correcting that of those Divines, (3) *That when some just occasion to do it occurs, it is no sin.* And a little after, to clear up this Question, he adds: (4) *But the difficulty is greater when he who is to forswear himself is not disposed thereunto, and he who intreats it of him hath some necessity obliging him thereto.*

He acknowledges that according to the Principles of S. Austin, S. Thomas, and other Divines, whom he had quoted before, this is not lawful; but he forbears not to maintain on the contrary, (5) *That it is lawful when any just occasion happens which renders this oath needful, though he who takes it, must forswear himself, and was not disposed to forswear himself, if he had not been intreated.* His grounds are the same with those of Fillinius, (6) *The reason is, saith he, because he is not required to forswear himself, but to swear; and the Law of Charity obliges not to eschew this sin of our Neighbour with notable damage to our selves thereby to be incurred.* And being desirous to make us see what necessity and motive might suffice to make a person swear, who, we are assured, will forswear himself, and offers himself to that purpose, he brings two Examples.

The first Example is, (7) *That it may happen that a man hath taken on him the care of another mans affairs, and that to acquit himself well therein, he shall be obliged to exact this oath; so that if he fail therein, he will give occasion of suspecting his fidelity, or his affection and vigilance.* So you have the first Example, which is of a man who being charged with some affairs, knows not well how to perform or dispatch them so readily as he desires, without making use of a Perjurer; this is to give great liberty, or rather a great and dangerous temptation to all Agents, Proctors, and Sollicitors of Affairs.

The other Example is of a man who hath need of a Knight of the Post to reform a Contract and make it valid, (8) *Moreover, saith Sanchez, this oath may be made use of to fortifie and make valid a Contract, which without it would be null.* This is to make good penny-worths of conscience and our neighbours Souls, to abandon it in this manner, and to help him even to cast himself into perdition and the power of the Devil, to secure a debt, or to avoid the reproach or suspicion of being negligent in the conduct of an affair.

Escobar puts also this Question about an Oath: (9) *Whether it be lawful to induce one to swear by false gods?* The Answer is, (10) *That to engage him expressly thereto, is a mortal sin: but to demand an oath of him who will swear by false gods, is no evil thing in it self.* He holds then that it is no evil in it self to take such an oath of an Infidel; but it would be to demand it; that it may be demanded, but not expressly; that we may sollicite an Infidel and engage him to swear, provided we tell him not in express terms, that he shall swear by his false gods, though we be assured that he will not swear otherwise, not acknowledging the true God. Who sees not that this is to deride God and men, to treat of matters of Religion and Salvation in a manner so unhandfom and gross, that common sense only is sufficient to perceive the excess and baseness of it?

8 Insuper potest deferri hoc juramentum confirmando contractui qui alias infirmus erit. *Ibid.* 9 Num liceat per falsos Deos ad jurandum inducere? Determinate inducere, mortale est; petere vero juramentum ab eo qui per falsos Deos est juraturus, peccatum non est. *Escob. tr. 1. exam. 3. num. 57. pag. 79.*

Escobar

Escobar cites *Filius* upon this Point, and he saith in effect the same thing with him, and in the same terms: (1) *To demand, saith he, an oath of him who, we are assured, will swear by his false god, is not a thing evil in it self.* This is also the Judgment of *Sanchez*, who with his Brethren acknowledging, that it is to contribute to an action of Idolatry, or at the least to give occasion of it also with them, that it may not be done without some reason for it. But instead of what the others say generally, that we ought to be engaged thereto by some necessity or utility, he saith more, that it cannot be so little, as not be sufficient thereunto. (2) *The least benefit or interest sufficeth, saith he, to dispense with the Precept which obliges us to avoid this occasion.*

And it is in a manner upon this reason that he gives a solution to another difficulty which he propounds a little after. (3) *What sin is it to require an oath of an Infidel who is ready to swear by false gods, without necessity or utility which might serve for excuse?* He answers, 1. That none have declared nor explained this Question in the terms he hath proposed it. And after he acknowledges that some condemn this action of mortal sin; because it is entirely against the Charity which we owe to our Neighbour, which obliges us to hinder, and much more not to tempt him to offend God mortally, at least when we can do it conveniently and without any loss.

This so weighty a consideration startles him a little; but it is not capable to make him to quit his opinion, and yield unto the truth. (4) *Though I believe, saith he, that this opinion is more probable, because the reason of these Authors which I now related is very urgent; it is very probable that it is but a venial sin.* His reason is, that since there needs so small a matter to be able without sin to prevail against the Precept forbidding us to demand an oath of an Infidel; this is a sign that this Command is not so rigorous, as to oblige under mortal sin, though we should violate it expressly and without any particular reason, (5) *Because, saith he, the least consideration of benefit sufficeth to exempt us from the Precept which obligeth to avoid this occasion; and it is not ordinary for so slight an occasion to dispense with Commands which oblige under mortal sin.*

This manner of arguing is very ordinary with the Jesuits, to establish one Error by another, and to make use of one disorder which they have already introduced, to make way for a second, by drawing consequences from the one to the other. Because they give liberty without sin to demand an oath of an Idolater, when we have any small pretext for it, they infer from thence, that when we demand it without any reason, it cannot be any great evil. Thus it is that they take from themselves authority to dispense with the Commandments of God, and abolish them as they please; and that they make use of their own dispensations to give them liberty to violate them freely, or at least without any great sin.

quando commode & absque suo damno id potest. 4 Quamvis autem hoc probabilius esse credam, quia ratio adducta fortiter urge; ac probabile est culpam solum venialem admitti. 5 Quia, ut vidimus n. 2. & seq. vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc præcepto vitandæ hujus occasionis; at à præceptis sub mortali obligantibus, non tam levis causa excusare solet. *Ibid.*

ARTICLE III. Of the Commandment of God,

HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER.

THis Commandment obligeth Children to their Fathers and Mothers in four principal things, as the Catechism of the Council of Trent observes; to love, reverence, obedience, and assistance. These are also the four Duties in which the Jesuits undertake to dispense with them.

1. For what concerns love, *Dicastillus* saith, (1) *That it is not altogether certain that a child can lawfully desire the death of his father or rejoice in it, because of inheritance which might come to him thereby; but he believes that he sins not mortally in rejoicing, not in his death, considered as an evil unto his father, but as a lawful*

P p

Tom. 2. Book 2 Part 2. Chap. 2. Artic. 3.

1 Petere juramentum ab eo quem constat esse juraturum per falsos Deos, non est peccatum. *Filius tom. 2. mor. qq. 11. 11. cap. 11. num. 339. pag. 205.*

2 Vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc præcepto vitandæ hujus occasionis. *Sanchez ut supra num. 23. pag. 37.*

3 Secunda difficultas est quale peccatum sit exigere hoc juramentum. ad Infidelis præcepto ad jurandum per falsos Deos, quando desunt necessitates aut utilitates excusans. *Ibid. num. 22.*

Quam difficultatem in terminis non enodant Authores.

Quia generale charitatis præceptum ac correctionis fraternæ præceptum obligat quemlibet sub mortali ad vitandum lethale alterius peccatum,

1 Desiderare filium v. g. parentis mortem aut de illa gaudere ob hereditatem eadem

provenientem, non ita certum est esse licitum, quamvis de gaudio & delectatione non quidem habita de morte ipsa secundum se, quatenus est malum patris, immo ad finem hæreditatis obtinendæ aut similem, optare ut licita via, scilicet à Deo, non quatenus malum patris est, sed quatenus inde filio bonum provenit, non putarem esse mortale. *Dicastill. lib. 2. tom. 2.*

means appointed of God, for him to obtain the succession; not because some evil befall the father, but some good the son. 2294

See here a man exceedingly confounded. He would gladly justify a child who desires the death of his father, that he may enjoy his estate; but he dares not do it absolutely, because this appears not to him to be altogether certain. He contents himself to exempt him from mortal sin by the rule of directing the intention, which teaches him to look on his fathers death, not as ill to his father, but as good for himself, because of the inheritance that comes to him thereby.

(1) *Tambourin* who wrote since *Dicastillus* is more hardy; he makes no difficulty of exempting this desire from sin, on condition the intention be directed according as *Dicastillus* discourseth. And that he might render this more probable and more intelligible, he distinguisheth of two sorts of desires, whereof the one is absolute, and the other conditional. (2) *If you desire the death of your father upon some condition, saith he, the answer is easie, that you may lawfully. For if one say in himself: if my father should dye, I should enjoy his estate; in this case he should not rejoyce in his fathers death, but in his inheritance.*

Behold the Example of a conditional desire, in which he finds no difficulty. 2295

He proposeth and expounds the other desire which he calls absolute, in these terms: (3) *I desire the death of my father, not because it is an evil to him, but because it is good for me, or because it is the cause of good unto me; and because by this his death I enter into the possession of my paternal inheritance.*

diff. 12. a. 1. dub. 6. num. 546. 1 An possit filius mortem patris optare, vel de illa gaudere, non ut est malum patris, (hoc enim esset odium execrandum) sed ut ipse filius patris hæreditate fruatur— facilis est responsio. Licite enim hæc optas vel amplecteris, quia non gaudes de alterius malo, sed de proprio bono. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. cap. 1. sect. 3. num. 29.* 2 Si desideres sub conditione, facilis item responsio licite posse. Si quis enim hunc actum eliciat: Si meus pater moreretur, ego hæreditate pariter, & gauderet tunc ille, non de patris morte, sed de hæreditate. n. 30.

3 Cupio mortem patris, non ut malum patris est, sed ut bonum meum, seu ut causa mei boni; nimirum quia ex illius morte ego ejus hæreditatem adibo. Si, inquam, sic desideras, major est difficultas resolvendi, &c.— Nihilominus *Castropalaus*.... ex quibus vides opinionem *Castropalai* esse satis probabilem. num. 31, 32, 33.

This is the same thing that he had already said in the former passage; and this repetition makes us see more clearly the perplexity he is in through the desire he hath to justify this unnatural child in his desire of his fathers death, that he may enjoy his estate. He finds therein some difficulty; but after he had reported the opinion of *Castropalao* who approves this sort of desires, he concludes that this opinion is probable enough; that is to say, that a child may lawfully and without sin love his fathers inheritance better than his father himself. For if he loved his father better than the inheritance that he hopes from him, he could not rejoyce in the death of his father as in some good thing, since it would procure him more hurt than good by taking from him his father whom he loves more than all the estate he should receive thereby.

I know not how without horreur any can, I will not say approve, but produce and publish such thoughts and desires so opposite to the most common notions of reason and of Christian and natural piety; to exempt that from sin in children which were horrible and criminal in the remotest kindred, friends, or domesticks; and finally to pretend to prove this overthrow of Nature and Reason, by the most brutish and inhumane Principle that can be imagined, saying, that a man may desire evil to any person whomsoever, and even death it self unto his own father, provided he consider this evil as his own proper good, and not barely as an evil unto him to whom he wisheth it. 22960

It is thus that Lyons, Bears, and Tygers devour men, not simply to kill them, and to do them hurt, but for their own proper good, that they may feed themselves with their flesh: yet they spare beasts of their own kind, and in this they are less cruel and inhumane than men who are so blind and unnatural as to believe and follow a Doctrine so pernicious, and which teaches men to kill, eat, and devour one another through a desire of any the least temporal interest.

If this were lawful, as the Jesuits pretend, there would be no more any true Christian or humane Society. It would be lawful for every private man to de-

fire publick Calamities, not considering them as the destruction of Families, Towns, and the Common-wealth, but as his particular benefit. There should be no more Charity nor Religion, since we might without sin, according to this Divinity, not only wish all sorts of mischief to our Neighbour; but desire also the profanation of the most Holy things, and the out-throw of the Laws of God and the Church, provided only we say that it is not any hurt or offence to God or our Neighbour that we desire, but only the good and profit that thereby we pretend unto.

Now *Tambourin* as he speaks more absolutely and boldly than *Dicastillus*, because he wrote after him, so he adds also the resolution of many like questions: (1) *May an inferior desire the death of his superior in the Church or Common-wealth, that he may succeed in his Office, or that he may be delivered from him, because he favours him not?* Here is the case to which he answers precisely and without hesitation in these words. *If you desire only or receive with joy the effect of this death, to wit, the Inheritance of a Father, the Charge of a Prelate, the deliverance from some trouble he procured you, the answer is easie, that you may desire all these things lawfully, and that because you rejoyce not in the evil of another, but in your own proper good.*

Dicastillus durst not at first determine upon this question, because it seemed to him uncertain; the Authority and Example of *Castropalao* having made him more bold, he approves and propounds it as probable; and *Tambourin* makes thereof a Maxime, in which there is no difficulty at all, *facilis responsio*. Thus it comes to pass, that these Doctors who make profession of a complacent Theology, go on still advancing, not to the better, but to the worse, as *S. Paul* speaks, and labour to stretch or rather to corrupt mens-consciences, by stretching and corrupting the most holy and inviolable Rules of Faith and Morality, and making those things probable which in themselves are incredible.

If to desire the death of ones father be of itself a crime, as none can question it, the crime is yet greater when he is carried thereto by some wicked motive, as that of having his estate, which comes from covetousness and injustice, and contains in it also a notorious ingratitude: and it is in the sight of God a kind of theft and usurpation to desire to have the estate of another, and which is more, of ones father, against his will, the appointment of God, and all the Laws of Reason and Nature. So that to justify the desire a child hath of the death of his father, by that which he hath of his goods, is to justify one crime by another wherein many more are also contained.

This injustice and disorder may appear yet more visible in the other Example brought by *Tambourin* of an Inferior who desires the death of his Superior: A Monk, for Example, or a Clerk of his Abbot or Bishop, that he might enter upon his Office. For the desire alone of a Charge of this nature, even under pretence of a good motive, as to be serviceable unto Souls, is a kind of ambition and presumption which renders a man unworthy of that Office which he desires in that manner, as *S. Thomas*, after the Scripture and Fathers, doth expressly teach us; he who hath not this good motive, and desires to enter by a way so odious and criminal, as is the death of his Superior, is not only unworthy of the Office which he so desires, but also deserves to be excluded from the Clergy, and even to be chased out of the Church, as a rebellious and unnatural child from the house of his father, who desires to see his death, though he dares not kill him himself. How then can one of these desires justify the other? How can we say that an Inferior may lawfully desire the death of his Superior, if we pretend not that one may be a murderer, because he is an Usurper, and desire the death of a man, because we would have his goods, without having either right or capacity, but only an unjust and unreasonable pretence unto the one or the other.

This yet sufficeth not this barbarous and murdering Theology, to permit children to desire the death of their father and mother, they permit them also to be willing to kill them themselves, to attempt their lives, and effectually to kill them in some cases. It is from this Principle that *Dicastillus* saith, (2) *That a child who defends himself against his father who assaults him unjustly, may kill*

1. An possit subditus mortem cupere sui Prælati, ut Prælatum ipse succedat, vel ut ab eo Prælato sibi infensio liberetur? Si solum desideres, vel cum gaudio effectus, hæreditatem, molestiæ carentiam, prælaturam, facilis est responsio. Licet enim hæc optas vel amplecteris, quia non gaudes de alterius malo, sed de proprio bono.

2 Colligitur ulterius licitum esse filii contra parentes,

servis contra dominos, vassallis contra principes vim repellere quando actu inviduntur, injuste, cum prædictis conditionibus, idemque de Monachis aut subditis contra Abbates & Superiores. *Dicasill. lib. 2. de just. tr. 1. d. 10. dub. 3. num. 30.*

An in casibus præcedentis dubitationis liceat directe velle & intendere mortem injusti aggressoris ad defendendam propriam vitam? *Negat S. Thomas.* His tamen non obstantibus attendendum est tanquam verissimum, sicut honestum est in executione repellere aggressorem illum occidendo, pari ratione honestum est directe illum velle & intendere occidere. *Dub. 4. num. 4.*

2 Filius si recognoscere nolit patrem, non ex contemptu, sed ad vitandum aliquod incommodum aut erubescenciam, à mortali culpa sic puto esset excusandus. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. cap. 2. sect. 2. num. 17.* 3 Difficultas ergo sola superest an cum indignis possint filii licite contrahere, patre vel genitrice dissentientibus? Et quidem licet aliquibus videatur non posse, idque sub mortali quod certe valde probabile est... fateor tamen probabile item esse ac tutum quod possint... Et recte docet Sanchez filiam adeo liberam esse, ut ante vigesimum quintum annum nubere valeat, etiam indigno, & sine patris consensu. *Tambur. decal. lib. 5. cap. 2. sect. 3. num. 5.* Vocavit itaque Jacob, Isaac, & benedixit eum, præcipitque ei dicens, Noli accipere conjugem de genere Chanaan. *Genes. 28.* 4 Si statuit Evaristus Paps, ut pronupta nequaquam habeatur puella quam pater ipse non disponat: si Leo Pontifex & Ambrosius aiunt non esse virginalis pudoris maritum eligere, sed judicium parentum esse expectandum: si in sacris Scripturis parentibus tribuitur hoc munus: si S. Paulus expresse docet à parentibus tradendas esse filias nuptui: si multa Sæcularum Scripturarum exempla id manifeste demonstrant: Respondeo cum eodem Sanchez hæc & similia probare quod esset valde honestum ejusmodi consilium à patre exquirere, diuinam peccati mortalis necessitatem non probare. *Tambur. lib. 5. decal. cap. 9. sect. 3. num. 6.*

him; as also Servants their Masters, Vassals their Princes; Monks their Abbots and their Superiors. Which he understands not only in such manner that a Son may kill his Father by accident and besides his intention, in his own defence; but so as he may have a design to kill him voluntarily. For after he had proposed this case which I have now related, and many others, he concludes that in this case it is lawful to desire to kill him who assails us.

As for what concerns the respect due unto Fathers and Mothers, *Tambourin* declares confidently, (1) *That a Son is to be excused from mortal sin who will not acknowledge his Father, if he do it not of contempt, but to avoid some inconvenience, or that he might not be put to the blush in acknowledging him.* It is manifest that according to Scripture this is to renounce ones father, as it is to renounce Jesus Christ to be ashamed to acknowledge and confess him; and yet this is a small fault in the Jesuits Divinity.

Neither is he more religious about their obedience, concerning which he demands, (2) *Whether children may lawfully contract Marriage with persons unworthy of their alliance against the will of their fathers and mothers?* He answers, *Though some believe they cannot without mortal sin, which is very probable, yet he avouches that it is probable and safe in conscience that they may.... and that Sanchez hath reason to say, that a daughter is so free, as to Marriage, that though she have not yet attained so much as twenty five years of age, she may marry her self unto a person unworthy of her, without her fathers consent.* Whence it follows, according to this Author, that *Isaac* exceeded his power when he so expressly forbid his Son *Jacob* to marry in the family of *Chanaan*, which was unworthy of his alliance.

If the disobedience of a Daughter towards her Father in these circumstances be not criminal, it seems it never can be so, since it cannot be in a more important matter than this same wherein Marriage is concerned, which imports an engagement for the whole time of life, and a Marriage with an unworthy person, and which proves a disadvantage and dishonour, not only to the Daughter who enters it, but also to her kindred and whole family.

But if we object to this Father, that Scripture, Fathers, Popes condemn the disobedience of these Children in terms capable to terrifie the most resolute, and to ashame the most impudent: He answers, that this proves indeed that it is very commendable for Children to do otherwise; but not that they sin mortally if they fail therein. (3) *Though the Pope Evaristus, saith he, have ordained that a daughter should not be held for a married wife, if her father himself agreed not to the Marriage: Though the Pope S. Leo and S. Ambrose say, that it is not becoming the modesty of a Virgin to chuse an Husband, but that she ought to attend on her Fathers judgment: Though in the holy Scriptures this charge be laid upon Fathers: Though S. Paul teach expressly, that daughters ought to be given in marriage by their fathers: Though many Examples of the Saints shew this manifestly; I answer with Sanchez, that these things and such like prove well that it is very commendable for them to demand their fathers advice; but not that they in not doing so fall into the horrible disorder of mortal sin.*

This

This discourse is proper for nothing but to countenance disobedience and impudence in Children, and so favour Rapes and clandestine Marriages; and this is very insolently and Jesuitically to elude the holy Scripture, the Authority of the Church, Councils, and Fathers, and the Examples of the Saints, by taking only for simple exhortations and counsels of Decency and Civility what they ordain under so great penalties, saying, such Marriage should be null, and that a daughter should not be held for a married wife, if her father himself agreed not to her Marriage.

See here another case wherein the liberty of Children, that is, their licentiousness is sufficiently established. (1) *A Son*, saith the same Author, is not subject to his Father in what concerns unlawful games: and by consequence he may without wronging him, retain unto himself the gain he makes thereby. He will have it that because a Son commits two sins, one in playing at an unlawful game, and the other in gaming contrary to his Fathers prohibition, that which he hath gained, is therefore justly acquired to his own use. If he had not been disobedient in gaming contrary to his Fathers will, he had had nothing of that he gained; but because he was disobedient, that which he hath gained appertains to himself, though he have contemned his Father, and plaid only with his money. So he receives benefit not only of the money which is his Fathers, but of his contempt of his Father also; and this contempt gives him a right which he could not have had if he had not abused both his Father and his money. So marvellous and gainful too is the Divinity of these Doctors.

Finally, *Tambourin* speaking of the temporal assistance which Children owe unto their Father, shews us how far this obligation may go. He proposes the case of a Father taken by Thieves who threaten to kill him, if a certain sum of money be not given them; he demands whether the Son were obliged to give this money? (2) *If a father*, saith he, *be in peril of his life, and money be demanded to save him of his Son who is rich, the question is more difficult. As for me, I would make use of this distinction: If the sum demanded may be taken out of goods superfluous or only becoming the condition of the Son, I would oblige him to give it. But if it ought to be taken out of what is necessary unto him, in such sort that it would wholly impoverish him, or cause him to fall notably below his condition, I would not oblige him at all.... Notwithstanding I say not, that it is altogether certain that this Son is obliged to give on this occasion such goods as are superfluous or convenient for his condition. Behold a decision very favourable to those Children of whom he spoke before, who innocently desired the death of their Fathers.*

ex supe fluis, vel solum statui convenientibus, obligarem patrem filiumque; si debeat demi ex necessariis, ita ut vel omnino depauperandi, vel admodum notabiliter a suo statu dimovendi essent, neu rum obligarem.... Et nihilominus priorem disti partem non tanquam omnino certam affirmo. Tambur. lib. 5. decal. c. 1. sect. 1. num. 11.

He would be far enough from obliging a Son to expose his life to save his Fathers, since he would not that he should be obliged so far only as to give for it a part of his goods which he may absolutely spare. And if you represent unto him that which our Saviour recommends unto us to love one another as he loved us, and what *S: John* saith, that we ought to lay down our life for our Brethren, and by stronger reason for our Fathers and Mothers, I see not what he can answer, but what he hath already said before, eluding the Authority of the Scripture and the Saints; that these Commands, though so express, repeated, and solemnly confirmed by the whole Church, are wholesom advices and counsels of Decency and Civility, which oblige no farther than we please to follow them.

ARTICLE

ARTICLE IV. Of the Command of God :

23040

THOU SHALT NOT KILL.

That the Jesuits absolutely overthrow this Commandment, and authorize all sorts of Murthers.

Here is, it may be, nothing in all the Morals wherein the Jesuits are so transported as in this same. The excesses they have committed therein are so great, that as it is enough to raise an horrour against them only to understand them, so we should have found it hard to believe them, had we learnt them from others than themselves : and if they, after they had taught them in their Schools, had not also published them every where by their Books.

Cum autem hujus legis viam Dominus explicaret, in eo duo continere ostendit. Alterum ne occidamus, quod à nobis fieri vetitum est ; alterum quod facere jabemur, ut concordiam amicitiam charitatemque inimicos complectamur, pacem habeamus cum omnibus, cuncta denique incommoda patienter feramus. *Catech. ad Pargos.*

1: *This Precept contains in it two things according to the explication which our Lord gives thereof, as the Catechism of the Council of Trent observes. The one is forbidden us, to wit, Murder ; and the other is commanded us, to wit, love and charity towards our enemies, peace with all the world, and patience to suffer all sorts of evils. The Jesuits destroy these two parts of this divine Precept by the pernicious Maxims of their Divinity. For as to the second, they are so far from believing that God hath commanded the love of enemies, that they believe not so much as that there is any true Command to love our Neighbour in general, nor God himself, as we have seen whilst we spoke of the first Commandment of the Decalogue. And for the first part, which is the Command not to kill, they overthrow it by infinite decisions which are contrary thereunto.*

For they generally allow to kill in defence of honour, life, and goods ; not only when a man sees himself in a near and evident danger of losing them, but when it is far off and uncertain. They would not have you stay till a man smite you, it is enough that he threatens you ; it is enough that you see him come afar off ; it is enough that he offends you with his words, or that you know that he hath a design upon your life, honour, or goods, for you to prevent, and kill him with a good conscience.

The allowance they make herein is general and without exception. They grant it to Clergy-men and to Fryars as well as Secular persons. And to give the greater liberty to the use of it, they make it pass for a right of nature, of which they pretend that any whosoever may make use against any other whomsoever, even a Servant against his Master, a Son against his Father, a Monk against his Superior, leaving them at their choice to employ all means whatsoever they please, and which they judge most proper for their design, whether it be by open force, or by surprize, and making use of secret ways, and by service of other persons interposed, if they will not or dare not themselves attempt to kill those who do or would do them some hurt ; as we shall see by and by. The matter is too large to be comprised under one single title, wherefore I will divide this Article into five Points, in each of which I will represent the Opinions of divers Authors of the Society, beginning with *Lessius*.

I. POINT.

I. POINT.

Lessius his Opinion concerning Murder.

SECTION I.

How far he enlargeth the permission of Killing in defence of his own life : that he holds that a Priest at the Altar may break off the Sacrifice to kill him who assails him.

Lessius proposes this Question concerning Murder : If it be lawful to kill a man in defence of my own life. And then he relates many cases, in which he maintains that this is lawful.

The first case, saith he, is if I be struck with a weapon, and in this point there is no doubt at all.

The second is, if you draw near unto me to strike me, and I cannot avoid it unless I flye or prevent your blow.

The third is, when you do not yet approach, but you are ready to invade me, and I cannot avoid you but by preventing you ; I may in this case prevent you.

The fourth case, when you have a design to cause me to be slain by a Servant or Assassin.

The fifth, when you fall upon me by way of justice to cause me to dye by false witnesses, who accuse me of crimes which I have not committed ; imposing upon me, for example, some Sacriledge or other detestable crime.

It appears then, that according to Lessius, it is not necessary that you may with a good conscience prevent and kill a man, for you to stay till he smite you ; it is sufficient that he draws near to smite you : Si accedas ad feriendum. It is enough that he is disposed to do it, though he be far off from you : Si nondum accedas, sed tamen instructus es ad invadendum. It suffices that he hath a will or hath given commission to another to do it : Si per famulum aut sicarium me statueris occidere. It is sufficient that he hath wrongfully accused you of some crime for which you may lose your life : Si falsis criminationibus, &c.

If you enquire unto whom it is lawful to kill in all these cases, Molina will answer that the permission is general, and for all sorts of persons. (6) To answer, saith he, to the question proposed, we must say that it is generally lawful to kill him who is resolved to kill you, when there is no other means to avoid death or imminent danger of death, whereunto you are reduced by the resolution he hath maliciously taken to cause you to dye. That is to say, that a prudent man, according to Molina, will not expect to use means for assuring his life, till he see himself nigh unto death ; but he will even prevent the danger, and without attending till his enemy assail or seek him out to kill him, will prevent & kill him, by getting the start of him as soon as he believes he bears him ill will, and designs to put him to death : Dicendum est fas esse universim interficere eum qui nos interficere decrevit. This liberty is without any exception and for all people : Fas est universim,

ultam meam impetas in iudicio. num. 47. 6 Dicendum est ad dubium propositum, fas universim esse interficere eum qui nos interficere decrevit, quando aliter non poterit vis evadendi mortem, aut grande periculum mortis, quod nequitia illius ex eo decreto nobis imminet. Molina de just. & jur. tom. 4. tract. 4. disp. 13. num. 2. pag. 1760

Amicus saith the same thing, and he expounds it also more particularly. For after that he hath advanced this general Maxime ; That every one hath a right to kill any whomsoever who would deprive him of his life, he draws from thence some consequences which serve to establish and declare his Principle (7) It followes, saith he, 1. That not only one private man hath a right to defend himself against another private man, but also against a publick person ; an inferior against his superior ; a Son against his father and mother ; a Clerk or a Monk against a Layman, Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 2. Artic. 4.

Utrum liceat alterum occidere in vitæ suæ defensionem. Lessius de just. & jur. lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 8. num. 41. p. 83. 1. Si reipsum me ferias armis, & de hoc nulum est dubium. Ibid. num. 42. 2. Si accedas ad feriendum, nec possis evadere nisi vel fugiam, vel te præveniam. num. 44. 3. Si nondum accedis, tamen instructus es ad invadendum, nec possis evadere nisi præveniam. Tunc enim possum prævenire. num. 45. 4. Si per famulum vel sicarium me statueris occidere. num. 46. 5. Si falsis criminationibus testibusque subornatis, v. c. imponendo sacrilegium vel crimen insan-

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7 Interitur, hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam non solum habere per-

sonem privam and a Layman against a Clergie-man or Monk, without contracting any irregularity
 contra priva- thereby.

And to shew us that this Maxime altogether barbarous and inhumane is com-
 mon to and passes for certain with the whole Society, *Lessius* maintains and re-
 hearses it almost in the self same terms with *Amicus*, and draws it like him from
 his Principles. (1) Therefore, saith he, it is lawful for Church-men and Monks to
 kill for the security of their lives, as well as Laicks, and they may use this liberty
 against any whomsoever, and against their Superiors themselves; as a Monk against
 his Abbot, a Son against his Father and Mother, a Servant against his Master, a
 Vassal against his Lord and Prince.

So that according to this Doctrine and what we have already seen and heard
 him say, relating and expounding the cases wherein we may prevent and kill a
 man in defence of our life, if a Souldier see his Captain, or a Child his Father,
 a Subject his Lord or Prince lay hold on a Sword or Cudgel, and lift his hand to
 strike him, all these persons may with all freedom prevent the blow and danger:
 yea, they may also first smite and kill upon fear only of being killed themselves.

The consequences of this bloody Doctrine which leads men on to such crimes as
 nature it self abhors, are clearer than that I need to stay to represent them.

Lessius adds, (2) That this may be done in what function soever we be employed,
 as if a Priest be assailed whilst he is at the Altar saying Mass, he may defend himself,
 and even kill, if it be needful, him who assaults him, and afterwards go on with his
 Mass. This without doubt is perfectly to imitate Jesus Christ, who is offered in
 that Sacrifice, who being nigh unto death, prayed for those who caused it; this
 is, I say, well to imitate Jesus Christ, to forsake the Mass which is a Commemora-
 tion of the Sacrifice of the Cross, and to abandon the Altar, to smite and slay an
 enemy. This is a good disposition wherein to return unto the Altar, and con-
 tinue the Mass, to joinrue his hands in the blood of his neighbour, and to come
 presently thereupon and lay them on the Body of Jesus Christ, and to receive his
 Blood which he shed for his enemies.

supra num. 41. pag. 84. 2 Et in quocunque officio sit quis occupatus, ut si celebret & invadatur, potest se tueri
 & occidere invasorem, si necesse sit, & postea Sacrum continuare. *Lessius ibid.*

This crime is not one single crime, since it contains in it many and the great-
 est which can be committed. It is without name as without example, so enor-
 mous is it and unheard of in all past Ages; and I see not to what end it could
 serve *Lessius* to speak of it without necessity, and propound it for an example, if
 it were not to make us see that the Jesuits Divinity is ingenious and fruitful in
 forming Monsters and inventing new Crimes, and audacious in giving liberty to
 commit them.

SECTION II.

That according to *Lessius* it is lawful to kill in defence of our Honour.

IT is not only in defence of our life, but in the preservation of our honour that
 we may kill any one whomsoever, according to *Lessius* Principles. (1) It is
 also lawful, saith he, for an honourable person to kill an Assailant who would strike
 him with a cudgel, or give him a box on the ear to affront him, if he cannot otherwise
 avoid the disgrace. And a little after, to facilitate the practice of so pernicious a
 Doctrine, he particularly sets down several ways by which we may attempt against
 anothers honour, which are so many occasions whereupon he pretends it to be
 lawful to kill him who makes this attempt. (2) It is to be observed, saith he,
 that the honour of another may be invaded and violated in divers manners, against
 which it is lawful for him to defend himself by the ways he hath related.

1 Fas etiam est vitio honora-
 to occidere in-
 vsorem qui su-
 stem vel aliam
 conatur impin-
 gere: ut ignomi-
 niam intrat, si
 aliter hæc igno-
 minia vitari ne-
 quit. *Lessius*
ibid. dub. 12.
num. 77. pag. 89. 2 Notandum est variis modis honorem alterius posse impeti & auferri, in quibus videtur con-
 cessa defensio. *Ibid. num. 78.*

First, If one endeavour to strike him with a cudgel, or to give him a box on the ear, of which we spoke but now.

In the second place, If he be outrageously reproached by words or gestures, he hath a right to defend himself, and by consequence to kill.

In the third place, If he who hath given him a box on the ear continue in the same place, or even though he flye away thereupon.

In the fourth place, If you endeavour to deprive me of my honour before a Prince, Judge, or Persons of great quality, by accusing me of feigned crimes; and I have no other way to divert this loss of reputation but by killing you secretly.

And a little after he adds, alledging Bannez for it: * The same is to be said where the crime is true, so it be hid and secret. And that he may establish this strange Doctrine, of which there is none who may not see how dangerous and fatal the consequences are, he brings three instances which are so many reasons whereof he makes use to prove it.

* This may be proved, saith he, first because if one attempt to damnifie me in my honour and reputation, by smiting me with a cudgel, or giving me a box on the ear, I may betake me to my arms to keep him off; and by consequence I have the very same right if he endeavour to do me the same wrong by reproaching me: for it is of small consideration what means are made use of to do me an injury, if I be hurt as much the one way as the other.

In the second place, Recourse may be had to arms to hinder an affront; and so likewise by consequence to silence reproaches.

In the third place, The danger of losing honour is equal to that of losing life. But it is lawful to kill to avoid the peril of losing life; and by consequence also for avoiding the danger of losing honour. * Because, as he saith a little before, men by good reason esteem their honour more than wealth and money; and by consequence, as he will say hereafter, if one may kill for fear of losing his money, he may also for fear of taking an affront.

culum. * Probsti potest 1. quia si baculo vel alapa impacta velis meum honorem & famam violare, prohibere: ergo etiam si id nitar lingua. Nam parum videtur referre quo instrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam, si æque efficaciter nocebit. *Ibid.* num. 81. 2. Quia contumeliæ possunt armis impediri, ergo & detractiones. 3. Periculum famæ æquiparatur periculo vitæ: acul ob periculum vitæ evadendum licitum est occidere: ergo &c. Quia honor merito apud homines plus æstimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum: ergo si potest occidere ne damnam pecuniarum accipiat, potest etiam ne ignominiam cogatur sustinere. *Ibid.* num. 77.

1. Si baculum vel alapam nitaris impingere, de quo jam dictum est. *Ibid.*

2. Si contumeliis efficiatur, sive per verba, sive per signa, hic etiam est jus defensionis. *Ibid.*

3. Si illata alicui alapa cesses, vel etiam fugias. *Ibid.* num 79.

4. Si nomini meo falsis criminationibus apud Principem vel viros honoratos detrahente nitaris, nec aliaratione possim damnum illud famæ avertere, nisi re occulte interficiam. *Ibid.* num. 81.

* Idem dicendum si crimen est verum; si tamen est occulte.

I have no design for the present to consider or examine this whole discourse nor all these reasons which contain almost as many excesses as words, I shall content my self to say in general of him and those who imitate him in this kind of reasoning in matters of Christian Morality, that the farther they advance, the farther they stray and are removed from the truth, and fall continually from one error into another; and the latter are usually the greater; their conclusions are worse than the Maxims from whence they draw them; and the reasons which they produce to prove the one and the other, are also oftentimes of yet more dangerous consequence than all their propositions.

The same *L. Sius*, after the three reasons which we have now related, gives thereupon also a fourth, which comprehends all the rest, & which alone may serve as a general Maxime to resolve a multitude of cases in this matter; but which may also be both the cause and justification of all sorts of Murders, (1) Because the right of self-defence, saith he, seems to give liberty to employ all the means which are necessary to secure ones self from all sorts of injuries. He seems to have taken this Maxime, as good store of others, from *Molina* who expounds it also more clearly. (2) It is lawful, saith he, to employ all sorts of means, and to make use of all sorts of ways, and of all sorts of arms to do that which is necessary for self-defence.

1 Quia jus defensionis videtur se extendere ad omne id quod necessarium ut te ab omni injuria servet immunitatem. *Ibid.* num 81.

2 Fas est quacunque via & ratione, & quibuscunque armis id totum efficere quod ad tuam defensionem fuerit necessarium. *Molina de just. & jure tom. 4. tract. 3. disp. 2. num. 5. pag. 1757.*

The Proposition of the one and the other is universal in all these points. They give no boundaries to mens passions, suspicions, jealousies, and pretences whereof they may make use to cover and justify their interests and vain-glory. If we believe these Jesuits, all men have right to make use of all sorts of expedients to maintain their reputation, true or false, against all sorts of people who offend against it in any manner whatsoever, or who hurt their interest and pretensions. He may kill his adversary himself, or employ other persons whom he shall judge more proper to kill him, by open force or surprize. All this is lawful for every private man, according to these Doctors. *Jus defensionis videtur se extendere ad omne id quod est necessarium, &c.*

They hold also, that we may use this right, not only in important occasions, but even in the least also, to repel or repair a petty as well as a grand injury, to have satisfaction for an offensive word, as well as if we had suffered the greatest reproachful outrage. And in a word, that we may make use of this right to protect our honour by all sorts of effectual ways, so that it may not receive the least diminution: *ut te ab omni injuria serves immunem.*

Verum hæc quoque sententia mihi in praxi non probatur.

After Lessius hath established so detestable a Maxime, which is equally prejudicial to the Church and State, and which overthrows all Laws divine and humane, he is constrained by the horror he had towards it in himself, to declare that he approves not the practice of it: But there is cause to believe that this word comes rather from the secret check of his conscience, than that it is a testimony of his true judgment, and that it proceeds not so much from the fear of God as men, who might, as he well perceived, reproach him justly therewith, and impute unto him all the unhappy effects of a Doctrine so abominable and pernicious to humane Society.

For if he had had God before his eyes, and had truly condemned the practice of this bloody and barbarous opinion, he would never have published and maintained it with so many reasons, as true, just, and reasonable; since this is at the same time to approve the practice thereof, there being none who doth not easily believe, that it is lawful to follow in the practice of a Rule which is just and conformable to reason and truth.

And though he had proposed it only as probable, and not as his own opinion, he had thereby sufficiently approved the use of it, and ought to be responsible for all the mischiefs which may arise from it, since according to him and all his Society, it is lawful in practice to follow a probable opinion, even so as to prefer it before that which is more probable.

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SECTION III.

That it is lawful to kill in defence of ones goods, according to Lessius.

THe third concern for which Lessius holds that it is lawful to kill, is for the preservation of our goods. His reasons are: (1) *First, because temporal goods are necessary to preserve life: and by consequence it is lawful to preserve them in the same manner as life in self, as being necessary, not only to live absolutely, but also to live honourably according to our rank and condition.* He made use of the same reason a little before, to prove that a man may fight a duel for the defence not only of his life and honour, but of his goods alio. (2) *It seems to me, saith he, that the same reason for killing takes place when our goods are invaded; for our wealth is a necessary instrument, support, and ornament of our life.*

1 Primo quia bona temporalia sunt ad vitam conservandam necessaria: ergo sicut licet vitam tueri, ita etiam hæc quæ sunt vitæ necessaria, non solum ut præcise vivamus, sed etiam ut convenienter & honeste vivamus. *Lessius de just. & jure lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 11. num. 67. pag. 88.* 2 Et eadem videtur esse ratio in invasione fortunatum. Nam fortunæ sunt necessarium vitæ instrumentum, subsidium & ornamentum. *Ibid. dub. 8. num. 49.*

So that, according to *Lessius*, we may deprive our neighbour of his life, for fear he should deprive us of our goods. It is manifest enough that this *Maximè* cannot appear very Christian; but the reason on which he grounds it is much less; because, saith he, *wealth is a necessary instrument, support, and ornament of life*. That is to say, that the commodity and advantage which we reap from wealth in that it gives means, not only to live, but to live at ease and in honour, ought to be preferred before the life of our brother; and so we need not make any scruple to kill him, if he attempt to disseize us of our temporal commodities, without fear of violating the Laws of the Gospel.

The second reason is, (1) *Because otherwise occasion would be given to Thieves and Robbers to pillage honest men.* For if it were not lawful to resist them by doing what is necessary for our defence, there would be nothing safe and secured from their enterprizes. But as it is lawful to defend our selves, so it is also lawful to kill, because oftentimes we cannot defend our selves without killing. He proves by the same argumentation, that we may kill to preserve our honour, and to repel or prevent an affront: (2) *Because if this were not lawful, occasion would be given to wicked persons to commit all sorts of outrageous abuses upon honest persons.* And a little after he repeats the same reason: (3) *Because otherwise liberty would be given to wicked men to outrage any person whomsoever as they pleased.*

Concessa ceteretur occisio, sine qua sæpe non potest esse defensio. Ibid. num. 67. 2 Quis alias daretur occasio improbitati optimos quoque contumeliis vexandi. Dub. 12. num. 78. 3 Quia alias daretur licentia improbis quodvis genus contumeliæ in quemvis ingerendi. Ibid.

He is very much afraid to give way to robbery, detraction, calumny; but he fears not at all to make way for the murdering and damning of his neighbour, which follows thereupon inevitably in such encounters; since a thief, a calumniator, a defamer, can no more avoid the loss of his Soul than of his body, when they are slain in the act, or in the design of committing these crimes. But the Divinity of the Jesuits judge that true charity may condemn these mischiefs to avoid the loss of temporal goods.

He contents not himself to establish in this manner this inhumane and barbarous *Maximè*; but to render it more easie to be practised, he notes out many particular cases wherein he pretends that it is lawful to kill, of which one is, (4) *When you conspire to ruine us; And another, (5) When you unjustly hinder my Creditor from paying me.* So that as soon as any man shall threaten to undo us, or we shall know that he will hinder our Creditors from paying us, whether he do it of animosity, or because the same persons who are indebted to us are also accountable to him, and he may lose his debt if we be first paid, it will be lawful for us to attempt upon the life of this man, and to kill him publickly or privately.

This Doctrine is so horrible, that *Lessius* himself foreseeing the extremities and deadly accidents which are inseparable from this liberty of killing, which he gives all sorts of people indifferently and without excepting any person, endeavours to moderate it by two conditions, that he might make it more tolerable, and diminish the horrour which at first sight it raises in all those who have only some resentments of humanity. For after he hath said absolutely, that it is lawful to kill him who would take away our goods; he adds by way of exception, (6) *That this is to be understood in case the things be of great importance; because there is no likelihood that for a small occasion it should be lawful to defend our selves with so great damage to our neighbour; and it would be very unreasonable and unjust to take away a mans life for an Apple, or a Crown it self.* But he overthrows this exception immediately after, and destroys it strangely, adding thereupon these words: (7) *Yet if some affront would be done you for not recovering your goods out of the hands of a thief, you may assail him, and even kill him if need be.*

to alterius malo. Est enim valde iniquum ut pro panno, vel etiam uno sacro servando, alicui vita suferatur. n. 68. 7 Si tamen tibi verteteretur probro nisi rem furi extorques, posses constri, & si opus esset, occidere.

It must then be confessed that it were a very rigorous and unjust thing, according to this Jesuit, to desire to deprive a man of his life, who had only taken an Apple from us: but if this should cause any confusion or disgrace to him from whom it was taken, and that he should be derided, if he suffered it to be carried away from him, he might endeavour to force it out of the hands of him who had done him this injury, and in case of resistance it would be lawful for him to kill him. Certainly a mans life cannot be made more cheap than to give it or rather to take it away for an Apple.

The same Author discovers another condition whereupon we may kill him who hath taken away some temporal goods, that is, that the loss cannot easily be recovered by some other means; but he hath no sooner propounded this condition, then he ruins it by the same reason by which he seems to establish it, in saying that to do otherwise, that is to say, to kill him who takes from us some thing which we might recover by some other more sweet way, would be to fall short of the charity which we owe unto our neighbour; but not to sin against justice. (1) For, saith he, if we can recover it by some other way, as that of justice, it will be oftentimes at least against charity to kill, that we may hinder him from taking it from us; as if a Thief fly when he hath taken away something. Which he expounds yet more clearly a little after, num. 70. where he puts this Question: (2) Whether it be against justice to kill a Thief that flies, when that which he hath taken may be recovered by Law? To which he answers No, according to the opinion which seems to him most probable.

Men believe now adays that they do very well to hold themselves precisely to that which they cannot omit without injustice; and they ordinarily trouble themselves little about charity, provided they can persuade themselves that they do what they ought of Justice. So that to tell them that an action is in some sort against Charity and not against Justice, is to give them liberty to commit it. And as for the Jesuits who abolish the Commandment of Charity, as we have already seen, when they say that a thing is against Charity and not against Justice, they say according to their Principles and in their ordinary language, that it were good indeed to abstain from it, but it is no sin to do it.

Lessius destroys also this condition in another way, saying, num. 70. that though we may absolutely by way of Justice recover our goods out of the hands of him who retains them unjustly, yet we are not obliged to follow this way, and, (3) That we may kill him when we cannot without great trouble and difficulty recover them by the way of Justice.

This is an excellent invention to cut off a multitude of Suits which arise daily for goods usurped or unjustly detained: this is a good expedient to avoid the charge and pains which must be undergone in pursuit of them. He that knows well how to make use thereof, according to Lessius advice, shall have no more need to seek to Judges or Advocates, and he may do himself Justice in all affairs of this nature; his Law shall be his own passion and interest; and instead of sending a Serjeant to cite him who will not restore his goods, he may send a Murderer to take away his life.

He saith also the same in a manner, num. 66. assuring us, that a person who sees a Thief carrying away his goods in the day time, may kill him, though the Thief neither was in a condition, nor had any will to offend him, nor even to defend himself. Behold his words: (4) It follows that he who should kill a Thief who steals by day, and who defends not himself with arms, would not be excused in Justice from the homicide which he had committed; and yet in conscience he should be excused, if probably he had no hope to recover what was stolen from him, or only doubted, and was not wholly assured thereof. And his reason is, (5) Because he is not obliged to lose his goods, or to expose them to the hazard of being lost, to save a Thief.

erat probabilis spes recuperandi, vel si recuperatio non erat certa sed dubia. num. 66. 5 Quia non teneretur res suas perdere, aut probabilis periculo exponere, ut fur saluus fiat.

