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# AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study

Appendices  
Volume III

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**Table of Contents**  
(Volume III Only)

**APPENDIX A SA AND VCSA MEMORANDUMS..... A-1**

**APPENDIX B COMMANDER TRADOC STUDY PLAN .....B-1**

**APPENDIX C CHRONOLOGY ..... C-1**

**APPENDIX D ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT..... D-1**

**APPENDIX E ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS.....E-1**

TAB 1 TO APPENDIX E SRC WITHIN EACH ALTERNATIVE..... E-3

TAB 2 ALTERNATIVE 1 DECREMENTS AND REDUNDANCIES..... E-5

**APPENDIX F PRE-MOBILIZATION SUPPORTING INFORMATION..... F-1**

TAB 1 TO APPENDIX F COLLECTIVE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (HHC) AND THE DIVISION BASE UNITSF-3

*Annex A to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-12*

*Annex B to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-18*

*Annex C to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-22*

*Annex D to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-30*

*Annex E to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-34*

*Annex F to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-38*

*Annex G to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-42*

*Annex H to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-48*

*Annex I to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-52*

*Annex J to Tab 1 to Appendix F..... F-56*

TAB 2 TO APPENDIX F UNIQUE TRAINING TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION ..... F-59

TAB 3 TO APPENDIX F ANALYSIS OF TRAINING PRODUCTS AND TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES ..... F-63

TAB 4 TO APPENDIX F TO CHAPTER 6 UNIQUE LEADER DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS F-67

TAB 5 TO APPENDIX F TO CHAPTER 6 DATA SOURCES ..... F-69

**APPENDIX G POST MOBILIZATION SUPPORTING INFORMATION..... G-1**

TAB 1 TO APPENDIX G THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS..... G-3

TAB 2 TO APPENDIX G FIVE STRATEGY CHARTS ..... G-7

TAB 3 TO APPENDIX G RAND SCRIPTED BRIEFING ..... G-15

TAB 4 TO APPENDIX G DATA SOURCES..... G-61

**APPENDIX H RESOURCE ANALYSIS..... H-1**

TAB 1 ALTERNATIVE 1 DIVISION BASE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES TO APPENDIX H..... H-3

TAB 2 (ALTERNATIVE 1 ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES) TO APPENDIX H..... H-9

TAB 3 ALTERNATIVE 2 EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES TO APPENDIX H..... H-11

TAB 4 ALTERNATIVE 3 EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES TO APPENDIX H..... H-13

TAB 5 ALTERNATIVE 1 AND ALTERNATIVE 3 EXCESS EQUIPMENT TO APPENDIX H..... H-19

TAB 6 ALTERNATIVE 1 DIRECT OPTEMPO METHODOLOGY ..... H-23

TAB 7 TO APPENDIX H ALTERNATIVE 2 DIRECT OPTEMPO METHODOLOGY .....	H-31
TAB 8 TO APPENDIX H ALTERNATIVE 3 DIRECT OPTEMPO METHODOLOGY .....	H-33
TAB 9 TO APPENDIX H EAD/EAC REQUIREMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVES 1 & 3 .....	H-41
<b>APPENDIX J IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES .....</b>	<b>J-1</b>
J.1 FORSCOM ERB ALIGNMENTS .....	J-3
J.2 ARNG ERB ALIGNMENTS .....	J-5
J.3 AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION HHC .....	J-7
<i>J.3.1 Combining an Alternative 2 HHC with an Existing Garrison .....</i>	<i>J-7</i>
<i>J.3.2 Combining an Alternative 2 HHC with a CONUSA .....</i>	<i>J-9</i>
<i>J.3.3 Decrementing an AOE Division HHC for the Alternative 2 HHC .....</i>	<i>J-10</i>
<i>J.3.4 A Decrementing AOE Division HHC for the Alternative 2 HHC .....</i>	<i>J-11</i>
J.4 IMPACTS ON TRAINING SUPPORT OF ERB SELECTION .....	J-12
TAB 1 TO APPENDIX J FORT CARSON AND FORT RILEY INPUT DOCUMENTS TO CONCEPT STUDY .....	J-15
TAB 2 TO APPENDIX J MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISIONS .....	J-51
<b>APPENDIX K DECISION BRIEF .....</b>	<b>K-1</b>

**Table of Figures  
(Volume III Only)**

Figure D-1 Warfight Tasks .....	D-3
Figure D-2 Stability and Support Tasks .....	D-4
Figure D-3 State Tasks .....	D-5
Figure D-4 Alternative 1 Force Structure .....	D-6
Figure D-5 Alternative 2 Force Structure .....	D-7
Figure D-6 Alternative 3 Force Structure .....	D-8
Figure F-1 Organizational Structure .....	F-4
Figure G-1 Army Force Projection .....	G-3
Figure J-1 Southeast Division .....	J-3
Figure J-2 Mid-America Division .....	J-3
Figure J-3 Central Division .....	J-4
Figure J-4 Northwest Division .....	J-4
Figure J-5 Light Division East .....	J-5
Figure J-6 Central Division .....	J-6
Figure J-7 Southeast Division .....	J-6
Figure J-8 Southern Division .....	J-7
Figure J-9 Fort Carson Garrison .....	J-8
Figure J-10 Fort Riley Garrison .....	J-8
Figure J-11 Division HHC Augmentation to a Garrison .....	J-9
Figure J-12 Alternative 2 Division HHC under a CONUSA .....	J-10
Figure J-13 Alternative 2 Modified AOE TOE Division HHC .....	J-11
Figure J-14 Integrated Alternative 2 Division HHC (ALO 3) .....	J-12

**Table of Tables**  
**(Volume III Only)**

Table E-1 SRC List for Each Altrnative .....	E-3
Table E-2 Additional Requirements for ERB and AOE HHC.....	E-6
Table J-1 USAR GSUs and Supported Installations.....	J-13



## **Appendix A SA AND VCSA MEMORANDUMS**

In this appendix are the Memorandum from the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of Defense on the Army National Guard Redesign and the Vice Chief of Staff Memorandum to the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command on the same subject.







SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1996



**MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**SUBJECT: Army National Guard Division Redesign Decision—ACTION  
MEMORANDUM**

The work of the ARNG Division Redesign Study Group is finished. Members of the group, representing the Army Secretariat, ARSTAF, NGB and The Adjutants General, developed a plan which I believe will bring us closer to a Total Force. As part of their work, the group considered the following issues the Army was tasked to study as part of the OSD Mid-Term Study generated by the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM):

- a. Possible reallocation of 60,000 Army National Guard (ARNG) combat personnel to fill known CS and CSS shortfalls;
- b. Possible elimination of 50,000 combat spaces from the Total Army; and
- c. Reduction and/or reorganization of ARNG divisions.

In August 1995, the Army briefed the Deputy Secretary of Defense on our plan to respond to the OSD tasks and gained approval to report back in March 1996 after completion of the Total Army Analysis 2003 (TAA-03) process and the ARNG Division Redesign Study.

Warfighting requirements developed by the TAA-03 process resulted in a force structure shortfall of 124,800 CS/CSS soldiers. This shortage is not an endstrength shortage but rather a force structure imbalance between combat and CS/CSS units required to support the two Major Regional Contingency scenarios. As part of the TAA-03 process, the Army developed a plan to convert approximately 66,400 existing spaces to reduce the critical CS/CSS shortages. The estimated cost to convert these predominately reserve component units is approximately \$2.6 billion. During the building of the POM 98-03, the Army has provided \$487 million to begin these conversions. The remaining CS/CSS shortages were addressed in the ARNG Division Redesign Study.

-2-

The ARNG Division Redesign Study examined alternatives to convert existing low priority combat units to support forces. The plan is to inactivate 12 ARNG combat brigades and use the generated force structure to form two combined arms divisions and an additional six combined arms brigades consisting of CS/CSS units. These 42,700 conversions will reduce the Army's CS/CSS shortages to 15,700 – an acceptable level of risk. To further the goal of AC/RC integration, the Army will develop an implementation plan to form and test two new AC/RC divisions.

Based on the ARNG Division Redesign Plan, the ARNG will consist of eight divisions at endstate. Three divisions will remain as currently organized. In three additional divisions, one divisional brigade will be inactivated in each division and replaced by an enhanced brigade. Two combined arms divisions will be formed by converting existing divisional structure to CS/CSS units. In addition, six combined arms brigades, containing CS/CSS organizations will be formed. Six enhanced brigades will remain as currently organized and six would become part of an AC/RC division test.

The Army will study and test an ARNG proposal to form two new divisions by merging six enhanced brigades – three brigades per division with an active component division headquarters of 250-300 soldiers. Training and Doctrine Command will develop the concept and report to me on progress not later than December 1, 1996. Their concept will consider doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, and warfighting impacts.

The ARNG Division Redesign Study accomplished two major goals. The Army's CS/CSS shortages will be reduced to the lowest level in decades and the Active Army and Reserve Components will take a major step towards integration. The cost for implementation of the redesign study is \$2.9 billion. This plan has the combined support of the Army senior uniformed and civilian leadership, the National Guard Bureau and The Adjutants General of the 54 States and Territories. With additional fiscal support from OSD, this dynamic plan will properly posture America's Army for the 21st Century.



Togo D. West, Jr.



UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF

General William W. Hartzog  
Commander  
United States Army Training and  
Doctrine Command  
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5000

Dear General *Bill* Hartzog:

The initial work of the Army National Guard (ARNG) Division Redesign Study Group has been completed. Members of the group, representing the Army Secretariat, the Army Staff, National Guard Bureau and the Adjutants General developed a plan which we believe will bring us closer to a Total Force. The plan is to inactivate 12 ARNG combat brigades and use the generated force structure to form two combined arms divisions and an additional six combined arms brigades consisting of combat support and combat service support units. These 42,700 conversions will reduce the Army's combat support and combat service support shortages to 15,700--an acceptable level of risk.

Based on the ARNG Division Redesign Plan, the ARNG will consist of eight divisions at endstate. Three divisions will remain as currently organized. In three additional divisions, one divisional brigade will be inactivated in each division and replaced by an enhanced brigade. Two combined arms divisions will be formed by converting existing divisional structure to combat support and combat service support organizations. In addition, six combined arms brigades, containing combat support and combat service support organizations will be formed. Six enhanced brigades will remain as currently organized and six will become part of an Active Component/Reserve Component division test.

The ARNG Division Redesign Study Plan also proposes studying and testing the concept of forming two integrated divisions containing both Active and Reserve Component soldiers. These new divisions will be formed by placing six enhanced brigades, three per division,

-2-

under an Active Component Division headquarters of approximately 300 soldiers.

Request that Training and Doctrine Command conduct an assessment of the integrated division proposal to determine the viability of the concept addressing doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, and warfighting impacts. The outcome of this study will be a recommendation to the senior Army leadership on the merits of the concept and how to proceed.

Would appreciate your staff briefing the study plan to me and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs by June 30, 1996. Additionally, provide an in progress review to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army by December 1, 1996. We estimate that nine to twelve months will be required to complete this study. *(obviously can be modified based on your recommendations)*.

We stand ready to brief you and your staff on the results of the ARNG Division Redesign effort and appreciate your assistance with this very important Total Army redesign effort.

Sincerely,



Ronald H. Griffith  
General, United States Army  
Vice Chief of Staff

*Per our previous discussions on this issue.*

## **Appendix B COMMANDER TRADOC STUDY PLAN**

In this appendix is the Study Plan approved by the Commander, Training and Doctrine Command. It should be noted that the original enclosure as signed by the Commander, TRADOC is provided along with the enclosure that represents the agreed to changes as a result of the 16-17 January 97 Council of Colonels at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.




Study Plan ATCD-F  
6 August 1996




**STUDY PLAN  
FOR THE  
AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION CONCEPT**

PREPARED BY:

  
JOHN J. PWOHIG  
LTC(P), FA  
Director, Force Design Directorate

APPROVED BY:

  
JOHN E. MILLER  
LTG  
Deputy Commander, TRADOC

6 August 1996

AC/ARNG DIVISION CONCEPT  
STUDY PLAN

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**1. Purpose.**

a. This plan describes the analytic framework for the validation of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept. It will provide insights to the suitability, feasibility and acceptability of the concept. It will affect the recommended division concept of operation, its design, the structure of subordinate division troops and brigades, and efforts required to determine necessary modifications to these units.

b. The scope of this plan is to assess the integrated division concept. Identification of specifics such as bill payers for personnel and equipment, fielding schedules, and TAA and POM inputs will require testing and implementation plans based on the results of this study. As stated by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the mission is for “..Training and Doctrine Command to conduct an assessment of the integrated division proposal to determine the viability of the concept addressing doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, and warfighting impacts”.

c. This plan describes the general approaches which will be used in various supporting analyses.

**2. References.**

a. *Memorandum, Secretary of the Army, 23 May 1996, subject: Army National Guard Division Redesign Decision-Action Memorandum*

b. *Letter, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, subject: Army National Guard Division Redesign.*

c. *Army National Guard Division Redesign Study Decision Briefing, 14 May 1996*

**3. Terms of Reference.**

a. *Problem Statement.* The Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) Mid-Term Study identified the following requirements: possible reallocation of 60,000 ARNG combat personnel to fill known CS and CSS shortfalls, possible elimination of 50,000 combat spaces from the Total Army, reduction or reorganization of ARNG divisions, and greater integration of the AC and RC.



b. *Background of the problem.* The ARNG Redesign Plan was developed to address these requirements and is depicted in figure 1. TRADOC has been charged with assessing part of ARNG Redesign Plan. This portion of the plan creates two divisions which integrate units of both the AC and ARNG. These two divisions will be formed by placing six Enhanced Brigades, three per division, under an Active Component Division headquarters. Assessment determines the viability of the concept by addressing doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, mission capability, and resource impacts. Three alternative division concepts have been developed for analysis of AC/ARNG integration in this study. Key characteristics of the concepts are summarized below:

(1) Alternative One. This concept is depicted in figure 2. In this concept the division consist of an Active Component HHC, AC and/or ARNG divisional troop units and three Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades. In peacetime the division headquarters coordinates and conducts training. Upon mobilization the division reforms into a standard AOE division organization with divisional units in the brigades falling under the command and control of divisional troop headquarters units. An example is the DS artillery battalions falling under the command and control of DIVARTY. The Enhanced Brigade thus becomes a standard divisional brigade, subject to task organization by the division commander.




Figure 1.




Figure 2.

(2) Alternative Two. This concept is depicted in figure 3. In this concept the division consists of an HHC of Active Component soldiers and three Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades. In this concept the Division HHC is intended only as a peacetime training and mobilization organization. Upon completion of mobilization the Enhanced Brigades would be committed and fought as Separate Brigade units. The Division HHC would not deploy.




Figure 3.

(3) Alternative Three. This concept is depicted in figure 4. In this concept the division is an AOE division consisting of an Active Component HHC, AC and/or ARNG divisional troop units and three National Guard Enhanced Brigades. In peacetime the division headquarters coordinates and conducts training. The Brigades are task organized as with AC split based divisions. The divisional troops are attached to the brigades for the purpose of peacetime training. In mobilization the divisional units in the brigades reform and fall under the command and control of divisional troop headquarters units. An example is the DS artillery battalions attached to the brigade reforming under the command and control of DIVARTY. The division would conduct combat operations in the same manner as any other AOE division.




Figure 4.

(4). Anticipated missions.

(a) Alternatives 1 and 3 have a divisional wartime missions. They are expected to deploy and conduct combat operations as any other division in the U.S. Army. These alternatives also imply the ability to task organize brigades and/or divisional troop units for non-standard missions and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) missions that may be assigned in support of national strategic objectives.

(b) Alternative 2 has no wartime mission for the division. The Enhanced Brigades are deployed and conduct combat operations as Separate Brigades. The Division HHC mission does not extend past post mobilization.

c. *Scope.* This study plan is applicable to all analysis conducted as part of, or in some manner linked to, the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept. The concept will be applied only to the two specified divisions. It does not describe support requirements or taskings from the remainder of the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study. During the course of the study the organizational “building blocks” of the AC/NG division will be analyzed and refined.

d. *Assumptions.*

(1) Additional Force Structure and procurement of AC portion of divisions will be provided.

(2) All units are organized IAW current Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

(3). Enhanced Brigades retain current ALO, training and equipment modernization levels.

(4) AC units will have same ALO, training and equipment modernization levels as AC AOE divisional units.

**4. AC/ARNG integrated division concept analysis management.** The AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept study supports the Army National Guard Division Redesign resourcing schedule. The critical timeline and decision points of this study are listed in paragraph 6 (d).

a. *Issues and methodology.* The Secretary of the Army has identified the following to be addressed in assessing the validity of the AC/ARNG Division Concept: organization, doctrine, training, mobilization, and mission capability. An additional issue to identify resource requirements and impacts was added. These areas of assessment identify several broad issues and analytical methods for investigation and are listed below. However, further delineation of listed issues is necessary to permit proper definition of what aspects of the issues are being address and, subsequently how they will be analyzed. The sub-issues to be specifically addressed are detailed in appendix A.

(1) Organization. The organizational assessment falls into three broad areas: eventual mission of the division, organizational design and force structure. The ultimate mission will be critical in the determination of the organization design and structure. Each alternative will be examined relative to its ability to perform as required by its concept. Force structure requirement to convert late or non-deploying combat units into Total Force shortfalls (COMPO 4 buy back), was one problem that initiated this study. Solutions proposed will

identify resources that may impact on that part of the overall ARNG Redesign Plan.

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Methodology</b>
What are the appropriate missions for each concept?	Review war plan documents, interviews and literature search.
What are the functions to be performed by each concept?	Literature search for functions related to peacetime, post mobilization and combat
What organizational concept alternative best supports the functions?	Comparative analysis of each alternatives' ability to perform functions.
What new organizational designs are required to support each concept?	Comparative analysis of new designs.
Are other alternative concepts appropriate?	Literature search of historical records and coordination with other services.
What are the impacts on the AC and ARNG structure?	Analysis of TPFDL impacts. Comparison of mix of heavy/light brigades in context of Global Planning Scenarios and comparison of before and after AC and NG forces.

(2) Doctrine. The employment of AOE separate brigades and divisions is supported by current doctrine (FM 71-3 and FM 71-100). Of the alternatives, only alternative 3 can thus be supported. It has a wartime/operational configuration as an AOE division and fights as such. Split basing during peacetime is an MTOE issue and has no doctrinal impact for this alternative. The remaining alternatives require different C2 relationships that can not be supported by existing doctrine. The analysis will identify the differences in doctrinal requirements of these alternatives by comparing existing doctrine with specified C2 relationships and employment of the division.

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Methodology</b>
What is the mission of the division HHC?	Comparative analysis of alternatives to existing doctrine.
What is the relationship between the corps and division if the division is only a C2 node?	Comparative analysis of alternatives to existing doctrine.

(3) Training. The training aspects of this study cannot begin until the AC/ARNG Integrated Division structure and mission are provided. From this start point, a Mission Essential Task List (METL) must be formulated to determine all critical wartime missions for which the units will be responsible for. The METL leads to a determination of the training doctrine, and training support products such as ARTEPS, MTPs, TSPs, etc. are available or if there are holes to be filled. If the AC/RC Integrated Divisions are given CS/CSS missions for example, this decision will require creation of new doctrine and new training products. All training opportunities must be examined from CTC rotations to BPC rotations and what home station training using synthetic environment or distance learning is feasible. The study must imagine the training opportunities of tomorrow. All of this must be reconciled with how soldiers allowed to train 39 days a year are integrated in the same division with soldiers who can train 365 days per year, all of whom reside at multiple and widely dispersed sites. The best training ideas must be sought whether based in the Army, other Services or other nations.

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Methodology</b>
What will be the Integrated Division Headquarters organization and mission? (These decisions are Force Design, not training decisions; but the decisions will obviously drive all training analysis in the study and therefore become a top training issue)	Examine similar structures and missions; not only in Army units, but those of the Marines and foreign units with similar AC/RC structure. Review number of units receiving BCTP and CTC rotations now versus future capabilities.
What are the units Mission Essential Task List (METL)?	Examine mission statement and organization. Compare to like structured units in AC/RC and determine METL.
What changes/modifications to doctrine and current training documents are required for each alternative?	Review current doctrine. Get MTPs for Division and Corps Staffs published.
What impact does the stationing of units have on training? (i.e. Headquarters over an eight state area vice one state)	Reconcile location with existing training opportunities to include technical opportunities such as distance learning and exercising using synthetic environment.
Who will be responsible for training division CS/CSS units and how?	Based on mission and organization, including what mix of AC/RC within the Division HQ and base, assess

training requirements

- What are the key training opportunities outside the CTC training experience for divisions? List all existing training opportunities in AC/RC and war game the feasibility and applicability against resources.
- What are the leader development requirements? Plug the requirements in the new organization into Center for Army Leadership Leader Development FAA.
- How will the reconciliation of training time for active soldiers versus the reserve soldiers be effected. (This includes individual as well as collective tasks.) Develop a long range calendar showing all mandatory and key training events (individual and collective) with the active versus reserve soldiers participation.
- How does the mixed structure affect current Medical Service Corps shortages? Analysis will determine reprioritization of critical MCS assets.
- What are the impacts on pre mobilization training? Comparative analysis of alternatives
- How much additional training time will be required to train a mission ready integrated division as opposed to an Enhanced Brigade? Comparative analysis of alternatives
- What are the criteria for best Enhanced Brigade candidates for comprising the integrated division, e.g. meeting warfight timelines, proximity to similar brigades, trained to validation of the entire division, differences in post mobilization training timelines of different types of brigades? Comparative analysis of alternatives
- What are the post mobilization impacts? Comparative analysis of alternatives
- What are the differences in divisional HHC operations cost and time when the three brigades are located in contiguous states, compared to more than 500 miles separation, and more Comparative analysis of alternatives

than 1000 mile separation?

Will the integrated division be expected to perform operations other than war? If so, will this be built into the pre and post mobilization training and how much more time will be added? Comparative analysis of alternatives

(4) Mobilization. Each alternative requires a substantially different process to prepare the organization for post mobilization deployment and combat operations. Those processes will effect the post mobilization organization and training requirements. These activities will require different times to accomplish and thereby effect the time when the organization will be available for deployment. The analysis will identify the differences in these requirements for each alternative by comparing applicable processes and the timelines with each.

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Methodology</b>
What are the post mobilization processes applicable to each alternative?	Develop processes for post mobilization activities for each alternative.
What are the mobilization timelines associated with each alternative?	Develop timelines and relationships for each process.
What are the differences in quality, resource needs and time requirements in connection with mobilization of the integrated division in all three alternatives?	Comparative analysis of alternatives
What current Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Stations can efficiently handle the mobilization of an entire AC/ARNG integrated division? (Efficiently is defined as an entire mobilization process completed in less than 20 days).	Comparative analysis of alternatives to current Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Stations.

(5) Mission capability. The mission capability assessment will identify possible impacts the alternatives have on Total Force strategic reserve missions and divisional C2 functions. A comparative analysis of the alternatives will be done to identify: net Total Force changes caused by units being assigned to an integrated division, potential enhancements to battle command flexibility created by new C2 relationships, and impacts of organic verses non-organic CS/CSS



functions within the division. For mission capability, it is assumed that since all the designs are built on six ARNG Enhanced Brigades, the differences in Total Force combat fighting potential will be indeterminable in constructive simulations.

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Methodology</b>
What impacts do the various alternatives have on the Total Force capability?	Comparative analysis of alternatives in qualitative terms
How do the alternative designs affect battle command, combat support, and combat service support during pre mobilization, mobilization, and combat within the integrated division?	Comparative analysis of alternatives in qualitative terms.

(6) Resources. The analysis of this issue will develop the relative feasibility of implementing each alternative. The potential source of personnel spaces and major materiel items will be identified and computed. Resource requirements will be developed using established Army models to evaluate cost/benefit and value added of each alternative.

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Methodology</b>
What additional resources are required?	Comparative analysis of resource requirements and research to identify potential sources for additional resources.

## 5. Support and resource requirements.

a. *Support requirements*. The following responsibilities are assigned to each participating organization as indicated.

(1) Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC.

(a) Approve this study plan.

(b) Approve the final analysis report, to include all subordinate analysis.

(2) Force Design Directorate.

(a) Serve as the lead study agency.

(b) Conduct in-process reviews (IPR), as required.

(c) Ensure the analytic validity of the analysis/collection plans for all subordinate analysis.

(d) Approve any subordinate study plans.

(e) Conduct assessment of organization, mobilization and resources for the AC/ARNG integrated division.

(f) Write and brief study results.

(3) CGSC-CDD.

(a) Conduct assessment of doctrine for the AC/ARNG integrated division.

(b) Provide assistance to Force Design Directorate during preparation of IPRs and decision briefs.

(4) DCST.

(a) Conduct assessment of training for the AC/ARNG integrated division.

(b) Coordinate with FORSCOM on training issues.

(c) Provide assistance to Force Design Directorate during preparation of IPRs and decision briefs.

(5) TRAC.

(a) Conduct assessment of mission capability issues for the AC/ARNG integrated division.

(b) Provide assistance to Force Design Directorate during preparation of IPRs and decision briefs.

(6) FORSCOM.

(a) Conduct assessment of mobilization issues for the AC/ARNG integrated division.

(b) Provide assistance to DCST on training issues.

(c) Provide assistance to Force Design Directorate during preparation of IPRs and decision briefs.

(7) Other TRADOC proponent schools. Provide assistance to ensure proper representation of branch-specific systems, TTPs and doctrine. Specific requirements will be coordinated as appropriate.

(8) DCSOPS, NGB, HQDA, CAA. Provide assistance and information. Specific requirements will be coordinated as appropriate.

*b. Resource requirements.* The following resources are estimated to be required from analytic organizations supporting the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept study:

Organization	Dollars	Man Years (Military/Civilian)	Man Years (Contractor)
DCSCD-FDD	\$500,000.00	2	4
TRAC	\$10,000.00	2	-
CGSC-CDD	-	1	-
DCST	\$200,000.00	2	2
Total	\$710,000.00	7	6

## 6. Administration.

*a. Study title.* AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept.

*b. Study team organization for the assessment.* The overall lead has been assigned to Force Design Directorate by TRADOC Deputy Commanding General. The Director, Force Design Directorate, has assigned the Force Design Division to lead the effort. The study team will consist of representatives from each of the supporting analytic organizations as shown in figure 6. Specific points of contact for each participating agency are listed in paragraph 6e.




Figure 6.

c. *Coordination.* This analysis support plan has been coordinated with all participating analytic agencies.

d. *Study Schedule.* The following key events with milestone dates represent the tentative study schedule.

<b>Event</b>	<b>Milestone</b>
Study Plan draft completed	June 1996
Brief CG TRADOC on study plan	2 July 1996
Brief DAMO-FD on study plan	8 July 1996
Brief VCSA/ASA(M&RA) on study plan	9 July 1996
AOWG meeting	17 July 1996
ARSTAFF comments on study plan	26 July 1996
Contractor FY96 task orders to FDD	26 July 1996
Final draft study plan to DCSCD	9 August 1996
Study Plan approval by DCG TRADOC	15 August 1996
CINC briefings	19 August - 13 September 1996
Contractor AOWG	27 August 1996
Contractor FY97 task orders to FDD	30 August 1996
Council of Colonels meeting	2-3 October 1996
IPR to DCG TRADOC and DCSCD	8 October 1996
Mission issues completed	11 October 1996
Organization and Doctrine issues completed	24 October 1996
IPR to DCG TRADOC and DCSCD	30 October 1996
Pre-mobilization training issues completed	1 November 1996
Post-mobilization training issues interim completed	8 November 1996
Council of Colonels meeting	14 November 1996
IPR to CG TRADOC	18 November 1996
IPR to VCSA and ASA(M&RA)	21 November 1996
IPR to CSA and SA	1 December 1996
Post-mobilization issues completed	10 January 1997
IPR to DCG TRADOC and DCST	17 January 1997
Warfight capability issues completed	24 January 1997
Mobilization issues completed	24 January 1997
Resource issues completed	31 January 1997
Force implications issues completed	7 February 1997
Council of Colonels meeting	19 February 1997
Study results briefed to CG TRADOC	5 March 1997
Study results briefed to Senior Army Leadership	12 March 1997

e. *Points of Contact (POC).*

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(10) FORSCOM.

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## **7. Appendices.**

A. Issues.

B. Issues as Amended during Action Officer Workshops

**FINAL DRAFT**

6 August 1996

**APPENDIX A  
AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION CONCEPT**

**ISSUES**

This appendix details the dendritic structure for the study issues. The broad over-arching issues are supplemented by sub-issues that define the scope, or aspects that will be addressed in this study. Some of those sub-issues are further decomposed into more specific questions, as appropriate.

TOPIC	ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES	LEAD	ASSIST
Org.	1. What are the appropriate missions for each concept?  1.1 What are the peacetime training missions?  1.2 What are the warfight missions?  1.3 What OOTW missions are appropriate?  1.4 What are the state missions/  1.4.1 How does the AC component support state missions?	FDD	SSW
	2. What are the functions to be performed by each concept?  2.1 What are the peacetime functions?  2.1.1 What are the training functions?  2.1.2 What are the "state mission" functions?	FDD	NGB CDD

<p>2.1.3 What are the potential OOTW functions?</p> <p>2.2 What are the post mobilization functions?</p> <p>2.2.1 What are the training functions?</p> <p>2.3 What are the combat functions?</p>		
<p>3. What organizational concept alternative best supports the functions?</p> <p>3.1 What alternative best supports the training functions?</p> <p>3.2 What alternative best supports the state support functions?</p>	FDD	NGB CDD
<p>3.3 What alternative best supports the potential OOTW functions?</p> <p>3.4 What alternative best supports the combat functions?</p>		
<p>4. What new organizational designs are required to support each concept?</p> <p>4.1 What are required by nonstandard functional arrangements?</p> <p>4.2 What are caused by stationing considerations?</p>	FDD	NGB CDD
<p>5. Are other alternative concepts appropriate?</p> <p>5.1 What AC/RC integration concepts have been used in the past by the Army?</p> <p>5.2 What have other services experienced in AC/RC integration?</p>	FDD	NGB CDD
<p>6. What are the impacts on the AC and ARNG structure?</p>	SSW	OCAR NGB



	<p>6.1 What are the impacts on the NG structure?</p> <p>6.1.1 What are the issues with geographic organization?</p> <p>6.1.2 What are the ARNG structure differences among the alternatives?</p> <p>6.1.2.1 What are the ARNG structure requirements for each alternative?</p> <p>6.1.2.2 What ARNG structure/units are decremented to fill the ARNG requirements?</p> <p>6.2 What are the impacts on the AC structure?</p> <p>6.2.1 What are the AC structure differences among the alternatives?</p> <p>6.2.1.1 What are the AC structure requirements for each alternative?</p> <p>6.2.1.2 What AC structure/units are decremented to fill the ARNG requirements?</p> <p>6.3 What are the structure impacts at EAD?</p>		<p>FDD FORSCOM DCST</p>
Doctrine	7. What is the mission of the division base?	CDD	<p>FDD DCST FORSCOM</p>
	8. What is the relationship between corps and division if the division base is only a C2 node?	CDD	FDD
Training	9. What will be the Integrated Division Headquarters organization and mission? (These decisions are Force Design, not training decisions; but the	DCST	<p>FORSCOM DAMO-TR NGB</p>



<p>10.2. How would the METL of brigades in an integrated division differ from the METL accorded to/or anticipated for Enhanced Brigades in extant OPLANS?</p> <p>10.3. Would pre mobilization delimited/generic METL such as Attack, Defend and Movement to Contact, now defined for Enhanced Brigades, also apply to an integrated division?</p> <p>10.4. To what extent are additional METL tasks, based on the METT-T, envisioned for post mobilization training? What tasks, level of proficiency and how much more training and time will be needed to train these added requirements?</p> <p>10.5. Will the gaining WARTRACE overseas CINC approve the integrated division METL?</p>		
<p>11. What changes/modifications to doctrine and current training documents are required for each AC/RC ID alternative?</p> <p>11.1. Will FORSCOM/ARNG Reg 350-2 continue to be primary training source document for the ARNG enhanced brigades in the AC/RC ID?</p> <p>11.2. Will existing ARTEP manuals, MTPs, and Drills meet the training requirements of the division headquarters and its sub-units?</p>	DCST	FORSCOM DAMO-TR NGB
<p>12. What impact does the stationing of units have on training? (i.e. Headquarters over an eight state area vice one state)</p>	DCST	FORSCOM DAMO-TR NGB

<p>13. Who will be responsible for training CS/CSS units and how?</p>	<p>DCST</p>	<p>FORSCOM DAMO-TR NGB OCAR</p>
<p>14. What are the key training opportunities outside the CTC training experience for divisions?</p> <p>14.1. How can BPCs be used most effectively? (The BPCs present both an added and alternative training opportunity regardless of AC/RC ID METL. Will the study examine beefing up BPCs to more closely mirror BCTP experience? For example, hiring retired active duty three or four star Senior Observers, and a more robust OC cadre to replace or supplement BCTP/BCBST rotations?)</p> <p>14.2. How can we restructure the reserve brigade/battalions conducting lane training to accommodate AC/RC ID unique training requirements?</p> <p>14.3. How can we tie training to existing corps exercises to include conducting embedded WFX for division in corps exercise or brigade in division WFX depending on AC/RC ID METL?</p>	<p>DCST</p>	<p>FORSCOM DAMO-TR NGB OCAR</p>
<p>15. What are the leader development requirements?</p>	<p>DCST</p>	<p>FORSCOM DAMO-TR NGB CAL</p>
<p>16. How will the reconciliation of training time for active soldiers versus the reserve soldiers be effected. (This includes individual and collective tasks.)</p>	<p>DCST</p>	<p>FORSCOM DAMO-TR NGB DAMO- OMD</p>
<p>17. How does the mixed structure affect current MCS shortages?</p>	<p>DCST</p>	<p>FORSCOM DAMO-TR</p>

			<p>NGB DAMO- OMD</p>
<p>18. What are the impacts on pre mobilization training?</p> <p>18.1. Will pre mobilization training proficiency floors, established by Section 1119, Title XI remain the same whether the unit's are in an integrated division or separate Enhanced Brigades?</p> <p>18.2. What is the division HHC role in pre mobilization training, e.g. has command, supervises training, assists training, assures AC support during the training year, another layer?</p> <p>18.3. How will the AC HHC interact with the State Adjutant General, and who has peacetime responsibility for the training readiness of the ARNG units?</p> <p>18.4. Given limited training time available, will the ARNG units be exempted from state missions? If not how much additional training and time will be needed?</p>	<p>FORSCOM</p>	<p>DCST DAMO-TR NGB</p>	
<p>19. How much additional training time will be required to train a mission ready integrated division than an Enhanced Brigade?</p> <p>19.1. To what extent will be added time be different if the integrated division is all heavy, tow heavy and one light, two light and one heavy, or all light? (Currently Enhanced Brigades require 90 days post mobilization training; while the Departmental estimate for training up an ARNG</p>	<p>FORSCOM</p>	<p>DCST DAMO-TR NGB</p>	

<p>division is 365 days).</p>		
<p>20. What are the criteria for best Enhanced Brigade candidates for comprising the integrated division, e.g. meeting warfight timelines, proximity to similar brigades, trained to validation of entire integrated division, differences in post mobilization training timelines of lights vs. heavy?</p>	<p>FORSCOM</p>	<p>DCST DAMO-TR NGB</p>
<p>21. What are the post mobilization impacts?</p> <p>21.1. Where would the entire integrated division train upon mobilization, or would the Enhance Brigades train simultaneously at different combat and warfighting training centers?</p> <p>21.2. Will the division HHC be able to effectively command and control the simultaneous training of its three Enhanced Brigades at widely dispersed combat and warfighting training centers, e.g. CTC, Fort Hood, and Yakima?</p> <p>21.3. What command would conduct the post mobilization training of the integrated division? And, considering deployment of most of the AC forces, will adequate AC trainers and support personnel be present?</p>	<p>FORSCOM</p>	<p>DCST DAMO-TR NGB</p>
<p>22. What are the differences in divisional HHC operations cost and time when the three brigades are located in contiguous states, compared to more than 500 miles separation, and more than 1000 miles apart?</p>	<p>FORSCOM</p>	<p>DCST DAMO-TR NGB</p>
<p>23. Will the integrated division be expected to perform operations other than war? If so, how will this be built</p>	<p>FORSCOM</p>	<p>DCST DAMO-TR NGB</p>

	into the pre and post mobilization training and how much more time will be added?		
Mob.	<p>24. What are the post mobilization processes for each alternative?</p> <p>24.1 What reorganization process must occur?</p> <p>24.2 What unit training facilities limit training scheduling?</p> <p>24.2.1 Do training facilities limit training scheduling?</p>	FORSCOM	<p>DAMO-SSW</p> <p>DAMO-TR</p> <p>DAMO-ODM</p> <p>NGB</p> <p>OCAR</p>
	25. What are the timelines associated with post mobilization activities?	FORSCOM	<p>DAMO-SSW</p> <p>DAMO-TR</p> <p>DAMO-ODM</p> <p>NGB</p> <p>OCAR</p>
	26. What are the differences in quality, resource needs and time requirements in connection with mobilization of the integrated division in all three alternatives?	FORSCOM	<p>DAMO-SSW</p> <p>DAMO-TR</p> <p>DAMO-ODM</p> <p>NGB</p> <p>OCAR</p>
	<p>27. What current Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Stations can efficiently handle the mobilization of an entire AC/ARNG integrated division? (Efficiently is defined as an entire mobilization process completed in less than 20 days).</p> <p>27.1. What additional resources would be needed to mobilize an entire AC/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization</p>	FORSCOM	<p>DAMO-SSW</p> <p>DAMO-TR</p> <p>DAMO-ODM</p> <p>NGB</p> <p>OCAR</p> <p>DCST</p>

	<p>Station installation, e.g. Reserve Component medical, dental, judge advocate general units?</p> <p>27.2. Are there any additional impact of mobilizing an AR/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation, e.g. delaying other planned units?</p> <p>27.3. Can mobilization and training effectiveness and efficiencies be realized by mobilizing the entire AC/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation and conducting all post mobilization training on that installation?</p>		
	<p>27.4. How much equipment can be prepositioned for post mobilization training of and entire AC/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation, to save time and funds, e.g. percent of combat arms major end items?</p> <p>27.5. What differences can be expected regarding Opposing Force planning, operations and cost for training and entire AC/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation, in contrast with Enhance Brigades mobilized and trained at geographically dispersed locations?</p>		
<p>Mission Capability</p>	<p>28. What impacts do the various alternatives have on Total Force capability?</p> <p>28.1. What brigade structure (IN,</p>	<p>TRAC</p>	<p>NGB DAMO-FDF FDD DAMO-SSW</p>



<p>AR, MX), do the division alternatives have?</p> <p>28.2. What are the impacts on the availability of forces to support the National Military Strategy?</p> <p>28.2.2. What are the timelines (mobilization, training, deployment) associated with each alternative?</p> <p>28.2.3. What are the impacts on the various CINC's TPFDL?</p> <p>28.3. What is the best mix of IN, AR, MX brigades for the divisions?</p> <p>28.4. What is the best mix of AC and ARNG units?</p>		<p>FORSCOM</p>
<p>29. How do the alternative designs affect battle command, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS), during pre mobilization, mobilization, and combat within the integrated division?</p> <p>29.1. What are the alternative unique aspects of the designs that affect battle command within the integrated division?</p> <p>29.2. What are the alternative unique aspects of the designs that affect CS units and support relationships within the integrated division?</p> <p>29.3. What are the alternative unique aspects of the designs that affect CSS units and support relationships within the integrated division?</p>	<p>TRAC</p>	<p>DAMO-FDF CDD FDD NGB</p>

Resource Mgt.	<p>30. What additional resources are required?</p> <p>30.1 What are the additional personnel and material required by each alternative?</p> <p>30.1.1 What are the EAD requirements for each alternative?</p> <p>30.2 What are the potential sources for the additional resources?</p>	FDD	<p>TRAC DCST CDD FORSCOM DAMO-FDF DAMO-TR DAMO-ODM DAMO-ODR DAMO-SSW NGB OCAR</p>
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# FINAL DRAFT

## As Amended January 1997

### APPENDIX A AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION CONCEPT

#### ISSUES

This appendix details the dendritic structure for the study issues. The broad over-arching issues are supplemented by sub-issues that define the scope, or aspects that will be addressed in this study. Some of those sub-issues are further decomposed into more specific questions, as appropriate.