1 Quia si possit aliter recuperari, v. g. per judicem, saepe erit saltem contra charitatem pro illius defensione occidere; ut si fur se ablata fugiat.

2 An sic contra iustitiam si furem procul fugientem conficias, quando res iudicio esset recuperabilis?

num. 70.

3 Quando in iudicio non potest nisi magnis molestiis recuperari. n. 70.

4 Hinc qui furem diurnum non se telo defendentem inexcuseret, non excusaretur ab homicidio in foro exteriori; in foro tamen conscientiae excusaretur si non

210 God saith by the mouth of S. John, (1) *That we ought to lay down our lives for our neighbour*, and Lessius saith we are not so much obliged as to part with our goods, nor a part of them to save his life; and that on the contrary we may take it from him and kill him our selves rather than to expose our goods to any hazard of being lost, or to spare our selves the trouble of recovering them after they are lost. So conformable are these Maxims to those of the Apostle and the Gospel.

1 Et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere. 1 Joan. 3. v. 16.

The horrout which he is constrained to receive hereof himself, or rather the fear which he hath to make himself odious and unsufferable in the Society of men, is the cause that he dares not absolutely counsel men to practise this; and he himself alledges inconveniencies which may render it difficult or dangerous. For after that he had said that it is lawful to kill him who is become an accuser of us of pretended or even of true crimes, but secret and concealed, he adds: (2) *But this opinion also, though it may be probable in the Theory, yet for all that is not to be admitted in the practice, because of the inconveniencies which may arise thereupon. For men easily perswade themselves that they are scandalized when they are accused, and that they have no other way to avoid the calumny, than by killing him who accuseth them. And by this means there would be a multitude of unjust murders committed. Finally, they who should practise this opinion in a Common-wealth well constituted, would be punished as Murderers.*

2 Sed & hæc sententia, etsi fortasse speculative probabilis videri queat, non tamen in praxi admittenda ob incommoda quæ ex ea sequi possunt.

20 And below, num. 55. having said that it is a wholesom advice rather to endanger our own life than to kill him that assaults us, he supports his advice with this reason: (3) *Because herein there is danger lest choler or hatred mingle it self therewith, or that we should be transported with some excess; and so thinking to preserve the life of our body, we should lose that of our Soul.*

Facile enim homines sibi persuadent se per calumniam accusari. & non esse effugium nisi morte accu-

setoris: sique multæ cædes injustæ patrarentur. Denique talis in Republica bene constituta, ut homicida plecteretur. Dub. 8. num. 47. pag. 85. 3 Quia periculum est ne ira aut odium se admisceant, neve modum excedamus, & hinc volumus servare vitam corporis, vitam perdamus animæ. num. 55.

And in Chap. 12. num. 78. after he hath set down of himself a Proposition of which he declares himself to be the first Author, saying, that he had not found it in any that had written before him, which is, that it is lawful to kill him who hath spoken any contemptuous word unto us, or who hath made only some sign thereof, he brings in this restriction: (4) *Yet he ought notwithstanding avoid herein the desire of revenge.* And though afterwards, num. 80. having proved by three different reasons that an honourable person who hath received a box on the ear, may pursue him who gave it him, and kill him, though he were withdrawn; speaking always of this as of an opinion he holds for true in it self, or at least probable, because of the reasons upon which he hath grounded it, yet he seeks to sweeten a little the rigour of it, concluding in these terms: (5) *For these reasons this opinion is probable in the Theory; yet for all that it ought not, as it seems, be easily permitted in the practice.* (6) *First because of the peril there is therein, lest hatred and revenge should transport unto some excess.*

4 Cavenda tamen vindictæ libido. Dub. 12. num. 78.

30 This judicious Jesuit requires some prudent man to the practice of this so reasonable and humane a Doctrine; he would have one kill in cold blood, after he had well thought of it, without heat or precipitation; and that having well weighed what he goes about, and being prepared for it as an action of importance, he should follow this rare Doctrine with so great simplicity, that he should thrust the sword into his brothers breast, and presently withdraw it again without any kind of emotion; that he should shed his blood, and wash his hands in it as soberly as if it were in water.

5 Ob hæc rationes hæc sententia est speculative probabilis; tamen in praxi non videtur facile permittenda.

It is therefore clear enough that all these precautions and apparent limitations proceed only from the apprehension he hath that this Doctrine which he believes to be good, might become odious by the imprudence and evil conduct of those who know not rightly to make use of it. He distrusts not the truth of this opinion, since he saith that it is probable in the Theory, but doubts of the capacity of many persons, for executing it as he desires, *because of the danger that is therein, lest hatred or revenge should transport them unto some excess.*

6 Primum ob periculum odii, vindictæ, & excessus. num. 80.

He produces also some other reasons to the same purpose, which are all taken from considerations purely humane and politick. As when after he had given a liberty to kill upon an injury or word spoken in drollery, he adds, (1) *That for all that we ought not to follow this opinion; because in a Common-wealth we ought to content our selves with the power of repelling injuries by words which consist only in words, and to repress and chastise them by a lawful and reasonable punishment.*

And a little after, *num. 82.* to prevent the reproach which might be cast upon him for saying we might make use of all sorts of means which we should judge necessary to kill an accuser who charged us with false crimes, or would discover and publish secret ones, though true, he endeavours to cover this pernicious Maxime, by saying: (2) *For all that; neither do I approve this opinion in the practice.* And his reason is; *because it would make way for many secret murders, not without great trouble and disorder to the Common-wealth. For we ought always in making use of the right we have to defend our selves, take heed we do nothing which might tend to the prejudice of the Common-wealth. For in this case it must not be used.*

So he always maintains his opinion, which teacheth to kill, to be at least probable, he also vindicates the licence he gives to kill, to be a true and lawful right, though he dares not advise us to use it at all times, because of the consequences thereof. Because as he now said, (3) *We must always beware that this bring no prejudice to the Common-wealth. For then we must not be suffered to make use of this right.*

So he always maintains his opinion, which teacheth to kill, to be at least probable, he also vindicates the licence he gives to kill, to be a true and lawful right, though he dares not advise us to use it at all times, because of the consequences thereof. Because as he now said, (3) *We must always beware that this bring no prejudice to the Common-wealth. For then we must not be suffered to make use of this right.*

He saith not that it is a thing evil in it self to kill, even in such occasions; he saith not, that we have no right to do it; but only that it is not for our advantage to make use of it; not because of any principle of conscience, as being against Gods Law, or against the love of our neighbour; but rather in respect of some Maxime of Policy: (4) *Because this would produce some disorder and mischief in the Common-wealth.*

And to terrifie him who against his counsel, but following his Maxims, would kill for so small an occasion as a word of contempt, he brings this reason, (5) *That if he be taken in the manner, or accused before a Magistrate, he will be handled and punished as a Murderer.*

This is a consideration of a prophane person rather than a Divine, and so are all the rest which he alledgeth on this point. And we may say that the Pagans would have furnished us with more forcible and solid ones, to condemn the Doctrine as well as practice of murders, which this Jesuit authorizes by his cruel Maxime.

And also it is easie to judg, that if he had had a true design to divert men from the practice of this murderous Doctrine which he teaches, he would have set himself to it after another manner, he would have pressed them with the Authority of Gods Law, the obligation of their consciences, and the fear and threats of eternal death, and not only with the dread of civil Laws, secular Judges, and temporal death.

But he would not rack the consciences of others, nor speak against his own: he believed, that absolutely we are under no obligation to observe the counsel he gives us in this point of practice. And therefore he pretends not to make any Law therein, nor to propose his advice by way of command, but only as a counsel. He would not revoke the right he hath given to kill; but only he is not of opinion that we may make use of it in occurrences wherein we may bring some trouble and prejudice to the Common-wealth, and so be brought to tryal before a Magistrate, and punished as Murderers.

In concluding this Chapter contains particularly the opinions of *Lessius Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 2. Artic. 4.* concerning

concerning Murder, I cannot omit one good advice which he gives Churchmen and Monks in this point. After he had said generally that there was no obligation thereunto; nevertheless it would be good counsel many times, *saintare consilium*, not to prevent and kill him who assails us; but rather to expose our own than to take away his life, he adds, (1) *That Church-men, and particularly Monks, ought to make great account of this counsel, and embrace it.*

But for fear he should give them any ground of scruple by giving them this advice; he advertises them that for all that they have a right and liberty to kill as well as the people of the world when they are assaulted, and that if there be herein any fault, it is only against the reputation of their profession. (2) *Not, saith he, that it is not absolutely lawful for them to kill; but because it doth not become them so well.*

70 And to shew how far he is from diminishing the right which he gives Churchmen and Monks, and from pretending by his counsel to oblige them to suffer themselves to be killed rather than kill him that assails them, he doth not so much as oblige them to flye when they may. (3) *Nevertheless, saith he, if they will not flye, they sin not against justice, though they kill him who assaults them.*

He saith also the same thing, afterwards, num. 86. and gives them the same liberty for defence of their goods as of their lives. For having put this express Question: (4) *Whether a Monk who will not flye; but defends himself, sins against justice in hurting or killing him who assaults him?* He answers definitively in these terms: (5) *I think he sins not against justice, especially if his life or goods be invaded.*

He pretends then that a Monk who sees a Thief take what belongs to him, may kill him without fear of acting against Justice, though he should do better to pardon him, and spare his life withdrawing himself or flying: (6) *And though Charity incline, it doth not oblige thereto, as he had said before, though by withdrawing himself, (7) he prevents his neighbour from destroying himself forever.*

80 If Charity oblige not in this occasion, as *Lessius* pretends, I know not when it can oblige. Here we are concerned in the saving, or rather in the not taking away of a mans life: here we are concerned even in his eternal damnation; and that we may not be the cause, or at least the occasion and instrument of this double death, the question is only of the peril of losing a few goods, or of retiring and flying. The case concerns a religious person who is assaulted, or from whom what he hath would be taken. What should he do in this encounter? Shall he withdraw or defend himself? Shall he resolve to kill him with his own hand who hath taken his goods, rather than suffer him to carry them away? *Lessius* answers that he may kill him without fear of sinning against Justice. *Puro*, saith he, *non peccare contra justitiam*, nor even against Charity it self absolutely, because it obliges not hereto. *Charitas non obligat.*

After this we may find it less strange which we have seen already, that *Father Sirmond* maintains that the Law of Charity obliges us not in rigour always to love God, nor our neighbour, upon what occasion soever; since, after *Lessius's* Maxims, there are many very slender occasions upon which it is lawful to kill, though we may easily abstain therefrom if we would, and though we see clearly enough that from temporal death he passeth on to eternal.

7 Ob has
ratiens cenleo
hoc consilium
magnificen-
dum, & omni-
bus Clericis,
maxime R li-
giosis, ample-
ctendum. num.
55.

2 Non quod
absolute non li-
ceat, sed quod
non ita debeat.
num. 55.

3 Si tamen
nolunt fugere,
non peccabunt
contra justiti-
am, nisi in valo-
rem occiderint.
num. 44.

4 Utrum si
Religiosus nolit
fugere vel se tu-
eri, peccet con-
tra justitiam,
laedendo vel oc-
cidendo in valo-
rem?

5 Puto non
peccare contra
justitiam, ma-
xime si vita vel
fortuna inva-
dantur. n. 86.

6 Charitas
cui non obli-
gat, tamen ad
hoc magis in-
clinat.

7 Ne proxi-
mus in aeter-
num pereat.
num. 55.

II. POINT

II. POINT.

The Opinions of *Amicus* concerning Murder respecting the Religious.

That he permits them to kill in defence of their Honour, him who impeacheth them of false Crimes, or only threatens to discover those they have indeed committed.

Not only to preserve his life and goods, as *Lessius* hath now said, but a Fryar may also kill to preserve his worldly honour, according to the Jesuits Divinity. This Doctrine at this day is very common in their Schools; notwithstanding because it is ordinarily attributed to *Amicus* in particular, and he himself makes no difficulty to declare himself the first Author thereof, at least of many points which he propounds himself, and which he saith he found neither cleared, handled, nor so much as propounded by any Author; we will afford him the honour of being treated as the Father of a new opinion, and we will represent apart his opinions upon this point, since they are singular, or at least were so when he first produced them. For they have since made a marvellous progress, as we shall see in the sequel of this Article.

He saith first as *Lessius*, that to eschew the danger of losing life, a Monk hath the same right as a secular person, to kill him that assaults him, whoever he be. (1) *This right, saith he, of defending his life, belongs not only to one private person against another, but also to a private against a publick person, to a Subject against his Superiour, a Son against his Father, a Father against his Son, an Ecclesiastick or Monk against a Secular, a Secular against an Ecclesiastick or Monk, without any irregularity thereby incurred.*

But he stays not there; he pretends that they may make use of this right of killing, for the preservation of their repute in the world, as well as their lives. (2) *The Authors of whom I speak, saith he, agree in this point, that to defend our selves from an affront which would be given us; it is lawful to prevent the aggressor by killing him: in the same manner as when a man endeavours to deprive us unjustly of life or member, it is lawful to kill him before he can execute his wicked design.*

It seems at first sight that this general Proposition is to be extended only to the Laity. But besides that, he gives in all things which concern the right of killing, the same liberty to the Monks as to the Laity, as we shall see hereafter: he declares it also here very manifestly. For after he hath demanded whether that he now said, (3) *That it is lawful to kill in defence of honour, ought to be extended to all sorts of persons? And said that according to Law and the common opinion of the Doctors it is forbidden the Religious, he forbears not to say afterwards; (4) That we cannot at least deny that Clergie-men and Fryars may and even are obliged to defend their honour and reputation which proceeds from vertue and prudence; because this honour doth properly appertain to their profession, and that if they lose it, they lose a very great benefit and advantage.*

1 Hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam non solum habet privata persona contra privatam, sed etiam privata contra publicam, subditus contra Superiorem, filius contra patrem, parens contra filium, Clericus aut Religiosus contra secularem, & contra, absque ulla irregularitatis contractione. *Amicus tom. 5. de just. & jure disp. 36. sect. 4. num. 76. pag. 537.*

2 Conveniunt supradicti fas esse ad pro-

pullandam ignominiam quam mihi aliquis inferre constat, illum preveniendo occidere: sicut fas est ad declinandam mortem quam mihi injustus invasor molitur, illum occidere, antequam mihi mortem vel mutilationem inferat. *Ibid. sect. 7. num. 106. pag. 542.* 3 Sed adhuc superest difficultas, an omnibus personis licitum sit in tutelam honoris invasorem occidere? Negant id concessum esse Clericis & Religiosis, ut cum glossa in *Element.* Si furivulus, de homicidio, & glossa in caput, *Suscipimus*, sub eodem titulo, docent communiter Doctores. *Ibid. pag. 544.*

4 Negari tamen non potest honorem famamque illum quæ ex virtute ac sapientia nascitur, quique verus honor est jure defendere Clericis aut Religiosis valesse, ac sæpe debere: cum hic sit proprius professionis eorum. Quem si amittant, maximum bonum ac decus amittunt. *Ibid. num. 118. pag. 544.*

The point of honour then, according to the Principles of this Jesuits Divinity, ought to be accounted amongst Church-men and Monks, as well as amongst the most ambitious men of the world, for one of their greatest blessings. (5) *Maximam bonum ac decus.* Whereupon he concludes, and saith in the second place, *That the Clergie and Religious may at least defend their honour, and in doing all which is necessary thereto, may even kill him who would deprive them of it.*

And to encourage and incline them to commit this Murder with greater confidence, he represents it to them as an action of vertue, and contents not himself to say that they may, but declares that sometimes they ought to do it; so that they should sin against Charity, if they failed therein: *Quin interdum, lege saltem charitatis, videntur ad illum defendendum teneri.* Ibid. Yea and sometimes, at least by the Law of Charity they seem obliged to defend it.

What kind of Religious Charity is this that obliges to commit Murders, for fear of suffering some loss or diminution in worldly honour? If it be Jesuitical Charity, it is not that of S. Paul which he recommends unto Christians, when he saith, (2) *That Charity is not puffed up, is not ambitious, and that it seeks no its own private interests.*

Amicus doth not content himself to have said once or twice very clearly, that it is lawful for a Monk to kill for the point of honour, he repeats it again as a thing very important, drawing this conclusion from his Principle. (3) *It follows, that it will be lawful for a Clergie-man or a Monk to kill a slunderer who threatens to publish some great crimes against him or his Order, if he have no other means to defend himself therefrom.*

It is not needful therefore, according to him, that a Monk attend until a slunderer speak evil of him or his Order, that he may kill him; it is sufficient that he threats to disgrace him; and even without expecting this, if he believes that he hath a will thereto; and that he is disposed and ready to do it. For in that case this Jesuit gives him the same right to kill him: (4) *If he be ready to charge these crimes on him or his Order publicly before considerable persons, if he be not slain before.* One of his reasons is, (5) *Because that in this case it seems that a Clergie-man or a Monk hath the same right as a Lay-man lawfully to kill a slunderer, there being no difference in this point betwixt a Lay-man and a Religious.* That is to say, that he would have the Clergy in this point conform themselves to the world, and that he would be sorry that Monks should have less liberty than Lay-men to follow their passions, and to revenge themselves before-hand of an injury they have not yet received.

casu calumniatorem occidere, eodem jure licitum videtur Clerico & Religioso, cum in hoc Religiosus & secularis sine omnino pares. Ibid.

Which cannot but seem very strange to a person never so little equitable, seeing that instead of putting a stop to the passions of the world by the Example of the Religious, he would overthrow the vertue of the Religious by the Example of the World, without considering that worldly men that have any conscience would themselves refuse the power he attributes unto them of killing him that only threatens, or hath a simple design to hurt their reputation by some calumny: and though they should believe they had a liberty to defend their honour in this manner at the expence of another mans life, honour it self and natural generosity alone would forbid them to use it, though this Jesuit dares to lead on the Religious unto it.

A Disciple of the Society desirous to defend this Doctrine, that he might clear up and make it better comprehended, propounds it in a very remarkable Example. (6) *You have read, saith he, this Doctrine of Amicus, and you demand whether a Monk that hath sinned through frailty of the flesh with a woman of base condition, who takes it for an honour to be prostitute to so great a Personage, boasts herself of it, and defames him, may kill this woman.*

minam vilem cognovit, quæ honori ducens se prostitutam esse tanto viro, rem nuptas, & eandem infamat, possit illam occidere? *Garanuel fund. 55. sect. 7. pag. 551.*

1 Ergo saltem hunc honorem poterunt Clerici ac Religiosi cum moderamine inculparæ tutelæ; etiam cum morte invaloris defendere. Ibid.

2 Caritas non instatur, non est ambiciosa, non quærit quæ sua sunt. 1 Cor. 13. v. 4.

3 Unde licet Clerico vel Religioso calumniatorem gravia crimina de se vel de sua Religione spergere minantem occidere, quando alius defendendi modus non suppetat. Ibid.

4 Si calumniator sit paratus ea vel ipsi Religioso, vel ejus Religioni publice ac coram gravissimis viris impingere, nisi occidatur. Ibid.

5 Nam quo jure licitum est seculari in tali

casu calumniatorem occidere, eodem jure licitum videtur Clerico & Religioso, cum in hoc Religiosus & secularis sine omnino pares. Ibid.

6 Legisti hanc doctrinam & inquis an homo Religiosus qui fragillitatis eedens fac-

He dares not at first declare his opinion, and he acknowledges he is in great suspense, and knows not which way to resolve, speaking thus: (1) *I knew not what to answer. It is true I have heard an excellent Father, a Doctor in Divinity of great wit and learning say, that Amicus might well have forborn to propound this Proposition; but it being once published in print, he was obliged to maintain it, and we to defend him. This Doctrine indeed is probable, and a Monk may kill a woman with whom he hath sinned, for fear she should defame him.*

At audivi ab eximio P. N.S. Theologiae Doctore, magni ingenii & doctriæ viro: Potuisset Amicus hanc resolutionem omisisse; ac semel impressam debet illam tueri, & nos eandem defendere. Doctrina quidem est probabilis, sed quia posset uti Religiosus, & pellicem occidere ne se infamaret. Ibid.

He saith well, that it had been better that *Amicus* had never published this mischievous Doctrine, but he saith not that it is wicked; and though he saw well enough the falsity and error thereof, as he testifies by the difficulty he makes to approve it, yet he believes that *Amicus* was obliged to maintain it after he had published it, *semel impressam debet illam tueri*. For that it is a kind of disgrace to a learned man as he is, and to the Society, to seem to have been ignorant of any thing, or to have erred; and a Jesuit knows not what it is to recant sincerely when he hath once set forth a Proposition by the order and with the approbation of his Superiors. 2334

This Doctrine, though altogether brutish and inhumane, ceaseth not to be probable in the Judgment of this Casuist: *Doctrina quidem est probabilis*, because *Amicus* hath set it out; and because he who is a Doctor as well as *Amicus*, by the engagement he stands in to the party, and that he might gratifie his Master and his friend, finds himself obliged to give him his approbation: *Ei nos debemus eandem defendere*. And upon a probability so well founded, a Monk may kill a woman with whom he hath sinned, for fear she defame him. *Poterit Religiosus pellicem occidere ne se infamet*, taking from her in this manner her life after her honour, and clearing an adultery by a murder.

A Judge cannot put to death a Malefactor, if he be not lawfully and evidently convicted; and if he condemn him upon simple conjectures, presumptions, and probabilities, he makes himself guilty of his death. So that the Casuists give more power to a Malefactor and an Adulterer, than the Laws give unto Judges, assuring him that he may upon a probable opinion kill her with whom he hath sinned, for fear she discover his crime. 2335

This is not sufficient to have made this opinion probable, he must also, that the Religions may have entire liberty to follow it without any scruple, remove from the contrary opinion all manner of probability; and this *Caramuel* doth, saying, (2) *That all able men and learned persons amongst them hold with him, not only that the opinion of Amicus is true, but that the contrary opinion is not so much as probable.*

2 Doctrinam Amici solam esse veram, & oppositam improbabilem censemus omnes docti. Ibid. sic. 6. p. 544.

It must needs be that this opinion which authorizes Murder in favour of Adultery, hath in a little time made a marvellous progress, since *Amicus* declares that he invented it, and *Caramuel* not daring at first to say that he approved it, speaks of it a little after as certain and evident truth, the contrary whereof seems not to him to be maintainable, because that upon his and *Amicus* Authority all the learned of the Faction of Probability have embraced it.

3 Confortius rationi videtur honorem tueri gladio quam mendacio; generosius & sanctius famam defendere occidendo aggressorem quam ei saluum testimonium imponendo. Ibid. fund. 55. sect. 6. pag. 550.

Then he fortifies this Authority by reason, which he proposes in this manner: (3) *It seems more agreeable to reason to defend honour by the Sword than by lying: That it is a thing more generous and holy to maintain reputation by killing an Assailant, than by bearing false witness against him.* He takes it for granted, that both the one and the other are reasonable, and that there is no difference but as of less and more: That it is an equitable, generous, and holy act to bear false witness against him that assails our reputation; but it is more generous and holy to kill him, (4) *provided only we pass not the bounds of a just and necessary defence, and that we do no more than is precisely necessary to kill him.* For it is, *thus that he declares he hath always understood it, for fear we should question his prudence and moderation.* 2336

He continues his reasoning and adds. (1) *Now it is probable that there is no mortal sin in the second, to wit, in bearing false witness against him who would take away our honour: and therefore neither any in the first, to wit, in killing for maintenance of the same honour. We may conclude by the same reason, that it is lawful to rob to preserve our reputation, or to commit a second adultery to cover the first for which we fear to be disgraced, since these crimes are not greater than slander, false witness, and murder, which he pretends to be lawful for the same reason.*

Then he undertakes to verifie in order all the Propositions of this his Discourse, beginning with the first. (2) *I prove, saith he, the major, because manslaughter is not absolutely evil in it self, since many may kill justly; and on the contrary, a lye is so wicked, that God himself cannot make it lawful and honest according to all the Thomists, nay, according to many of the Scotists, who hold that God may dispense with some Precepts of the Decalogue.*

1 At non esse mortale hoc ultimum probabile est, ergo nec illud primum. *Ibid.*

2 Majorem probet, quia homicidium ex natura sua malum non est.

Multi enim interrimunt iustus

& mendacium ita malum est, ut nec divinitus dispensari aut honestari possit, in omnium Thomistarum sententia; imo etiam in opinione Scotistarum plurium, qui putant posse Deum dispensare in aliquibus preceptis Decalogi. *Ibid.* Quod si dicantur non sufficere, vix erit ulla opinio probabilis. *Ibid.*

Amicus then and his Fraternity, and other his Partisans, who maintain at this day his opinion, must have more power than God himself; being they can justify and sanctifie lyes and calumnies when they are serviceable to them for preserving their honour in the world, which God cannot so much as make lawful by dispensation.

But the proof of his second Proposition is remarkable. (3) *I prove also, saith he, the minor, namely, that it is probable that he who bears false witness to defend his right and his honour, sins not mortally: for that which is maintained by persons of piety and learning is probable; and this doctrine hath for it more then twenty great and very learned Personages. Whence he concludes, That if we imagine these not to be sufficient to make it probable, we shall hardly find any at all that is so.*

3 Probabilem etiam, esse videlicet probabile non peccare mortaliter qui imponit falsum testimonium alicui, ut lusum iustitiam & honorem defendat: quia illud est probabile quod asseritur a viris doctis; ac hoc doctrina habet in se viginti & plures viros magnos & doctos. Quod si dicantur non sufficere, vix erit ulla opinio probabilis. *Ibid.*

Behold a new wonder of the Doctrine of Probability, to prevail not only against the opinions of men, but against the Law of God and Nature. For this Casuist said a little above, that by the common consent of the Doctors, a lye is in its nature so bad, that God himself cannot prevent it from being so at all times, nor dispense with the Law which forbids it: And here he would have the opinion of twenty Jesuits or Disciples of Jesuits of force to make it lawful by the Doctrine of Probability, and not only to protect lying, but which is worse, false witness also against the Law of God.

It is impossible to advance the Doctrine of Probability any higher, then to elevate it above the Power of God, and to subject the Laws of God unto it, by giving it a power to approve what they condemn, and to justify that which God himself cannot so much as tolerate.

I know not whether, as they hold that a Confessor is obliged to quit his own opinion to follow that of his Penitent, though he believe it is false, if it be supported by some probability, so they do not even pretend also that a man who hath killed one to preserve his honour, coming to appear before God to receive his Judgment, may not oblige him to renounce his own light, and to pass over his own Laws to absolve him, by representing unto him, that he could not sin, following a probable opinion supported by the Authority of twenty Doctors.

If the Jesuits be not confident enough to say this, yet they must needs believe it, or renounce their Doctrine of Probability, since it is a necessary and evident consequence of the Maxims of this Science. For as they hold it for certain, that we cannot sin in following a probable opinion; it is also very certain, that an equitable Judge, and by stronger reason God who is Equity and Justice it self, cannot condemn nor punish him who sins not. And by consequent this man who following the opinion of *Amicus* and these twenty Doctors who have approved it, hath slain one to preserve his honour, having not sinned, God cannot condemn nor punish him; but he shall be obliged to absolve him, and give him part of his

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glory, in yielding to the Authority of these Doctors, and giving way to the Rules of Probability, though he judge according to divine light, that his action is wicked, and condemned by the eternal Laws.

After this we must not think it strange, that they will not submit this marvellous Doctrine to the Laws of the Church, or Princes, and that they pretend that they are of no force against it, as *Caramuel* declares, answering this question :

1 Anne eadem doctrina poterit admitti sano jure civili & canonico?

2 Respondeo Amici doctrinam esse novam & legibus vulgaris juniorum; atque adeo nihil de illa à Pontificibus, Cæsariibus, aut Regibus fuisse dispositum. *Ibid.* pag. 549.

(1) *May we entertain this Doctrine of Amicus without offending against Civil and Ecclesiastick Laws?* For he answers, (2) *That the Doctrine of Amicus is new, and later than the common Laws; and that by consequence the Popes, Emperors, and Kings have ordained nothing about this point.* Whence it will follow by the same

reason, that if any one should begin at this day to teach some new and heretofore unheard of error, as to say that Blasphemy or Adultery were no sin, his opinion would not be condemned by the Church; because it would be new and later than its Laws. When the Church condemns an Error, it condemns all those who shall hold it for the future, as well as those who have held it in time past: And it hath truly and sufficiently condemned this of *Amicus*, in condemning slander and murder which this Jesuit approves and authorizes.

But if the Error and Crime were not so evident as it is in this opinion, its novelty alone, of which this Casuist would make use to exempt it from the censure of the Church, suffices to make us see that it is condemned by the Church it self. For there is no Divine who knows not that Novelty, and particularly in matters of Doctrine, hath been always suspected and odious in the Church, and that it hath always rejected and condemned it by the Laws and Mouths of all the Saints which governed it. And by consequent this opinion of *Amicus* being novel by his own confession, it hath been condemned by the Church before it proceeded from his imagination.

After *Amicus* had expounded this pernicious Doctrine so largely, built it up with so great care, and supported it with all the reasons he could, he thinks to put himself under shelter by saying, (3) *That since he had not read these things in the Writings of any Author, his design was not to oppose himself to the common opinion, but only to propose it by way of dispute, leaving it to him who should read these things to judge thereof according to his prudence.*

3 Verum quoniam hæc apud alios scripta non legimus, nolumus à nobis ita sint dicta, ut communis sententia advertentur: sed solum disputandi gratia proposita, in maturo iudicio relicto penes prudentem lectorem. *Amicus* *supra* tom. 5. *disp.* 36. *sect.* 7. *num.* 118. *pag.* 544.

But seeking to hide, he discovers himself the more, and his words render him more guilty, since he acknowledges this Doctrine is novel, and that he hath not found it in any Author. He therefore by this makes known and declares openly that it is he who invented so abominable an opinion. And therefore we may say with all truth, that it had its birth in the School of the Jesuits; that they are the Authors of it, and that it is properly and particularly their Doctrine.

And it is to no purpose for *Amicus* to say, that he doth not set on foot these Maxims so contrary to Justice, Nature, and humane Society, but only by way of disputation, and that he submits his unto others Judgment. For this discourse makes not an opinion good which is bad of it self; and this excuse and submission hinder him not from being blamable for publishing of it; but it only testifies that he did this with fear, and that he meant hereby to sound as it were the minds of men, to see how this his first Proposal of it would be received in the world, that he might afterwards declare himself more openly, and maintain it with an absolute confidence, if this first draught of his Essay should prosper with him, and an opinion so strange and odious should only be tolerated.

But besides this, it is an enterprize unsufferable and pernicious to the Church and Common-wealth to propose so horrible Errors and Maxims which carry on unto vice, revenge, and murder, under a pretence that it is done only for disputation sake, and for an exercise of wit, without determining any thing at all absolutely. There is no more certain way to teach men all sorts of villainies, and to imprint in their minds all sorts of the most brutish and abominable imaginations.

III. POINT.

III. POINT.

The Opinions of other Jesuits concerning Murder.

This matter is too important to rely on the Judgment of *Lessius* and *Amicus* alone. We must joyn thereto that of some others of their Fraternity, the better to verifie what we have reported of their Writings. Now if it fall out that they say in a manner all the same thing, it will prove the truth of what I say, that this Doctrine of Murder is not the opinion of one or two private persons only; but of the principal Jesuits, and of the Spirit of the Society.

1. *Dicastillus* as well as *Amicus* whom we have already quoted, with others also, gives licence to any one whomsoever to kill all sorts of persons indifferently, Father, Mother, Priest, Monk, all Superiors generally, without excepting Princes and Kings, no more than Bishops or Popes, when they are perswaded that they assault them unjustly. (1) *It is lawful*, saith he, *for Children to rise against their Parents, Servants against their Masters, Vassals against their Princes, and to repel force with force, when they are actually and unjustly assailed. And the same is lawful for Monks against their Abbots, and Inferiors against their Superiors.* So that if we should see a Son smite his Father, we ought not lightly to condemn him, for it may be this Father would have beaten him unjustly.

Molina speaking of an Adulterer, doth not only not call it in question, whether it be lawful for him to kill the Husband of the Woman with whom he hath sinned, when he takes him in the fact; but he takes it for granted as a certain thing, that he may do it for the defence of his honour and life. (2) *An Adulterer*, saith he, *may lawfully kill the Husband of a Woman with whom he hath committed Adultery, if her Husband having surpris'd him in the fact do assault him:*

Tambourin is also of the same opinion: (3) *An Adulterer*, saith he, *taken in the fact, may he defend himself, and kill those that would kill him?* I answer he may. Because according to the Laws of Conscience the Husband hath not right to assault him. *If then in Conscience and before God, this Husband assaults him not according to Justice. He kills him then unjustly. And notwithstanding Tambourin forbears not to give him a dispensation also, saying in the following Section, (4) That a Husband may kill a young man that forces his Wife, though she consent to it in any sort whatsoever.* This advice doubtless is very religious, to permit a dishonoured Husband to revenge himself of treachery by injustice; and it is also an excellent manner for an Adulterer to repair his fault and expiate his crime of prophanation of Marriage by taking away the Husbands life, after he hath taken away the Wifes honour, according as these Jesuits allow him.

Molina in the process of his discourse saith the same of a Thief, (5) *According to this Doctrine we must say, that a Thief being entred into a house to steal, may in conscience kill him that would kill him for his Theft, if he cannot otherwise escape death.* We must no more be so much astonished that they assure us that he from whom one would take life, honour, or goods, may kill in his own defence, and prevent the Assailant; since they pretend that he who unjustly invadeth the honour or goods of another hath the same right and power.

& merito. *Tambur. lib. 16. decal. cap. 1. sect. 1. num. 7.* 4. *Potest maritus occidere juvenem vim inferentem uxori quomocunque consentienti, quando illum aliter avertere non potest sect. 2. num. 8.* 5. *Juxta hanc doctrinam dicendum est fas esse furi qui ad furandum est ingressus interficere eum qui tali de causa vult saltem furem interficere quando aliter non potest evadere eam mortem, Ibid. pag. 1766. num. 2.*

1. *Licetum est filiis contra parentes, servis contra Dominos, vassallis contra Principes vim vi repellere quando actu invaduntur injuste—*

Idemq; de Monachis aut subditis contra Abbates & Superiores est communis sententia. Dicast. l. 1. tr. 1. disp. 10. dub. 3. num. 30.

2. *Adulter aggressus à marito adultera, in facto deprehensus, licite illum interficere potest. Molina de just. & jur. tom. 4. tr. 3. disp. 14. pag. 1765.*

3. *Adulter in adulterio deprehensus potest se defendere, occidendo eos qui ipsum occidere aggrediuntur; quia in foro conscientie non juste invaditur*

He also maintains, that in these occurrences wherein it is lawful to kill, according to him, it is lawful to desire it, to lay a design for it, and to do all we can to effect it. See his words. (1) *We must say that he who is assaulted may form a design to kill the Assailant, and direct his blow at his heart or throat, that he may overthrow and kill him, when he sees that it is necessary for him, that so he may certainly escape out of his hands.*

1 Dicendum
posse aggressum
intendere mor-
tem aggressoris,
petendo ictu cor-
aut jugulum ag-
gressoris animo
cum proster-
nendi ac necan-
di, quando vi-
det sibi ita esse
necessarium ad
vite evadendum
manus ejus. Ib.
disp. 11. num. 4.
pag. 1755.

Tambourin permits us to have this determinate will of killing in our own defence all sorts of persons. (2) *It is, saith he, the common Doctrine, (without doubt amongst the Jesuits) that to defend my life, but not to revenge my self, I may kill him who assaults me unjustly, even with an intention to kill him, his death being as a means to save my life; yea, though it were my Father, Son, Brother, Master, Wife, a Priest, or Monk, without incurring any peril of Excommunication or irregularity.* He might have said moreover, and added with merit, and even with pretension to gain an Indulgence by this man-slaughter; since according to his Brethren, an action of this nature is good and honest; and by consequence a matter capable of merit and indulgence.

2 Ut vitam
meam defen-
dam, non vero
ut vindictam su-
mam; commu-
nis est doctrina
posse à me occi-
di eum qui me
injuste aggredi-
tur, etiam in-
tendendo ejus
mortem ut me-
dium mee vi-
tæ, licet is sit
meus pater, fi-
lius, frater, do-
minus, conjux,
Sacerdos, Reli-
giosus, sine pe-
riculo excom-
municationis
vel irregularita-
tis. Hurtado
Dicastillus &
alii apud Dian-
nam. Tambur.
lib. 6. Decal. c.
1. sect. 1. n. 1.

Amicus saith in like manner, (3) *That he who is assaulted may endeavour to kill the Assailant, looking on his death, not as his end, but as a means to preserve his own life.*

Dicastillus adds, that this design of killing is honest. (4) *We must say and maintain it as most true (saith this Father) that as it is an honest thing to repel him who assaults us, by killing him; so likewise it is honest directly to desire to kill him, and to intend it for repelling him, and defending our own life.* This is not simply to tolerate, excuse, or justify murder, this is highly to praise it, and to stir up all people to commit it, and to give themselves voluntarily to the practice of it as a good action, to say, as this Jesuit doth, that the designment as well as the execution of it is commendable and honourable.

But if you have given occasion to this unjust Aggressor to invade you, may you kill him? You may according to the same Dicastillus. (5) *He commits not a sin of man-slaughter, who kills him that invades him unjustly, though he gave him occasion to assault him.* That is to say, that he who by any offence or injury done against a person, hath given him occasion to assault him, becomes just by taking up arms to maintain his injustice, and may justly kill after he hath unjustly offended. And herein he shall do also, if you will believe this Doctor, an honourable and commendable action.

Filliutius assures us also, (6) *That in occurrences wherein it is lawful to kill the Invader, it is also lawful to desire his death as a means necessary for our defence.*

Molina goes yet farther, and saith that though in killing him who assaults unjustly, we see that he will dye in an estate of eternal damnation, yet nevertheless we may kill him without offending against that Charity which we owe unto our Neighbour: (7) *Because in this case Charity obligeth not to prefer this mans spiritual before our own corporal life, nor before our honour it self, or our temporal goods which he would unjustly bereave us of.*

3 Inferitur
posse inyasum
in defensionem
sue vitæ inten-
dere, non qui-
dem ut finem,
sed ut medium necessarium, mortem invadentis. Amicus de just. & jur. disp. 36. num. 78. pag. 538. 4 Asserendum est tanquam verissimum, sicut honestum est in executione repellere aggressorem illum occidendo; pari ratione honestum est directe illum velle & intendere occidere ad repellendum illum & conservandam propriam vitam. Dicastillus lib. 2. sr. 1. disp. 10. dub. 4. num. 41. 5 Non peccat peccato homicidii invalor qui occidit injustum invasorem, etiam si invasus dederit causam invasionis. Ibid. dub. 5. num. 25. 6 In casu quo licet occidere invasorem, etiam licitum est intendere ejus mortem tanquam medium necessarium ad sui defensionem. Filliutius Moral. qq. tom. 2. sr. 29. cap. 3. num. 37. pag. 358. 7 Tunc lege charitatis non est necesse præponere vitam illius spiritualement nostræ propriæ corporali. Imo vtro nec honorari bonis externis quæ ille velit injuste à nobis auferre. Molina de just. & jure sr. 3. disp. 13. pag. 1751.

That is to say, that without violating the Laws of Charity, and much less of Justice, we may kill the body and soul of an enemy or thief; and send him to Hell rather than suffer any loss in goods or honour, or hazard our lives; and if Charity should require any other thing of us in these occurrences, its yoke would be, according to this Jesuit, unsupportable, unreasonable, and contrary to publick

70 good and humane Society. (1) Otherwise, saith he, this would be a yoke and command unreasonable, unsupportable, and contrary to publick good; since it would oblige us to suffer an unjust loss of our lives and goods, for fear that in defending our selves, and doing what is necessary for our security, we should cause a man to lose his life who invades us unjustly, and who of meer malice refuses to desist from so great injury as he would do us, or lest he should incur eternal damnation, by continuance in the same wicked disposition.

1 Irrationabile autem & impossibile bonoque communi esset jugum & præceptum quo patitur pati iustitiam

injustam vitæ & bonorum omnium nostrorum externorum; ne nos nostraque cum modestissime defendendo interficeremus injuste aggressorem qui sua nequitia à tanta injullitia non vult desistere: aut necesse illa sua nequitia desistere nolendo, interitum incurrat æternum. Ibid.

By this reckoning S. Paul was unreasonable, and made an unsufferable remonstrance to the *Corinthians*, when he reproved them that they did not suffer themselves to be wronged, defrauded, unjustly spoiled of their goods, rather than, not only to offend or kill the wrong-doers, as this Jesuit allows; but also rather than sue and contest publickly with them. (2) You are to blame, saith this great Apostle, in this very thing, that you go to Law together before the Judges, why do you not rather suffer wrong? Why do you not rather suffer your selves to be defrauded? And S. John must be yet more unreasonable and inhumane, when he saith that all the faithful ought to lay down their lives for their brethren.

2 Jam quidem omnino delictum est in vobis quod iudicia habetis inter vos. Quare non magis injuriam accipitis? Quare non magis fraudem patimini? 1 Cor.

80 And yet the licence which *Molina* gives in this point, is absolute and general, and he will have it (3) belong not only to the Laicks, but to the Ecclesiasticks, as being allowed by the Law of Nature; and not found to be forbidden them at any time; since on the contrary it is lawful for them to defend their worldly goods.

6. v. 7. Et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere. 1 Joan. 3. vers. 16.

Amicus applies also this Maxime to the Religious particularly, saying, (4) That it is certain that the right of defending their goods at the expence of their lives, who would take them away, doth not only belong to Secular, but also to Ecclesiastick and Religious persons. Thence it follows, that a Monk encountering a man who is entred into his Monastery to rob it, may take a Sword or a Knife to kill him, if he cannot otherwise hinder him from bearing away the goods of the Monastery.

3 Est autem hoc licitum, non solum Laicis,

sed etiam Clericis, cum jure naturæ liceat; nulli bique illis prohibitum reperitur; quin potius defensio bonorum externorum illis permittatur. Ibid. pag. 3770. 4 Quod hoc jus tuendi propriam vitam etiam cum periculo mortis invasoris, non solum habeant seculares, sed etiam Clerici & Religiosi, constat. *Amicus de just. & jur. disp.* 36. num. 328. pag. 546.

Dicaillus, supported by the Authority of many Authors whom he quotes, speaks more resolutely and more generally, (5) That it is lawful for all sorts of persons, Clergie men themselves, to kill them who take away their goods. And if you will take his word, and keep to his Principles, this sort of man-slaughter is an action not only not wicked, but honest and worthy the profession of a Clerk or Religious Monk. (6) That if a Thief fly away on horse-back, he may be pursued with a weapon, or killed by a Pistol-shot, when after he hath been threatned to be killed, he cease not to bear away what he hath taken; and even though he be not threatned nor admonished thereof, because time permits not, and there is danger never to recover what he carries away.

5 Assertendum est omnibus, etiam Clericis, licitum esse occidere invasorem suorum facultatum notabilis momentis quando aliter servari vel recuperari non possunt. *Dicaillus lib. 2. tract. 1. disp. 10. dub. 5. num. 46.*

490 But what if satisfaction might be had for it by Law, were it not then ill done to kill him? It is not, saith he, against Charity to kill a Thief who robs me of things which I cannot recover at Law without much trouble. So it is that in the Jesuit-Divinity the Law of Charity hath no force against that of Interest, and the life of a man is not worth the pain of pursuing at Law the restitution of what he hath robbed.

6 Colligitur posse occidi furem dum fugit cum re quam

surrepuit, ut si fugiat cum equo quem mihi surrepuit, possum illum insequi telo vel bombardâ confodere; quando fur præmonitus de morte recusat rem acceptam dimittere; vel etiam si non sit præmonitus, quando non est locus præmonendi, & periculum nunquam recuperandi rem mesm. Ibid. num. 58.

Molina gives the same liberty, and yet greater, for he allows killing for preservation of worldly honour. For he fears not to say, (1) *That if an honourable person be assaulted, and in danger to lose his reputation, if he flye, though by flying, he might preserve his own life, and his who assaults him, he is not for all that obliged to flye; but it is lawful for him to kill him who invades him unjustly, in defence of his life and honour, when he cannot do it otherwise.* So a worthy person is not obliged to retire, nor step one pace backward, no more than abate a point of honour to save the life of him who offends him in some matter, or assaults

Vasquez finds so little difficulty in this point, that he speaks of it as a thing of which none ought to doubt, saying, (1) *That all are agreed (without doubt they of the Society) that when a man comes upon us to assault us, and testifies that he would violate our honour, by threatening to beat us with a Cudgel, or give us a box on the ear, it is lawful for us to kill him, if we have no other way to defend our selves.* He is not content to say we may revenge an affront received; but he pretends that it is lawful even to prevent the mischief, and to kill him that only threatens to do it.

The reason is, (2) *Because he who invades us in this sort, seeks to deprive us of our honour, which is justly esteemed of more value than money or goods. For he who repels not such an affront, is of no account amongst the people.* And hereupon after he hath said that the *Casuits* are agreed, that when a man is in hazard to lose his life and honour at once, it is lawful to kill him who assaults him; he adds, that albeit he were not in danger to lose his life, he is not obliged to flye, and that he may kill only to defend his honour. (3) *It seems to me also, saith he, that when a man hath his honour only to defend, he is not obliged to flye; because he is to set more by his honour than money or goods. Wherefore there is no reason to oblige Christians to lose possessions so precious, by flying from him who assaults them unjustly.*

Vasquez opusc. moral. cap. 2. dub. 9. num. 34. pag. 43. 3 *Quia aggreditur proprium honorem auferre, qui iure optimo plucis pecunia estimatur. In populo enim parvi habetur qui similem injuriam non propelleret. Ibid.* 4 *Set & mihi etiam videtur quod ob tuendum honorem non tenetur fugere, quia pluris sciendus est honor quam pecunia aut res familiaris. Unde non est cur obligemus Christianos ita pretiosa amittere ex eo quod fugiant invasorem injustum. Ibid.* *Honestus vit si alapa, &c. percutiatur, &c. Tambur. lib. 6. cap. 1. sect. 3. num. 1.*

Tambourin saith the same, and *Dicastillus* extends and expounds it very largely, exempting him that follows his opinion in this point from restitution as well as sin. And by the same Principle upon which he establishes this Doctrine, (4) *he approves the Doctrine of Sanchez who believes that it is lawful secretly to kill a slanderer or false witness in an affair wherein not only life, but even outward goods also of great importance are in question.* And in another place (5) he extends this permission of killing false witness and slanderers, (6) *unto such as defame us before a Judge, Prince, or honourable persons, when we have no other means to secure our selves against this damage.* He proves that it is even probable in the Theory, that we may prevent this slanderer, and kill him before he have defamed us.