New	ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES	AUTHOR
1.1	What AC/RC integration concepts have been used in the past by the Army?	FDD
1.2	What have other services experienced in AC/RC integration?	FDD
2.1	What are the appropriate missions for each concept?	FDD
2.1.1	What are the wartime missions?	
2.2	What are the functions to be performed by each concept?	FDD
2.3	What are the peacetime functions?	FDD
2.3.4	What are the training functions?	FDD
2.4	What are the post mobilization functions?	FDD
2.4.1	What are the training functions?	FDD
2.5	What are the combat functions?	FDD
2.6	What will be the Integrated Division Headquarters organization and mission?	FDD
2.6.1	What training requirements will be generated by the decision on mission and organization of the division headquarters?	FDD
2.6.2	Will the division headquarters have a go-to-war mission?	FDD
3.1	What is the mission of the division base?	
3.2	What changes/modifications to current doctrine is required for each AC/RC ID alternative?	FDD
4.1	What new organizational designs are required to	FDD

New	ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES	AUTHOR
	support each concept?	
5.1	How does the AC component support state missions?	TJAG
5.2	What impact does the selection of units have on C2?	TJAG
5.3	What are the impacts on pre mobilization training?	DCST
5.3.1	Will pre mobilization training proficiency floors, established by Section 1119, Title XI remain the same whether the unit's are in an integrated division or separate Enhanced Brigades?	
5.3.2	What is the division HHC role in pre mobilization training, e.g. has command, supervises training, assists training, assures AC support during the training year, another layer?	
5.3.3	How will the AC HHC interact with the State Adjutant General, and who has peacetime responsibility for the training readiness of the ARNG units?	
5.3.4	Given limited training time available, will the ARNG units be exempted from state missions? If not how much additional training and time will be needed?	
5.4	What are the legal and procedural bases for the proposed organization?	TJAG
5.4.1	What statutes and regulations will require changes?	TJAG
5.4.2	If under Federal control during peacetime, how do the governors mobilize affected units in response to peacetime state emergencies?	TJAG
5.4.3	Whose training requirements take precedence - state or Federal?	TJAG
5.4.4	Who is responsible for OERs, NCOERs, and other personnel actions	TJAG
5.5	What modifications need to be made to the existing manning and equipping data flows and systems?	C2I
5.6	What is the funding stream for this organization (manpower, training, maintenance, parts, etc.)? If it is AC money, are appropriations decremented for the states providing the brigades and division base units?	TJAG?
6.1	What changes/modifications to current training documents are required for each AC/RC ID alternative?	FDD
6.1.1	Will FORSCOM/ARNG Reg 350-2 continue to be	

New	ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES	AUTHOR
	primary training source document for the ARNG enhanced brigades in the AC/RC ID?	
6.1.2	Will existing ARTEP manuals, MTPs, and Drills meet the training requirements of the division headquarters and its sub-units?	DCST
6.1.3	What are the collective training tasks for the Div HHC and base?	DCST
6.2	What impact does the selection of units have on training support?	
6.3	Who is responsible for training division units?	DCST
6.4	What are the key training opportunities outside the CTC training experience for divisions?	
6.5	What are the leader development requirements?	
6.6	How much additional training time will be required to train a mission ready integrated division than an Enhanced Brigade?	
6.6.1	To what extent will added time be different if the integrated division is all heavy, if two heavy and one light, if two light and one heavy, or if all light?	
6.7	What are the differences in resource needs and time requirements in connection with mobilization of the integrated division in all three alternatives?	
6.8	Will the gaining WARTRACE overseas CINC approve the integrated division METL?	
6.9	Will a wartime mission result in a BCTP or other Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation?	6, 7, 8
7.1	Will the gaining WARTRACE overseas CINC approve the integrated division METL?	
7.2	What are the post mobilization processes for each alternative?	FORSCOM OR SSW
7.2.1	What reorganization process must occur?	FDD
7.2.2	What unit training facilities limit training scheduling?	RAND
7.3	What additional resources are required to train the divisions?	RAND
7.4	What current Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Stations can efficiently handle the mobilization of an entire AC/ARNG integrated division alternative?	RAND
7.5	What are the post mobilization impacts?	RAND
7.5.1	Where would the entire integrated division train upon mobilization, or would the Enhance Brigades	RAND

New	ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES	AUTHOR
	train simultaneously at different combat and warfighting training centers?	
7.6	Will a wartime mission result in a BCTP or other Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation?	6, 7, 8
7.7	Do training facilities limit training scheduling?	RAND
7.8	Will the division HHC be able to effectively command and control the simultaneous training of its three Enhanced Brigades at widely dispersed combat and warfighting training centers, e.g. CTC, Fort Hood, and Yakima?	RAND
7.9	What command would conduct the post mobilization training of the integrated division? And, considering deployment of most of the AC forces, will adequate AC trainers and support personnel be present?	RAND
8.1	What additional resources are required to train the divisions?	RAND
8.1.1	Where would the entire integrated division train upon mobilization, or would the Enhance Brigades train simultaneously at different combat and warfighting training centers?	RAND
8.1.2	Will the division HHC be able to effectively command and control the simultaneous training of its three Enhanced Brigades at widely dispersed combat and warfighting training centers, e.g. CTC, Fort Hood, and Yakima?	RAND
8.1.3	What command would conduct the post mobilization training of the integrated division? And, considering deployment of most of the AC forces, will adequate AC trainers and support personnel be present?	RAND
8.2	What are the post mobilization impacts?	RAND
8.3	What are the post mobilization processes for each alternative?	FORSCOM OR SSW
8.3.1	What reorganization process must occur?	FDD
8.3.2	What unit training facilities limit training scheduling?	RAND
8.3.3	Do training facilities limit training scheduling?	RAND
8.4	What current Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Stations can efficiently handle the mobilization of an entire AC/ARNG integrated division alternative?	RAND
8.5	Will a wartime mission result in a BCTP or other Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation?	6, 7, 8
8.6	What additional resources would be needed to mobilize an entire AC/ARNG integrated division on	RAND/ FDD/

New	ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES	AUTHOR
	one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation, e.g. Reserve Component medical, dental, judge advocate general units?	FORSCOM
8.7	What impacts do the various alternatives have on Total Force capability?	SSW
8.8	What are the impacts on the availability of forces to support the National Military Strategy?	SSW
8.8.1	What are the timelines (mobilization, training, deployment) associated with each alternative?	SSW
8.8.2	What are the impacts on the various CINC's TPFDL?	SSW
8.9	What is the best mix of AC and ARNG units?	SSW
8.10	What are the timelines associated with post mobilization activities?	RAND
8.11	What are the impacts on the AC and ARNG structure?	
8.11.1	What are the impacts on the NG structure?	
8.11.2	What are the impacts on the AC structure?	FDD
8.11.3	What are the structure impacts at EAD?	FDD/SSW
8.12	Are there any additional impact of mobilizing an AR/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation, e.g. delaying other planned units?	SSW
9.1	How much equipment can be prepositioned for post mobilization training of and entire AC/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation, to save time and funds, e.g. percent of combat arms major end items?	
9.2	What differences can be expected regarding Opposing Force planning, operations and cost for training and entire AC/ARNG integrated division on one Power Projection Platform/Mobilization Station installation, in contrast with Enhance Brigades mobilized and trained at geographically dispersed locations?	RAND
10.1	What additional resources are required for each alternative?	CALIBRE
10.2.1	What are the additional personnel and material required by each alternative?	

<b>New</b>	<b>ISSUES AND SUB-ISSUES</b>	<b>AUTHOR</b>
10.2.2	What are the EAD requirements for each alternative?	
10.3	What are the impacts on FORSCOM GFRE utilization?	FORSCOM
11.1	What organizational concept alternative best supports the functions?	FDD
11.1.1	What alternative best supports the training functions?	DEST
11.2	What alternative best supports the combat functions?	FDD



## **Appendix C CHRONOLOGY**

In this appendix is the chronology of events leading to the approval of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study by the Secretary of the Army on 6 August 1997.



Listed below are the major events pertaining to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
23 Jun 95	Commission on Roles and Missions Recommendations.
16 May 96	Charter for the Army National Guard Division Redesign Work Group signed by General Tilelli. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Review the Army's future unresourced CS/CSS requirements.</li><li>- Review the structure and missions of the ARNG divisions; develop options for changing ARNG division structure to meet future Army requirements.</li><li>- Conduct a resource feasibility assessment of the options to determine whether the Army possesses or is able to program the resources needed to equip and maintain the redesigned structure.</li><li>- Refine and prioritize the options for presentation to the Army Leadership.</li></ul>
23 May 96	Secretary of the Army, Mr. Togo West, signs action memorandum approving the ARNG Division Redesign Study Plan. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- The Army will develop an implementation plan to form and test two new AC/RC divisions</li></ul>
No date	Vice Chief of Staff, General Griffith, tasked TRADOC to conduct an assessment of the integrated division proposal to determine the viability of the concept addressing doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, and warfighting impacts.
9 July 96	Commander, TRADOC, General Hartzog briefs approval of a Study Plan Concept for reorganization of National Guard Forces.
30 Jul 96	Meeting with HQDA DAMO-SSW to discuss the force implications modeling for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study.
31 July 96	Information Briefing on ARNG Division Redesign Study for Requirements Review Council.
26 Aug 96	ARNG Division Redesign Study Brief to Secretary of Defense. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- BG Byrnes, Director of Force Programs, presented this briefing to report the progress made toward reducing the COMPO 4 shortfall and move toward further AC/RC integration by way of the integrated division proposal.</li></ul>

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AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

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- 27 Aug 96 Meeting at Fort Leavenworth, KS between ARSTAF, FORSCOM, ARNG, and TRADOC representatives to discuss actions to date on the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study.
- 25-27 Sep 96 Meeting at Fort Monroe, VA between ARSTAF, FORSCOM, ARNG and TRADOC representatives to discuss actions to date on the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study.
- 30 Sep 96 ARNG Division Redesign Information Briefing to Dr. Edward L. Warner Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements.  
- BG Byrnes, Director of Force Programs, presented this information briefing to Dr. Warner as an update on the status of the ADRS initiatives to reduce COMPO 4 and further integrate the AC and RC.
- 15 Oct 96 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study briefing to DCG, TRADOC.
- 4-5 Nov 96 CG FORSCOM Familiarization Brief on the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study.
- 15 Nov 96 CG TRADOC Video Teleconference In-Progress Review on the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study. The purpose of the brief:  
- Obtain approval for briefing to Sec. Army  
- Obtain approval for briefing ARNG Division Redesign to GOWG II  
- Confirm guidance and how to proceed.
- 11-12 Dec 96 AC/ARNG Division RAND Seminar at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The purpose of the seminar: To answer the question, "After mobilization how long will it take to train an AC/ARNG Division? Outputs for this seminar are expected to be a set of alternative strategies, consisting of times and events, to accomplish the collective training tasks for the Division. Pros and Cons developed for each strategy as well as resource considerations. Also, identify areas requiring further analysis before taking to senior trainers and leadership.
- 9 Jan 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division information briefing to G-3, FORSCOM. RAND training strategies information briefing to CG, First Army.
- 10 Jan 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study in progress review to the Secretary of the Army.
- 15 Jan 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division information briefing to BG Clark, Deputy Commander/Assistant Commandant, USA Infantry Center and School.

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

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- 16 Jan 97 RAND training strategies information briefing to BG Cherrie, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, TRADOC.
- 16-17 Jan AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study Council of Colonels meeting, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
- 24 Jan 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study information briefing to Mr. Spiegel, OASA(M&RA).
- 27 Jan 97 Discussion with HQDA OTJAG regarding the regulatory and statutory considerations for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.
- 7 Feb 97 Study Director visit to Fort Carson, CO to discuss AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC and C2 issues.
- 10 Feb 97 Study Director visit to Fort Riley, KS to discuss AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC and C2 issues.
- 13 Feb 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division in progress review with GEN Hartzog, CG, TRADOC.
- 18 Mar 97 FORSCOM and ARNG representatives and Study Director meeting at Fort Leavenworth, KS to discuss statutory and regulatory issues for AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions.
- 21 Mar 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study VCT between Forts Leavenworth, Monroe, and McPherson; HQDA; and ARNG representatives to discuss decision briefing for Secretary of the Army.
- 25 Mar 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study decision briefing for Secretary of the Army presented to MG Navas, Director, Army National Guard.
- 3 Apr 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study decision briefing for the Secretary of the Army reviewed by GEN Hartzog, CG, TRADOC.
- 7 Apr 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study information briefing presented to Congressional staffers from the Senate Armed Services Committee.
- 8 Apr 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study decision briefing for the Secretary of the Army presented to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

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- 9 Apr 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study decision briefing for the Secretary of the Army presented to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).
- 6 Aug 97 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study decision briefing for the Secretary of the Army.

## Appendix D ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT

This appendix contains supporting data for developing the AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives and consists of 6 charts. The first three charts show:

- Wartime operations that can be supported by each of the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives,
- Stability and support operations that each alternative can support, and
- State missions that each alternative is capable of supporting.

Each chart has four major columns: a listing of operations pertinent to the subject area and the three AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives (Alt 1, Alt 2 and Alt 3). Each alternative column is further broken down into a “Div” and “Bde” column. Opposite each wartime operation, stability and support operation, or state mission, an “X” has been placed beneath each alternative to show whether the alternative is capability of supporting the respective mission at the division and/or brigade level. For example, both alternative 1 and alternative 3 are capable of supporting “Movement to contact” at both the division and brigade level; alternative 2 can support this operation at the brigade level only.

This appendix also contains full page diagrams for each of the three alternative designs used in the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study. Each of these diagram shows the major components of the alternative, the standard requirements code (SRC) for each component, and the number of personnel within each component. Those components shown with a “-” or a “+” have either a personnel decrement or have additional personnel assigned respectively. Chapter 4 describes the derivation of the decrements while Appendix E contains a full explanation of the adjustments made to each component for Alternative 1. Adjustments to Alternative 3 are similar to the adjustments made to Alternative 1, but are done by whole units vice partial units.





## AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION WARFIGHT TASKS

	ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3	
	DIV	BDE	DIV	BDE	DIV	BDE
Movement to contact	X	X			X	X
Hasty attack	X	X		X	X	X
Deliberate attack	X	X		X	X	X
Exploitation	X	X		X	X	X
Pursuit	X	X		X	X	X
Economy of force	X	X		X	X	X
Area defense	X	X		X	X	X
Covering force operations	X	X		X	X	X
Mobile defense	X	X		X	X	X
Relief in place	X	X		X	X	X
Passage of lines	X	X		X	X	X
Delay	X	X		X	X	X
Withdrawal	X	X		X	X	X
Retirement	X	X		X	X	X
Protect rear area	X	X		X	X	X
Deep operations	X	X		X	X	X
Conduct recon, counter-recon, and security operations	X	X		X	X	X

Figure D-1 Warfight Tasks

## AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION STABILITY AND SUPPORT TASKS

	ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3	
	<u>DIV</u>	<u>BDE</u>	<u>DIV</u>	<u>BDE</u>	<u>DIV</u>	<u>BDE</u>
Peacekeeping	X	X		X	X	X
Peace enforcement	X	X		X	X	X
Show of force	X	X		X	X	X
Noncombatant evacuation	X	X		X	X	X
Security assistance	X	X		X	X	X
Humanitarian assistance	X	X		X	X	X
Arms control	X	X		X	X	X
Support to domestic civil authorities	X	X		X	X	X
Nation assistance	X	X		X	X	X
Combating terrorism	X	X		X	X	X
Support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies	X	X		X	X	X
Attacks and raids	X	X		X	X	X

Figure D-2 Stability and Support Tasks

**ACI/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION**  
**STATE TASKS**

	ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3	
	<u>DIV</u>	<u>BDE</u>	<u>DIV</u>	<u>BDE</u>	<u>DIV</u>	<u>BDE</u>
Civil disturbance control operations under state and federal authority	X	X			X	X
Evacuation of civilians for natural disasters	X	X		X	X	X
Support to state authorities (e.g., water shortages, floods, fire, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc.)	X	X		X	X	X
Environmental contamination control	X	X		X	X	X
Civic missions in support of local and/or state governments	X	X		X	X	X

Figure D-3 State Tasks






Figure D-5 Alternative 2 Force Structure




Figure D-6 Alternative 3 Force Structure

## Appendix E ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

This appendix contains supporting data for the organizational analysis. The appendix contains both a listing of the standard requirements codes (SRCs) within each alternative and a description of the decrements and redundancies that exist within alternative 1.

- Tab 1 is a table depicting the list of SRCs for each alternative and has five columns. The first column is the SRC; the second column is the Unit Description, and the third through the fifth columns are the AC/ARNG Integrated Division alternatives (Alt 1, Alt 2, and Alt 3) with a number placed opposite each respective SRC contained within the alternative. For example, Alt 1 and Alt 3 have a “2” opposite SRC 87402L100 (HHC, Heavy Separate Bde) because these SRCs represent the HHC for a heavy separate brigade (e.g., the ERBs) and are present in each of these alternatives. Similarly, SRC 06365A400 (FA Bn, 155 SP) has a “3” beneath Alt 3 because alternative 3 is an AOE division.
- Tab 2 is a description of decrements and redundancies for alternative 1 and outlines how the respective SRCs for Alternative 1 are affected for both personnel and equipment. For example, the ERB brigade HHC (SRC 87402L100) has a chemical element present. The AOE division base in alternative 1 has a chemical company (SRC 03157L200). The AOE division chemical company, therefore, is decremented by 3 Decon Platoons, 1 Smoke Squad, and 2 Recon Squads. The description also describes how redundancies occur and what personnel and equipment are excess to alternative 1 post mobilization if the division is required to reorganize into an AOE division.





**TAB 1 TO APPENDIX E SRC WITHIN EACH ALTERNATIVE****Table E-1 SRC List for Each Altrnative**

<b>SRC</b>	<b>UNIT DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>ALT 1</b>	<b>ALT 2</b>	<b>ALT 3</b>
01302A000	HHC, Division Aviation Bde	1		1
01305A000	General Support Aviation Bn	1		1
01385A200	Attack Helicopter Bn	1		1
03157L200	Chemical Co, Heavy Division	1		1
05332L000	HHD, EN Bde	1		1
05335L000	EN Bn, Hvy Division	3	3	3
06302L000	DIVARTY HHC	1		1
06365A400	FA Bn 155 SP			1
06365A500	FA Bn 155 SP			2
06375A300	FA Bn 155SP Split	1	1	
06375A400	FA Bn 155SP Split	2	2	
06395A400	MLRS Bn	1		1
07245L000	Inf Bn (Mech)	5		5
11065L400	6 Node Division Signal Bn	1		1
12113L000	Band	1		1
17285L200	Division Cavalry Sqdrn	1		1
17375L000	Tank Bn, Heavy Division	4		4
19333L000	MP Co, Heavy Division	1		1
34395A000	MI Bn (CEWI), Heavy Division	1		1
44175L300	ADA Bn, Heavy Division	1		1
63002L000	HHC/DMMC, Heavy Division	1		1
63005L100	FSB (1X2)			1
63005L200	FSB (2X1)			2
63085L100	FSB, Heavy Separate Bde	1	1	
63085L200	FSB, Heavy Separate Bde	2	2	
63135L000	MSB, Heavy Division	1		1
63885A400	DASB	1		1
87004A200	Division HHC	1		1
87100L100	AR Bde HHC			1
87100L200	Inf Bde HHC			2
87402L100	HHC, Heavy Separate Bde	1	1	
87402L200	HHC, Heavy Separate Bde	2	2	



**TAB 2 ALTERNATIVE 1 DECREMENTS AND REDUNDANCIES**

Alternative 1 has three ERBs organized under an AOE Division base. To reduce the equipment and personnel authorizations of this organization, the division base is decremented based on the existence of like/similar type units in the ERBs. However, there are dissimilarities in some of these like/similar units when compared one against the another. In many cases a one-for-one decrement is not possible since units are organized under different TOEs with different concepts. As a result, there are excess or shortages of personnel and equipment when alternative 1 is compared to an AOE division. This situation is compounded because the AOE division base units must keep some sections/squads in tact so that they may conduct training. Thus, in some cases there are redundant units when alternative 1 is compared to an AOE Division, most often occurring in headquarters, CS and CSS units. If alternative 1 reorganizes to an AOE Division upon mobilization, redundant units in alternative 1 will be excess to the needs of an AOE Division.

The rationale for decrementing in this alternative is based on:

- ERBs are left as they are - no decrement of Brigade TOE authorizations.
- Decrementing division base units is only done down to TOE section II paragraph level. Decrementing within paragraphs is subjective, and would represent a "best guess" solution. If this becomes desirable, the creation of a new TOE would be required.
- Division base units are decremented down to squad/section level only as far as not to hinder the ability of units to train.
- Decrementing is done to the point that which when the division reorganized upon mobilization, it is as close to a normal AOE Division as possible.

Listed below are the decrements and redundancies found within alternative 1. The deltas depicted in decrements represent the excesses or shortages of personnel and equipment that result from standing up the decremented Division base units to AOE authorizations. Positive deltas ("+") depicted in the redundancies represent excess sections/squads above AOE Division authorizations. Negative deltas ("-") represent shortages that occur because requirements exist in the AOE Division but are not found in the ERBs.

**DIVISION/BRIGADE HHCs (MINUS BRIGADE HHC MP, SIGNAL, AND CHEMICAL SECTIONS/PLATOONS)**

**DECREMENTS:** The Division HHC (SRC 87004A 100/200) for alternative 1 is not decremented. The division HHC requires its normal authorizations of personnel and equipment for training.

**REDUNDANCIES:** With no decrements, there are many duplications of functions between the Division and Brigade HHCs (SRC 87402L100/200). Listed below are the deltas created when the ERB HHCs reorganize into AOE Division Brigade HHCs upon division mobilization:

Table E-2 Additional Requirements for ERB and AOE HHC

<u>HHCs PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ERB HHC (X3)	144	15	393	552
AOE BDE HHC (X3)	60	3	195	258
DELTA	+84	+12	+198	+294

<u>HHCs EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BDE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
C05541 CTR TRAN	--	18	-18
C11158 CARRIER, CP	9	--	+9
C18234 CARRIER, RISE	3	3	--
D11538 CARRIER, CP	6	3	+3
L28351 MKT	6	3	+3
M36543 MET STATION	3	--	+3

<u>HHCs EQUIPMENT (CONT)</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BDE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
R33351 RAU TRC-191	--	3	-3
R50681 M88	3	3	--
T07679 HIMMWV HVY	7	--	+7
T38844 HIMMWV AMBULANCE	6	--	+6
T61494 HIMMWV CGO	60	42	+22
W98825 H20 TRL	12	3	+9
Z13860 CARRIER, CP	9	18	-9
Z15940 CSSCS CMPTR SYS	3	3	--
Z17296 CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	18	--	+18
Z17545 CMPTR SET, GEN	--	3	-3
Z26338 CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	3	--
Z36068 LMTV TRL	18	9	+9
Z36272 3/4T TRL	27	--	+27

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<u>HHCs EQUIPMENT (CONT)</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE/BDE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
Z39609	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	--	+3
Z40430	LMTV CGO	24	9	+15
Z46135	CHMCS CMPTR SYS	21	15	+6
Z60951	LMTV CGO W/W	6	3	+3
Z64310	MET STATION	--	3	-3
Z89119	DAMMS-R	--	3	--
Z90712	MTV TRL	3	--	+3
Z94047	MTV POL	3	3	--
Z94433	MTV WRECKER	6	--	+6

CHEMICAL

DECREMENTS: The ERB HHCs (SRC 87402L100/200) have a Smoke/Decon Platoon. The Divisional Chemical Company (SRC 03157L200) is decremented 3 Decon Platoons, 1 Smoke Squad and 2 Recon Squads. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB Smoke/Decon Platoon (minus their Support Squad which is covered in Redundancies below) and the decremented Division Chemical Company sub-units. This provides the deltas created when the ERB Smoke/Decon Platoons reorganize into AOE Chemical Company Decon Platoons upon division mobilization:

<u>CHEMICAL PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CHEM IN ERB HHC (X3)	6	0	75	81
AOE DECON PLT (X3)	3	0	78	81
DELTA	+3	0	-3	0

<u>CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
A32638	M21 CHEM ALARM	3	--	+3
D82404	DECON APRTS	12	--	+12

<u>CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT (CONT)</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
G58151	SMOKE GEN	18	--	+18
T07679	HMMWV HVY	39	9	+30
T19033	TANK, H20	12	18	-6
T61494	HMMWV CGO	3	3	--
V14744	TANK, H20	--	9	-9
Z04910	M22 CHEM ALARM	12	13	-1
Z21102	DECON APRTS	12	12	--
Z31551	DECON APRTS	6	9	-3
Z36068	LMTV TRL	6	9	-3
Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	6	9	-3
Z40430	LMTV CGO	12	9	+3
Z40439	MTV CGO	6	--	+6
Z48015	SMOKE GEN	--	4	-4
Z93212	NBC RECON VEH	--	4	-4
Z94047	MTV POL	6	9	-3

REDUNDANCIES: The AOE division has 1 Support Squad in the Chemical Company. Each ERB HHC also has a Support Squad. This creates 3 excess squads when alternative 1 reorganizes upon mobilization.

<u>SPT SQUAD PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	0	0	+12	+12

<u>SPRT SQUAD EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>DELTA</u>
Z94047	MTV POL	+6
Z90712	MTV TRL	+3

MILITARY POLICE

DECREMENTS: Each ERB HHC(SRC 87402L100/200) has a Military Police Platoon. The Divisional MP Company (SRC 19333L100) is been decremented 3 DS Platoons. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB MP Platoon and decremented Division Base MP Company DS Platoons. This provides the deltas created when the ERB MP Platoons reorganize into AOE MP Company DS Platoons upon division mobilization:

<u>MP PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MP IN ERB HHC (X3)	3	0	114	117
AOE DS MP PLT (X3)	3	0	60	63
DELTA	0	0	+54	+54

<u>MP EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
T07679	24	0	+24
Z36272	15	9	+6
Z62630	39	21	+18

REDUNDANCIES: The AOE division has 1 Provost Marshall section in the MP Company. Each ERB HHC also has a Provost Marshall section. This creates 3 excess sections when the Division reorganizes upon mobilization.

<u>PMO PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	+3	0	+9	+12

<u>PMO EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
T61494	+3
Z36272	+3

**SIGNAL**

**DECREMENTS:** Each ERB HHC (SRC 87402L100/200) has a Signal Platoon and a C-E Section. The Divisional Signal Battalion (SRC 11065L400) is decremented 3 Extension Switch Sections and 3 EPLRS Sections. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB Signal Platoon and C-E Section, and decremented Division Base Signal Battalion sub-units. This provides the deltas created when the ERB Signal Platoons and C-E Section reorganize into AOE Signal Battalion Extension Switch and EPLRS Sections upon alternatives 1 mobilization:

<u>SIGNAL PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
SIGNAL IN ERB HHC (X3)	9	3	81	93
AOE SIGNAL SECTIONS	0	0	111	111
DELTA	+9	+3	-30	-18

<u>SIGNAL EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
G42170 10 KW GEN	9	18	-9
G42238 5KW GEN	--	18	-18
L69306 LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)1	--	15	-15
R33351 RAU TRC-191	--	3	-3
S25379 SENS TTC-48C(V)2	3	--	+3
S38172 SENS TTC-48C(V)4	--	3	-3
T07543 HMMWV W/SHELTER	3	--	+3
T07679 HMMWV HVY	21	36	-15
T61494 HMMWV CGO	21	3	+18
T61562 HMMWV CGO W/W	--	18	-18

<u>SIGNAL EQUIPMENT (CONT)</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
Z12353 SENS TTC-48C(V)1	--	9	-9
Z36272 3/4T TRL	3	18	-15
Z40430 LMTV CGO	3	--	+3
Z40439 MTV CGO	--	3	-3



<u>SIGNAL EQUIPMENT (CONT)</u>				<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
Z70011	NCS TSQ-158(V)2		3	3		--

REDUNDANCIES: None.

**MILITARY INTELLIGENCE**

**DECREMENTS:** The ERBs have a DS MI Company (SRC 34393A200). The Divisional MI Battalion (34395A000) is decremented 3 DS Companies. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB MI Companies and the decremented Division Base MI Companies. This provides the deltas created when the Enhanced Separate Brigade MI Companies reorganize into AOE MI DS Companies upon mobilization

<u>MI PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ERB MI CO. (X3)	9	6	132	147
AOE DS MI CO. (X3)	9	6	105	120
DELTA	0	0	+27	+27

<u>MI EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BDE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
C18234	--	12	-12
C89935	12	--	+12
D11538	--	3	-3
D40782	3	--	+3
D77692	6	--	+6
J70288	3	--	+3
Q16110	9	12	-3
R57843	3	--	+3
T07679	9	6	+3
T61494	27	15	+12
Z17435	--	3	-3
Z17296	6	--	+6
Z17744	3	--	+3
Z26406	--	3	-3
Z36068	--	3	-3
Z36204	9	6	+3
Z36272	15	3	+12

<u>MI EQUIPMENT (CONT)</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BDE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
Z40430	LMTV CGO	--	3	-3
Z43728	MIIT	3	--	+3
Z62562	HIMMWV EXP CAP	12	--	+12
Z78222	TGT ACQU SYSTEM	3	--	+3

REDUNDANCIES: None. In the case of MI, it is a one-for-one decrement.

AIR DEFENSE

DECREMENTS: The ERBs have a DS ADA Battery (SRC 4423A100). Based on this, the Divisional ADA Battalion (SRC 44175L300) is decremented 3 DS Batteries. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB ADA Batteries (minus their MSCS Platoon which is covered in Redundancies below) and the decremented Division Base ADA Batteries. This comparison provides the deltas created when the ERB ADA Batteries reorganize into AOE ADA Batteries upon mobilization.

<u>ADA PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ERB ADA BTRY (X3)	18	6	342	366
AOE DS ADA BTRY (X3)	15	6	333	354
DELTA	+3	0	+9	+12

	<u>ADA EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
C11158	CARRIER, CP	3	3	--
C18234	CARRIER, RISE	6	6	--
C76335	M3A2 (BSFV)	--	30	-30
F57713	AVENGER	18	--	+18
L28351	MKT	3	--	+3
R50681	M88	3	3	--
T00466	STINGER TRAINER LAUNCHER	42	54	-12
T04834	STINGER TRAINER SET	18	30	-12
T07679	HMMWV HVY	3	--	+3
T61494	HMMWV CGO	12	54	-42
T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	3	--	+3
W98825	H2O TRL	3	3	--
Z27460	M2A3 (BSFV)	30	--	+30
Z36068	LMTV TRL	12	9	+3
Z36272	3/4T TRL	6	6	--
Z40430	LMTV CGO	12	3	+9
Z40439	MTV CGO	6	6	--

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<u>ADA EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
Z60951	LMTV CGO W/W	--	6	-6
Z90712	MTV TRL	6	6	--
Z94047	MTV POL	6	6	--
Z94433	MTV WRECKER	3	--	+3

REDUNDANCIES: Each ERB ADA Battery has a MSCS Platoon comprised of a Platoon HQ, 2 MSCS Section HQ, and 6 MSCS Teams. The AOE ADA HQ Battery is decremented 3 MSCS Section HQ and 6 MSCS Teams. A MSCS Platoon HQ, 1 MSCS Section HQ and 2 MSCS Teams are retained in the Division Base for the GS Battery training requirement. Thus, there is a redundancy of 3 Platoon HQ, 3 MSCS Section HQ and 12 MSCS Teams when the Division reorganizes upon mobilization.

<u>MSCS PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	+3	0	+36	+39

<u>MSCS EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>DELTA</u>
T07679	HMMWV HVY	-5
T61494	HMMWV CGO	+22
T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	-3

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

**FIELD ARTILLERY**

**DECREMENTS:** The ERBs have a DS FA Battalion (SRC 06375A300). Based on this, the Divisional Artillery (SRC 06375A300/400) is decremented 3 DS Battalions and 3 Q36 Radar Sections from the TAB Battery. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB FA Battalions (minus their MET Section which is covered in Redundancies below) and the decremented Division Artillery Base units. This provides the deltas created when the Enhanced Separate Brigade FA Battalions and Q36 Radar Sections reorganize into AOE FAA Battalions and Q36 Radar Sections upon mobilization.

<u>FA PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ERB FA BN (X3)	156	9	1806	1971
AOE FA BN/Q36 SEC (X3)	159	9	1781	1949
<b>DELTA</b>	-3	0	+25	+22

<u>FA EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
C10908	54	54	--
C11158	39	27	+12
C12155	57	54	+3
G35981	3	3	--
H57642	54	54	--
L28351	9	15	-6
R50681	12	12	--
S74832	--	3	-3
T07679	--	3	-3
T38844	3	3	--
T41067	54	54	--
T45465	9	9	--
T58161	12	12	--
T61494	123	99	+24
T61562	6	27	-21
T63093	3	6	-3
W95537	3	--	+3

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<u>FA EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
W98825	H2O TRL	24	30	-6
Z06157	AMRV	12	12	--
Z13860	CARRIER, CP	--	12	-12
Z36068	LMTV TRL	27	24	+3
Z36272	3/4T TRL	18	24	-6
Z40430	LMTV CGO	33	36	-3
Z52571	Q36 RADAR	3	3	--
Z60951	LMTV CGO W/W	24	27	-3
Z62562	HMMWV EXP CAP	9	6	+3
Z85341	MTV TRACTOR	--	3	-3

**REDUNDANCIES:** Each ERB FA Battalion has a MET Section. The AOE DIVARTY HHB is decremented 1 MET Section based on the existence of the MET Sections in the ERB FA Battalions. This leaves a MET Section for the MLRS Batteries training requirement. Thus, there is a redundancy of 2 MET Sections when the Division reorganizes upon mobilization.

<u>MET PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	0	0	+12	+12

<u>MET EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>DELTA</u>
T07679	HMMWV HVY	+6
W98825	H2O TRL	+2
Z05088	MET STATION	+2
Z36204	I 1/4T TRL	-2
Z36272	3/4T TRL	+6
Z40669	MHG GENERATOR	+2

**ENGINEER**

The ERBs have an Engineer Battalion (SRC 05335L000). Based on this, the Divisional Engineer Brigades are decremented 3 battalions. In this case, the engineer battalions in the ERBs and those decremented in the Divisional Engineer Base have the same TOE. Thus, there are no deltas or redundancies when alternative 1 reorganizes upon mobilization.

**AVIATION BRIGADE**

**DECREMENTS:** The ERBs have a Cavalry Ground Troop (SRC 17483L000). The Divisional Aviation Brigade Cavalry Squadron (SRC 17285L200) is decremented 3 Ground Troops, 3 Combat Medics, 3 Class III/IV Squads, and 3 Ambulance Squads. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB Ground Troops and the decremented Division Base Cavalry units. This provides the deltas created when the ERB Ground Troops reorganize into AOE Ground Troops and decremented HHT units upon division mobilization:

<u>CAV PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ERB CAV TRP (X3)	18	0	444	462
AOE CAV UNITS (X3)	18	0	450	468
DELTA	0	0	-6	-6

<u>CAV EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB BDE</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
C10990	6	6	--
C18234	9	3	+6
D11538	3	9	-6
L28351	3	--	-3
M68405	6	6	--
T13305	27	27	--
T61494	6	3	+3
T39518	3	9	-6
T59278	6	--	+6
T87243	12	12	--
W98825	6	3	+3



AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

	<u>CAV EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB BDE</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
Z15752	JAVELIN	18	18	--
Z36068	LMTV TRL	6	6	--
Z40430	LMTV CGO	12	6	+6
Z40439	MTV CGO	3	--	+3
Z41156	M3A3 CFV	39	39	--
Z60951	LMTV CGO W/W	3	3	--
Z62381	M88 IRV	3	3	--

REDUNDANCIES: None.

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

**DISCOM**

DECREMENTS: The ERBs has a Forward Support Battalion (SRC 63085L100/200). The DISCOM was decremented 3 Forward Support Battalions (SRC 63005L100/300); and from the Main Support Battalion (SRC 63135L000): 3 Wheeled Ambulance Squads, 3 Treatment Squads, 3 GREGG Collection Teams, and 1 Arid Water Section. Listed below are the comparisons of the ERB Forward Support Battalions (minus their Truck Platoons, covered in Redundancies below) and the decremented DISCOM units. This provides the deltas created when the ERB FSBs reorganize into AOE FSBs and decremented MSB units upon mobilization:

<u>SUPPORT PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ERB FSB (X3)	141	42	1805	1988
AOE FSB (X3) & MSB UNITS	91	15	1292	1398
DELTA	+50	+27	+513	+590

<u>SUPPORT EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
B83002	54	54	--
C18234	18	18	--
C18297	--	3	-3
C36151	3	3	--
D11538	18	12	+6
D69050	72	48	+24
F07657	--	15	-15
F07794	--	12	-12
F42612	12	8	+4
G21472	3	6	-3
G68966	36	12	+24
H01855	6	6	--
H01907	--	12	-12
H01912	3	6	-3
H94824	6	3	+3
J04717	3	--	+3
L28601	6	9	-3

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<u>SUPPORT EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
L76556	SCOOP LOADER	3	--	+3
P44549	H2O PUMP	3	6	-3
P92030	H2O PUMP	30	16	+14
P96640	PETRLM PUMP ASSY	--	3	-3
P97051	PETRLM PUMP	6	--	+6
R11154	LOADING RAMP	6	3	+3
S70027	SEMI TRL	24	21	+3
S70517	SEMI TRL	3	3	--
S73372	SEMI TRL, TANK	27	--	+27
S73668	SEMI TRL	3	33	-30
S74832	SEMI TRL	9	9	--
S75175	SEMI TRL	15	18	-3
T07679	HMMWV HVY	36	21	+15
T12620	TANK ASSY, PETRLM	12	--	+12
T12938	TANK ASSY, H2O	9	22	-13
T13413	TACTICAL CMPTR	3	--	+3
T13481	TACTICAL CMPTR	6	--	+6
T19033	TANK ASSY, H2O	36	--	+36
T19101	TANK ASSY, H2O	6	--	+6
T38844	HMMWV AMBULANCE	18	18	--
T40999	PLS, HVY	9	9	--
T48944	FORK LIFT	12	--	+12
T49119	FORK LIFT	3	--	+3
T49255	FORK LIFT	15	3	+12
T61494	HMMWV CGO	159	117	+42
T63093	HEMMT WRECKER	18	18	--
T93761	PLS TRL	9	9	--
T96838	FLT BED TRL	15	18	-3
V12552	TANK ASSY, PETRLM	6	--	+6
W35417	H2O PURIFICATION SET	12	--	+12
W37243	H2O STORE/DIST SET	--	1	-1

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

	<u>SUPPORT EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
W48391	WELD SHOP TRL	3	3	--
W55968	H2O STORE/DIST SET	3	3	--
W95537	3/4T TRL	--	33	-33
W98825	H2O TRL	18	18	--
Z06157	ARMV	12	15	-3
Z15940	CMBT SVC SPT CONTRL SYS	12	6	+6
Z17296	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	--	3	-3
Z17303	CMPTR SET, GENERAL	3	--	+3
Z17545	CMPTR SET, GENERAL	3	--	+3
Z26338	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	9	--	+9
Z27727	CONTAINER LFT KIT	3	--	+3
Z36068	LMTV TRL	72	72	+12
Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	12	--	+12
Z36272	3/4T TRL	54	9	+45
Z36909	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	9	--	+9
Z40337	MTV, LWB	3	6	-3
Z40430	LMTV CGO	91	70	+21
Z40439	MTV CGO	48	39	+9
Z59481	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	--	+3
Z59617	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	6	--	+6
Z59651	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	--	+3
Z59685	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	9	--	+9
Z60951	LMTV CGO, W/W	3	9	-6
Z62381	M88 IRV	3	3	--
Z65205	M1097	18	24	-6
Z62562	HMMWV EXP CAP	--	12	-12
Z85341	MTV TRACTOR	105	90	+15
Z88915	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	--	+3
Z90712	MTV TRL	33	9	+24
Z94028	FORK LIFT (ATLAS)	--	21	-21
Z94047	MTV POL	12	9	+3

<u>SUPPORT EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>ERB</u>	<u>AOE BASE</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
Z94433	MTV WRECKER	6	12	-6
Z94492	LMTV VAN	45	49	-4
Z94560	MTV EXP VAN	18	15	+3

REDUNDANCIES: The ERB FSBs (SRC 63005L100/200) contain many sections that are normally found in an AOE Division MSB (SRC 63135L000). Listed below are the deltas created when the companies of the ERB FSBs are reorganized into AOE Division FSBs upon mobilization:

1. ERB HHC. The HHC (SRC 87402L100/200) contains DMMC sections that are excess when alternative 1 reorganizes upon mobilization. These sections are: 3 Class I, II, IV Sections; 3 Class III Sections; 3 Class V Sections; 3 Property Book/Class VII Sections; 3 Material Offices; 3 Bde Material Management Offices; 3 Armament & Combat Vehicle Sections; 3 Automotive-Generator Maint Sections; 3 C-E Section; Missile Sections; 3 General Repair Parts Sections; and 3 CSS Ammunition Sections.

<u>MMC PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	+18	+21	+126	+165

<u>MMC EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>DELTA</u>
T61494	HMMWV CGO	+30
Z15940	CBT SVC SPRT CNTR SYS	+9
Z36272	3/4T TRL	+21
Z39609	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+9
Z40430	LMTV CGO	+3
Z59481	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z59617	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z59651	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z59685	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+6
Z94560	MTV EXP VAN	+3

2. ERB S&T Company. The S&T Company (SRC 42084L000) contains sections normally found in the MSB Supply Company (SRC 42007L000). The sections that are excess when the Division reorganizes upon mobilization are: 3 Class I/Water Sections, 3 Petroleum Platoon HQs, and 3 Petroleum Distribution Sections.

<u>SUPPLY PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	+3	0	+87	+90

<u>SUPPLY EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
T61494 HMMWV CGO	+30
Z15940 CBT SVC SPRT CNTR SYS	+9
Z36272 3/4T TRL	+21
Z39609 CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+9
Z40430 LMTV CGO	+3
Z59481 CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z59617 CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z59651 CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z59685 CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+6
Z94560 MTV EXP VAN	+3

3. ERB S&T Company. The S&T Company (SRC 42084L000) contains a Truck Platoon comprised of a Platoon HQ, 2 Light Truck Squads, 1 Medium Truck Squad, and 1 Heavy Truck Squad. The AOE TMT Company (SRC 55188L000) is decremented 2 Light Truck Squads, 2 Medium Truck Squads, and a Heavy Truck Platoon. Light, Medium and Heavy Truck Platoon Hqs and Squads are retained in the TMT Company to provide support for the AOE Division base. Thus, there is a redundancy of 2 Platoon HQs, 4 Light Truck Squads, 1 Medium Truck Squad, and 1 Heavy Truck Squad when alternative 1 reorganizes upon mobilization:

<u>TMT PERSONNEL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	+2	0	+94	+96

<u>TMT EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
S70027 SEMI TRL	+20
S70859 HET TRL	+6
T59048 HET TRACTOR	+6

<u>TMT EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>DELTA</u>
T61494	HMMWV CGO	+2
Z36068	LMTV TRL	+16
Z40439	MTV CGO	+80
Z85341	MTV TRACTOR	+10

4. ERB Medical Company. The Medical Company (SRC 08437L000) contains sections normally found in the MSB Medical Company (SRC 08057L000). The excess sections when alternative 1 reorganizes upon mobilization are: 3 Bde Medical Support Offices, 3 Preventive Medicine Sections, 3 Surgical Squads, 3 Mental Health Sections, and 3 Optometry Sections.

<u>MED PERSONNEL</u>				
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DELTA	+24	0	+54	+78

<u>MED EQUIPMENT</u>		<u>DELTA</u>
T49255	FORK LIFT	+3
T61494	HMMWV CGO	+24

<u>MED EQUIPMENT (CONT)</u>		<u>DELTA</u>
Z17303	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z26718	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	+3
Z36068	LMTV TRL	+6
Z36272	3/4T TRL	+6
Z40430	LMTV CGO	+6

**ALTERNATIVE 1 BILLS**

The only existing organizations available to form this alternative are the ERBs. All personnel and equipment in the division base are unresourced, and represent the bill required to stand up this alternative.

This alternative is compared to a AOE division to provide the relative personnel and equipment impacts of this design. The delta shown in the tables below is the result of this comparison.

PERSONNEL

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ERBs	987	93	12624	13704
DIVISION BASE	484	269	4488	5241
TOTAL	1471	362	17112	18945
AOE DIVISION	1323	320	16390	18033
DELTA	+148	+42	+722	+912

EQUIPMENT

<u>LIN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ENH BDE</u>	<u>DIV BASE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AOE DIV</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
A21383	AERIAL RECVRY KIT	--	4	4	2	+2
A41666	Q37 RADAR	--	2	2	2	--
B83002	BDE CGR, PLS	54	--	54	54	--
B84404	BOAT, PNEUMATIC	21	--	21	21	--
C10900	CARRIER, MORTAR	60	--	60	60	--
C10998	CATV AMMO VEH	54	--	54	54	--
C11158	CARRIER, CP	63	16	79	60	+19

<u>LIN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ENH BDE</u>	<u>DIV BASE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AOE DIV</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
C12155	FSIT-V	57	3	60	57	-3
C18234	CARRIER, RISE	273	8	276	297	-21
C18927	CMPT'R SET, GENERAL	--	5	5	5	--
C36151	CRANE	3	2	5	5	--
C76335	M3A3	--	--	--	30	-30
C89935	CNTRL COM TSQ-190(V)3	12	3	15	3	+12
D11049	CARRIER, M548	18	--	18	18	--



AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study -- Appendices

LIN	EQUIPMENT	ENH BDE	DIV BASE	TOTAL	AOE DIV	DELTA
D11538	CARRIER, CP	81	8	89	95	-6
D15941	DIGITAL COM TERM	--	3	3	3	--
D30897	MINE DISPENCER	18	--	18	18	--
D40782	DIG MSG DEVICE GRP	3	--	3	--	+3
D69050	DRUM, H20	72	18	90	138	-48
D77692	DATA ANALY CEN	6	--	6	--	+6
D82404	DECON APRTS	12	2	14	2	+12
E56578	CEV	36	--	36	36	--
E61338	EIDS	--	8	8	8	--
F07657	CONVEYOR ROLLER	--	32	32	32	--
F07794	CONVEYOR ROLLER	--	12	12	12	--
F42612	FAW SS	12	13	25	33	-8
F43003	CRANE	--	1	1	1	--
F57713	AVENGER	18	24	42	24	+18
G12170	15KW GEN	--	6	6	6	--
G17460	60KW GEN	--	3	3	3	--
G21061	PETRL PUMP	--	1	1	1	--
G21472	PETRL PUMP	3	4	7	7	--
G35981	10KW GEN	3	--	3	3	--
G38140	10KW GEN	--	2	2	2	--
G42170	10KW GEN	9	44	53	60	-7
G42238	5KW GEN	--	51	51	69	-18
G58151	SMOKE GEN	18	--	18	--	+18
G68966	PETRL DRUM	42	42	84	84	--
G74711	10KW GEN	--	2	2	2	--
G78306	60KW GEN	25	25	50	25	+25
G01855	ELEC SHOP	6	16	22	22	--
H01857	ELEC SHOP	--	6	6	6	--
H01907	ELEC SHOP	--	8	8	8	--
H01912	ELEC SHOP	3	5	8	8	--
H30616	EH-60 HELO	--	3	3	3	--
H31110	OH-58 HELO	--	22	22	22	--
H32361	UH-60 HELO	--	24	24	24	--
H57642	HOWITZER	54	--	54	54	--
H94824	FARE	6	2	8	8	--
J04717	PETRLM SYS SUP POINT	3	3	6	6	--
J35492	15KW GEN	--	1	1	1	--
J70228	ICIT	3	3	6	3	+3

LIN	EQUIPMENT	ENH BDE	DIV BASE	TOTAL	AOE DIV	DELTA
L28351	MKT	65	32	97	94	+3
L67342	MICLIC	36	--	36	36	--
L69306	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)1	--	16	16	31	-15
L69442	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)3	--	24	24	24	--
L69510	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)4	--	1	1	1	--
L76556	SCOOP LOADER	3	2	5	5	--
M04268	MGMT FACILITY TTC-46C(V)	--	1	1	1	--
M36543	MET STATION	3	--	3	--	+3
M68405	120mm MORTAR	60	--	60	60	--
N20115	OP CONTRL COM MSC-31	--	2	2	2	--
N34334	OUTBOARD MOTOR	9	--	9	9	--
P04332	PED	--	1	1	1	--
P42126	30KW GEN	--	1	1	1	--
P44549	H2O PUMP	3	--	3	9	-6
P91756	PUMP	--	4	4	4	--
P92030	H2O PUMP	30	16	46	56	-10
P96640	PETRLM PUMP ASSY	--	2	2	2	--
P97051	PETRLM PUMP	6	6	12	12	--
Q16110	RADAR SET, PSS-5	9	--	9	12	-3
R11154	LOADING RAMP	6	6	12	12	--
R38403	TAC SAT PSC-30	--	1	1	1	--
R33351	RAU TRC-191	--	7	7	16	-9
R50544	REC VEH, M578	--	1	1	1	--
R50681	REC VEH, M88	18	4	22	22	--
R57843	TAC SATCOM BASE VSC-7	3	--	3	--	+3
S25379	SENS TTC-48(V)2	3	--	3	--	+3
S34963	SAT COM TERM TSC-93A	--	3	3	3	--
S37228	SWITCH GRP TTC-47C(V)	--	2	2	3	-1
S38172	SENS TTC-48C(V)4	--	3	3	6	-3
S70027	SEMI TRL, FLT BED	84	78	162	209	-47
S70243	SEMI TRL, WRECKER	--	1	1	1	--
S70517	SEMI TRL, LOW BED	3	9	12	12	--
S70859	HET TRL	18	12	30	42	-12
S73372	SEMI TRL, TANK	27	37	64	64	--
S73668	SEMI TRL	3	--	3	3	--
S74832	SEMI TRL, VAN	9	11	20	23	-3
S75038	SEMI TRL, VAN	--	5	5	5	--

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<u>LIN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ENH BDE</u>	<u>DIV BASE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AOE DIV</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
S75175	SEMI TRL, VAN	15	33	48	48	--
S78466	SAT COM TERM TSC-85B	--	2	2	2	--
T00466	STINGER TRNG LAUNCHER	42	34	76	34	+42
T04834	STINGER TRNG SET	18	8	26	92	-66
T07543	HMMWV W.SHELTER	3	6	9	6	+3
T07679	HMMWV HVY	154	178	332	291	+41
T12620	TANK ASSY, PETRLM	12	8	20	20	--
T12938	TANK ASSY, H2O	9	--	9	31	-22
T13305	MIA2	259	--	259	259	--
T13413	TACTICAL CMPTR	3	4	7	7	--
T13481	TACTICAL CMPTR	15	9	24	24	--
T19033	TANK, H2O	48	36	84	90	-6
T19101	TANK, ASSY H2O	6	2	8	8	--
T20701	TRANS TRQ-35(V)I	--	1	1	1	--
T34437	TRACTOR, EXCAVATOR	18	--	18	18	--
T38844	HMMWV AMBULANCE	27	6	33	33	--
T39518	HEMMT CGO W.W	48	10	58	64	-6
T39586	HEMMT CGO	38	18	56	50	+6
T39654	HEMMT CGO W.W	5	6	11	11	--
T40999	PLS, HVY	9	--	9	9	--
T41067	PLS	54	--	54	54	--
T45465	HEMAT TRL	9	57	66	66	--
T48944	FORK LIFT	12	1	13	13	--
T49119	FORK LIFT	3	--	3	3	--
T49255	FORK LIFT	15	9	24	24	--
T58161	HEMMT POL	12	13	25	25	--
T59048	HET TRACTOR	18	12	30	42	-12
T59278	HEMMT CGO	81	3	84	78	+6
T61494	HMMWV CGO	742	487	1229	1206	+23
T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	37	48	85	131	-46
T63093	HEMMT WRECKER	30	13	43	61	-18
T87243	HEMMT POL	116	41	157	157	--
T93761	PLS TRL	9	--	9	9	--
T96838	FLT BED TRL	15	5	20	5	+15
V12552	TANK ASSY, PETRLM	6	10	16	16	--
V14744	TANK, H2O	--	3	3	12	-9
W35417	H2O PURIFICATION SET	12	14	26	26	--

<u>LIN</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>ENH BDE</u>	<u>DIV BASE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AOE DIV</u>	<u>DELTA</u>
W37243	H2O STORE/DIST SET	--	--	--	1	-1
W48391	WELD SHOP TRL	3	2	5	5	--
W55968	H2O STORE/DIST SET	3	--	3	6	-3
W76473	ACE	63	--	63	63	--
W93995	AIRCRAFT MAINT TRL	--	9	9	9	--
W94536	BOLSTER TRL	--	--	--	--	--
W95537	3/4T TRL	3	2	5	9	-4
W95811	1 1/2T TRL	45	2	47	47	--
W98825	H2O TRL	157	73	230	225	+5
Z04910	M22 CHEM ALARM	12	5	17	18	-1
Z05088	MMS MET STATION	3	1	4	2	+2
Z06157	ARMV	54	5	59	59	--
Z07366	AUGER	9	--	9	9	--
Z10187	FAAD TAC OP CNTR	--	2	2	2	--
Z10988	HVY ASSUALT BRIDGE	36	--	36	36	--
Z12353	SENS TTC-48C(V)I	--	9	9	18	-9
Z13860	CARRIER, CP	36	2	38	59	-21
Z15752	JAVELIN	168	--	168	150	+18
Z15940	CSSCS SYSTEM	15	5	20	20	--
Z17296	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	27	12	39	32	--
Z17303	COMPTTR SET, GENERAL	3	3	6	6	--
Z17435	TGT ACQU SYS	--	3	3	3	-3
Z17545	CMPTTR SET, GENERAL	24	2	26	17	+9
Z17676	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	--	2	2	2	--
Z17744	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	3	1	4	1	-3
Z21102	DECON APRTS	12	6	18	24	-6
Z23978	BREACHER	--	--	--	--	--
Z24045	CMD SYS TACTICAL	--	1	1	1	--
Z24079	SWITCH GRP TTC-46C(V)	--	1	1	1	--
Z25954	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	--	1	1	1	--
Z26402	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	--	2	2	--	+2
Z26406	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	--	--	--	5	-5
Z26338	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	28	2	30	30	--
Z26616	CMPTTR SET, DIGITAL	--	4	4	4	--
Z27460	M2A3	310	--	310	280	+30
Z27727	CONTAINER LIFT KIT	3	--	3	3	--
Z31551	DECON APRTS	6	3	9	12	-3
Z32349	GRND BASE SENSOR	--	6	6	6	--

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study -- Appendices

LIN	EQUIPMENT	ENH BDE	DIV BASE	TOTAL	AOE DIV	DELTA
Z33524	RAH HELO	--	18	18	18	--
Z33914	AH-64 HELO	--	30	30	30	--
Z36068	LMTV TRL	346	149	495	485	+10
Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	29	42	71	79	-8
Z36272	3/4T TRL	201	238	439	412	+27
Z36909	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	12	1	13	10	+3
Z37991	GRAPLE HOOK	9	--	9	9	--
Z49337	MTV CGO, LWB	3	12	15	15	--
Z40405	MTV CGO, LWB W/W	--	1	1	1	--
Z40430	LMTV CGO	490	201	691	634	+57
Z40439	MTV CGO	146	61	207	225	-18
Z40507	MTV CGO W/W	--	14	14	11	+3
Z40669	MGH GEN	3	1	4	2	+2
Z41156	M3A3	74	2	76	76	--
Z43012	FARR SYS	--	10	10	10	--
Z43728	MITT	3	1	4	1	+3
Z46135	CHMCS SYS	45	14	59	53	+6
Z48015	SMOKE GEN	--	4	4	7	-3
Z52571	Q36 RADAR	3	--	3	3	--
Z54382	JTIDS NCS	--	3	3	3	--
Z54632	JTIDS NCS RELAY	--	5	5	5	--
Z54664	LOSAT	60	--	60	60	--
Z57250	MLRS	--	18	18	18	--
Z59413	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	--	3	3	3	--
Z59481	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	--	3	3	--
Z59617	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	6	2	8	8	--
Z59651	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	--	3	3	--
Z59685	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	9	2	11	11	--
Z60951	LMTV CGO W/W	88	32	120	127	-7
Z62381	M88 IRV	69	6	75	75	--
Z62562	HMMWV EXP CAP	39	22	61	46	+15
Z62630	HMMWV ARMD	79	22	101	83	+18
Z64310	MET STATION	--	1	1	4	-3
Z65205	M1097	18	9	27	27	--
Z70011	NCS TSQ-158(V)2	3	1	4	4	--
Z71517	OP GRP TTC-46C(V)	--	1	1	1	--
Z77269	SYS CNTRL GRP TYQ-46(V)	--	1	1	1	--
Z78222	TGT ACQU SYS	3	--	3	--	+3

LIN	EQUIPMENT	ENH BDE	DIV BASE	TOTAL	AOE DIV	DELTA
Z85341	MTV TRACTOR	123	131	254	282	-28
Z85409	MTV TRACTOR W/W	--	7	7	7	--
Z88915	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	--	3	3	--
Z89119	DAMMS-R	--	--	--	6	-6
Z90712	MTV TRL	154	22	176	170	+6
Z91122	TANKER, TRL	--	1	1	1	--
Z93212	NBC RECON VEH	--	2	2	6	-4
Z93626	MTV W/MHE	12	9	21	27	-6
Z94028	FORK LIFT, ATLAS	--	19	19	19	--
Z94047	MTV POL	37	28	65	62	+3
Z94433	MTV WRECKER	24	19	43	34	+9
Z94492	LMTV VAN	45	14	59	59	--
Z94560	MTV EXP VAN	18	30	48	48	--



## **Appendix F PRE-MOBILIZATION SUPPORTING INFORMATION**

**Purpose:** The purpose of the appendix is to provide the which is to be used to support the findings and observations contained in the Chapter 6.

**Appendix Organization.** This appendix is organized into 5 tabs:

Tab 1: Identification of the collective training tasks for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the Division Base units.

Tab 2: Analysis of unique training tasks required by the AC/ARNG Integrated Division for each alternative.

Tab 3: Analysis of training products and responsibilities associated with the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.

Tab 4: Analysis of unique leader development requirements.

Tab 5: Data Sources used.



***TAB 1 TO APPENDIX F COLLECTIVE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (HHC) AND THE DIVISION BASE UNITS***

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this Tab is to identify the Division Headquarters and Division Base pre mobilization collective training requirements for the three alternatives associated with the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept.

2. **Methodology.** The methodology used in developing these collective training requirements consisted of three elements: basic assumptions, limitations, and procedures. The primary objective during the entire analytical process, was to stay within approved Army doctrine.

a. **Assumptions.** Several key assumptions were made to provide a constant baseline for the analytical process. The assumptions and supporting rationale are:

(1) Since the objective organization is a division and divisions will organize and fight IAW FM 71-100, Division Operations, dated October 1995, the comparative base for each alternative is the Army of Excellence Division structure.

(2) While both light and heavy divisions have complex characteristics, the heavy division is considered more logistically complex. Therefore, to analyze the worst case situation, the AC/RC Integrated Division was considered a Heavy Division.

(3) To stay within Army doctrine we assumed Mission Training Plans are the approved sources of collective tasks to be analyzed.

(4) The AC/RC Integrated Division pre mobilization training objectives are the same as those defined for the Enhanced Brigade in FORSCOM Reg 350-2, Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4.c.

(5) Based on 2 October 1996 message from the Study Director, Military Occupation Specialty Qualification (MOS-Q) is a given. Individuals will be considered trained in their assigned military occupation specialties.

b. **Limitations.** The scope of the analytical effort was limited in two areas:

(1) **Division Headquarters and Division Base:** Based on the decision made during the 26 September 1996 In Progress Review, the analysis was limited to only the Division Headquarters and major units of the Division Base. This

decision was based on the study group’s opinion that FORSCOM Reg 350-2 adequately addressed the ERBs collective training requirement.

(2) Command and Control and Staff Functional Responsibilities: The analysis was limited to Command and Staff pre mobilization collective training addressing the unit’s capabilities and requirements to perform planning, coordinating, executing, reporting, and supervising functions at the level organized. The analysis did not consider the company level collective tasks as they pertained to Headquarters and Headquarters Companies (HHC) and Batteries (HHB) of the organizations they support.

c. Procedures. Within the identified assumptions and limitations, the collective task analysis process followed the procedures described below:

(1) Organization Identification. The first step was to determine what command and control organizations the analysis would consider. FM 71-100, Division Operations was used as the doctrinal source for the analysis. Figure F - 1 shows the organizations considered.




Figure F-1 Organizational Structure

(2) Collective Task Sources. The second step was to determine the sources for collective tasks to be analyzed. Except for the two cases described below, Mission Training Plans (MTP), obtained from the Force XXI Training Database, were used as the source for the collective tasks analysis. Organizations and their appropriate MTP are listed in Table F-2.

Organization	Mission Training Plan
Division Headquarters	71-100 - Corps and Division Command Group and Staff, December 1996 - (Revised Final Draft)
Aviation Brigade	ARTEP 1-100-MTP - Aviation Brigade and Battalion, 7/8/96
Division Artillery	ARTEP 6-102-MTP, Mission Training Plan



Organization	Mission Training Plan
	for Corps Artillery, Division Artillery and Field Artillery Brigade Command and Staff Group, and Headquarters, and Headquarters Battery 5/8/96.
Engineer Brigade	ARTEP 5-402-33-MTP - Engineer Groups and Brigades, 4/1/95
DISCOM	ARTEP 63-001-MTP - DISCOM Headquarters/DMMC Support Command, 8/25/89
Air Defense Artillery Battalion	ARTEP 44-115-MTP - Air Defense Artillery Battalion, 2/10/92
Military Intelligence Battalion	ARTEP 34-113-11 and -12, Military Intelligence Collective Training Standards Document April 95, and ARTEP 71-100 Corps and Division Command Group and Staff, December 1996 - (Revised Final Draft)
Signal Battalion	ARTEP 11-065-MTP - Division Signal Battalion, 11/14/90
Chemical Company	ARTEP 3-457-30-MTP Chemical Company, 2/25/94
Military Police Company	ARTEP 19-17-30-MTP - Division Military Police Company/Provost Marshall Staff, 10/3/88

Figure F - 1 Organizations and Appropriate MTP

**NOTE:** To identify the collective task appropriate to Military Intelligence Battalion, the team used ARTEP 34-113-11-MTP and ARTEP 34-113-12, *Military Intelligence Collective Training Standards Document*, both dated April 1995 and ARTEP 71-3, *Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff* and ARTEP 71-100 (The data was coordinated with and reviewed by subject matter experts at the US Army Military Intelligence School).

(3) Collective task analysis. The third step was the collective task analysis. A Delphi analysis technique was used to review each collective task for the organizations identified in Figure F-2.

(a) Each collective task was reviewed down to subtask and standard level, this ensured that collective tasks were not omitted due to ambiguous task titles and/or identifications. The analysis addressed:

- Element and/or subelement involved (e.g. G3, Air Liaison Officer, etc.).
- Missions.
- Functions.

Applicability to the three alternatives.

(b) The element/subelement provided the capability to identify the “who” in the task performance. This assisted in eliminating collective tasks that were not within the scope of the analysis.

(c) Each collective task in the MTPs was then analyzed to ascertain if the task or its subtask supported any of the missions provided by the Government. The mission considered were:

- Movement to Contact
- Attack
- Defend
- Economy of Force
- Rear Area Security

(d) The team looked at each collective task in the MTP to ascertain if the task or its subtask supported any of the functions provided by the government. The functions considered are:

- Reinforce
- Backfill
- Augment
- Rotate

(e) Tasks that supported neither missions nor functions were eliminated.

(f) The last step was to determine to which alternative the collective tasks applied. The main focuses of this step were Alternative 1 and 3, since Alternative 2 does not have a division base and the Division headquarters does not have a go-to-war mission.

### **3. Results:**

a. The efforts resulted in a series of required pre mobilization collective task lists (see Annexes A through J) for the respective units of the integrated division headquarters and base elements. This serves as a beginning baseline in developing the Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) for the units of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

b. The tasks in each appendix were selected to enhance command and control, and supporting staff requirements in specific organizations. The reader will notice inconsistency in the level of detail between different organizations. This is a reflection of individual proponent schools’ translations of the regulations governing MTP development. However, the analytical common thread aimed at selecting tasks that support command and control functions and common staff responsibilities that enhance

the commander's capability to exercise command and control. These common responsibilities are:

- (1) Advising/providing information to the commander.
- (2) Making estimates.
- (3) Preparing plans and orders.
- (4) Monitoring execution of decisions.
- (5) Processing, analyzing, and disseminating information.
- (6) Problem identification and analysis.
- (7) Performing staff coordination.
- (8) Training.
- (9) Performing staff assistance visits.
- (10) Performing risk management.
- (11) Performing staff inspections.
- (12) Staff writing.
- (13) Staff research.
- (14) Performing staff administrative procedures.

c. Only the collective tasks are identified in the appendices. Information on the details of the analysis is available from the contractor upon request.



**ANNEXES:**

<u>Annex</u>	<u>Unit</u>
A	Division HHC
B	Aviation Brigade
C	Division Artillery
D	Engineer Brigade
E	Division Support Command (DISCOM)
F	Air Defense Battalion
G	Military Intelligence Battalion
H	Signal Battalion
I	Military Police Company
J	Chemical Company



**Annex A to TAB 1 to Appendix F**

**Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)**

**Collective Tasks**

*Annex A to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) Collective Tasks

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the HHC of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
022-8/7-CG01	Command and Control Division Operations.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-CG02	Protect the Force.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-CG03	Sustain the Force.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-CG04	Control Close Operations.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-CG05	Control Stress.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-CS01	Control the Main/Forward Command Post.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-CS02	Provide/Accept Command Liaison Teams.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-LO01	Provide Liaison.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-RC01	Control Rear Operations.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-RC03	Operate the Rear/Rearward Command Post.	Cmd Gp
022-8/7-HQC1	Provide Essential Services, Headquarters Planning and Support.	Cmd Gp
012-8/7-1001	Monitor Personnel Status of Deploying Units.	G1
012-8/7-1002	Plan Personnel Support.	G1
012-8/7-1004	Perform Staff Supervision of the Personnel Services Support System.	G1
012-8/7-1005	Recommend Priority of Replacement Fill.	G1
012-8/7-1006	Provide Information Requirements.	G1
012-8/7-AG01	Provide Personnel Services.	G1
027-8/7-JA01	Provide Legal Services to Commander and Command Group.	G1
027-8/7-JA02	Provide Legal Services.	G1
027-8/7-JA03	Provide Legal Services for Deployment.	G1
041-8/7-PA01	Provide Public Affairs Support.	G1
014-8/7-FN01	Coordinate Financial Support.	G1
020-8/7-IG01	Conduct Investigations and Inquiries.	G1



<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
008-8/7-MD01	Plan Combat Health Support.	G1
008-8/7-MD02	Synchronize Combat Health Support.	G1
008-8/7-MD03	Supervise Combat Health Support.	G1
E34-5-C214	Coordinate Intelligence Collection Operations	G2/ACE
E34-5-C415	Coordinate Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Requirements	G2/ACE
34-8-2001	Produce and Disseminate Intelligence Products	G2/ACE
34-6-2010	Maintain Current Enemy Situation	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2001	Perform Intelligence Functions for Deployment.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2002	Perform Intelligence Functions for Close Operations.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2003	Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2004	Produce Intelligence Products.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2005	Disseminate Combat Information and Intelligence.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2006	Perform Collection Management.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2007	Provide Counterintelligence Support.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2008	Plan Intelligence Operations.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2009	Direct Intelligence Operations.	G2/ACE
030-8/7-2011	Perform Intelligence Functions for Rear Operations.	G2/ACE
036-8/7-SW01	Provide Weather Forecast and Observations.	G2/ACE
878-8/7-3001	Initiate Deployment Actions.	G3
878-8/7-3002	Prepare for Deployment.	G3
878-8/7-3003	Deploy in Theater.	G3
878-8/7-3004	Control Close operations.	G3
878-8/7-3005	Operate the Tactical/Assault Command Post.	G3
878-8/7-3008	Coordinate Joint Air Support for Close Operations.	G3
878-8/7-3009	Coordinate Immediate Close Air Support and Airlift.	G3
878-8/7-3010	Conduct Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures.	G3
878-8/7-3013	Prepare the Operations Estimate.	G3
878-8/7-3014	Develop the Operation Plan/Operation Order.	G3
878-8/7-3015	Plan Joint Air Support Operations.	G3

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
878-8/7-3016	Plan Future Operations Sequels.	G3
878-8/7-3017	Plan Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures.	G3
878-8/7-3018	Review Plans and Orders of Subordinate Units.	G3
878-8/7-3019	Maintain Current Estimate.	G3
878-8/7-3020	Maintain the Current Situation.	G3
878-8/7-3021	Monitor Close and Rear Operations.	G3
878-8/7-3022	Synchronize Combat Operations.	G3
878-8/7-3023	Control Psychological Operations.	G3
878-8/7-3024	Control Electronic Warfare.	G3
878-8/7-3025	Synchronize Army Airspace Command and Control.	G3
878-8/7-3026	Control Mobility/Survivability Support.	G3
878-8/7-3027	Control Deep Operations.	G3
878-8/7-3028	Manage Terrain.	G3
878-8/7-3029	React to Enemy Nuclear/Chemical Attack.	G3
878-8/7-3031	Maintain the Tactical Standing Operating Procedure.	G3
878-8/7-3033	Develop Fragmentary Orders.	G3
878-8/7-3035	Implement Contingency Plans.	G3
878-8/7-3036	Displace the Command.	G3
878-8/7-3037	Ensure Continuity of Command and Control in the Event of Catastrophic Loss.	G3
878-8/7-3039	Maintain the Current Rear Situation.	G3
878-8/7-3040	Synchronize Rear Security Operations.	G3
878-8/7-3043	Review Security Plans of Units in Rear Area.	G3
878-8/7-AC01	Develop and Coordinate A2C2 Plans to Support Tactical Operations.	G3
878-8/7-AC02	Request, Maintain, Disseminate A2C2 Measures or Restrictions.	G3

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
878-8/7-AC03	Develop and Maintain Airspace Use and Situation Overlays.	G3
878-8/7-AC04	Identify and Resolve Airspace Conflicts.	G3
001-8/7-AV02	Plan Army Aviation Employment.	G3
001-8/7-AV03	Coordinate Army Aviation Employment.	G3
001-8/7-AV04	Coordinate Army Aviation Employment with Fires.	G3
001-8/7-AL01	Coordinate Close Air Support.	G3
001-8/7-AL02	Plan Tactical Air Support.	G3
001-8/7-AL03	Coordinate Close Air Support.	G3
003-8/7-CM01	Coordinate NBC Defense and Smoke Operations for Close Operations.	G3
003-8/7-CM03	Plan Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense and Smoke Operations.	G3
003-8/7-CM04	Coordinate Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense, and Smoke Operations.	G3
003-8/7-CM06	Coordinate Rear Area NBC Defense and Smoke Operations.	G3
005-8/7-EN01	Coordinate Mobility/Survivability Effort in Support of Close Operations.	G3
044-8/7-AD02	Plan Air Defense Operations.	G3
044-8/7-AD04	Coordinate Air Defense Operations.	G3
011-8/7-AL05	Coordinate United States Air Force Airlift Support.	G4
010-8/7-4001	Monitor Deployment.	G4
010-8/7-4002	Coordinate movement from Aerial Port of Debarkation/Sea Port of Debarkation.	G4
010-8/7-4003	Plan Logistics Support.	G4
010-8/7-4004	Monitor Logistics Situation.	G4
010-8/7-4005	Synchronize Logistics Support.	G4
010-8/7-4006	Coordinate Support for Deployed Units.	G4
041-8/7-5001	Analyze Civil-Military Situation.	G5
041-8/7-5002	Plan Civil-Military Operations.	G5
041-8/7-5003	Control Civil-Military Operations.	G5
024-8/7-SIG2	Plan Signal/Automation Support	G6
024-8/7-SIG3	Coordinate Signal and Automation Support	G6



**Annex B to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Aviation Brigade and Battalion  
Collective Tasks**

*Annex B to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Aviation Brigade and Battalion

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Aviation Brigade of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
01-4-0606	Prepare for a Chemical Agent Attack.	Bde/Bn Cdr and Staff
01-4-0607	Respond to Chemical Agent Attack.	Bde/Bn Cdr and Staff
01-4-0609	Cross a Chemically Contaminated Area.	Bde/Bn Cdr and Staff
01-4-0610	Perform Hasty Decontamination.	Bde/Bn Cdr and Staff
01-4-0611	Perform Deliberate Decontamination.	Bde/Bn Cdr and Staff
01-4-1001	Command and Control Brigade/Battalion Operations.	Bde/Bn Cdr
01-4-1002	Direct and Supervise the Staff and Command and Control Brigade/Battalion operations in the Absence of the Commander.	Bde/Bn Executive Officer
01-4-1101	Participate in the Staff Planning Process.	Bde/Bn S1 Section
01-4-1102	Perform Strength Management.	Bde/Bn S1 Section
01-4-1103	Conduct Replacement Operations.	Bde/Bn S1 Section
01-4-1104	Conduct [by name] Casualty Reporting.	Bde/Bn S1 Section
01-4-1105	Provide Other Personnel and Administrative Services.	Bde/Bn S1 Section
01-4-1106	Provide and Coordinate Health, Welfare, and Morale Services.	Bde/Bn S1 Section
01-4-1107	Establish and Coordinate Security of Temporary EPW Collection Point.	Bde/Bn S1 Section
01-4-1109	Monitor Headquarters Management.	Bde/Bn S1 Section

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
01-4-1112	Develop and Implement a Safety Program.	Bde/Bn Safety Officer
01-4-1113	Observe and Advise the Commander on Training and Safety.	Bde/Bn Safety Officer
01-4-1114	Advise the Commander and Staff on Health Services Available and Medical Unit Capabilities and Readiness.	Bde/Bn Surgeon
01-4-1115	Supervise Medical Support Services.	Bde/Bn Surgeon
01-4-1201	Participate in Staff Planning Process.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1202	Establish and Implement Security Measures.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1203	Identify and Process Information into Intelligence.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1204	Coordinate and Direct Weather Analysis Support.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1205	Coordinate Counterintelligence Measures for OPSEC with the S3.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1206	Process Enemy Prisoners of War.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1207	Develop a Friendly Data Base.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1208	Implement and Supervise the Command Map Program.	Bde/Bn S2
01-4-1301	Participate in the Staff Planning Process.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1302	Establish and Maintain a tactical Operations Center.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1303	Plan, Coordinate, and Control Tactical Operations.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1304	Maintain and Coordinate the Operational Situation with Other Staff Sections.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1305	Coordinate Maneuver Operations with Combat Support and Combat Service Support during Close, Deep, and Rear Operations.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1306	Establish and Maintain a Tactical Command Post.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1307	Plan and Direct Deception Operations, Psychological Operations, and Operations Security Activities.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1308	Plan and Direct Army Air Space Command and Control	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1309	Develop and Execute Contingency Plans.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1311	Conduct Liaison Operations.	Bde/Bn S3
01-4-1313	Plan and Direct Flight Operations for Organic Command Aviation Assets.	Bde/Bn S3

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
01-4-1314	Advise the Commander and Staff on Capabilities Limitations and Employment of TAC Air Support including Counterair BAI, CAS, SEAD, TAC Surveillance, Reconnaissance TAC Airlift.	Bde/Bn ALO
01-4-1315	Coordinate Tactical Air Support with Aviation Forces.	Bde/Bn ALO
01-4-1316	Supervise Tactical Air Control Party Functions.	Bde/Bn ALO
01-4-1317	Participate as Part of the Brigade/Battalion A2C2 Element and Assist the S3 in Planning and Coordinating Army Airspace Command and Control.	Bde/Bn ALO
01-4-1318	Participate in the Staff Planning Process.	Bde/Bn NBC
01-4-1319	Plan, Coordinate, and Supervise NBC Operations.	Bde/Bn NBC
01-4-1320	Receive, Process, and Disseminate NBC Reports.	Bde/Bn NBC
01-4-1321	Maintain and Evaluate NBC Contamination Information.	Bde/Bn NBC
01-4-1323	Participate in the Staff Planning Process.	Bde/Bn Sig Off
01-4-1324	Advise the Commander on Signal Activities.	Bde/Bn Sig Off
01-4-1325	Plan, Coordinate, and Supervise Signal Activities.	Bde/Bn Sig Off
01-4-1326	Advise the Command and Staff on Weather Forecasts and Observations and Climatology.	AF SWO
01-4-1401	Participate in the Staff Planning Process.	Bde/Bn S4
01-4-1402	Coordinate the Requisition, Acquisition, and Distribution of Supplies and Equipment.	Bde/Bn S4
01-4-1403	Monitor, Analyze, and Inform the Commander of the Equipment Readiness Status.	Bde/Bn S4
01-4-1404	Coordinate with the S3 and Recommend to the Commander Maintenance Priorities.	Bde/Bn S4
01-4-1405	Plan and Coordinate External Transportation Assets for Movement of Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment.	Bde/Bn S4
01-4-1406	Coordinate and Provide Other Logistic Services.	Bde/Bn S4
01-4-1407	Establish and Maintain the Rear Command Post in Coordination with the S1 Section.	Bde/Bn S4



**Annex C to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Division Artillery  
Collective Tasks**

*Annex C to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Division Artillery