And that Church-men may not in this regard be in worse condition than others, *Tambourin* who quotes for himself *Dicastillus, Lugo, &c.* saith, (7) *That it is lawful for a Gentleman, though he be a Clergie-man, not to flye, because this would be a shame to him.* Though this Father *Tambourin* had lived all his life time amongst Armies, he could not have determined more Souldier-like of the point of honour. He believes not that a Gentleman in turning Clerk, and renouncing the world, hath renounced the right his Divinity gives him to kill for preservation of his worldly honour.

Idem dicendum si crimen sit verum, dummodo sit occultum. Dicast. lib. 2. tr. 2. disp. 12. pag. 4. dub. 2. num. 414.

6 *Si alta via, v. g. fugiendo, te tutari possis, fugere teneris si dedecori magno tibi fuga non vertitur, ut certe non verteretur si esset Religiosus; non ita si vit sit nobilis, quamvis sit Clericus, cui dedecus esset se in pedes dare. Dicastillus lib. 6. decal. cap. 1. sect. 1. num. 6.*

It is not sufficient for *Vasquez* to place worldly honour above other temporal goods; it seems that he would have it current as the most precious thing among Christians. And this honour and estimation which he would make so dear and precious with Christians, is that which depends on the opinion and fancy of those persons who are of basest and most contemptible condition in the world, which are the common Rabble. (1) *This honour, saith he, is justly of more esteem than money and goods. For he who repels not this affront, is of no account at all amongst the common people.*

7 In populo enim pauci haberetur qui similem injuriam non propelleret.

The value and love of this worldly honour, is that which we properly call Ambition and Vain-glory. So that when *Vasquez* saith we may kill him who invades this honour, he gives a liberty and power to sacrifice the lives of men to ambition and vain-glory, it being clear, that we cannot love the honour of the world so far as to kill men for the preservation thereof, not only without ambition, but without extraordinary ambition, whereof many ambitious persons themselves are not capable, having an horreur against so barbarous a cruelty.

3530

This very Jesuit, as well as his Fraternity, granting a liberty to kill for preservation of goods, doth with them put thereto this restriction: (2) *Provided that what the Thief steals be not of very small value: for it is not fit to kill him who would take some slight thing.* And immediately after, to mitigate what might seem too severe in this condition, he adds: (3) *But though the thing be of small value; yet if he to whom it belongs, be in the estimation of the people an honourable person, and who will receive some reproach, if he force it not out of the Thiefs hands, he may kill the Thief if there be no other remedy.*

2 Omnes intelligunt id quando res quas latro furatur non sunt minimi pretii, quia pro parvo detrimento non est bonum occidere invalorem. Ibid. num. 3 r. pag. 42.

And that he may leave no doubt at all about this point, he proposes also this difficulty: (4) *Perhaps it will be demanded, after how long time is it lawful to kill a Thief?* He first relates the opinion of those who say, (5) *That it is only lawful to kill when he is taken in the fact.* And he afterward concludes with some others who hold on the contrary, that it is lawful to pursue and kill him. (6) *It seems to me, saith he, more true, that seeing a Thief flye away on horse-back or otherwise, it is lawful to kill him before he hides what he hath stoln.*

3 Sed licet res pravi pretii, si tamen ex eo quod dominus illius non eripiat illam de manibus latronis, illi vertatur dedecori, & ille sit homo dignus honore in populo; potest illum latronem occidere, cum aliud non restat remedium. Ibid.

4 Sed dices: Quo tempore licet latronem occidere? Ibid. 5 Tanquam licet in ipso flagranti delicto occidere. 6 Sed oppositum videtur verius quod potest etiam fugientem latronem in equo vel alio modo occidere, antequam rem occultet. Ibid.

Lessius, as we have seen already, propounds the same case, and resolves it in the same manner. He speaks as *Vasquez* of a person that hath taken away something of no value, as an Apple, and will not restore it. He avows that he deserves not to be killed for that; but he adds, (7) *That if it would be a shame to you not to take it out of the Thiefs hands, you may endeavour to take it from him, and even kill him if it be necessary.*

3540

The Stoicks taught indeed that it was lawful to kill ones self rather than lose his honour, and there are many Examples found in the Histories and Books of the Pagans, of persons commended for having practised this wicked Maxime. But I find no moral Rule nor civil Law in all Heathen Antiquity, which ever tolerated what the Jesuits allow, to kill a man for a thing of so small importance as an Apple, so often as it falls out that the loss thereof brings upon us some abatement of worldly honour.

7 Si tamen tibi verteretur probro nisi rem furi extorquess, pessis conari, & si opus esset, eum occidere. Lessius de just. & jur. lib. 2: c. 4. c. 9. d. 1 r. num. 68. p. 88.

I have not found, I say, in all Heathen Antiquity any Philosophy which hath taught, no Law which hath tolerated this, no more than any Example of any person that ever did it with the approbation of any sage persons. For this cause the Jesuits may boast truly, that they have passed the bounds, not only of the Fathers of the Church, as they brag openly, but even of all the Heathen Philosophers, and to have discovered Principles, and invented Rules of Morality, which the Pagans destitute of faith, by the light of reason only would have abhorred and rejected as errors and extravagances.

Nevertheless *Vasquez* believes that he is obliged to extend this same power of killing in defence of what belongs to them, unto the Clergy and Monks. *It seems*

to me, saith he, that this is lawful for them as well as the Laity, and that herein there is nothing contrary to their Profession. 23550

The Jesuits content not themselves to allow killing, as we have now seen; they teach also and note out in particular the ways to do it, *Lessius* and *Molina*, as we have already seen, give herein an entire liberty to do whatsoever we please, and to take all ways which seem necessary, and which may be most commodious and easie.

Sanchez descending farther unto particulars, saith it is lawful to take the way of a Duel, if we be expert therein, and think to have advantage thereby: (1) *Because*, saith he, *this duelling is accounted a just defence, moderate also and without excess, and this sort of defence is lawful for the preservation of life, honour, and goods.*

There are Casuists who on these occasions would at least that the Princes licence be had; but *Sanchez* saith that this is not necessary: (2) *Because Nature gives a right of self-defence without need of demanding any toleration.* And this natural right gives leave to send as well as receive a Challenge, according to this same Jesuit, who attributes, not without commendations, this opinion to *Bannes*, saying, (3) *That he hath very well observed, that in these occurrences the innocent party may accept or offer combat, if he had not rather deal more securely for himself by killing him secretly instead of fighting him.* For he pretends that the same reason which gives liberty to kill an enemy in a Duel, gives him leave also to kill him secretly, (4) *Because this slaughter, in what manner soever it be done, is always a true defence.* 23560

And he declares that this right of killing an enemy in secret rather than by fighting with him, is so strong, that it sometimes passeth into an obligation. Inasmuch that he even assures us, (5) *That Navarra saith very well, that an innocent person ought neither to offer or accept the combat, if he can kill his enemy privately, and thereby escape that peril of life, honour, and goods.* And he holds, that this obligation proceedeth from the Charity which this innocent person, who commits this secret murder, owes to himself and him whom he kills. (6) *For as much, saith he, as by this means he will avoid the imminent danger of his own life whereunto he had exposed it in fighting a duel, and he will withhold his Adversary from offending God by giving or accepting the Challenge.*

Ibid. 3 Atque opprimere *Bannes* ait licere—innocenti in his casibus acceptare & offerre duellum ob rationem traditam. *Ibid.* Imo non provocando ad duellum, interficere occulte auctorem illum calumiosum. *Ibid.* 4 Cum hæc occisio sic vera defensio. 5 Imo beate Navarra n. 290. ait teneri innocentem non acceptare duellum, nec indicere, si potest occulte illum occidendo id vitæ, honoris, fortunarum periculum evadere. *Ibid.* 6 Quippe qui proprium vitæ periculum in duello imminens vitabit, & peccatum auctoris offerentis aut acceptantis duellum. *Ibid.*

It must be confessed, that this is a strange and unheard of Law of Charity which obliges to kill our Neighbour and Brother to keep him from offending God, and to cause him to be slain secretly, for fear that if he be openly set upon; he should be transported with some excess through a desire to defend himself, and commit a crime in fighting a duel; and in the mean time to make no difficulty nor scruple of sending him to Hell by killing him in an estate which he believes to be criminal and guilty of injustice, which ought surely to be very great and manifest, since it is taken for the ground and pretence of killing. It is sufficiently manifest, that this is not the Charity which Jesus Christ hath taught us by his Words and Example, which obligeth us to dye for our brethren and for our enemies themselves, and to prefer the good of their Souls and their Salvation above all our interests and all the goods of the world. 23570

Molina proceeds yet farther than *Sanchez*, or at least he declares himself better upon this Point. For *Sanchez* seems not to oblige us to kill our enemy in our defence no otherwise than by the Charity we owe to our selves, and imposes not this obligation on other than the innocent, without determining what his sin would be, if he failed herein. But *Molina* extends this obligation to every sort of Superiors, publick Persons, and even to many private Persons, pretending that it is a duty of Justice: and he fears not to say and declare, that he who fails

herein sins mortally. (1) When he, who is assaulted, saith he, is a person whose life is of importance, and necessary to the Weal publick, whether it be in temporals or spirituals, he is obliged under mortal sin to kill, if he can, the Aggressor, in defence of his life:

1 Quando aggressus persona esse cujus vita multum in Reipublica vel in spiritualibus vel in temporalibus referret, teneretur sub reatu culpæ lethalis interficere aggressorem si possit, ut vitam suam conservaret. Molina de just. commut. tract. 3. disp. 14. pag. 1754.

3580

If this Jesuit had been found amongst the Apostles when our Lord said unto them, that he should be delivered unto the Gentiles, outrageously dealt with, and put to death, he would have believed without doubt, that he ought to have opposed himself thereto more forcibly than S. Peter did, who said unto him only by way of advice and natural affection: (2) God forbid, Lord, that this should befall thee, this evil shall not be unto thee. And he would have had no better answer than that which Jesus Christ made unto S. Peter: (3) Get thee behind me, Satan, thou art an offence unto me; for thou savourest not the things that are of God, but of men.

2 Ablic à te, Domine, non erit tibi hoc. Mat. 16. v. 22. 3 Vade post me, Satana, scandalum es mihi, quia non spicis ea quæ sunt Dei, sed quæ hominum. Ibid. v. 23.

It must also be observed, that he would have the Commandment to kill an Aggressor, unless we will sin mortally, not to be only for publick persons, when the publick good is in question, but also for private persons, when the interests of their families are concerned. See here his words: (4) It seems that the same is to be said, if his death would bring some great prejudice unto his family, as to his wife, his children, whom he is obliged to sustain.

4 Idem videtur esse si ex ipsius morte sequeretur maximum detrimentum familiae, ut uxori ac filiis quos alere teneretur. Molina ibid.

And for fear that it should be objected to him, that if this man be not obliged in Justice to expose his life or his goods for his neighbour, that he might recover him from death eternal and temporal at once, he might at least do it of Charity; he prevents this objection by saying, (5) That though it might be lawful for him to depart from his right by suffering himself to be slain by him that assaults him, to prevent his falling into death temporal and eternal; yet he cannot give away the right of those who belong unto him, to whom his life is necessary, being obliged to maintain and defend them. And by consequence he sins mortally in not killing the Aggressor, if he can, for the preservation of his life.

5 Quamvis enim possit cedere juri suo, permit- tendo se ab aggressore interfici ne aggressor damnus mortis temporalls & æternæ incurreret, non tamen posse cedere juri suorum quibus vita ipsius est necessaria, & quibus alimenta & protectionem debet, quæ à vita ipsius pendent. Ibid.

But why may he not say also of the Head of an Ecclesiastick Body, of the Superior of an Order, and of all those who have any Charge or Employment in the Church, what he speaks generally of those whose lives are necessary for the Common-wealth or their private Families, (6) That they are obliged under mortal sin, to kill the Aggressor, if they can, for the preservation of their lives.

6 Tenetur sub reatu culpæ lethalis interficere aggressorem, si possit, ut vitam suam conservet.

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The one as well as the other is a consequence of his Principle, and his reason is stronger for a Head of an Ecclesiastical Body, or Superior of an Order, or a person who hath some Charge in the Church, than for a Secular Magistrate, or a Father of a Family, it being more true of every one of the former than of the latter, (7) That he is a person whose life is very important to the Weal-publick of the Church both in temporals and spirituals. Whence it will follow, that we may say according to the same Jesuit, (8) That he sins mortally, if he kill not him that assaults him, if he can, in the defence of his life.

7 Est persona cujus vita multum Reipub. in temporalibus & in spiritualibus referret.

So that it shall not be in one or two cases only, but in an infinity of occurrents almost, that this Command of Killing, which Molina would introduce amongst Christians, shall oblige them under pain of eternal damnation. And it would not be easie, according to the Doctrine of this Jesuit, to exempt from mortal sin a multitude of holy Martyrs who have suffered themselves to be slain unjustly, not only without defending themselves; but also sometimes forbidding those who could and would to defend them; because some of them being Fathers of Families, and others Fathers of the Church and of the Faithful, their lives were of importance both in spirituals and temporals. So that though they might recede from their right in Charity, and suffer themselves to be slain without defending themselves, yet they could not, according to this new Theology, recede

8 Tenetur sub reatu culpæ lethalis interficere aggressorem, si possit, ut vitam suam conservet.

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from the right of those who appertained to them, and who were under their Charges, whereunto their lives were necessary. And by consequence if this Jesuit do not shew them favour, and grant them a dispensation from this Rule, they sin mortally in dying for Jesus Christ, and not defending themselves, and not doing all they could to preserve their lives, so far as to kill, if it were needful, their Aggressors.

But if he pretend, that this Commandment is from God, as it ought to be, that it may imply so great and strict an obligation, we must also believe that the Law of God is less reasonable and less just than the Maxims of Philosophy, and the Civil Laws of Pagans, who never commanded nor taught any such thing, and who rather condemn it in many cases in which the Jesuit approves it, as an excess and crime; he must therefore be constrained either to change the Commandments of God, or to increase their number; we must, according to him, make eleven Commandments of God instead of ten; or indeed instead of what hath been said to this present; *Thou shalt not kill*, we must say for the time to come: Thou mayst kill oftentimes without fear of mortal sin, and thou shalt even be obliged sometimes to kill on pain of Hell.

IV. POINT.

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The Opinion of Escobar concerning Murder.

I Will give all this Article to *Escobar*, and indeed he deserves it well, for he is Spokesman for twenty four of the most famous and ancient Divines of the Society. And he hath also handled this subject of Murder very largely, and in that short Piece of his Epitome he hath omitted in a manner nothing of what the rest have said. So that in his Book, as in an Abridgment, may be seen, what is diffused through a multitude of great Volumes of his Fraternity.

He proposeth many exceptions to the Law of God which forbids killing, of which the first is this: (1) *All that do wrong may be killed, as those who rob by night or by day, and all such as offend us, though we be certain they will be damned; dying in that estate.* In saying all wrong doers, he gives liberty to kill all in general who hurt us, in what manner soever it be, leaving it to the discretion of private men to judge whether they deserve death or no:

1 Malefactorum res possunt occidi, nocturni, diurni fures, & alii quicunque malefactores etiam certo damnandi. Escobar tr. 1. exam. 7. esp. 2. num. 2. pag. 115.

2 Quæstio rim quanti valoris debet esse res pro cuius conservatione possunt furem occidere? Ibid. num. 44. pag. 122.

3 Non debet esse res parva.

4 Nisi toleretur cum injuria.

5 Regulariter

autem Molina tom. 4. de just. tr. 3. dub. 16. num. 7. unum aureum assignat. Ibid. 6 Num licet contumeliosum, seu profanum, mentiris, honorato viro, interficere? 7 At Badelli lib. 3. dub. 24. num. 24. putat licitum esse occidere contumeliosum, sed in casu in quo aliter acceri non potest.

He expounds himself after more clearly, introducing a person who speaks in these terms: (2) *Of what price ought the thing to be, for preservation whereof a Thief may be slain?* He answers presently, (3) *That it ought not to be of small value.* But he adds after this exception: (4) *If it turn not to the disgrace of him from whom it is taken.* This is the opinion of *Lessius*, as we have seen already, and indeed he quotes him.

He relates also the opinion of *Molina* who holds, (5) *That ordinarily it should be a Crown, or of the value of a Crown.* So his general Rule is, that ordinarily we may kill a man, whoever he be, for a Crown. But he pretends there are extraordinary cases wherein far less doth suffice, and that sometimes it is enough to have taken an Apple, as *Lessius* saith in express terms, or to have spoken an offensive word, or to have given the lye, as *Escobar* assures us after *Badel*. For proposing this Question: (6) *Whether it be lawful for an honourable person to kill him who hath given him evil language, or the lye.* He answers, (7) *That Badel holds, that it is lawful to kill him who utters reproachful words, in case he cannot otherwise be repressed.*

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He gives the same liberty to a Gentleman, against him that threatens him with a blow of a Cudgel, or a box on the ear, and prepares to smite him; saying,

(1) If any one attempt to give a box on the ear, or a blow with a Cudgel to a Gentleman, it is lawful for him to prevent and kill him, according to Lessius. And if he could not prevent him, he demands, (2) Whether it be lawful for him after he hath received a blow on the ear, to pursue him who smote him, and to kill him? To which he answers, (3) That some say no; because this is to revenge, and not defend himself. But he is not content with this answer, and he opposes to it that of Lessius, (4) who believes that it is lawful in the Theory, though it be not advisable to practise it, because of the peril of malice, revenge, disorders, duels, and murders, which may arise from it, to the prejudice of the Common-wealth.

1 Aggreditur quis vitum nobilem seu alapa, seu baculo percussus, licet occidere agat, si forem? Affirmat Lessius l. 2. cap. 9. dub. 2. num. 77.

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post impactam alapam, percutientem insequi & interimere? 3 Aliqui negant, quia id est injuriam vindicare, non defendere. 4 At Lessius lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 12. num. 80. licere existimat speculative, sed in praxi non consulendum, ob periculum odii, vindictæ, excessuum, pugnarum & cædium, in Republ. perniciem. Alii seclusis his periculis in praxi probabilem ac tutam judicarunt. Ibid. num. 48. pag. 123.

2 An liceat occidere eum qui non invadit actu, sed decrevit invadere? Dicit Molins.

We have already observed before, that all these reasons are humane and politick: and though they conclude the practice of this Doctrine to be difficult and dangerous, they are no hinderance but that it may continue always probable, according to these Authors, and by consequence that it may be followed with a safe conscience, care being only had to avoid the dangers and mischiefs that may arise thereupon, as some of those cited by Escobar do expressly say. That is to say, that according to these Casuists, we may pursue a person from whom we have received a box on the ear, or some other affront, without giving over, or being satisfied till we have slain him.

(5) They also teach, that we may prevent the mischief by preventing him who might do it, and killing him before-hand, without need to attend till he falls upon you indeed; because it is enough that he seeketh occasions, or lays trains against you.

5 Prevenire aggressor potest a iugando? Potest, ut etiam invidiator. num. 6. pag. 115.

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But if he present himself to fall upon you, though you may save your self by retiring, you are not obliged thereto, if your flight would be dishonourable. But if he come near, and lay hand on his Weapon, it is lawful to prevent and kill him first, if there be no other way to avoid death, and preserve his honour.

Tene turne aggressus cum dedecore fugere? Minime. Ibid.

(6) They declare, that it is not needful so much as to attend till he smites us, or till he puts himself in a posture to do it; that he assail us, or seek occasions to do it, and that it is enough that he is minded to do it, to give us power with a safe conscience to prevent the mischief we apprehend, and to take away an enemies mischievous intention with his life.

Accedit quis ad me pugionem extracturus ad me occidendum, nec potsum aliter mortem evadere? Potes preveniendo occidere. num. 38. pag. 121.

(7) If any man have committed a crime which is not publickly known, and he knows that another hath a design to inform against him before a Magistrate, if he fears lest this Accuser should cause him to be condemned to lose his life, or part of his goods, Escobar gives him, by the Authority of Bannez, liberty to kill him. He only wills him, that he may not offend against the Laws of Prudence in doing Justice in this manner, to consider well before-hand whether there be not some other means to quit himself of this peril, and that by all means he admonish the Informer to give over his prosecution, that if he refuse, he may be slain with greater satisfaction of conscience.

6 Licetne occidere eum qui non invadit actu, sed decrevit invadere? Dicit Molins.

de just. tom. 4. tract. 3. dub. 12. num. 2. Ibid. num. 37. 7 Scio solum testem vel iniquum accusatorem contra iusticiam legalem expandere intendere crimen verum, sed occultum, licetne occidere, si ex eo timeam capitale sententiam, aut notabilem bonorum amissionem? Bannez alicui, dummodo prius admonitus nolit desistere, & non sit spes evadendi. Ibid. num. 39. pag. 121.

Coninck, by the report of Escobar, is not altogether of this opinion, not that he condemns the opinion which is attributed to Bannez, but on the contrary he acknowledges, (8) That it is probable, if we respect the Law of Nature: but he

8 Coninck de act. Supern. d. 32. dub. 2.

num. 12. docuit, licet opinio Bannez spectato solo jure naturall sit probabilis; jus tamen positivum potuisse id prohibere, & de facto prohibuisse. Ibid.

faith, that positive Laws might, and have in effect forbidden it. And one of the most forcible considerations which he bringeth to dissuade us from following this opinion in the practice, is that though we may, if we will repose our conscience and Salvation upon the Faith of this Author; yet for all that we shall not therein find security for our persons and lives. (1) *Because he who thus kills a man for being an Informant, or witness against him, under pretence that he had revealed some crime true, but secret, or even had accused him falsely, cannot free himself from being punished by the Judge.*

1 Ne impu-
nis sibi qui ac-
culstorem & te-
stem prætextu
falsitatis, aut in-
justæ veri cri-
minis reveltio-
nis, necat. *Ibid.*

So that if one can design his plot so well, and give the blow so secretly, that he be not known, killing a man in this manner, that he may escape the chastisement justly due unto the crime he hath committed, he hath nothing to fear, according to this Doctrine, neither from the Justice of God nor man.

2 Quis bona
externa medium
sunt ad vitæ,
honoris & sta-
tus sustentatio-
nem. *Ibid.* n. 43.
pag. 122.

Escobar also maintains with his Brethren, that it is lawful to kill in defence of our goods, and he brings their very reason for it, saying, (2) *That worldly goods serve to the preservation of life and honour, and for the support of our state and condition.* And to add something to this invention, which is common to him with his Brethren, he saith, (3) *That it is for this reason that worldly goods are called the life and blood of men.*

3 Et ideo
bona externa
vita & sanguis
hominum ap-
pellantur.

But if they be the life of men, they are only so to them that love them, and who are of the world, and live according to its Maxims. And this speech is unworthy to proceed from the mouth of a Religious person, and agrees not with the profession of despising the world and its goods to follow Jesus Christ and his Gospel. But this Jesuit testifies also, that he speaks as he thinks, and believes not that Monks are obliged to desire and love the goods of the world less, than Worldings themselves, since he gives them the same liberty with the Laity, to kill those who would take them from them.

4 An possit
extendi ad Re-
ligiosos, cum
proprium nihil
habeant? Po-
test, quis unus-
quisque habe-
jus defendendi,
non solum prop-
ria, sed ea quæ
possidet in com-
muni. *Ibid.*
num. 43. p. 122.

For after he hath said that *Molina* extends this Doctrine, which permits to kill in preservation of goods, unto the Clergy, he demands, (4) *Whether it may be also extended unto Monks, seeing they have nothing of their own.* And he answers, *Yes; because all men have a right to defend not only what every one possesseth in particular, but also what they possess in common.*

5 Licetum-
ne Religioso oc-
cidere calumnia-
torem gravia
crimina de sua
Religione spar-
gentem, sicut li-
citurum est cuilibet
pro tuendo honore
cum moderatione
interimere? *Ibid.* num. 46.

That is to say, that the goods of the Monks are to Monks, as the goods of the world are to Lay-men; and that there is none but this difference advantagious to Monks; that every private person in the world enjoys only his own propriety; but in a Monastery every one doth not only possess a part of the goods of the Society, but the whole is common to him with the rest. Whence it follows, that every Monk hath a right to kill him that invades the goods of his house.

He demands a little after, num. 46. if Monks have the same right to kill for maintenance of their honour, as for defence of their goods. (5) *Is it lawful for a Monk to kill a slanderer who publisheth great crimes against his Order, as it is lawful for all men to kill for preservation of their honour with requisite moderation?*

And he saith first, (6) *That Amicus durst not bold to the affirmative for fear of seeming to oppose himself against the common opinion.*

6 P. Amicus; cujus octo de
cursu Theologiæ volumina nuper ad meas venire manus, tom. 5. de just. d. 36. sect. 2. num. 118. non audeat sen-
tentia affirmativæ adhaerere, ne omnium adversari videatur.

He acknowledges that until the time of *Amicus*, Monks had not yet the liberty of killing for the preservation of their honour. This Jesuit would gladly give it them, but he dares not; and that which restrains him, is not consideration of Justice, but of men and custom. He is not afraid of violating the Law of God by granting them this dispensation, but of offending the Casuists, and opposing himself to the common opinion. *Ne communi sententiæ adversari videatur.* In the mean time he forbears not to propound this opinion which he dares not yet maintain, and he approves and supports it as much as he can.

7 Si Laico,
ait, propter ho-
norem & famam

His reason for it is, (7) *Because if it be lawful for a Lay-man to kill for the preservation of his honour and reputation, it seems by stronger reason, that it is lawful*

also for a Church-man or Monk. For as much as their profession, wisdom, and vertue, from which the honour of a Clergie-man or Monk proceeds, is more to be esteemed than skill in Arms, from whence Lay-men draw their honour.

Amicus quoted in this same place by *Escobar*, adds also to confirm his reason, that in this the condition of a Monk is altogether equal to a Lay-mans. *Cum in hoc Religiosus & Secularis sint omnino pares.* But *Escobar* forgot these words, or rather left them out purposely, though they seemed favourable enough to the design he had of establishing unto Monks the right of killing for honour. Without doubt he believed that this would debase too much the right of the Monks in this point, to make them equal to Lay-men.

80 For the right of the Monks being grounded, according to him, on their Profession and Vertue; as the Laicks on their valour, and dexterity in managing their Arms; being the Profession and Vertue of Monks is more elevate and more to be esteemed than the Exercise of Arms, it must necessarily follow by this reason of *Amicus*, that the right which the Religious have to kill for honour, being better grounded, should also be stronger and greater than the Laicks. And by consequence he ought not to have said, that the condition of the one and the other was altogether equal; but it must be concluded by the Principle and Argumentation of these Jesuits, that in this the Monks ought to have advantage over the Laicks, and that they may kill with more liberty, and upon less occasion those who invade their honour.

And the reason hereof is clear. Because the more precious honour is, the more easie it is to hurt it, and the fault of him that doth it, is the greater; and as offences which are slight, being done against private persons, are very great, and deserve exemplary chastisement, being done against the honour of a Prince or a King; so an injury which would not be considerable against the person of a Laick, would be criminal, being done against a Monk, to blast his or his Orders reputation.

90 By this Rule it is easie to judge how far this pretended right may be extended; or rather it will be hard to judge of its so great extent. As it will be at the pleasure of Monks to set their honour, vertue, and the respect due unto their Profession at what rate they please, so it will also be in their power to judge of the greatness of the faults which are committed against them in this point, and consequently of the penalty they deserve who commit them.

And if it be lawful for a Lay-man to kill for a matter of small value, *licet sit res parvi pretii*, as *Vasquez* saith, by example, for an Apple or a Crown, *ut propono, vel etiam uno aureo servando*, as saith *Lessius*, as we have seen; when a mans honour is concerned in the taking these things from him, we must confess that a yet lesser occasion, if a less can be had than an Apple or a Crown, will suffice, according to this Divinity, to give the same toleration to a Monk. We need only look surlily upon him, do or say the least thing to offend him, to incur his displeasure, and thereupon to dye by his hand, if he please to make use of this right which the Jesuits attribute unto him, as they also usurp it themselves, and pretend they may use it, as we shall see in the following Point; where we relate the Opinion of Father *Petavius* upon this matter.

hoc licitum est, multo magis videtur licere Clerico ac Religioso, siquidem professio, sapientia & virtus, ex quibus hic Clerici & Religiosi honor progignitur, majoris est quam dexteritate armorum ex qua secularibus honor nascitur. *Ibid.*

V. POINT

V. POINT.

The Conformity of the Jesuits, who in our days have taught in their Colledges, with the more Ancient, in the Doctrine of Murder.

THis Doctrine having been invented and established partly by the most ancient and most considerable Divines of the Company of Jesuits, as we have now seen in the preceding Points, their Authority hath given such credit and such a current to it amongst their Fraternity, that passing thus from one to another, as a Tradition of the Society, it hath been ever since maintained by their Schools, and is propagated unto our days without any interruption. On the contrary, it hath by succession of time received a notable increase, and far greater Authority by the multitude of those who have followed it, the later always endeavouring to add something, and to augment the inheritance of their Fathers, by expounding and extending more and more the bloody and inhumane Maxims which they had left them on this subject.

For some years this Doctrine hath also been taught in divers places of this Realm, in many Colledges of the Jesuits at the same time, and many years together in the same Colledges. Father *Flachaut* and Father *Le Court* have taught it at *Caen*, and in teaching it, have been transported to all excess which therein could be committed. I will only report here one or two passages of one of these two Casuists, faithfully extracted out of his Writings, which have been verified by publick Authority, by the diligence of the Rector of the University of *Paris*, 23710
wherein he hath heaped together, and said in short a great part of what *Lessius* and

1 Dico 5. probabiliter licitum esse cuiusvis, etiam Clerico & Religioso, per se loquendo, & semoto scandalo, occidere furem fugientem, etiam non resistentem, ferentem res suas pretiosas, puta equum, & praeter eam Ecclesiae, si aliter recuperare nequeas. *I say that it is probably lawful for all sorts of persons, even for Clergie-men and Monks, speaking absolutely, and setting aside scandal, to kill a Thief who flies, though he make no resistance, when he takes away some precious thing, as a Horse; especially Church-goods, and which he cannot otherwise recover.*

2 Itemque licitum esse occidere fugientem, si id necessarium sit ad defensionem honoris tui nobiliter amittendi. *I say moreover, that it is lawful to kill a Thief who flies, if it be necessary to the preservation of mine honour therein notably concerned.*

3 Denique licet volentem te percutere leviter, occideres ubi id insignis est injuria, praesertim in Nobilibus, nimirum accepta alapa, gladio percutere statim ad vitandam ignominiam, conservandumque honorem. Ita docti permulti. *Finally it is lawful, especially for Gentlemen, to kill him who is minded to smite them, though slightly, if the injury and dishonour they receive thereby be remarkable; so after they have received a box on the ear, they may presently strike with the Sword to avoid disgrace, and preserve their honour. This is the opinion of many learned men.*

4 E duobus mediis licitis illud videtur eligendum quod tutius est ex parte ejus qui seipsum defendit, ad vitandam certam mortem, ejusve certum periculum.

These learned men are *Molina*, *Lessius*, *Sanchez*, and others whom we have produced in the fore-going Points, as the Authors and Fathers of this Doctrine, since they have confessed themselves, that they found it not in the Books of other Divines, at least as to certain the most important Propositions.

The same Casuist saith, that a man who fears lest another should lay some
Indictment against him, or accuse him unjustly, that he might destroy him, because
he hath affirmed, that he hath such a design, may justly kill this his enemy,
challenge him into the field, or rid his hands of him by secret means, as he judges
it convenient. And then he advices rather to make use of the latter than former

4 E duobus mediis licitis illud videtur eligendum quod tutius est ex parte ejus qui seipsum defendit, ad vitandam certam mortem, ejusve certum periculum. *way. (4) Because of two ways which are both lawful, it seems that ought to be preferred which is most secure for the defendant, that he may avoid evident peril or*

death it self. And a few lines after, he adds, (1) That all this ought to be understood in the sovereign and inward Court of God and Conscience. For in the outward Court which proceeds according to forms of Justice, and considers presumptions and conjectures, he who should thus prevent his Adversary how injurious soever, would be condemned as a Murderer, if he could not clear himself.

Hæc intelligentes sunt in foro fori, quod dicitur forum Dei & conscientia. Nam in foro licigioso ubi locus est presumptionibus ita præveniens, actorum injuriam habetur reus homicidii, nisi seipsum purgaverit.

As if Gods Law did not forbid Murder as strongly as those of men, and it were lawful to abuse his goodness by fearing him less than his Creatures; because his Justice doth not commonly punish with so great severity and speed as that of the Princes of the Earth.

2 Respondeo nihilominus cum quibusdam probabiliter id licere. Propterea quod hoc præcepto, Non occides, non

This Jesuit raises yet another Question, whether one may kill a person from whom he yet never received any displeasure, as an infant, when he cannot secure his own life but by his death. And after he had said, that there are many who cannot approve so barbarous an action, he adds, (2) That according to the opinion of some others, which is also his own, it is probable that this is lawful; because this Commandment, Thou shalt not kill, forbids not absolutely to kill an innocent, but with this exception, not to kill him without obligation and just cause, according as S. Thomas speaks. Now in this case he that kills, doth it not without just and very urgent reason, such as is the preservation of his own life.

prohibetur absolute omnis occisio Innocentis, sed cum limitatione, ne videlicet indebitæ & sine justa causa fiat. Sicut docet S. Thomas 1. 2. q. 100. a. 3. Ista autem occisio non fit sine iustissima causa & urgentissima, qualis est conservatio propriæ vitæ.

This reason may be extended yet farther. For hence it will follow, that liberty may be taken to kill an innocent, not only to preserve life, but honour and goods; and if he should be blamed, who had done it, he may alledge for his justification, that if he had not done this, he had been ruined in estate and honour, whereof the one is necessary to life, and the other more dear than life itself; and he will say as the Casuist here: *Ista occisio non fit sine iustissima causa & urgentissima.*

Tambourin hath very lately caused the same thing to be imprinted. If any one, saith he, assault you, and make use of an innocent person to shelter him, you may kill him, that you may hit him who invades you.

Escobar is of the same opinion, tr. 1. ex. 7. num. 52. pag. 121. and Lessius whom he quotes, proposeth the Question in these terms: (3) It is demanded, whether if a person assaulted cannot secure himself but by hazarding the death of an innocent wherewith the Aggressor covereth himself, he may defend himself notwithstanding that hazard? He answers, (4) That it is more probable he may. He afterwards proposeth the same case in another fashion. (5) Suppose, saith he, that a man flies from his enemy, and he cannot escape but through some strait way wherein he will crush to death some infant or lame person, it is demanded, whether he may take that way to save himself?

3 Si is qui invaditur non possit se tueri nisi cum periculo innocentis quo invalore se protegit, utrum & liceat cum eo periculo se defendere?

He answers first, (6) That Navarra saith that he may not, unless he have probable hopes not to kill him. But though this be always a great injustice to hazard the life of an innocent, over whom we have no power, to secure our own; yet this satisfies not Lessius, who outvying Navarra, adds, (7) That in truth it seems that we ought to say the very same thing of this case as of the former. That is, that as to save my life I may kill an innocent with my own hand; so one may ride over him, though we be assured that he will dye thereof.

4 Respondeo probabilius esse posse. Lessius de just. lib. 2. cap. 2. dub. 9. num. 57. pag. 86.

dere nisi per angustum iter ubi proteret infantem vel claudum; poterint illac fugere ut se salvet? Navarra negat, nisi sit aliquis probabilis spes non interficiendi. 7 Sed verèta videtur eadem ratio quæ in casu superiori.

5 Peres si fugiens hostem non possit evadere? 6 Petrus Navarra

His reason is, (8) Because he who is assaulted hath right to defend himself, and that his meeting with, or the interposure of an innocent doth not take from him this right. Which is no other than an application of the general Maxime whereon he grounds all this Doctrine of Murder under pretence of defending life, honour,

8 Quia qui invaditur jus habet se defendendi, quo jure non privatur ex illa Innocentis interpositione.

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1 Jus defensionis videtur se extendere ad id omn: quod est necessarium ut te ab omni injuria servet immunem.

2 Adverte eamem primo, si potes fugere, teneris saltem ex charitate, ne innocentem interficias. *Ibid.* num. 58.

3 Si es molenis fugere, non peccabis contra justitiam.

4 An si nominis mei falsis criminationibus apud Principem, Judicem, vel vios honoratos detrahere nitaris, nec ulla ratione possim hoc damnum sive avertere nisi te occulte interficiam, id licite possum? *P. Hercul.*

5 Affirmat Baunez q. 64. a. 7. d. 14. addens id dicendum, etiam si crimen sit verum, dummodo occultum sit, ita ut secundum justitiam legalem non possit pendere.

6 Quia si baculo vel alio impetu velis honorem meum vel famam violare, possum armis prohibere. Ergo etiam si id coneris lingua, nec aliter possum evadere nisi te occidam, parum id videtur referre, cum æque lingua atque alio instrumento mihi nociturus es.

7 Deinde jus defensionis extendit se ad omne quod est necessarium ut te quis ab omni injuria servet immunem.

8 Monendus tamen prius esset detractor ut desisteret, & si nolle, ratione scandalis, non esset aperte occidendus, sed clam.

9 Et quaerunt Summi Sacerdotes & Scribae quomodo eum dolo tenerent & occiderent: Dicebant autem, Non in die festo, ne forte tumultus fieret in populo. *Marci 14. v. 12.*

and goods: which is, (1) *That this pretended right of self-defence is generally extended to whatsoever is necessary to secure ones self from all injuries.* 23750

But he gives a charitable advice to temper a little these answers, if they be found too rigorous. That is to consider, (2) *That we are obliged, at least by Charity to flye, if we can, for fear of killing an innocent.* But this language, as we have already observed elsewhere, according to the Principles of the Jesuits Divinity, is not intended to signifie any more than that if being assaulted, you can flye without any inconvenience to you, rather than kill an innocent, in your defence, you shall do well, though you are not obliged to it absolutely, and in doing the contrary, you cannot be blamed of any injustice. This is that which the same *Lessius* saith in another case. (3) *If notwithstanding you will not flye, you sin not against Justice.*

All this murderous Doctrine hath also been taught at *Paris* in the Colledge of *Clermont* by *Father Hereau*, under the view and with the approbation of the Superiors and Chief of the Society. For he demands: (4) *If when any one endeavours to defame me before a Prince, a Judge, or Persons of Honour by false reports, and I cannot by other means prevent him from causing me to lose my reputation than by killing him secretly, I may do it with a good conscience?* This is the same Question which *Lessius* hath already proposed before, and others with him. And he gives also thereto the self same answer. (5) *Bannez*, saith he, believes it, and adds moreover, that we ought to say the same also, though the crime be true, provided it be secret, so that according to the Rules of Law and Justice, he could not discover it. 23760

A crime can never be more strongly authorized than by allowing another to be committed to conceal it, and giving liberty to kill a man who hath knowledge of it, when there is fear that he will utter it.

The reason of this Casuist is, (6) *Because if you profess that you will take away my honour or reputation by striking me with a Cudgel, or giving me a box on the ear, I may oppose you with Arms; and by consequence if you endeavour to do it with your tongue, I may make use of the same means when I cannot save my self otherwise than by taking away your life.* For the difference is of small moment, whethersoever of these two ways you assail me, since as much mischief may be done with the tongue as any other instrument.

He alledges also this other reason which is more general. (7) *The right of self-defence is extended to all that is necessary to secure ones self from all sorts of injuries.* He took this reason from *Lessius*, which we have already examined, but he adds this sweetning thereto, (8) *That it were good to admonish this Detractor before we kill him, that he should desist from his bad intention; and if he will not do it, not to kill him publicly, for avoiding scandal, but in secret:*

If this reason and this bloody *Maxime* be current amongst men in our days, as this Jesuit seems desirous to make it, by giving it his stamp, and teaching it in his publick Lectures, no man can be sure of his life, or rather there will hardly be any person left alive in this world, wherein defamations serve for common entertainment, and a flouting humor goes for a vertue.

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The Jews had this same consideration, and said in a manner the same thing when they were upon the demand of the death of *Jesus Christ*, and yet would not

for all that have him put to death on the Feast-day for fear of scandal and tumult. (9) *The chief Priests and Scribes*, saith *S. Mark*, sought means to take him

how they might kill him: Dicunt autem, Non in die festo, ne forte tumultus fieret in populo. *Marci 14. v. 12.*

by subtilty, and put him to death; but they said, This must not be done on the Feast-day, lest it should cause a tumult amongst the people.

I will put an end to this Chapter, and close it with some remarkable places of a Book which Father *Petavius* caused to be printed some years since, of Publick Penance. For writing after those whom we have already quoted, and seeing he could add nothing to the licentiousness of their opinions about Murder, he was minded to signalize and make himself remarkable above all others, by shewing himself more audacious than they in the practice and execution of what they had taught.

3780 This Doctrine is of it self so far distant from all reason and humanity, that the greater part of themselves who would have it pass for true, or at least for probable, have maintained it only in general and in the Theory: and when they more nearly considered it in the particular cases and dire consequences it drew after it, horror and shame kept them back, and hindred them many times from approving the practice.

Perhaps there will be none found besides Father *Petavius*, who transgressing all bounds of moderation, is not content to maintain, as others, that this Doctrine, which teaches Murder, is probable, or to approve it in the practice; but he requires and presses the execution of it, and pursues it with all extremity of heat against a Doctor and Priest whom he acknowledges unreprouchable in his life, and who could not be criminal in that point upon which he pursues him, if not in this, because he being obliged in Charity and of necessity to reprove some defaults of the Jesuits conduct in the administration of the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist; that which this Doctor of Sorbonne said, was not pleasing to him, nor his Brethren.

3790 He would cover his inhumane passion with a veil of imaginary good intention. He would have his aversion against an innocent person, pass for a laudable and necessary duty. And because he can find nothing in the life of this famous Doctor which could render him so criminal as he represents him, he forms against him general accusations, and imputes unto him the greatest crimes against the State and Religion, without any proof, without other foundation than that of his passion and blindness.

He goes yet farther, and to rid his hands of his Adversary more easily, he shews a desire, that the invention of a famous Law-giver might be followed, who ordained, That if any one would change and innovate any thing in the received Laws, he should present himself with a Halter about his neck, cast into a running knot, and having in this manner proposed his reasons in opposition to them, if they were judged equitable, the Law should be abolished or moderated, and the Proposer come off safe; but if his overture were not consented to, he should be strangled immediately; and so undergo the penalty due unto his unadvisedness. This course, saith he, may seem too rigorous, but the intent is commendable; nay, it is necessary for them in whose hands the Government now is. By this discourse it is easie to conclude, according to this Fathers Morals, that Dr. *Arnauld*, having proposed a Doctrine contrary to that which is in credit amongst the Jesuits, deserved death, and that he should do no other than a very laudable act who should draw the running knot about his neck to strangle him; nay, that it is necessary for them who have the Government in their hands to act thus, and to make themselves the instruments of the passions and interests of these Fathers.

3800 It is an incredible thing, that a Priest, a Monk, and a Christian durst speak in this sort, and durst rise up in a manner so cruel and shameful against a Priest and Sorbonne Doctor. But it is more incredible, that he would extend this fury, as he makes shew of against so many Bishops and Doctors who approved his Book of frequent Communion, and generally against all those who followed and esteemed the opinions of this Book; that is to say, against an infinity of learned and pious persons of all conditions.

It must be avowed, that those who have allowed Murders, who have given liberty to dispatch enemies by killing them, were never transported to so great excess, and that there are few men who have in their whole lives committed so

great and abominable homicides, as this Father, so good and gentle, hath a will to do with his own hand.

I speak not here, though this seems to be its place, of that detestable Doctrine which teaches Subjects to kill their Kings, under pretence of their being Tyrants; women great with child, to cause the fruit in their wombs to perish, when they cannot be delivered thereof without endangering their lives; young Maidens deflowered, to expose their children to save their credit, which is the Jesuits Doctrine. I shall represent all these things more conveniently, when I shall come to speak in particular of the Duties of every person according to his condition.

I will only observe here, that if the Murder which is committed in all these cases, and in all others which we have formerly related, and extracted out of the Jesuits Books, be not against the Commandment of God which forbids to kill, as the Jesuits maintain; it will not be easie to imagine on what occasion one may possibly break that Commandment, or make himself criminal in the violation thereof, if he may kill an enemy, a slanderer, a thief, an invader, an informer in false crimes, and even in true ones, but secret, and which is yet more an innocent person, and from whom he never received any displeasure; an Infant, a Prince, a King, all sorts of Superiors, without excepting Fathers and Mothers. 23810

If he may challenge into the field, assassinate publicly, kill by surprise or upon advantage, cause to dye secretly, by poyson, or otherwise for the preservation of his life, honour, or goods, and even for the least thing in the world, as for an Apple, when he believes himself obliged in honour not to let him carry it away who hath taken it.

I say, if one may kill, or cause to be killed in all these cases without punishment or sin, as the Jesuits teach publicly, it will necessarily follow, that according to their Maxims, for a man to make himself criminal against the Commandment which forbids Murder, he must kill in a frolick, and without any true or apparent cause. Which cannot be suitable to any but Devils, and those that have a diabolick malice.

A R T I C L E V.

Of Uncleanness, which the Jesuits allow against the Command of God and natural Reason.

THE Jesuits allow almost every thing in this matter, excepting the last act of this sin; and it would be even hard to justify according to their Maxims and Reasons, that they condemn it at all in good earnest, since they approve, as we shall see presently, and discharge from all crime all the ways and means that conduce to that end, as lewd company, impudent discourses, kisses, looks, dishonest thoughts, pollution it self, which is in some sort the accomplishment of fleshly lust. 23820

I know not whether we may not fear after what Father Tambourin hath written, lest the Jesuits should at length affirm, that Fornication may be lawful. See here his words. (1) *It is defined by the Clementine Ad nostram: De Hæreticis. That Fornication is a mortal sin, and that to say the contrary, is an Heresie. But whether it be forbidden by positive or natural Law; and by consequent whether it be evil in it self, is a question amongst the Doctors. Durand, Martinus de Magistris, Caramuel, and some few others believe that it is forbidden by positive Law only. But the common opinion and of almost all the Doctors is, that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature.---As for me I hold two things for certain. First; that the common opinion is true. Secondly, that this truth being presupposed, we must say, that there is some natural reason which proves it. But I must ingenuously acknowledge, that the Principle whence this Conclusion is drawn, is not yet entirely discovered. After this manner it is that we are accustomed to answer concerning some secrets of Heaven, or the squaring of the Circle, or other like questions when we dispute of them in Philosophy.* 23830

1 Fornicationem esse peccatum mortale, & contrarium asserere esse hæreticum decretum est in Clement. Ad nostram. De hæreticis. Sed an sic solum prohibita jure positivo an etiam jure naturali; et

phy. For we say, that these things are certain, and that they may be proved by demonstrative reasons, but no man hath yet propounded them: I say, the Principle whence this Conclusion is drawn. For if the consequences of it be considered, it may be proved manifestly enough, principally from this, that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature, it might be granted by dispensation in some very pressing occasions, which cannot be said in any wise.