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Division Artillery of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
6-9-01-A001	Monitor Targeting Operations.	Cmd Gp
6-9-01-B001	Command and Control FA Operations.	Cmd Gp
6-9-01-B002	Provide a Fire Support Element to the Combined Arms Force Command Post.	Cmd Gp
6-9-01-E001	Protect the Force Artillery.	Cmd Gp
6-9-01-E003	Sustain the Force Artillery.	Cmd Gp
6-9-01-E004	Monitor FA Service Support Operations.	Cmd Gp
6-9-01-E005	Control Stress.	Cmd Gp
6-9-01-B003	Supervise and Coordinate Artillery TOC Operations and Staff Actions.	Chief of Staff
6-9-01-B004	Provide Fire Support Command Liaison Teams.	Chief of Staff
6-9-01-E006	Coordinate and Monitor the Force Artillery Sustainment Operations.	Chief of Staff
6-9-01-E007	Perform and Manage Personnel Administration, Strength, Accountability Operations.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E008	Provide Legal Support.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E009	Perform Administrative Services.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E010	Manage Casualty Reporting.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E011	Monitor Personnel Actions.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E012	Coordinate Combat Health Support.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E013	Monitor Graves Registration (GREEG) Operations.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E014	Monitor Postal Services.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E015	Coordinate Financial Service Support.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E016	Develop and Maintain Morale Programs.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E017	Manage the Awards and Decorations Program.	S1 Section
6-9-01-E018	Provide Information Requirements and Services.	S1 Section
6-9-01-A002	Direct and Control Target Intelligence.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B005	Perform Intelligence Functions for Deployment.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B006	Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.	S2 Section

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
6-9-01-B007	Prepare Intelligence Plans and Orders.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B008	Perform Intelligence Collection and Asset Management.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B009	Develop Intelligence Requirements.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B010	Direct Intelligence Collection Management Operations.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B011	Conduct Intelligence Collection Functions for Close, Deep, and Rear Operations.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B012	Produce Intelligence Products.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B013	Maintain Current Enemy Situation.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B014	Consolidate, Analyze, and Process Combat Information and Intelligence.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B015	Monitor Operations Security (OPSEC) Measures.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B016	Develop a Physical Security Plan.	S2 Section
6-9-01-B017	Maintain and Manage Classified Information.	S2 Section
6-9-01-A003	Establish the Operations Security (OPSEC) Data Base.	S2 Section
6-9-01-A004	Plan and Coordinate Deployment Operations.	S3 Section
6-9-01-A023	Plan Employment of Field Artillery Assets.	S3 Section
6-9-01-B018	Prepare the FA Support Plan.	S3 Section
6-9-01-B019	Establish and Maintain the Force Artillery Tactical Operations Center (TOC).	S3 Section
6-9-01-B020	Plan for Future Operations.	S3 Section
6-9-01-B021	Review Subordinate Unit Plans and Orders.	S3 Section
6-9-01-B022	Prepare Fragmentary Orders.	S3 Section
6-9-01-D001	Advise the Field Artillery Commander on NBC Defense Measures.	S3 Section
6-9-01-D002	Plan, Employ, and Coordinate Survey Operations.	S3 Section
6-9-01-D003	Plan, Employ, and Coordinate MET Operations.	S3 Section
6-9-01-D012	Command and Control FA Communications Operations.	S3 Section
6-9-01-D020	Plan and Coordinate Force Artillery Logistics.	S4 Section
6-9-01-E021	Coordinate Transportation Support.	S4 Section
6-9-01-E022	Monitor Unit Logistic Operations.	S4 Section
6-9-01-E023	Coordinate Class VIII Supplies.	S4 Section
6-9-01-E024	Monitor Unit Maintenance Procedures.	S4 Section
6-9-01-E025	Monitor Food Service Operations.	S4 Section
6-9-01-E026	Monitor Logistic Situation.	S4 Section
6-9-01-A005	Coordinate and Direct Deployment Operations.	Ops Element

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
6-9-01-A006	Direct and Coordinate FA Unit Operations	Ops Element
6-9-01-A007	Coordinate FA Conventional Fires.	Ops Element
6-9-01-A008	Provide Counterfire.	Ops Element
6-9-01-A010	Implement Operations Security (OPSEC) Activities and Programs.	Ops Element
6-9-01-A011	Collect and Manage FA Tactical Information.	Ops Element
6-9-01-B023	Prepare Contingency Plans as required.	Ops Element
6-9-01-B024	Execute Contingency Plans.	Ops Element
6-9-01-B025	Monitor Close, Deep, and Rear Operations.	Ops Element
6-9-01-B026	Monitor the Current Situation.	Ops Element
6-9-01-D004	Coordinate Target Acquisition and Counterfire.	Ops Element
6-9-01-D005	Establish and Maintain the Operations (OPS) Element.	Ops Element
6-9-01-D006	Conduct Command, Control, and Communication Countermeasure Activities.	Ops Element
6-9-01-D008	React to Enemy Attack.	Ops Element
6-9-01-E019	Monitor Combat Service Support of FA Operations.	Ops Element
6-9-01-A020	Conduct Fire Support Coordination in Support of Ground Operations.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-A021	Coordinate Target Attack.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-A022	Process Target Attack.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-B032	Prepare the Fire Support Portion of the Operations Plan or Estimate.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-D014	Establish and Maintain Fire Support Coordination Facilities.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-D015	Conduct Fire Support Planning.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-D016	Coordinate and Plan Employment of Maneuver Force Support.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-D017	Synchronize Fire Support Operations	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-D018	Manage Fire Support Coordination Reports and Information.	Fire Spt Element

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
6-9-01-D020	Integrate Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability Operations with Supporting Fires.	Fire Spt Element
6-9-01-A009	Develop Targets and Potential Targets.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-A012	Perform and Provide Target Value Analysis.	Fire Control Element
6-9-01-A013	Establish and Maintain a Targeting Element.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-A014	Prepare and Maintain Target Cards and Target Files.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-A015	Develop Targets.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-A016	Predict and Produce Targets.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-A017	Request Enemy Intelligence Validation.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-A018	Prepare and Maintain Target Production Map.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-A019	Evaluate and Develop Enemy Order-of-Battle Information.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-B028	Prepare and Maintain a Target Workbook.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-B029	Prepare and Maintain the Order-of-Battle Map and Library.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-B030	Monitor and Recommend the Employment of Organic and Attached Target Acquisition Assets.	Targeting Element
6-9-01-B027	Establish and Maintain a Fire Control Element (FCE).	Fire Control Element
6-9-01-D009	Control Target Attack.	Fire Control Element
6-9-01-D010	Control and Coordinate Field Artillery Missions.	Fire Control Element
6-9-01-D011	Prepare Schedule of Fires.	Fire Control Element

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
6-9-01-B031	Establish and Maintain Liaison.	Liaison Section
6-5-01-4000	Command and Control Communications Operations.	HHB
6-5-01-6000	Command and Control Battery Service Support Operations	HHB
6-5-01-7110	Plan and Coordinate Defense and Security of the Battery Area.	HHB
6-2-01-5010	Conduct Tactical Movement.	HHB
6-2-01-7100	Defend and Secure Battery Area and Material.	HHB
6-2-R201	Prepare for Operations Under NBC Conditions.	HHB
6-2-R309	Conduct Chemical Reconnaissance.	HHB
6-2-R310	Conduct Chemical Survey.	HHB
6-2-R311	Perform Operational Decontamination.	HHB
6-2-R312	Conduct Thorough Decontamination.	HHB
6-2-R313	Cross a Chemically Contaminated Area.	HHB
6-2-R328	Respond to the Residual Effects of a Nuclear Attack.	HHB
6-2-R329	Respond to the Initial Effects of a Nuclear Attack.	HHB
6-2-R334	Respond to a Chemical Attack.	HHB
11-2-0102	Establish a Single Channel Voice Radio Station (FM)	HHB
6-9-01-E029	Coordinate Command Religious Support Program	Unit Ministry Team
6-9-01-4001	Direct and Coordinate Battery Communications Operations.	Commo Pltn
6-9-01-4004	Perform Re-transmission Services.	Commo Pltn
6-9-01-4010	Plan, Supervise, and Coordinate DIVARTY Communications (Signal Officer).	Commo Pltn
6-9-01-4030	Manage Communication-Electronics Information, Records, and Reports.	Commo Pltn
6-9-01-4700	Employ Electronic Counter-Countermeasures	Commo Pltn
6-9-01-4710	Employ Signal Security Techniques.	Commo Pltn
6-9-01-4900	Maintain Communication Equipment.	Commo Pltn
6-4-01-4200	Establish and Maintain Wire/Cable Communications	Commo Pltn
6-4-01-4220	Prepare and Distribute Line Route and Overlays.	Wire Section

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
6-9-01-E027	Coordinate Signal and Automation Support.	Signal Section
6-9-01-E028	Plan Signal Automation Support.	Signal Section
6-2-R001	Conduct Unit Level Maintenance.	Maint Section
8-7-C004	Provide Sick Call Services.	Med Treatment Team
8-7-C005	Provide Initial Emergency Treatment.	Med Treatment Team
8-7-MD01	Plan Combat Health Support.	Med Treatment Team
8-7-MD02	Synchronize Combat Health Support.	Med Treatment Team
8-7-MD03	Supervise Combat Health Support.	Med Treatment Team
8-7-MD04	Participate in C <sup>2</sup> Process.	Med Treatment Team
71-7-1301	Plan Medical Support.	Med Treatment Team
71-7-1302	Direct Combat Health Support Activity.	Med Treatment Team
6-7-R006	Provide Ground Ambulance Evacuation Support.	Med Treatment Team
6-9-R317	Provide Food Service Support.	Food Service Section

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
TBD-MET1	Displace a MET Section.	MET Section
TBD-MET2	Provide MET Support.	MET Section
TBD-MET3	Sustain MET Operations.	MET Section
6-9-01-D013	Plan and Coordinate Survey Operations.	Survey Planning and Coordination Element (SPCE)
6-7-01-2700	Plan and Coordinate Survey Operations.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2702	Establish a Declination Station.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2710	Update PADS and Establish Azimuth Using Assumed Data.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2711	Assume Positional and Directional Control.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2720	Establish Azimuth by Simultaneous Observation.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2721	Establish Azimuth with SIAGL.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2722	Establish Azimuth by Astronomic Observation.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2723	Extend Azimuth by Directional Traverse.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2725	Establish a Survey Control Point (SCP) by Resection.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2731	Extend Survey Control by Triangulation.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2732	Extend Survey Control by Traverse.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2734	Extend Survey Control with PADS.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2750	Submit Survey Reports and Combat Information.	Survey Section
6-7-01-2770	Process Survey Information.	Survey Section



**Annex D to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Engineer Brigade  
Collective Tasks**

*Annex D to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Engineer Brigade

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Engineer Brigade of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
5-2-0008	Prepare an Operations Order.	Company
5-6-0002	Prepare an Engineer Estimate.	Brigade
5-6-0035	Control a Base in a Base Cluster.	Gp/Bde/Co
5-6-0060	Establish External Communications.	Commo Section
5-6-0062	Control Operations.	Gp/Bde HHC
5-6-0064	Establish a Command Post.	Gp/Bde HHC
5-6-0068	Conduct Base Cluster Operations.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0070	Plan Engineer Operations.	Gp/Bde Staff Engineer
5-6-0072	Control Engineer Operations.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0074	Control Area Damage Control Operations.	Gp/Be
5-6-0080	Recommend Priority of Employment of Engineer Assets.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0084	Coordinate Engineer Support with Host Nation (HN)/Coalition Representative.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0086	Requirement and Prioritization of Class IV and Engineer Class V Stocks to Units.	Gp/Bde
5-7-0003	Prepare an Engineer Annex.	Bde
5-6-0090	Perform Engineer Intelligence Functions.	Gp/Bde
5-6-R332	Maintain Operations Security.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0092	Plan Engineer Countermobility Operations.	Gp/Bde

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
5-6-0094	Plan Engineer Survivability Operations.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0125	Plan Engineer Mobility Operations.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0640	Plan River/Gap Crossing Operations.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0029	Develop an Area Damage Control Plan.	Gp/Bde
5-6-0096	Plan General Engineering Operations.	Gp/Bde
5-6-1000	Plan Logistics Operations.	Gp/Bde



**Annex E to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Division Support Command (DISCOM)**

**Collective Tasks**

*Annex E to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Division Support Command (DISCOM)

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the DISCOM of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
63-1-2019	Manage Supplies.	DMMO/ Gen Spt/ Class V/ Prop Book Class VII Rpr Prts Br Sections
63-1-2020	Manage Weapon System, Replacement Operations.	Prop Book Class VII Section/ Class VII Assets- Visibility Section
63-1-2021	Plan Rear Operations.	S2/S3/S4
63-1-2022	Direct Rear Operations.	Command and S2/S3
63-1-2023	Direct Area Damage Control Operations.	S4
63-1-2001	Determine Combat Service Support/Tactical Assets and Requirements.	S2/S3
63-1-2002	Prepare Operations/Commander's Estimate.	Staff
63-1-2003	Prepare OPLAN/OPORD and Annexes.	Staff
63-1-2004	Plan the Move.	Staff
63-1-2005	Coordinate the Road March.	S2/S3
63-1-2006	Plan Occupation of Division Support Area.	S2/S3
63-1-2007	Establish the Tactical Operations Center.	S2/S3
63-1-2008	Establish the Materiel Management Center.	MMC and S2/S3
63-1-2009	Coordinate the Establishment of the Division Support Area.	S2/S3/S4
63-1-2010	Coordinate Division Combat Service Support Operations.	Command Section

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
		and Staff
63-1-2011	Direct Division Health Service Support.	Med Ops Ctr
63-1-2012	Coordinate DISCOM Internal Logistics.	S1/S4
63-1-2013	Supervise Operational Security.	S2/S3
63-1-2014	Employ Operational Security Measures.	Staff
63-1-2015	Supervise Nuclear, Biological, and Radiological Operations.	S2/S3
63-1-2016	Provide Command and Control.	Command Section
63-1-2017	Provide Automation Support.	LASSO
63-1-2018	Manage Maintenance.	DMMO and Materiel Section (Less Repair)





**Annex F to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Battalion**  
**Collective Tasks**

*Annex F to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Air Defense Artillery Battalion

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Air Defense Artillery Battalion of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
44-4-2371	Plan and Coordinate Air Defense for a Static Asset.	Gun/Stinger Cmd Gp
44-4-2364	Plan and Coordinate Air Defense for Defensive Operations.	Gun/Stinger Cmd Gp
44-4-2365	Plan and Coordinate Air Defense for Movements to Contact.	Gun/Stinger Cmd Gp
44-4-2366	Plan and Coordinate Air Defense for Offensive Operations.	Gun/Stinger Cmd Gp
44-4-2369	Provide Early Warning.	Gun/Stinger Cmd Gp
44-4-2301	Conduct PAC Operations.	Gun/Stinger S1 PAC Section
08-2-C316	Evacuate Casualties.	Battery Trains
44-4-2305	Maintain Unit Communications.	Gun/Stinger Commo Section
44-4-2306	Manage Unit Maintenance Operations.	Gun/Stinger HHB Motor Maintenance Section
44-4-2307	Perform Unit Maintenance Operations.	Gun/Stinger HHB Motor Maintenance Section
44-4-2308	Plan and Coordinate Logistics.	Gun/Stinger S4
44-4-2309	Prepare Logistics Estimate.	Gun/Stinger S4
44-4-2311	Provide Logistics Support.	Gun/Stinger S4

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
44-4-2312	Provide Unit Communications Support.	Gun/Stinger Commo Section
44-4-2313	Provide Unit Supply Support.	Gun/Stinger HHB HQ Section
44-4-2314	Conduct Continuous Operations.	Gun/Stinger Battalion TOC
44-4-2315	Coordinate Air Defense.	Gun/Stinger Bn A2C2 & AD Coord Sections
44-4-2316	Direct NBC Operations.	Gun/Stinger NBC Cell
11-2-C302	Establish and Operate a Single Channel Voice Radio Net.	Battery
44-2-2317	Establish and Operate the Battalion Command Post.	Gun/Stinger Bn HHB
44-4-2319	Perform Air Space Management Functions.	Gun/Stinger Bn A2C2 & AD Coord Sections
44-4-2320	Plan Air Defense.	Gun/Stinger Bn Cdr and Staff
44-4-2318	Prepare Staff Estimates.	Gun/Stinger Bn A2C2 & Staff
44-4-2321	Provide Command and Control.	Gun/Stinger Battalion TOC and ABMOC/AD TOS (C3I)
44-4-2334	Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.	Gun/Stinger S2
44-4-2324	Process Early Warning Information.	Gun/Stinger Bn AB

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
44-4-2325	Provide Intelligence Support.	Gun/Stinger Bn S2
44-4-2361	Adjust Air Defense Coverage.	Gun/Stinger Cmd Gp
44-2-226	Conduct RSOP.	Gun/Stinger Bn HHB
44-4-2330	Consolidate the Bn TOC.	Gun/Stinger Bn TOC
44-4-2327	Deploy and Occupy Positions.	Gun/Stinger Bn TOC, and A2C2, ADA Coord Sections
44-4-2332	Move a Command Post.	Gun/Stinger Bn Cmd Posts
07-2-C330	Perform a Tactical Road March.	Avenger Btry HQ
44-4-2331	Reorganize the Battalion TOC.	Gun/Stinger Bn TOC
44-4-2323	Develop an Electronic Warfare Estimate.	Gun/Stinger Bn S3
03-2-C202	Prepare for Chemical Attack.	Battery
03-2-C201	Prepare for Operations under NBC Conditions.	Battery
03-2-C334	Respond to a Chemical Attack.	Battery

**Annex G to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Military Intelligence Battalion  
Collective Tasks**

*Annex G to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Military Intelligence Battalion

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Military Intelligence Battalion of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
34-1-0401	Establish the Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC).	MI Bn Staff
12-1-C404	Perform Strength Accounting.	MI Bn Staff S1
12-1-C405	Process Replacements.	MI Bn Staff S1
12-1-C409	Prepare Personnel for Deployment.	MI Bn Staff S1
34-1-0403	Disseminate Combat Information and Intelligence.	MI Bn Staff S2
34-1-0404	Process Information and Intelligence.	MI Bn Staff S2
34-1-0405	Employ Security Measures.	MI Bn Staff S2
34-1-0704	Establish TOC Operations.	MI Bn Staff S3
34-1-0408	Manage IEW Assets.	MI Bn Staff S3
34-1-0418	Perform C-E Functions.	MI Bn Staff C-E Section
34-1-0420	Maintain Equipment and Maintenance Status.	MI Bn Staff S4
34-1-0421	Procure and Dispatch All Classes of Supplies.	MI Bn Staff S4
34-1-0422	Establish a Battalion Trains Site.	MI Bn Staff S4

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
71-6-0018	Employ Military Intelligence Company Assets.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-0019	Plan Reconnaissance and Surveillance.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-0077	Provide Intelligence Input to the Command Estimate.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-0246	Plan and Supervise Main Command Post Security.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-0811	Conduct Intelligence Functions for Deployment.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-1080	Employ Operations Security Measures.	MI Bn Staff and all Division Elements
71-6-1208	Plan Security of Designated Persons, Units, Convoys Facilities and MSR Critical Points.	MI Bn Staff and all Division Elements
71-6-2001	Prepare the Intelligence Estimate.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2002	Prepare the Intelligence Annex to the Operations Order.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2003	Analyze Incoming Information from Maneuver Elements in Conjunction with Intelligence Received from Higher Headquarters G2.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2004	Manage the Intelligence Effort.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2005	Process Specific Information Requirements Data.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2006	Process Combat Information and Intelligence.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2007	Conduct Aerial Intelligence Support Planning.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2008	Maintain the Division Intelligence Data Base.	MI Bn Staff
71-6-2009	Establish Operations Security Data Base.	MI Bn Staff.
71-6-2010	Monitor Implementation of Operations Security Measures	MI Bn Staff and all other Division Elements
71-6-2011	Develop a Physical Security Plan.	MI Bn Staff and all other Division Elements
71-6-3014	Implement Operations Security Activities and Programs.	MI Bn Staff and all other Division Elements

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
34-8-0404	Perform Strength Accounting.	G2/ACE
34-8-0408	Manage IEW Assets.	G2/ACE
34-8-2011	Perform Intelligence Functions for Rear Operations.	G2/ACE Operations Cell, Rear CP
34-8-2008	Plan Intelligence Operations.	G2/ACE, Plans Cell, Main CP
34-8-2009	Direct Intelligence Operations.	G2/ACE, Current Ops Cell, Main CP
34-8-2010	Maintain Current Enemy Situation.	G2/ACE, Current Ops Cell Main CP
34-8-2001	Perform Intelligence Functions for Deployment.	G2/ACE
34-8-2002	Perform Intelligence Functions for Close Operations.	G2/ACE, TAC CP
34-8-2003	Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.	G2/ACE, Main CP
34-8-2004	Produce Intelligence Products.	G2/ACE Main CP
34-8-2005	Disseminate Combat Information and Intelligence.	G2/ACE Main CP
34-8-2007	Provide Multi-disciplined Counterintelligence Support.	G2/ACR (CI/ OPSEC) Main CP
34-8-C400	Disseminate Combat Information and Intelligence.	G2/ACE TAC CP/Intel
34-8-C401	Perform Collection Management.	G2ACE Main CP



<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
34-8-C404	Disseminate Combat Information and Intelligence.	G2 Section Main ACE/TAC1
34-8-C405	Maintain a Current Intelligence Estimate.	G2 Section Main/TAC1
34-8-C407	Process Information and Produce Intelligence Products.	G2 Section Main CP/ACE
34-8-C410	Direct Intelligence Operations for Close Operations.	G2 Section Main/TAC1
34-8-C411	Prepare the Division Intelligence Estimate.	G2 Section Plans-Deployment/Transition to War
34-8-C412	Supervise Intelligence Operations.	G2 Section Main CP Current Ops
34-1-0400	Plan Battalion IEW Operations.	MI Battalion Staff
34-1-0406	Develop the Battalion OPORD.	MI Battalion Staff
34-1-C700	Plan for Strategic Deployment and Mobilization.	G2
34-1-C701	Prepare for Strategic Deployment and Mobilization.	G2
34-1-C702	Execute Strategic Deployment and Mobilization.	G2
34-1-C703	Debark in the Theater of Operations.	G2
34-1-C704	Plan for Strategic Deployment and Mobilization (RC).	G2
34-5-C501	Implement Information Security Procedures.	G2
34-5-C503	Prepare for Electronic Security.	Battalion Staff
34-5-C504	Prepare for Communications Security (COMSEC) Operations.	Battalion Staff
34-5-C505	Implement Information System Security Procedures.	Battalion Staff



**Annex H to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Signal Battalion  
Collective Tasks**

*Annex H to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Signal Battalion

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Signal Battalion of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
11-1-0001	Prepare an Operations Plan//Order/Fragmentary Order [OPLAN/OPORD/FRAGO].	Staff
11-1-0002	Provide Signal Staff Support.	Div Sig Office
11-1-0003	Provide Operations/Intelligence Staff Support to the Battalion.	Bn S2/S3
11-5-0573	Establish System Control Center [SCC] AN/TYQ-46(V).	Network Control Branch (NCB)
11-5-0574	Operate/Maintain SCC AN/TYQ-46.	NCB
11-1-0004	Establish Communications System Control Element (CSCE) Facility.	Bn S2/S3
11-1-0005	Perform Logistics Staff Operations.	Bn S4
11-1-0010	Perform Administrative Staff Functions.	Bn S1
11-1-0011	Perform Personnel and Administrative Center (PAC) Functions.	Bn S1
11-5-0102	Establish a Single Channel Voice Radio Station (FM).	Single Channel Voice Radio Operators
11-2-0050	Support HHC Elements in the Field.	HHC
11-1-0040	Supervise Battalion NBC Defense Operations.	Bn S2/S3
11-1-0008	Provide Organizational Maintenance for Vehicles and Generators.	Bn Motor Maint Section

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
11-1-0020	Provide Direct Support [DS] Electronics Maintenance for Organic Electronic Equipment.	Bn Motor Maint Section
11-1-0021	Provide Communications Security [COMSEC] DS Logistics Support.	Bn COMSEC Maint Section



**Annex I Tab 1 to Appendix F**  
**Military Police (MP) Company**  
**Collective Tasks**

*Annex I to Tab I to Appendix F*

Subject: Military Police Company

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Military Police Company of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
19-2-009	Perform Convoy Security.	Security Platoon
19-2-0011	React to Level I Attack.	Security Platoon
19-2-0012	Plan Movement to Contact.	Co Ops Ctr
19-2-0013	Coordinate and Monitor Intelligence Collecting and Reporting.	Co Ops Ctr
19-2-0014	Monitor MP Response to Base/Base Cluster Defense.	Co Ops Ctr
19-2-0015	Coordinate and Monitor a Delay.	Co Ops Ctr
19-2-0016	Coordinate and Monitor a Battle Hand-off to a Tactical Combat Force (TCF).	Co Ops Ctr
19-2-0017	Coordinate and Monitor Security for a Conventional Ammunition Supply Point (ASP).	Co Ops Ctr
12-2-C250	Maintain Unit Strength.	Co HQ
12-2-C251	Perform Consolidation and Reorganization.	Co HQ
19-2-0019	Coordinate and Monitor Railway Security.	Co Ops Ctr
43-2-C001	Coordinate Unit Level Maintenance Operations.	Co Maint Sec
43-2-C002	Manage Unit Maintenance Operations.	Co Maint Sec
19-2-0021	Coordinate and Monitor the Security of Critical Sites/Facilities/Storage Areas.	Co Ops Ctr
03-2-C013	Prepare for a Chemical Attack.	Company
03-2-C022	Operate in Smoke.	Company
03-2-C024	Respond to Chemical Agent Attack.	Co HQ
19-2-0001	Provide NASP Perimeter Security.	Security Platoon
19-2-0002	Perform Security Area Patrol [Mounted/Dismounted].	Security Platoon



<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
19-2-0003	Coordinate Circulation Control Operations.	Co Ops Ctr
19-2-0004	Establish Exclusion Area Security.	Security Platoon
19-2-0005	Prepare Traffic Control Plan.	Co Ops Ctr
19-2-0006	Perform Airhead Security.	Security Platoon
19-2-0007	Provide the Response Force.	Security Platoon
19-2-0008	Perform Reconnaissance of Routes to New Sites.	Security Platoon



**Annex J to Tab 1 to Appendix F**

**Chemical Company  
Collective Tasks**

*Annex J to Tab 1 to Appendix F*

Subject: Chemical Company

The collective tasks identified in the table below have been determined to be valid pre mobilization training requirements for the Chemical Company of the AC/RC Integrated Division.

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
3-2-3001	Establish a Command Post.	Company
3-2-3003	Prepare for Operations.	Company
11-2-C301	Establish and Operate a Single-Channel Voice Radio Net.	Company
3-2-3004	Establish and Maintain Wire Communications.	Company
7-2-C330	Perform a Tactical Road March.	Company
7-2-C331	Occupy Assembly Area.	Company
10-2-C320	Provide Company Supply Support.	Co HQ
43-2-C322	Perform Unit Level Maintenance.	Company
10-2-C317	Provide Food Service Support.	Co HQ
3-2-3019	Plan and Coordinate Unit Deployment.	Company
3-2-3006	Secure and Defend Unit Position.	Company
3-2-3007	Employ Physical Security Measures.	Company
3-2-C202	Prepare for a Chemical Attack.	Company
3-2-C334	Respond to Chemical Attack.	Company
3-2-C313	Cross a Chemically Contaminated Area.	Company
3-2-3008	Conduct a Radiological or Chemical/Biological Reconnaissance or Survey.	Company
3-2-3009	Perform Operational Decontamination.	Company
3-2-3010	Conduct Thorough Decontamination Operations.	Company
3-2-3011	Conduct Smoke Operations.	Company
3-2-3012	Plan and Initiate OPSEC Program.	Company
3-2-3013	Employ Information Security Measures.	Company
19-2-C304	Process Enemy Prisoners of War.	Company
19-2-C305	Process Captured Documents and Equipment.	Company
3-2-3014	Conduct Route Reconnaissance.	Company

<b>Task Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Element</b>
8-2-C337	Treat Casualties.	Company
8-2-C316	Evacuate Casualties.	Company
3-2-3016	Provide Admin Support.	Company



***TAB 2 TO APPENDIX F UNIQUE TRAINING TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION***

1. **Purpose.** This Tab describes the analysis of the unique training requirements associated with the AC/ARNG Integrated Division as they impact each of the three alternatives.

2. **Unique training requirements.** The following elements were analyzed as pertinent elements of unique training requirements:

- a. Training opportunities.
- b. Use of the USAR Divisions (Exercise) and their Battle Projection Centers (BPC).
- c. Impacts upon Lane Training.
- d. Feasibility of tying the divisions elements to existing Warfighter, division/corps, and other exercises.

3. **Training opportunities.** A training opportunity is defined as any training event which affords the unit to be trained the opportunity to train in collective training tasks which form part of its METL or go to war mission. The assessment of each alternative is provided below:

a. Alternative 2-because of the least amount of turbulence associated with Alternative two, it offers the best capability of taking advantage of existing training opportunities. Alternative two organizes three existing ARNG ERBs under an Active Component Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The mission of the AC Division HHC is to coordinate and facilitate training. There are no known obstacles precluding the HHC from accomplishing its mission. The requirements for training support resources will remain relatively constant with existing training support requirements.

b. Alternative 3-because it establishes an AOE division at its inception, is seen as the second best of the three alternatives. The Division will have the capability to build into both its short term and long term training calendars, training events and activities which capitalize the team building and associated operational relationship. The new division will introduce requirements for additional training support resources, especially considering the requirement for training combat support and combat service support elements.

c. Alternative 1-because it is the most turbulent of the three alternatives and because its training priorities are split between initially focusing on training the ERBs and

simultaneously training the division as an AOE division. Because of these split priorities this alternative will probably experience more lost training opportunities and be the least like alternative to capitalize on existing training opportunities. Depending on the brigades chosen, this alternative's limited capability to capitalize on training opportunities could be exacerbated by time and space (distance).

**4. Use of the USAR (Divisions) Exercise and their Battle Projection Centers (BPC).**

The United States Army Reserve (USAR) Divisions (Exercise) currently provide simulation supported command and staff training exercises for the ARNG's combat arms, combat support, and combat service support elements. Additionally, these divisions plan, conduct, and assist in training exercises (lane training) for selected ARNG combat support and combat service support units. The battle projection centers of the divisions (Exercise) provide computer assisted staff training using real time data which exercise staff functions and interaction. The BPC provide compatible computer systems developed for CA/CS/CSS. Their scenarios are developed based on the commander's objectives and intent. Their exercises are conducted at the unit's location during inactive duty training (IDT) or Annual Training (AT) and are conducted at no cost to the exercised unit. Analysis of this area indicated:

- a. Alternative 2-affords the best immediately effective use of the divisions (exercise) and their BPCs since it requires little or no change to the current use of the divisions and their BPC.
- b. Alternatives 1 and 3-will require changes and accommodations to the divisions/BPC in order to be the most effective. Accommodation for the additional division base units (down to company level) will have to be made in the exercise scenarios, and increases in the personnel, equipment and material will have to be resourced.

**5. Impacts upon Lane Training.** FORSCOM regulation provides that lane training will be provided during one IDT and AT for all Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units. A basic assumption in this chapter provided that the AC/ARNG Integrated division would receive the same priority for training resources as the enhanced brigade; consequently the division would experience the same status in the CFP as do the ERBs. The divisions CS and CSS element would then face the same lane training requirement as do the ERBs. The analysis of impacts on lane training showed:

- a. Alternative 2-is the best alternative for capitalizing on lane training as it is currently configured and requires the least modification to accommodate the elements of the division as currently structured.
- b. Alternatives 1 and 3-will require changes and accommodations to the lane training in order to make the most effective use of training opportunities. Accommodation for the additional division base units (down to company level) will have to be made in the lane training exercise scenarios, and increases in the personnel, equipment and material will have to be resourced.



6. **Feasibility of tying the divisions elements to existing Warfighter (WFX), division/corps, and other exercises.** Currently, the ARNG's ERBs are tied into appropriate exercises. The provision of an Active Component division will ensure that the arrangements and future iterations are accomplished as effectively as possible. Additional elements will generate a requirement for modifications to existing exercises to insure inclusion of the additional elements in the exercise. The analysis of this area showed:

a. Alternative 2-is the best alternative for being included into existing exercises because it generates the least requirements for modification to those exercises as they currently exist and because it does not generate the additional resource requirements.

b. Alternatives 1 and 3-will require changes and accommodations to existing Warfighter, division/corps and other exercises for the most effective use of training. Accommodation for the additional division base units will have to be made in the lane training exercise scenarios, and increases in the personnel, equipment and material will have to be resourced.

7. **General.** The analysis demonstrated that while all three alternatives can be accomplished, alternative 2, because it creates the least turbulence, requires the least change or modification to existing programs, resources, and facilities, is the best alternative for near term implementation.



***TAB 3 TO APPENDIX F ANALYSIS OF TRAINING PRODUCTS AND TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES***

1. **Purpose.** This Tab provides information gained from the analyses conducted to determine the effectiveness of training products and the training responsibilities attendant to each of the three alternatives within the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study.

2. Types of training products analyzed.

a. Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS).

b. ARTEP/ Mission Training Plans (MTP).

c. Training Support Packages (TSP).

d. Drills.

e. Training Aids Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS).

3. **Analysis results.** The analysis showed that currently available training products were adequate to support training at the brigade level and below. There are deficiencies in training support available or planned for above the brigade level. Notable are the following:

a. There is no combined arms strategy (CATS) published for the Division Headquarters and Headquarters company, the Division Artillery (DIVARTY), and the division's Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI). It should be noted that these deficiencies apply to active and reserve component units.

b. The ARTEP/MTP for the division HHC available at the writing of this report was limited to a revised final draft. The draft when published should meet the requirements of providing adequate guidance and identification of appropriate collective tasks.

4. **Effectiveness of training products as it applies each of the alternatives.**

a. Alternative 2-is reasonably supported by available training products and documents. The current orientation of training products on the brigade and below, provides the three ERBs with adequate training products and documentation to meet their training needs.

b. Alternatives 1 and 3-both require a division HHC, DIVARTY and MI Bn (CEWI) CATS. While these deficiencies apply to both the AC and RC, it does not lessen the requirement for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.

**5. Training responsibilities.**

a. In Alternative 3 there is no doubt that the division commander is ultimately responsible for the training of his division.

b. In Alternatives 1 and 2 the responsibility is less clear. The Division Commander and his command group and staff are only charged with the responsibilities to coordinate, assist, and assure AC support to training. The TAG still retains training responsibilities albeit he receives substantial support in accomplishing this training. Special and clear definitions of the AC “division commander’s” and the TAGs roles in meeting the AC/ARNG Division’s training requirements must be forthcoming.

c. In Alternative 3 and in Alternatives 1 and 2 once training responsibilities are defined, there are training resources available to ensure the training requirements of the AC/ARNG division are met. These resources include:

(1) USAR Divisions (Exercise)--provide command and staff training exercises and lane training for ARNG combat support and combat service support units.

(2) Regional Training Brigades (RTB)--provide IDT and AT support to the commander; conduct lane training, gunnery training; and evaluation for combat units to platoon level for Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, and Armor, and to company/battery level for Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Combat Engineers, and Aviation.

(3) Regional Training Teams-provide IDT and AT support to the commander; also provide evaluation; and assist in developing tasks to be trained.

(4) Readiness Groups-provide IDT and AT support to the commander; also provide evaluation; and assist in developing tasks to be trained.

(5) Field Exercise Brigades (FEB)-provide IDT and AT support to the commander; conduct lane training for CS/CSS units.

(6) Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)-provides IDT and AT support to the commander.

(7) Battle Command and Battle Staff Training (BCBST)-provides IDT and AT support to the commander.

(8) Battle Command Staff Training (BCST)-provides IDT and AT support to the commander.

(9) Mobile Training Team-provides specialized training/tailored assistance.

(10) Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE)-a comprehensive training support system that makes the best use of dedicated AC and RC soldiers to assist in training RC units. GFRE provides tailored organizations suitably located to facilitate collective training assistance and evaluation to RC units on a prioritized basis. GFRE structure provides the linkage between IDT and AT and between pre- and post- mobilization training requirements.

**6. Training responsibilities and alternatives' impacts.** The analysis of the impacts of the three alternatives on training responsibilities showed that:

a. Alternative 2-generates little or no changes to the current responsibilities. Superimposing a division headquarters specifically charged to facilitate and coordinate training will improve the support provided by all agencies, programs and units.

b. Alternatives 1 and 3-will require more personnel, equipment and material from most if not all the agencies that have training support responsibilities.

c. When the ERBs in Alternative 2 have completed post mobilization training, the division commander and his staff are free for further assignment. For Alternative 1, if the brigades are deployed separately, the division commander and his staff are also free for further assignment. If the brigades deploy as part of a division, the commander and his staff deploy with the division. For Alternative 3, the division commander and his staff train and deploy with the division.



***TAB 4 TO APPENDIX F TO CHAPTER 6 UNIQUE LEADER DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS***

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this Tab is to provide information describing the analysis of leader development requirements related to each of the three alternatives of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study.

2. **Leader Development Standard Requirements.** The leader development process is a continuous cycle of education, training, experience, assessment, feedback, and reinforcement. The purpose of leader development is to produce leaders who are capable of maintaining a trained and ready Army in peacetime to deter war, and should the need arise, who have the required competence to successfully engage and defeat an enemy in battle. The process consists of the three pillars:

a. Institution training-that is, all of the “school house’ training and education the Army’s leaders receive. It is here the leaders train to perform critical tasks by learning the skills, knowledge, and attitudes that are essential to high quality leadership.

b. Operational assignments-upon completion of most institutional training, leaders ideally are assigned to operational positions. This operational experience provides them the opportunity to use, hone, and build on what they have learned through the formal education process. Experience gained through on-the-job training in a variety of challenging assignments prepares leaders to lead and train soldiers, both in the field and in garrison.

c. Self-development-serves to ensure that Army leaders attain and sustain the degree of competency needed to perform their warfighting mission. Self development must relate to both institutional training and operational assignments. It is a planned, progressive, and sequential program followed by leaders to enhance and sustain their military competencies. It consists of individual study, research, professional reading, practice and self-assessment.

3. **Leader Development impacts on AC/ARNG Integrated Division.** At all levels, the commander is responsible for developing professional leaders capable of training and leader their units in combat or in support of combat operations. The division commander trains his staff and brigade commanders, the brigade commander is responsible for training his staff and battalion commanders and so on. Commanders and leaders must ensure that required officer, warrant officer and non-commissioned officer educational courses are programmed, taken, and completed; and that leader and staff developmental assignments are executed. The analysis indicates:

a. Alternative 2-has the best chance of meeting leader development requirements. Under this alternative, the specific mission of facilitating, coordinating, and tracking training provides the division commander and his staff a good capability to implement the actions required to provide the leaders institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development opportunities.

b. Alternative 3-provides the second best chance of meeting leader development requirements. Under this alternative, the division commander knows from the start that his division will train, mobilize, and deploy as a full up AOE division.

c. Alternatives 1-while the prospect of providing operational command and control as well as meeting other training requirements makes the commander's completion of leader development requirements more difficult, it does not remove any of these responsibilities. In this alternative, the uncertainty attendant to how the division will mobilize and deploy exacerbates the situation making this the most difficult of the three alternatives to meet the leader development requirements.