It is easie to see whither this reasoning tends. (1) It is probable, saith he, that one may be invincibly ignorant of the precept which forbids fornication, at least amongst barbarous and gross-witted persons. This is the opinion of Azor and Fagundes. The reason is, because this precept is not drawn manifestly from some first principle of natural light.

Secundo data hac veritate, dicendum à nobis esse dari rationem naturalem id certo probantem, sed ingenue fateri nos debere eam à priori nondum clare esse compertam. Ita solemus respondere cum de cæli quibusdam occultis, cum de quadratura circuli, aliisque similibus etiam in Philosophia disputamus; ea nimirum certa esse, certisque rationibus posse probari, verum eas nondum adhuc fuisse manifeste ab ullo prospectas. Dixi à priori; nam à posteriori satis manifeste probatur, præsertim ex eo quod si non tunc jure naturali prohibita, in aliquo tandem urgentissimo casu posset in ea dispensari, quod nullo modo dici potest. Tambourin. lib. 7. deæ. cap. 1. sect. 2. num. 1.

1 Dari posse ignorantiam invincibilem circa præceptum non fornicandi, saltem apud Barbaros & incultos, probabile est. Ita Azor, Fagundes, quis non admodum manifeste illud deducitur ex primis principiis luminis naturalis. num. 10.

He saith first of all, that many Doctors, whom he cites, hold; that Fornication is forbidden only by positive Law; and by consequent this opinion is probable, according to him, being supported by the Authority of these Doctors, who without doubt are not destitute of reasons to prove it

In the second place he saith, the Principle from whence we may infer, that Fornication is evil in it self, and forbidden by the Law of Nature, is not evident; that it cannot be found, or at least wise not clearly discovered. Whence it follows, that this Conclusion is no more evident than its Principle, but is it self only probable. And though it be more probable at this day than the contrary opinion which hath not so many Partizans and Casuists on its side, nevertheless as it is the more sweet, that is to say, hath more liberty and conformity to the corrupt inclinations of Nature, it may perhaps shortly prevail above the other by suffrages, and the greater number of these new Casuists who profess a complacent Divinity, and follow voluntarily the most indulgent opinions.

In the third place, though it should continue always less probable, it is enough that it is simply probable, since the least or last degree of probability suffices to be followed with a safe conscience, according to these Doctors.

4. Whence it follows evidently, that he who shall be of Tambourins opinion, may absolutely demand and receive a dispensation for Fornication, as well as for fasting, because it is at least probable, according to him, that neither the one nor the other is forbidden, but only by positive Law; and where things are not evil, save only in regard they are forbidden, one may with some reason, and even without any reason, according to some Casuists, obtain and make use of a dispensation for it.

5. Tambourin hath foreseen this inconvenience and disorder, and confesseth openly enough, that it follows from his opinion in the manner he propounds, and that he maintains it when he saith, (2) That if for want of an evident Principle, which he confesses it hath not, one would prove it by consequences, it may be proved manifestly enough, from this principally, that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature (he speaks of Fornication) it might be indulged by dispensation.

He produces here as a principal reason which may prove it, or rather as a conjecture which may make it believed, that Fornication is forbidden by the Law of Nature, because we cannot have a dispensation to commit it. And some other time, if the world be better disposed than at present, he himself or his Society building upon the same Principles with him, may easily prove, that it may be dispensed with; because it is not evident that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature, and that it is even probable, that it is only by positive Law, as he declares

que adeo ex se sit intrinsece mala, quæritur à Doctoribus. Et Durandus quidem, Martinus de Magistris, Caramuel, alique putant esse solum ex jure positivo. Verum communis & antiquior sententia docet esse de lege naturali.

Mihi vero duo sunt certa. Primo hanc communem esse veram sententiam: Secundo data hac veritate, dicendum à nobis esse dari rationem naturalem id certo probantem, sed ingenue fateri nos debere eam à priori nondum clare esse compertam.

Ita solemus respondere cum de cæli quibusdam occultis, cum de quadratura circuli, aliisque similibus etiam in Philosophia disputamus; ea nimirum certa esse, certisque rationibus posse probari, verum eas nondum adhuc fuisse manifeste ab ullo prospectas.

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it himself. And so Fornication shall be in the number of things indifferent; and it may be lawful, when it pleases them to employ their Authority and their reasons, to take away the prohibition which alone renders it evil and criminal.

And it seems that he would prepare before-hand, as it were at distance, mens minds one day to receive this unhappy Doctrine, when he saith in the end of the Section, (1) *That it is probable that there may be invincible ignorance of the precept which forbids Fornication, at least amongst Barbarians and gross-witted people. This is the opinion of Azor and Fagundez. The reason whereof is, because this precept is not manifestly drawn from the first Principles of the light of Nature.*

He also said once, that it is neither evident nor certain by way of Principle or by natural Reason, that Fornication is evil of it self, and forbidden by the Law of Nature. And from thence he infers, that a man may be invincibly, that is, innocently, ignorant that Fornication is a sin. Whence it follows, that in such a disposition it may be committed innocently and without sin: because, according to the Principles of his Divinity and Society, that which is done by invincible ignorance is no sin.

This permission which he grants to commit Fornication by ignorance, is as it were, a presumption and proof, that Fornication may be committed, according to him, by dispensation, since the one follows as well as the other from his reasoning, and is grounded upon the same foundation, which he establisheth or supposeth here in this place: That there is no evident Principle drawn from the light of Nature, by which it may be demonstrated, that Fornication is evil in it self, and forbidden by the Law of Nature.

And this same reason proves also, that he holds Fornication not to be forbidden by the Law of God. For no man can dispense any more with the Law of God than with the Law of Nature. So that if Fornication were not forbidden by the Law of Nature, nevertheless it could not be dispensed with, if it were forbidden by the Law of God; and so whilst he maintains, that if the Law of Nature forbade it not, it might be lawful in some case by dispensation from men: he testifies clearly, that he believes not that it is forbidden by the Law of God.

Bauny in his Sum, Chap. 46. pag. 717. assures us, *That they who in the places of their Trade and Commerce are obliged to see, speak, and treat with young Maids, and Women, whose sight and company causeth them oftentimes to fall into sin, are capable in this perpetual danger of being in a state of Grace, and of receiving the Sacrament.*

Layman affirms indeed in general, that we are obliged to flye the next occasions of sin, but he adds thereto these exceptions: (2) *Unless it be so that this peril and next occasion of sinning mortally, cannot be removed without undergoing some notable incommodity in body, reputation, or goods. For in this case there is an advice, but no command to forgo the lesser for the greater good, and to make less account of our temporal commodity than of the security and Salvation of our Souls.*

Excipitur si proquinquum periculum seu occasio mortaliter peccandi, sine gravi incommodo corporis, fame, aut fortunarum tolli non possit; tunc consilium quidem est minorem illam securam majori bono securitatis anime posthabere. Layman lib. 5. tract. 6. cap. 4. num. 9.

There is no person, how engaged soever he be in the next and most dangerous occasions of sin, who may not always take for pretence to abide therein, some one of these reasons, and therefore none will ever believe himself obliged to avoid them.

Lessius speaking of lewd Discourses, saith, that it is only a venial sin to hear or utter them, (3) *though we take pleasure in them, provided we have some other intention besides the pleasure we take therein.* He might say as much of an idle word, or of an inconsiderate discourse spoken at random.

Si solum fiat ob voluptatem quæ præcise ex ipsa narratione capiuntur absque ulteriore intentione, est peccatum veniale. Lessius de just. lib. 4. cap. 3. dub. 8. num. 63. pag. 688.

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And a little after, speaking of the pleasure which comes by the imagination and thinking of dishonest things, he saith also the same thing in another manner. He distinguisheth of two sorts of pleasure, or rather of two ways of taking pleasure in dishonest things. The first is, when the pleasure comes from the dishonest thought: the second is, when it comes from the object or thing it self, or the dishonest action whercon we think, and wherewith we entertain our selves.

He declares then, that in the first sort of pleasure there is no sin at all. And his reason is, (1) *Because the pleasure is of the same nature with the action from whence it proceedeth. For it is like unto this action, as saith Aristotle in the 10. of his Ethics, cap. 4. and it is a necessary consequent of every operation which is agreeable unto us. Now the operation from whence this pleasure issues, is not bad, but good, or at least indifferent, to wit, the knowledge of the truth, or the view of any rare and admirable thing, which men esteem very much, though they abhor the object of this knowledge and view.*

890

(2) The things, the knowledge whereof men so much esteem, and which they take so much pleasure to behold, or to entertain themselves with, are, as he saith himself, Combats, Duels, Inchantments of Magicians, the Generation of Beasts or men, and every thing that belongs to that action. So that, according to him, the thoughts of all these things, though a man entertain himself with them voluntarily and with pleasure, and even for the pleasures sake which he relishes therein, will be no sin. For he concludes all his Argumentation in these words: (3) *This pleasure is not evil in it self.*

caus. Aequi opus ex quo nascitur non est malum sed bonum, vel quid indifferens, nimirum notitia raræ aut admirandæ visio; quam notitiam & visionem homines magni æstimant; etiamsi objectum fatatur maxime execerentur. Ibid. dub. 15. num. 108. pag. 698. 2 *Hæc modo delectantur homines lætatione vel narratione præliorum, duellorum, & rerum admirandarum quæ per artem magicam fiunt, vel eorum quæ pertinent ad opus generationis & conceptum prolis. Ibid.* 3 *Ergo talis delectatio non est de se mala.*

He might have said more, and infer from the Principle which he saith is *Aristotles*, that this sensual pleasure not only is no sin, but it is also commendable and honest, since the object he hath given it, is good and honest, namely, the knowledge of the truth: *Nempe notitia veritatis.*

The only condition then which he demands; that we may entertain our selves innocently with the thoughts of these things, is that we stay not at the pleasure alone which arises from these thoughts; and that we think not of what may come from the thing, or the wicked and dishonest action we think on.

I will not stay to examine this imaginary condition in moral matters, any more than the Metaphysical distinction and abstraction whereupon it is grounded. I will only say, that to declare unto any person that he may take pleasure in any filthy thought, provided that he respect not the filthy object that this thought represents unto him, or that he be not touched with the pleasure which comes from it naturally; is as if one should say, that one may stand before a fire, provided he be not heated, and pass through the dirt, provided he be not defiled.

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Common sense only and continual experience shew sufficiently, that it is as it were impossible to behold those things which we love, and to which we have an inclination; as men have naturally to the objects of fleshly concupiscence, without exciting love and the motions of that propension we have to them; as it is impossible to behold and consider the things which we hate, without conceiving an hatred and averfation yet more great against them.

As for Kisses, *Lessius* propounds a Question in this manner: (4) *There is some difficulty about Kisses, being considered as actions in themselves agreeable to the flesh, and disposing, though afar off, unto pollution; to wit, whether in using them in this manner, without having an intention to pass any farther in sensual pleasure, we sin mortally?* He answers first, according to the opinion, which is, as he saith himself, the more common in the Schools; that there is mortal sin in Kisses which

utrum si quis hac ratione illo utatur, non intendendo ulteriorem voluptatem, peccet mortaliter. Ibid. dub. 8. num. 52. pag. 687.

1 Commu- are taken in this manner, and he testifies that he doth approve it. (1) First, nis sententia est because this opinion is the more common. In the second place, because it is the safer in istis esse pec- course to remove our selves as far as we can from these things. In the third place, 2391 carum mortife- because there is oftentimes danger to consent unto these things, and so to stay therein rum, quæ & with pleasure, or to fall into pollution, according to the complexion or disposition of the mihi prebatur, body. For this cause, saith he, it is expedient not to be too loose in these things. cum quia com- body. Whence he infers, that these kisses must be absolutely forbidden unto persons muniõr, tum betrothed. quia tutius est betrothed.

But a little after he grants them as innocent and lawful things to the betrothed themselves. For having made this Objection on the behalf of those who are of the contrary opinion: (2) It is allowed unto persons betrothed to enjoy the pleasure they take in kissing, or touching the hands or faces of one another, so that herein they sin not so much as venially. He answers, affirming this Proposition, (3) That it is allowed to betrothed persons, because this is a sign of the carnal conjunction which is to be afterwards; whereunto they have in some sort a right to consent by reason of Marriage.

temperamenti aut peculiaris dispositionis corporis. Quam ob causam expedit in hujusmodi non esse laxum. Unde etiam inter sponfos censeo plane esse dissuadenda, si causa voluptatis fiant. 2 Sponfis conceditur ea voluptas quæ præcise ex osculo & contactu manus vel faciei percipitur; ita ut ne venialiter quidem in eo peccet. Ibid. num. 59.

3 Sponfis conceditur; quis est signum copulæ futuræ, in quam ratione matrimonii consentire quodammodo possunt. num. 59.

He allows them the same kisses, which he had before condemned of mortal sin, according to the more common Doctrine and his own opinion. And which is yet more strange and extravagant, he hath allowed these unto them for the same reason for which he had said above, that they could not be allowed them. This is granted, saith he, to persons betrothed; because it is a sign of the future carnal conjunction, whereunto they have in some sort a right to consent by reason of Marriage.

4 Etiam in- And a little above he had said: (4) My advice is, that we ought wholly to divert cer sponfos sua- from them, even persons betrothed themselves, because these kisses as they produce sen- 2392 deo plane dis- from them, even persons betrothed themselves, because these kisses as they produce sensual pleasure of themselves, signifie naturally present or future carnal conjunction, as osculum ut est may be seen commonly amongst Animals themselves. For which cause it seems that delectabile car- they contain in them a silent consent unto this conjunction. ni, natura sua est signum copulæ vel instantis, vel futuræ, ut etiam ex usu animalium constat. Itaque in eo continet videtur tacitus quidam consensu in copulam. Ibid. num. 59.

I leave it to his Brethren to undo these contradictions: I will only observe here farther that he assures us, that betrothed persons may take pleasure, and consent in some sort to the action of Marriage, which they shall exercise when they are married; as if it were lawful to enjoy a right which we have not yet, and even which we shall never have; Marriage giving us only a power to do what is necessary for the begetting of children, and not to hunt after shameful pleasures, and the satiating of lust.

Layman hath taught the same thing. For taking the difficulty at the highest,

5 An sit mor- he puts this general Question: (5) Whether a married person commit mortal sin by tale peccatum a too long continued delight taken in dishonest pleasures of mind, when in the absence of his Bed-fellow he entertains himself with the thoughts of the pleasure which arises- morosæ delecta- from the use of the Marriage-bed? The same Question is commonly made concerning tionis, si con- a Widow entertaining her self with the remembrance of pleasures past, and a Spouse jugæ absente con- who desires and fore-tastes as it were by way of advance that which he shall have. He jugæ delectet se- answers, (6) That a Husband and Wife sin not mortally, when at a distance from cogitatione co- one another, they think of the action of Marriage, and admit and entertain this thought pulæ maritalis. with pleasure and joy. Eademq; qua- sio proponi so- let de vidua ob- lectante se re-

cordatione copulæ præteritæ. Idem de sponso desiderante vel oblectante se in copula futura. Layman lib. 1. tract. 3. cap. 6. num. 12. pag. 41. 6 Dico 1. conjux mortaliter non peccat si de maritali copula absente conjuge cogitans, rem cogitatum, voluntarie approbet, sive de ea gaudeat.

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He ſaith the ſame thing after of Widows and betrothed perſons who do what he ſpoke of in the Queſtion he propounded. He proceeds yet farther, and makes uſe of the Authority of Sanchez to maintain that all ſorts of perſons indifferently may voluntarily continue and with complacence in the thoughts of pleaſure which they might have with any woman whatſoever ſhe be, if they were married together.

Quod idem Sanchez lib. 1. moral. cap. 2. num. 33. & Filiur. esp. 1. extendunt ad omnem voluntatis affectionem, etiam ſimplicis, complacentiæ conceptivæ & cogitatione concubitus cum muliere, ſi uxor eſſet. Ibid.

It is eaſie to ſee, that there are no filthy and diſhoneſt deſires which may not be juſtified by theſe diſtinctions and ſubtilties, which are of no uſe but to corrupt minds, and to give them liberty to commit without ceaſing an infinite of Fornications, Adulteries, and Inceſts within themſelves without any ſcruple of conſcience.

I Dico 3. probabile eſt licitum eſſe illam deſiderare ſimplici affectu cauſa alicuius boni effectus cum es conjuncti, v. c. cauſa ſanitaris, ſedandæ tentationis, obtinendæ tranquillitatis animi. Leſſius de juſt. lib. 4. cap. 3. d. 24. n. 104. pag. 697.

As for Pollution, Leſſius maintains, that it may be deſired when any good is expected from it. His words are: (1) It is probable that it may be deſired with a ſimple affection, by reaſon of ſome good effect which may thereby be produced; as health, deliverance from temptation, and reſt of mind.

Tolet ſaith the ſame thing more clearly: (2) If any one deſire pollution for ſome good end, as for his health, or that he may be quit of ſome ſiſhly temptations which are a trouble to him oftentimes, it is no ſin. Emanuel Sa, Sanchez, and Eſcobar are of the ſame opinion. I will only relate the words of the laſt who ſaith, (3) That a perſon who in his ſleep begins to fall into pollution, is not obliged to reſreſt it when he awakes. This he takes for certain in his Divinity; and then demands, what is to be ſaid to it, (4) If he be well pleaſed with this pollution, and deſire it? His answer is, (5) That if he be pleaſed with this pollution, and deſire it, not be- cauſe of the pleaſure, but becauſe of his health, or to appeaſe temptations, it is not ſo much as a venial ſin.

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Leſſius gives the reaſon why the one and the other are lawful, to wit, to deſire pollution, and rejoyce in it. (6) Becauſe, ſaith he, when it is lawful to deſire a thing to come to paſs, it is alſo lawful to rejoyce in it when it doth come to paſs. For theſe things are of the ſame nature, according to the Rules of Morality; becauſe de- light follows neceſſarily from the enjoyment of the good we deſire, and it preſuppoſes and contains in it the deſire of this good.

his tentaciones quibus interdum affigitur, non eſt peccatum. Tolet lib. 5. cap. 13. num. 4. pag. 772. Sa verbo Luxuria num. 11. pag. 449. Sanchez moral. lib. 1. cap. 2. num. 18. pag. 7. Eſcobar tr. 1. ex. 8. num. 95. pag. 154. 3 Inchoſtam in ſomno pollutionem non tenetur quiſ vigilans reprimere. 4 Quid ſi gaudeat de illa pollutione, vel optet evenire? Si gaudeat vel optet, non ob delectationem, ſed propter ſanitaris, vel ad ſedandis tentationes, nec peccatum quidem veniale eſt. 5 Quis quod licitum eſt deſiderare ut fiat, licitum eſt etiam eo gaudere quod factum ſit, & contris, ſi ſas gaudere de ſeſto, etiam licitum eſt deſiderare ut fiat. Hæc enim ſunt ejuſdem moris. Nam gaudium reſultat neceſſario ex bono deſiderato obtento, & ſupponit, vel implicite deſiderium includit. Leſſius ſupra num. 105.

He ſeems to ſet pollution in the rank of good things, ſince he finds the deſire thereof and delight taken therein to be good, ſaying, (7) That delight follows neceſſarily from the fruition of the good deſired. And indeed if pollution were not a good action, or at leaſt indifferent, his Argument were nothing worth. For as he ſaith, delight follows the nature of the thing wherein we delight. If therefore pollution be wicked and unlawful, according to him, the delight as well as deſire of it would be wicked, he could not ſay as he doth; that both are lawful. Leſſius his opinion then is, that pollution is good and commendable, or indifferent at leaſt.

7 Nam gaudium reſultat neceſſario ex bono deſiderato obtento.

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Upon which he expounds himſelf more clearly in the ſame place, building al- ways upon this ſame reaſon, and ſaying for corroboration thereof, (8) That the material object of this joy is not wicked, and that its formal object is good. And he had ſaid a little above, that the reaſon why the deſire of pollution was lawful, is, (9) Becauſe the thing deſired is no ſin, but in it ſelf indifferent.

8 Confirmatur, quia ob- jectum materiale hujus gaudii non eſt malum, & formale eſt

bonum. Ibid. 9 Ratio eſt, quia quod hic deſideratur, non eſt peccatum, ſed per ſe indifferentis

Whence he infers, not only that it is lawful to desire the good effect which follows from pollution, as health, without desiring the pollution it self, as some reach, who are a little more reserved than himself. But he concludes, that we may also desire both at once, and be well pleased not of the relief only we receive by means of the pollution it self.

1 Non solum licitum est gaudere de ipso effectu bono, ut quidam volunt, quamvis hic sit formalis ratio objectiva, seu totum motivum desiderii & gaudii consideratus cum conditione futuri vel presentis, sed etiam de ipsa causa (pollutione sc.) propter effectum.

(1) It is not only lawful, saith he, to rejoyce in this good effect, according to some, though this joy have no other object or motive than this effect it self, and regards it only as present or to come; but it is lawful to delight in the cause it self, which is pollution, because of the good effect it produces.

He speaks in all this discourse of pollution as he might of eating and drinking, and all indifferent things. For in the Morals we can give no other rank unto eating and drinking, which are natural actions, than that of indifferent things, which are not lawful to be desired but because of the need we have of them to the discharging of our duties, and preservation of our lives; and this Author would have it lawful to say all this of pollution; and he saith it in express terms, **(2)** *That it is no evil, that it is no sin; that of it self it is an indifferent thing, that it is lawful to desire it, that it is lawful to rejoyce in it.*

2 Non est peccatum, non est malum, est per se indifferens; licet eam desiderare, licet de ea gaudeat. *Ibid.*

So that according to his Principles there is no more ill in pollution, than in eating and drinking; and as eating and drinking are a remedy against hunger and thirst, pollution is, according to him, a remedy against indisposition, heaviness of body and mind, and against temptation which puts the Soul in hazard of Salvation. And so as we make use of meat and drink to repair our strength, and sustain Nature; he holds, that we may also make use of pollution to recreate Nature, and to preserve the health and repose of the mind as well as of the body:

Whence it follows from these very Principles of this Jesuit and his Brethren, that as we may take and demand bread when we are hungry, we may likewise not only desire, but also procure pollution when we feel our selves urged by temptation, or any corporal indisposition which we hope by this means to alleviate.

This follows necessarily from his Principle. For it is allowable to do that which it is lawful to desire and receive with joy; it being so that desire and joy cannot be setled but upon good things only, as *Lessius* himself confessed formerly, speaking of Pollution it self. And it is not only lawful to desire the things which are good, and to rejoyce therein, but also to do them, to seek after, and procure them: So that if it be lawful to desire pollution in it self, and to rejoyce therein, it is also lawful to stir up and incline our selves to it as a good and blameless action.

So they are not ashamed to declare, that we are not obliged to abstain from things which cause pollution, though we know it by experience. And this is the formal decision which *Escobar* draws from the Principles of the Society.

3 Hinc colligo teneat neminem abstinere à calidis cineribus, ab equitacione, à talli accumbendi ratione quibus expectus polluitur; *Escobar trad. 1. exam. 8. num. 77. pag. 150.*

(3) I collect from hence, saith he, that a person who knows by experience that when he uses hot victuals, when he is to ride a journey, or lying in his bed in a certain manner, he shall fall into pollution, is not obliged to abstain from these things.

Layman saith more clearly the same thing, to wit, that if the cause from whence pollution proceeds, be in it self lawful and honest, we are not obliged to avoid it, and that pollution in this case is no sin. And afterwards he there adds;

(1) That if the action whereupon we believe pollution will ensue, be unlawful of it self, or by reason of some circumstance, or perhaps be done without benefit or necessity, as when one eats or drinks to excess, or when we entertain our selves with fruitless discourses whereby we foresee we shall fall into pollution, though we have no such intention; in this case we sin only venially against chastity, though the cause whence the pollution arises, be in it self a mortal sin.

1 Sed actio talis secundum se honesta est, & finis ejus honestus, v. c. confessiones mulierum audire, vel eos secundum morem patriæ

amplecti, quando sine gravi offensione intermitteri non potest à Laicis & Secularibus, hujusmodi actiones licitæ sunt; non obstante periculo pollutionis inde naturaliter secururæ. Vel actio ex qua pollutio securura putatur, secundum se vel ratione circumstantiæ necessaria est, v. c. nimio cibo aut potu se ingurgitare, inutiliter consulari, unde pollutionem secururam existimet; quam tamen minime intendas; tunc veniale tantum peccatum contra castitatem committitur, etiam si causa ex qua pollutio sequitur in se mortale sit, v. c. ebrietas. *Layman lib. 3. sect. 4. num. 16.*

There is no man who will not affirm, that this is to fall voluntarily into pollution, not to do what we can to avoid it; that not to flye the occasions of it, is to seek after it; and by the common sense of all men to pursue of our selves the things which we know by experience will produce it, when we may freely abstain therefrom, is to procure it; which is yet more certain, when the things are in themselves forbidden and criminal, as drunkenness, according to *Layman*.

The reason he alledges to excuse him who falls thus into pollution after he had been drunk, is because he had no intention to fall thereinto, although he have perceived that being drunk, he should fall into it; *Unde pollutionem secururam existimes*, saith he, *quam tamen minime intendas*. But if this reason excuse pollution, we must say that it excuses drunkenness also. For this mans intention, without doubt, was not to make himself drunk, any more than to fall into pollution; but only to take his pleasure in eating and drinking, though he foresaw that giving way thereto, he should fall into drunkenness, and consequently into pollution.

We may even affirm truly, that his intent was farther from drunkenness than pollution; because drunkenness bringing nothing but hurt and inconvenience to the body and mind, is not a thing desirable in it self; and pollution on the contrary, since it may have good effects, as the allaying of the inconveniencies of the body, or troubles of the mind, may, by this Jesuits Argument, be absolutely desired. And by consequence, if when a man falls into pollution after he hath been drunk, pollution be no mortal sin, because he had no intention to fall into it; drunkenness will yet be less such, because he had less intention to be drunk.

The Jesuits say then, 1. That it is lawful to desire pollution in it self. 2. That it is lawful to rejoyce in it when it is come on us. 3. That it is lawful to do that which excites it, as to use hot meats, to be transported to excess in eating and drinking, so far as to be drunk, though we foresee, and know by experience, that the consequent thereof will be, that we shall fall into pollution. It must needs be that they believe, that we may absolutely procure it. For this is indeed to procure a thing, to pursue it with inclination, and after we have done what we know is necessary to procure and produce it, to rejoyce and be well pleased when it is come.

This Doctrine is very convenient to bring to pass the designs of the Devil of Uncleanness, who after he hath tempted men by day with dishonest thoughts, continues to torment them also in the night by illusions. Which the Church hath judged so important a thing, and so much to be feared and avoided by its Children, that in its Publick Prayers it hath instituted one for demanding peculiarly of God, that he would preserve them from these nocturnal illusions, and especially from pollution.

*Procul recedant somnia,
Et noctium phantasmata,
Hostemq; nostrum comprime,
Ne polluantur corpora.*

And the Jesuits on the contrary inform us, that we may desire pollution, 24000
teaching us to make a prayer altogether contrary, since to desire is indeed to pray
in the sight of God.

But if the Church teach us in this manner to avoid, and by our prayers to prevent
pollutions which might happen in the night against our wills, and without
our giving occasion unto them; with what severity would it not have condemned
them to whom they happen night and day, after they have desired and procured
them, by doing what they foresaw must needs bring them on?

Beyond the things I have formerly related concerning this subject in the
Chapter of Lust, and those which I shall relate also, treating particularly of the
Duties of married Persons, I could report here also abundance of other most
filthy and shameful opinions, if Christian modesty did not oblige me to use great
moderation in a discourse which necessity only allows me to make use of, and
honesty obliges me to cut as short as possibly I can, speaking of a matter wherein 24010
the things themselves that are lawful and honest, can hardly be honestly represented.
I will therefore take heed here carefully to pass by all those Filthinesses
whereof Sanchez hath made whole Volumes, and whereof some were so scandalous,
that they have been left out in some Editions; which hath not restrained
Tambourin from renewing them in his Book.

It suffices to see by these discourses of the Jesuits which I have cited, the great
licence their Divinity gives to the lust of the flesh, of abandoning our selves to
filthy and dishonest thoughts, so as to rejoyce in the imaginations of them
towards all sorts of persons, provided we imagine that we have married them, or
that we desire to marry them; and that pollutions and other shameful effects
which may arise from these thoughts, are not sins, or but slight ones. There
are many vicious and immodest people who would content themselves with this,
to satisfy their infamous passions. Also from these its easie to pass to other excesses,
and wholly to let the reins loose to all sensual motions and desires.

ARTICLE VI. Of Theft.

24020

*That the Jesuits authorize it, and abolish the Commandment of
God which forbids it.*

TO steal is no other thing than to wrong another in his goods, and therein to
cause him some damage, in what manner soever it be, whether we take or
detain something which is his; whether we take it by force, slight, or artifice;
whether we dispose of it, give it, or consume it; whether we make profit of it
or not. For in all these different ways of using another mans goods as our own,
his right to whom it belongs, is always equally violated, and injury is done him
by taking from him what is his. Let us see how the Jesuits Divinity excuses Theft
in all these different manners.

I Quidam
num nullum
dedit rem al-
quam accipiens,
quia ea domi-
nus non uteba-
tur, non tene-
tur restituere, si
nulli est Domi-
no usul futura.
Sa verbo fur-
rum, cap.6. pag.
292.

Emanuel Sa amongst his Aphorisms puts this concerning Theft: (1) *He who
in taking what is anothers, doth him no prejudice, because he made no use of it, and
was not like to use it, is not obliged to restitution.* There are no Thefts almost
which may not be cloaked with this pretence, it being easie to be perswaded,
that what we would take, is for no use to him from whom we take it, especially if
he be rich, and well to live. And indeed there are abundance of things whereof
the owners make no use, and it may be never will, which by this Principle it
will be lawful to take away without scruple, and without fear of being obliged 24030
unto restitution. This Maxime opens a great gap unto poor people and to
household-

Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 2. Artic. 6.

household-servants of Persons of Quality and well to pass, to commit many Thefts boldly without fear of punishment, by taking away things which they see are not made use of, but are many times suffered to perish.

He saith a little after, speaking after the common opinion, (1) *That he who steals frequently by little at a time, so as to gather together a notable sum, is obliged unto restitution; but he adds afterwards in favour of these Thieves, (2) That there are some who hold the contrary, when it is not done with intention to steal this great sum.*

Escobar proposes the same difficulty in the same terms. (3) *If a man after many small thefts hath taken the last half-penny which makes up a great theft, whereof he thereby becomes guilty, be obliged to restore all the sum which was composed of these petty thefts?* He answers, (4) *He is not obliged under mortal sin to make restitution of all the sum, but only part, which being taken off, the theft would be no more criminal.*

Amicus before had said the same thing, almost in the same terms; (5) *That he who had stoln some notable sum, is not obliged under mortal sin to restore it all; but that it is enough that he restore what suffices to make the wrong done unto his neighbour not to be notable.*

furti reus, tenetur totam illam quantitatem quæ ex minimis illis furtis coluit, restituere? Escobar tract. 1. Ex. 4. num. 23. pag. 161. 4 Non ad totam quantitatem tenetur sub mortali, sed ad illam, quæ ablata, furtum grave non remanet. 5 Qui notabilem quantitatem furatus est, non tenetur sub mortali totam restituere, sed sac esse si restituatur quantum sufficit ad tollendum notabile damnum illatum proximo. Amicus tom. 5. disp. 38. num. 47. pag. 441.

The same Author in another place draws from these Principles another consequence very different from this, though he be upon the same subject, saying, that (6) *When a man hath by many petty thefts proceeded unto a notable sum, he sins mortally every time after this that he takes any little thing from the same person.* This might seem severe after the sweetness and complacence which he had testified in his other Answer; but such is the property of mens spirits, that they cannot observe moderation, but are transported into excesses, passing from one extreme unto the other, when they quit the conduct of Faith, and the support of Authority, to follow their own private light.

Bauny handling the same Question saith, that it is the common opinion amongst Divines, that he who hath at divers times stoln many small sums, loses Gods grace when he attains to a sum sufficient to constitute a mortal sin. And then he adds by way of correction to these Authors; *Nevertheless by their permission I dare say, 1. That the last theft which is supposed to be a small one, even as those which went before, is only venial.* And a little after intermingling his own discourse with Emanuel Sa's, and speaking part Latine, part French, as if he feared to be understood of all people, he draws this Conclusion from this Authors Argumentation: *Sa verbo furtum, num. 8. saith he, relying on this foundation that he, qui per vices pauca alicui furatus est, cum ad notabilem quantitatem pervenerit, is not obliged under pain of eternal damnation to restore any of it.*

That which above all things in the world toucheth men most, and hinders them most from doing wrong to their neighbour, is an apprehension of being obliged to restore; but this is to give them all kind of liberty to steal and commit all sorts of injuries, to take from them this fear, dispensing with them for restitution and for all punishment not only of this life, but also of the other, and eternal damnation, as doth this Jesuit.

And the reason is a strong one, saith he. *For to repair the wrong whereof we have happened to be the cause, none is obliged under pain of eternal damnation, when in doing it, we have only sinned venially; because such an obligation is not the effect of other than mortal sin.*

So that according to Bauny, a man may feather his own nest, and even enrich himself with the goods of another, provided he take not too much at once, and proceed thereto only by small Thefts, which yet all together at length make up a notable sum, without obliging the Thief to any restitution on the pain of undergoing eternal damnation. So restitution and damnation belong only to

1 Qui per vices pauca alicui furatur, cum ventum est ad notabilem summam, tenetur restituere. Ibid. num. 8.

2 Etsi quidam probabiliter negant, quando non fit ex intentione furandi totam summam. Ibid.

3 An quilibet ultimum obolum attripuit, & sic ideo gravis

6 Tertio cum quis per singula furtiva ad notabilem quantitatem pervenit quoties deinde ab eodem Domino levem msteriam usurpat, toties peccat mortaliter. Amicus tom. 3. disp. 23. sect. 7. n. 233. p. 257. Bauny in his sum, chap. 10. pag. 143.

Thieves that are not crafty enough, or covetous over-much. There are Merchants, Bankers, Confederates, and other Traders, who may heap up extraordinary riches by this method; by taking in many parcels small sums which together produce very great ones; and they need not cease for all that to live in repose, without fear of damnation or restitution; which is to them many times more severe and afflicting, if they will rely upon *Banny's* word and the Divinity of his Society.

This same Casuist speaking of things that are found, demands *what must be done with them, that his conscience may be set at quiet?* He answers, that according to the common and true opinion, they belong unto the poor. But he adds, according to the opinion of some, we may without any sin appropriate them unto our selves with the following circumstances. The first is, that we inform our selves of the neighbourhood, or of those who by their condition may best know news thereof; if they have no knowledge of the true and lawful possessor. The second is, that we be in a disposition readily to restore it when the true owner shall make appear it is his.

Though this opinion be false and very unjust, yet he seems to make it less criminal by the qualification he gives it, being not willing that he who keeps the things he finds, should appropriate them unto himself, and permitting him only to become depository, and to make use of them, so only that he be disposed to restore them to the demandant, when he makes appear they are his. But he immediately after destroys this condition, by establishing three Principles which he holds for certain, and whereupon he will have the decision of this difficulty entirely to depend.

The first is, that he who hath these things, may appropriate them to himself, if he be poor. The second, that this being once done, that is to say, the thing found being once thus appropriated, it shall so properly belong unto him, that though the true owner appear afterwards, he shall not be obliged to quit the possession thereof. Which doth wholly destroy what he had before established as a necessary condition unto the power of retaining what is found; that he should be disposed to restore it to him who should demand it, when it appeared that it was his.

The third Principle, That under the name of the poor are comprised the Monasteries, Hospitals, Churches, those that want things necessary for a moderate maintenance, as well of their quality as of their life.

If he be a poor man that hath not all that which is necessary to support him creditably according to his condition, there is scarce any man at this day who may not call himself poor, and who by consequence may not appropriate to himself all the lost things he can find, or which shall be directed to him, without being ever obliged to restore them, though they whose they are come to challenge them.

Laymen is of the same opinion. For after he had said, that in the case of things found, the common opinion of the Doctors is, that they ought absolutely be restored to them whose they are, or at least if he be not found to be distributed to the poor, and employed in good works; he supports this opinion also on the Authority of *S. Austin*, bringing a passage out of this great Doctor of the Church, which he took out of the 9. of his 50 Homilies. (1) *If you have found any thing, and have not restored it, you have stoln it.*

And on the other hand he relates also the contrary opinion which holds, that we may appropriate and keep things found. And afterwards passing sentence upon this difference, he concludes in these terms. (2) *The first of these two opinions is more pious and secure; nevertheless the last is probable also.* And he adds

in favour of this last opinion, that after we have attended some time, if it happen that he whose the thing is which was found, cannot be discovered, we have liberty to dispose of it absolutely, whether he give it, or sell it, or spend it. (3) *And if it happen that after he hath alienated or spent it without fraud or unjust contri-*

2 Si quid invenisti & non reddidisti, rapuisti. S. August. homil. 9. inter. 50.

2 Inter has duas opiniones prior magis placet tutor est; ut tamen posterior quoque probabilis. Layman lib. 3. tract. 1. cap. 5. num. 24.

3 Quod si vero post alienationem vel consumptionem bona fide factam Dominus compareat, nihil ipsi restituendum est, nisi quatenus inventor locupletior inde factus est. Ibid.

vance simply and honestly, the owner come and present himself, he is not obliged to restore any thing unto him but what he hath put out to use, and whereby he is become more wealthy.

Bauny saith also the same thing, and seemeth to have taken it out of Layman, translating it only out of Latine into French. For in Chap. 13. of his Sum, pag. 191. he makes this Question; *Whereunto are we obliged, having spent what was anothers in honest simplicity, supposing it to be our own, and not anothers?* He answers: *To restore so much as we have profited thereby, and not more.* And foreseeing himself the objection might be made against him; That there was injustice therein, and by consequence an obligation to restitution, in his action who contrary to justice appropriated unto himself what he neither could nor ought, because he took it from another, he saith for Answer, *That in the above alledged acts there is no injustice to be found, because they have a specious shew of honest simplicity.*

This good Father speaks better than he intended, saying, *That these actions (which he intended to justifie) have a colour of sincerity.* For indeed they have only an appearance of fair dealing and equitable actions, and are true Thefts, as S. Austin above quoted by Layman, testifies: *If you find, and restore not, you steal.*

Under the same pretence and colour of simplicity he would have usurious bargains and contracts to pass for good; When he saith, *That they who by traffick, merchandize, usurious bargains, or contracts, believing them to be good, have gained great wealth, being invincibly ignorant that such manner of dealings were forbidden and unlawful, are not obliged to make restitution of those goods so gotten, although after they have so gained them, they be informed of the injustice of such contracts.* Bauny in his sum, chap. 11. pag. 156.

And a little after, pag. 154. after he had said, that a person after renunciation might in conscience subtract and keep one part of his goods to maintain his family and his port; continuing his discourse, and enlarging his opinion, he adds: *Which thing I conceive also to take place in like manner when women by the ill government of their husbands, and children by that of their parents, are constrained to renounce their Estates unto the Creditors, who thereof cause an Act of Renunciation to be made by the hands of the Judges.*

And a few lines after he pursues it farther, and saith, *That a wife or children being called unto Judgment to see themselves condemned, to confess what they have put aside, taken out from, or usurped of the Moveables, Inheritance, or Goods of the Deceased, are not in conscience obliged to confess it.* And because they may be brought upon their Oaths, and obliged to swear before a Judge, he gives them this expedient: *Nevertheless that they may not lye, and so doing forswear themselves, the prudent Confessor shall teach them that they are to frame a conception in their minds, according to which they may form their answer and oath, which they may make by the command of the Judge, to justifie, and make him believe their innocence.*

And in case they meet not with a prudent Confessor who understands well these shifts and deceits, and fall into the hands of one who seems to them too exact, and would oblige them to restore what they have privily taken away, he holds that they are excused from giving credit unto him; and though the Church it self should interpose and employ its Authority, and press them by vertue of a Monitory to come unto Confession and Restitution, they would not be obliged to obey it: *Because in this occurrent, saith he, neither the wife nor the children aforesaid ought, or can be forced by the Confessor to reveal the things they so purloyn'd, though the Creditors should obtain Mandates and Letters monitory from the Bishop.*

From the same Principle he affirms in the same Chapter, pag. 200. *That a person, who is indebted for very great and notable sums, may, to the prejudice of his Creditors, give away part of his goods, so that he to whom the gift is made, shall not be obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors, if he be not constrained by Law.* See how he concludes after he had proposed contrary opinions upon this point: *I say then, that he who hath received by Deed of Gift any moveable*

or immovable of a man in great debt, is not obliged to quit it in favour of the Creditors of such a Debtor, before the Law constrain him.

In the following Page he propounds another Case upon the same Subject; and he resolves it after such a manner as authorizes and maintains, not only injury, but revenge also and murder. *Some one, saith he, entreats a Souldier to smite and beat his neighbour, or to burn the Farm of a man who hath offended him. It is demanded, whether the Souldier failing, the other who prayed him to do all these out-rages, ought to repair out of his own Estate the damage which proceeded thence?* Upon which he makes a Relation of some Authors who hold the affirmative, and without quoting any one for the contrary opinion, he broaches it as from himself, and saith for refuting the first: *My opinion is not as theirs. For no man is obliged to restore, if he have not violated Justice. Doth he so who submits himself to anothers pleasure, when he only entreats of him a favour?* 24110

This goodly reasoning may serve to justify from doing wrong, not only all men who employ their friends or other persons to do mischief, making use of them as their hands and instruments, and so doing the very same action and injury with them, whether they commit theft or murder, or other violences: but it may also justify all persons who induce and sollicite others unto wickedness, and the Devil himself when he tempts men, and causes them to sin; because temptation and sollicitations unto evil force not the will, and are only inducements, and prayers as it were which depend absolutely on them who are tempted and sollicitated to do evil, which many do also refuse and reject.

Behold whereunto the Maxims of this Casuist are reduced. They teach to steal with subtilty and confidence, without being obliged unto restitution; to speak against ones conscience, without lying; to forswear, without treachery; to make a mock of Justice, without being deficient in the respect due thereto; to contemn the Authority of the Church, without disobedience; and finally to defraud Creditors, ruine Commerce, destroy publick Faith, and make havock of our neighbours goods, without injustice.

ARTICLE VII.

24120

THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESSE.

Bearing false witness is a sin so odious and contrary to the Law of Nature, that the most corrupted persons, and who boast of all other sins, cannot endure to be accused of this, nor even of a simple lye. God hath always forbidden it, whether before a Judge, or in private; but the Jesuits favour it at any time, and the sins which depend on it, to wit, slander and detraction.

Dicaſtilus demands: (1) *Whether he be obliged to retract who hath affirmed some falsity which will cost the loss of life or member to another, when the witness by his retraction will himself incur the same penalty?* He answers, *That he believes that if the false witness have not sinned mortally by bearing this false testimony, he is not obliged after that he understands the truth, to retract what he hath said, so exposing himself to so great evils. That is to say, it is lawful to kill an innocent after we have slandered him, rather than put our selves into any danger by retracting; since it is not so much the offences or the Hangmen, as the witnesses that put him resulter simile to death who is condemned upon their depositions:*

An teneatur quis retractare suum falsum dictum, quando ex eo inferenda est alteri mors seu mutilatio, etiam si testis retractanti fidem resulter simile damnum? Ex istimo si non peccaverit mortaliter, dicendo illam falsitatem; non teneri cum tanto suo incommodo cognita veritate dictum retractare. Legatur Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 59. Less. dub. 7. Reginald. sect. 2. num. 45. Dicaſtil. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 8. dub. 7. num. 92.

That we may have a clearer Exposition of this Question, this Jesuit sends us his Treatise of Restitution, where he saith, (1) *That the opinion which holds that a person who hath born false witness through ignorance or inadvertence, without sinning mortally, is obliged to nothing, though this false testimony do occasion the condemnation of a man, is safe in practice, though the opinion seem to him more agreeable unto reason.* For he regards no more to follow the light of natural reason and equity, than the Rules of Faith; but only his own sense and the Authority of such as he is, in resolving difficulties which refer to Manners and Religion. And this is one of the most goodly and commodious Principles of the Jesuits Divinity, that we are not obliged to restitution when we have not sinned mortally in wronging our neighbour. For if this Principle be sure, they who find a great sum of money, or take it by ignorance and heedlessness, are not obliged to restore it, because they have not sinned mortally in taking of it. We may see the consequence of this in the Chapter of Restitution. But if you joyn hereto the conditions the Jesuits require to make an action a mortal sin, false witnesses will thereby receive great comfort and encouragement boldly to act and acquit themselves in this duty.

The same Author is not less favourable to him who suffers himself to be corrupted by money, not to bear false witness, but not to testify the truth. He approves Azors observation, who saith, (2) *That if a witness corrupted by money, bide or retire himself before he hath been legally examined, or cited into the Court, he is not obliged to restore the money he receives in this manner.* As if Justice were no other thing than the formalities, and outward appearance of Law. A man is in danger to lose his life for not having witnesses of his innocency: if being able to deliver him by your testimony, you take money not to render him your due assistance, you take it to put him to death; since not he only who deposes against the truth, but he also who conceals a truth whereon the life of an innocent depends, is the true cause of his death. Which is so much more true, or at least more criminal and unjust, when he suffers himself to be corrupted by money.

Tambourin saith, (3) *That he who is accused of a crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuser, may not only deny the crime; but say that the Accuser lyes, and slanders him.* He sends us to S. Thomas in his 2. 2. q. 69. art. 2. This is without doubt that we may see his condemnation. For S. Thomas proves in that Article, *That it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself by a slander,* and that even when he is not legally examined, *it is not lawful for him to speak an untruth.* *Falsitatem tamen proponere in nullo casu licet alicui.* Tambourin for all that finds there is no difficulty in his opinion; as if this were no lye, to say unto a man that he lyes, when we know he speaks the truth, and to slander an accuser as a slanderer, when he accuses us of a crime which we have committed. Of two accusers the one speaks the truth, the other lyes; the one objects a true crime, and the other a false; and according to Tambourins admirable Divinity; he who saith the truth, is the liar; and he who objects a true crime, is a slanderer; of which he doubts not at all.