**4. Unique leader development requirements in the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.** Under any and all the alternatives, the AC division commander will face these unique challenges:

a. AC/RC difference in the leader development program. There is a significant difference in executing the leader development program in the AC/USAR and the ARNG. The most significant difference is in personnel management. In the AC and USAR, this management is far more centralized than it is in the ARNG. Management in the ARNG is a function of the state within guidelines and policies established by Department of the Army, the National Guard Bureau and the Army Directorate. Duty assignments are made at the state level based on the force structure of the state, leaders available to fill vacancies, unit readiness and geographical considerations.

b. Team Building-the division commander will be responsible for ensuring that all the elements of the division work in concert as a team to accomplish training and eventually the combat mission. Under alternative 2, this will translate to the division command group ensuring the appropriate scheduling of team building events within training schedules and the provision of the appropriate support (personnel, material, equipment, and facilities). Under alternatives 1 and 3, the onus for scheduling events and providing support falls to the division commander and his staff. However, this situation is exacerbated by combat support and combat service support requirements not found in alternative 2. The most difficult alternative is alternative 1 where the decision to deploy as a division or separate brigades will not be made until mobilization.



**TAB 5 TO APPENDIX F TO CHAPTER 6 DATA SOURCES**

The purpose of this Tab is to provide information relative to the sources of the data contained in Chapter 6. The references used are listed below:

a. Department of the Army Regulations:

- AR 10-87, *Major Army Commands in the Continental United States*.
- AR 135-3, *Full-Time Support Program*.
- AR 350-7, *Training and Evaluation of Forces for Civil Disturbances*.
- AR 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*.

b. Army Training and Evaluation Plans (ARTEP)/ Mission Training Plans (MTP):

- ARTEP 1-100-MTP, Aviation Brigade and Battalion.
- ARTEP 3-457-30-MTP, Chemical Company.
- ARTEP 5-402—33-MTP, Engineer Groups and Brigades.
- ARTEP 6-102-MTP, Corps Artillery, Division Artillery and Field Artillery Brigade Command and Staff Group, and Headquarters, and Headquarters Battery.
- ARTEP 11-065-MTP, Division Signal Battalion.
- ARTEP 19-17-30, Division Military Police Company/Provost Marshal Staff.
- ARTEP 34-113-11-MTP and ARTEP 34-113-12, Military Intelligence Collective Training Standards Documents.
- ARTEP 44-115-MTP, Air Defense Artillery Battalion.
- ARTEP 63-001-MTP, DISCOM Headquarters/DMMC Support Command.
- ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and Company Team.
- ARTEP 71-2-MTP, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
- ARTEP 71-3-MTP, Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff.
- ARTEP 100-15-MTP and ARTEP 71-100-MTP (combined into one volume) Corps and Division Command Group and Staff, Revised Final Draft.

c. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlets:

- DA Pamphlet 10-1, *Organization of the United States Army*.
- DA Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army, The Enduring Legacy*, dated October 1994.
- DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, dated June 1995.

d. Department of the Army Field Manuals:

- FM 6-20, *Fire Support in the AirLand Battle*.
- FM 25-100, *Training the Force*.
- FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*.
- FM 71-100, *Division Operations*.
- FM 100-5, *Operations*.
- FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.
- FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations (Revised Final Draft)*.

e. FORSCOM Regulations:

- FORSCOM Regulation 220-3, *Army National Guard and Army Reserve Reserve Component Training Assessment*.
- FORSCOM Regulation 350-50, *Training at the National Training Center*.
- FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, *Unit Commander's Handbook*.

f. FORSCOM and Army National Guard Regulation 350-2, *Reserve Component Training in America's Army*.

g. Army National Guard Regulations:

- ARNG Regulation 10-1, *Organization and Federal Recognition of Army National Guard Units*.
- ARNG Regulation 10-2, *Organization and Functions, State Area Commands, Army National Guard*.
- ARNG Regulation 350-1, *Army National Guard Training*.
- ARNG Regulation 500-1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*.

h. TRADOC Regulations:

- TRADOC Regulation 350-35, *The Combined Arms Training Strategy*.
- TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Training Development Management, Processes, and Products*.

i. Department of the Army, *Enhanced Brigade Study*, 15 November 1996.

j. Army Ground Forces Historical Section, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions*, AGF Historical Monograph Series, 1946.

k. Donald E. Sorter, et al., *Training Readiness in the Army Reserve Components*, RAND, 1994.

l. Thomas F. Lippiatt, et al., *Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Component Combat Units*, RAND, 1992.

m. Other references:

- Collective Training Requirements Report, AC/RC Integrated Division, Collective Training Division, DCST, HQ TRADOC, 1 November 1996.
- Briefing Slides, charts and materials, used at 11-12 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study Working Meeting held at Fort Leavenworth Kansas conducted 11-12 December 1996.
- Briefing Slides, charts and materials, used at 11-12 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study In Process Review held at Fort Leavenworth Kansas 16-17 January 1997.



## **Appendix G POST MOBILIZATION SUPPORTING INFORMATION**

**Purpose.** The purpose of the appendix is to provide the detailed information which supports the findings and observations contained in the Chapter 7.

**Appendix Organization.** This appendix is organized into 4 tabs:

Tab 1: The Mobilization Process;

Tab 2: Full page copies of the training strategy charts described in Chapter 7;


Tab 3: The RAND scripted briefing describing the post mobilization strategy;  
and

Tab 4: The data sources used to support the analysis in Chapter 7.



**TAB 1 TO APPENDIX G THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS**

Figure 7-1 shows the phases of the mobilization and deployment process that all mobilizing units must pass through.



**Figure G-1 Army Force Projection**

***Mobilization Phases***

- ***Phase I, Planning and Preparation***, involves RC units at home stations during peacetime. During this phase, units plan, train, and prepare to accomplish assigned mobilization missions; prepare mobilization plans and files as directed by their higher commands and in accordance with FORMDEPS; attend power projection platform (PPP) coordination conferences; provide required planning data to their PPP; and conduct mobilization training as directed. Each unit takes as many administrative and processing actions as possible prior to mobilization. Plans, to include movement planning, must be completed for the following phases.

- ***Phase II, Alert***, begins when a unit receives notice of a pending order to report to active duty and ends when the unit enters active Federal service. The unit takes specific actions (outlined in detail in the RCUCH) to transition from RC to AC status. Simultaneously, the unit begins to implement actions with available personnel and facilities, and takes the necessary emergency actions to complete the administrative and processing actions initiated in Phase I.
- ***Phase III, Home Station***, begins with the unit's entry on active Federal status and ends when the unit arrives at its PPP or port of embarkation (POE). During this phase, the unit begins its transition to AC status.
- ***Phase IV, Mobilization Station*** activities begin when the mobilized unit arrives at its PPP. Additional training may vary as evaluations dictate. The unit goal is to attain operational readiness and meet minimum deployment criteria in the shortest possible time, consistent with its deployment or operational mission.
- ***Phase V, Port of Embarkation***, begins with arrival of the unit at its POE, and encompasses all activities while at the POE. These activities include loading of equipment and manifesting and loading personnel. This phase ends with the departure of personnel and equipment from the POE.

#### ***Phases of Deployment***

- ***Phase I, Predeployment Activities***, during normal peacetime operations, include preparation for crisis response and force-projection missions. Based on the operational requirements of the supported CINC, Army organizations are designated, equipped, trained, and led with force projection capabilities in mind. Units conduct routine collective deployment training to ensure the Army forces, manpower, and material are deployed to meet the combatant commander's mission requirements.
- ***Phase II, Movement to the Port of Embarkation***, only begins when the mobilization process and/or Phase I, Predeployment Activities is complete, the unit has completed Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) and the unit has been validated as operationally ready for deployment.
- ***Phase III, Strategic Lift*** begins with the unit's departure from the POE and ends with its arrival in the operational theater.
- ***Phase IV, Theater Base Reception***, begins with the arrival of forces and sustainment at the port of debarkation (POD) in the theater, and ends with the departure of the forces from the POD.



- ***Phase V, Theater Onward Movement***, includes the personnel and equipment linkup, the reconfiguration of forces, sustainment, and receipt of pre-positioned war reserve stock at designated marshaling areas. This phase concludes with arrival at the gaining command's staging areas where combat preparation occurs.

***Post Mobilization Training Strategies***

Within Phase IV of mobilization, the ERBs pursue the Post Mobilization Training Strategy outlined in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, Appendix I (Draft). The major features of this strategy are summarized in the table below.

- |  |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Phase 1 involves soldier training and movement to the unit's designated WFC.</li><li>• Phase 2 involves tank and Bradley gunnery exercises (Tables I-XII) and company/team lanes training.</li><li>• Phase 3 includes synchronization training at the battalion and brigade task force levels.</li><li>• Phase 4 involves recovery operations (maintenance and fiscal cross-leveling of equipment) and preparation for loading operations.</li></ul> |
|--|



***TAB 2 TO APPENDIX G FIVE STRATEGY CHARTS***

The purpose of this is to provide information relative to the post mobilization training strategies developed in Chapter 7. The five charts are listed below:

- A. Training Strategy A.
- B. Training Strategy B.
- C. Training Strategy C.
- D. Estimated Additional RTD Requirements for each Division.
- E. Estimated Post-mobilization AC Trainers Required for Each Division in addition to RTDs.



# Training Strategy A Brigades Train in Parallel at Three Different Sites




Figure G-1 Training Strategy A

# Training Strategy B

## One Division Site at Ft. Irwin with Two Company Level Sites




Figure G-2 Training Strategy B

# Training Strategy C

## Two Division Sites with Two Gunnery Sites

Divisions 1 & 2  
Ready to move  
M+239 to 242

M		32				164				205				239 to 241																							
Division MSC HQs		BCTP Seminar Staff training CPI/Orders drills				MAPEX Seminars w/o BCTs				BCTP Ramp Up CPX				C2 BNTFs/BCT BCTP Prep.				BCTP				CFX				Deep Attack Maint.											
Gnd		Train: PLTs				Train: Gunners				Train: Troops				Train: Squadron and Support BNTFs/BCT				BCTP				CFX				Deep Attack Maint.											
CAV SQN		Train: Crews				Train: Gunners				Mission Support				Tactical Training and Support BNTFs/BCT				BCTP				CFX				Deep Attack Maint.											
Aviation Brigade		Train: Crews				Train: Gunners				ATK BN at Gunnery Site								BCTP				CFX				Deep Attack Maint.											
GS BN																																					
ATK BN																																					
M		17				92				195				205				239 to 241																			
BCT 1		Mob & Move				Train: Gunnery and Platoon				Train: Gunnery Company				Re-Train or Deploy early without BCTP				Rec. & Maint.				BCTP				Begin Move											
M		37				97				149				195				205				239 to 241															
BCT 2		Mob & Move				Train: Gunnery and Platoon Drills				Train: Gunnery and Platoon Drills				Re-Train or Deploy early				Rec. & Maint.				BCTP				Begin Move											
Gunnery site -> DIV site		Mob & Move				Train: Gunnery and Platoon Drills				Train: Gunnery and Platoon Drills				Re-Train or Deploy early				Rec. & Maint.				BCTP				Begin Move											
M		34				94				154				205				239 to 241																			
BCT 3		Mob & Move				Train: Gunnery and Platoon Drills				Train: Gunnery and Platoon Drills				Re-Train or Deploy early				Rec. & Maint.				BCTP				Begin Move											

Division Exercises    
  Movement    
  Optional CFX

Figure G-3 Training Strategy C

## Sources for Additional DIV/MSC Pre-Mob Training Requirements Appear To Be Available

- RTDs - 94 per division required
  - Not programmed in FORSCOM's AC to RC support
  - FORSCOM has allocated ~580 AC slots for two division HHCs
  - AC slots could be reallocated to support both division HHC and additional RTD requirements
    - Reduce ALO of HHC
    - Replace non-critical elements with ARNG M-day soldiers, e.g., SJA, cooks, etc.
    - Use AGRs
- IDT/AT support - FORCOM's RTDs, RTBs, and DIV(EX)s
  - Except Aviation BNs if they are additive to existing priority units
- BCTP/BCBST - TRADOC
- CPX and simulation based staff training - DIV(EX)s



Figure G- 4 Sources for Additional DIV/MSC Pre-Mob

## **Additional Post-Mobilization Training Resource and Support Requirements and Sources**

- Sufficient training resources currently exist for 3 ERB training sites
- However, AC trainers needed in addition to RTDs for division MSCs for such units as aviation, artillery and support units
- Required for each division:
  - 94 RTDs plus
  - 115 additional post-mob trainers
- Additional trainers available from FORSCOM's AC to RC structure with exception of trainers for the aviation battalions
- Trainers and support for BCTP - available from TRADOC
- Technology and support to conduct remote staff CPX and simulation based training - USAR Divisions (Exercise)

Figure G- 5 Additional Post-Mobilization Training Resources



***TAB 3 TO APPENDIX G RAND SCRIPTED BRIEFING***

*Preface*


This annotated briefing contains the results of analysis by RAND's Arroyo Center on training strategies for Active Component and Army National Guard integrated divisions. As part of the ARNG division redesign effort, the Secretary of the Army has directed the Army to study and to test a proposal to form two integrated divisions by merging six enhanced ARNG brigades, three per division, with an active component division headquarters.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has been given the task of developing the concept and assessing its viability. The analysis presented in this briefing is part of that assessment. The briefing has been developed for presentation to the Commanding Generals of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and TRADOC.

The work was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Combat Development, TRADOC, and was carried out in the Manpower and Training program of RAND's Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.



*Introduction*



This briefing presents the interim results of a study of the post mobilization time and training resources required by a division that integrates both Active Component and Army National Guard units. The purpose of this briefing is to elicit comments about the methodology, assumptions, alternative training strategies and conclusions. The research presented here draws heavily on Arroyo Center work that has been published in *Postmobilization Training Resource Requirements: Army National Guard Heavy Enhanced Brigades*, a study sponsored by Forces Command.

## Background

- **Army National Guard division redesign undertaken in response to recommendations made by Commission on Roles and Missions**
- **Secretary of the Army directed the Army to study and test a proposal to form two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions**
  - Active Component Division Headquarters
  - Three ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERB)
- **TRADOC given task to develop the concept and assess viability of three alternatives:**
  - 1) AC division HHC with 3 ERBs; deployable as a division or three separate brigades
  - 2) AC division HHC to oversee pre and post-mobilization training of three ERBs; not deployable as a division
  - 3) AC division HHC with 3 standard brigade combat teams; deployable only as a division
- **TRADOC asked RAND to estimate time and resources required for post-mobilization training of alternatives 1 and 3**

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As a result of the Commission on Roles and Missions' recommendations, the Army is redesigning the Army National Guard divisions. As part of the redesign effort, the Secretary of the Army has directed the Army to study and test a proposal to form two divisions by merging six enhanced ARNG brigades, three per division, with an active component division headquarters.

TRADOC has been given the task to develop the concept and is assessing the three alternatives shown on the chart.

TRADOC's assessment is to determine the viability of each alternative by addressing doctrine, organization, training, mobilization, mission capability, and resource impacts. The study will also provide insights into the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the overall concept. The analysis is to be completed by the end of February 1997, with a final decision brief to be given in March 1997.

The Force Design Directorate at TRADOC is leading the study and is being supported by FORSCOM, contractors, and other TRADOC elements. RAND was asked to estimate the time and resources required for post mobilization training for alternatives 1 and 3.


### **Purpose of this Briefing**

- **Describe three alternative post-mobilization training strategies for AC/ARNG integrated divisions**
- **Provide a comparative assessment of these strategies**
- **Identify additional training resources required to support division level training**
- **Solicit comment**

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This briefing focuses on one part of the evaluation process: post mobilization training. It proposes three strategies and the timelines for training a combined AC/ARNG division after mobilization and comparatively assesses them. It also describes the resources needed, indicating where these exceed what FORSCOM has already programmed for the post mobilization training of Reserve Component units.



This chart depicts the procedure for and the general timeline of the post mobilization training strategy development and assessment process. The first phase, largely conducted during November, was data collection. We drew on a number of inputs, including the current AC Division training strategies and the events that make up those strategies. We also made a number of assumptions about the post mobilization training resource base and what might have been accomplished prior to mobilization.

Data collection involved extensive interaction with two active Army divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 3rd Infantry Division. We reviewed their training plans in some detail, including extensive interviews with training staff at division and Major Subordinate Command (MSC) level. We also took into account the experience of those active CONUS based brigades with split basing, that is, the 1st Armored Division and 2nd Infantry Divisions. This experience seemed particularly relevant for our analysis of pre mobilization training because the components of the proposed integrated division will be geographically dispersed.

In December, we held a working group meeting at Fort Leavenworth. The purpose of this meeting was to define alternative training strategies and



identify the advantages and disadvantages of each. The working group drew wide representation from across the Army. Representatives attended from the National Guard Bureau, the 49th ARNG Division in Texas, Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, CASCOM, FORSCOM G-3, members of the Integrated Division Project staff at TRADOC, and CAC.

In the latter part of December and the early part of January, we interviewed several active and retired senior trainers. In the active force, these included the director of BCTP and ADCS-T, TRADOC; the Deputy Commanding General (former ERB commander), deputy G-3 and G-3, FORSCOM; and the Commanding General of First Army as well as two First Army M-Day general officers (one former ERB commander). We also interviewed a former Armor School Commandant and a former FORSCOM commander.

We are now preparing our interim results for presentation to the commanding generals of FORSCOM and TRADOC. As the arrow shape of the bottom box suggests, this work is continuing and will be revised based on the feedback we receive from these presentations.

*Summary of RAND Research on Postmobilization Training for ERBs*

**Outline**

- **Summary of RAND study of ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigade (ERB) post-mob training time and resources**
- **AC/ARNG integrated division post-mob training strategies**
- **Required additional training resources**
- **Assessment of alternative strategies**

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The remainder of this briefing divides into four sections. The first summarizes the highlights of an extensive Arroyo Center research project that analyzed the resources necessary to train enhanced heavy Army National Guard brigades. The results of that research have been fully documented, both in the monograph report cited earlier and in an annotated briefing, *Postmobilization Training Resources for National Guard Brigades*, AB-128-A. In this section of the briefing we summarize that work because it directly shapes the analysis of the training requirements and resources required to train the integrated division.

The second section describes three strategies for training the integrated division. The third section describes the additional training resources that would be required to train the integrated divisions. By additional, we mean those required above what FORSCOM has already allocated to the postmobilization training of reserve component units including the ERBs. Next, we assess the different training strategies by applying several different criteria. Finally, we present the feedback obtained from the senior trainer review and our initial conclusions.

## Enhanced Readiness Brigade Train-up Time Assumptions

- Brigades will seek to meet pre-mob training goals in FORSCOM Reg 350-2 and have attained levels of better ERBs.
- Missions are attack, defend, and movement to contact
- Post-mobilization time estimates based on several key assumptions - by **M + 18**:
  - ERB personnel are stabilized and equipment is ready
  - Spare parts and training ammunition available for high OPTEMPO
  - Trainers and OPFOR have completed planning and preparation
    - CONUSAs
- If assumptions are not met, more time will be required

Same assumptions will hold for AC/ARNG integrated divisions

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
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This chart lists the major assumptions made in determining the time and resources required for the post mobilization training of the enhanced heavy ARNG brigades. We bring the same set of assumptions to our analysis of the post mobilization training requirements of the integrated divisions. We assumed that the ARNG brigades would attempt to meet the training goals described in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2. These goals include Table VIII gunnery qualification, platoon-level maneuver proficiency, field sustainment, and command and control training at the level organized. Many factors, primarily attrition and job turbulence, limit the ability of ERBs to reach and sustain these goals. We assumed that the training levels currently achieved by the better brigades would continue.

We also assumed that post mobilization training would focus on the three missions developed by the Enhanced Brigade Task Force, i.e. Attack, Defend and Movement to Contact. However we also realized that the actual post mobilization METL could change based on the CINC's theater requirements (e.g., rear area defense, securing LOC) and we purposely developed a training model that had sufficient time and resources to adjust to changed METT-T requirements.

We also assume that some key events have occurred by the time that the brigades are ready to commence training, which we posit as M +18. Our analysis assumes that all personnel are at, or at least close to, C-1 status, that is, 90 percent are present, qualified, and stabilized. By assuming that the equipment is ready, we mean that the unit has its major combat systems on hand, and, further, that almost all of that equipment is fully operational by M +18. We further assume that the supply and maintenance support systems are able to bring equipment on hand and equipment status ratings to C-1 by M+18 and that the training site will have sufficient support (facilities, MILES, personnel, parts) to begin training and maintain the OPTEMPO.

Finally, we presuppose that both the trainers and the OPFOR have completed their preparation for the training. We regard these assumptions as reasonable but optimistic. Should they not hold, it will take longer to prepare the units for deployment than the times we use here.



This chart presents an overview of the training required for an enhanced brigade. The large bar on the bottom depicts the training for the combat elements, with the numbers on the top of the bar showing the time for each segment and those on the bottom showing cumulative days elapsed. The smaller bar on the top shows the training for the commanders and staffs. This training occurs in parallel with that of the combat units.

The underlying model contains detailed day-by-day training events for each unit in the brigade and incorporates as much parallel training as possible to reduce the overall time requirement.

Following the training events in this model, the brigade is validated in 92 days and ready to deploy in 102.

## Adequate Resources Can be Provided to Support Three Brigade Training Sites

- Training sites: 3 identified by FORSCOM, 1 available shortly after C-Day; availability of others could hinder force generation (30-45 days)
- Training personnel
  - Sufficient Active Component personnel (NTC & AC to RC): 1,800
  - ARNG support personnel required (ARNG DIVs): 1,000+
- 11th ACR plus ARNG OPFOR (ARNG Divisions): 2500 + 11,000
  - Separate BDE equivalent required at each site (MRB+ & MRR+)
- RC garrison support augmentation required (USAR): 5,000+
- Reserve Component mobilization: ~18,000

Training model with resources for three brigade training sites are the basis for the AC/ARNG division post-mob train-up analysis

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We used the training model as a basis for determining the resources needed for post mobilization training. The most important training resources to train three E brigades are shown on this slide. We canvassed the Army identify the training sites, trainers, training support personnel, OPFOR and garrison support that would be available to support the training of the ERBs. This survey showed that the Army could support up to three heavy brigade-level training sites.

The training model and the resources identified for the three brigade-level sites became the basis for the analysis of the post mobilization training requirements for the integrated division. The model specifies the requirements to grade and skill level of detail.

This chart summarizes the resources required to support three brigade training sites. Our analysis showed that five sites could support company, battalion and brigade-level training. The Army has subsequently identified Forts Irwin and Hood and the Yakima Training Center as the sites it would use. Fort Irwin would be available almost immediately after C-day. Fort Hood and the Yakima Training Center could be involved with the deployment of active component units, which could delay the training of the enhanced ARNG brigades at those sites between 30 and 45 days.

Although not many installations have the space to support force on force maneuver and CALFEX training required by the training model, quite a few can support the required gunnery (through Table XII) and platoon/section level drill training. We found that we could speed the deployment of brigades by using these installations for gunnery and lower level collective training (we call them “gunnery sites.”). The gunnery sites also figure into our strategies for the integrated divisions. Again, early access to some forts, e.g., Riley and Carson, may be delayed because of active component post-alert training.

Training requires five categories of personnel: trainers, training management personnel, training support personnel, simulation support personnel, and installation and higher echelon support personnel. Sufficient trainers and training managers can be drawn from the NTC and units that support RC training in peacetime to staff the three sites. These number about 1,800. About 1,000 support personnel are needed, and the ARNG divisions can supply them. The 11th ACR can provide some of the OPFOR required, but additional forces must come from the ARNG divisions. OPFOR requires about the equivalent of a separate brigade at each training site. Finally some additional support is required at the garrisons because some of the support normally there will have deployed. To meet this requirement takes an additional 5,000 people, and the USAR is tasked to provide them. The total requirement for Reserve Component forces to be mobilized to support training 3 heavy ERBs is about 18,000.

*Alternative Training Strategies*

**Outline**

- **Summary of RAND study of ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigade (ERB) post-mob training time and resources**
- **AC/ARNG integrated division post-mob training strategies**
- **Required additional training resources**
- **Assessment of alternative strategies**

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This section of the briefing describes how we developed the alternative strategies for training the integrated division, basing that analysis on the training model developed for the ERBs and the resources available to support their training. Any additional resources required to train the divisions will be discussed in the next section.



### **Methodolgy For Determining an AC/ARNG Division’s Post-Mob Training Strategy**

- Review events (times and resources) in current AC Div. & Major Subordinate Cmd. (MSC) training strategies
- Assume a pre-mobilization AC/ARNG division and MSC training strategy that is consistent with:
  - FORSCOM 350-2
  - ARNG time constraints
  - Current training methods
- Develop a DIV/MSC post mobilization training strategy
  - Preparatory events
  - Walk, Run primary events to reach deployment standards
- Overlay on RAND ERB training model to deconflict events
- Develop timelines and additional training resources

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To develop a methodology for training AC/ARNG integrated divisions, we reviewed the training strategies of active component divisions and their major subordinate commands. We assumed that the pre mobilization strategy for these divisions would conform with FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 and reflect the typical time and other constraints that ARNG units face. We also assumed current training methods for an “Army of Excellence” Division and currently available TADSS.

Based on these strategies and assumptions we designed a post mobilization strategy for the division and its MSCs. It contains two types of events: preparatory and primary. The preparatory events include such activities as individual and section training, CP drills, order drills, and so forth. The primary events employ a walk-run approach that leads the unit through key training events at a measured pace culminating in one that meets deployment standards.

We then compared the division-level training events with those required by the model for the ERBs to ensure that the divisional training did not conflict with the brigade. For example we did not schedule a divisional level CPX when the brigades were involved in supporting battalion level training events.

Once any conflicts were resolved, we developed a division-level timeline and identified any additional resources required to support the divisional training, i.e., resources needed for the divisional and MSC training events not already being provided to train the E brigades.

### **Active Component Training Data Sources**

- **1st Cav and 3rd ID**
  - **Division and MSC Annual and Quarterly Training Guidance with calendars**
  - **Divisional training regulations**
  - **MOIs for selected training exercises**
  - **Interviews with Divisional and MSC personnel (S3s, etc.)**
- **Interviews with split-based brigade training (2nd ID and 1st AD)**
- **Interviews with BCTP trainers**

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Our AC information about division-level training came largely from three sources: the 1st Cavalry Division and the 3rd Infantry Division, trainers from CONUS-based brigades aligned with OCONUS Divisions, and interviews with BCTP personnel.

The two active divisions provided their training guidance and accompanying calendars, regulations, and the memorandums of instruction for selected training exercises. After reviewing that information, we followed up with extensive interviews with trainers, both at the division and MSC level.

We also interviewed trainers from the split-based brigades from the 1st Armored Division and 2nd Infantry Divisions. Given that the integrated division would be training in geographically dispersed sites, we wanted to find out if there were specific issues caused by the physical separation that we needed to account for in our strategy.

Finally, we interviewed the trainers from the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) staff.

## AC Divisional/MSC Training Consists of Nine Types of Events

- Primary Events
  - Divisional BCTP seminar, Warfighter and ramp up exercises
  - Deep attack/interdiction/counterfire FCX
  - Reduced scale divisional FTX (3rd ID - Bright Star)
  - NTC and operational deployments
- Sustaining Events
  - Corps BCTP
  - Joint and other external CPXs
  - CPX/COMEX/MAPEX
  - OPD/Section level training
  - “Real World” division C2 - major factor raised by senior trainers

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Analysis of the input from the AC sources shows 9 major types of events that constitute the “battle focused” training (i.e., direct training for wartime missions) of the division and its MSCs. There are two categories of events, primary and sustaining. Primary events are four: the Divisional BCTP exercise, deep-attack live fire exercise (FCX), deployments to the NTC or operational deployments, and reduced scale divisional FTX.

Divisional and MSC training revolves around bi-annual divisional BCTP Seminars and Warfighter exercises. The Warfighter exercises are preceded by two or more preparatory “ramp up” exercises that mimic to the degree possible the actual BCTP Warfighter. Each spans four weeks for the division and three weeks for the MSCs.

The live-fire exercise is a logical follow-on to the Warfighter where the divisions exercise all the divisional deep attack elements on the ground but scale down the distance and level of unit participation to conform to the live-fire areas available.

The 3rd ID conducted a divisional FTX in conjunction with its Bright Star deployment. While this exercise only involved one maneuver brigade, it exercised movement of all MSC elements and divisional C2 in a force-on-force exercise .

Preparation for the NTC is also regarded as a primary division and MSC event, even though the division does not participate directly in the NTC training. The MSC, as well as the division staff, get deeply involved in the preparation of the brigades and their movement to and from Fort Irwin, and this preparation translates well into the types of activities these organizations would be involved in during combat. Many of the active divisions also have elements involved in actual deployments (e.g., peacekeeping operations in the Sinai and elsewhere), and these exercise division and MSC-level combat skills as well.

Sustaining events maintain divisional proficiency between the primary events and include division participation in corps BCTP, joint and other command post exercises, and a variety of command post, communication, and map exercises. Also relevant are professional development classes, which typically take place on a weekly to monthly basis, and the normal staff section training.

A major factor in the development of division-level skills cited independently by all of the senior trainers we interviewed is the exercise of command and control that results from day-to-day operations. Typically, the division commander exercises command and control of his units through his division staff (in conjunction with the installation staff). This day-to-day interaction exercises division operating procedures, causes commanders and staffs to get to know each other, and generally results in well-understood operational procedures. Although not quantifiable, this routine interaction enhances the division's ability to deploy.

Another related aspect brought up during our review sessions was the sequential nature of brigade NTC rotations and other BCT training. This to some extent allows division commanders and staff to focus individually on each brigade to develop mutual understandings. This was seen as important because if all brigades were training simultaneously, team building would be much more difficult.

Finally we must realize that these training strategies were not seen as ideal or even fully adequate. These divisions have a large number of demands on leader and staff time. These training strategies represent the best use of available time given numerous priorities and missions.

## AC/ARNG Integrated Division Pre-Mobilization Training Assumptions

- Division units will seek to meet training goals in FORSCOM Reg 350-2
  - Maneuver units - platoon maneuver, crew gunnery, . . .
  - Other units - company/battery
  - Units can sustain operations in the field at level organized
- Division/MSC command and staff trained at the level organized
  - Division BCTP - once every two years
  - BDE/BN BCBST - on alternate years (DIV/MSCs involved)
  - BOS exercises - division support elements every year
  - Division/MSC SOPs developed and practiced
  - Same for both division structure alternatives 1 and 3
- Adequate TDY and ADT budget to oversee and support subordinate unit training

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As we did for the ERBs, we made several assumptions about the pre mobilization training of the integrated division, and these appear on the slide. Like the enhanced readiness brigades we assume the division's lower echelon units will seek to meet the training goals set forth in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2.

We assume that the pre mobilization training focus of the division and its major subordinate commands is toward deployment as a division under both organizational alternatives 1 and 3. We believe that the training events shown on this slide would provide a reasonable basis from which to begin post mobilization training and are consistent with the goals of FORSCOM Regulation 350-2.

The division goes through a division BCTP every two years and conducts a brigade and battalion BCBST in the alternate years. This latter exercise involves the division and MSC staffs. The division combat and combat service support elements conduct battle operating system exercises every year. We further assume that the SOPs for the division and its MSC have been developed and practiced. We also see that the division and its MSC would oversee and provide support during maneuver AT and other major

training events. Sufficient TDY or ADT funds have been provided to support these activities.

During our reviews with senior trainers these events were seen as needed and achievable. Moreover, focusing on employment as a divisional brigade was seen as a sound approach for either alternative because 1) this would not change current pre mobilization training activities, and 2) the consensus was that a CINC gaining a separate ERB, if using it in a full combat role , would attach it a division rather than use it as direct corps element.

## Post-Mobilization Assumptions

- **Post-mobilization division training goals for combat missions**
  - **Attack, defend, and METT-T driven missions**
  - **Less demanding missions could take less time**
- **Personnel who will reorganize to form DIV MSCs have been identified and know where and when to report for train-up**
- **Use ARNG ERB post-mob training model for division's BCTs except CAV troops will train as squadron, not with BCTs**
- **Division HHC, ARNG units, OPFOR, and trainers are prepared and ready to start collective training at M + 18**
- **Sufficient training resources available for three BDE sites**

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Turning to the assumptions made for the post mobilization period, we assume that the division must be able to attack, defend and carry out any specific missions desired by the gaining CINC (e.g., rear-area security). If the missions were less demanding, say only rear-area security, then the time required to train the division would be less. We also assume that any reorganization can be accomplished before “walk” level MSC training. The soldiers and leaders who will reorganize to form the major subordinate commands have been identified and they have been notified of where to report for post mobilization training.

We have applied the training model developed for the enhanced ARNG brigades with one exception. The cavalry troops will train as a squadron rather than as separate troops with their brigades. As we do for the brigades, we assume that the trainers and supporting organizations are prepared to begin training on M+18. And, finally, we assume that the resources determined necessary for the training will be available.

The primary challenge lies in bringing together and developing proficiency in a group of people who have not trained together consistently.



## Recommended Post-Mobilization AC/ARNG Division Training Requirements

- **Division/MSO Command and Staff**
  - Preparatory events
    - Individual/Section training (10 days)
    - CP and order drills (10 days)
    - MAPEX/ CPX without BCTs (10 days)
  - Primary events
    - BCTP seminar (8 days)
    - BCTP ramp up training (20 days)
    - Warfighter (15 days preceded by 5 day DIV order prep )
    - Division FTX (1 BCT attack) with deep attack/counterfire/interdiction FCX (8 days including 3 day prep) - optional CFX
- BOS exercises during ramp up CPX & BCTP rehearsals
- Division oversees all training and provides direct support to colocated BCTs and MSOs

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Based on the experience of the active component divisions and the assumptions we made, we determined that the division and MSO level events listed on the slide are those required to prepare the integrated division for deployment. The training model presented here assumes that division is being trained for combat missions. Preparatory events move from individual and section level to more integrated training. The purpose is to develop basic team work and individual proficiencies as well as integrate new members into organizations. These events do not involve the brigade combat teams.

Primary events include the BCTP seminar, Warfighter exercise, and attendant preparatory or “ramp up” training. After the BCTP, we have also included a combination of the division FTX modeled on the Bright Star exercise conducted by the 3rd Infantry Division and the Deep Attack FCX contained in both division strategies. This exercise could be executed with one brigade combat team and divisional MSOs. Divisional deep, close and rear operations would be included. We have also provided for an optional preparatory command field exercise (CFX) to precede this reduced scale FTX, live-fire deep-attack exercise.

The battle operating system exercises occur during and prior to the CPXs and BCTP rehearsals. The division oversees all the training. During the

post mobilization period, the division and MSCs operate from a tactical configuration and exercise the divisional C2 and sustainment to the extent installation arrangements and schedules allow.

### Three AC/ARNG Integrated Division Post-Mobilization Training Strategies

- Strategy A - Three BCTs train in parallel at three different sites
  - Division, first BCT and AVN BDE train at Ft. Irwin
- Strategy B - All BCTs train BNTF/BCT maneuver at Ft. Irwin
  - Division, first BCT and AVN BDE go directly to Ft. Irwin
  - Other BCTs go to two company level training sites to train gunnery through company team lanes...then to Ft. Irwin in staggered sequence
- Strategy C - One or two division sites
  - All BCT maneuver training at the division site
  - Division, first BCT and AVN BDE go to division site
  - Other two BCTs go to gunnery sites for gunnery and platoon drills...then to division site in staggered sequence
  - One or two BDE level training sites could be opened in parallel to train other ARNG ERBs/ACR

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
Given the events and resources required, we posit three alternative strategies to accomplish the post mobilization training. In Strategy A, the three brigade combat teams train in parallel at three different sites, with the division, one maneuver brigade and the aviation brigade going to Fort Irwin. The other two brigades go to Fort Hood and Yakima.

Strategy B calls for all brigade combat team and battalion task force maneuver training to be conducted at Fort Irwin. As in Strategy A, the division, one brigade and the aviation brigade go to Fort Irwin immediately and begin training. The other two brigades report to company-level training sites where they conduct gunnery training through company team lanes. They then report to Fort Irwin in a staggered sequence. This sequencing is necessary because Fort Irwin can only accommodate one brigade combat team at a time for maneuver and live fire training.

Strategy C employs one or two division sites depending on the number of divisions being trained. All force-on-force maneuver training takes place at the division's site. As in the other strategies, the division, one maneuver brigade and the aviation brigade go to a single division site. The other two brigades first go to gunnery sites and complete gunnery and

platoon drills. Then, in staggered sequence, they report to their division's site to complete their training.


The following three slides address these three strategies in greater detail.



This diagram depicts the sequence, events and timelines of Strategy A, brigades training in parallel at three different sites. The division level integration occurs as a result of a series of division exercises, depicted on the diagram as light gray vertical bars running through all units. The first, the BCTP seminar, occurs early in the mobilization period while lower level units are moving to their training locations. The next division exercise occurs during the company-level training. This is the BCTP “ramp up” exercise but unlike current BCTP program does not include battalion commanders and staffs because they are training their companies. The majority of this exercise would be conducted remotely, but necessary command elements could travel from Fort Hood and Yakima to participate in key events ( issuing orders, rehearsals and AARs) at Fort Irwin. The final exercise involving all elements is the BCTP Warfighter exercise, which takes place at Fort Irwin. Because this exercise is being conducted after the completion of the brigade combat team FTXs, a full command and staff set from the two brigade combat teams would travel there for the exercise. Strategy A ends with a reduced scale divisional CFX and deep attack FTX shortly after the BCTP. The brigades that train at Fort Hood and Yakima are ready to move to deployment ports on day 124, and all divisional elements are ready to move between day 132 and 135.

Note that meeting these deployment timelines requires collective training at all sites to begin at M+18.

Under this strategy (assuming the use of three gunnery sites, which would allow some of the lower level training to commence before the first division left Fort Irwin), a second division could be ready to deploy by day 217.



Training Strategy B uses a single division site, Fort Irwin, and two company-level sites. All brigade combat team and battalion task force maneuver training is conducted at Fort Irwin. As in Strategy A, the division, one brigade and the aviation brigade go to Fort Irwin immediately and begin training. The other two brigades report to company-level training sites.

The dotted portions of the bottom two bars indicate that two of the brigades can mobilize later than the division elements, aviation brigade, and one brigade combat team. Although they can mobilize later, the second brigade must be ready to begin training at M+37 and the third brigade no later than M+67.


The key brigade and MSC staff must mobilize at the same time as the division staff so they can attend the BCTP seminar, which is held at Fort Irwin at about M+5.

The third brigade combat team is the last one to pass through Fort Irwin, and it is the one that participates in the CFX and deep attack exercise. Between the time they complete BCT training and the BCTP Warfighter exercise the first and second BCTs have an opportunity to re-train, act as OPFOR or deploy early if needed.

The first division is ready to deploy somewhat later under this option, around day 185. The second division is ready to deploy in slightly over 300 days.

Although this strategy results in slower deployment than strategy A, it offers training advantages. Towards the end of the training period, all division units congregate at a single post, and the division and MSCs can fully control and support the entire division. Also this option provides for all battalion and brigade field training to be conducted by the NTC Operations Group and with the 11th ACR as OPFOR, whereas Strategy A effectively requires 3 CTCs to be set up early using cadres from the Operations Group and the 11th ACR.





Strategy C employs one or two division sites depending on the number of divisions being trained. All force-on-force maneuver and CALFEX training takes place at the division's site. As in the other strategies, the division, one maneuver brigade and the aviation brigade go to a single division site. The other two brigades first go to gunnery sites and complete gunnery and platoon drills. Gunnery sites should not be confused with company level training sites, which require the same maneuver space as a brigade-level site. Gunnery sites have a multipurpose range complex and must be able to support gunnery through Table XII. They also require space for platoon-level maneuver.

Again, while the brigades going to the gunnery sites can mobilize later than the divisional elements, key brigade staff members have to mobilize early so they can participate in the BCTP seminar and BOS exercises with divisions and MSCs. Arrival at the division site has to be sequenced because resource availability precludes maneuver training of more than one BCT at a time at one site. As in Strategy B, the last brigade passing through the division site participates in the CFX and deep attack exercise. Under this strategy, either one or two divisions is ready to move by M+239. If other available heavy brigade training resources are used and a third brigade training site is opened, the other heavy brigade and ACR could be trained there and potentially have deployed by this date. Thus an

advantage of this strategy is the potential for training other heavy ERBs or the 278th ACR concurrently with training the AC/ARNG divisions.

A disadvantage of this strategy is a large amount of “dead time” for the early brigades. While strategy B had some dead time, the possible need for retraining and potential for providing some of the OPFOR support ameliorated this issue. This would also be somewhat true for Strategy C. However, this strategy extends the potential dead time to over 3 months. Experience from ODS and the recent Bosnia deployment indicates that units should deploy soon after completing training or risk losing their training edge.

*Additional Training Resources Required*

**Outline**

- **Summary of RAND study of ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigade (ERB) post-mob training time and resources**
- **AC/ARNG integrated division post-mob training strategies**
- **Required additional training resources**
- **Assessment of alternative strategies**

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This portion of the briefing describes the additional training resources required to accomplish the post mobilization training of the integrated divisions. By additional we mean resources beyond those already allocated for the training of the ERBs. Both pre- and post mobilization training require additional resources.

## **Additional DIV/MSO Pre-Mobilization Training Resource and Support Requirements**

- **All division MSCs resourced at same level as ERBs - NGB issues**
  - Personnel overstructure
  - AGRs
  - ADT funding
  - OPTEMPO/STRAC
  
- **Training Support - FORSCOM & TRADOC issues**
  - Resident Training Detachments (RTDs)
  - IDT/AT support
  - BCTP support bi-annually
  - Technology and support to conduct remote staff CPX and simulation based training

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Additional assets required fall into two categories: those that can be provided internally by the National Guard, and those that must come from external sources, TRADOC and FORSCOM in this case. The overarching principle is that the division MSCs need to be resourced at the same level as the ERBs.

This requirement has both personnel and funding implications for the National Guard. The enhancement of these brigades has resulted in additional resources. They have been provided additional personnel, about 10 percent above the required strength. These additional personnel enable the brigade to send people to individual skill qualification schools during AT and still have an adequate number available for unit training. The brigades also have additional AGR personnel, and these would be needed for the MSCs as well. Furthermore, additional ADT funds have been made available for schooling outside of regular unit training periods and to otherwise facilitate unit training.

TRADOC and FORSCOM also face additional requirements. To receive the same support that the ERBs do, the MSCs will require Resident Training Detachments. These additional detachments amount to 94 active component soldiers for each division. Additional trainers will also be needed to support IDT and AT periods. The pre mobilization training requirements call for a bi-annual BCTP exercise. These exercises are not

now programmed but the current BCTP structure can sustain the additional requirement if more funds for TDY are made available. Finally, the divisions will be geographically dispersed, and the division-level peacetime training will require both technology and support to carry on remote CPX and simulation-based training.

## Sources for Additional DIV/MSO Pre-Mob Training Requirements Appear To Be Available

- RTDs - 94 per division required
  - Not programmed in FORSCOM's AC to RC support
  - FORSCOM has allocated ~580 AC slots for two division HHCs
  - AC slots could be reallocated to support both division HHC and additional RTD requirements
    - Reduce ALO of HHC
    - Replace non-critical elements with ARNG M-day soldiers, e.g., SJA, cooks, etc.
    - Use AGRs
- IDT/AT support - FORSCOM's RTDs, RTBs, and DIV(EX)s
  - Except Aviation BNs if they are additive to existing priority units
- BCTP/BCBST - TRADOC
- CPX and simulation based staff training - DIV(EX)s

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What are the possible sources for the additional pre mobilization assets? The RTDs (94 people each) are not now programmed in FORSCOM's AC to RC support; however, FORSCOM has allocated about 580 active component personnel authorizations from that group for the two division headquarters companies. These are "non-titled" authorizations, which means that they are not subject to the restrictions imposed by Title VII and XI legislation.

These 580 active component authorizations could be reallocated fill both the division headquarters and RTD requirements. The ALO of the headquarters company could be lowered, which would require fewer AC personnel. Also, personnel not critical for the training of the combat mission in peacetime, such as cooks or lawyers could be replaced by Army National Guard M-day personnel. And AGR personnel could be used within the division HHC.

With one exception, FORSCOM can meet the requirement for IDT and AT support with existing resources. The exception is if the division's aviation battalions are in addition to the current initial Force Support Package and other early deploying ARNG aviation units. In this case, additional active component trainers are required that are not available from the current AC to RC structure.

In terms of personnel, the requirements for BCTP, BCBST, CPX and simulation-based training can be met with resources on hand. TRADOC can absorb the additional BCTP and BCBST requirements and the USAR Divisions (Exercise) structure can be modified to meet the need for the additional CPXs and simulation-based training. Some additional funding would be required for TDY and equipment to support the simulation-based training.

### **Additional Post-Mobilization Training Resource and Support Requirements and Sources**

- Sufficient training resources currently exist for 3 ERB training sites
- However, AC trainers needed in addition to RTDs for division MSCs for such units as aviation, artillery and support units
- Required for each division:
  - 94 RTDs plus
  - 115 additional post-mob trainers
- Additional trainers available from FORSCOM's AC to RC structure with exception of trainers for the aviation battalions
- Trainers and support for BCTP - available from
- Technology and support to conduct remote staff CPX and simulation based training - USAR Divisions (Exercise)

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The same types of resources needed for pre mobilization training are also needed for post mobilization training. FORSCOM has already programmed enough AC to RC assets to operate three ERB training sites. However, these do not account for division MSCs such as the artillery, aviation and support units or for the divisional and MSC training events included in our strategies. In addition to 94 people from the RTDs, the post mobilization trainer requirement for each division is 115 MSC trainers, and one or two BCTP teams. As with pre mobilization AT and IDT training support, FORSCOM can provide the required additional trainers from the programmed AC to RC structure with the exception of those needed for the aviation battalions. TRADOC can provide the BCTP teams if there is no conflicting requirement from deployed active component units.

Additionally training support personnel and simulations are required to support these training events; these resources can be provided from the USAR Divisions (Exercise)



*Assessment of Alternatives and Interim Conclusions*

**Outline**

- **Summary of RAND study of ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigade (ERB) post-mob training time and resources**
- **AC/ARNG integrated division post-mob training strategies**
- **Required additional training resources**
- **Assessment of alternative strategies and interim conclusions**

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In this section, we assess the alternatives based on a number of different criteria and provide our interim conclusions.

<b>Assessing the Alternatives</b>			
<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strategy A</b>	<b>Strategy B</b>	<b>Strategy C</b>
Force Generation - 1st division - 2nd division	M+132 M+217	M+185 M+303	M+239 M+239
Division training oversight and leader team building	Worst	Next best	Best
Opportunity to integrate and practice division support operations - all MSCs	Worst	Next best	Best
Least risk to planned timeline: • Training site availability • Differential BDE readiness • Opportunity to cross-level • Trainer and OPFOR preparation	Worst	Best	Next best
FORSCOM flexibility to generate ERBs or ACR & divisions simultaneously	No	No	Only one

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The overall evaluation of the three strategies requires an assessment of several tradeoffs. The next two charts list some of the key ones. Strategy A produces a trained division in the shortest time, but it is the worst option from the standpoint of integration, cohesion and team building. The division is never colocated as a cohesive unit. Strategy C provides the entire division the most time together, but it takes more than three months longer than Strategy A to produce a division.

Strategy A also has the least flexibility to respond to potential execution problems. So its risk of failing to meet the timeline is the greatest. Because all units report at the same time to different training sites, there are few opportunities to address such problems as some brigades being more proficient than others or a significant cross leveling requirement. The other two strategies stagger the mobilization of the units, so that a brigade needing more training could be called up early to address training deficiencies. Similarly, an early mobilizing brigade could be cross-leveled with personnel from one mobilizing later, and that unit would have time to make up shortages from the individual replacement system. Also, because Strategies A and Option C open three sites at the beginning they would be more adversely affected by site availability and the ability of the trainers and the OPFOR to prepare and begin collective training by M+18.

Strategy C is the only option that gives FORSCOM the flexibility to train divisions and ERBs or the armored cavalry regiment. This strategy would also permit the mobilization only one division, and the remaining resources could be devoted to other units.

**Assessing the Alternatives  
continued**

Criteria	Strategy A	Strategy B	Strategy C 3 Sites
BCT dead time	None	Moderate	Most
BCTP teams	One	Two	Two
Trainer experience	BN/BDE cadre thin	Best match	BN/BDE cadre thin
OPFOR C2 ARNG number	AC cadre thin 11,000	Best match 8500	AC cadre thin 11,000
Sites Instrumentation Live fire	Limited - 2 sites CO at 2 sites	BN and BDE BN and BDE	Limited - 2 sites CO at 2 sites
Total RC mobilization	6 locations 20,000	3 locations 15,500	6 locations 20,000

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Strategies B and C mobilize units sequentially which creates substantial dead time for those units mobilizing early because they have to wait for the BCTP Warfighter. These units have the opportunity to retrain, provide OPFOR for sister units or deploy early without BCTP participation. Strategy C is the worst.

Both Strategy B and C require 2 BCTP teams because two divisions are training in parallel. If BCTP is being used to support in-theater requirements this could become an issue.

Strategy B is most attractive considering the match of trainer pre mobilization experience and post mobilization training missions. The Operations Group from the NTC could conduct all battalion, brigade and division field training exercises. In contrast, both A and C require a cadre from the Operations Group to form 3 trainer groups to conduct this training.

Strategy B is also the most attractive when considering the OPFOR requirement. It requires the smallest force, because it employs company-level training sites and these demand fewer OPFOR personnel. It also allows the AC OPFOR cadre (the 11th ACR) to focus its efforts on battalion and brigade training. In Strategies A and C, the cadre must spread across three sites.

Only Strategy B, which has all battalion task force and brigade maneuver conducted at Fort Irwin, can take advantage of the instrumentation and unequaled live fire areas at the National Training Center.

Finally, Strategy B requires the mobilization of the fewest RC personnel. Because it uses only three locations, the installation support requirements are smaller.

## Synopsis of Senior Trainer Comments

- All strategies could work but involve risk and implementation would be difficult
- They generally preferred strategy B over A or C
  - Strategies B and C have more time with all units colocated, on the ground, for leaders to “get into each other’s heads” - difficult to quantify but important
  - Strategy B has better match of trainers and OPFOR for BN and BCT training and less “dead time”
- Most felt strategies would not produce a division equal to an AC division, but one competent for many wartime missions - experience of MSC and BCT commanders and staffs biggest concern
- Concern expressed over availability of AC trainers during post-mobilization time frame given lower personnel readiness of AC follow-on forces

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This chart summarizes the comments of the senior trainers we interviewed. All agreed that the proposed strategies could work. However, they pointed out that all involve risk and that implementation would be difficult. In general, they favored Strategy B. Both B and C offer more time with all units co-located. This close contact was deemed important to developing the cohesion and team-building necessary for an efficient unit. Strategy B produces the best match of trainers and the least dead time.

None of the senior trainers felt that the proposed strategies would produce a division equal to an active one. However, they believed that the resulting division would be competent to carry out a wide variety of missions and would provide a valuable asset to a theater commander. Their primary concern centered on the MSC and brigade commanders and staff.

Some concern was expressed about the possibility that active component trainers might be diverted during the post mobilization period to fill vacancies in active units. Not all units enjoy the same level of personnel fill, and there might be a temptation to divert the trainers to fill voids in deploying active units.

## Interim Conclusions

- AC/ARNG integrated divisions will take more time to accomplish post-mobilization training and preparation
  - One division takes 30 or more days longer than three ARNG ERBs
  - Two divisions takes 60 or more days longer than six ARNG ERBs
- Faster train-up strategies incur more risk and are less flexible
- More training resources required: pre- and post-mob
  - AC RTDs and post-mob trainers - 418
  - BCTP teams (TRADOC) - potential AC conflicts
  - Requirements can be met with the exception of those needed for aviation battalions.

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Conclusions at this point in the study are:

- It takes longer to prepare divisions for deployment than it does ERBs—at least a month. This additional time is required for the division level training.
- The faster training strategies poses more risk-both to the timeline and to the quality of the training.
- Divisions take more resources than separate ERBs, both people and money. It appears as though most assets required for pre- and post mobilization training are available from existing or currently planned sources, with the exception of the training support needed by any new aviation battalions.

*References*

Lippiatt, Thomas et al., *Postmobilization Training Resource Requirements: Army National Guard Heavy Enhanced Brigades*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-662-A, 1996.

Lippiatt, Thomas, et al., *Postmobilization Training Resources for National Guard Brigades*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, AB-128-A, 1996



**TAB 4 TO APPENDIX G DATA SOURCES**

The purpose of this is to provide information relative to the sources of the data contained in Chapter 7. The references used are listed below:

a. Department of the Army Regulations:

- AR 10-87, *Major Army Commands in the Continental United States*.
- AR 135-3, *Full-Time Support Program*.
- AR 350-7, *Training and Evaluation of Forces for Civil Disturbances*.
- AR 350-50, *Combat Training Center Program*.

b. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlets:

- DA Pamphlet 10-1, *Organization of the United States Army*.
- DA Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army, The Enduring Legacy*, dated October 1994.
- DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, dated June 1995.

c. Department of the Army Field Manuals:

- FM 6-20, *Fire Support in the AirLand Battle*.
- FM 25-100, *Training the Force*.
- FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*.
- FM 71-100, *Division Operations*.
- FM 100-5, *Operations*.
- FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.
- FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations (Revised Final Draft)*.

d. FORSCOM Regulations:

- FORSCOM Regulation 220-3, *Army National Guard and Army Reserve Reserve Component Training Assessment*.
- FORSCOM Regulation 350-50, *Training at the National Training Center*.
- FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, *Unit Commander's Handbook*.

e. FORSCOM and Army National Guard Regulation 350-2, *Reserve Component Training in America's Army*.

- f. Army National Guard Regulations:
- ARNG Regulation 10-1, *Organization and Federal Recognition of Army National Guard Units*.
  - ARNG Regulation 10-2, *Organization and Functions, State Area Commands, Army National Guard*.
  - ARNG Regulation 350-1, *Army National Guard Training*.
  - ARNG Regulation 500-1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*.
- g. TRADOC Publications:
- Headquarters TRADOC, Army Training OPORD 1-59, *WARFIGHTER XXI (Draft)*. Headquarters TRADOC, Operations Directive No. 1-96, *Army Distance Learning Program*.
  - Headquarters, TRADOC, *Version 3 Warrior XXI Campaign Plan*.
- h. TRADOC Regulations:
- TRADOC Regulation 350-35, *The Combined Arms Training Strategy*.
  - TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Training Development Management, Processes, and Products*.
- i. Department of the Army, *Enhanced Brigade Study*, 15 November 1996.
- j. Army Ground Forces Historical Section, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions*, AGF Historical Monograph Series, 1946.
- k. Donald E. Sorter, et al., *Training Readiness in the Army Reserve Components*, RAND, 1994.
- l. Thomas F. Lippiatt, et al., *Mobilization and Train-Up Times for Army Reserve Component Combat Units*, RAND, 1992.
- m. Other references:
- Collective Training Requirements Report, AC/RC Integrated Division, Collective Training Division, DCST, HQ TRADOC, 1 November 1996.
  - Briefing Slides, charts and materials, used at 11-12 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study Working Meeting held at Fort Leavenworth Kansas conducted, 11-12 December 1996.
  - Briefing Slides, charts and materials, used at 11-12 AC/ARNG Integrated Division Study In Process Review held at Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 16-17 January 1997.

## Appendix H RESOURCE ANALYSIS

This appendix contains supporting data for the resource analysis. The appendix contains 9 TABs showing procurement quantities for each alternative, the OPTEMPO methodologies applicable to each of the three alternatives, and the EAD/EAC requirements for alternatives 1 and 3.

- TABs 1 and 2 pertain to the procurement for alternative 1; TAB 6 outlines the alternative 1 OPTEMPO methodologies.
- Alternative 2 procurement quantities are found in TAB 3; the alternative 2 OPTEMPO methodology is at TAB 7.
- Procurement quantities for alternative 3 can be found at TAB 4; the OPTEMPO methodologies for alternative 3 are in TAB 8.
- TAB 5 contains the excess quantities for both alternative 1 and alternative 3 and shows a comparison between the alternatives.
- TAB 9 is the echelon above division(EAD)/echelon above corps (EAC) requirements for the divisions in alternatives 1 and 3.



**TAB 1 ALTERNATIVE 1 DIVISION BASE EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT  
QUANTITIES TO APPENDIX H**

The table below shows the equipment needed to form the division base (to include the division HHC) for alternative 3. Under this alternative, the ERBs remain in their current configuration until post mobilization, when a decision is made to either employ the ERBs as separate entities or to employ the division as a whole. The first column is the line item number (LIN) for the item of equipment; the second column is the description for the item of equipment; and the third column is the quantity required for the division base in this alternative. The division base requirement has been decremented to reflect the capabilities and equipment present in the ERBs. It should also be noted that the equipment requirements do not change regardless of whether the division base is all active component or the division HHC is active component and the remainder of the division base is ARNG.

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
A21383	AERIAL RECVRY KIT	4
A41666	Q37 RADAR	2
C11158	CARRIER, CP	16
C12155	FIST-V	3
C18234	CARRIER, RISE	8
C18297	CMPTR SET, GENERAL	5
C36151	CRANE	2
C89935	CNTRL COM TSQ-190(V)3	3
D11538	CARRIER, CP	8
D15941	DIGITAL COM TERM	3
D69050	DRUM, H2O	18
D82404	DECON APRTS	2
E61338	EIDS	8
F07657	CONVEYOR ROLLER	32
F07794	CONVEYOR ROLLER	12
F42612	FAW SS	13
F43003	CRANE	1
F57713	AVENGER	24
G12170	15KW GEN	3
G17460	60KW GEN	1
G21061	PETRL PUMP	4

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
G35981	10KW GEN	2
G38140	10KW GEN	44
G42170	10KW GEN	51
G58151	SMOKE GEN	42
G68966	PETRL DRUM	2
G74711	10KW GEN	25
G78306	60KW GEN	16
G87229	SMOKE GEN	14
H01855	ELEC SHOP	6
H01857	ELEC SHOP	6
H01907	ELEC SHOP	8
H01912	ELEC SHOP	5
H30616	EH-60 HELO	3
H31110	OH-58 HELO	22
H32361	UH-60 HELO	24
H94824	FARE	2
J04717	PETRLM SYS SUP POINT	3
J35492	15KW GEN	1
J70228	ICTT	3
L28351	MKT	32
L69306	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)1	16
L69442	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)3	24
L69510	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)4	1
L76556	SCOOP LOADER	2
M04268	MGMT FACILITY TTC-46C(V)	1
N20115	OP CONTRL COM MSC-31	2
P04332	PED	1
P42126	30KW GEN	1
P91756	PUMP	4
P92030	H2O PUMP	16
P96640	PETRLM PUMP ASSY	2
P97051	PETRLM PUMP	6
R11154	LOADING RAMP	6
R33351	RAU TRC-191	1
R38403	TAC SAT PSC-3()	7
R41282	NBC RECON VEH	2

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
R50544	REC VEH, M578	1
R50681	REC VEH, M88	4
S34963	SAT COM TERM TSC-93A	3
S37228	SWITCH GRP TTC-47C(V)	2
S38172	SENS TTC-48C(V)4	3
S70027	SEMI TRL, FLT BED	78
S70243	SEMI TRL, WRECKER	1
S70517	SEMI TRL, LOW BED	9
S70859	HET TRL	12
S73372	SEMI TRL, TANK	37
S74832	SEMI TRL, VAN	11
S75038	SEMI TRL, VAN	5
S75175	SEMI TRL, VAN	33
S78466	SAT COM TERM TSC-85B	2
T00466	STINGER TRNG LAUNCHER	34
T04834	STINGER TRNG SET	8
T07543	HMMWV W.SHELTER	6
T07679	HMMWV HVY	178
T12620	TANK ASSY, PETRLM	8
T13413	TACTICAL CMPTR	4
T13481	TACTICAL CMPTR	9
T19033	TANK, H2O	36
T19101	TANK, ASSY H2O	2
T20701	TRANS TRQ-35(V)1	1
T38844	HMMWV AMBULANCE	6
T39518	HEMMT CGO W.W	10
T39586	HEMMT CGO	18
T39654	HEMMT CGO W.W	6
T41135	MTV CGO W/W	61
T41203	MTV W/MHE	9
T45465	HEMAT TRL	57
T48944	FORK LIFT	1
T49255	FORK LIFT	9
T58161	HEMMT POL	13
T59048	HET TRACTOR	12
T59278	HEMMT CGO	3

LIN	Description	Quantity Required
T60081	LMTV CGO	1
T60149	LMTV CGO W/W	32
T61239	MTV TRACTOR	131
T61307	MTV TRACTOR W/W	7
T61494	HMMWV CGO	487
T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	48
T61772	MTV CGO, LWB W/W	12
T61908	MTV CGO	201
T63093	HEMMT WRECKER	13
T87243	HEMMT POL	41
T93484	LMTV VAN	14
T94709	MTV WRECKER	19
T96838	FLT BED TRL	5
V12552	TANK ASSY, PETRLM	10
V14744	TANK, H2O	3
W35417	H2O PURIFICATION SET	14
W48391	WELD SHOP TRL	2
W93995	AIRCRAFT MAINT TRL	9
W95537	3/4T TRL	2
W95811	1 1/2T TRL	2
W98825	H2O TRL	73
Z04910	M22 CHEM ALARM	5
Z05088	MMS MET STATION	1
Z06157	ARMV	5
Z10187	FAAD TAC OP CNTR	2
Z12353	SENS TTC-48C(V)1	9
Z13860	CARRIER, CP	2
Z15940	CSSCS SYSTEM	5
Z17296	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	12
Z17303	COMPTR SET, GENERAL	3
Z17435	TGT ACQU SYS	3
Z17545	CMPTR SET, GENERAL	2
Z17676	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	2
Z17744	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	1
Z21102	DECON APRTS	6
Z24045	CMD SYS TACTICAL	1



AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

LIN	Description	Quantity Required
Z24079	SWITCH GRP TTC-46C(V)	1
Z25954	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	1
Z26338	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	2
Z26406	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	2
Z26616	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	4
Z31551	DECON APRTS	3
Z32349	GRND BASE SENSOR	6
Z33524	RAH HELO	18
Z33914	AH-64 HELO	30
Z36068	LMTV TRL	149
Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	42
Z36272	3/4T TRL	238
Z36909	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	1
Z40669	MGH GEN	14
Z41156	M3A3	1
Z43012	FARR SYS	2
Z43728	MITT	10
Z46135	CHMCS SYS	1
Z49337	MTV CGO, LWB	4
Z54382	JTIDS NCS	3
Z54632	JTIDS NCS RELAY	5
Z57250	MLRS	18
Z59413	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3
Z59617	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	2
Z59685	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	2
Z62381	M88 IRV	6
Z62562	HMMWV EXP CAP	22
Z62630	HMMWV ARMD	22
Z64310	MET STATION	1
Z65205	M1097	9
Z70011	NCS TSQ-158(V)2	1
Z71517	OP GRP TTC-46C(V)	1
Z77269	SYS CNTRL GRP TYQ-46(V)	1
Z90712	MTV TRL	22
Z91122	TANKER, TRL	1
Z94028	FORK LIFT, ATLAS	19

LIN	Description	Quantity Required
Z94047	MTV POL	28
Z94560	MTV EXP VAN	30

**TAB 2 (ALTERNATIVE 1 ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES) TO APPENDIX H**

In addition to the equipment required to form the division base for alternative 1, there are equipment requirements over and above the division base that are necessary to make alternative 1 an AOE division. The table below shows the additional equipment required. The first column shows the LIN for the item of equipment; the second column is the description; and the third column is the quantity required.

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
C18234	CARRIER, RISE	16
C76335	M3A3	30
D11538	CARRIER, CP	6
D69050	DRUM, H2O	48
F42612	FAW SS	8
G42170	10KW GEN	7
G42238	5KW GEN	18
G87229	SMOKE GEN	3
L69306	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)1	15
P44549	H2O PUMP	6
P92030	H2O PUMP	10
Q16110	RADAR SET, PSS-5	3
R33351	RAU TRC-191	9
R41282	NBC RECON VEH	4
S37228	SWITCH GRP TTC-47C(V)	1
S38172	SENS TTC-48C(V)4	3
S70027	SEMI TRL, FLT BED	47
S70859	HET TRL	12
S74832	SEMI TRL, VAN	3
T04834	STINGER TRNG SET	66
T12938	TANK ASSY, H2O	22
T19033	TANK, H2O	6
T39518	HEMMT CGO W.W	6
T41203	MTV W/MHE	6
T59048	HET TRACTOR	12
T60149	LMTV CGO W/W	7
T61239	MTV TRACTOR	28

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	46
T61908	MTV CGO	18
T63093	HEMMT WRECKER	18
V14744	TANK, H2O	9
W37243	H2O STORE/DIST SET	1
W55968	H2O STORE/DIST SET	3
W95537	3/4T TRL	4
Z04910	M22 CHEM ALARM	1
Z12353	SENS TTC-48C(V)1	9
Z13860	CARRIER, CP	21
Z17435	TGT ACQU SYS	3
Z21102	DECON APRTS	6
Z26406	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	5
Z31551	DECON APRTS	3
Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	8
Z64310	MET STATION	3
Z89119	DAMMS-R	6

**TAB 3 ALTERNATIVE 2 EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES TO APPENDIX H**

The table below shows a display of the equipment needed for the stylized division HHC for alternative 2. The first column shows the LIN for the item of equipment; the second column is the description for the piece of equipment; and the third column is the quantity required.

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
C11158	Carrier, CP	2
C18234	Carrier, Rise	3
D40782	Digital Msg Device	1
P42126	30KW Generator	1
P42194	60KW Generator	1
P42262	10KW Generator	1
T07679	HMMWV Hvy	2
T61494	HMMWV Cargo	22
W98825	H2O Trailer	2
Z15940	CSSCS System	2
Z17296	Computer Set, Digital	6
Z36068	LMTV Trailer	4
Z36272	3/4 Ton Trailer	8
Z40430	LMTV Cargo	6
Z46135	CHMCS System	12
Z60951	LMTV Cargo W/W	1
Z64310	MET Station	1
Z94047	MTV POL Tanker	1
Z94433	MTV Wrecker	1



**TAB 4 ALTERNATIVE 3 EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT QUANTITIES TO APPENDIX H**

The table below shows the equipment needed to form the division base (to include the division HHC) and to transform the 3 ERBs into divisional maneuver brigades for alternative 3. The first column is the LIN for the item of equipment; the second column is the description; and the third column is the quantity required.

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
A21383	AERIAL RECVRY KIT	2
A41666	Q37 RADAR	2
C18234	CARRIER, RISE	14
C18297	CMPTR SET, GENERAL	8
C36151	CRANE	2
C76335	M3A3	30
D11538	CARRIER, CP	8
D15941	DIGITAL COM TERM	3
E61338	EIDS	8
F07657	CONVEYOR ROLLER	47
F07794	CONVEYOR ROLLER	24
F42612	FAW SS	9
F43003	CRANE	1
F57713	AVENGER	6
G12170	15KW GEN	6
G17460	60KW GEN	3
G21061	PETRL PUMP	1
G21472	PETRL PUMP	7
G38140	10KW GEN	2
G42170	10KW GEN	51
G42238	5KW GEN	36
G68966	PETRL DRUM	18
G74711	10KW GEN	2
G87229	SMOKE GEN	7
H01855	ELEC SHOP	16
H01857	ELEC SHOP	6
H01907	ELEC SHOP	20
H01912	ELEC SHOP	8

LIN	Description	Quantity Required
H30616	EH-60 HELO	3
H31110	OH-58 HELO	22
H32361	UH-60 HELO	24
J35492	15KW GEN	1
L28351	MKT	32
L69306	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)1	31
L69442	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)3	16
L69510	LOS RADIO TRC-190(V)4	1
M04268	MGMT FACILITY TTC-46C(V)	1
N20115	OP CONTRL COM MSC-31	2
P04332	PED	1
P42126	30KW GEN	1
P44549	H2O PUMP	3
P91756	PUMP	4
P96640	PETRLM PUMP ASSY	5
Q16110	RADAR SET, PSS-5	3
R11154	LOADING RAMP	3
R33351	RAU TRC-191	16
R38403	TAC SAT PSC-3()	1
R41282	NBC RECON VEH	6
R50544	REC VEH, M578	2
R50681	REC VEH, M88	3
S34963	SAT COM TERM TSC-93A	3
S37228	SWITCH GRP TTC-47C(V)	3
S38172	SENS TTC-48C(V)4	6
S70027	SEMI TRL, FLT BED	59
S70243	SEMI TRL, WRECKER	1
S70517	SEMI TRL, LOW BED	9
S70859	HET TRL	6
S73372	SEMI TRL, TANK	10
S73668	SEMI TRL	30
S74832	SEMI TRL, VAN	11
S75038	SEMI TRL, VAN	5
S75175	SEMI TRL, VAN	36
S78466	SAT COM TERM TSC-85B	2
T00466	STINGER TRNG LAUNCHER	46



<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
T04834	STINGER TRNG SET	20
T07543	HMMWV W.SHELTER	3
T07679	HMMWV HVY	122
T12938	TANK ASSY, H2O	13
T13413	TACTICAL CMPTR	1
T13481	TACTICAL CMPTR	3
T19033	TANK, H2O	6
T20701	TRANS TRQ-35(V)1	1
T39518	HEMMT CGO W.W	16
T39586	HEMMT CGO	18
T39654	HEMMT CGO W.W	6
T41135	MTV CGO W/W	11
T41203	MTV W/MHE	15
T45465	HEMAT TRL	57
T58161	HEMMT POL	13
T59048	HET TRACTOR	6
T60081	LMTV CGO	164
T60149	LMTV CGO W/W	45
T61239	MTV TRACTOR	123
T61307	MTV TRACTOR W/W	7
T61494	HMMWV CGO	420
T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	94
T61772	MTV CGO, LWB W/W	1
T61908	MTV CGO	9
T63093	HEMMT WRECKER	16
T87243	HEMMT POL	41
T93484	LMTV VAN	24
T94709	MTV WRECKER	16
T96838	FLT BED TRL	8
V12552	TANK ASSY, PETRLM	4
V14744	TANK, H2O	12
W35417	H2O PURIFICATION SET	2
W37243	H2O STORE/DIST SET	1
W48391	WELD SHOP TRL	2
W93995	AIRCRAFT MAINT TRL	6
W95537	3/4T TRL	36

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
W95811	1 1/2T TRL	2
W98825	H2O TRL	68
Z04910	M22 CHEM ALARM	6
Z06157	ARMV	8
Z12353	SENS TTC-48C(V)1	9
Z13860	CARRIER, CP	23
Z17296	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	8
Z17435	TGT ACQU SYS	6
Z17676	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	2
Z21102	DECON APRTS	12
Z24045	CMD SYS TACTICAL	1
Z24079	SWITCH GRP TTC-46C(V)	1
Z25954	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	1
Z26406	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	5
Z26616	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	4
Z31551	DECON APRTS	6
Z32349	GRND BASE SENSOR	6
Z33524	RAH HELO	18
Z33914	AH-64 HELO	30
Z36068	LMTV TRL	128
Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	38
Z36272	3/4T TRL	169
Z40337	MTV CGO, LWB	15
Z41156	M3A3	2
Z43012	FARR SYS	10
Z46135	CHMCS SYS	8
Z54382	JTIDS NCS	3
Z54632	JTIDS NCS RELAY	5
Z57250	MLRS	18
Z59413	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3
Z62381	M88 IRV	6
Z62562	HMMWV EXP CAP	19
Z62630	HMMWV ARMD	46
Z64310	MET STATION	4
Z65205	M1097	15
Z70011	NCS TSQ-158(V)2	1

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity Required</b>
Z71517	OP GRP TTC-46C(V)	1
Z77269	SYS CNTRL GRP TYQ-46(V)	1
Z89119	DAMMS-R	3
Z91122	TANKER, TRL	1
Z94028	FORK LIFT, ATLAS	40
Z94047	MTV POL	22
Z94560	MTV EXP VAN	21



**TAB 5 ALTERNATIVE 1 AND ALTERNATIVE 3 EXCESS EQUIPMENT  
TO APPENDIX H**

The table below is a comparison between alternative 1 and alternative 3 of the excess equipment. The first column is the equipment LIN; the second column is the description; the third column is the alternative 1 excess quantity; and the fourth column is the alternative 3 excess quantity. The last column is the difference between alternative 1 and alternative 3. A positive difference is caused by alternative 1 retaining equipment until a decision is made during post mobilization as to whether or not the division will be employed as a division or separate brigades. In alternative 3, the ERBs are transformed into an AOE division during pre mobilization and do not retain additional equipment.

LIN	Description	ALT 1 Quantity	ALT 3 Quantity	Difference
A21383	AERIAL RECVRY KIT	2		2
C11158	CARRIER, CP	19	3	16
C12155	FSIT-V	3		3
C89935	CNTRL COM TSQ-190(V)3	12	9	3
D40782	DIG MSG DEVICE GRP	3	3	0
D69050	DRUM, H2O		6	-6
D77692	DATA ANALY CEN	6	6	0
D82404	DECON APRTS	12	10	2
F57713	AVENGER	18		18
G58151	SMOKE GEN	18	18	0
G78306	60KW GEN	25		25
H94824	FARE		1	-1
J70228	ICTT	3		3
L28351	MKT	3		3
L76556	SCOOP LOADER		1	-1
M36543	MET STATION	3	3	0
P92030	H2O PUMP		4	-4
R57843	TAC SATCOM BASE VSC-7	3	3	0
S25379	SENS TTC-48(V)2	3	3	0
T00466	STINGER TRNG LAUNCHER	42		42
T07543	HMMWV W.SHELTER	3		3
T07679	HMMWV HVY	41		41
T12620	TANK ASSY, PETRLM		4	-4
T19101	TANK, ASSY H2O		4	-4

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

LIN	Description	ALT 1	ALT 3	Difference
		Quantity	Quantity	
T39586	HEMMT CGO	6		6
T41135	MTV CGO W/W	3		3
T48944	FORK LIFT		11	-11
T49119	FORK LIFT		3	-3
T49255	FORK LIFT		3	-3
T59278	HEMMT CGO	6	3	3
T60081	LMTV CGO	57		57
T61494	HMMWV CGO	23		23
T94709	MTV WRECKER	9		9
T96838	FLT BED TRL	15		15
W98825	H2O TRL	5		5
Z05088	MMS MET STATION	2	1	1
Z15752	JAVELIN	18	18	0
Z15940	CSSCS SYSTEM		1	-1
Z17296	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	7		7
Z17545	CMPTR SET, GENERAL	9	9	0
Z17744	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	2	1
Z26338	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL		7	-7
Z26402	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	2		2
Z27460	M2A3	30	30	0
Z27727	CONTAINER LIFT KIT		3	-3
Z36068	LMTV TRL	10		10
Z36272	3/4T TRL	27		27
Z36909	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL	3	11	-8
Z40669	MGH GEN	2	1	1
Z43728	MITT	3	2	1
Z46135	CHMCS SYS	6		6
Z59481	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL		3	-3
Z59617	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL		4	-4
Z59651	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL		3	-3
Z59685	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL		7	-7
Z62562	HMMWV EXP CAP	15		15
Z62630	HMMWV ARMD	18		18
Z78222	TGT ACQU SYS	3	3	0
Z88915	CMPTR SET, DIGITAL		3	-3
Z90712	MTV TRL	6	8	-2

<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>ALT 1 Quantity</b>	<b>ALT 3 Quantity</b>	<b>Difference</b>
Z94047	MTV POL	3		3





***TAB 6 ALTERNATIVE 1 DIRECT OPTEMPO METHODOLOGY***

Alternative 1 is a division base with three ERBs. The division base is decremented based on the equipment and capabilities inherent in the ERBs that is also present in the division base (e.g., signal, air defense, military police, chemical). The decrement is accomplished by identifying the equipment and capabilities within the ERBs and removing them from the division base.

A key point in the methodology is ensuring that units are computed with the correct OPTEMPO values. When the division base is active component and is decremented because of capabilities present in the ERBs, the decrement must be computed as active component. When the division base is ARNG, the division HHC is computed as active component, and the decrements are computed as ARNG. The ERBs are always computed as ARNG.

The following charts reflect the computations used to determine the direct OPTEMPO costs for alternative 1. The first chart shows the methodology used when the division base, to include the division HHC, is active component. The second chart shows the methodology when the division base (less the division HHC) is ARNG. The third chart shows the LINs used to decrement various units within the division base when selected items of equipment were (vice whole units) present in the ERBs.

The first segment of each chart shows the detailed methodology used for the direct OPTEMPO computations. The second segment of the chart shows the units that comprise the division base. This portion of the chart contains the standard requirements code (SRC) for the unit, a description of the unit, and a “notes” column showing any adjustments to the units. The final segment of the chart shows the composition of the ERBs by SRC, units description and quantity.



### Active Component Direct OPTEMPO Computations

1. Compute the Active Component ALO1/C1 cost for all units in the Division Base.
2. For the MI Bn, ADA Bn, and Div Cav Sqdrn, the following computation is made:
  - a. Compute the ALO1/C1 cost for the Battalion/Squadron.
  - b. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for subordinate 3 subordinate companies (e.g., 3 MI Cos (344397A000), 3 ADA Companies (44177L200) and 3 Div Cav Trps (17287L200))
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
3. For the Chemical Platoon, Signal Platoon, and Military Police Platoon in the ERBs, the following computations are made:
  - a. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the parent company/battalion.
  - b. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the respective units in the ERBs using the equipment listed on the sheet for the respective plts within the EBs
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base
4. The ERBs also include personnel and equipment from the HHT, DIV CAV SQDRN, the MSB and from the DIVARTY TAB. For these attachments, the following computations are made:
  - a. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the parent squadron/battalion.
  - b. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost the respective units in the ERBs using the equipment listed on the attached sheet for the respective plts and the AC average OPTEMPO cost per LIN.
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
5. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for all units in the ERBs.
6. Sum the costs for the Division Base (Steps 1-4) and the ERBs (Step 5).  
This is the total cost for the Alternative 1 Division with an AC Division Slice.
7. Subtract the cost for the 3 ERBs (see Alternative 2) from the total cost determine in Step 4. This is the marginal cost for Alternative 1.