But, (4) *There is, saith he, more difficulty in another case. It is demanded, if you cannot defend your self against an unjust witness, but by slandering him, may you do it without sin, and impose on him so many false crimes as will be necessary for your just defence. I say two things; one is, that it seems to me probable enough the other is, that I find it doubtful enough. It is to me sufficiently probable, that if you do it, you sin not against Justice; and by consequence that you are not obliged to*

q. 69. art. 2. Qui enim accusat de crimine quod probari non potest, calumniosus est & mentiri presumitur. Tambour. lib. 9. decal. cap. 2. sect. 2. num. 2.

4 Hæc passim in ore sunt omnium: illud singulare & difficile: An si alio modo te ab injusto teste tueri nequeas, licite falsa crimina illi possis objicere, quanta sufficiunt ad tuam justam defensionem? Duo assero. Unum satis mihi probabile est; alterum satis incertum. Probabile mihi est te, si id facias, non peccare contra justitiam; unde nec obligari ad restitutionem. Incertum mihi est an id possit licite fieri sine ulla culpa. Ut quid enim si Sodomitam oportet probari esse illum testem? si excommunicatum? si hæreticum? — Quid enim si sit necesse publicas Scripturas ementiri? Possitne Notarius publicus adhuc induci? Libenter nodum hunc in aliud tempus exolvendum reservo. num. 4, 5, 6, 7.

1 Ad nihil tenetur is qui falsum testimonium dixit ex ignorantia vel inadvertentia, etiam si ex illo testimonio contingat aliquem damnari. Less. cap. 3. dub. 7. Hæc sententia est, sed præter magis videtur consona rationi. Dicastill. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 3. dub. 2. num. 57.

2 Notat Azor quod licet testis pecunia corruptus se occultet nec discadat antequam iudicem rogetur aut ad iudicium vocetur, non peccat, contra Justitiam, nec tenetur restituere pecuniam sic acceptam, nisi vero similiter crederet esse falsitatem. Dicastill. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 4. dub. 8. num. 156.

3 Hinc sequitur 1. eum qui accusatur de crimine quod iudicem ab accusatore prebati nequit, non solum posse negare crimen, sed etiam dicere accusatorem calumniosum & mentiri. Ita Petrus Navarra lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 34. Legè etiam S. Thomam 2. 2.

restitution--- but I do not know certainly whether this may be done without any sin--- For if it be needful to prove that this witness is a Sodomite, excommunicated, an Heretick --- if it be necessary to this purpose to counterfeit publick Records, may we sollicite a Notary hereunto? I leave this difficulty to be resolved another time. 24160

1 Hic accu-
sator sibi impu-
ret si ex hoc ca-
lumniator ha-
beatur, immo
cum probare
non possit, atq;
adeo injuste ac-
cusaverit, tene-
tur restituere ac-
cusator. *Dicass.*
lib. 2. tract. 1.
disp. 12. pag. 3.
duo. 18. n. 285.

It must be observed, that he speaks not of a false Witness who charges with false crimes, but of an unjust Witness, *ab injusto teste*, who accuses of true crimes, but secret, or which he cannot prove, according to the forms of Justice. For thus these Doctors expound themselves what they mean by an unjust Witness, or Accuser. (1) *That this Witness, saith Dicastillus, may thank himself, if in the conclusion he be held for a slanderer, since he could not prove the crime; and by consequence having accused unjustly, he is obliged unto restitution.*

So that, according to this Divinity, to defend our selves from true but secret crimes, and whereof there are no publick proofs, we may say to the honestest man in the world who would inform against us in a Court of Justice, that he is a Sodomite, Heretick, Excommunicate, &c. and we may for proof of this slander, make use of false Witnesses, counterfeit false Deeds and Writings, and corrupt publick Notaries to subscribe them, without committing any injustice in all this; though according to Scripture, those who do evil, and those who cause it to be done, or only consent thereto, commit the same fault. 24170

But after he hath maintained, that herein there is no injustice, *Tambourin* doubts if at least there be not some sin in an action which contains so many crimes, because that he knows it not certainly, that is to say, according to the Principles of his Divinity, that it is also probable, that there is none therein. For a Doctor so learned as he is, remains not easily in suspence concerning things which he hath well examined, and he doubts not thereof without reason. And therefore his doubting of it is a sufficient ground whereon to establish a probable opinion. 24170

He holds then indeed, though he dare not declare it, that it is also probable, that one may without any sin, as well as injustice, commit all sorts of crimes to hide one he hath committed, and to oppress by slanders, false Witnesses, forged Writings, corruption of Courts, and publick Persons, him who would discover it; because he is perswaded he accuses him unjustly, that is to say, he cannot prove what he saith by the ways and formalities commonly used in Courts of Justice, though it be true and certain.

2 Scholasticus volens probare cursum ad quod eger duobus testibus, adhibere potest duos amicos qui illum non viderint interesse lectionibus, ac facis sibi persuadent illum interfuisset; ac non possunt jurare se id vidisse. *Tambour.* *lib. 3. decal. cap. 2. sect. 1. num. 8.*

Scholars may give testimony of the studies of their Companions. (2) *A Scholar, saith he, having need to prove that he hath gone through his course, and having used of two witnesses hereof, may employ therein two of his friends, who have not seen him go to the Lecturer, but are sufficiently perswaded that he did attend them: but they may not swear for all that they have seen him go. Neither indeed is it the custom to cause them to swear, whereupon it will be no hard matter to get false attestations of our studies, which may serve for obtaining degrees and benefices.*

For detraction, see here *Tambourin's* Rule which he gives us to instruct us how to revile with pleasure and delight, without mortal sin. (3) *When one reproaches another, he who without desiring that reproach, rejoices in it, not because of the shame that happens to his neighbour, but because of the new and curious knowledge he obtains of his neighbours actions, or because of the eloquence of the detractor, it is very probable that in this, precisely taken, there is no mortal sin.* We may then, according to him, without doing any great evil, rejoyce in the reproach of another without desiring it; but he seems not to remember that Principle of his Divinity quite contrary hereunto, by which his Brethren conclude familiarly, that we may desire pollution, because we may rejoyce in it. And indeed it is one and the same thing, or the one is the consequent of the other. 24180

3 Qui supposita detractio-
ne, sine ullo i-
pſius desiderio,
lætat non de ipsa infamia, sed de sola curiosa vel nova cognitione factorum proximi; vel de eloquentia detractoris, & de probabile est ex hoc per se non peccare mortaliter. *Tambour. lib. 9. decal. cap. 3. sect. 7. num. 1.*

He adds, that this rejoicing ought to come from the eloquence of the detractor, and not from the shame of our neighbour who is reproached. This is done conveniently, and without trouble, by an abstraction of the mind, or direction of the intention; but that takes nothing from the evil of the detraction, it augments it rather instead of redressing it. For it is true, of reproaches as well as impurities, that the best express are most dangerous; because eloquent words, and discourses studied, and agreeable to their subjects, are as it were a bait which entices and opens the heart, to cause the evil which is understood with pleasure to enter with more delight into it.

After you have heard this defamation, (1) *It is lawful for you*, according to Dicastillus, *to believe certainly the evil that hath been related unto you of any one, provided he be publickly defamed by common report.* As if common report, which may be false, and oftentimes is so, might be made use of as a just foundation for a visible injury, and a judgment disadvantageous to our neighbour. By this reason Dicastillus could not have condemned of detraction or rash judgment, those who had an ill opinion of Jesus Christ, and who accounted him a wicked and impious person; because the envy and slanders of the Pharisees had made these reports very common during his life, and much more at his passion and death.

But will it not be lawful to utter some reproach as well as to hear it? Dicastillus holds, (2) *That it is probable that it is no mortal sin to destroy a mans reputation in the mind of some considerable person, from whom no evil may be feared by revealing unto him some mortal sin of the person defamed.* He would not have talked otherwise, had he taken upon him to maintain that detraction of it self is not evil; and that if no other evil ensue than the infamy and loss of reputation of him whom we reproach, it cannot be a great sin.

(3) *Neither can it be any more a mortal sin*, according to this same Author, *to reveal some great sin, or even to impose a false one on a person who boasts he hath committed such, or who makes no account of them, or who is publickly defamed of such like, this passes with him for a small infamy.* That is to say, that we may without breach of charity speak evil of those of whom many persons speak it, not only in repeating what we have heard spoken of them, but also by imposing on them false crimes: or if so be a person disgraces himself by his wicked life, you may without any great evil help to reproach him yet more, and cause him to lose his reputation altogether, by slandering him, and augmenting his disorders, and attributing unto him disorders he never yet thought of. I should as soon say that one may, without much offending God or our Neighbour, help him to destroy himself, who by a transport of passion or folly, would burn his own house, drown or kill himself.

1 Non est peccatum certo credere de aliquo id de quo publice est infamatus per rumores. *Dicast. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 12. dub. 2. num. 15.*

2 Probabilis est sententia non esse mortale (scilicet revelare mortale crimen alterius; ex quo sequitur infamia famæ apud virum gravem à quo nil mali timeretur) docent aliqui recentiores *Lib. 2. tr. 2. disp. 2. pag. 2. dub. 8. num. 133.*

3 Revelare peccatum grave, vel etiam falso illud imponere tali personæ quæ de similibus ipsa se jectat, aut nil

curat, aut de iis est publice infamata, nec est mortalis detraçtio. Volens enim & consentienti non fit injuria. *Dicast. lib. 2. tract. 2. disp. 12. pag. 2. dub. num. 106.*

CHAPTER III.

Of the Commandments of the Church.

IF the Jesuits afford so good penny-worths of Gods Commandments, as we have now said, it is not to be hoped that they will use the Churches better. This shall be seen in this Chapter, wherein we speak, 1. of the Sanctification of Festival days, 2. of Fasting, 3. of the Communion at *Easter*, 4. of the yearly Confession commanded by the Church.

X x 2

ARTICLE

ARTICLE I.

24210

Of the Sanctification of Festival Days.

THIS Commandment carries with it two obligations. One not to labour on Festival and Lords-days; the other is to keep them holy. This is the end of the Precept, the other is but a mean to accomplish it. For that which God requires of us principally on these Holy-days, is that we employ our selves peculiarly to sanctifie him, or rather to sanctifie our selves in serving him: And that we may be at more leisure, and attend better and with greater devotion and liberty unto his Service, he wills, and the Church hath on its behalf commanded us on these days to quit the care of all other affairs, and abstain from all employments which might hinder or divert us from it.

The Jesuits acknowledge these two obligations contained in this Commandment; but they destroy them at the same time by false explications and accommodations altogether humane, as we shall now presently see in this Article, which we shall divide expressly into two Points, and each of them shall have two Paragraphs, that we may more distinctly and clearly represent the Opinions of the Jesuits upon each of these obligations.

I. POINT.

24220

SECTION I.

That the Jesuits despise the Authority of the Church, and destroy the Commandment by which it forbids to work on Feast-days.

LAyman treating on the observation of Feasts, saith that in that part of this Commandment which forbids labour, it is commanded that we should 1 Ut integro die Festo opera servilia non ex-
eccantur. (1) abstain the whole Feast-day from doing any servile work. And in his following discourse expounding what he intends by servile works, he adds: (2) 2 Opera servilia dicuntur quæ corporis commoditatibus inservientia, ignobiliora sunt, & per servos exerceri solita, cujusmodi sunt arare, fabricare, &c. Layman lib. 4. tract. 7. cap. 2. num. 1. pag. 181. They are called servile works which being only for the service of the body, are in themselves base, and are not ordinarily done but by servants, as to plow, to build, &c. He testifies that to dance, play, go to a Stage-play, are not actions forbidden by this Commandment, because these are not actions proper unto servants nor slaves. And he discovers his opinion sufficiently by what he speaks in the sequel: 3 Dicimus igitur sola opera servilia, eaque omnia die Festo prohibita esse, præterquam si jure vel consuetudine permilla sint. Ibid. n. 2. (3) That none but servile works are forbidden on Feast days; but they are not all forbidden neither, if there be any particular reason or custom that allows them.

This suffices him not, to have reduced the Churches Prohibition of working on Feast-days to those works only which are proper for slaves and servants, as if this part of the Commandment were only for servants; he thought fit also to put a great exception to it by saying; *Præterquam si jure vel consuetudine permilla sint.*

From this exception, as a Principle, he draws many Conclusions, which are so many usurpations upon this Commandment, and so many dispensations to work 24230 on Feast-days.

He allows 1. To write all sorts of things, to copy, to paint. And his reason is; 4 Quia non minus pictores in pingendo, quam literarum studiosi in legendo animi quaedam voluptate capiuntur & detinentur; quod signum est artem pingendi non servilem sed liberalem esse, quippe ad recreandum hominem institutam, liberæque hominæ dignam. Ibid. num. 3. (4) Because Painters receive no less satisfaction in painting than those who love books in studying: which shews that the Painters Art is not servile, but liberal, and taken

up for a divertisement unto our minds, and worthy of a Gentleman. As if Festivals were instituted for divertisement, or none but persons of base and servile condition were obliged to break off their ordinary Trades and labour, to serve God on these days.

He adds a little after, that to follow these exercises, that is to say, to write and paint on the Feast-days, not only for divertisement, or some just and necessary cause, but also out of a meer mercenary Spirit, and for lucre only, is no evil; and his reason is: (1) *Because interest and profit do not make an action servile.* There is nothing but toil and weariness of the body that seems to him to be servile, profane, and unworthy the Feast-days: but divertisements, pleasures, interests, and profits appear unto him honourable and worthy of generous persons and solemn Festivals.

And because, according to this Principle, hunting and fishing should be judged the most servile, being the most toilsom & of greatest labour, see how he speaks thereof. (2) *To hunt, and hawk, and fish, seem to be actions of a servile nature; and consequently forbidden by the civil Law, as may be gathered from the Chapter, Licet. De Feriis: yet custom hath obtained that it should be allowed to hunt for divertisement on Feast-days, as also to fish in Rivers without too many people and too much toil.*

He doth well to set the civil Law and the Commandment of the Church on the one hand, which forbid hunting and fishing on Feast-days; and on the other hand the custom contrary to this Commandment, which hath introduced the abuse of hunting and fishing on these days; and hereupon he passes sentence in favour of the custom: *Consuetudo obtinuit.*

It puts also the Exercises of War into the same rank with hunting and fishing. (3) *It seems, saith he, that the Exercises of War are servile works; because they tend directly to kill men: for this cause they are not lawful on Festival-days.*

He declares then that the Exercise of War is a servile thing. But presently after he advances and ennobles it again in the same manner as he did hunting and fishing before, adding, (5) *That custom hath made it honourable and worthy of the Feast-days as well as hunting.*

The same thing may be said of Dances, Balls, Stage-plays, and other shews which the corruption of the world hath authorized against the intention and order of the Church; *consuetudo illa die festo honestavit.* But it is easie to see that the Feast-days do not make these exercises honourable, but rather these exercises dishonour and profane the Feasts, as all the Saints have at all times believed and taught in the Church, and the most common light of Faith and Christianity alone is sufficient for us whereby to know this.

And this Jesuit himself acknowledges it sufficiently, in affirming that these Exercises of Hunting, and War, &c. are of a servile nature, and forbidden by the civil Law on the Feast-days. So that when he saith afterwards, that notwithstanding the prohibition of the Church, and order of Nature it self, custom hath authorized these Exercises, and made them honest and lawful on Feast-days, he must needs attribute an admirable vertue unto custom, and altogether extraordinary, which surpasses the Power of the Church, and Nature it self; since it can prevail without incurring any penalty against the Laws of the one and the other.

And since the Laws of the Church are also the Holy Ghost's, who by it hath given us them, and who guides it in all it doth and ordains, if custom carry it against the Laws of the Church, as this Casuists pretends; it must needs be, according to him, that it hath more power than the Holy Ghost, and that the Authority it hath in their School, is more to be considered than that of God himself, since he believes that we ought to yield to the abuses it hath introduced into the Church, to the prejudice of the primitive Orders and Laws which the Holy Ghost hath established.

But if these things seem extraordinary and incredible in themselves, and considered according to the Rules of Truth and natural Sense alone, yet they are not so in the Maxims of these new Doctors. For it is not in this case only, but in occasions of all other sorts, that the custom being found opposed and contrary to

1 Num lucrum aut merces non facit opus esse servile.

2 Venari, aucupari, piscari, ex genere suo servilia opera esse videntur; ideoque jure communi prohibentur ut colligitur ex cap. Licet. De feriis. Consuetudo tamen obtruncit ut diebus Festis licita sit recreationis causa instituta venatio, itemque piscatio in fluminibus, sine, &c. Ibid. n. 6.

3 Bellare videtur opus servile, cum proxime tendit ad hominum necem, quare die Festo permittum non est. Ibid. num. 7.

4 Consuetudo tamen non minus artem militarem quam venerationem Festo die honestavit.

the Laws of God and the Church, it ordinarily gains the cause by their Judgment; as hath been observed in many places of these Writings.

Escobar follows the same Rules with *Layman* to determine what labour is lawful or forbidden on Feast-days, that is (1) *Servile work*, saith he, which is *servile* *ad quod* for servants and slaves. And he adds, as *Layman*, that if a work be not servile in it self, it doth not become servile when it is done for gain.

He afterwards sets down in the number of actions which are not servile, *studying, writing, travelling, dancing*. And although he affirm that hunting and painting are servile actions, he forbears not to say afterwards, (2) *That if hunting be followed upon obligation and of duty, as when a Hunts-man, or a servant hunts at the command of his Master, it is servile as well as painting, but that it is not so if it be pursued of pleasure and for pastime.*

That is to say, that a servant may not go on hunting in obedience to his Master, when he sends him; but the Master may go for his pleasure, and the servant also; and by consequence, that obedience in labour profanes a Holy-day, but pleasure in the same work profanes it not.

Speaking in the same place of those who labour in cleansing, hanging, and trimming Churches on Feast-days, he saith that they sin at the least venially, if they have not some lawful cause. He saith the same thing of the outward works of mercy which are exercised towards our neighbour, as to mend the cloaths of the poor, to carry them wood, or other things whereof they have need; these actions, according to him, are servile and forbidden on Feast-days.

He would have it lawful to paint and hunt for pleasure on Feast-days; and he will not have it lawful to sweep, hang, and adorn the Church for the Service of God. He would have us have power to walk, dance, travel, and go whither we will for our pastime; but he will not have it lawful to visit the poor and sick, and to give them some assistance, pretending that works of mercy are more contrary to the Sanctification of Feasts, than the sports and pastimes of the world. He will not have it lawful to carry alms themselves unto the poor on Feast-days, as he saith expressly a little after.

For having put the Question, if those who by a motive of piety do actions which are called servile, sin against this Commandment of the Church, he answers in these terms: (3) *There are some who exempt them from sin who busy themselves in servile works on Feast-days, to build or re-edifie Churches gratis, to carry alms to the poor, to adorn Temples, &c. But as for me, I am of the opinion of those who exempt them not who labour without necessity on Feast-days, though they do it under this pretence, that is to say, by a motive of piety.*

Aliqui liberant à reatu exercentes die Festo opera servilia ad templa ædificanda, vel reficienda gratis, ad elemosynam gerendam, ad ornanda delubra, &c. At ego cum illis sentio qui laborantes vel hoc prætextu, sine necessitate non excusant.

He believes then that it is lawful to play, dance, walk abroad without necessity and for pleasure only on Feast-days; because, according to the Jesuits Divinity, these actions are not servile. He pretends also, though painting and hunting be servile of themselves; yet the motive of pleasure and contentment which we look for in them, hinders them from being so, and makes them lawful: And yet he maintains, that to sweep a Church for devotion, or to take delight to dress an Altar, to hang a Chappel, to carry alms unto the poor, are actions prohibited on Feast-days; and that necessity only, not pleasure, can hinder them from being servile. As if the pleasure taken in hunting or painting were more noble and holy, than that which is taken in serving the poor and God himself in the Churches.

He finds it difficult to exempt these actions of Piety and Religion from mortal sin, so rigorous would he appear in this point. They are, saith he, at the least venial sins. *Saltem venialia sunt.*

Filius had said it before him in the same terms, and yet more clearly. (1) *It*

(1) It seems that to sweep Churches, to hang them, and other such like actions, are servile; and to do them without lawful excuse, is at least a venial sin, though not mortal, if not done through contempt. Strange Divinity, that we need not to fear to condemn the Command of God, forbidding us to work on the Feast and Lords-days, by working for our selves; because we take our pleasure in the work, as in hunting; and that we ought to fear contempt and mortal sin in working only for the Service of God and the Church.

So that these days which God hath ordained particularly for his Service may be employed, according to this Divinity, to serve anything but him. We may give one part of it to pastime, another to the world; and which is more astonishing and horrible, we may give it all entirely, or in part, to the Service of the Devil, passing it over in debauching and sinning against God, without violating thereby the Commandment which ordains that you should sanctifie the Feasts and Lords-days.

Filliusius teaches us this in exprest terms, when he saith, (2) That it is not particularly forbidden to sin and offend God on Feast-days, as if by crimes and sins the Feast-day were violated. It will not then be a thing done contrary to the Sanctification of Festivals, to employ them wholly in offending God; but these Holy-days will be profaned, if they be employed in the Service of Churches, Altars, and Poor. If the former of these excesses be more impious, the other will appear more ridiculous, and both together do entirely abolish the Commandment to sanctifie Festivals; the one in condemning one part of that which God hath commanded; and the other in justifying or excusing what he hath forbidden, particularly on these days.

If Filliusius as well as Escobar, who in this is of his Judgment, had been in the company of the Pharisees when our Lord intending to heal the man who had the withered hand, to stay their envy, and prevent their malice, demanded of them, (3) Whether it were lawful to do good or evil on the Sabbath-day? Without doubt they would not have been so surpris'd, nor have been so gravelled as the Pharisees. For they answered nothing, and continued silent, saith the Gospel. But these Jesuits could not have been silent without betraying their own consciences and the cause of their Society. Escobar would have said that it was not lawful to do good. *Non licet bene facere*: since he maintains that it is not lawful to dress Churches, nor carry alms to the poor: and Filliusius might have said that it is lawful to do evil, *licet male facere*, since he believes that sins do not profane these days: *Opera peccaminosa non esse specialiter prohibita die Festo, quasi per illa dies Festus violesur.*

After this Filliusius expounds what sins he means; when he saith they profane not Feast-days, alledging withal the reason of his opinion. (4) The principal reason, saith he, is because this third Commandment, being divine as it is, obliges not particularly not to sin on the Feast-days. As if to command us only to honour and serve him, and especially on this day, were not particularly to forbid us to offend God thereon, there being nothing more opposite to honouring God than sinning against him.

He alledges a second reason yet more strange; saying, That to sin, as to slander, forswear, commit fornication, and such like, are not servile actions. And because S. Thomas, after the holy Fathers and the Scripture, hath said that there is no baser servitude, nor more opposite to the Sanctification of Feast-days, than that of sin, which makes us slaves of the Devil, and causeth us to give that service unto him which we owe particularly unto God on these days, he prevents this reason, and touches it only in his way, as not making any great account of it. It is of no importance, saith he, to say, that he who sinneth becomes the slave of sin; because this is not true, but in Metaphor and figure, and not indeed and really, as Suarez hath shewn at large.

He speaks this generally without excepting any person, when he saith, that this word: He who sinneth becometh the slave of sin, is not really true, though he could not be ignorant that it is Jesus Christ his speech in the 8. of S. John, where

1 Mundare scopis templum, vellire parietes capitebus & humulcedi, videtur servilia, & nisi aliquis excusatio intercedat, erit saltem peccatum veniale, non mortale, seculo contemptu. *Filliusius qq. moral. tom. 2. tract. 2. cap. 9. n. 156. pag. 267.*

2 Dico 3. opera peccaminosa non esse specialiter prohibita in die Festo, quasi per illa dies Festus violesur. *Ibid. n. 147. p. 24.*

3 Licet Sabbatis bene facere, an male? *Marci 3. v. 4. At illi tacebant. Ibid.*

4 Ratio potissima est; quia hoc preceptum tertium, quatenus divinum est, non obligat specialiter ad non peccandum die Festo. *Ibid. num. 147.*

Tum quia corpus peccati formaliter non est servile, ut detrahere, peccare, fornicari, &c. similia. *Ibid.*

Nec obstat quod peccatis dicitur fieri servus peccati; quia id tantum metaphorice & symbolice verum est, non autem reipsa, ut pluribus; *Suarez n. 7. Ibid. num. 148.*

where he saith, *That every man who sinneth, is the slave of sin: omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati.*

This is an imagination very novel amongst Christians, that an indifferent action, or rather good in it self and laudible, as it is to adorn the Church, should be more base and more servile, and therefore more forbidden on Feast-days, and more contrary to the Holiness which God demands of us on these days, than the most enormous sins. But this is a novelty and an excess yet more strange, to say that these sins are not properly servile actions; that is to say, that they are not contrary to the natural liberty and honour of men, and above all of Christians. 2432

Whence it will follow, as in effect this Jesuit fears not to affirm, that Jesus Christ spoke not properly, when he said, that he who sinneth, is the slave of sin; nor S. Paul when he saith, that sinners are slaves of the Devil, and that he holds them Captives.

And he must hereupon declare that Jesus Christ hath not properly delivered, nor redeemed us, since they cannot be properly delivered who are not properly slaves; and they are not properly redeemed who are properly in slavery and captivity. And finally in the height of impiety, he must take away from Jesus Christ the quality of a Redeemer and a Saviour, and say that he is but a Metaphorick and Symbolick Redeemer and Saviour, and not a proper and true one, but an improper and figurative one; contrary to the word of Jesus Christ himself. (1) *If the Son set you free; you shall be free indeed.*

1 Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis. Joan. 8. v. 34.

So that this Doctrine of the Jesuits overturns the foundations of the Scripture and Religion, and is not only opposite to the Wisdom of the Cross and Christian Philosophy, but also to the Light of Reason and Heathen Philosophy. For the Pagans themselves have acknowledged that there is nothing more servile nor more contrary to the natural liberty of man and reason, than vice and sin, though they knew not the Author of this servitude, and the true Master of these slaves, which is the Devil, no more than the true Deliverer of these same slaves, who is Jesus Christ.

SECTION II.

Expedients which the Jesuits propose to elude the Commandment which forbids working on Feast-days.

WE have seen hitherto how the Jesuits dispense with Painters, Hunters, Fishers, &c. from the Commandment which forbids working on Feast-days, it remains now to see what expedients they give to elude it.

Escobar furnisheth us with two: The first is, if the Feasts be local and commanded in one place only, as the Feasts of Parish-Patrons often are, to depart from that place, and go work in another. First, he puts the thing in question, and demands, (2) *Whether it be lawful to depart purposely from a place where there is a Feast, to go to another where there is no Feast?* And he answers, (3) *That assuredly it is lawful to go thither, and to labour there in servile works.*

2 Num è loco ubi non est recedere consuleret?

He doth not say, that he ought to have some reason or some necessity for it, but that he may do it only upon a design to work and discharge himself of the Commandment of the Church.

3 Ita plane, & servilibus ibi operibus vacare.

Emanuel Sa is of the same opinion, and saith, (4) *That after one hath heard Mass in one place where there is a Feast, he may go into another place where there is none, to labour there.* He would have the Mass heard, but only out of devotion,

Exam. 5. cap. 3. num. 11. pag. 100.

as Filiutius who cites and follows him, hath expounded him. For after he had demanded, (5) *Whether one may lawfully depart from the place of his abode where there is a Feast, to go unto another where men labour in servile works?* He answers 2434

4 Audita Missa potest quis ad locum ubi non est Fe-

stum ire causa laborandi ex loco ubi Festum est. Sa verbo Festum, num. 8. pag. 275. 5 An licet recedere à proprio loco in quo est Festus dies ad locum in quo vacatur operibus servilibus?

absolutely, (1) That this is lawful, and that he being there may labour, as others do who live there. And he adds, (2) That for what concerns the Mass, it seems more probable that he who departs, should hear it in the place where the Feast is, if he can do it conveniently, and Mass be said early; that he may afterwards have spare time to go to and labour in the place where there is no Feast.

He would have him hear Mass, but provided he can do it commodiously, otherwise he would not have him obliged thereto. And that you may not doubt of his thought and intention, he saith once more, as it were to expound himself yet better in these terms: (3) I said, provided he can do this commodiously: because Suarez in the place I have already quoted, expresses this same condition. Yet Sanchez believes it very probable, that there is no obligation on him to hear Mass, since he must before noon be out of the bounds of the place of the Feast-day.

And to clear up this difficulty yet more, Filiutius demands, (4) Whether for doing all things lawfully, it be necessary to have some reason? He answers, (5) That though some hold this necessary, because otherwise the Law would be eluded, yet it is more true that it is not; but it is in every ones power to go from the place where the Feast is, without other cause than to labour and gain somewhat. His reason is, (7) Because, to speak properly, it is no fraud for a man to make use of his right, and that it is rather to avoid the obligation of the Precept, which being it is not forbidden by the Precept it self, it follows that it is a thing in it self indifferent.

Ibid. num. 111. 3 Dixi, si modo commode possit, quia sic etiam limitat Suarez, quamvis Sanchez valde probabile putet non solum ad Sacrum audiendum, quando ante meridiem futuri sunt extra limites illius loci. *Ibid.*

4 An ad hæc quæ diximus legitime facienda requiratur iusta causa? 5 Et si aliqui requirant, quia aliqui fieret in fraudem legis; at tamen verius est non requiri, sed libere posse ad ea loca se conferre solum operis servilis faciendæ gratiæ, & sic lucrum aliquod colligendi. *Ibid. num. 113.* 6 Quia proprie loquendo non est ulla fraus si quis jure suo utatur, & potius est fugere obligationem præcepti, quod cum eodem præcepto non sit prohibitum, erit res ex se indifferens. *Ibid.*

It is a strange right, this of not observing Festivals, and to play in this manner with the Church, by eluding its Commandment. If all the Inhabitants would make use of this pretended right, and betake themselves every one to his own affairs, to his work, or would only walk abroad for their divertisement out of the Parish where the Feast is, there would be no Feast, or indeed the Rector must celebrate it all alone, or with his Priests only, if he have any.

But this Authors reason is pleasant, that to depart expressly out of the Parish where the Feast is, to labour in another where there is no Feast, is not to deceive, but only to avoid the Precept of the Church. As if to avoid payment of what we owe, were not to deceive, and a child ought not to be taken for disobedient and rebellious who flies away, that he may not do what his father commands him.

And that which he adds to confirm this reason, is also very considerable: That the Church not forbidding to depart out of the Parish where the Feast is, it is a thing indifferent and free to every one; and by consequence there is no obligation upon any one to stay and keep Feasts.

By the Judgment of this Jesuit the Manuals of the Church must be reformed, and when the Rector doth thenceforth recommend a Feast to his Parishioners, it will not be sufficient to say, that they are obliged to observe it, he must also forbid them on the Churches behalf from going out of the Parish to discharge themselves of their obligation. The Commandment of the Church must likewise be reformed, and not say only, as it hath done hitherto, Thou shalt sanctifie the Feasts, but add also; Thou shalt not flye out of the Parish where they are kept, to discharge thy self of the obligation of keeping them holy: because without this be done, all the Parishioners may abandon the Church, according to this new Divinity, and leave the Rector to officiate alone.

Another Expedient Escobar gives us to defeat this Command, is to keep infidel Servants and Workmen, who may be employed and made to work on Feast-days. That he might establish this Maxime, he demands: (7) Whether servile works are only forbidden unto Christians on Feast-days, or to all sorts of persons in-

1 Dico licet ac posse eadem vacare operibus servilibus in eo loco. Filiutius mor. qq. tom. 2. rr. 27.

2 Qued ad Sacrum audiendum, probabilius videtur teneri recedentem à proprio loco ubi est dies Festus, si modo commode possit habere Sacrum summo mane, ut deinde in loco ubi non obligat dies Festus, vacare possit operi servili.

3 Quod ad Sacrum audiendum, probabilius videtur teneri recedentem à proprio loco ubi est dies Festus, si modo commode possit habere Sacrum summo mane, ut deinde in loco ubi non obligat dies Festus, vacare possit operi servili.

4 Ibid.

5 Et si aliqui requirant, quia aliqui fieret in fraudem legis; at tamen verius est non requiri, sed libere posse ad ea loca se conferre solum operis servilis faciendæ gratiæ, & sic lucrum aliquod colligendi. *Ibid. num. 113.*

6 Quia proprie loquendo non est ulla fraus si quis jure suo utatur, & potius est fugere obligationem præcepti, quod cum eodem præcepto non sit prohibitum, erit res ex se indifferens. *Ibid.*

7 Prohibentur opera servilia in Festis tantum Christianis, an omnibus communiter?

Y y differently?

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¹ *Heud dem-panus Domi-nes qui hujusmodi opera mancipio imponeret Infideli, quia mancipium Infideli non peccat, si quidem legibus Ecclesiarum non tenetur. Ibid. cap. 4. num. 13. pag. 101.* differently? He answers, (1) *That a Master is not to be condemned who commands an Infidel servant to employ himself in his work on Feast-days. And his reason is, because this Infidel slave sins not, in as much as he is not obliged to observe the Laws of the Church.*

He might have said the same thing of Atheists and Fools. And indeed he saith ²⁴³⁷⁰ that it is *Laymans* opinion, (2) at the least in fools. But if this were so, it were advantagious to take Atheists and Infidels for servants. This is without doubt to testify a great love to the Laws of God and the Church, to cause them to be violated by others, when we cannot do it our selves; as if the act and fault of a Servant did not recoil upon the Master that commanded it.

A fool indeed sins not, no more than a Horse when he works on Feast-days; but he that makes the one and the other work, shall bear the sin, because he is the Author of the work, and it is he properly that works, as it is the Plow-man that turns up the land, rather than the Plow and the Oxen which he uses thereunto: And it seems that they ought to renounce reason, who have renounced the obedience they owe unto God and the Church, that they may imagine that they offend not in causing that to be done in their houses, for their own interest alone, which is forbidden, and which they dare not do themselves.

Father *Bauny* in the 17. Chap. of his Sum, pag. 266. wherein he treats expressly of this matter, saith that those who neglect to honour and sanctifie the Lords-days, *do plunge themselves into a great and very enormous crime; and he saith after, that if they would avoid it, as they are obliged, they should take the pains to hear Mass, and not to work.* He reduces all the Sanctification of Feasts to hearing Mass, and not working; whatsoever we do the rest of the day, he pretends we are discharged.

To give authority to his imagination, he saith *that the holy Apostles have com-24380 manded us both these things, by the testimony of S. Austin, 261 Serm. de Tempore. See here his words, Apostoli Dominicum diem, & Apostolici viri ideo religiosa solemnitate habendum sanxerunt, quia in eodem Redemptor noster à mortuis surrexit, quiq; ideo Dominica appellatur, ut in eo terrenis operibus vel mundi illecebris abstinentes tantum divinis cultibus serviamus.* The Apostles and Apostolick men have therefore ordained that the Lords-day should be celebrated with Religious Solemnity, because thereon our Saviour arose from the dead, whence it is that it is also called the Lords-day, that in it abstaining from all earthly labours and worldly pleasures, we should give our selves only unto the Service of God.

He makes great account, and lays a great stress upon this passage, and he would have it observed as very important in this matter, believing he had therein found all he sought for: See, saith he, *how he forbids us on the holy Lords-days to employ our selves in manual operations?*

I will not insist on it, that this learned Divine quotes a Sermon as *S. Austins*, which notwithstanding is not his. But I cannot but admire the simplicity of this good man, who brings for proof of his Proposition a passage which destroys it, and which proves evidently the quite contrary to what he pretends: For the Author of this Sermon speaking of that part of the Commandment which forbids to work on Festival and Lords-days, requires us on these days not only to cut off all businesses and cares about all earthly things; but worldly pleasures and divertisements also; *Ut in eo terrenis operibus & mundi illecebris abstinentes, &c.* And on the contrary this Jesuit and his Brethren allow a multitude of persons to work, and leave an entire liberty to the whole world, to delight themselves with what pleasures and divertisements they please: even with those which are forbidden by Gods Laws, without herein doing any thing contrary to the Com-24390 mandment of the Church or Sanctification of the Feasts: *provided only they take the pains to hear Mass, as saith Bauny.*

And for the other part of the Commandment which concerns the Sanctification of the Feast-days, he makes his blindness to appear much more clearly in what he relates out of the same Author and the Councils who evidently condemn his opinion in the very places he alledges, as we shall presently see in the second Part of this Chapter.

II. POINT.

SECTION I.

That for the Sanctification of the Lords-day it suffices, according to the Jesuits, to hear one low Mass; that we may hear it where we will, the whole or part, and at as many parcels as we please.

THIS Author whom Father Bauny cites, after he had said that the Apostles had ordained that we should abstain on the Lords-day from the business and pleasures of the world, adds that they ordained this only the better to dispose us by this retrenchment of our pleasures and work, to keep holy this day in the holy Service of God, without employing our selves in any other thing; *ut in co terrenis operibus, vel mundi illecebris abstinentes, tantum divinis cultibus serviamus.* And Father Bauny saith that we are quit of all obligation to sanctifie the Lords and Feast-days, *If we take the pains on those Holy-days to hear Mass.*

And continuing to cite the same Author, as if he were for him; *And for the Mass,* saith he, which is part of the honour which God requires of us on this day, he speaks thus: *In die vero nullus se à Missarum Særarum celebratione separet, neque quis domi remaneat cæteris ad Ecclesiam pergentibus, neque in venatione se occupet.* On that day let no man separate himself from the celebration of the Sacred Mass, nor let any stay behind at home whilst others go to Church, nor spend his time in hunting.

If he would draw any advantage from this passage, he ought at least to have cut off these last words; *neque in venatione se occupet.* For citing them as out of S. Austin who relates the Commandment of the Apostles, he acknowledgeth that according to S. Austin and the Apostles, hunting is forbidden on the Lords-day, which nevertheless, according to the opinion of this Father and his Brethren, is lawful on this day for those persons who employ themselves therein only for recreation.

He ought also have taken notice, that this place makes nothing at all for him; and in no wise proves what he pretends. For this Author whom he cites, saith indeed that no person ought to dispense with himself for hearing Mass on the Lords-day; but he saith not that this will suffice him to acquit himself as he ought of this Precept which commands him to sanctifie this day. And how was it possible for him to say that, having said immediately before, that the intent of God and the Church is, that we should not busie our selves in any other thing than his Service. *Ut in eo tantum divinis cultibus serviamus.*

After Bauny had so well expounded this passage, and had made so happy use of it unto his design, he joyns the Authority of the Councils to that of the Apostles and S. Austins, and he goes on with his discourse in this manner: *The Councils say as much. That of Mayence, cap. 17. and of Tours 3. both in the year 813. in the time of Leo III. and of Charles the Great, and the 6. of Constantinople in the 8. Chapter, in these terms: Dicit vero Dominici tanta debet esse observantia, ut præter Orationes & Missarum solennia, & ea quæ ad vescendum pertinent, nihil fiat.* So great ought the observance of the Lords-day to be, that besides prayers and the solemn celebration of Masses, nothing should be done, but what appertains to dressing of meat.

It would not be easie to find in the Councils a passage more exprest than this for condemning Father Bauny and his Brethrens opinion concerning the Sanctification of the Lords-day; and yet he produces it, and pretends to make use of it as a strong proof for himself.

Bauny would have handy labour only forbidden on the Lords-day, and the Council which he cites, forbids us doing any thing on that day, but what is necessary for our lives, *ut præter ea quæ ad vescendum pertinent nihil fiat.* Bauny maintains, that in hearing Mass we satisfy the Precept which commands us to

sanctific the Lords-day; and the Council declares, that we ought to employ all the day in the actions of Piety and Religion, such as are prayers, presence at the Mass and divine Service: forbidding all other sorts of employments and diversifications; *ut præter orationes & Missarum solennia nihil fiat.*

Layman speaking of the obligation to sanctific Festival days, expounds it in this manner: (1) *The other part of the Commandment of the Church which regards the observation of Festivals, is affirmative, and ordains that all the Faithful, who have the use of reason, should hear the whole Mass with attention.*

1 Alterum quod in Ecclesiasticis præcepto de observatione Festorum continetur, affirmativum est, ut omnes Fideles usum rationis habentes integram Missam cum attentione audiant. *Loy-man lib 4. tr. 7.*

If you be concerned to know which Mass ye are obliged to hear, he will answer you, (2) *That for fulfilling this Precept, it is indifferent whether the Faithful they are under to hear the high Mass in their own Parishes, he will resolve you this doubt by telling you, that there is not an absolute obligation of hearing Mass only in your Parish: Neither is there any Church appoimed, as namely that of your Parish, for hearing Mass, saith he, but in what place soever the Faithful hear it, they satisfy the Precept of the Church.*

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cap. 3. num. 1. pag. 185. 2 Non refert ad præcepti hujus adimpletionem utrum Fideles Festo die intersint Missæ solemnæ vel privæ. *Ibid. num. 3.* 3 Neque etiam certa Ecclesia, puta Parochialis, pro Missa audienda definita est; sed ubicunque Fideles Missam audiant, præcepto Ecclesiæ satisfaciunt. *Ibid.*

He will acknowledge indeed that the Bishops and Pastors of the Church ordain that the Faithful hear Mass in their own Parish; but he acknowledges not their voice in this point for the voice of the Church, and he makes no scruple to say that the Faithful are not obliged to obey them, grounding himself upon the Authority of Suarez and Tolet, (4) *who give, to that he speaks of, this advice: that the Command which the Bishop makes unto those under his Charge, to hear Mass every one in his own Parish, is not obliging; pretending that the Bishops themselves have not power to command this, without doubt, because they have not received it from Suarez nor Tolet, there being no appearance for them to say, that they have not received it from Jesus Christ, since he hath given them Authority to govern their people, and to command them whatsoever they judged profitable to their Salvation and the good of the Church, and hath said unto them, that whatsoever obeyeth them, obeyeth him in their persons, and that they who despise them, despise him himself. Besides many Councils have ordained, that we should be present at Masses in our Parish, who deserve not to be heard, according to these Jesuits, as having gone beyond their power, and made rash Ordinances.*

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Tambourin troubles not himself to know whether there be any Ordinance which forbids the hearing of private Masses in Religious houses, to the prejudice of the Parochial. For he pretends that these Decrees are abolished by custom.

5 Quod si textus cap. 2. de Parochis contrarium dicat, jam is est usu & consuetudine abrogatus. *Tambour. lib. 1. meth. celebr. Miss. cap. 4. sect. 5. num. 6.*

(5) *That if the Text de Parochis, cap. 2. say the contrary, it is at this day abolished by use and custom.*

Dicastillus before him had assured us the same thing. (6) *Whatsoever may be said by the Ancients, it is altogether certain at present, saith he, according to these Authors, that the ancient Law is abrogated by the custom. And which is astonishing, after he had given unto this custom, which is a visible disorder, the power of abrogating the Right and Laws of the Church, he denies the Bishop the power to destroy this custom by his Ordinances. (7) The Bishop, saith he, cannot order every one to hear Mass in his own Parish; because, according to the usage of the*

6 Sed ubique & quæcunque

Church, every one is free to hear any where.

Missæ audiatur satisfi: præcepto, quidquid aliqui ex antiquis dixerint, jam enim certissimum est apud omnes auctores, antiquum jus consuetudine abrogatum esse. *Dicastill. de sacr. Miss. tract. 5. disp. 5. dub. 4. num. 56.*

7 Episcopus non potest præcipere ut quisque audiat Missam in sua Parochia, eo ipso quod secundum Ecclesiæ usum liberum sit cuique ubique audire. *num. 59.*

So if you will believe these Divines, all the Sanctification of Feasts and Lords-days are reduced to the hearing of a Mass, and that a low Mass, and to hear that where we please, let the Bishops and Councils say what they will.

40 But if any one have not devotion and leisure to hear Mass, *Dicaſtillus* hath taken care to accommodate persons of Quality. (1) If they cannot, saith he, conveniently remit publick Affairs to another time; they are exempt from the observation of this Precept.

But that we might not accuse him for accepting of mens persons, he allows Servants not to go to Mass. (2) If they must rise early thereto, and sleep less than they are accustomed. If they were urged with their own affairs, sleep and drowsiness would not keep them in bed; and if their Master had commanded them to rise very early in the morning to follow him on hunting, or to do some infamous service for him, this Jesuit would have obliged him to obey him, and yet he dispenses with them for obeying the Commandment of the Church to serve God, in hearing Mass, if to observe this Commandment, they must rise earlier and sleep less than they were wont.

Senatores ac reliqui primarii vultu qui Republicæ negotia in aliud tempus recedere commode nequeunt. *Dicaſtillus de Sac. Miſſ. tract. 5. diſp. 5. dub. 10. ſect. 5. n. 207.*
2 Famuli in locis ubi non est nisi una Miſſa, moderate fomno

extraordinariam adhibere diligentiam non tenentur, v.g. nimis diluculo surgendo, & ab ordinario nimis demendo, vel aliquo simile præstando. Ad hoc enim non obligat præceptum. num. 214.

But if you would not hear a whole Mass, these new Casuists hold, that one may satisfy this duty by hearing part only: and it's a shameful thing to see how they talk thereof, how they divide and cut into pieces, as we may say, the most holy things in Religion, disputing and contesting one against another to determine precisely what part of the Mass may be omitted, and what is absolutely obliging to be heard to satisfy the Churches Command. They are all agreed, that he sins against the Commandment, who comes short of any notable part of the Mass; but they are at difference how to determine this notable part.

Coninck saith that he wants a notable part who hears the Mass only from after the Gospel. Others reduce it to a moiety or third part of the Mass, as *Azor* who demands, (3) What part of the Mass shall we hold to be notable? And he answers, That all are agreed, that the half or third part is notable.

Bauny in his Sum, cap. 17. pag. 277. is bolder than the rest, because he speaks after them. For he determines more particularly what part of the Mass we are obliged to hear precisely to satisfy the Precept. This is my opinion, saith he, that he who hears the Mass from the Offertory inclusively, until the after Communion, satisfies the Precept; because he finds himself present at all the essential and integral parts of that Mass. I know not who hath given him Authority to diminish the Mass in this sort, and to chop off from it, as I may say, the head and the feet, by cutting away the beginning and the end of it.

There are found some others who are yet more subtle on this subject, and teach us to cut the Mass in two in the middle, and to joyn the parts of two different Masses together, thereof to make up one entire one: *Azor* in the place now alledged, gives us this Expedient, and saith that he that will make use thereof, shall acquit himself very well of his obligation to hear Mass; (4) Because he doth all that is contained in the Precept, as much as the Church doth simply command when the whole Mass is heard, since it commands not the whole Mass to be heard of one and the same Priest.