**Division Base**

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
01302A000	HHC AV Bde, Hvy Div	
01305A000	Atk Helo Bn, Hvy Div	
01305A000	General Spt Avn Bn	
03157L200	Chem Co, Hvy Div	Less 3 Plts in EBs
05332L000	HHD EN Bde, Hvy Div	
06302L000	HHB DIVARTY, Hvy Div	Less 3 MET Secs in EBs
06395A000	MLRS Bn, Hvy Div	Less 3 Q-36 Secs in EBs
11065L400	6 Node Div Sig Bn	Less 3 Plts in Task Org Bdes
12113L100	Band	
17285L200	Div Cav Sqdn, Hvy Div	Less 3 Cav Trps/Spt Secs in EBs
19333L000	MP Co, Hvy Div	Less 3 Plts in EBs
34395A000	MI Bn (CEWI), Hvy Div	Less 3 Cos in EBs
44175L300	ADA Bn, Hvy Div	Less 3 Cos/MSC S Secs in EBs
63002L000	HHC/MMC, Spt Cmd, Hvy Div	
63135L000	MSB, Hvy Div	Less offsets in EBs
63885A400	DASB, Hvy Div	
87004A200	Div HHC	

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Qty</b>
05335L000	EN Bn, Hvy Div	3
06365A400	FA Bn 155SP Split	1
06365A500	FA Bn 155SP Split	2
07245L000	MX Bn	5
17375L000	AR Bn, HSB	4
17483L000	Cav Trp, HSB	3
34397A000	MI Co, HSB	3
44423A100	BSFV/AVENGER Co	3
87100L100	FSB (2X1)	1
87100L200	FSB (1X2)	2
87402L100	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	1
87402L200	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	2

**Alternative 3 ARNG Direct OPTEMPO Computations**

1. Compute the Active Component ALO1/C1 cost for the Division HHC (SRC 87004A200).
2. All other units in the Division Base are computed at ALO1/C1 for the ARNG.
3. For the MI Bn, ADA Bn, and Div Cav Sqdrn, the following computation is made:
  - a. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the Battalion/Squadron.
  - b. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for subordinate 3 subordinate companies (e.g., 3 MI Cos (344397A000), 3 ADA Companies (44177L200) and 3 Div Cav Trps (17287L200))
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
4. For the Chemical Platoon, Signal Platoon, and Military Police Platoon in the ERBs, the following computations are made:
  - a. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the parent company/battalion.
  - b. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost the respective units in the ERBs using the equipment listed on the attached sheet for the respective plts.
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
5. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for all units in the ERBs.
6. Sum the costs for the Division Base (Steps 1- 4) and the ERBs (Step 5). This is the Total Cost for the Alternative 1 Division with an AC HQ and an RC Division Slice.
7. Subtract the cost for the 3 ERBs (see Alternative 2) from the total cost determined in Step 5. This is the marginal cost for Alternative 3 with an RC Division Slice.

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Notes</b>
01302A000	HHC AV Bde, Hvy Div	
01305A000	Atk Helo Bn, Hvy Div	
01305A000	General Spt Avn Bn	
03157L200	Chem Co, Hvy Div	Less 3 Plts in EBs
05332L000	HHD EN Bde, Hvy Div	
06302L000	HHB DIVARTY, Hvy Div	Less 3 MET Secs in EBs
06395A000	MLRS Bn, Hvy Div	Less 3 Q-36 Secs in EBs
11065L400	6 Node Div Sig Bn	Less 3 Plts in Task Org Bdes
12113L100	Band	
17285L200	Div Cav Sqdn, Hvy Div	Less 3 Cav Trps/Spt Secs in EBs
19333L000	MP Co, Hvy Div	Less 3 Plts in EBs
34395A000	MI Bn (CEWI), Hvy Div	Less 3 Cos in EBs
44175L300	ADA Bn, Hvy Div	Less 3 Cos/MSC S Secs in EBs
63002L000	HHC/MMC, Spt Cmd, Hvy Div	
63135L000	MSB, Hvy Div	Less offsets in EBs
63885A400	DASB, Hvy Div	
87004A200	Div HHC	

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Qty</b>
05335L000	EN Bn, Hvy Div	3
06365A400	FA Bn 155SP Split	2
06365A500	FA Bn 155SP Split	1
07245L000	MX Bn	5
17375L000	AR Bn, HSB	4
17483L000	Cav Trp, HSB	3
34397A000	MI Co, HSB	3
44423A100	BSFV/AVENGER Co	3
87100L100	FSB (2X1)	1
87100L200	FSB (1X2)	2
87402L100	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	1
87402L200	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	2

### Division Base Adjustments

As previously described, the division base contains certain capabilities and equipment also present to varying degrees in the ERBs. In this alternative, the division base is decremented as required to eliminate the duplicity. The table below shows the decremented units within the division base (by SRC), the types of equipment removed from the respective units (by LIN and description), and the quantities for each item. In some cases, there are also notes used to describe where the equipment is located within the ERBs. For each LIN, the CEAC direct OPTEMPO factor (either active component or ARNG) is applied. The total OPTEMPO cost is then determined by summing the costs for all LINs and subtracted from the direct OPTEMPO cost for the division base.

SRC	LIN	Description	Quantity
<b>03157L200</b>	<b>Chemical Company (Chem Plt per Bde HHC)</b>		
	T07679	HMMWW HVY	9
	T19033	TANK, H20	18
	T61494	HMMWW CGO	3
	V14744	TANK, H20	9
	Z04910	M22 CH3M ALRM	13
	Z21102	DECON APRTS	12
	Z31551	DECON APRTS	9
	Z36068	LMTV TRL	9
	Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	9
	Z40430	LMTV CGO	9
	Z48015	SMK GEN	4
	Z93212	NBC RECON VEH	4
	Z94047	MTV POL	9
<b>11065L400</b>	<b>Signal Battalion (1 Sig Plt/C-E Staff per Bde)</b>		
	G42170	10KW GEN	18
	G42238	5KW GEN	18
	L69306	LOS RAD TRC-190(V)1	15
	R33351	RAU TRC-191	3
	S38172	SENS TTC-48C(V)4	3
	T07679	HMMWW HVY	36
	T61494	HMMWW CGO	3
	T61562	HMMWW CGO W/W	18
	Z12353	SENS TTC-48(V)1	9
	Z36272	3/4T TRL	18
	Z40439	MTV CGO	3
	Z70011	NCS TSQ-158(V)2	3

SRC	LIN	Description	Quantity
<b>19333L000</b>	<b>MP Company (1 MP Plt per Bde HHC)</b>		
	Z36272	3/4T TRL	9
	Z62630	HMMWV ARMT	21
<b>06302L000</b>	<b>HHC, DivArty (1 MET Sec per FA Bn per Bde)</b>		
	T07679	HMMWV HVY	3
	W98825	H2O TRL	1
	Z05088	MMS MET STN	1
	Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	2
	Z40669	MHG GEN	1
<b>06395A000</b>	<b>MLRS Bn (1 Q-36 Sec per Bde)</b>		
	G35981	10 KW GEN	3
	T07679	HMMWV HVY	6
	T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	3
	Z52571	Q36 RADAR	3
	Z60951	LMTV CGO W/W	3
<b>17286L000</b>	<b>Div Cav Sqdrn (1 med &amp; spt sec from HHT attached per Bde)</b>		
	D11538	CARRIER, CP	6
	T39518	HEMTT CGO	9
	T87243	HEMTT POL	12
<b>44175L300</b>	<b>ADA Bn (1 MSC S Sec per ADA Bty per Bde)</b>		
	T07679	HMMWV HVY	5
	T61494	HMMWV CGO	5
	T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	3
<b>63135L000</b>	<b>MSB, DISCOM</b>		
	S70027	SEMI TRL, FLT BED	47
	S70859	SEMI TRL, HET	12
	T388444	HMMWV AMBULANCE	6
	T59048	HET TRACTOR	12
	T61494	HMMWV CGO	10
	W95537	3/4T TRL	3
	Z36272	3/4T TRL	6
	Z40430	LMTV CGO	3
	Z40439	MTV CGO	18
	Z85341	MTV TRACTOR	25
	Z93626	MTV W/MHE	6



***TAB 7 TO APPENDIX H ALTERNATIVE 2 DIRECT OPTEMPO  
METHODOLOGY***

Alternative 2 has no division base, only a division HHC which is always active component. The direct OPTEMPO for alternative 2, therefore is based on the computations for a single unit and is determined by applying USACEAC cost factors to the respective LINs comprising the stylized division HHC. For each LIN in the division HHC, an active component Army wide cost factor is obtained and multiplied by the respective LIN quantity to yield a total OPTEMPO cost by LIN. These LIN costs are then summed together to obtain the total direct OPTEMPO cost for alternative 2. As previously discussed, changes to the LINs comprising the division HHC or changes to the quantities for each LIN alters the OPTEMPO cost for alternative 2.



***TAB 8 TO APPENDIX H ALTERNATIVE 3 DIRECT OPTEMPO  
METHODOLOGY***

Alternative 3 is an AOE with task organized maneuver brigades. The task organized brigades have elements similar to those found in the ERBs - signal, air defense, military police, chemical, etc. The task organization is accomplished by removing whole elements (sections, platoons, and company equivalents) from the respective parent organizations within the division base and assigning them to the maneuver brigades. This differs slightly from alternative 1. In alternative 1, the elements within the ERBs may or may not be the same as the elements within the division base and the division base is incrementally decremented. In alternative 3, the division base is decremented by whole units.

A key point in the methodology for alternative 3 is ensuring that all units are computed with the correct OPTEMPO values. When the division base is active component and is decremented, the decrement must be computed as active component. When these decrements are then added to the maneuver brigades, they are added as ARNG. When the division base is ARNG, the division HHC is computed as active component, and the decrements are computed as ARNG and added to the task organized brigades as ARNG. The task organized brigades are always computed as ARNG.

The following charts reflect the computations used to determine the direct OPTEMPO costs for alternative 3. The first chart shows the methodology used when the division base, to include the division HHC, is active component. The second chart shows the methodology when the division base (less the division HHC) is ARNG. The third chart shows the decrements within the division base and added to the task organized brigades.



**Active Component Direct OPTEMPO Computations**

1. Compute the Active Component ALO1/C1 cost for all units in the Division Base.
2. For the MI Bn, ADA Bn, and Div Cav Sqdrn, the following computation is made:
  - a. Compute the ALO1/C1 cost for the Battalion/Squadron.
  - b. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the respective units in the Tasked Organized Brigades (e.g., the 3 MI Cos, the 3 ADA Cos, and the 3 Div Cav Trps)
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
3. For the Chemical Platoon, Signal Platoon, and Military Police Platoon in the Tasked Organized Brigades, the following computations are made:
  - a. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the parent company/battalion.
  - b. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the respective units in the Tasked Organized Brigades using the equipment listed on the attached sheet for the respective plts.
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
4. The Tasked Organized Brigades also include personnel and equipment from the HHT, DIV CAV SQDRN and from the DIVARTY TAB. For these attachments, the following computations are made:
  - a. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the parent squadron/battalion.
  - b. Compute the AC ALO1/C1 cost for the respective units in the Tasked Organized Brigades using the equipment listed on the attached sheet for the respective plts.
  - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
5. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for all units in the Task Organized Brigades, to include units from the Division Base.
  - a. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the respective units in the Tasked Organized Brigades (e.g., the tank Bns, the MX Bns, the 3 MI Cos, the 3 ADA Cos, and the 3 Div Cav Trps)
  - b. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the equipment attached from the parent company/squadron/battalion using the equipment shown for each unit on the attached sheet and an average ARNG OPTEMPO for each LIN.
  - c. Add the costs in "b" to the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed the Task Organized Brigades.
6. Sum the costs from the Division Base (Steps 1-4) and the Task Organized Brigades (Step 5).

This is the total cost for the Alternative 3 Division with an AC Division Slice.
7. Subtract the cost for the 3 ERBs (see Alternative 2) from the total cost determined in Step 4. This is the marginal cost for Alternative 3.

**Division Base**

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Notes</b>
01302A000	HHC AV Bde, Hvy Div	
01305A000	Atk Helo Bn, Hvy Div	
01305A000	General Spt Avn Bn	
03157L200	Chem Co, Hvy Div	
05332L000	HHD EN Bde, Hvy Div	
06302L000	HHB DIVARTY, Hvy Div	
06395A000	MLRS Bn, Hvy Div	3 Q-36 Secs in Task Org Bdes
11065L400	6 Node Div Sig Bn	3 Nodal Plts in Task Org Bdes
12113L100	Band	
17285L200	Div Cav Sqdn, Hvy Div	3 Cav Trps in Task Org Bdes
19333L000	MP Co, Hvy Div	3 DS Plts in Task Org Bdes
34395A000	MI Bn (CEWI), Hvy Div	3 DS Cos in Task Org Bdes
44175L300	ADA Bn, Hvy Div	3 DS Cos in Task Org Bdes
63002L000	HHC/MMC, Spt Cmd, Hvy Div	
63135L000	MSB, Hvy Div	
63885A400	DASB, Hvy Div	
87004A200	Div HHC	

**Task Organized Brigades**

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
05335L000	EN Bn, Hvy Div	3
06365A400	FA Bn 155SP Split	2
06365A500	FA Bn 155SP Split	1
07245L000	MX Bn	4
17375L000	AR Bn, HSB	5
17287L000	Div Cav Trp	3
34397A000	Div MI Co (DS)	3
44177L300	Div DS Co (BSFV/AVENGER)	3
63005L100	FSB (2X1)	1
63005L300	FSB (1X2)	2
87402L100	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	1
87402L200	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	2

### ARNG Direct OPTEMPO Computations

1. Compute the Active Component ALO1/C1 cost for the Division HHC (SRC 87004A200).
2. All other units in the Division Base are computed at ALO1/C1 for the ARNG.
3. For the MI Bn, ADA Bn, and Div Cav Sqdrn, the following computation is made:
  - a. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the Battalion/Squadron.
  - b. Subtract the costs determined for the respective Companies and Troops in the Task Organized Brigades from "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
4. For the Chemical Platoon, Signal Platoon, and Military Police Platoon in the Tasked Organized Brigades, the following computations are made:
  - a. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the parent company/battalion.
  - b. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the respective units in the Tasked Organized Brigades using the equipment listed on the attached sheet for the respective plts.
    - c. Subtract the costs in "b" from the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed to the Division Base.
5. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for all units in the Task Organized Brigades, to include units from the Division Base.
  - a. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost the respective units in the Tasked Organized Brigades.
  - b. Compute the ARNG ALO1/C1 cost for the equipment attached from the parent company/squadron/battalion using the equipment shown for each unit on the attached sheet and an average ARNG OPTEMPO for each LIN.
    - c. Add the costs in "b" to the cost determined in "a". These are the costs attributed the Task Organized Brigades.
6. Sum the costs for for the Division Base (Steps 1- 4) and the Task Organized Brigades (Step 5).

This is the total cost for the Alternative 3 Division with an AC HQ and an RC Division Slice.
7. Subtract the cost for the 3 ERBs (see Alternative 2) from the total cost determined in Step 6. This is the marginal cost for Alternative 3 with an RC Division Slice.

**Division Base**

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Notes</b>
01302A000	HHC AV Bde, Hvy Div	
01305A000	Atk Helo Bn, Hvy Div	
01305A000	General Spt Avn Bn	
03157L200	Chem Co, Hvy Div	
05332L000	HHD EN Bde, Hvy Div	
06302L000	HHB DIVARTY, Hvy Div	
06395A000	MLRS Bn, Hvy Div	3 Q-36 Secs in Task Org Bdes
11065L400	6 Node Div Sig Bn	3 Nodal Plts in Task Org Bdes
12113L100	Band	
17285L200	Div Cav Sqdn, Hvy Div	3 Cav Trps in Task Org Bdes
19333L000	MP Co, Hvy Div	3 DS Plts in Task Org Bdes
34395A000	MI Bn (CEWI), Hvy Div	3 DS Cos in Task Org Bdes
44175L300	ADA Bn, Hvy Div	3 DS Cos in Task Org Bdes
63002L000	HHC/MMC, Spt Cmd, Hvy Div	
63135L000	MSB, Hvy Div	
63885A400	DASB, Hvy Div	
87004A200	Div HHC	

**Task Organized Brigade**

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
05335L000	EN Bn, Hvy Div	3
06365A400	FA Bn 155SP Split	2
06365A500	FA Bn 155SP Split	1
07245L000	MX Bn	4
17375L000	AR Bn, HSB	5
17287L000	Div Cav Trp	3
34397A000	Div MI Co (DS)	3
44177L300	Div DS Co (BSFV/AVENGER)	3
63005L100	FSB (2X1)	1
63005L300	FSB (1X2)	2
87402L100	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	1
87402L200	HHC, Hvy Sep Bde	2



### Alternative 3 Division Base Adjustments

As previously described, the division base is decremented and equipment and personnel are assigned to the task organized brigades. The table below shows the decremented units within the division base (by SRC), the types of equipment removed from the respective units (by LIN and description), and the quantities for each item. In some cases, there are also notes used to describe where the equipment is located within the task organized brigades. For each LIN, the CEAC direct OPTEMPO factor (either active component or ARNG) is applied. The total OPTEMPO cost is then determined by summing the costs for all LINs and subtracted from the direct OPTEMPO cost for the division base.

SRC	LIN	Description	Quantity
03157L200	<b>Chemical Company (1 Decon Plt per Bde)</b>		
	T07679	HMMWV HVY	9
	T19033	TANK, H20	18
	T61494	HMMWV CGO	3
	V14744	TANK, H20	9
	Z04910	M22 CH3M ALRM	9
	Z21102	DECON APRTS	12
	Z31551	DECON APRTS	9
	Z36068	LMTV TRL	9
	Z36204	1 1/4T TRL	9
	Z40430	LMTV CGO	9
	Z94047	MTV POL	9
	11065L400	<b>Signal Battalion (1 Nodal Plt per Bde)</b>	
G42170		10KW GEN	6
G42238		5KW GEN	11
L69306		LOS RAD TRC-190(V)1	5
L69442		LOS RAD TRC-190(V)3	4
R33351		RAU TRC-191	2
S38172		SENS TTC-48C(V)4	1
T07679		HMMWV HV	20
T61494		HMMWV CGO	3
T61562		HMMWV CGO W/W	6
Z12353		SENS TTC-48C(V)1	3
Z36373		3/4T TRL	9

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<b>SRC</b>	<b>LIN</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
<b>19333L000</b>	<b>MP Company (1 DS Plt per Bde)</b>		
	Z36272	3/4T TRL	9
	Z62630	HMMWV ARMT	21
<b>06395A000</b>	<b>MLRS Bn (1 Q-36 Section per Bde)</b>		
	G35981	10 KW GEN	3
	T07679	HMMWV HVY	6
	T61562	HMMWV CGO W/W	3
	Z52571	Q36 RADAR	3
	Z60951	LMTV CGO W/W	3
<b>17286L000</b>	<b>Div Cav Sqdrn (1 med &amp; spt sec from HHT attached per Bde)</b>		
	D11538	CARRIER, CP	6
	T39518	HEMTT CGO	9
	T87243	HEMTT POL	12

**TAB 9 TO APPENDIX H EAD/EAC REQUIREMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVES 1 & 3**

The following table displays the EAD/EAC doctrinal CS/CSS units (e.g., the “heavy division slice”) required to support *a single division* for alternatives 1 and 3 when either alternative is employed in a theater of operations as a whole division. The table (derived by FDD from TAA05) shows the types of units required (both by SRC and by unit description), the total number of type units required for a single division, and the total size by type unit (both number of personnel and gross weight in short tons). The grand total gives the number of type units required, the total number of personnel required to support a single division, and the gross weight of the EAD/EAC CS/CSS units needed to support a single division.

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Number of Units Required</b>	<b>Total Weight in Short Tons</b>	<b>Total Personnel</b>
01385A200	Bn Attack Helicopter (AH-64)	1	804	309
01427A100	Co ATS Bn	1	159	36
03437L000	Co Chemical (Smoke Gen)	1	204	112
03467L000	Co Chemical (Smoke/Decon)	1	974	138
05415L000	Bn Combat Engineer	1	4123	653
05423L000	Co CSE (Engr Bn)	2	3284	358
05435L200	Bn Combat Engr (Corps)	2	4480	958
05493L100	Co Engr Flt Asslt Bridge (Rib)	1	811	179
05510LA00	Tm Engr FFTG - FFTG HQ	11	66	44
05510LB00	Tm Engr FFTG - Fire Trk	27	297	162
05510LC00	Tm Engr FFTG - Water Trk	32	736	192
05520LE00	Tm Well Drilling	2	128	20
05540LF00	Det Terrain Analysis	1	4	6
05540LI00	Det Terrain Dir Spt	1	30	2
06402L200	HQB FA Brigade w/ TACFIRE	2	580	232
06455L200	Bn FA 155 SP (3X8)	6	17802	3258
08447L100	Co Med Air Ambl (UH-1V)	1	330	130
08449L000	Co Med Ground Ambl	1	297	75
08457A000	Co Med Area Support	1	132	80

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Number of Units Required</b>	<b>Total Weight in Short Tons</b>	<b>Total Personnel</b>
08478L000	Co Med Dental Svcs	1	129	87
08498L000	Det Med Prev Med (Sanitation)	1	15	11
08518LA00	Tm Med Forward Surgical	3	87	60
08567LA00	Tm Med Cmbt Stress Cntrl	1	54	44
08588LA00	Tm Med Prostho	1	14	5
08495A100	Bn Med Hospital Corps	1	860	494
09484L000	Co ORD Ammo DS (PLS/MOAD)	1	1122	149
09510LA00	Tm BSTF Aug (DS/GS)	1	37	5
10426L000	HHD QM Petrol Supply Bn	6	77	56
10427L000	Co QM Petrol Supply	2	2692	388
10570LC00	Tm QM Water Purif (12000 gph)	1	196	16
12426L100	HHD Personnel Svcs Bn	1	231	27
12427L000	HHD Personnel Svcs Det	5	100	240
12440L000	Co Postal	1	110	73
12447L000	HHD Modular	1	5	5
14423L000	Det Finance	5	75	105
14426L100	HHD Finance Spt Cmd	1	22	29
19283L100	Det MP (CID) (DSE) (Hvy Div)	1	14	11
20017L000	Det Mil Hist	1	3	3
27512LB00	Tm Legal Svcs	1	1	27
27512LD00	Tm Court-Martial Defense	2	0	10
27512LE00	Tm Senior Military	2	0	12
27512LF00	Tm Military Judge	2	0	4
33708L000	Co Psyops Tactical	1	107	79
41705L000	Bn CA (General Purpose)	1	107	141
42414L000	Co QM Fld Svcs	1	349	120
42507LC00	Tm Arid Envr Water	1	30	25
43209L000	Co Maintenance (Non-Div) DS	5	5075	1000
43509LB00	Tm Engr Equipment Repair	2	28	18
43509LF00	Tm Radar Repair	1	0	2
43509LG00	Tm Wheeled Veh Repair	3	18	21
43509LS00	Tm FA Maint Spt	2	188	4
43549LG00	Plt QM/Chem Repair	2	48	72
45500LA00	Tm Public Affairs	1	8	8

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

<b>SRC</b>	<b>Unit Description</b>	<b>Number of Units Required</b>	<b>Total Weight in Short Tons</b>	<b>Total Personnel</b>
55580LA00	Tm Mvmnt Cntrl	1	3	3
55580LB00	Tm Mvmnt Cntrl	1	4	5
55580LC00	Tm Mvmnt Cntrl	2	8	14
55580LH00	Tm Mvmnt Cntrl	2	6	8
55719L100	Co Med-Lt Truck	1	1010	164
55727L100	Co Med Trk 40 ft Cgo	1	1901	169
55728L100	Med Trk 20 ft Cgo	3	5775	522
55728L200	Med Trk 5000 gal	4	4864	680
55728L300	Med Trk PLS	4	7596	568
55817L100	Co Cgo Transfer	3	1236	270
63422L000	HHC Support Grp (Corps)	1	130	116
63426L000	HHD Corps Support Bn	1	111	57
63885A200	Bn Avn Spt	1	2635	594
<b>TOTAL</b>				
		<b>177</b>	<b>72,322</b>	<b>13,465</b>



## **Appendix J IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**


This appendix captures the implementation issues captured as a part of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study. Although these issues were not a part of the original study plan, they are documented in this report to provide a firm basis for implementation. Furthermore, these issues highlight the obstacles that must be overcome to ensure the smooth and successful implementation of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division concept.






**J.1 FORSCOM ERB ALIGNMENTS**

Each of the FORSCOM organizational designs offers both advantages and disadvantages. The following five charts (Figures J-1 through J-5) show each organization design and its respective advantages and disadvantages. In addition, each chart shows a proposed location for the division HHC, the power projection platforms (PPP)/power support platforms (PSP) used by the division, and the warfighting center (WFC) used by units comprising the division in the event of mobilization.



**Figure J-1 Southeast Division**



**Figure J-2 Mid-America Division**




Figure J-3 Central Division




Figure J-4 Northwest Division




Figure J-5 Light Division East

## J.2 ARNG ERB ALIGNMENTS

The following three charts (Figures J-6 through J-8) show the ARNG compositions for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. Each chart shows a proposed location for the division HHC, the power projection platforms (PPP)/power support platforms (PSP) used by the division, and the warfighting center (WFC) used by units comprising the division in the event of mobilization.




Figure J-6 Central Division




Figure J-7 Southeast Division




Figure J-8 Southern Division

### J.3 AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION HHC

In its current configuration, the division HHC for Alternative 2 is comprised of approximately 302 personnel in a TDA organization. Four excursions (seven designs) were examined as potential substitutes for this design: augmentation of an existing garrison; augmentation of a CONUSA; a reduced TOE AOE HHC; and an integrated division HHC.

#### J.3.1 Combining an Alternative 2 HHC with an Existing Garrison

There are several locations that can potentially be used to house the ARNG Division HHC. However, the most logical locations are: Forts Riley and Carson. It was suggested that it would be wasteful to generate another layer of command while there currently exist two active Army installations, Ft Riley and Ft Carson, which are tenant posts commanded by Major Generals. To capitalize on the availability of personnel and post support and reduce the number of personnel required to implement an AC/ARNG Integrated Division, the two general officers could fill two roles - that of post commander and the commander of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. Discussions and coordination with the commanders at Forts Riley and Carson highlighted the need to separate the installation from the division warfighting responsibilities. Figures J-9 and J-10 illustrate the organizations required to supplement each garrison and execute the

warfighting responsibilities for a division HHC under Alternative 2 for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. TAB 1 contains responses from the commanders at Forts Carson and Riley to a request for review of the concept and the organizations required.




Figure J-9 Fort Carson Garrison




Figure J-10 Fort Riley Garrison

Figure J-11 shows a reduced division HHC for Alternative 2. It consists of 40 personnel and is based on the assumption that the garrison commands at the respective installations are able to provide most post mobilization support and that only a small staff is needed to conduct pre mobilization activities. In separate briefings, both post commanders indicated that the concept of augmenting the garrison was a good idea, but the assumption that the garrison could provide most of the support is erroneous, and that a larger Alternative 2 HHC is required.




Figure J-11 Division HHC Augmentation to a Garrison

### J.3.2 Combining an Alternative 2 HHC with a CONUSA

Another suggestion indicated that all resources required to administer and support post mobilization training for the ERBs are already in place within the CONUSAs. Therefore, if a dedicated, peacetime AC command and control headquarters is required, it should be staffed to the level required to only administer and oversee pre mobilization training for the ERBs. Figure J-12 reflects a strawman Alternative 2 division HHC that has been reduced to handle pre mobilization training requirements only.




Figure J-12 Alternative 2 Division HHC under a CONUSA

J.3.3 Decrementing an AOE Division HHC for the Alternative 2 HHC

One of the questions asked of the division HHC for Alternative 2 is why it is a TDA organization and not a TOE organization. The suggestion has been advanced that if Alternative 2 is the recommended choice for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, it may serve as an interim design, leading to later conversion into an Alternative 1 or Alternative 3 division design. If this is the case, it might be best to have AOE division headquarters (modified) in place and ready to assume the mission. Figure J-13 depicts a decremented AOE HHC that could possibly be used to satisfy the requirement. The HHC reflects staff elements that have been zeroed out as their particular capabilities are not required in a peacetime training environment for Alternative 2 and indicates the required TDA augmentation to conduct the training mission that can not be accommodated by the AOE design.






Figure J-13 Alternative 2 Modified AOE TOE Division HHC

J.3.4 A Decremental AOE Division HHC for the Alternative 2 HHC

The Secretary of the Army letter of 23 May 1996 stated that the division HHC would be “an active component division headquarters of 250-300 soldiers.” This requirement, however, can be met with a mixture of active and reserve component (both ARNG and USAR) soldiers. For example, it may be possible to fill some positions such as the division chief of staff, division operations officer, or division intelligence officer with Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel or with ARNG or USAR personnel who only drill on the weekend.

Other suggestions indicated there is a further opportunity to achieve AC/ARNG integration within the proposed integrated division headquarters. Figure J-14 depicts one such approach. The organizations depicted in Figure J-14 are at ALO 3. The vacant positions, in turn, can be filled by drilling Guardsmen which, at time of mobilization, will bring the organization back to full ALO 1. Within the ALO 3 organization, there is even further opportunity for integration. An analysis of remaining positions can be performed with the intent of identifying positions that could be filled with AGR personnel. The final organization, then, would consist of a mix of AC, AGR, and drilling guardsmen. Every space filled by an AGR or drilling Guardsman reduces the number of AC personnel required (which reduces the GFRE impact) or which can be inserted into the HHCs of the division MSCs, contributing even further to integration.




Figure J-14 Integrated Alternative 2 Division HHC (ALO 3)

**J.4 IMPACTS ON TRAINING SUPPORT OF ERB SELECTION**

The selection of which ERBs will comprise the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions is a distinct issue; however, once units have been selected to be part of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division(s), the impact of their selection on the training support mechanisms on which they relied as ERBs must then be assessed. These impacts can be categorized as:

- Training site(s) availability and capacities;
- Garrison support augmentation;
- Opposing force (OPFOR) availability and capabilities;
- Trainers, both individual and unit;
- Training support personnel and units; and,
- Transportation of the unit(s).

*Training site(s)* must have sufficient maneuver space, combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX) space, gunnery ranges, and logistical capabilities to allow different types of training events to occur with virtual simultaneity.

*Garrison support augmentation* will be required because the tenant AC units at the respective installations which might normally be expected to support training will deploy prior to the arrival of an AC/ARNG Integrated Division. This

requirement can be addressed by the prior activation of the USAR Garrison Support Units (GSU). These units, and the installations which they support, are shown in the following table:

Table J-1 USAR GSUs and Supported Installations

INSTALLATION	GSU	LOCATION
Fort Benning	2145th	Nashville, TN
Fort Bliss	5035th	Fort Bliss, TX
Fort Bragg	2125th	East Point, GA
Fort Campbell	3397th	Chattanooga, TN
Fort Carson	5025th	Denver, CO
Fort Dix	1079th	Fort Dix, NJ
Fort Drum	1215th	Willow Grove, PA
Fort Eustis	2174th	Salem, VA
Fort Hood	4003d	Barling, AR
Fort Lewis	2122d	Seattle, WA
Fort McCoy	6015th	Chicago, IL
Fort Polk	4013th	Bossier City, LA
Fort Riley	6025th	St. Louis, MO
Fort Sill	5045th	Fort Sill, OK
Fort Stewart	3220th	W. Palm Beach, FL
Camp Roberts	6045th	San Jose, CA
Fort Buchanan	65th ARCOM	Fort Buchanan, PR

*OPFOR* is essential for the synchronization training portions of the post mobilization training strategy. The *OPFOR* must be qualified and dedicated to its purpose, freeing the unit being trained from the need to divert some of its own resources.

*Trainers* provide the actual training, observe and record the results of the training, and facilitate post-action reviews. They also act as controllers for field exercises.

*Training support personnel* provide the general support functions ancillary to the training itself (e.g., staffing ranges, tending targets, and support for the trainers.)

*Transportation* of the unit(s) from their respective home stations to their respective mobilization stations, and onward to their assigned WFCs will be a factor insofar as the distances involved for movement of personnel and equipment impacts the training strategy timetable. For instance, the inclusion of the 30<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (NCARNG) could, under current arrangements, involve its movement from its various home stations to Fort Bragg for mobilization, and onward to its WFC at Yakima Firing Center in Washington state. These movements consume considerable amounts of time and resources. This cost could be mitigated through the use of prepositioned equipment at WFCs and the realignment of mobilization stations and WFCs after the Integration Divisions are formed.

Individually and collectively, these factors determine the degree of stress placed on existing facilities, procedures and mechanisms, which in turn influence the adjustments necessary to reduce or eliminate the stress. The precise degree of stress varies according to the unique situations of the selected units comprising the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions. Thus, any implementation planning process must include a determination of how these factors will emerge. In summary, while these factors do not have a *decisive* role in determining which units are included in the divisions, these factors must be explicitly and rigorously examined as part of the implementation planning.

***TAB 1 TO APPENDIX J FORT CARSON AND FORT RILEY INPUT  
DOCUMENTS TO CONCEPT STUDY.***

On 7 February 1997 and 10 February 1997, the Study Director for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study visited Forts Carson, Colorado and Riley, Kansas. The purpose of these visits was to discuss the concept for AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC that would provide training and readiness oversight for three ERBs and potentially operate a WFC during post mobilization. This TAB contains the responses from each installation to the concept.



AFZC-DT-P

28 Feb 97

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, GA 30330 ATTN: AFOP-TRP (Mr. Chuck Hyder)

FOR Director, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Force Design Directorate, Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027 ATTN: ATCD-F (LTC Twohig)

SUBJECT: AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC Study

1. Purpose. To provide Fort Carson's analysis of the resource requirements for an integrated AC/ARNG division headquarters.

2. General. On 7 Feb 97, a team from FORSCOM and TRADOC presented a concept for a division headquarters that would provide training and readiness oversight for three Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades, and potentially operate a Warfighting Center (WFC) during the post mobilization phase. Fort Carson is being considered as a possible location for an AC/ARNG division HHC; consequently, the team solicited input from the Fort Carson staff on the adequacy of the proposed organization (Encl 1). Enclosures 2-5 detail the specific recommendations of the primary staff sections at Fort Carson (G1-G4 or their TDA equivalent). Each recommendation includes resource considerations based on a stand alone MTOE HHC and for a HHC incorporated into the current Fort Carson TDA.

3. Assumptions.

a. The division HHC would not be required to act as an operational headquarters for contingency, combat, or security and stability operations. It might be required to deploy during the post mobilization phase to operate a WFC or to assist one or more of its ERBs with its post mobilization training; consequently, there must be sufficient manpower in the TDA or MTOE to ensure mission accomplishment.

b. Resourcing estimates were based on the assumption that the division HHC would perform the following functions:

(1) Prepare division orders for CPXs, JANUS exercises, FTXs, JRTC and NTC rotations.

AFZC-DT-P

SUBJECT: AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC Study

(2) Deploy/operate a division tactical and main CP (DTAC, DMAIN) for C3 of brigade exercises/annual training.

(3) Conduct mobilization planning and exercise oversight of brigade post mobilization training plans.

(4) Conduct liaison with appropriate theaters to ensure brigades' METL and training are properly aligned with their wartime mission.

(5) Deploy liaison elements for brigade weekend drills.

(6) Receive and analyze brigade readiness reports.

(7) Prepare training guidance, receive annual training briefings, and coordinate training schedules and the master calendar.

(8) Conduct training and readiness evaluations and command inspections.

(9) Coordinate force structure and force modernization issues.

(10) Perform comptroller functions.

4. Concerns.

a. The division HHC must be structured to ensure adequate branch/MOS representation across all the battlefield operating systems.

b. If the division HHC organization is incorporated into the existing Fort Carson TDA, it cannot be assumed that large manpower savings will be achieved vice a separate MTOE HHC. While some functions may be duplicated, the overall workload of that function will greatly increase. The geographic dispersion of the brigades will greatly increase the time required to perform many functions beyond what occurs in a normal division.

c. The HHC must be equipped with command and control vehicles, radios, and other systems, such as the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and the Unit Level Logistics System-S4 (ULLS-S4) to meet the requirements of para. 3 b. above. It must also be manned with appropriate personnel to maintain this equipment.



AFZC-DT-P

SUBJECT: AC/ARNG Integrated Division HHC Study

5. The POC for this action at Fort Carson is MAJ Tovo, DSN 883-1361 or commercial (719) 524-1361.

5 Encls

1. Division HHC MTOE Draft,  
(TRADOC produced (**Removed from Study**))
2. G1/AG Evaluation
3. G2/ISD Evaluation
4. G3/DPTM Evaluation
5. G4/DOL Evaluation

/Original Signed/

EDWARD T. BUCKLEY JR

Colonel, GS

Chief of Staff

CF:

Cdr, III Corps ATTN: G-3

### **G-1 Section Requirements**

1. The following provides the G1 recommended element for a stand alone HHC. The staffing represented below is sufficient to staff one Tactical Personnel Operations Center (DMAIN) and three Brigade Support Cells (MTS Teams). Please note that this is an increase of 11 positions from the original draft FORSCOM MTOE. We recommend adding five additional enlisted personnel clerks in the G1 Strength Management cell (75H1O), one Administrative Specialist (71L1O) for the Equal Opportunity Office, one Warrant Officer to the Division Automation Section (251A, SWO), and the inclusion of four personnel for a G1 Plans/MOB Cell (AG MAJ, 75H5O, 96B2O, 75H2O).
2. The G1 Strength Management Cell is critical to providing the prerequisite expertise in the BOSS function of manning. This section represents the major focus in the G1 arena. The additional clerks provide the required manpower to support three Brigades.
3. A G1/Plans/MOB cell consisting of an AG Major, Senior Personnel NCO, Intel NCO, and a Junior Personnel Sergeant are required to provide overall supervision and execution for G1 plans, exercises, and mobilization.
4. The Warrant officer addition to the Automation Cell is critical to the training and programming functions of that section not only for the explicit use for the G1, but for the assistance rendered supported Brigades in creating mobilization and deployment tracking tools.
5. Should the HHC be incorporated into the current Fort Carson TDA, the same total number of personnel would be required to perform this mission. While there may be some overlap of function, the additional workload incurred would necessitate the increased manpower.
5. From the equipment standpoint, the Divisional G1 would require an increase of two radio systems (SINCGARS or VRC).
6. The POC for this action at Fort Carson is MAJ Badger, DSN 691-6538.

**G-2 Section Requirements**

1. The following illustrates two options for an active component intelligence (G2) element (non-deployable), whose purpose would be providing pre and post mobilization training support and staff oversight at the brigade level and below.

2. **Option 1, Stand alone organization:** Listed below is a stand alone intelligence element assuming Fort Carson has no existing assets for augmentation in support of the training effort, which is the present situation. The configuration represents a realistic training package for brigade level operations and missions with all personnel involved in the effort as trainers. Guidance received from the III CORPS G2 recommended putting the emphasis on personnel who can work all-source intelligence, collection management and the IPB process. Per a phone conversation with the MI Branch Manager it was found that although it will be difficult to support the ACofS G2 position with a LTC, it would be more realistic than establishing and supporting a MAJ/04 requirement.


ACofS G2 LTC/05 35D00	TOTAL = 8
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER MAJ/04 35G00	<b>BRIGADE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CELL (3)</b>
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CPT/03 35D00	
INTELLIGENCE SENIOR MSG/E-8 96B50	INTELLIGENCE OFFICER CPT/03 35D00 (3)
INTELLIGENCE NCO SSG/E-6 96B30	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST SSG/E-6 96B30 (3)
INTELLIGENCE ANALYST SGT/E-5 96B20 (x2)	
ADMIN SPECIALIST E-4 71L10	TOTAL = 6
<b>TOTAL PERSONNEL = 14</b>	

3. **Option 2, Combined with installation TDA organization:**

a. Listed below are the intelligence assets Fort Carson will have to support the Installation Intelligence/Force Protection and Mobilization Mission with the positions recently recognized by the FORSCOM manpower survey team. Positions will be recognized on the next installation TDA which will have an effective date of 1st Qtr FY-98.