Coninck is also of this opinion in the place which I have now cited, where he makes this Question: (5) Whether he who comes to the Mass, for example, a little before the Consecration, and hears that which remains of that same Mass, and the beginning of another said after, to the Consecration exclusively, satisfies the Precept of the Church? He affirms that they who hold the negative, are grounded upon a very strong and effectual reason, which is, that he who carries the matter so, hears not any one whole Mass, whereunto nevertheless he is obliged by the

3 Quislem secundum communem sententiam, committere qui veniet post Evangelium.
Coninck de Sac. q. 83. a. 6. dub. unico num. 285. pag. 285.
4 Quisnam pars Miſſæ notabilis habetur? Inter omnes convenit dimidiam aut certam partem esse notabilem.
Azor lib. 7. cap. 8. pag. 630.
5 Præstat quidquid in præcepto continetur. Nec enim præcipit Ecclesia ut ab eodem Sacerdote totum & integrum Sacram, sed simpliciter ut Miſſam totam audiamus.

Azor supra. 6 Utrum qui venit ad unum Sacrum paulo ante consecrationem, v.g. & audit reliquam partem illius Sacri, & aliud sequens usque ad consecrationem exclusive, satisfacit præcepto Ecclesiæ? *Coninck supra num. 287.*

1 Quia cum duz illæ partes sine inter se omnino independentes, non possunt integrum sacrificium constituere, & consequenter quæ eas audit, non audit Missam integram, ad quam tamen obligatur; & hæc ratio in rigore loquendo hanc sententiam satis efficaciter probat. *Ibid.* 2 Quia tamen plurimi Doctores docent contrarium, absolute loquendo talis est securus, & probabile est eum satisfacere. *Ibid.*

Commandment of the Church: (1) For that, saith he, these two parts of two different Masses are independent one on another, they cannot make up an entire Mass; whereunto nevertheless he is obliged; and this reason speaking in rigour, proves this opinion effectually enough. But quickly after these words he adds, that notwithstanding this, (2) Because there are many Doctors who teach the contrary, he that so carries the business is in safety, and its probable that he satisfies this Commandment.

He assures this man upon a simple probability and the word of some Casuists, against the Authority of the Church, since he confesses that it intended a whole entire Mass, and which is not so, if it be not said of one and the same Priest, and against reason, which he acknowledges to be evident and forcible; as if the new Casuists ought to carry it against the Church and Reason it self. 2447

He is not content to renounce reason to follow a new and corrupt practice, and to take the liberty to overturn the Laws of the Church under pretence of expounding them; he would also cast the fault of this licentiousness and contempt of the Authority and Laws of the Church upon it self. For to support his answer, he saith, (3) That the Church knowing well that the Laws are thus expounded

3 Racio est quia cum Ecclesia sciat suas leges ita à gravibus Doctoribus explicari, hoc ipso quo eorum explicationes permittit publice imprimi & doceri, censetur suum præceptum juxta eas moderari. *Ibid.*

by grave Doctors, and suffering their Expositions to be imprim'd and taught publicly, is thought to sweeten its Laws, and to moderate them according to these Explanations.

As if the Church approved all things it tolerates, or which comes not to its knowledge. A new Inquisition altogether extraordinary would need to be established to examine all the Errours which are in the new Books. And because the Pastors of the Church dissemble them sometimes, and suffer them with sorrow and groaning, seeing at present neither means nor disposition to correct or repress them, it is to do them great wrong, and to abuse unjustly their patience and forbearance to draw from thence advantage to deceive the world, and to make the Commonalty and simple people believe that the Bishops approve by their silence all that they condemn not openly, though they frequently lament it before God: See here how errors and abuses slide into the Church, and establish themselves therein by little and little; they that have introduced them pretending at last to make them pass for Laws and Rules of the Church. 2448

Bauny in his Sum, cap. 27. pag. 181: proposes also this question: *Whether it be satisfactory to the Precept of hearing Mass, to hear one part of it of one Priest, and another of a second different from the first?* He quotes Emanuel Sa and others who hold the affirmative, and approving this opinion, he adds: *I hold it for true, for that hearing it in that manner, that is done which the Church would have. For it is true to say that he who hears of one Priest saying the Mass after he is entered into the Church, that which follows the Consecration unto the end, and of a second who succeeds the first, that which goes before the Consecration, hath heard all the Mass, since he hath been found present indeed at all its parts.*

He stays not here. He saith moreover, that we may not only hear the Mass in this manner in parts at twice, when two Priests say it in course and successively without interruption; but also at thrice or four times, and more with interruption and at as great a distance of time as we will. And because he saw that this opinion might be ill received because of its novelty, he would make it passable under the name of Azor, that we might not believe that he invented it himself. *It is demanded, saith he, if this ought to be done in an uninterrupted succession, and without intermission of time?* Azor p. 1. lib. 7. cap. 3. q. 3. answers no, and that dividing it, we may at divers times attend unto so many parts of the Mass, as may make up one entire Mass. 2449

That is to say, that we may hear it of so many different Priests as there are parts in the Mass, provided that what we have heard of every one apart being joyned

joyned together, contain all that is said in a Mass; and though the Priests say these Masses at far distant times and Altars, we fail not by hearing them in this manner, to satisfy the Commandment of the Church, and to have truly heard an entire Mass composed of parts so different and incoherent. It were better to oppose the Commandment of the Church openly, than to make sport with it in so ridiculous a manner, and with so strange a liberty, which can be good for nothing but to make the Mass and all Religion contemptible to Hereticks and Atheists.

In the mean time this goodly reason which suffices to fulfil the Precept of the Church, by attending at all parts of the Mass in what manner soever we hear them, whether it be in a continued succession, and at once, or by many parts, and at divers times, hath brought things to such a pass, that some exceed so far as to say, that entering into a Church where we find two Priests at two Altars, whereof the one hath newly begun his Mass, and the other is at the middle of his, if we attend at once to the one from the beginning unto the middle, and to the other from the middle unto the end, we shall thereby discharge our duty of hearing Mass. *Bauny* cites for this opinion *Azor* and some others, and *Azor* speaks in these terms: *If that be true which the second opinion affirms, I see nothing to hinder but he may fulfil the Precept, who entering into a Church hears the Mass in two parts of two several Priests who say it at the same time. For as for attention he may lend it to them both at once. For this cause I approve this opinion, not because it is grounded on a sufficiently forcible reason; but because it is supported by the Authority of considerable persons.*

1 Non vi-
deo, si verum
est quod secun-
da opinio do-
cet, quin satis-
faciat præcepto
quod ædem Sa-
cræam ingressus, duos Sacerdotes rem Sacram facientes audit simul per partes. Nam quod attinet ad attentionem, potest ad utrumque animum intendere. Quære secunda sententia mihi solum probatur, quia tantorum virorum est autoritas, non effacit ratione suffulta. *Azor instit. mor. lib. 7. cap. 3. pag. 631.*

He acknowledges that this opinion is ridiculous in it self, and contrary to the Commandments of the Church, and the respect which is due unto the Mass, and is also without reason and solid foundation; and for all that he forbears not to approve it, for fear of disobliging and reproaching those who maintain it, to whose Authority he chuses rather to submit his Judgment, than to that of the Church and Reason.

Coninck saith the same thing, and he approves also this opinion as the more probable, though he follows it not, being restrained by this single consideration, (2) *That the Doctors do not assure us that this latter doth fulfil the Precept as well as they do for the former.*

2 Quia Do-
ctores non eod-
em modo asse-
runt hunc si-
tisfacere sic
priorem. *Con-
inck supra.*

Here it is remarkable what submission and respect these Casuists have for one another, which proceed so far as to make them renounce reason and truth, rather than to separate from, and contradict one anothers opinions, if it be not rather some combination in a faction or private interest that obliges them thereunto. They give themselves the liberty to reject the holy Fathers, and to prefer their proper imaginations and new opinions before the ancient Doctrine of those Great Masters of Divinity, as we have observed on many occasions; and they are very tender of departing from the opinions of the Casuists of these times, though they doubt that they are far off from reason and truth, establishing by this means the Casuists as Judges and Masters of truth, and their novel opinions as the Law and Rule of Manners and Religion.

Tolet treating of this subject, speaks thus: (3) *There are some who say, that if one hear the half of a Mass of one Priest, and the rest of another, he doth thereby satisfy the Precept, as well as if he had heard the whole Mass entire. And this seems probable unto me.*

3 Aliqui vo-
lunt quod si
quis mediam
Missam audierit
ab uno Sacerde-
te & reliquam
ab alio, quod
satisfaceret præ-
cepto. Nisi
Missam ince-
gram audierit, &c

Escobar takes it for granted as certain and general, that it is lawful to hear the Mass in parts of divers Priests; and afterwards he makes a person that advises with him to talk in these terms: (4) *You have said that we may hear the one half of the Mass of one Priest, and the other half of another: I demand of you whether we*

mibi videtur probabile. Tolet. Instit. sacerdot. lib. 6. cap. 7. num. 8. pag. 1030. 4 Dixisti pelle quem partem Missæ ab uno, partem ab alio Sacerdote exaudire; Rogo an possit prius pars posterior Missæ audire & postea prior?

1 Affert Turrianus select. p. 2. d. 16. dub. 7. quia præceptum quoad substantiam impletur, & solum invertitur ordo. *Escobar tract. 1. Exam. 11. num. 73. pag. 189.*

2 Potestne simul & eodem tempore audiri quando ex duobus Sacerdotibus unus Missam inchoaret, alter consecrationi daret operam? *Affirmat Hurtado de Sacr. tom. 2. de Missa dub. 5. diff. 4. quia ut Azorius p. 1. lib. 7. cap. 3. q. 3. ait, potest quis ad utrumque Sacerdotem animum intendere. ibid. 3 Unde aliquis docuit probabiliter ex præcepto, ex voto, ex pœnitentiis inunctis obligatum tres Missas audire, satisfacere si simul à tribus Sacerdotibus eodem tempore celebrantibus audiat. Ibid.*

may first hear the latter part of the Mass, and afterwards the former? To which he answers thus: (1) Turrianus saith you may; because so that is accomplished in substance which is commanded by the Precept; and therein he only inverts the order. This is not the only point wherein the Jesuits make no dainty to overturn the order which the Holy Ghost hath established in the Mysteries of Religion and the Church.

He inquires also, (2) Whether we may at once and the same time hear the Mass of two Priests, whereof the one is newly begun, and the other is at the Consecration? And he answers, That Hurtado believes it, because as Azor saith, one may attend to both Priests. So that a person who could at the same time apply his mind to five or six Priests who said Mass together, and were in divers parts of the Sacrifice, might in a moment discharge the obligation of hearing Mass, taking from each a part to compose one compleat Mass in his mind.

And it is upon this Principle that Escobar relies, when he saith also, (3) That he holds that probable which a certain Auctor, whom he names not, hath taught, that a person obliged by precept, vow, or penance imposed on him to hear three Masses, may fulfil it by attending at once to three Priests who celebrate at once.

Affirmat Hurtado de Sacr. tom. 2. de Missa dub. 5. diff. 4. quia ut Azorius p. 1. lib. 7. cap. 3. q. 3. ait, potest quis ad utrumque Sacerdotem animum intendere. *ibid.* 3 Unde aliquis docuit probabiliter ex præcepto, ex voto, ex pœnitentiis inunctis obligatum tres Missas audire, satisfacere si simul à tribus Sacerdotibus eodem tempore celebrantibus audiat. *Ibid.*

There is nothing so easie as thus to accomplish Commands, Penances, & Vows. But this accomplishment will deserve a greater penance than the former, because it is nothing else than a playing with, and deriding Religion approaching unto impiety, when a man is commanded to hear three Masses, or to hear them as they are ordinarily heard in the Church, and according to the custom of Christians fearing God, and attending at his holy Sacrifice of the Mass, and not in a way so new-conceited, and capricious; this ridiculous invention of hearing three Masses, and even twenty or thirty in less than half an hour, if so many Priests were to be had who might celebrate at the same time, being never heard of by any man before.

SECTION II.

That according to the Jesuits the Precept of hearing Mass may be satisfied, by hearing them without internal Devotion, Attention, Intention, even with an expresse intent not to satisfy, and whilst we entertain our selves alone or with others with other discourse and wicked and dishonest thoughts.

ALL that we have hitherto produced out of the Jesuit-Divinity concerning the obligation and manner of hearing Mass, respects precisely the outward Sanctification of Festivals only. We must say one word of the internal Disposition; and see with what devotion and attention they hold it ought to be heard that the Precept may be fulfilled.

4 Non est necessarium ut quis præcise satisfaciat præcepto Ecclesiæ, ut habeat internam aliquam devotionem. *Coninck de Sacr. q. 83. a. 6. dub. unico. num. 301. pag. 186.*

Coninck taking the question higher, and making it general of all the Commands of the Church, maintains, (4) That to satisfy it there needs no internal devotion; and that it suffices to do that outwardly which it ordains; and he draws from this general Maxime a particular Conclusion, which is as follows: (5) That he who is distracted the whole time of the Mass even voluntarily, satisfies the Precept of the Church, provided he have attention enough to attend at the Mass with outward devotion. He had said before, according to the same Maxime, that

5 Hinc sequitur eum qui etiam voluntarie est toto tempore Sacri distractus, modo sibi sufficienter præsens sit ut Sacro cum externa devotione assistat, satisfacere Ecclesiæ præcepto. *Ibid. num. 302.* Possumus Ecclesiæ præceptis satisfacere per actum qui non sit vera virtus; imò qui sit peccatum. *Ibid. num. 296.*

the Command of the Church may be satisfied by an action not only not good, but even really a sin.

Azor saith the same thing, and he expounds it more at length. (1) *It is demanded, saith he, whether he that sins in hearing the Mass, fulfils the Commands?* He reports first of all the opinions of the Ancients, saying, (2) *There have been some heretofore who believed generally, that no precept could be accomplished by an action that was bad in it self.* They that held this opinion were all the holy Fathers and ancient Divines. (3) *But their opinion, if you will believe this Author, is now rejected with common consent.* Without doubt, because it is not large and obsequious enough for those who have since invented others to sweeten or rather to disparage and abolish the Commands of the Church. The reason of this Jesuit is, (4) *Because, according to him, charity and the desire of a good end is not necessary to accomplish a precept in substance; that is to say, simply to perform what is commanded.*

1 An præcepto & legi satisfaciunt qui cum peccato rem audiunt divinam? Azor instit. mer. lib. 7. cap. 6. pag. 635.
2 Fuere qui fecerint generationem nullum præceptum perfectum qui sic per se molus impleri. Ibid.

3 Sed horum opinio communi est omnium consensu refutata. Ibid. 4 Neque enim ad præceptorum substantiam servandam requiritur charitas aut boni finis voluntas.

550 He reduces his Maxime into Examples, which is a means to facilitate the understanding and practice thereof; he takes these Examples in part from S. Antonin, whose opinion he relates and refutes. This Saint saith, that a man who goes to Church only to look on Women, and to entertain himself with filthy thoughts in beholding them, so that without this he would not go to Church, nor hear Mass on a Feast-day, doth not fulfil the Precept, if he be there with such inclinations. But Azor rejects this opinion, eluding it by a very subtle distinction. He durst not absolutely deny but this man commits a great crime; but he saith, that this crime is against God who forbids lust, and not against the Church which obligeth him to hear Mass.

See how Azor discourses: (4) *S. Antonin would say that a man that goes not to Church but only to see a woman, and satisfy his lustful desires, who without this would not go, sins. Which is true, not because he hath violated the Command to hear Mass, but because he went to Church for a dishonest passion and pleasure only, and because he heard the Mass with a spirit altogether disordered. For this cause, speaking in general, we must hold their opinion true, who say that though we sin in hearing Mass, yet we fail not of satisfying the precept.*

4 S. Antoninus id voluit dicere ejusmodi hominem alias ad templum nullo modo accessurum nisi scemur a videnda, aut in temperanter appetendæ causa, peccare. Id verum est, non in eo quod rem divinam & præceptum omiserit, sed quod tempus adierit libidinis & voluptatis gratia, & quod depravato animi affectu rem divinam audierit. Quare si generatim loquamur, omnino verum est aliorum responsum, hoc præceptum servari etiam si cum peccato res divina audiat. Ibid.

560 Tambourin saith the same thing in terms capable to strike them with horreur who know what the Sacrifice of the Mass is. (5) *If any one, saith he, attend at Mass to look on a woman, or to attain some vain-glory, he satisfies the precept, provided in the mean time he attend to the Sacrifice.* According to this Author the Sacrifice of the Mass may be attended to whilst we entertain and feed our minds with thoughts of lust and vanity; that is to say, that we may at the same time sacrifice unto God and the Devil: with this difference that tends also to the Devils advantage, that he is adored and served truly with the heart by the vanity and lust which it voluntarily entertains. Whereas the homage we owe unto God in this estate, is only apparent and altogether outward, and consists in nothing but the presence and posture of the body. And yet this Jesuit will have the Church hold it self satisfied with this manner of being present at Mass, as with an entire accomplishment of its Precept. Nothing more horrible can be spoken against God, more disparaging against the Church, more ridiculous and contrary to common sense, as well as Faith, and the most general resentments of all Religion.

Fillinius speaks also the same thing, and brings the same Example: (6) *An evil intention, saith he, as to look lasciviously upon a woman, joynd with a will to hear Mass, is not contrary to the precept; wherefore he who hears in this disposition, fulfils*

6 Prava intentione ad sanctam voluntati audiendi Missam, ut

aspiciendi mul- it, provided he give that attention which is necessary. And a little after speaking ^{2457^o}
 erem libidinoso, of this attention which is required in hearing Mass, he confesses indeed that it
 &c. dummodo were to fail herein to use idle talk, and discourse of affairs during the Mass; but
 sit sufficiens ac- with this exception: (1) Unless this discourse be sometimes discontinued by talk-
 centio, non est ing one while, and then attending, as it is usually done.

contraria huic He hath reason to say, as it is usually done; because it happens hardly at all
 præcepto; quare to be done otherwise amongst the most indevout themselves. Since though the
 satisfacit. Fil- respect for these Mysteries could not induce them unto this interruption, yet the
 liutius 99. mo- diversity of the actions and Ceremonies of the Mass would constrain therunto
 ral, tom. 1. rr. 5. all those who would not appear openly profane. Private discourses must needs
 c. 7. num. 212. be interrupted, that we may kneel when the Priest descends to the foot of the
 pag. 128.

1. Nisi vel consulsatio ef- sec discontinua- is, partim scilicet loquendo, & partim aten- dendo, u com- munitate firri so- let. Ibid n. 216.
 is of the same opinion, and he expounds it also more clearly in his Sum, Chap. 17. ^{2458^o}
 pag. 278. in these terms: Men and women who during the Sacrifice of the Mass
 interrupt your prayers by unnecessary discourses, though often repeated, fulfil the Com-
 mandment. And he adds a little after, That to be slightly distracted in prayer, is
 of it self a slight fault. Whence he infers: That albeit it be reiterated and multi-
 plied during the Mass, it can never proceed to be mortal. And from this discourse
 he concludes absolutely. Therefore to speak a few words to our neighbour, after
 returning to prayer, and from thence to talk again, is not a thing which in rigour can
 binder our attention to the Mass.

But if nevertheless any person would chat continually during the Mass, these
 Doctors would not condemn him to hear another, provided these discourses were
 not about serious matters, but slight, and which did not too much employ the
 mind. *Non de re seria, sed levi, que non impediatur attentionem necessariam.* And
 this attention is altogether external, and consists in observing what the Priest
 doth, and the Ceremonies he practises, at least by intervals, that he may stand up
 when he reads the Gospel, kneel at the Consecration, and adore our Lord at the
 elevation of the consecrated Host.

According to this Doctrine, Tradesmen and women who prattle and are mer-
 ry together at their work, may in like manner chat and entertain themselves
 while they are together at the Mass; because their ordinary discourses being not
 seldom about serious things which busie their minds, they may apply the same
 attention to the Mass as to their work; which is sufficient, according to these
 Divines.

They go so far as to say, that when discourses made during the Mass are wick- ^{2459^o}
 ed and dishonest, they hinder not but that the Precept of hearing may be fulfilled.

2. Quo pacto explicandus est Soto, disp. 13. q. 2. a. 1. fin. cum dicie; et colloquia sine de rebus inde- centibus, tamen impleri. Ibid. num. 216.
 This is that (2) *Filiutius* saith, expounding *Soto* whom he will have to be of
 this opinion; and *Bauny* would come to agreement with them very easily upon
 this point, since he saith in his Sum, Chap. 18. pag. 176. That he thinks they are
 not blame-worthy, who hold that *Prebends* and *Canons* discharge their duty who
 assisting in the *Quire* during holy Service, pass their time in scandalous discourses, and
 in an employment altogether vicious, as in laughing, scoffing, &c.

Escobar concludes this point by reducing it to the uttermost extremity, when he
 demands, (3) Whether he that hears the Mass with a design not to fulfil, do fulfil
 the Precept? He answers, That he certainly fulfils it, according to *Vasquez's* opinion.

3. Audir quis Sacrum animo non satisfaciendi præcepto, satisfaciunt? Ita plane ex *Vasquez's* assertion. *Escobar* tract. 1. exim. 11. num. 107. pag. 193.

Sanchez saith the same. And that it might appear less odious, he draws it by consequence from another Principle which is yet more strange. (1) He, saith he, who hears the Mass of contempt, accomplisheth the Precept truly. And with much stronger reason he that hears with an intention not to satisfie. He would have us believe that we may do the will of the Church, doing it expressly against our intention; and that we may obey it by a wilful rebellion, and honour it by an affected contempt, hearing the Mass with a resolution not to satisfie it in what it desires, and with a formal contempt of its Command.

1 Vere implet audienti Sacri præceptum illud ex contemptu audiendo; ergo à fortiori cum intentione non satisfaciendi. Sanchez. oper. mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 13. pag. 64.

It seems impossible to advance farther in this matter, than to say that we accomplish a Precept by an action that we do in contempt of it, and with an intention not to satisfie it. But Tambourin goes yet farther. For he finds means not to transgress this Precept, not only with an intention not to accomplish it, but even in not doing outwardly that which is commanded, though it might be done if we would. (2) We may, saith he, lawfully retire some days before a Feast unto some place distant from the Church where we foresee that we might hear a Mass on a Feast-day, though we do it with a design of not hearing, or of not being obliged to bear.

2 Potest quis licite in aliquem locum distantem ab Ecclesia discedere, in quo prævidet, non posse die festivo Missam audire; tempore à die festo remoto, etiam eo sine ne audiat, seu ne teneatur audire Sacrum. Tambour. l. 4. decal. c. 2. sect. 3. n. 6.

This is a Paradox greater than those of the Stoicks; that we may obey by disobedience, honour by dishonouring, and discharge our duty to God and the Church by sins and crimes contrary to the Ordinances of God and the Church. And there remains nothing more for these Doctors to say, but that crimes and sins are good actions, since they may serve, according to them, to the accomplishment of the Commandments of God and the Church: since God and the Church cannot command other than good actions.

And this is that which Celot seems to pretend, when he maintains, that he who hears the Mass out of vain-glory, doth a good work. This is in his 9. Book and 7. Chapter, where he encounters with Peter Seguenot, and reproves him for having said, that though we cannot accomplish as we ought the Commandments of God and the Church, without the assistance of Grace; yet we may by the force of Nature only, and without Grace do all the outward actions that are commanded. And to oppose himself unto him more directly, he speaks in these terms: (3) I maintain on the contrary, that a man who is in an estate of mortal sin, going to Church and Mass on a Feast-day, which is the Commandment, for fear of losing his reputation, though his work be imperfect, ceases not to act by Grace, preventing and accompanying him, and that he offends not against the obedience he owes to the Church.

3 Ego contra disputo: licet peccato interitum hominem qui publice mecum infamiam templum

& Missam ex præcepto Festa die celebrat, id ipsum, licet imperfectum; opus præveniente comitanteque gratia faceret; neque obedientiam Ecclesie debitam infringere. Celot lib. 9. cap. 7. pag. 813.

This action is out of vain-glory, and notwithstanding it must be good and holy if it be done by the motion of preventing and accompanying Grace, as he supposes; or indeed he must say that a sin must proceed of Grace as of its Principle, and that Grace may cause us to sin; which were Blasphemy, or rather a folly greater than theirs who have said that God is the Author of sin. For they have not said that he causes us to sin in giving us Grace; but rather in refusing to give it, and pushing us on unto sin, not by his Grace but by his Power.

Also Celot affirms, (4) That it never came into the thoughts of any man to imagine that the Grace of Jesus Christ could press us on to any action which were sin. He declares then, that he who hears the Mass in mortal sin out of vain-glory, or for worldly honour alone, doth it by the motion of the Grace of Jesus Christ; and by consequence that his action is good; and that in this quality it sufficeth to accomplish the Commandment to hear Mass on Feast-days.

4 Cui verè in mentem dicere nos Christi gratia ad id impelli, quod sic cum peccato? Ibid. pag. 815.

This Jesuit pretends that all those who observe any Commandment outwardly as the Jews, and yet in worse manner than the Jews, doing it by a wicked motive, cease not to have the Grace of Jesus Christ, to act by his motion, and to do thereupon good works, though they be not perfect; that is to say, though the good motive, which is to them as the Soul and form, and which should give them perfection, be wanting; and on the contrary, though they be done by a wicked

and criminal motive, so that they be in themselves true sins and crimes covered with an appearance of good external actions. And so, according to this Doctor, sins and crimes shall be good works, proper to content God, and to satisfy his Commandments and those of the Church.

ARTICLE II.

Of Fasting, and the Commandment to Fast.

Fasting in the Church consists in abstinence from certain victuals which it hath forbidden, and to be content with one meal a day, which sometimes is not taken till in the evening after Even-song, or at least after Noon in certain less solemn Fast-days, as in the Vigils of Festivals; which was practised also in the days of S. Bernard, and long after, as the Casuists themselves agree. In our days they have anticipated the time of repast, changing supper into dinner, and they have of late introduced the custom of making Collations at night. 24630

There is none who sees not that this change hath brought great relaxation in Fasting, according to what was observed and instituted by all Antiquity; and it is not without great condescension that the Church suffers that it should be discharged by such an observation.

The Jesuits in the mean time find it too severe; and to sweeten and accommodate it to the world, they have reduced it to such a point, that to fast, according to their Maxims, is in truth not to fast at all, and to make good cheer.

To make this more clearly appear, we will divide this Article into three Points. In the first we shall see how they regulate eating and the hour of repast on Fasting-days. In the second what they say of drinking and of the Collation at night. And in the third their easiness to dispense with all sorts of persons for Fasting, and upon all sorts of occasions, even the most criminal and infamous.

I. POINT.

24640

That according to the Jesuits Divinity we may prevent the hour of Repast, make it as long and great as we please, eat more than on another day, and break out into all excess and intemperance, without breaking our Fast.

Buny in his Sum, Chap. 16: pag. 251. declares, that at present the hour of repast is at Noon; but he adds, that we may advance and anticipate this time one hour without sin, and he cites for this opinion Layman, Binsfield, and Diana, who saith, that the Religious have this priviledge. This is no great advantage nor honour for the Religious, that they are the first to favour themselves, and demand priviledge to fast more at their ease. But if we may prevent and anticipate the time of refectio[n] by an hour, as he saith, without sin, there is no need of priviledge for this, and the Religious do ill employ their credits to obtain it. This Jesuit also seems not to make any great account of it, saying afterwards, that without any regard thereof they do it, and all others also without fault; and that altogether, that is, Seculars and Monasticks, may prevent that time by two or three hours when necessity or convenience requires it. That is, that we may break-fast on Fast-days, instead of dining, and sit down at the table at eight or nine of the clock in the morning.

¹ Anticipatur sine causa hora comedendi die jejunii, solviturne? ² Minime, quia determinatio horæ non est de essentia jejunii. Escobar tract. 1. exam. 3. num. 72. pag. 213. 24650

Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 3. Artic. 2.

and

and first of all to prevent the hour of repast on Fast-days, not only two or three hours, as *Bauny* saith, but more also, and it gives power to eat absolutely at what hour we will, because, as this *Casulist* saith, to eat at one or other determinate hour is not of the essence of a Fast.

But if any fault be committed in this disorder, it can be at the most but a venial one, according to this Doctor himself: (1) It will be but a venial sin, saith he, if this anticipation be but a small one, as of half an hour. Whence he concludes in favour of the Religious, who have the privilege to prevent dinner-time by an hour, that they may without sin dine at half an hour past ten.

Delinquent venialiter, nisi sit exigua anticipatio, ut dimidia hora, Ibid.

Colligo Religiosos habentes privilegium anticipandi prandium per horam, posse sine ulla culpa per horam & mediam ante meridiem prandere. Ibid.

The corrupt custom and looseness of the time gives them half an hour, and their privileges give them an hour to anticipate their repast. So that they may dine without scruple at half an hour past ten on Fast-days, thereby giving a great example of Penance and Austerity to Seculars and ordinary Christians, who prolong their Fast an hour and a half, or two hours longer than they, and in these times dine not till after-noon.

Tambourin flies yet higher than *Escobar*, and maintains that the Religious may dine on Fast-days at nine of the clock and a half in Winter, and at half an hour past eight in the Summer, saying, (2) As for them who imagine that mid-day is appointed for repast under pain of mortal sin, it is to be observed that they may dine an hour before noon in Winter, and two hours in Summer. Whence it follows, that the Mendicant Fryars, and those who participate of their privileges to anticipate their dinners one hour on Fast-days, as it is contained in the Abridgment of the Privileges of the Society of Jesus, may by this reason dine two hours by the Sun before mid-day in Winter, and three in Summer; because the moral duration of Noon gives them one or two, and the Papal Privilege another. And because many do grant with probability, that to eat half an hour before the time appointed, even without cause, is no notable fault; because a little matter is considered as nothing; thence it comes, that in Winter they may dine two hours and a half before mid-day, and in Summer three and a half. But if this be done by reason of studying, travelling, or business, it is not so much as a venial sin.

Pro his quos juvat putare meridiem esse horam festificandi statum sub mortali, nota eos potest prandere una hora circiter ante meridiem in hyeme. Sanchez d. 53. num. 7. Toul. in d. n. 3. cap. 2. dub. 4. num. 2. & durbus in altate. Ita 2305. f. 4.

cap. 18. num. 100. hinc quoniam Mendicantes. & qui eorum privilegiis participant, gaudent privilegio anticipandi refectorem per horam, (ita Comp privilegiorum Societatis Jesu) Ideo poterunt prandere duobus horis hyeme, tribus ætate ante meridiem. Nam unam aut alteram dat moralitas meridiei, reliquis Papæ concessis. Et quia multi probabiliter censent comedere semi-horis ante statum vel concessum tempus, etiam sine causa, non esse notabilem culpam, quia parum pro nihilo reputatur, Dian. p. 5. tract. 5. num. 10. p. 1. tract. 9. num. 27. p. 2. 19. num. 53. idcirco hyeme poterunt hi duobus horis cum dimidia, ætate tribus cum dimidia ante solarem meridiem mensæ accumbere. Et quidem ex causa studii itineris, negotii, &c. etiam sine veniali. *Tambourin. decal. lib. 4. cap. 5. sect. 4. num. 3.*

This privilege seemed so considerable unto *Tambourin*, that he would gladly have it observed here, and to cause all the world to know that it was found worthy to be put into an Abridgment of the Privileges of the Society of Jesus, as one of the most important for the good of the Society it self, and for the greater Glory of God. Where it must be observed, that all this is for them who do imagine that the hour of mid-day is that appointed for repast under pain of mortal sin. Whence it follows, that they who will not entertain this imagination, may eat in the morning, if it seems good unto them, without breaking their Fast.

As for the quality of the repast that is made on Fast-days, *Tolet* saith you may fare better than you would have done, had it not been Fasting-day. (3) It is lawful, saith he, on a Fasting-day to take something more than usual to dinner.

3 Licet tracti pore jejunii a quid plus accipere in prandio. Tolt. lib. 6. cap. 2. num. 4. pag. 103.

Sanehez saith the same thing yet more openly, and with greater contempt of the Church and its Commands. (4) He, saith he, who taking his resedion on a Fast-day, takes care to fill his belly so with victuals, that he may not be hungry, doth

4 Qui semel in die jejunii comedit, curans ita stomachum cibis replere, ut nihil profus famis patiatar, vere implet præceptum, cum tamen legis intentionem, quæ est fame aliqua tantum macerare, deservat. Sanchez op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 14. num. 4. pag. 65.

truly fulfil the Precept, though he elude the end of the Law, which is to mortifie the flesh by hunger. It is lawful then, according to this great Doctor, to mock the Church in this manner by doing the contrary to what it expects, even then when we seem to do what it commands.

Tolet proceeds yet farther, saying, that what excess soever we commit in eating or drinking at dinner, and how long time soever we spend therein, provided there be no intermission, the Fast is not broken, though sobriety be notably violated, and we sin grievously against this vertue. So that we may be three or four

In continuis
autem quantitate
prandii non est certa
servanda mensura
ratione jejuniis;
sed quomvis aliquis
multum excedat,
non ob id solvit
jejunium, peccat
tamen contra sobrietatem.
Tolet. supra.

hours at table after the manner of Germany, and drink and eat as much as we will, without breaking the Fast, and without transgressing the Order of the Church, according to these Fathers. We may accomplish a Precept of Abstinence by an excess of gluttony; we may fast without sobriety; do Penance by sinning, and mortifie the flesh and paunch by pampering and stuffing it.

According to this solid Divinity, they all in a manner conclude, that drink breaks not the Fast at what time and in what excess soever it be taken. At this time (saith Bauny in his Sum, speaking of the Collation at night, Chap. 16. pag. 255.) drinking concerns not the Fast, as neither on the day. Which very well agrees with the Institution of the Fast, and as this Jesuit speaks himself, pag. 258. with the end for which God and the Church do will and ordain that we should fast, which is to bridle the flesh and subdue the appetite under the dominion of reason. Use and excess of drinking, especially of wine, having more force to inflame the flesh, and stir up the appetite against reason, than the use of the most nourishing meats.

There are Drunkards that fast all the year, according to this Doctrine, though they drink themselves drunk every day, passing them all almost without eating, and contenting themselves with a mouthful of bread and some little matter therewith, provided they want not wine.

The same Author saith in the same place, pag. 256. that so often as we eat flesh and eggs on a Fasting-day, so many sins we commit; but he adds, That it is not so in other victuals, as bread, fish, and butter, the use whereof repeated so often as our appetite requires them, after the second time is no sin. His reason is, Because seeing that what exceeds above necessary, turns into crudities in the stomach, which increase not but weaken strength, it seems that it cannot reasonably be said that the repast which is taken above the second, profits the body, much less that it strengthens it.

He would say that excessive eating and drinking do the same thing that Fasting, which is to enfeeble the body; and consequently that excesses which are committed in Lent by eating as much and as oft as their appetite requires it; after the second time, are not sins against the Fast, because they are not against the intention and end for which it was instituted.

This Father hath not considered the difference betwixt mortifying and weakening the body; betwixt the abating the violence of sensuality, and enervating the forces of Nature. The intention of the Church and the end of Fasting is to abate the violence of sensuality, and not to deprive the body of its strength. It pretends on the contrary to cure by abstinence the weaknesses and infirmities of the body as well as of the Soul, as it also declares frequently in the office and in the prayers of the Lent.

This good Elder took no heed of this distinction. He confounds sensuality which is in the body as a strange heat equal to that of a Fever, and which gives no strength to it but to rebel against the Spirit and against the Law of God, with the force and natural vigour of the body it self, which ought to help him in his obedience to the Spirit, and to render it more fit and prompt to the outward actions of piety and vertue. He pretends that to mortifie sensuality, and to weaken the body being one and the same thing, according to him, he that eats excessively in Lent, by that means destroying his health, and weakening the natural strength of his body, corresponds perfectly well with the intention of the Church when it commands us to fast.

That is to say, that the true way of pursuing the intent of the Church in Lent, is to drink and eat excessively, and that the best invention to obtain the end of

Fasting is not to fast at all, but rather to give ones self unto debauches, because debauches do more subdue the body than Fasting, and they weaken its force, which is the end of Fasting, according to this great Divine.

As for the Collation at night, *Bauny* in his *Sum*, Chap. 16. pag. 255. tells us that we may without breaking our Fast, take any broth made with herbs, or any Sallet with a red Herring. And to clear it up yet more largely, he demands: And if a man should take some Confection of Almonds or Pottage with coarse-grated bread, were it a sin? He acknowledgeth with some others whom he quotes, that this cannot be done without sin; but he declares his opinion in these terms, pag. 255. *But I believe nevertheless that by the use of these things the Fast is not at all concerned, when they exceed not the quantity which is allowed by the custom of the Church, received by the consent of prudent persons.* And that there may be nothing wanting to this reformed Collation, he adds that in the time of this Collation drinking concerns not the Fast: that is to say, that we may take as much thereof as we will without breaking our Fast.

Azor saith the same thing in these terms: (1) *The custom is at present to take a little bread only, or with fruit, herbs, or other slight victuals, as Figs, Raisins, Nuts, Pears, Apples, Confections made up with Honey or Sugar, or some small fish.* For herein we must observe the custom. If we may take for our Rule the liberty, delicacies and excess which custom introduceth every day into Collations, there will be no bounds, and there will remain no appearance of Fasting at all, it being clear that men every day give themselves more liberty in this matter, and many times make Collations which are good Suppers, and which cost more than those which many persons of every condition, who neither do nor pretend to fast, do make all the year long.

Escobar follows *Azor* in this point: (2) *I know well, saith he, that Azor and others permit to eat little fishes at Collation, and I condemn it not if they eat a few.* *Azor* nor *Bauny* spoke of no more than one small fish, and *Escobar* makes him say that it is lawful to eat many. *Scio Azorium & alios permittere pisciculos*, because according to his Judgment, it is indeed lawful to eat more at a Collation, provided the quantity be not too great; *quod non imprebarim si sint pauci.* It will quickly be lawful, as we shall see presently, to eat a great fish at Collation, since many little ones are as much worth as a great one, and may be equal to it.

He adds also; (3) *For what concerns Pottage of Almonds and Pulse, the Doctors agree not; but he allows them, provided the quantity of them be not so great as that of fruit.* As soon as things concerning manners come to be deliberated of, and we begin only to doubt, these Doctors, who profess an easie and officious Divinity, will not fail to take the part of the flesh and blood, and to conclude for sensuality, and the carnal humor of worldly men.

We must conclude and finish this Point with a passage of *Tambourin* who speaks yet much more boldly, and is not so scrupulous as the rest. He saith, (4) *That the meats which are used in Lent, to wit, raw and boiled herbs, little or great fish salted, fresh or dried Fruits, Confections, Milk of Almonds or other Pulse, may be taken for Collation, which soever we love best, provided that the whole, with the bread eaten with them, exceed not the weight of eight ounces.*

ciant Doctores; permittit si quantitas permittam quantitatem frugum non exaequet. Ibid. 4 Dico de cibis communibus quadragesimalibus, herbis nimirum, sive crudis, sive elixis, piscibus sive parvis, sive magnis sale coctis, fructibus sive recentibus, sive siccis, dulciariis, pulvis ex amygdalarum cremore, ex leguminibus, ea accipi possunt in jentaculo quae cuilibet arrident, dummodo constarum ex pane ut sic & praestitis quod accipitur, non excedat uncias octo. *Tambour. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. sect. 3. num. 3.*

He must be very squeamish who cannot find in so great a diversity of meats what may satisfy his appetite, and a very great Eater who cannot be satisfied with the quantity he saith may be taken. And yet he adds that on *Christmas-Eve* we may double the weight, and take the quantity of sixteen ounces. Perhaps this is because on that day the Fast is greatest and most solemn. He proceeds in his indulgence, and saith, *We may add two ounces more to these eight, because*

sum:

N. 1. Sive *some hold it is too little; and though it may happen that eight ounces may suffice wholly*
 iis octo uncias *to satiate, it ceases not to be lawful to eat them; which was prudently introduced to*
 fames prorsus *remove scruples from some very religious persons.*
 extingatur, si-
 ve nequaquam.
 Id quod prudenter inventum est pro praxi, ne scilicet scrupulis pateret paulo religiosioribus vis. Dixi autem octo
 circiter uncias. Nam parum excedere addendo unam vel alteram unciam supra prædictas octo; esset ex nonnullorum
 sententia provilio materiæ, nec mortale præcatum constituens.

This without doubt is an excellent way to remove scruples, to take away all pains of the body for fear of creating any to the mind, and to allow religious Souls to satiate themselves at Collations, that they may be delivered from the care of watching over themselves, and from the pains they should take to restrain and moderate their appetites.

II. POINT.

24740

That according to the Jesuits Divinity we may on Fast-days drink as much as we please during our Refection, or after it, and take, every time we drink, a morsel of bread or some other thing, and be drunk also without intrenching on the Fast.

IT seems that all humane condescendence cannot reduce Fasting lower than these Jesuits do, whose opinions we are about to report. After they have said that we may anticipate the hour of Refection, and both dine and break-fast on Fast-days; that we may make our repast as good as we please, and better than on the days we fast not, so far as to proceed unto excess; that we may continue and lengthen it as much as we please; and after this make a Collation in the evening, which should be a true Supper; it might seem that there remained no difficulty in fasting, nor any appearance of any foot-step of that holy Severity wherewith it was instituted and faithfully observed in the Church, until these last Ages of Ignorance and Corruption have changed it in this manner.

Yet because the people of the World bred up in luxury and pleasures, are never contented with the indulgence and relaxation that is granted them, but demand always more, and find Fasting, such as it is at this day, too severe and troublefom, the Jesuits Divinity searches out new ways to satisfy them, and easily descends unto the lowest point of complacency.

1 Non violat jejunium qui extra con-
 suctam corporis
 refectioem bi-
 bit etiam vi-
 num & cervi-
 siam: id enim
 consuetudo tem-
 pore immemo-
 riali permittit.
 Layman lib. 4.
 rr. 8. c. 1. n. 7.
 pag. 194.

2 Ecclesia
 nunc diebus je-
 juniorum non
 prohibet potum,
 quandoquidem
 is per se ac
 principaliter
 non tendit ad
 corpus nutrien-
 dum, sed ad si-
 rim sedandam.
 Ibid.

First of all it maintains, that we may in the morning, as well as at other 24750
 times of the day, take as much wine, and as often as we please, without fear of
 breaking our Fast. (1) *He breaks not his Fast, saith Layman, who out of the time*
of the ordinary repast drinks Wine or Beer; because the custom of time beyond all me-
mory allows it.

He must never have heard of the manner of Fasting according to the Discipline
 of the Church in Ages past, to call it, as he doth, a custom beyond all memory,
 which was not introduced until of late times, and which is contrary to the De-
 claration which the Church hath publickly made in the Office of *Lent*, testifying
 to its Children that the Fast of *Lent* requires abstinence from drink as well as
 meat, whilst it causes daily to be said to excite us to keep it faithfully: *Uiamur*
ergo parcius verbis, cibis, & potibus, without putting any difference betwixt the
 one and the other.

But besides this custom so corrupt and opposite to the Laws and Discipline of
 the Church, this Doctor alledges also a reason which seems to him to be solid,
 saying, (2) *That the Church doth not at present forbid us to drink out of the time*
of refectioem on Fast-days, because it is not principally to nourish the body, but to quench
thirst. If this reason be true, eating will be no more forbidden than drinking.
 For as drinking is of it self a remedy against thirst, so eating is also a remedy
 against hunger; and if eating nourisheth by delivering us from hunger, drinking
 nourisheth us also by delivering us from thirst.

Tom. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 3. Artic. 2.

Thers

4670

There are even some drinks, as Wines and Beer, that nourish more than many slight meats. Whence it follows, that if the intention of the Church in the Precept of Fasting, as this Jesuit also testifies, and it is true, be to regulate and abridge the nourishment of the body, that it may be subjected unto the Spirit, and its vices and passions mortified, we must say that it indifferently forbids eating and drinking, which strengthen the body: which was exactly observed in the first Ages, wherein they knew no more what it was to drink wine, than to eat flesh on Fasting-days, as they may well know who have any understanding of the Antiquities of the Church, and the most loose of all the Casuists also do acknowledge, as *Bunny* in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 250. and many others, the Church thereby testifying that wine nourisheth and strengthens more than fish and other Lenten provision, which have been always allowed.

Yet if *Layman* had said, as some others, that thirst being more difficult to support, and in some sort more inconvenient than hunger, we might sometimes in case of necessity drink out of the time of refection, it had been more excusable; but he and most of his Brethren with him will have it, that we may drink as much and as often as we will on Fast-days, and even without necessity and without thirst, drinking to nourish our selves, and to allay our hunger, without offending against the Commandment of the Church. (1) *Wherefore, saith Layman, concluding his discourse, if any one drink Wine or Beer to appease his hunger, he doth nothing contrary to the Precept of the Church.*

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But what shall we say of a person that drinks on this fashion purposely to elude the Fast? He will not fail for all that to observe the Law of the Church, according to *Tambourin*, provided he drink neither milk nor broth, he may drink what he pleases, even for the pleasure alone which he takes therein. See his own words here: (2) *It is not lawful on a Fast-day to drink Milk or Pottage; but it is lawful to drink Wine, Must, Beer, Waters distilled from Herbs or Wine, and these even in the morning, and for pleasure only, and many times in the day, and to defeat the Fast.*

And for fear the drink should discompose or distaste us, especially taken on this manner in the morning without necessity or thirst, *Layman* holds that we may take a bit of bread after we have drunk. (3) *Thence it follows by the same reason, saith he, that when we drink after the hour of repast, it is lawful to take also a bit of bread, for fear that drinking should offend our health.* And if any person will drink ten or twelve times, as he may, according to these Casuists Rule, and yet more frequently without breaking their Fast, he may also every time take a morsel of bread, *ne potus noceat.*

780

Bunny who takes many things commonly out of *Layman*, follows him also in this point, saying in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 258. *He who, after he hath drunk to quench his thirst, eats a little bread, or who during the day shall hold in his mouth some Confection, doth he sin?* He would shelter himself under some Authors whom he cites, saying, *That they answer boldly, No, in as much as those things supply the place of medicine rather than food.* He approves this answer, without producing any other, testifying that he is indeed neither less bold, nor less complacent than these Authors, though he make shew of being more reserved, making use of their names to declare his own opinion in a point, which he believed might be ill received; because the looseness thereof appeared too visible.

He would notwithstanding in this great facility, which is as it were natural unto him, appear sometimes severe. For in the same Chapter amongst the things about which he would have a Confessor examine his Penitent about the matter of Fasting, he places this for the seventh: *Whether during the whole day he have taken any crum of bread never so small.* For in this, though there be no fault when it is done out of necessity; yet he cannot be excused from venial sin, who herein hath no other Rule but his concupiscence, which is so much more blameable, the oftner he hath taken the boldness to return thereto, and to take the same quantity at many several times, though it be little in it self. For though every one of them, considered singly, nourish not much, yet they do it, being joyned altogether; besides strengthening the body, they remove the difficulty of Fasting; and so deprive it of the end for which

1 Quameb-
rem si quis vi-
num aut cervi-
siam bibat gra-
tia famis sedan-
da, non agit
contra Ecclesie
preceptum.
Ibid.

2 Non licet
intra diem jeju-
nii ebibere lac
vel jus, sed licee
bibere vinum,
mustum, cervi-
siam, aquas ex
herbis vel eodem
vino distillas,
etiam de mane,
etiam eb totam
delectationem,
etiam multoties
in die, etiam in
fraudem jejunii.
*Tambur. lib. 4.
decal. c. 5. sect.
2. num. 4.*

3 His adde
eadem ratione
colligi cum ex-
tra tempore re-
fectionis bibi-
tur, licitum esse
paucillum panis
adjicere ne po-
tus noceat.
Ibid.

God and the Church instituted and ordained it to be done, which is to curb the flesh as with a bridle, and to bring the appetite into subjection unto reason.

It seems that this is a great severity for him to condemn this man of venial sin, but he sweetens it presently, and corrects himself in the same page where he makes this question. *And he who without hunger or thirst shall take on a Fasting-day at the request of a friend, some wine with a little morsel of bread and some few Comfits, sins he?* He names many Authors who blame this action as contrary to Fasting; but he forbears not to conclude with others who exempt it from sin, even from venial, whereof he relates this reason: *For that, say they, to act well and prudently is no offence.*

This is without doubt a rare prudence to prefer our being complacent to a friend, before the Laws of God and of the Church, and humane Courtesie before Christian Discipline. There is reason to call this *wisdom of the world*, and even to doubt if there be any wisdom in the world like this: For the people of the world would not have had the confidence to have violated the Laws of the Church at this time and at others more important, if others more wise than they in this worldly wisdom did not furnish them with reasons, and give them Expedients to confirm, or rather to deceive their consciences, in committing these excesses.

Escobar accords well enough with *Bauny* in this point. (1) *A friend prays me, saith he, to taste a small morsel on a Fasting-day; I do it out of civility to him, is it a venial sin? I answer, with Fagundez, that it is not. I permit him the liberty to drink as much and as often as he pleaseth.* And taking it for granted, that to drink breaks not the Fast, he demands, (2) *Whether we may take wine as often as we please, though it be in great quantity?* And he answers in one word, *Yes.* And acknowledging that by vertue of this permission we may be carried out unto excess, and drink beyond reason and temperance, he adds to justify his opinion,

(2) *That excess in drinking may indeed violate temperance, but not the Fast.* Whence he draws this Conclusion, which is a general Maxime in this matter, (3) *That whatsoever we drink, though it be taken frequently and in great quantity, as he said before, breaks not the Fast at all.*

The common reason of all those who hold this opinion, is, as we have already seen above, that drinking of it self nourisheth not. But there being drinks which nourish, as wine, they forbear not for all that to say, that we may take as much of it as we please, even without thirst, and only to nourish and strengthen ones self.

Escobar supposing, (4) *That a man takes wine after dinner to appease his hunger, and to nourish and sustain himself, demands whether this be to break his Fast?* He saith, (5) *That Azor believes it is.* But he condemns him boldly and strongly, saying, *That by the common opinion it is not to break it.* His reason is that which I now related: (6) *Because wine nourisheth not but by accident, and the Church forbids only things that nourish of themselves.*

It is true in general, that drink nourisheth accidentally, because there are drinks that nourish, and others which nourish not at all. But this is not by accident that wine nourisheth; it hath a force and natural vertue to nourish; and there is no wine that nourisheth not, more or less, according as it hath more or less strength.

And when the Church forbids or regulates the use of things which nourish, it considers not whether they nourish by accident or otherwise. *Meta-* physical distinctions enter not her Regulations nor Discipline, which is so true, and particularly in wine, that formerly it absolutely forbid the use of it in *Lent*, as well as of eggs and flesh.

As this Casuist gives liberty to drink wine or any other liquor as much and as often as we will, *quoties quis voluerit, & in magna quantitate*, he gives also liberty to eat as often as we drink. For propounding this question himself: (7) *It is lawful, every time we would drink, to take before-hand some little thing for fear the* frangere; *quis vinum alit per accidens: Ecclesia autem prohibet ea quae per se alunt.* *Ibid:* 7 *Licebit toties quoties frigidus potus hauriendus, aliquid ne noceat praesumere.* *Ibid. num. 18. pag. 261.*

1 Dic jejunium ab amico rogatus sumo modicum cibi urbanitatis gratia, num venialiter delinquo? Negativo cum Fagundez respondeo Escob. tr. 1. ex. 13. num. 77. pag. 214.

2 Dixi potum non violare jejunium, an vinum assumere potest quoties quis voluerit, licet in magna quantitate? Potest. Ibid. num. 74.

3 Immoderatio potest temperantiam violare, sed non jejunium. Ibid. num. 75.

4 Iraque quidquid potus est, jejunium non solvit. Ibid. num. 75.

5 Vinum quis in sustentationem sumit, & ad sedandam famem extra prandium, an frangit jejunium?

6 Afferit Azorius p. 1. l. 7. esp. 10. q. 4. ac certum est ex communi non frangere; quis vinum alit per accidens: Ecclesia autem prohibet ea quae per se alunt. Ibid: 7 Licebit toties quoties frigidus potus hauriendus, aliquid ne noceat praesumere. Ibid. num. 18. pag. 261.

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drink should hurt us? He answers, (1) That though Azor (who holds that this is lawful) except from this Rule certain meats; nevertheless the Doctors all w^o take indifferently all kind of meats, which we use in Lent, provided we take them not in great quantity.

1 Licet A-
zotius q. 7. ai-
quos cibos ab
hæc regula exci-
pist, Doctor. s
modica inquan-
tate omnem
cibum per mite-
tunt. *Ibid.*

There are Casuists who allow us to take somewhat after we have drunk, but he permits us to take it before we drink. They commonly allow us only to take bread, but he gives us liberty to take all that we can eat on Fast-days, omnem cibum, fish it self. For he excepts nothing.

Fasting will not without doubt be too severe for them that can do in this manner, drinking at all seasons whatsoever they will, and as much as they please, eating likewise every time they drink, bread, cheese, fish, or any other thing, whether after drinking, according to the more general Rule of these Casuists, or before it, according to the privilege Escobar gives; assuring us that we shall not for all this fail in fasting, provided that every time we eat we take but a little, though we may drink as much as we will, even to excess.

2 Jejunium
non violat po-
tus aquæ: u. vi-
ni, etiam si ali-
quid edatur ne
potus nocet:
nec si factum fi-
nico prandio,
parum edat, ro-
gatus ab amico
concedente illud
enim pars pran-
dii censetur, nec
si horam pran-
dii ex causa
prevenis. *Sæ*
verb. jejunium
num. 8. p. 317

Though Emanuel Sa speaks nothing singular nor novel upon this matter, which hath not been already said by others whom I have already quoted, yet because his contains in it the opinion of many, he doing nothing but collect and reduce into an Abridgment the most common opinions of the Society, it will not be impertinent to relate his words in this place. (2) To drink water or wine is no violation of the Fast, though you eat something therewith, for fear it should do you some hurt, no more than to eat a little after dinner, when a friend not yet risen from dinner, entertains you; because this passes also for a part of your dinner, as also to hasten the hour of dinner when there is some cause to do it. These words are as it were an Abridgment of all that others have said concerning the liberty of drinking wine, of eating with our drink, of prolonging our refection, and preventing the hour of dinner. For he speaks of all these things absolutely, and almost without any limitation.

III. POINT.

That according to the Jesuits Dispensations which they give in Fasting, hardly any person is obliged to Fast.

After Fasting is reduced to this point, changed and corrupted in this manner, that it deserves not so much as the name of a Fast, and cannot serve so much as to regulate the life of a person who is any thing sober, it may seem that there is no more occasion to speak of a Dispensation for fasting, there being indeed no more any real Fast, nor difficulty to pass over the Fasting-days, according to these Doctors Maxims, since sobriety alone commanded all men, and at all times, obliges us to more than what these people pretend that we are obliged to by the Churches Fast. Nevertheless these moderate Divines that take such part with the flesh and the world, proceed yet farther, and dispense with the greatest part of men in all sorts of conditions for Fasting, not only to ease them of the pain and difficulty, if any be to be found in Fasting, according to their Rules, but also to take away from it every thing which might put a stop to their lusts, and to give them an entire liberty to do whatsoever they please.

1. First, They will have the obligation to Fasting to commence only at the age of 21 years; and that it ceases commonly at sixty. Whereupon Tambourin raises a question worthy himself. (3) If one, saith he, accomplish the age of twenty one at one of the clock after midnight of a Fasting-day ensuing, is he bound to fast that day? He answers, That if this first hour belong not to the twenty second year, he is not obliged to fast that day, because he might have eaten this first hour and so broken his Fast. So exact is he to maintain intemperance against Fasting, that he would not lose one single hour, and by this one hour he will gain a whole

3 Si quis in
prima hora me-
die noctis hoc
die quo jejunan-
dum est, impleat
annum viginti-
mum primum &
teneat h. prima

hora pertinet ad annum vigesimum secundum talis ætatis in quo urget præceptum. Si sit natus in ipsa prima hora medie noctis, non obligatur. *Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. sect. 7. num. 2.*

day entire, and thereby discharge it of the obligation of Fasting; as if the liberty he gives to eat, could avail more in one hour than the most holy Law of God and the Church in a whole day.

2. In the second place, Father Bauny dispenses for this obligation with *Labourers, Vine-dressers, Masons, Joyners, and generally all Handicrafts and Artificers.*

This is in his Sum, Chap. 16. pag. 262. & 263. Out of other Casuists, whose opinion he rather approves than condemns, he adds unto them *Painters, Taylors, Barbers, Chirurgeons, with Weavers, Bakers, Shoemakers; as also Scholars, Travellers, Pleaders, (Attorneys and Counsellors) and poor People.*

To these he adds such as have any infirmity of body or mind: And in the 261 page he saith generally, *They who complain of pain in head, heart, or stomach, and who being empty and without food cannot sleep, are not comprised under this Precept.* His reason is, *that the Church intends not to oblige us with this rigour, that we ought to the prejudice of our health, or lessening our strength to follow its pleasure.*

Fasting moderated and regulated, according to the order of the Church, doth rather repair our strength and health than diminish them, as appears by the testimony the Church it self gives in its Prayers, and by the experience and consent of the most expert and able Physitians. But though it should diminish them a little, and bring some incommody to the body, ought we to conclude from thence that we were dispensed with, the intent of God and the Church being to give some trouble to the flesh, that it might do Penance for the pleasure given it, and to mortifie it, at least for some time, after it had been pampered and nourished with too much tenderness all the rest of the year.

Tambourin extends the Dispensation for Fasting yet farther than Bauny. For after he had said, (1) *That it is very certain that those who are notably sick, are exempt from Fasting, though they have fallen into this sickness by their own proper fault, he adds, that the same must be said of a sick person unto whose health Fasting might happily conduce. For being otherwise truly weak, he is exempt from the obligation to fast, though by accident Fasting might be beneficial unto him. Whence it follows, that if he fast not, he sins indeed against the temperance and charity he owes to himself, but not against the Precept of the Church.*

Idem de eo infirmo cui forte conducerent ad sanitatem jejuniis— Idem de eo qui noctu dormire per notabile tempus non potest nisi coener. Iis enim esset onerosum sic jejunare— neque hunc obligo mane jentare seq; sero plene reficere, quo pacto jam jejunium sarrum rectum conservare, non obligo, inquam, licet commode id facere quest. Nemo in jejunando est obligandus ad extraordinaria remedia, & ad relinquendum suum jus comedendi circa meridiem. Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. sect. 7. num. 14.

He speaks of a man who is fallen into a disease by his own fault, for example, intemperance, for the expiation whereof he is obliged to fast, according to the Rules of Penance. He supposes also that Fasting is a remedy for his disease, and profitable to his health. So that in not fasting he sins against the Laws of the Church, of temperance and of charity which he owes to himself, hurting his health already impaired, and augmenting his disease. And for all that he pretends that because he is sick he is dispensed with for Fasting. That is to say, that the same disease which obligeth him to fast, dispenseth with him for it; and the Church which dispenseth with none but for to relieve their weakness; agrees to this dispensation, which relieves not, but hurts him, and pretends not to oblige him unto a Fast, which, if it commanded him not, he could not omit without sin.

The same must be said of him, adds the same Author, who cannot sleep in the night of a considerable time, unless he sup. For he would be over-charged too much by fasting in this manner. I would not oblige him neither to so much as to make his Collation in the morning, in which case the Fast would continue without intermission, though he might do it conveniently; for no man is bound to do extraordinary things that he may fast, and to abandon the right which he hath to eat about Noon.

The Indulgence of the Church in suffering and permitting to eat at Noon on Fasting-days is a right, according to this Casuist, which its Children may make use of against it to the neglect of its Commandment. He finds not that it is need-

ful to do any thing extraordinary, nor to the least change in the order or hour of our repast to keep the Fast, and obey the Church. And in another place he finds it very reasonable that to content a friend, for his own benefit, pleasure, or any the least reason in the world, and even without reason, we should alter the usual course of our repast, and advance the time two or three hours or more, if we will.

(1) Finally we must say the same, so this Author goes on, of him who unless he sup well, is troubled to get heat; because this is judged in some sort prejudicial to his health. There are who pretend to be dispensed with for Fasting, because it heats the blood, say they, and causes headach; and this man would dispense with it, because it chills the feet, and hinders sleep. I pass by these ridiculous excuses and visible contradictions, and observe only that these people take the liberty to say whatsoever comes in their minds, and make use of all sorts of reasons to fight against the truth, and know to turn to the right and the left, not as S. Paul, to go unto God, and conduct his neighbour thither; but rather to confound the ways of God, make his Commands obscure, and to teach men thereupon to violate them without fear of punishment. (2) That infirmity or some notable prejudice of health hinders the common actions of every person, and we judge that he who after his usual labour cannot, if he fast, conveniently perform these actions, is much damnified by the Fast. Whence it follows, that if Fasting makes a Scholars head ache, or disturb his Studies; if a woman cannot, by reason of her Fasting, conveniently attend her household affairs; if a man perform the exercises of his profession with more difficulty; for that cause he is not obliged thereto, nor others such like. That is to say, that Fasting which is commanded for our mortification, is not obliging when it mortifies us; and that we may be obliged to fast, we must be able to do it commodiously and without difficulty:

1 Idemquidē
co de eo qui de
ne ēte abſq; per
fecta cœna ca
leſieri notabi
ter nequit. *Ibid.*

2 Ila infir
mitas notabilis
est quæ opera
tiones ordina
rias cuſlibet
perſonæ impe
dit, ita ut qui
conſuetudo ſuo o
perandi modo
eas exercere
commode cum
iunio nequeat
ſi Scholaſticus

quomodocumque cum difficultate studeat; si mulier ex debilitate jejunii servitia domus incommode operetur: si vic suum officium atemque jejunando difficulter exercet, ex hoc capite à jejunando legitime excusabuntur. *Ibid.* num. 17.

It appears clearly that, according to these Maxims of the Jesuits, few people are obliged to the Fasts of the Church, though they have been generally instituted for all the Faithful, observed in all Ages past by all those who had any fear of God, of what condition soever they were, and that the Church hath always thus understood it, as may yet farther appear, seeing that in the general Commandment which it hath given so many Ages since, it doth not, nor ever did except any condition, exercise, or sort of life.

But the Jesuits leave hardly any Profession which they exempt not from Fasting. (3) The Office or Mystery, saith Tambourin, which a man exercises, if it be laborious, as (there are scarce any which are not) exempts him of it self from Fasting, and though there be some in the same Trade who can endure Fasting, yet he is not obliged— For example, a strong Labourer, and who can fast with ease, is not obliged to fast, though he be very rich, because all Labourers as such are exempt. And besides this, the Church hath no intention to deprive the Faithful of the exercise of their Trades, and course of life. It must be added, that in establishing the Precept of Fasting for all those who could bear it, it had an intention not to exempt those who should make false pretences for their not observing it. It seems that he would have us believe that the Laws of the Church regard not the Salvation of every one in particular; but that they are only general Ordinances of an outward Policy, and therefore odious and unjust, from which every one may save and exempt himself that can.

3 Officiū
& ars quam
quis exercet, si
sit ex se labori
osa, hominem
per se liberat à
jejunio; & ita
quidem etiam si
in illo exercitio
quis inveniat
posse tolerare je
junium, adhuc
ad illud non ad
stringetur—
Arator etiam
robustus pari

entissimusque inedia; imo etiam ditissimus, non obligatur ad jejunium, quia per se omnes aratores excusantur, & ex alia parte Ecclesie non intendit privare Fideles suo officio modoque vivendi. *Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. sect. 7.* num. 18.

1 Dico pro-
per authorita-
tem Doctorum
esse probabile
nulos artifices,
arque adeo Su-
tores obligari
ad jejunia. *Ibid.*
num. 28.

2 Propter
eandem ratio-
nem poterit quis
ex Escob. tr. 1.
exam. 13. de je-
junio cap. 3. o-
perarios condu-
cere cum pacto
ut non jejunent,
ne alias minus
laborent. *Ibid.*
sect. 6. num. 4.

He adds also more particularly, (1) *That it is probable, because of the Authority of the Doctors who are of that Judgment, that no Handicrafts, and by consequence neither are Taylors obliged to fast.* And so the Artificers, and those who labour in bodily occupations, making up the greater number, in comparison of whom the rest of Mankind are small in number, the Precept of Fasting shall be of small use, and shut up in very narrow bounds.

But least any resentment of Christianity should induce the Artificers to fast, Escobar cited and confirmed by Tambourin, (2) *permits those who hire Workmen, to condition with them not to fast, for fear they should work less.* Thus they would have us love God above all things, and our neighbour as our selves, by hindering him from rendering that obedience he ought and would yield unto the Church, that he may be possibly a little better served, and gain some small matter in the days work of an Artificer in a time of Alms and Charity.

The Monks and Clergy-men themselves may find reasons in these grave Divines to exempt them from Fasting. For 1. They who work with their hands, or who travel abroad about their affairs, may enjoy the privilege which Bauny hath given Workmen, Artificers, (Counsellors and Attorneys) Those who are employed in Study, Confessions, Missions, Preaching, should not be used with less favour than Advocates and Students. *Those who climb the Pulpit, saith Bauny also, pag. 263. every day in Lent, are not obliged to fast, because of the extreme toil they are obliged unto by their Profession.* And there is the same reason for Confessors and Missionaries, who spend whole days almost in Confession, and Professors who commonly ascend their Chairs twice a day, and continue therein commonly longer than Preachers.

It is true he dispenses with Preachers under a condition which he hath taken from some Authors a little straiter laced than himself, *who restrain, saith he, pag. 263. this universal and general Proposition, to those who have not strength enough to preach and fast both at once, in which case they exempt them from the obligation to Fasting, and not otherwise.* And he saith after the same thing of Readers and Confessors. *As for Readers and Confessors, they must know that upon their strength depends the Judgment they ought to make of themselves and their obligation to fast. For if without hurt to their bodies they can do it, and wishal read and perform their duty to their Penitents in their Confessions, and afflict their flesh at the same time with abstinence practised in the Church on these holy days; Fagundez and Diana hold it for an indubitable Maxime, that they cannot be exempted without sin.*

I know not how it comes to pass, that they perceive not that the same reason they have in this manner to restrain the Dispensation for Fasting which they grant to Preachers and Confessors, doth also oblige them in like manner to restrain that which they give unto Artificers, Labourers, Travellers, and all other sorts of people. For if they can fast in their exercise and labour, by what reason should not they be obliged as well as Preachers *who have strength enough to preach and fast both at once?*

If Confessors and Readers ought to consider, *that upon their strength depends the Judgment they ought to make of themselves and their obligation to fast, wherefore may we not say the same thing indifferently of all sorts of persons, of what quality, age, or profession soever? And what hinders but that we may declare unto them, that if without prejudice to their bodies, they can fast and do all that also which belongs unto their duty, they are thereunto obliged, and that it is an indubitable Maxime, that they cannot dispense with themselves therein without sin?* Are they less Children of the Church than others, and are they less obliged to obey their Mother, and to employ themselves with all their power to give testimony of their good affection towards her, which cannot be good, if it incline not to do that which it hath power to do?

Father Bauny should remember the Doctrine of S. Antonin and others whom he quotes upon the same subject, pag. 261. who speaking of the age at which we are obliged to fast, *hold, saith he, that herein we ought to have regard to every ones strength and complexion, and to the proportion of their greatness and littleness, for judging of the obligation of this Precept.*

Some Rules may well be established to judge who are obliged to fast; but there is nothing more certain nor more reasonable than to say, that this ought to be regulated by the strength of every one particularly. For if we can fast without any notable inconvenience, what pretence can we have to exempt our self from it? We dispense with them who, according to the opinion of the Casuists themselves, are of age to fast; and who are not engaged in any profession nor exercise which might excuse them from it, when they have not strength for it. Wherefore then do they not oblige those to fast who are strong enough, and who can do it without prejudice to their bodies, though they are in some toilsom Trade, or are not yet of the age which might oblige them thereto, according to the Rules of these Casuists themselves?

Emanuel Sa alleges these same causes with Father Banny to dispense with Fasting, and he hath added others to them, of which this is one: (1) *When Fasting hinders the Husband from performing the Marriage-duty towards the Wife, or causes the Woman to be disliked by her Husband.*

Fillius saith the same thing in other words: (2) *Hence it follows, that a Woman is exempt from Fasting, for the preservation of the love which her Husband bears towards her.* He repeats it again in another place, where he saith, (3) *That if a Husband cannot discharge his Marriage-duty fasting, or a Woman become displeasing to her Husband through leanness or paleness, they are both exempt from Fasting.*

1 Causa reddendi conjugii debitum, vel non displicendi, si hæc jejunio impediuntur. Sa verbo jejunium num. 9. pag. 338.
2 Sequitur uxorem excusari à jejunio ra-

tionem conservandi amorem mariti erga ipsam. *Fillius tom. 1. tract. 10. cap. 9. num. 306. pag. 317.* 3 Tum vic non potens reddere debitum jejunando, tum uxor non valens se reddere gratam viro ob maciem vel pallorem, excusatur à jejunio. *Fillius tom. 2. tract. 27. cap. 6. num. 119. pag. 289.*

Heretofore Fasting dispensed with persons for Marriage-duties, according to the order and custom commonly observed in the Church; and at this day the duties of Marriage dispense with Fasting, according to the Rules of these new Casuists.

They who say that the Wife for fear of displeasing her Husband, and Husband his Wife, *causa non displicendi*, may be dispensed with in a Fast ordained by the express Command of God and the Church, might very well by the same reason have excused Adam from sin, or at least have said, that he had not committed any great sin in eating only an Apple, giving way thereto, that he might not grieve his Wife, *causa non displicendi*, as many of the Ancients speak.

Tambourin hath not only taken care of married persons, he speaks also in favour of those who would marry. (4) *A young Maid, saith he, that would marry, if by Fasting continually all the Lent, she notably blemish her beauty, is exempt from Fasting.*

Emanuel Sa saith also in the same place, (5) *That one may be justly excused from Fasting, when he cannot do it without great trouble.* As if Fasting were not in it self troublesome, and were not instituted to cause pain, to subdue and mortify the flesh, being an action of Penance which brings along with it pain and difficulty; besides they who have most pain in, and most opposition unto Fasting, have commonly more need thereof than others, and their trouble is oftentimes more in their minds than in their bodies, and comes rather from effeminateness and daintiness than want of strength.

4 Libetatur puella nubere volens, si ex continuato jejunio quadragiesimæ speciei: a-tem faciei notabiliter amitteret. Tambur. lib. 4. decal. 5. scilicet. 7. num. 45.
5 Dispensandi causa justa est, magna in jejunando difficultas. Sa verbo jejunium n. 10. pag. 338.

Escobar saith the same thing, and brings the same reasons with Banny and Sa for dispensing with Fasting: and thereupon proposes this question: (6) *What must be said of him who soils to an ill purpose, as in debauchery with women? His reason is, that he cannot break his Fast, that he may be able to commit that crime; but if he have committed it, he may break it to recover his strength, and for fear of tiring and enfeebling himself yet more.* If he had not fallen into debauchery, he had been obliged to fast, so that the penance for his crime shall be a dispensation from Fasting. Tambourin saith that he willingly admits this opinion as certain.

6 Quid de laborante ob malum suum, ut libidinis, v. c? Non potest jejunium

solvere ut vires colligat ad crimen perpetrandum, sed potest ad vires reparandas, lassitudini, jejunio soluto, occurrere. *Escobar tract. 1. exam. 13. cap. 2. num. 23. pag. 204. Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. scilicet. 7. num. 32.*

Fillinius proposes in a manner the same difficulty, supposing that some one or other demands of him, (1) *Whether he who labours in some wicked design, as to kill a man, or in pursuing a woman whom he would abuse, or in doing some such like thing, be obliged to fast.* He answers, (2) *That such a person would sin indeed, because of the wicked design he hath; but that having toiled and wearied himself in the execution thereof, he is to be excused from Fasting.* He adds that there are some who are of the same opinion with him, but upon this condition; (3) *That this be not done with an express intention to elude the Commandment of Fasting.* But he finds them too rigorous, and taking part with others, who are more favourable to these persons tired with debauchery, and overwhelmed with crimes, he adds, (4) *That there are others who say with better reason, that these persons have done ill to reduce themselves to that inability to fast; but that having done it, they are exempt from Fasting.* (5) *Escobar* puts the same question, supposing that some person had given himself unto debaucheries till he is tired, with a design to deliver himself from the obligation of Fasting. And knowing well *Fillinius's* answer, though he disproves it not, yet he finds it so infamous and shameful, that to spare the reputation of his Brother, he cites it without naming him. (6) *There is one learned man, saith he, who dissenses with Fasting in this case.*

1 Dices an qui malo sine laboraret, ut ad aliquem occidendum, vel ad insequendam amicum, vel quid similes, teneretur ad jejunium? 2 Respondeo talem peccatorum quidem ex ma o sine; ac secuta fatigatione excusaretur à jejunio. *Fillinius supra num. 123. pag. 289.* 3 Nisi fieret in fraudem jejunii. 4 Sed melius alii culpam quidem esse in apponenda causa fractionis jejunii ac ea posita, excusari à jejunio. *Ibid.* 5 Quid si in jejunii fraude n sele nimium fatigasset? *Escobar tract. 1. exam. 13. num. 45. pag. 209.* 6 Adhuc liberatur à docto.

If Dispensations be favours, as all agree they are, without doubt a Murderer or a Rake-hell deserves well of the Jesuits that they should grant, or rather that they should offer it him, for fear he should not dare to demand it of them when he cannot observe the Fast because of his debauches.

If Dispensations ought not to be given but only to those who have just cause to demand them, according as the Laws of the Church ordain, and the Bishops and Popes practise, never granting any but upon reasons that are alledged to them, we must say, according to these Casuists, that an honest and lawfuller reason to demand a Dispensation for Fasting cannot be alledged than that which is grounded on these two horrible crimes. And if sincerity and honest meaning be required also much more for the just obtaining of a Dispensation, and to the right usage of it, there is no doubt but it is to be found altogether in him who being resolved not to fast, and seeking out some means to deceive the Church, and to elude its Command, sees no better pretence to exempt himself therefrom, than to disable himself to observe it, by tiring himself in the pursuit and execution of a murder, adultery, or other crime. So that two horrible crimes joynd with contempt of the Church, and a will not to obey its Command, will be a just cause and sufficient motive to give him a Dispensation, according to *Fillinius's* words: *Qui malo sine laboraret, ut ad aliquem occidendum, aut insequendam amicum, vel ad simile quiddam secuta defatigatione excusaretur à jejunio*, though the design of this man were to deride the Church, deceive it, and elude its Command: *Esi fieret in fraudem.*

After this, all pretences which may be taken up to dispense with a Fast, be they most unjust, may appear reasonable: and we shall not find even that so strange which this Jesuit saith also, (6) *That the Pope may dispense with all sorts of persons for Fasting, though it were for their whole lives, and even without any cause.* *Tambourin* saith the same thing in a more odious manner against the Church and Pope. (7) *It suffices, saith he, to the Pope for to dispense with Fasting, that he hath a design to shew his kindness towards some person who hath obliged him.* If it be kindness to dispense with Fasting commanded by the Church, it is rigour contrary to the affection and humanity of the Church to command it. And this is to use the Pope in a base manner, and unbecoming his Holiness and Greatness, to will that he should pay his debts, and acknowledge the Services done him, at the charge of the Church, and to the prejudice of the obedience which all the Faithful owe unto its Commands.

6 Papat posse dispensare quemcumque, etiam per coram vitam, etiam sine causa. *Ibid. n. 126. p. 290.* 7 Sufficit ad dispensandum, quia Papa vult se benignum alicui bene merito ostendere. *Tambour. lib. 4. decal. c. 5. sect. 7. num. 53.*

That which *Escobar* saith is no less extravagant : (1) That no person who cannot sleep when he hath not supped is obliged to fast. And he adds, that which is more strange : (2) That if this person by making his Collation in the morning, and reserving his supper till night, could fast, he would not be obliged therunto, because no person is obliged to pervert the order of his repast.

1 Dormire quis nequit nisi sumpta coena, teneatne jejunare? Minime.
2 Si sufficere collationem respiciatur.

culam sumere; & vespere coenare, teneatne? Non tenetur; quia nemo tenetur pevertere ordinem.

If he had been well informed of the order of Fasting, and the manner wherein it was instituted in the Church, he would have known that there was no order of repast in Fasting; because the order of Fasting is, that we take but one refection, and that at supper, as *Bellarmin* himself and many others acknowledge; and so they that dine on Fast-days do pervert the order of Fasting rather than they who make their Collation in the morning, and sup at night, if the Church of its usual kindness did not tolerate dinners on these days, and slight Collations at night.

(3) This same Jesuit gives us also another Expedient to exempt us from Fasting without necessity and dispensation; which is to depart from the place where the Fast is, and to go to another place where it is not observed. And if any think that this is to deceive our selves, whilst we think to deceive the Church, *Filiutius*, as we have already observed, answers in a like case; (4) That this is not to deceive the Church, nor to elude its Command; but only to avoid the obligation of the Commandment, in pursuance of the right which every man hath to do it when he can; that is to say, that if the Church hath a right to command a Fast or Mass, we have also a right to avoid them, and to do all we can, that we may not be obliged to obey it; and after this we shall not cease, in the Judgment of the Jesuits, to be faithful and obedient Children of the Church; because we neither offend nor deceive in making use of this right: *Non est ulla fraus si quis utatur jure suo.*

3 Potestne aliquis alio se conferre ut jejunium viciat? Egregius posse respondet. *Ibid.* num. 64. p. 212.

4 Proprie loquendo non est ulla fraus si quis jure suo utatur; & potius est fugere obligationem precepti. *Filiutius mor. qq. tom. 2. cap. 7. n. 116. pag. 261.*

The last question which I shall report here concerning the dispensing with Fasts, and the use of meats on Fasting-days, is *Escobars* also. (5) He demands if we may on Fast-days give flesh to children under seven years old? To which he answers, that they may eat it before they attain that age. He demands a little after whether in case they have the use of reason before that age, we may make them eat flesh? And his answer is; that we may; because it is by accident that the use of reason in any person prevents that age. It behoves them therefore who would give flesh to these children not to seem to know that they have the use of reason; and that they may eat with a safer conscience, to present it to them without acquainting them that the Church forbids them to eat it. That we may hold them in this ignorance, and conceal from them their fault, they must be hindered from learning the Commandments of the Church, and must not be brought to Church, where they are published every Lords-day.

5 Quid de pueris? Ante septennium comedere carnes possunt. *Ibid.* num. 10. p. 202.

Dixitne possunt carnes pueris ante septennium si sunt de liberi casibus? Possunt, quia accidentale est good in aliquo usus rationis acceleretur. *Ibid.* n. 52. pag. 210.

He saith the same thing of Pagans, and those that have lost their Wits, consenting that we may make them eat flesh on Fast-days as well as children; because the one sort have no use of reason, and the other are not subject to the Commands of the Church.

Quid de Paganis? Etiam, quia non tenentur legibus Christianorum. Quid de amencibus? Cum pueris ante septennium computandi. *Ibid.* n. 52. p. 210.

By this same reason we may suffer Fools and Infants to blaspheme, and tolerate them in all sorts of crimes; because having no reason, they sin not in committing them. We may make them also to violate all the Laws of the Church who are Infidels; because they acknowledge not the Church, and are not subject unto it; but rather are its declared enemies. As if a Father who had forbid something to be done in his house under grievous penalties, could take it well for his Son to cause it to be done by a stranger or a fool, not daring to do it himself. In the mean time they would have the Church to be well satisfied with a Christian who out of a Frolick causes its Laws to be violated in his house by his household-servants, under pretence that they are Children, Fools, or Infidels.

They must be Fools or Infants that can believe so great a Paradox, and worse

than an Infidel, to have so little care of their Household, and to proceed to so gross and visible a contempt of the Church and Religion.

But may we not at least condemn those who induce others to violate the Fast? *Tambourin* who hath had a care to secure Victuallers in this point, saith, (1) *That when they probably believe that those who come to their houses, break not their Fast, it is evident that an Inn-keeper or Cook may give and sell them victuals. And though they doubt whether or no they violate the Fast, they yet may do it, because we ought not presume that a man is wicked unless we know it: And by consequence we must not presume that he will break his Fast. But if they know probably or certainly that they will break it, it is more difficult to grant them this permission; yet we grant it them with probability enough; because the Victualler provides not these meats, nor provokes us to buy them with a direct intention that we should break our Fast, or sin; but that he might get their money, as all Buyers know.*

25010

Quando probabiliter putantur accedentes non violaturi jejunium, possunt ea oportet vendere, atque invitare. Sed quid si sit dubium? A ihuc poterunt; quia nisi certo constet contrarium, nemo est presumendus in malis. At quando probabiliter vel certo sciunt violaturos, concessu est difficilius: Concedimus tamen facis probabiliter..... quia ministratio illa, imo ulteriores invitatio non fit a caupone vel venditore, directe alliciendo ad non jejunandum; atque adeo ad peccandum: sed ad lucrum expiscandum. Tambur. lib. 4. decal. cap. 5. sect. 6. num. 4. & 7.

See here a motive very capable to purifie this action. Interest which spoils the best things, and corrupts the most holy actions, purifies and justifies this which of it self is vicious. By this reason it will be lawful for a Merchant to sell poyson to a man whom he knows certainly will take it or give it to another to destroy him; since as poyson kills the body, so meats taken against the Churches Prohibition kill the Soul: and he that sells the poyson hath no more than he that sells the meat, a direct intention to kill or commit a spiritual or corporal murder; but only to benefit himself by this murder, and to get money by the sale of this meat and poyson, which are the cause of this murder. And so it will be lawful to induce any person whomsoever to violate all the Commands of the Church and God himself, if therein we find our interest, and can draw thence some temporal benefit.

A R T I C L E III.

25016

Of the Commandment to communicate at *Easter*, and of the Confession to be made every year.

That according to the Jesuits Divinity these Commandments may be satisfied by true Sacriledges.

THe Jesuits expound not the Commandment to communicate at *Easter* more Christian-like than the other Commandments of the Church. They pretend that it may be satisfied by a sacrilegious Communion, and by receiving the Body of Jesus Christ with a criminal conscience, nay, though we know that we are in this estate and in mortal sin. This opinion is common in their School, and passes there for indubitable. (2) *He that receives the Eucharist unworthily on Easter-day, satisfies the Precept, quoth Emanuel Sa.*

2 Eucharistiam indigne sumens in die Paschatis, satisfacet præcepto. sa verbo Eucharist. in fine. pag. 233.

(3) *Escobar* supposes a person to communicate unworthily, and saith that he faileth not for all that to accomplish the Precept, though he receive the Body of Jesus Christ in this estate voluntarily: that is to say, though he commit Sacriledge voluntarily, as the rest whom we shall relate hereafter say it openly.

3 Quid si indigne communicem? Implet tamen per voluntariam susceptionem præceptum. Escobar 1747. l. 1. c. 12. cap. 2. num. 15. pag. 196.

Filius saith the same thing almost in the same terms. He demands, (1) *Whether this Precept may be accomplished by receiving the Sacrament voluntarily, though unworthily? And his answer is, that it is accomplished.*

An im-
pletur præce-
ptum per volun-
tariam suscepti-
onem Sacra-
menti, etiam si
indigne suscipi-
atur? Respon-
deo & dico pri-
mo impleri.
Filius. qq. mor.
tom. 1. tract. 4.
cap. 2. num. 66.
pag. 74.

Amicus is of the same opinion, and he expounds it yet better than others. (2) *I hold absolutely, saith he, that the Precept of the Church touching the Eucharist is fulfilled even by a sacrilegious Communion.* This is a strange manner of obeying the Church by committing Sacriledges, and it is to honour it very much to imagine that it may be satisfied with Sacriledges. It must needs be that they who believe it to be capable of this, have an horrible opinion of it; they must believe that it commands Sacriledges, if they believe that by obeying it, they may be committed, and it may be satisfied by these same Sacriledges. For when it commands any thing, it cannot be satisfied otherwise than by doing what it commandeth.

2 Ecclesia-
sticum præcep-
tum Eucharistiæ
omnino censo
impleri, etiam
per sacrilegam
manducationem.
Amicus
tom. 2. disp. 29.
sect. 5. num. 53.
pag. 401.

Jesus Christ hath said in the Gospel, that they who despise the Church and its Pastors, despise himself; and these Jesuits make the Church to say, that those who despise Jesus Christ, and dishonour him outragiously by a sacrilegious Communion, cease not to obey and satisfy it by fulfilling its Commandment.

Celot having undertaken to prove against *Aurelius*, that the Laws of the Church and Gospel may be accomplished without love, speaks thus against him: (3) *Aurelius cannot doubt but that he who communicates at Easter in mortal sin, satisfies the Command of the Church, and yet though he accomplisheth not the Justice of the Law, he accomplisheth for all that the Justice of Works.* He would not that his Adversary should doubt of this Maxime, though he knew well enough that he did not only doubt of it, but condemn it.

3 Non enim
post disputata
cum Judæis dis-
putare potest
Aurelius, q. 2
Paschalem ty-
rannim cum
conscientiis le-
thalis peccati
celebraverit,
quin is nihilomi-
nus Ecclesiæ
paruerit, & ju-
stissimum operum;
si non justiciam
legis impleverit.

Coninck, to prove that the Commandment of the Church may be fulfilled, not only in an estate of sin, but also by an action which is a sin, brings an Example of a man who communicates unworthily at Easter. (4) *As it is clear, saith he, in his case who fasts for vain-glory, or communicates unworthily at Easter.* Which he propounds as a constant Maxime, and of which it was not lawful to make any doubt, saying, (5) *That it is certain that he satisfies the Precept of the Church, who makes shew of Fasting for devotion, and of communicating at Easter with requisite piety, though he fasteth out of vain-glory, and commits Sacriledge in communicating.*

4 Ut patet
in jejunante eb-
riano glorians
aut in Paschate
indigne com-
municante. *Co-
ninck de Sacra-
m. q. 83. a. 6. uni-
v. n. 296. p. 286.*

This is also the opinion of *Azor*, answering those who demand, (6) *Whether he who receives the Sacrament of the Eucharist unworthily on Easter-day, whether it be that he hath not well confessed his sins, or for some other defect which renders him guilty of mortal sin, do accomplish the Precept of the Church?* For he saith, (7) *That he accomplisheth the Precept of the Church.* And his reason is: *Because though he violate the Law of God by approaching the Sacrament in a wicked estate; yet he observes the Law of the Church in the substance of it.* Whereunto he adds for a second reason, or as an explication of the former, (8) *That the Church by its Command requires no other thing, but that approaching at Easter unto the sacred Mysteries of the Eucharist, we receive them in some manner whatsoever it be.*

5 Num cer-
tum est eum satisfacere præcepto Ecclesiæ qui simulat se jejunare ex pietate, & pie in Paschate communicare, etsi jejunet ob vanam gloriam & sacrilege communitet. *Ibid.* 6 An qui in die Paschatis Sacramentum Eucharistiæ accipit indigne, videlicet aut sua peccata non legitime confessus, aut alio quolibet modo lethalis peccati conscientius, Ecclesiæ præceptum implet? 7 Respondeo eum implere. Is enim licet jus divinum frangat aut violente male ad Sacramentum accedendo, legis tamen Ecclesiasticæ substantiam servat. *Azor Instit. lib. 7. cap. 30. pag. 734.* 8 Nimirum Ecclesia nihil aliud sua lege sanxit, nisi ut in Paschate ad sacra mysteria accedentes, ejus participes efficiamur. *Ibid.*

Azor answering those who demand, (6) *Whether he who receives the Sacrament of the Eucharist unworthily on Easter-day, whether it be that he hath not well confessed his sins, or for some other defect which renders him guilty of mortal sin, do accomplish the Precept of the Church?* For he saith, (7) *That he accomplisheth the Precept of the Church.* And his reason is: *Because though he violate the Law of God by approaching the Sacrament in a wicked estate; yet he observes the Law of the Church in the substance of it.* Whereunto he adds for a second reason, or as an explication of the former, (8) *That the Church by its Command requires no other thing, but that approaching at Easter unto the sacred Mysteries of the Eucharist, we receive them in some manner whatsoever it be.*

Nay he saith, that not only he who is guilty of mortal sin, but also an Excommunicate or interdicted person approaching to the Altar, and receiving the Body of Jesus Christ in that disposition, doth satisfy the Commandment of receiving the Sacrament at Easter. He inquires, (9) *Whether the same judgment may be past on him who being excommunicated or interdicted approaches to the Sacrament, with that he had already made of him who receives it in an estate of mortal sin?* An

9 Rogabis
an idem sit ju-
dicium de eo
qui excommu-
nicatione vel interdico adstritus ad hoc Sacramentum accedit?

1 Respondet
rum quidem
peccare, ac non
solum contra
jus divinum,
sed etiam con-
tra jus Canoni-
cum seu Eccle-
siasticum tacere.

answer is, (1) That indeed he doth really offend not only against the Divine but also against the Canon and Ecclesiastick Law; because the Divine Law forbids him to approach the Sacrament in a wicked estate, and the Canon Law doth absolutely exclude the excommunicate and the interdicted persons from the Sacraments themselves, and forbids them to approach them: notwithstanding the Sacrament which he receives is a true Sacrament, though he receive it unworthily; and it seems that herein he accomplisheth the Precept and Law of the Church.

Jus enim divinum prohibet, ne male quis accedat: & jus Canonicum in universum excommunicatos & interdictos a Sacramentis excludit & prohibet: actamen ab eo susceptum indigne Sacramentum est ratum, & ipse Ecclesie legem seu preceptum adimplere videtur. *Ibid.*

The Canon Law is nothing else but the Laws of the Church transcribed, and the Commandment to communicate at *Easter*, is part of the Canon Law. So that if we may satisfie the Commandment of communicating at *Easter*, by violating the Canon Law in this same Communion, as this Jesuit will have it; it follows that we may obey the Canon Law in despising it, and honour the Church in deriding, and even in outraging it externally, as the Souldiers treated Jesus Christ in adoring and prostrating themselves before him.

2 Magis
communis &
probabilior sen-
tentia est præ-
ceptum hoc im-
pleri per quam-
cunque volun-
tariam suscepti-
onem Sacra-
menti Euchari-
stie, etiam sa-
cilegism. So-
lum enim præ-
cipitur substan-
tia actus, non
vero modus.

Dicasillus is of the same opinion, and maintains that it is more probable. (2) The more common and probable opinion, saith he, is that this Precept is fulfilled by a voluntary receiving of the Sacrament, in what sort soever, even sacrilegiously, because the substance of the act only is commanded; and the manner not at all, according to *Suarez*. Could the Church express better the manner wherein it would have us communicate, than by joyning the Command of Confession and Penance to that of the Communion, and ordaining that we should receive this Sacrament with reverence, reverenter? And to the end we might not mistake this Reverence for any external Ceremony, it allows none to communicate at *Easter* whom their Confessors judge not fit, that afterwards it might be performed with the greater preparation and respect. Could it say more clearly that it would not be obeyed by Sacriledges?

Dicasillus de Sac. Eucharist. tract. 4. disp. 10. dub. 8. num. 175. Suscipiens reverenter, ad minus in Pascha Eucharistie Sacramentum, nisi forte de consilio proprii Sacerdotis ob aliquam rationabilem causam ad tempus ab ejus præceptione duxerit abstinentium. *Concil. Lateran. sub Innoc. 3. cap. 21. de pæn. & remiss. c. Omnis.*

As for what concerns the preparation unto the Communion, as the Jesuits make the Command to communicate altogether outward and politick, and maintain that we may accomplish it in any state of sin wherein we are, and even by a sin and sacrilegious manducation; it is no wonder if they scarcely ever speak of internal dispositions required to a worthy participation; and content themselves with those only which are external: And also they speak of them so slightly and so unworthily as is sad to consider, and gives cause of astonishment and indignation to those who have any knowledge of the Grandeur and Holiness of this Sacrament.

And because they hold Confession to be a principal preparation to the Communion, it seems they believed that it was not reasonable to require it to be done in any better manner than the Communion. *Escobar* saith, (3) That it is a probable opinion that we may satisfie the Command which obliges us to confess, by an invalid Confession, because the Church cannot command the internal, but only the external act of Confession.

3 Porro pro-
babiliter afferi-
tur invalida
confessione
præcepto satis-
fieri; quia Ec-
clesia internos
actus non po-
test præcipere,
sed solum ex-
ternam confes-
sionem. *Escobar*

He had said already before, not as a probable opinion, but as an assured thing, that we might satisfie it by defective Confession, answering this question: (4) May we satisfie the Churches Commandment by a Confession out of form? And answering thereto in these terms; We may satisfie it truly, as well as the Commandment of God made thereupon, as I have but now said.

tract. 1. exam. 12. cap. 3. num. 27. pag. 199. 4 Satisficne præcepto Ecclesie confessione informi? Ita, quo modo proinde de præcepto divino affirmari. *Ibid. cap. 1. num. 9. pag. 195.*

080

Filliutius had said before the same thing, speaking thus : It is demanded whether we may accomplish this Precept (of Confession) by a Confession without form. He answers, That we may accomplish it. His reason is : For we accomplish the Precept in substance. And as to the end of the Precept, which is Grace, it falls not under the Precept. That is to say, that when the Church commands sinners to confess themselves, it intends not to oblige them to return into a state of Grace, and reconcile themselves with God ; but only to confess as they please themselves.

1 Quæritur
20 in præcepto
præceptum
confessionis
confessionem
validam, sed in-
ferimus ? Re-
spondeo & dico
impleri : ut a-
impletur præce-
ptum quod
substantiam si-
militudinis au-
tem gratia, non
cadit sub præ-
ceptum. Fili-
utius qq. mor.
tom. 1. tract. 7.
cap. 2. num. 42.
pag. 171.

He saith the same thing a little above, and adds that being not obliged by the Command of the Church to confess our selves worthily, and receive Grace in the Sacrament ; neither are we bound to prepare our selves to confess well, nor to do what lies in us to attract the Grace and Mercy of God. (2) Neither is a man bound, saith he, by virtue of the Precept of Confession to disperse himself for Grace : For provided the Sacrament be doth receive be a true one, though it be without form, that is to say, without Grace, he satisfies the Precept. As for the disposition unto Grace, it is the end or consequent of the Sacrament, which falls not under the Precept.

090

Amicus holds with the same Doctrine, and grounds it on that Principle, (3) That we ought rather restrain than extend things that are imposed as penalties. Whence he draws this Conclusion ; that the Precept of Confession being imposed as a penalty, we must not extend it so far as to say, that it obliges to make such a Confession as may restore the sinner into a state of Grace : but we must rather restrain it, saying, that it is enough to make one that doth not confer any Grace on him, provided it be a true one, and have every thing else that is of the Essence of a Sacrament.

2 Nec tene-
tur homo sedi-
ponere ad gra-
tiam ex vi præ-
cepti confes-
sionis, quia etiam
si recipere Sa-
cramentum in-
forme, dummo-
do recipit ve-

rum Sacramentum, satisfacit præcepto. Dispositio autem ad gratiam, est finis ejus, vel qui i consequens. Eius su-
rem non cadit sub præcepto. Ibid. tract. 6. cap. 8. num. 209. pag. 158. 3 Pœnalia sunt potius relaxanda
quam amplificanda. Cum igitur confessiois præceptum sit pœnale, non debet amplificari mandatum confessionis
formate ; sed potius restringi ad actum confessionis informis, modo quoad essentiam Sacramenti sit valida. Amicus
tom. 8. disp. 17. sect. 3. num. 30. pag. 277.

This is not to honour the Sacraments very much, to pretend that they are not Gods gifts and graces, but penalties : and that when Jesus Christ commanded Confession, he ordained it not for our good, as a remedy and a means to deliver us from our sins, and to restore us into Grace ; but that he imposed it upon us as a yoke and a punishment, as this Jesuit saith. Cum igitur præceptum confessionis sit pœnale.

He that shou'd say that a remedy ordained by a Physician to a Patient were a punishment, and not a relief and a favour ; or when a Prince ordains that a Malefactor shall confess the crimes whereof he desires the abolition, that he uses him rigorously, and impose an odious Law upon him, would pass for a man of little discretion and without common sense. The Malefactors hold this for a favour in such sort, that they ordinarily set down their crimes in the Letters of Grace which are given them, in the most effectual and odious terms they can, and are for the most part ready to say therein more than they have done, rather than less, to heighten the favour of the Prince, to render it more ample, and the better to assure themselves of it, though this Declaration be publick and in writing. And yet Amicus dares say that the Confession which God and the Church demand of a sinner, that he may obtain remission of his sins, which is secret, and by word of mouth only, is rather a penalty than a grace and favour. Præceptum confessionis est pœnale.

100

He proceeds farther, and is not contented to say the Church commands us not to confess Christianly and faithfully, according to the Institution of Jesus Christ ; but he dares maintain also that it cannot so much as command us to receive the Sacrament of Penance in the manner instituted by Jesus Christ. (4) The Church, saith he, cannot so much as command all that which is required to the Sa-
crament of Penance as it was instituted by Jesus Christ. He expounds himself bet-

4 Non pos-
set Ecclesia præ-
cipere totum
Sacramentum
penitentiae,
prout est formaliter à Christo institutum.

1 Quoniam ter, by rendring a reason of this opinion. (1) For that, saith he, the Sacrament
 hec Sacramen- as it was instituted by Jesus Christ, contains essentially an inward grief for sin, and a
 zum prout est a confession of all even inward sins. Now the Church hath no power over a²is purely in-
 Christo institu- tum, essentiali- ternal. And by consequence cannot command the Sacrament in the manner it was
 ter includit de- institutum by Jesus Christ.

lotem inter-
 num, & confessionem omnium peccatorum, etiam interiorum. Sed Ecclesia non habet potestatem supra a²is mere
 internos. Igitur non possit hoc Sacramentum prout a Christo institutum est, præcipere. *Ibid. sect. 2. num. 12.*
 pag. 274.

This language stifles the prime notions of Christianity, and the most common apprehensions of the Church, which believes on the contrary that it cannot command the Sacrament of Penance otherwise than Jesus Christ hath instituted it, and hath no other design in this Commandment, nor in all the rest, than to follow the orders of Jesus Christ, and to execute his will, it being far remote from its thoughts and all appearance that it would have us receive the Sacraments otherwise than Jesus Christ hath ordained. For it is not established for other end than to obey Jesus Christ, and to cause him to be obeyed; and its Commands serve only for the accomplishment of those of Jesus Christ, according to the order which was given it in the persons of the Apostles, when he sent them to teach all people, and instruct them how to observe all things he had commanded them.

Docentes eos
 servare omnia
 quæcumque man-
 davi vobis,
Matth. 28.

So that the Commands of Jesus Christ are contained in those of the Church, and are as it were the Soul, Spirit, and Rule thereof; since it doth nothing but confirm or determine what it is that Jesus Christ hath ordained and instituted, as the usage of the Sacraments and the exercise of vertues, which are good works.

Which shews that the Jesuits know not the estate of the Church, nor its mind, nor its conduct; considering it as an humane and secular Society, which regards only what is outward; since it hath no other scope than civil peace and temporal happiness; or as the Synagogue of the Jews which adhered only to the letter and outward exercises of Religion and Gods Law. Though we cannot find in the very times of the Synagogue it self any Jews who have affirmed that the Law might be fulfilled by Sacriledges, and manifest and voluntary impieties, as the Jesuits, who say that we may satisfie the Commandments of communicating, confessing, hearing Mass, and such like, by doing them with contempt, and all sorts of unsufferable irreverences and profanations. Which never came into the head of any man but Casuists, who had any sense of Religion. But these are the new fruits of the new Divinity of the Jesuits, and the rare Method which they have invented for the Service of God in the Church it self, and under the new Law which is all Spirit and Charity, which considers not what it sees, but what it sees not, as saith S. Paul; because it neither acts nor sees but by Faith, and not by sense and reason all alone.

The second disposition which the Jesuits require unto the Communion besides Confession, is Fasting. *Amicus* treating of this condition, puts it in question, and demands: (2) *Whether putting a little sugar in the mouth to stay defluxions from the brain, be a bar to the Communion?* And he answers that this is *Suarez's* opinion. (3) *Nevertheless, saith he after, Tabiena and other learned men whom I have consulted, seem to be of a contrary judgment, and say moreover, that this opinion is safe in the practice. And in truth it seems probable, this liquor distilling down into the stomach in the form of spittle.* This opinion which was not received in *Suarez's* time, is become probable in *Amicus's*, and it may quickly become very common, because it is favourable unto sensuality.

2 Dubium
 est de saccharo
 quod recinetur
 in ore, ad tem-
 perandas capitis
 distillationes, an
 impediat Eu-
 charistiæ sum-
 ptionem?

3 Affirmat
 Suarez; negare
 tamen videtur

Tabiena & alii viri docti quos ego consului, qui addunt hanc opinionem tutam esse in praxi. Et sane non videtur improbabilis, cum talis liquor in stomachum descendat per modum salivæ. Amicus tom. 7. dub. 27. sect. 1. num. 5.
 pag. 385.

5130

Escobar puts another question, to wit, (1) *Whether Tobacco in leaf or powder breaks the natural Fast?* He takes his answer out of *Præpositus* who saith, *That being taken in the leaf, and put into the mouth, it breaks not the Fast, provided that it be not swallowed down.* *Tannerus* goes beyond what he saith, and holds, *That this is true, though something of it do fall into the stomach, being mingled and incorporated with our spittle.* And as for the smoke of it, *Granado* whom he cites, saith, (2) *That it is all one, though it be taken in such quantity as may in some fashion serve for nourishment.* That is to say, that it hinders not nor breaks at all the natural Fast which is necessary for approaching to the Communion. And his reason is, (3) *That smoke is not taken in form of nourishment.* We may communicate, according to this reason, after we have taken some medicine, or drunk water; because neither are taken in form of nourishment.

1 Frangitur naturale jejunium totum aut pulvis herbæ illius quæ abac vocatur? Relpondeo ex Præposito in 3. p. 280. arc. 8. d. 1. n. 34. Per os sumptum in solio non frangitur nisi deglutitur. Adult. Tannerus tom. 4.

disp. 5. num. 1. neque si quid salivæ incorporatum trahitur in stomachum. 2 De fumo idem attendendum Granado in 3. p. contr. 6. tract. 10. dub. 8. num. 4. putat, etiamsi sit tantæ quantitatis, ut ad aliqualem nutritionem sufficiat. 3 Quis fumus non sumitur per modum cibi. *Ibid.*

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There remains nothing behind to the resolving of this question in all these instances, but to know what must be said of taking Tobacco in powder. *Escobar* fortified by the advice of those whom he hath made to speak before him, gives us the resolution of this point himself, and saith, (4) *That his opinion is, that we must affirm the same thing of the powder as of the leaf and smoke: Because to keep us fasting, it is only forbidden to eat and drink.*

4 De pulvere autem idem omnino cenfeo, quia ad hoc jejunium observandum solum prohibetur cibus & potus. *Ibid.*

Amicus allows us to take Sugar, *Escobar* Tobacco, so every one may please his own taste. And if any one have an aversion from Tobacco and Sugar, he may according to the reasonings of these Casuists, take in his mouth all sorts of Essences, Electuaries, Tablets, Comfits which may be taken without chewing, suffering them to melt, like Sugar, by little and little in the mouth, so the liquor which falls into the stomach with the spittle, shall not break his Fast, nor hinder him from communicating.

If any too scrupulous person should say that to take Comfits, or such like things, and to make them dissolve in the mouth, is a sort of eating and drinking; he may perhaps find satisfaction in that which this Jesuit adds for the explication of his thoughts, and supportation of his opinion; (5) *That we break not our Fast, if the meat and drink, which we take by the mouth, be not eaten and drunk by a vital action, and pass not on presently into the stomach.*

5 Jejunium non violatur, nisi cibus & potus per os sumptus in stomachum vitali quidem actione comestiva & potativa trahatur. *Ibid.*

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And if you urge him farther, shewing that these things may serve for nourishment as well as what we eat and drink; he hath told you already out of *Tannerus* and *Granado* that this matters not; for though these things nourish, it is always true to say that in rigour and in the letter we neither eat nor drink in taking them, as *Granado* affirmed of Tobacco: *quia non sumitur per modum cibi, though it do nourish. Etiamsi sit tantæ quantitatis, ut ad aliqualem nutritionem sufficiat.*

This is very new and unheard of in the Church of God until these Authors. But that which he saith in the same place, relating the opinion of *Præpositus* is more strange. (6) *Præpositus*, saith he, speaking of the Commandment to communicate Fasting, maintains that it is a Precept of the Church, and must be understood in such manner as the Churches command to fast in Lent and Ember-week. From whence he draws this consequence, that it hath some latitude, (7) *and some small matter may be allowed.* Upon which we may consequently judge whether there be any evil in it or not, and what evil or sin it is to communicate after we have taken something.

6 Præpositus asserit esse præceptum Ecclesiasticum, & intelligendum eo modo quo Ecclesis in quadragesimis & quatuor temporibus

præcipit jejunium. *Ibid.* num. 65. pag. 870 7 Colligitur, hinc parvitatem admitti materiæ. *Ibid.* Addunt aliqui peccare venialiter qui post modicum cibum synaxi reficiuntur. *Ibid.*

That is to say, that we may eat before we communicate, provided we eat not much; all one as in Fasting-days commanded by the Church, we may according to these Doctors, take a morsel of bread, and drink once without breaking our

Fast. But if there be any fault in communicating thus, the most rigorous can make it but a venial one.

So the Jesuits acknowledging hardly any, save these two dispositions and preparations necessary to communicate, that is, Confession and Fasting, yet are found in truth to destroy them both, and to give liberty to people to communicate without having any at all. And indeed if it be true, as these Jesuits teach, that by communicating in an estate of mortal sin, and knowing well that we commit Sacrilege, we cease not to satisfy the Precept of the Communion, any thing is credible after this in this matter: and it seems that, according to this opinion, we need no other preparation to approach the Altar and holy Table, than for to eat at our common tables, and that a man may go with the same pace and temper to receive the Communion as he would to a Feast to be debauched.

As for Priests who are the Ministers of the Eucharist, and who consecrate the Body of Jesus Christ upon the Altar, and who give it to the Faithful after they have taken it first themselves, *Emanuel Sa* saith that for to say Mass, they (1) may make use of the same Napery whereof they make use to spread common tables, when they have no other, and make use of them after Mass, as they did before, at table.

But if this Casuist be so liberal in this, he will appear very severe in another of less moment, when he supposes that it is a great sin to say Mass (2) without shoes, though he dare not say that it is a mortal sin when it is not done by contempt, as he assures us it is when the Consecration is celebrated on very foul Corporals. But he is yet more rigorous afterwards, when he saith, it is not lawful to say Mass before day nor after noon without a dispensation, adding that they who transgress Rule, and say the Mass a quarter of an hour, or at most half an hour sooner or later, sin mortally; grounding this opinion upon *Azor*.

Amicus saith the same thing, and acknowledging after *Baronius*, that the Mass hath been heretofore celebrated in the Church at divers hours, and many times in the evening it self; he saith that this ancient custom hath been interrupted for some time, and another new one introduced into use, to say it only from the time it is day until noon. And after he adds, (3) That this Custom is instead of a Law, and hath a vertue to oblige upon pain of mortal sin; as may be collected from the Priviledges that the Popes give unto Monks to say Mass before day and after noon.

He would say, that if it were only a venial sin to say Mass before day or after noon, there would be no need to demand a Dispensation, for neither he nor his Companions make any great account of venial sins, mortal ones only in their opinion requiring a Dispensation, that they may be committed without fear or danger. So that all Laws and Commandments that oblige not under mortal sin, have not any need of a Dispensation, according to these Doctors, and we may boldly violate and contemn them.

We have seen hitherto in divers places of this Book, and particularly in this Treatise of the Commandments of the Church, that, according to the Jesuits, when the Church commands the Faithful to pray, to assist at divine Service, to say, to hear Mass on the Feast and Lords-days, to communicate at Easter, to confess at least once a year; we may satisfy and accomplish all its Commands by doing only the outward actions which it commandeth, though we do them by compulsion, in hypocrisy, with a formal design not to obey it, through any wicked motive, and by committing in the very outward action of the obedience we render it, crimes and Sacrileges. It is now pertinent for us, and as it were necessary in the prosecution of this Work, to discover the cause of this mischief, and to ascend unto the Spring and Principle from whence the Jesuits draw these Maxims so pernicious and contrary to all good Manners, Christian Purity, Sanctity of the Sacraments, Authority and Conduct of the Church and of the Holy Ghost who animates and governs it in all things. This we are about to do in the next Chapter, where we shall shew that the Jesuits hold, that the Church is no other than an humane Assembly and a Body Politick; and by consequence that it hath no Power nor Authority over internal and spiritual actions, which are out of its Jurisdiction; because they are hid and without its cognizance. Whence they infer, that when it commands any practice of Vertue, exercise of Religion, or use

1 Potest quis, secundum quoddam, in necessitate profanis lineis uti, ea; postea Domino reddere utenda. Sa verbo Missa, num. 7. p. 501.

2 Celebrare sine caleamentis, si absit contemptus, non est mortale; est autem si celebretur corporalibus valde immundis. Ibid. num.

15. pag. 502. Azor existimavit mortificare eos peccare qui sine justa causa, tertia hora parte ante auroram vel post meridiem faciunt Sacrum. Ibid. n.

27. pag. 509. 3 Quod autem hæc consuetudo vim habeat legis obligantis sub mortali, colligitur cum ex privilegiis quæ Pontifices concedunt Religiosis, &c.

of the Sacraments, its Commandment reaches only to, and stays at what is external in these actions, without proceeding farther unto inward actions, and obliges not to any other thing than to do simply what it ordaineth in some sort whatever it be, and upon what design or motive soever it be done; that we may represent the Opinions the Jesuits have of the Church, its Authority, and Commandments, we will add this Article to the three former.

A R T I C L E I V.

That the Jesuits teach that the Church cannot command spiritual and internal Actions; that its Laws and Guidance are humane; that it is it self only a Politick Body.

IF you inquire of the Jesuits wherefore, according to their Divinity, we may be discharged of the Prayers ordained by the Church by praying with voluntary distraction, and reciting the divine Service without intention? Wherefore we may accomplish the Command of saying Mass on Feast and Lords-days, by attending without devotion; that of Fasting, by fasting for vain-glory; that of Confession, by confessing without sufficient sorrow for sin; that of Communicating at Easter, by receiving with hypocrisie; and knowing we are in mortal sin? Wherefore we may acquit our selves of Penance enjoyned us by a Confessor; accomplish a Vow made unto God; satisfie a Promise, an Oath made unto men and God; by doing only in outward appearance what we are obliged to do? And why we may generally accomplish all sorts of Precepts by actions which in truth are sins, by doing them without any design to discharge our duty, and on the contrary with a formal design not to discharge it, and by a formal contempt of the Commandment, and those who made it; having an expresse intention not to obey even then when we seem to obey it, doing outwardly what is commanded.

If you demand, I say, of the Jesuits the reason of all these so strange things, which we have already made appear that they teach for the most part; some will answer you with Sanchez, that this is because the Church hath not the power to make Laws which command other than the substance of a thing: that is to say in his language, what is external in the actions it wills you to do: *Quis leges præcipiunt solum substantiam actus, non modum.*

Sanchez oper. mor. lib. 1. cap. 14. num. 1. pag. 65.

Others will say with Filliutius and Layman, that it is because when the Church commands any thing, it cannot prescribe the manner of doing it, nor the end, nor motive wherefore it ought to be done; *Finis præcepti non cadit sub præceptum*, saith Filliutius. And Layman adds; *imo nec cadere potest.*

Filliutius mor. qq. tom. 1. tr. 7. cap. 2. n. 24. pag. 171.

Finally, the greater part and almost all of them will tell you with Amicus, Coninck, and Escobar, that the Church hath no power over internal actions, and that it cannot command them, nor oblige us to accompany the outward actions, which we exercise by its order; with the inward actions of vertue which are necessary to their being well done. *Ecclesia non habet potestatem supra actus mere internos*, saith Amicus: *Ecclesia absolute non potest actus mere internos præcipere aut vetare*; saith Coninck; and Escobar after him; *Ecclesia actus internos non potest præcipere.*

Layman l. 1. tr. 4. cap. 4. n. 6. pag. 49. Amicus tom. 8. dub. 17. scilicet 2. num. 12. pag. 274.

The last of these answers is most general. And indeed the other two depend on it, and are referred unto it as Conclusions unto their Principle. For the reason wherefore, according to them, the Church cannot prescribe the manner of doing things which it commands, nor the end wherefore they ought to be done, is because the end and good motion for which they ought to be done, that they might be well done, are acts of the will and internal power, upon which they pretend that the Church hath neither power nor command: *Ecclesia actus internos non potest præcipere.*

Coninck q. 83. de sacramentis. art. 6. dub. unius. num. 191. & 292. pag. 285. & 286. Escobar tr. 2. exam 12. cap. 1. n. 2. pag. 199.

So that being here to declare the Principles of all the mischievous Maxims which we have reported before, which tend to the ruine and entire abolition of

the Commands of God and the Church and all Christian Piety, I will only stand upon the Examination of this: *That the Church cannot absolutely command or forbid internal acts*; because this comprehends all the rest.

Ecclesia non potest absolute præcipere actus internos. To make appear that this Principle is common amongst the Jesuits, we shall not need fresh proof. For besides that they make no difficulty to confess it, I have already before in divers places reported many passages wherein they use it to elude the Commandments of God and the Church, and teach men to undervalue and despise them. And to refute this so pernicious Doctrine, it will suffice to have represented, as I have done, the wicked sequels which infallibly arise from it, and the consequences contrary unto the Foundations of Religion and Christian Piety which depend thereon, and are inseparable from it.

But because that this point is very important, and hath a great extent in matters of Religion and good Manners, I will here relate some more passages upon this subject, to make it yet more clear, and make the pernicious sequels of this novel Doctrine of the Jesuits evidently appear.

Layman speaking of this matter, gives a charitable advice, or rather a Law to the Pastors and Bishops of the Church, saying, (1) *That it is no easie matter to find occasions wherein a Law-giver or a Superior may oblige his Subjects under pain of sin to have an intention or other inward accidental disposition.*

1 Non potest facile legislator aut Prælati sub peccato obligare subditos ad adhibendum intentionem, aliamve internam dispositionem accidentalem. Layman lib. 1. tr. 4. esp. 4. num. 13. pag. 51.

He puts no difference betwixt Secular Law-givers and Pastors of the Church, nor betwixt Authority of those, and the Ordinances of these. He denies equally to both a Power of regulating what is internal of their Subjects, and to prescribe unto them the intention and other spiritual dispositions in which they ought to do what they command them. He excepts not the Superiors in Religious Orders, unto whom yet he gives in this point more power than unto the Bishops and the Pope himself: (2) *The Prelates Regulars, saith he, have a little more power over their Inferiors, because of the Religious vow they have made to obey their Superior in all that he shall command them according to the Rule and Customs of their Order.*

2 Prælati regum regularibus paulo major potestas in suis competit, ratione voti religiosi obediendi Prælati in omnibus, quæ secundum regulam & consuetudinem Ordinis præcipiuntur. Ibid.

He grounds this pretended advantage of the Superiors of the Religious Orders above the Pastors of the Church, upon the vow which the Religious make to obey them in all things; as if the Faithful were not obliged by Baptism to render all manner of obedience to the Church as well as those who enter into any Religious Order promise to keep the Rule, and to obey those who received them into it; and as if a Religious person could give more power over himself to his Superior than Jesus Christ hath given his Church, and its Pastors over the Christians whom he hath committed to their Governance.

3 Qua de re Suarez lib. 4. de legibus cap. 22. in fine, ubi monet discrimen esse inter obligationem regularium ex voto obediendiæ & obligationem aliorum ex lege civili vel Ecclesiastica. Nam lex fundatur in iustitia, dict. one quæ solum datæ est quantum expedit ad bonum communitatis. Præceptum autem Prælati regularis fundatur in voluntate votentis, seu pacto & promissione ejus, quæ quis principaliter fit Deo, & actu etiam mere interno fieri potest. Ibid.

But he grounds himself also upon the Authority of Suarez, (3) *Who, saith he, treating on this subject, observes that there is difference betwixt the obligation of Religious persons by vertue of their vow of obedience, and that of others by vertue of Civil and Ecclesiastick Law. For the Law is founded upon Jurisdiction and Authority, which is not given the Law-giver but for the common good. But the command of a Superior in a Religious Order is founded upon the will of him who makes the vow, and upon the covenant and promise by which he is obliged to obey. And this promise being principally made to God who hath power over the internal acts, it may be extended to these acts as well as the external.*

If this arguing be good for the Superiors of Religious Orders, it must needs be good also for the Superiors of the Church. For we submit our selves voluntarily to the Superiors of the Church, as the other submit voluntarily to the Superiors in a Religious Order. We become Christians voluntarily, as we become Religious voluntarily: and as we promise obedience to the Superiors of a Religious Order in becoming a Monk; so we promise obedience to the Superiors of the Church in becoming Christians; and we promise to render them this obedience, as to them who hold the place of God, according to the Word of Jesus

Christ: (1) *He that obeys you, obeys me.* And according to that of *S. Paul:* (2) *Gods speaks unto you by us; we are but the Ministers and Embassadors of Jesus Christ.* If then the Superiors of a Religious Order can command the internal actions; because the submission rendred unto them depends on the will and promise of their Inferiors which regards God in them: it must also be confessed by the same reason, that the Ecclesiastick Superiors & Prelates have the same power, and may as well command the internal actions of them that are subject unto them for their Salvation.

1 Qui vos audit, me audit. Luc 10 v. 16.

2 P. o Christi ergo legatione fungimur, tanquam Deo exhortante per nos. 2 Cor. 5. v. 20.

Also it is incredible, and contrary to the most common apprehensions of Christianity; that the Superiors of Religious Orders should have more Power and Authority in their Congregations, than the Bishops and Pope himself have in the Church, and that the Power of the Pope and the Bishops should not be more internal and spiritual, than that of Magistrates and Secular Princes, unto whom these Jesuits compare them, setting them all equally in the same inability to command internal things, without acknowledging any difference betwixt them in this point, and giving this advantage above them only unto Superiors of Religious Orders, when they say, (3) *That this is the difference which is betwixt the obligation of Regulars, who come under a vow of obedience.*

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And if the Laws of the Church differ not in this point from the Civil Laws; and the Prelates of the Church, no more than Civil Magistrates, have any power to command internal actions, we must say that the Superiors of Religious Orders, unto whom they ascribe this power, hold it not from the Church, and cannot receive from it that power which they say it hath not it self.

3 Discrimen est inter obligationem regularium ex voto obedientie & obligationem aliorum ex lege civili vel Ecclesiastica.

Also they pretend to hold it from the will of those who make vows of Religion, since they say, (4) *That the command of a Superior in a Religious Order is founded upon the will of him who makes the vow, and on the covenant and promise by which he is obliged to obey him, &c.* They would then that the Superiors of a Religious Order receive not from the Church the Authority and Power which they have to command; but from the will of those who become Religious; and they are herein sovereign and independent on the Church. Which is both against the modesty of Religious persons, the Order of the Church, truth it self, and evident reason, the Superiors of the Religious Orders being not capable of so much only as to receive any Religious into their Order, but by the power which they have received from the Superiors of the Church, who consequently have all the power of the Superiors of the Religious Orders, and much more; but they have it in a manner more eminent, as the Spring and Principle of this Power.

4 Preceptum Prelati regularis fundatur in voluntate votantis & pacto seu promissione ejus, &c.

And if the Inferiors can by their will and by their vows give to the Superiors of Religious Orders Authority and Power to command them even internal things, Jesus Christ might, with stronger reason, give it unto the Prelates of the Church over them and over all other the Faithful; since Jesus Christ hath more power over us, than we have over our selves, and we are, without comparison, more his than our own.

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So that he might give the Church all power over us, which private persons can give over themselves to Superiors of Religious Orders by their vows, and much more.

Which shews that the Ecclesiastick is far different from the Civil Jurisdiction, with which the Jesuits nevertheless do confound it; and the Ecclesiastick are other than the Civil Laws, which they notwithstanding would make equal. For the Jurisdiction which Jesus Christ hath given the Church over all Christians, is more extended, holy, and divine than that of Secular Magistrates, and it respects Souls more than bodies, the inward than the outward; since it respects eternal Salvation, which depends altogether on the actions of the Soul, and not of the body, which do nothing without those of the Soul.

Also Jesus Christ hath not given unto Secular Powers the Holy Ghost to govern their people, as he hath given it to his Church. He hath not given them the power to open and shut Heaven unto them; to cut them off and re-unite them to his body; to nourish them with his flesh and blood, and to fill them with his Spirit, and he hath not said unto them that when they speak, it is the Holy Ghost who speaks in them; that it is the Holy Ghost who commands what they command; that who so despise and dishonour them, despise and dishonour the Holy

Ghost. For thus the Apostles have spoken in the Scripture, since S. Peter saith to *Ananias* and his Wife, that they lyed unto the Holy Ghost, because they had lyed unto one of the Ministers of the Church. And this is the reason that the Councils and the Fathers so often call the Laws of the Church Sacred and Divine, knowing that they proceed from the Holy Ghost, who is always in the Church as Jesus Christ was with the Apostles, and conducted them till his Passion and death.

Which is so true, that *Layman* himself could not refrain from acknowledging it more than once, in very clear terms, (1) *Who doubts*, saith he, that the Church which in all its conduct regards the Salvation of Souls, may command its Ministers to pray and administer the Sacraments with sincerity, and not only in appearance, and to all the Faithful to receive in like manner the Sacraments with a true internal disposition? Now they who pray without inward attention, and they who confess without a true sorrow for their sins, neither pray nor confess truly, but in appearance. And by consequence they satisfy not the Commandment of the Church. Which may be extended to all the Commandments and all the Laws of the Church, since they are all of the same nature, and all have reference to true piety and true vertue, and the eternal Salvation of Souls, and not the appearances and shadows of falshood and hypocrisie. 25270

He repeats the same thing afterwards, and he saith it also more clearly and strongly in these terms: (2) *There are two sorts of Laws, and two sorts of Powers to make Laws; Ecclesiastick and Civil. They are different, as well in their original, because the Ecclesiastick Power is instituted immediately from God, and the Civil Power comes immediately from men; as in their objects and their ends; because the Ecclesiastick Power regards properly and directly spiritual things which conduce Souls unto Salvation and eternal life, as those words of our Saviour in Matth. 16. do testify. I will give thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; and in S. John 21. Feed my Lambs; and those of S. Paul in Act. 20. The Holy Ghost hath established you Bishops to govern the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his Blood.*

He explicates the same truth yet more fully, and discovers the principal foundation thereof, pursuing his discourse, and drawing this consequence from what he now said. (3) *Wherefore Jesus Christ having shed his Blood to purchase and found a Church which is holy and ordained to eternal life, he hath also given it Pastors and Bishops to govern and conduct it to this very eternal life. But Civil Power regards properly and directly wealth and peace temporal only: Which shews clearly the difference which is betwixt Politick and Church power, and betwixt the Laws of the one and the other.* 25280

D. o. instituta est; civilis vero ab hominibus provenit; tum ratione objecti & finis: quia Ecclesiastica versatur per se & directe erga res spirituales ad salutem & vitam æternam ordinatas, sicut constat ex verbis Christi, Matth. 16. Tibi dabo claves regni cælorum; & Joan. 21. Pæce oves meas; & ex Apostolo Paulo, cap. 2. Act. Posuit nos Spiritus Sanctus Episcopos regere Ecclesiam Dei quam acquisivit sanguine suo. Ibid. cap. 6. num. 1. pag. 53.

3. Quare cum Christus sanguinem suum fuderit ut acquireret & fundaret Ecclesiam sanctam & ad vitam æternam ordinatam; ideo etiam Pastores & Episcopos ei constituit, qui ad eundem vitæ æternæ finem Ecclesiam dirigerent & gubernarent. Civilis vero potestas per se ac directe temporalem tantum commoditatem ceu pacem spectat. Ibid.

For the Civil Power regards the outward order and civil tranquillity alone, and prescribes none but outward and humane means to attain this end. But the Church being established for procuring unto men eternal life, inward and divine peace, it ought to have power to ordain means, and to give commands proportionate to that end, whereunto we cannot attain but by actions of the Soul altogether spiritual and divine. And for that cause it must needs be that its commands should be more internal than external, spiritual than corporal, divine than humane.

We need then no other proofs against the errors of *Layman* and his Brethren than his own confession, which is more than sufficient to overturn all that they said before; that we might satisfy the Commandments of the Church by actions of vain-glory, lust, avarice, and Sacriledges: That we may fulfil them without any will to fulfil them, and even with an express will not to satisfy them,

Rem. 2. Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 3. Artic. 4.

and

and to despise them ; provided we do outwardly what is commanded. For these actions thus done, have no communication with the Salvation of Souls and eternal life, and being rather formally opposite thereto , they also have nothing common with the Commandments of the Church , which ordains for its Children no other than means to attain unto eternal life , and works which procure the Salvation of the Soul, that is to say, actions of vertue and charity, sobriety, penitence, and obedience especially , which is the Soul and Spirit of all other actions.

For to answer unto a truth so clear, what Sanchez doth, that the Church commands only a material obedience , is to forget the respect due unto the Church, and to oppose the light of reason as well as of Faith and the Gospel. (1) But if you object, saith this Jesuit, that the Commandments oblige unto obedience , and that it seems that he hath it not, who hath no intent at all to satisfy the Commandment. I answer that they oblige not to a formal, but material obedience ; that is, to do that which is commanded, though it be not done for the reason it was commanded.

And if this Explication make you not to understand sufficiently what this material obedience is, Layman will declare it unto you more perspicuously, and will tell you that it is a corporal and purely external obedience, maintaining that the Church demands no other, and proving it by Seneca's Authority, who was without doubt very intelligent in the Government of the Church, and an excellent Judge of the Authority it hath received from Jesus Christ for conducting Souls unto eternal life. (2) It seems, saith Layman, that it is reasonable that humane Power and Jurisdiction should not be extended farther than to humane actions which are discernable by their objects and some external sign. which Seneca also observes in 5. Book de Beneficiis. It is an error to believe that servitude extends it self over all that which is in man, his best part is exempt from it. The body only is subject to the will of a Master, and depends on his power ; but his spirit is always independent and its own.

We must then believe, according to the opinion of this Jesuit, since he hath learned it of Seneca, that the Church hath no power save over the bodies of Christians, no more than Masters have over those of their slaves, and Princes over their Subjects ; that Christ hath not subjected unto it the whole man, but the least part of him, which is his body, and it hath no power over Souls, which are free and independent in respect of it, and in their own governance. And so (3) S. Paul did amiss to pretend that he had received a power altogether divine to bring all Spirits into subjection unto Jesus Christ, and to make them Captives to his light and guidance. All this is not conformable to the Judgment of Seneca, nor by consequence to that of Layman, who exempts the Soul from the Jurisdiction of the Church, and allows it only over bodies, for the outward conduct of the Faithful, and to injoyne them material and corporeal actions and vertues, and to forbid them sins only of the same sort, i. e. external and gross ones.

Neither will he leave it a power to command all these visible and carnal vertues, nor to forbid all sensual and material vices, how enormous soever they may be. For in the same Chapter where he reduces the Power of the Church, which he will have to be only humane, to command only external vertues, he speaks thus. (4) I have said that humane Law's may command some virtuous actions, but not all ; because there are some that are so high and difficult, that they ought indeed be counselled, but not commanded ; as Gospel-poverty and Chastity.

He saith moreover, and declares, (5) That a publick Magistrate cannot forbid all sorts of vices and sins ; but that he ought to tolerate many, though grievous ones, to avoid greater. And the same thing ought to be said of the Church, according to him and his Companions ; since they hold, that its Power and Laws are altogether humane, as those of the Secular Magistrates.

caralia sunt ; sed potentia Deo, ad destructionem munitionum, consilia destruentes, &c. & in capivitate redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. 2 Cor. 10. v. 4. & 5. 4 Qui aliquis, non omnes actiones virtutum humans lege imperari posse. Quaedam enim sunt nimis arduae ac difficiles, ut in consilio esse debeant, non in praecepto, v. c. Evangelica paupertas, castitas, &c. Layman ibid. c. 4. n. 1. p. 48. 5 Sed neque omnia peccata etiam externa ab humano Magistratu prohiberi possunt, sed multa permitti debent, ut graviora evitentur. Ibid.

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1 Qued si obijcias, praecepta obligare ad obedientiam, quae non adesse videtur ubi non edest intentio satisfaciendi praecepto. Respondedo non obligare ad obedientiam formalem, sed materiale; nempe ut fiat quod praecipitur, quamvis non fiat propterea quod praecipitur. Sanchez. mor. qq. lib. 1. cap. 43. num. 9. pag. 63.

2. Convenienter videtur ut humana potestas sine jurisdictione soluta sit extendat ad actiones humanas, quatenus in externam materiam transeunt, ut signo aliquo produntur; quod etiam Seneca notat lib. 3. de Beneficiis. Et si quis putet libertatem in totum hominem descendere. Pars enim melior excepta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt & adscripta dominus mens sui juris est. Layman l. 1. r. 4. c. 4. n. 5. pag 49.

3 A ma militie nostrae non

And to give us to know what the crimes are which a Secular Magistrate or a Prelate of the Church may forbid, and what he may tolerate, he speaks thus in general terms, and he establisheth this Rule, which is as it were a reason and a proof of what he had said. (1) *Humane Law is made for the many, and for all those who live in a Society, of whom the greatest part are such as are imperfect in virtue.* Whence he draws this consequence; *Wherefore Laws are not wont to forbid other than the most enormous sins, from which, speaking morally, the greater part of the Commonalty may abstain.* 25330

1 Lex humana ponitur multitudini siue communitati in qua major pars est hominum in virtute non perfectorum. Quare sermo non nisi gravia peccata legibus prohiberi solent, à quibus moraliter possibile est majorem partem multitudinis abstinere.

So that when people are grown very corrupt, we must release the more the rigour of the Church, as well as Civil Laws, and forbid no sins but such as are not common and ordinary. And because they are all such in a manner at this day, there being hardly any that is not done without fear of punishment against God and the Gospel by the greatest part of the world, who give themselves up to them, and pamper themselves in them with quiet of conscience, by the favour of the Doctrine of Probability, which authorizes them all in a manner; it will follow, that the Church can hardly forbid any by its Laws, and that it will be obliged to tolerate them all. And so we must speak no more of reformation of Manners in Church-assemblies and Councils. And though in these Propositions which we now observed, *Layman* expresses not formally the Ecclesiastick Power, yet he includes it in the general of humane Power and Law, pretending as he doth, that the Power and the Laws of the Church are humane, as well as the Laws of the Secular Magistrate, as we have made appear already.

2 Es potestas concessa est Ecclesiæ, quæ accommodata est humano regimini. *Amicus* tom. 8. dub. 17. sect. 2. num. 12. pag. 275.

Amicus testifies this also where he saith, (2) *That the power which God hath given unto the Church, is such as was needful unto an humane conduct.* He declares not only that the power of the Church is humane, but the conduct and government of it also. And it is from this Principle that he draws the Proposition whereof we speak in this Chapter; that the Church cannot command inward actions: (3) *Because, as he speaks there, they pass the bounds of humane Government and cognizance.* Whence he infers, that whatsoever Laws the Church may make, (4) *all that it ordains, must be of external acts proportionable to the Ecclesiastical Government, and which may help in the outward conduct of those who are under its charge.* 25340

And what he saith generally of the Pastors of the Church, that their conduct is but humane and external, he saith particularly of the Pope, and proves it by reason. (5) *As God, saith he, conducts his Church by men as his Instruments, so we must not believe that he hath given unto his Vicar other power than what is necessary and sufficient for an humane Government.*

He acknowledges not in Jesus Christ himself any other than an humane and outward conduct, whether he believes he could or would not take up any other Government in the Church. (6) *We must believe, saith he, that when Jesus Christ gave these precepts unto men, he did it in an humane manner, and as the Princes of the Earth are wont to make their Ordinances and Laws for their Subjects, which oblige them to no other thing than what they contain and express precisely.* 25350

3 Non possunt esse intra spheram humanæ gubernationis. *Ibid.*

4 Nsm totum id quod præcipere esset actus externus conducens ad externum regimen & gubernationem Ecclesiasticam. *Ibid.* num. 15. pag. 275.

5 Cum enim Deus suam Ecclesiam regat per homines; eam tantum potestatem suo Vicario contulisse credendum est, quæ necessaria est & sufficit ad humanum regimen. *Ibid.* num. 34.

6 Putandum est Christum præcepta dedisse hominibus more humano, quo solent terrestres Principes suis subditis præcepta dare, quæ non obligant nisi ad id quod expriment. *Ibid.* sect. 3. num. 31. pag. 277.

After this the Bishops and the Pope himself have not, as it may seem, any cause to complain of the Jesuits, since they treat them no worse than Jesus Christ, whom they think not that they have offended in saying, that he governs the Church and Faithful as well as they, in an humane manner as the Princes of the Earth govern their Subjects.

I know not whether ever there were any Heretick that had so base a thought of
Tom. 2. Bk. 2. Part 2. Chap. 3. Artic. 4. the

the Power and Conduct of Jesus Christ, since they themselves who will not acknowledge him for a God, hold nevertheless that his conduct was divine, and that God himself, with whom he had an alliance and very peculiar union of affection and perfect correspondence of will, acted by him, and he by the Spirit of God who conducted and governed him. And if the Jesuits themselves had not set on foot and published in their Writings these excesses against Jesus Christ never heard of until this present, there are few persons that would have believed, or who durst have objected to them so great an impiety, as which renders Religion altogether humane, outward and politick, though it be contained in the bottom of their Doctrine, and be a necessary and evident consequence of the Principle of their Divinity, which we examine in this Chapter.

For the Power of the Church, and that which the Pope and the Bishop's exercise in the Church, being given them by Jesus Christ, and being the power of Jesus Christ himself whose place they hold, and person they represent; it thence follows, that if the power of the Church and its Pastors be humane, that of Jesus Christ is so also; and that if the Church in the vertue of the Authority which it hath received of Jesus Christ, cannot command internal and spiritual acts of virtues and exercises of Religion; the power of Jesus Christ is likewise bounded to the external, and his Laws oblige only to the external part of that which he hath commanded himself in the Gospel, or by the Apostles in their Writings, being in this like the power of the Princes of the Earth, who have an humane Authority, and external conduct, which obliges their Subjects to no other thing than to observe the external part of what they command, and to do precisely that which they say and express in their Commands. This is so as *Amicus* speaks of Jesus Christ. *Putandum est Christum precepta hominibus dedisse more humano quo solent terrestres Principes suis subditis precepta dare, quae non obligant nisi ad id quod exprimitur.* But that we may see yet more clearly that these so strange discourses and propositions are not found by chance in the Books of the Jesuits; but are, as I have said, the sequels of their Maxims which they bring forth upon a formal design they have to debase the Church in its Pastors, and to render the Kingdom of Jesus Christ all carnal and earthly; as they have said that the power of the Church and its conduct is only humane, and like that of the Princes of the Earth, politick and civil Magistrates, they say also that the vertue and Holiness required of them who enter into the Offices of the Church, and to be exercised by them, is only humane, external, and politick.

For Father *Celso* after he had divided piety into that which is internal and true, and that which is only external and apparent, saith; that this latter suffices to the exercise of the Offices of the Church. *I call, saith he, the Holiness whereof the question here proceeds, external; and there needs not precisely any other to Jurisdiction and Hierarchick functions.* Which he expresses also in such manner, and in terms so strong and express, that I dare well say that the most criminal and infamous persons are not unworthy of an Episcopal Charge considered in it self, nor because of its greatness and Holiness, but only by reason of the Ordinance of the Church which hath judged them incapable. (1) *Gratian* holds, saith he, that he who is made infamous by some crime, is excluded from being a Bishop, not by the proper condition of Episcopacy, but by the Ordinance of the Church, which requires in its Ministers the greatest Holiness that is possible. But always external, because it cannot demand any other, having no power of the internal.

For this cause they fear not to say that we may advance our kindred or friends to the highest Offices in the Church, (2) though they be no Saints, provided they have politick and apparent vertues. And that you may not contemn all these vertues, he calls them perfect, and maintains this name may be given them with reason; because they appear such in the eyes of men. And he pretends that we

Gratian
sententia est
in omnibus non
nullis infames
ab Episcopatu
procul haberi
non vi status
ipsius, sed opi-
mo Ecclesiae in-
stituto, eximi-
am, quoniam
quidem fieri po-
test, sanctitatem

In ministris suis exigentis. *Celso* lib. 9. cap. 20. pag. 947. 2 Attamen ego fieri dicam & sine vicio, eos etiam assumi posse qui non sunt perfectioris vicutis: modo politicis virtutibus sint praediti. *Ibid.*

1 Quis tu ought thus understand the vertues which S. Paul requires in a Bishop. (1) The
 perfectiores, ego vertues, saith he, speaking to Mr. Hallier, which you call most perfect, I call most
 illustriores & resplendent, and most remarkable in the sight of men, and I shew that which you call
 hominum oculis magis expo- perfection of the Episcopall estate, which requires more perfect vertues than the common
 sitas voco, in- ones, may easily be understood of more resplendent and politick, and not of those which
 deque ostendo produce a more perfect love of God. This is that which he had expressd a little be-
 caput illud tu- fore in other terms, when he propounded as a certainty, (2) That the vertues
 um Episcopalis which S. Paul required in a Bishop, writing to Titus or Timothy, are not at all above
 perfectionis, the vulgar.
 quod perfectio-
 res virtutes ex-
 igit, facile explicari de splendidioribus politicisque, non de his quæ majorem Dei amorem pariunt. Ibid. 2. Aposto-
 lus certe, sive ad Titum, sive ad Timotheum, virtutes non admodum supra vulgares desiderat in Episcopo. Ibid.
 pag. 946.

Finally, it will appear by these excesses which would seem to us incredible, if our eyes did not oblige us to believe in seeing and reading them in the Books of 25390
 the Jesuits, that these men destroy the Church from its Foundation, and make it altogether external, humane, and politick. And this is that *Lessius* saith in express terms, calling it a Body politick, *Corpus politicum*. After this we cannot think it strange, if other Jesuits, in conformity to the Opinions, and in consequence to the common Doctrines of the Society, have said that there need only politick vertues to govern the Church, and to exercise its principal Offices, which are Government and Policy, and that its Laws are but humane and politick, which oblige only to the external part of its Commands, not only in those made by the Ministers of Jesus Christ, but by Jesus Christ himself, who according to these Doctors, hath commanded nothing but in an humane manner, as other Princes do.

So that whereas Jesus Christ hath called his Kingdom not of this world, the Jesuits maintain that it is, and like to that of the Princes of the Earth. And whereas he hath said that his Kingdom is within us and in the innermost parts of our Souls, they maintain on the contrary, that it is external and without us, and that the Church, which is his Kingdom, is no other than a politick Body and Church. And so by the wonderful Judgment of God they fall into the condemnation which S. *Cyprian* hath pronounced so many Ages ago against the Novatian Hereticks who introduced an humane Church. *Ecclesiam humanam faciunt*: And in this they make themselves like the Libertines of our times, who reduce all Religion into Policy, and deserve as well as they to bear the name of Politicks, 25400
 which they would injuriously and falsely attribute unto the Church and its Pastors, by representing and rendring as much as they can both their Authority and Government altogether humane and politick.

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
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
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