ISE OIC - CPT 35D	TRAFFIC ANALYST - SSG 98C30
ISE NCOIC - SFC 96B40	ELINT ANALYST - SSG 98J30
OB TECH - CWO 350B	OB ANALYST - SGT 96B20 (4)
SIGINT TECH - CWO 352C	OB ANALYST - SPC 96B10 (3)
OB ANALYST - SSG 96B30	<b>TOTAL = 15 PERSONNEL</b>
TERRAIN ANALYST - SSG 81Q30	

b. Listed below are the requirements for a Intelligence Training Element to support the ARNG training using augmentation personnel from existing intelligence assets located on Fort Carson. This option is based on the assumption that the Fort Carson Intelligence Support Element as recognized by the FORSCOM survey team is fully manned.



c. As illustrated above, combining the Intelligence Support Element and the Intelligence Training Element will result in a manpower savings of three personnel, a 96B30 and two 96B20s.


4. POC for this action at Fort Carson is Mr. Larry Harlin, (719) 526-3997, DSN 691-3997.

**G-3 Section Requirements**

1. The following provides two options for an active component G3 element (non-deployable), whose purpose would be providing pre and post mobilization training support and staff oversight at the brigade level and below.

**2. Option 1, Stand alone organization:**

a. Shown below is Fort Carson’s assessment of the manning requirements needed to perform as a divisional G3 section for three enhanced brigades with a separate organization from the current installation TDA structure. Recommended manpower increases from the TRADOC HHC MTOE (Draft) (Encl 1) are explained in the subsequent paragraphs.




b. G3 Plans/Mob section reflects an increase of two officers and one NCO. These soldiers will act as a war plans cell, to coordinate with higher headquarters and staffs in theaters where the brigades may be employed, and to assist the brigade staffs with preparing their implementing war plans. The remainder of the section will focus on preparing and coordinating mobilization plans and division orders/plans for brigade exercises and will help man the DTAC/DMAIN during field exercises.

c. Recommend the creation of a five man exercise cell to assist the brigades in planning, coordinating and preparing for FTXs, CPXs, simulations, etc. This section could be stand alone, as depicted above, or incorporated into the G3 Training section. The manning of the training section (4-0-7) is adequate to perform the training policy, calendar and coordination functions, and to help staff the DTAC/DMAIN during field exercises.

d. The G3 Air section reflects an increase of three officers, one warrant officer, and one enlisted soldier. One of the officers would be a USAF LNO to integrate and coordinate fixed wing assets into exercises and plans. Major functions of the air cell include the development of A2C2 plans, writing the Air Coordination Order (ACO), operating an A2C2 cell for exercises, training brigade S-3 air officers, and coordinating OSAC and JA/ATT mission support for the brigades.

**2. Option 2, Combined with installation TDA organization:**


a. The following represents the TDA authorizations of the portions of the Fort Carson DPTM relevant to a division G3. These numbers reflect authorizations from the Feb 97 FORSCOM manpower survey which are an increase over current TDA authorizations.



\* Includes staffing of 24 hour Operations Center (8 personnel) and Force Modernization branch.

\*\* Does not include manpower required to operate Butts Army Airfield.

b. The following is the recommended DPTM organization needed to conduct current installation missions in addition to the HHC responsibilities. Incorporating the HHC into the DPTM will result in an overall savings of one officer and one warrant officer. The officer position is a result of dual slotting the Director, DPTM as DPTM/G3. The warrant officer position is a savings within the air section.




3. Regardless of the option chosen, it is critical that the various sections within the G3 shop be staffed with a variety of branch/MOS expertise. Without it, the G3 will not have the requisite skills and knowledge to write quality division orders and exercise scenarios, nor will it be able to assemble a battle staff to run a division command and control structure for exercising the brigades.

4. The POC for this action at Fort Carson is MAJ Tovo, DSN 883-1361 or commercial (719) 524-1361.

**G-4 Section Requirements**

1. Recommend a G4 element for a stand alone HHC as pictured below. This represents an increase of three personnel over the draft FORSCOM MTOE in enclosure 1. A 92A40 should be added to the MMC section. A 88M30 should be placed in the DTO and a 63H42 in the General Support Section.



2. Should the HHC be incorporated into the current Fort Carson TDA, the same total of personnel would be required to perform this mission. While there may be some overlap of function, the additional workload incurred would necessitate the increased manpower.

3. The divisional G4 shop would require a number of tactical systems. These include, but are not limited to, communications (SINCGARS or VRC), organic tactical transportation (HMMWVs, Medium Tactical Vehicles) and deployable shop capability (5 Ton Expando Toc Vans/M109A3 Vans).

4. The POC for this action at Fort Carson is MAJ Flanagan, DSN 691-1074 or commercial (719) 526-1074.







AFZN-GT-P (5-9)

31 March 97

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command,  
ATTN: AFOR-TRP (Mr. Chuck Hyder), Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330

FOR Director, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Force Design  
Directorate; ATTN: ATCD-F (LTC(P) Twohig), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
66027

SUBJECT: Active Component(AC)/Army National Guard (ARNG)  
Integrated Division Study.

1. References:

- a. Army Regulation 10-42, dated 1 Apr 92.
- b. FORSCOM Regulation 10-42, dated Dec 94.
- c. RAND Study: Postmobilization Training Resource Requirements, 1996.
- d. Fort Riley Mobilization Plan, dated 1 Mar 95.
- e. Fort Riley Republican Flats Plan, dated Mar 96.
- f. FY 97 Annual Training Guidance, dated 11 Sep 96.
- g. FORSCOM and TRADOC concept briefing, dated 10 February 1997; subject: Active Component (AC)/ Army National Guard (ARNG) Integrated Division Study.

2. This memorandum assesses the adequacy of design of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) organizational proposal, and provides implementation and organizational concerns.

3. The Army's consideration of creating an Active Component HHC to serve as divisional headquarters for ARNG Enhanced Readiness Brigades (E-Bdes) at Fort Riley, and Fort Carson or Fort Lewis; responds to an effort to realign the National Guard force structure in order to make it more relevant and to improve the integration of Active and Reserve components. Alternative #2 of the TRADOC Force Design Directorate's (FDD) study, proposes the creation of an Integrated Division HHC. The HHC must be capable of conducting garrison operations, and providing training and readiness oversight during pre mobilization and post mobilization training for at least 3 National Guard E-Bdes. On order, the Integrated Division must be capable of operating a "WARFIGHTER" Training Center (WTC) (see mission statement at Enclosure 1).

4. To assess the viability of the FDD study at Fort Riley, our assessment focused on Alternative #2 (Addition of Division HHC to USAG TDA). This alternative assumes that initially the Integrated Division will not operate as an operational headquarters for either combat or other military operations. The Integrated Division will perform the current Fort Riley USAG mission, and additionally it will be required to:

- a) Provide training guidance to the E-Bdes.
- b) Support the E-Bdes METL development process.
- c) Focus the E-Bdes pre mobilization training tasks.
- d) Schedule and coordinate training resources.
- e) Mentor and professionally develop the E-Bdes leaders.
- f) Support train up and training that is peculiar to BCST, BCBST, and WFX.
- g) Support post mobilization training as required.
- h) Operate a deployment platform.
- i) May potentially be required to operate a WTC.

5. The proposed alternative also assumes that the Mobilization and Training Support (MTS) functions will still be conducted by each of the E-Bdes' Readiness and Training Detachments (RTDs) under the operational control of the Integrated Division. Initially, the E-Bdes will continue to conduct most of their pre mobilization training, including Annual Training (AT), at their current home stations; because of their large geographical dispersion, and current location of equipment concentration and mobilization sites.

6. The E-Bdes best suited for assignment to the Fort Riley AC/ARNG Division are listed below in order of priority:

- a) 218th IN Bde (Mech) (Sep) (SC ANG)
- b) 48th IN Bde (Mech) (Sep) (GA ANG)
- c) 30th IN Bde (Mech) (Sep) (NC ANG)
- d) 256th IN Bde (Mech) (Sep) (LA ANG).
- e) 155th AR Bde (Sep) (MS ANG).
- f) 39th IN Bde (L) (Sep) (AK ANG).
- g) 278th ACR (KY ANG).

7. Examination of the study revealed that we are in close agreement on the overall number of personnel required by the Integrated Division HHC, although we made recommendations for some redistribution of those assets among the staff sections. Our proposal at enclosure 6, calls for 317 personnel capable of planning for and executing training, provide Command and Control, and provide DS and limited GS Combat Support and Combat Service Support functions for the E-Bdes. We also considered it critical to maintain a contingent of 116 full-time positions to provide continuous

manning of the BOS at the division level. This reorganization of assets will facilitate effective coordination, Command and Control, and efficient support of each brigade and its subordinate units. Most of the redistributions are in G3, G4, and G6; where the absence of separate divisional CS and CSS battalions in the proposed designs mandated the need for robust representation at the division level. We agree that 10 of the Fort Riley USAG Command Group functions and positions in the Integrated Division HHC are duplicated and can serve both roles. Fort Riley USAG will continue to perform functions unique from those of the division.

8. We believe there are great savings to be realized by bringing additional National Guard units to Fort Riley for training. Fort Riley has 70K acres of the best mechanized training area in the U.S. In contrast, at places like Fort Stewart we have an organic division and an additional four mechanized brigades attempting to train in unsuitable terrain. We believe that by increasing our existing equipment concentration site and constructing a modest admin. and support area, the use of the Fort Riley training area by the National Guard could be greatly expanded. National Guard Brigades could bring their soldiers to Fort Riley, draw equipment and easily cycle through their platoons, companies and battalions. With the existing 70K acres, improved equipment stationing and the addition of the Division structure to Fort Riley, we would be able to provide a greatly enhanced quality of training for the National Guard units. The execution of Integrated Division training, and garrison mobilization missions at this level then, would provide the foundation for the establishment of a WTC at Fort Riley. This progressive path will give the Integrated Division Commander the flexibility to conduct parallel planning, conduct training and deployment for AC brigades, execute pre mobilization and post mobilization training for NG and USAR units, and transition into a WTC.

9. The Active Component and Army National Guard Integrated Division at Fort Riley concept is viable if properly resourced. Fort Riley has great support facilities, and some of the best mechanized training areas in the Army

10. The point of contact for this memorandum is MAJ Jim Llinet at DSN: 856-6845/6847, commercial (913) 239-6845/6847, unclassified FAX: 239-3050; or e-mail: afzngt@riley-emh1.army.mil

3 Encls

1. Mission Statement
2. Facts and Assumptions
3. Manpower Assessment

/Original Signed/  
BRUCE H. BARLOW  
Colonel, General Staff  
Chief of Staff

CCF: Cdr, III Corps; ATTN: G3

Enclosure 1: Mission Statement.

1. Fort Riley's current mission (Ref: Fort Riley Centurion Study and Mission Analysis brief dated 20 March 1995):

Fort Riley is responsible for the training, readiness, and deployability of three active component combat brigades. Additionally supports designated RC units and ensures quality of life for Fort Riley soldiers and families. On order, mobilizes and deploys active and reserve component units with or without equipment to one or more locations simultaneously, in support of national interests and objectives. On order, receives and recovers active and reserve component units during redeployment.

2. The FDD Integrated Division proposal will add the following missions:

- The Division conducts pre mobilization training to maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency or as otherwise directed.
- On order, the Division mobilizes at home stations, moves to mobilization station(s) as required and conducts post mobilization training. On order, Separate Brigades (Enhanced) deploy to APOE/SPOE for commitment to a Corps, Joint Task Force (JTF), or geographical CINCs to conduct offensive and defensive operations.
- Separate Brigades (Enhanced) are prepared to conduct various stability and support operations, semi-independently or as part of a corps, joint or multi-national headquarters in overseas peacetime and conflict environments. The Division Headquarters is prepared to accept and support the mobilization and training of other Separate Brigades (Enhanced) as determined by National Command Authority.
- On order, Division provides state(s), as directed by the appropriate authority, trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or otherwise required by law (maintain public peace and order, disaster relief, etc.).
- Be prepared to operate a Warfighting Training Center during post mobilization training (planning, training and validation of brigades).

Enclosure 2: Facts and Assumptions.

1. General: The USAG Fort Riley is a non-deployable organization, that will remain at Fort Riley to support operations of tenant AC/RC units, and deployment of late deploying units and individual soldiers after all other units are gone. Additionally, it will continue to support family members of deployed soldiers, and the retiree community in the area. The creation of two single-function staff organizations will facilitate the support of the E-Bdes during training, to include the deployment of a “CTC/Warfighting” cell, or deployability of the unit as a division.

2. Facts:

(a) The USAG Fort Riley is a non-deployable unit.

(b) The mission of Fort Riley is prescribed in AR 10-42 and FORSCOM Reg 10-42.

(c) Fort Riley has the largest mobilization mission of any installation in Fifth Army and is the Fifth largest mobilization station in FORSCOM. 228 Reserve Units mobilize to Fort Riley. Under the nearly two simultaneous regional contingency scenario Fort Riley peaks at 12,000 troops at about 55 days into a mobilization. That figure reflects the deployment and mobilization flow. The total mobilization responsibility is for 262 units (32,546 troops).

(d) As of January 97, Fort Riley supported a combined population of approximately 10,600 military , and 1990 civilian personnel. 180 Borrowed Military Manpower(BMM) personnel are used to support post functions within activities and installation projects.

(e) The installation provides personnel service support for all military personnel assigned or attached, operates a consolidated in-out processing center/transition point that service approximately 1300 personnel per month, and provides support to the military retiree community, all active military family members, and DA civilians and their families.

(f) Under the management of its Range Division, Fort Riley’s 71,000 acres of ranges, training facilities and maneuver areas support over 100 active duty units 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. It provides training support for weekend and annual training for National Guard and Army Reserve, the FBI, the KBI, and other state and local law enforcement agencies.

(g) On a monthly basis, Fort Riley’s G4/Directorate of Logistics supports transportation, maintenance, supply, and services logistic operations of 145 active army and 191 reserve units. It provides backup DS/GS and Aviation Maintenance and Army Oil Analysis for assigned areas of responsibility, manages Installation Consolidated Property in excess of \$70,000,000, and supports the operation of 248 administrative vehicles.

(h) TDA:



- (1) Fort Riley's current approved Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) was prepared on 19 June 96, with E-date 961017.
- (2) Current garrison TDA requires a combined military-civilian strength of 2442 and authorizes 1,436 (58% of required). In addition, the TDA Augmentation document authorizes an additional 180 Borrowed Military Manpower spaces for a combined total of 1,616 personnel (62% of required).
- (3) The military personnel required strength is 579 while authorized is 405 (68.9% of required).
- (4) Civilian personnel strength required is 1853 while authorized is 1031 (55.6% of required).
- (5) The proposed FDD study over estimates the Fort Riley USAG combined TDA. The study presents the garrison TDA at an authorization of 2152 personnel vice the 1433 we actually are authorized.

### 3. Assumptions.

- (a) Alternative #2 represents a temporary state in a transition toward a "true division" endstate, provided by either alternative #1 or alternative #3.
- (b) The Readiness and Training Detachments (RTDs) will continue to conduct training with their current E-Bdes. They will maintain a "resident" Plans and Mobilization cell within the Integrated Division G3 Section, to conduct dedicated and detailed training planning, including coordination of resources, and maintain liaison between the forward positioned RTDs and the division Hqs. The cell Chief will be rated by the Integrated Division G3.
- (c) The proposed division design represents an add-on organization to the current garrison TDA structure.
- (d) The Mobilization and Training Support (MTS) functions will be performed by the Readiness and Training Detachments (RTDs).
- (e) Initially, pre mobilization training (monthly drills and Annual Training) will be conducted at the unit's current training areas by the RTDs.
- (f) The proposed 5025th Garrison Support Unit (GSU) TDA will be approved.
- (g) Annual Training(AT), if done at Fort Riley, will be conducted by one brigade size unit at a time, for a period not to exceed 3 weeks in duration.

(h) Impact to the current relationships established by the Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) Program will be minimal. Lane Training will continue to be provided by the RTB/FEB.

(i) The division will be required to perform the following training functions:

1. Prepare division level orders for: BCST, BCBST, WFX, CPXs, FTXs, CTC rotations, Simulations, and Annual Training.
2. Deploy/operate a division tactical command post (DTAC) and/or a division response cell (in lieu of) for C3I of brigade level exercises and annual training.
3. Conduct mobilization planning and exercise oversight of brigade post mobilization training plans.
4. Ensure synchronization of brigade level METL with appropriate theaters and wartime mission.
5. Prepare training guidance, receive annual training briefings, coordinate training schedules and master calendar, and assist in coordination of training resources.
6. Conduct training and readiness evaluations and command inspections.
7. Monitor brigade monthly training.
8. Receive and analyze brigade readiness reports.
9. Perform comptroller functions.

1. This Manpower Assessment is based on the following assumptions:
  - a. Fusion of functions where duplication may exist is possible. So far we can only identify some duplication at the Command Group level..
  - b. The Readiness and Training Detachments (RTD) will perform the Mobilization and Training Support Team (MTS) functions.
  - c. The RTDs will maintain a resident Plans and Mobilization Cell, under the G3 section to provide interface/liaison between the division Hqs. and the RTD.
  - d. The Integrated Division HHC MTOE will have a balanced representation of Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) within its manpower structure, that should resemble a baseline AC heavy division HHC MTOE. This is of particular importance in the G3 Plans and G3 Operations cells.
2. The Manpower data in tables 1 to 3 of this enclosure reflects the redistribution of personnel assets as stated in the basic memorandum. Tables 4 and 5 offer detailed data of where our proposal considers duplication and minimum required manning of functions. Tables 6 to 9 offer personnel data about the entire manpower force required to conduct the necessary missions. The next few paragraphs establish justification for our redistribution of personnel. The figures (X/X/X) refer to the number of Officers, Warrant Officers, and Enlisted personnel required by our proposal vice the FDD design.
3. Command Group: (22 personnel)
  - a. Requires 11/0/11 vice 10/0/12 to maintain liaison with each brigade. The FDD proposal considers only 2 liaison officers instead of 3. One enlisted position was redistributed to correct this.
  - b. Ten positions in the Command Group can function in a dual capacity in the garrison and the division staff. Table 5 identifies the staff positions that are capable of this. The other 12 positions are division unique. Redistribution of personnel, to resource the correct mix of MOS, rank, and functional area will solve this situation.
4. G1: (41 personnel )
  - a. Requires 7/1/33 vice 7/4/18 because the increase in personnel density and training tempo will create an increase in the amount and diversity of soldier Personnel Actions. The lack of a Separate Personnel Service Company in the division requires G1 to process those actions. An enlarge staff will facilitate this task.

- b. We also redistributed the automation section under G1 in the FDD study, to the G6 where it belongs.

5. G2: (15 personnel, plus 46 personnel for DTOC Support Element)

- a. Requires 8/ 0 /7 vice 6/ 0 /8 to allocate an additional planner versus one analyst. The absence of a divisional MI battalion places the G2 section in disadvantage. To compensate this need, we added a DTOC Support Element to the structure.
- b. The DTOC Support Element requires 10/6/30, and it contains the following functional areas:
  - (1) Deputy G2 Operations section.
  - (2) Plans section.
  - (3) Training section.
  - (4) Counterintelligence section.
  - (5) Electronic Warfare section.
  - (6) Special Security Officer.
  - (7) Staff Weather Officer.
  - (8) Terrain Team.
  - (9) Analysis and control Element.
  - (10) Directorate of security.

6. G3: (45 personnel)

- a. Requires 20/0/25 vice 36/3/75 because the RTDs conduct the Mobilization and Training Support functions under the Integrated Division control. We redistributed these. personnel to expand the coverage of the BOS, And to resource sections G3 Operations section that was absent in the proposal.
- b. The absence of separate CS battalions in the division requires increased BOS representation in G3. The redistribution of assets would organize G3 section as follows:

- (1) G3: 2 / 0 / 3
- (2) G3 Operations: 4 / 0 / 4
- (3) G3 Plans: 4 / 0 / 3
- (4) G3 Air: 3 / 0 / 1
- (5) FSE 2 / 0 / 5
- (6) ADE: 1 / 0 / 3
- (7) ADA 2 / 0 / 3
- (8) AVN: 2 / 0 / 3
- 20/ 0 /25

- c. In this configuration a “resident” training planning cell from the RTDs, is present in G3 Plans.
7. G4: (58 personnel)
- a. Requires 14 / 7/ 37 vice 20 / 7/ 43 because some of the initially allocated personnel was to conduct MTS functions, which are going to be conducted by the RTDs.
  - b. It retains a robust logistic functions packet (48 personnel above a typical heavy division G4 section) to compensate for the absence of a DISCOM.
8. G6: (22 personnel)
- a. companies or Signal Battalions, G6 will have to maintain connectivity and communications with the Separates brigades. This Staff section becomes of paramount importance for command and control of the division.
  - b. We also redistributed the automation session previously under G1 to G6.
9. Div HHC: (42 personnel). Requires 3 / 0/ 39 vice 3/ 0/ 18 because the food service section was absent from the design.
10. Minimum personnel manning for our proposal will require 116 positions to be manned full-time. See Table 4, attached.

TABLES:

TABLE 1: Personnel Redistributions

TABLE 2: Fort Riley’s Proposal.

TABLE 3: Changes to the FDD Proposed Design.

TABLE 4: Minimum Manning Requirements.

TABLE 5: Dual Function Positions

TABLE 6: USAG TDA Additional Military Force

TABLE 7: USAG Civilian Work Force

TABLE 8: Fort Riley TDA Authorizations

TABLE 9: Manpower Recapitulation

AC/ARNG Integrated Division Concept Study – Appendices

STAFF SECTIONS	USAG TDA			FDD PROPOSAL			FRK PROPOSAL			REMARKS/JUSTIFICATION		
	OFF	IWO	ENL	TOT	OFF	IWO	ENL	TOT	OFF		IWO	ENL
PARA. #01: CMD. GP	6	0	15	21	10	0	12	22	11	0	11	22
PARA. #02: IG	3	0	11	14	2	0	3	5	2	0	3	5
PARA. #03: SJA	15	1	13	29	2	1	3	6	2	1	3	6
PARA. #04: CHAPLAIN	5	0	9	14	1	0	2	3	1	0	2	3
PARA. #05: PAO	1	0	5	6	4	0	8	12	1	0	5	6
PARA. #09: USAG HHC	2	0	13	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PARA. #13: G1/DPCA	3	0	43	46	7	4	18	29	7	1	33	41
PARA. #14: G2/DSEC	5	2	21	28	6	0	8	14	8	0	7	15
PARA. #15: G3/DPTM	9	8	46	63	36	3	75	114	20	0	25	45
PARA. #19: G4/DOL	2	0	8	10	20	7	43	70	14	7	37	58
PARA. #23: PMO	4	0	94	98	1	0	5	6	1	0	5	6
PARA. #24: G6/DOIM	4	3	26	33	0	0	0	0	6	2	14	22
DIOC SPT ELEM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	30	46
DIV HHC	0	0	0	0	3	0	18	21	3	0	39	42
SUB-TOTALS	59	14	304	377	92	15	195	302	86	17	214	317
ADDITIONAL MIL TDA.**	5	3	20	28	64	17	324	405	64	17	324	405
** (SEE NEXT TABLE)												
TOTAL MIL PERSONNEL	64	17	324	405	156	32	519	707	150	34	538	722
USAG TDA CIVILIAN FORCE				1031				1031				1031
GRAND TOTAL:				1436				1738				1753

NOTE 1: TNG. EVAL. TM. CONCEPT NOT RESOURCED-->RTD CONDUCTS THAT MISSION/ 14 PERS. ABOVE HVY DIV MTOE TO PROVIDE BOS PL

NOTE 2: TNG. EVAL. TM. CONCEPT NOT RESOURCED-->RTD CONDUCTS THAT MISSION/ 48 PERS. ABOVE HVY DIV MTOE TO COMPENSATE ABS

TABLE 1: Personnel Redistributions

Impacted Staff Sections	Off	WO	Enl.	BMM	ETD	Total MIL	Civ	Total	Full Time
para. #01: CMD: GP	11	0	11	0	0	22	0	22	22
para. #02: IG	2	0	3	0	0	5	0	5	2
para. #03: SJA	2	1	3	0	0	6	0	6	2
para. #04: Chaplain	1	0	2	0	0	3	0	3	2
para. #05: PAO	1	0	5	0	0	6	0	6	3
para. #09: USAG HHC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
para. #13: G1/DPCA	7	1	33	0	0	41	0	41	5
para. #14: G2/DIS	8	0	7	0	0	15	0	15	11
para. #15: G3/DPTM	20	0	25	0	0	45	0	45	22
para. #19: G4/DOL	14	7	37	0	0	58	0	58	17
para. #23: PMO	1	0	5	0	0	6	0	6	2
para. #24: G6/DOIM	6	2	14	0	0	22	0	22	12
DTOC Spt(G2/G3)	10	6	30	0	0	46	0	46	9
Div HHC	3	0	39	0	0	42	0	42	7
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>317</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>317</b>	<b>116</b>

TABLE 2: Fort Riley's Proposal.



TABLE 3: Changes to the FDD Proposed Design

AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION HQS.

SECTION	PROPOSED HHC			RECOMMENDED CHGS			REASON REMARKS
	OFF	WO	TOTAL	OFF	WO	TOTAL	
WFO SPACES							
GRDOP	2	0	2	0	0	0	
COB	4	0	4	0	0	0	
ADCM	2	0	2	0	0	0	
ADCS	2	0	2	0	0	0	
(CMDR SUBTOTAL)	10	0	10	0	0	0	(NOTE 1)
G3	2	0	2	0	0	0	
G3 PENS/MOB	3	0	3	0	0	0	
G3 PENS/MOB	3	0	3	0	0	0	(NOTE 2)
G3 TRNG	4	0	4	0	0	0	
TRNG EVAL TMS	21	3	24	0	0	0	
G3 AIR	3	0	3	0	0	0	
(G3 SUBTOTAL)	36	3	39	0	0	0	
G2	3	0	3	0	0	0	(NOTE 3)
G2	3	0	3	0	0	0	(NOTE 4)
(G2 SUBTOTAL)	6	0	6	0	0	0	
G1	2	0	2	0	0	0	(NOTE 3)
G1 PEROPS	3	1	4	0	0	0	(NOTE 3)
G1 PEROPS	0	3	3	0	0	0	(NOTE 4)
DIV AUT OFC	2	0	2	0	0	0	(NOTE 7)
(G1 SUBTOTAL)	7	4	11	0	0	0	
G4	2	0	2	0	0	0	
G4 SPT OPNS OFC	2	0	2	0	0	0	(NOTE 4)
G4 SPT OPNS OFC	3	1	4	0	0	0	
G4 DIV AMMO	1	1	2	0	0	0	
G4 PHO	3	2	5	0	0	0	
G4 GEN SPT SEC	3	0	3	0	0	0	
G4 MED OPS	3	0	3	0	0	0	
G4 DTD	3	0	3	0	0	0	(NOTE 4)
G4 MMAC	2	0	2	0	0	0	
(G4 SUBTOTAL)	20	7	27	0	0	0	
PWO	1	0	1	0	0	0	
PWO	1	0	1	0	0	0	(NOTE 4)
PWO	3	0	3	0	0	0	
(PWO SUBTOTAL)	4	0	4	0	0	0	
SJA	2	1	3	0	0	0	
NO	2	0	2	0	0	0	
CCM	1	0	1	0	0	0	(NOTE 3)
CCM	1	0	1	0	0	0	
CCM	2	0	2	0	0	0	
FOOD SERVICE	0	0	0	0	0	0	(NOTE 5)
DIVOC SPT ELEM	0	0	0	0	0	0	(NOTE 6)
G67 SIG SPT SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	(NOTE 7)
DIV AUTOMATION OFC	0	0	0	0	0	0	(NOTE 8)
G3 OPERATIONS	0	0	0	0	0	0	
CURRENT TOTAL	92	13	105	0	0	0	
REVISED TOTAL				80	22	102	317

NOTE 1: TO positions in the USAF CMO Ops will have dual functions within IV  
 NOTE 2: "Resident" RTD Plans/Mobilization Cell.  
 NOTE 3: Positions required to operate a Warfighting Center.  
 NOTE 4: MTS functions will be performed by RTD.  
 NOTE 5: DIOC Spt Elem required for Warfighter exercises and possible deployment.  
 NOTE 6: Required for C2 commo for ble level exercises.  
 NOTE 7: This section was previously allocated to G1  
 NOTE 8: This section was not included in the proposed MTOE

TABLE 4: Minimum Manning Requirements

SECTION	PROPOSED HHC FULL TIME MANNING				
	MTS SPACES	OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
CMD GP		2	0	4	6
CofS		5	0	3	8
ADC-M		2	0	2	4
ADC-S		2	0	2	4
(CMD GP SUBTOTAL)		11	0	11	22
G3		1	0	2	3
G3 PLNS/MOB		4	0	3	7
G3 TNG		2	0	2	4
(G3 SUBTOTAL)		7	0	7	14
G2		1	0	3	4
G2		2	0	1	3
(G2 SUBTOTAL)		7	0	4	11
G1		1	0	1	2
G1 PEROPS		1	1	1	3
(G1 SUBTOTAL)		2	1	2	5
G4		1	0	1	2
G4 SPT OPNS OFC		2	0	1	3
G4 PBO		0	1	1	2
G4 GEN SPT SEC		1	1	2	4
G4 DTO		1	0	2	3
G4 MMC		1	0	2	3
(G4 SUBTOTAL)		6	2	9	17
PMO		1	0	1	2
PAO		1	0	2	3
SJA		1	0	1	2
IG		1	0	1	2
CHAP		1	0	1	2
HQ CMDT		1	0	1	2
CO HQS		1	0	1	2
MAINT		0	0	3	3
DTOC SPT ELEM		2	1	6	9
G6/SIG SPT SEC		2	1	3	6
DIV AUTOMATION OFC		1	0	2	3
G3 OPERATIONS		4	0	4	8
REVISED TOTAL		52	5	59	116

TABLE 5: Dual Function Positions

USAG TDA COMMAND GROUP POSITIONS		TDA AUTHORIZATION	DUAL FUNCTION POSITIONS
<b>INSTALLATION COMMAND</b>			
INSTALLATION COMMANDER		1	* (DIV CDR)
DEPUTY CDR, SUPPORT		1	* (ADC-S)
GARRISON CDR		1	
INSTALLATION CHIEF OF STAFF		1	* (DIV C/S)
INST. CDR AIDE		1	* (DIV CDR'S AIDE)
DEF. INSTALLATION CDR AIDE		0	
GARRISON CSM		1	
ENLISTED AIDE		1	* (DIV CDR ENL AIDE)
DVQ ORDERLY		1	
ADMIN ASSIST		3	* 2 (ADMIN ASSIST)
ADMIN SPEC.		2	
ADMIN CLK		1	
SECY (STENO) (CIV)		1	
SECY (STENO/OA) (CIV)		2	
MVO (CIV)		1	
<b>SUB-TOTAL:</b>		<b>18</b>	<b>SUB-TOTAL: 7 (4 OFF/3 ENL)</b>
<b>SGS</b>			
SGS		1	* (DIV SGS)
AST PROF OFF		0	
ADMIN SUPV		1	
EXEC ADMIN ASSIST		2	* 1 (EXC ADMIN ASSIST)
ADMIN SPC		2	* 1 (ADMIN SPC)
ADMIN CLK		1	
PROTOCOL OFF (CIV)		1	
PROT ASST (CIV)		1	
<b>SUB-TOTAL:</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>SUB-TOTAL: 3 (1 OFF/2 ENL)</b>
<b>TOTAL:</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>TOTAL: 10</b>
<b>OTHER INTEGRATED DIVISION MTOE POSITIONS</b>			
<b>POSITION</b>	<b>AUTHORIZATION</b>		
ADC-M	1		
ADC-M AIDE	1		
ADC-S AIDE	1		
LIAISON OFFICERS	3		
DIV CSM	1		
LIAISON NCOs	3		
DRIVERS	2		
<b>SUB-TOTAL:</b>	<b>12</b>		
<b>** INTEGRATED DIVISION COMMAND SECTION GRAND TOTAL : 22</b>			

STAFF SECTIONS	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT
PARA. #06: IRAC	0	0	0	0
PARA. #07: EO	1	0	4	5
PARA. #10: CIV. PER. OFF	0	0	0	0
PARA. ##11: DCA	0	0	0	0
PARA. #12: AD. COM. FAM. ACT.	0	0	0	0
PARA. #16: DRM	3	0	0	3
PARA. #17: F & A DIV	0	0	0	0
PARA. #18: RESERVE PAY	0	0	0	0
PARA. #20: SUPPLY DIV.	0	3	5	8
PARA. #21: TRANS. DIV.	0	0	10	10
PARA. #22: MAINT. DIV.	0	0	0	0
PARA. #25: DIR. CONTRACTING	0	0	0	0
PARA. #26: DPW	1	0	0	1
PARA. #27: HOUSING DIV.	0	0	0	0
PARA. #28: OPNS. & MAINT.	0	0	1	1
PARA. #34: DIR. ENV. & SAFETY.	0	0	0	0

TOTAL ADDITIONAL MIL TDA: 

5	3	20	<b>28</b>
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TABLE 6: USAG TDA Additional Military Force

TABLE 7: USAG Civilian Work Force

PARA. #	STAFF SECTION	CIV. PERS.	MIL PERS.	ADD. MIL	TOT
1	COMMAND GROUP	6	21	0	27
2	IG	3	14	0	17
3	SJA	12	29	0	41
4	CHAPLAIN	2	14	0	16
5	PAO	3	6	0	9
6	IRAC	4	0	0	4
7	EO	3	0	5	8
8	N/A	0	0	0	0
9	USAG HHC	1	15	0	16
10	CIV. PERS. OFFICE	10	0	0	10
11	DCA	45	0	0	45
12	AD. COM. FAM. ACT.	102	0	0	102
13	G1/DPCA	38	46	0	84
14	G2/DSEC	4	28	0	32
15	G3/DPTM	119	63	0	182
16	DRM	44	0	3	47
17	F & A DIV.	0	0	0	0
18	RESERVE PAY	0	0	0	0
19	G4/DOL	23	10	0	33
20	SUPPLY DIV	90	0	8	98
21	TRANS. DIV.	32	0	10	42
22	MAINT. DIV.	16	0	0	16
23	PMO	11	98	0	109
24	G6/DOIM	75	33	0	108
25	DIR. CONTRACTING	39	0	0	39
26	DPW	64	0	1	65
27	HOUSING DIV.	76	0	0	76
28	OPNS & MAINT.	180	0	1	181
34	DIR. ENV. & SAFETY	29	0	0	29
TOTALS:		1031	377	28	1436

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL MIL TDA	CIV FORCE	TOTAL
64	17	324	405	1,031	1,436

TABLE 8: Fort Riley TDA Authorizations

	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT. MIL (USAG TDA)	CIV	TOTAL
CURRENT TDA AUTHORIZATIONS	64	17	324	405	1,031	1,436
FORT RILEY'S INTEGRATED DIVISION HHC PROPOSAL	86	17	214	(MTOE) 317	0	317
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>538</b>	<b>722</b>	<b>1031</b>	<b>1753</b>

TABLE 9: Manpower Recapitulation





***TAB 2 TO APPENDIX J MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR  
AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISIONS***

One of the essential documents for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions is an MOA which delineates the commander's authority and the funding for the division. This Tab contains a working paper of such an MOA. The MOA contains the major paragraphs to be addressed and in many cases contains language showing the intent of the paragraph. In other cases, only the paragraph heading is given.

Once the alignments of the ERBs and the location of the division HHC is decided, the respective parties must consummate the MOA and gain a legal sufficiency review. Once signed by all parties, the MOA will become the governing document for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.



**MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA)**

**between**

**THE UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND,  
THE UNITED STATES ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, and  
THE ADJUTANTS GENERAL of the MEMBER STATES of the AC/ARNG  
INTEGRATED DIVISION**

1. **Purpose.** This MOA promulgates agreements between the respective parties regarding their interrelated responsibilities for the AC/ARNG Integrated Division for organization, training, personnel, resources, and statutory, regulatory, administration and data flow. Specifically, this MOA:
  - a. establishes the orderly planning and transition to an AC/ARNG Integrated Division through mutual cooperation of the Active Component (AC) division commander and his staff; the Adjutants General (TAGs) of those states having organic units of the Division; and the Director, Army National Guard (ARNG);
  - b. sets forth the Division commander's command and control authority;
  - c. prescribes key responsibilities incumbent on the AC division commander, the respective TAGs and the ARNG staff;
  - d. provides guidance for the command, control, communications and computer (C4) compatibility and interoperability within and between the Division and those states and units organic to the Division;
  - e. ensures appropriate administrative, logistics, and resource support of the Division by the respective states forming the Division; and
  - f. must be signed by participating TAGs as a condition of establishing units in the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions, including additional base structure.
2. **References.** See Appendix A.
3. **Scope.** This MOA supersedes all other documents and understandings , except statements made by the Secretary of the Army and/or the Chief of Staff, Army specifically in regard to the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions; and extant policy in Army Regulation 350-41 and FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2; and FM 25-100 doctrine.
4. **Commander's Intent/Objective.** The AC/ARNG Integrated Division is different from all other Army divisions and requires enhancements to leadership and management processes. A multi-state, multi-component division creates a unique challenge regarding command and control relationships. State level and component specific administration, logistics, training, resource support, and command and control must optimize peacetime training effectiveness and readiness operational employment. This MOA assigns responsibilities for the overall combat readiness of

the Division and provides the Division commander with the authority, the resources, and the support necessary to ensure the Division can meet its wartime requirements.

**5. Agreements.** The respective signatories of this MOA agree to the following provisions:

**a. Organization.**

**(1) Division Headquarters and Constituting ARNG Brigades.** The location of the headquarters and comprising brigades is:

**(a) AC/ARNG Integrated Division at Fort Carson, CO**

- 1 division headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) forward located at Fort Lewis, WA;
- 2 41<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade - Oregon;
- 3 81<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) - Washington; and
- 4 116<sup>st</sup> Armored Brigade - Idaho.

**(b) AC/ARNG Integrated Division at Fort Riley, KS**

- 1 division HHC at Fort Riley, KS;
- 2 39<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade - Arkansas;
- 3 256<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) - Louisiana; and
- 4 115<sup>th</sup> Armored Brigade - Mississippi.

**(2) Effective Date.** The effective date for the Division will be entered in the Troop Structure Program published by National Guard Bureau (NGB) after coordination and agreement by member states, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).

**(3) Changes in Unit Location.** The relocation of existing or programmed subordinate units from one state to another must be approved by FORSCOM and agreed upon by the TAGs of the respective states prior to formal publication by NGB.

**(4) Affiliation.** The AC/ARNG Integrated Division and all subordinate units will be the associated active duty command for each of the brigades and the units assigned to the Division IAW Title XI, Army National Guard Combat Reform Initiative.

**(5) Additional Units.** Division base units will be constituted on the authority of HQDA; recommendation by NGB (in the case of ARNG units); and approval by FORSCOM. Key considerations will be the readiness status of units and efficacy of training and support.

b. **Training.**

- (1) **Training Plans.** The Division commander shall issue Annual Training guidance to the Division, to include instructions for the development of long range, short range, and near term training plans, and will be the sole approving authority for all of these plans. Plans for training will be consistent with established Army regulations, doctrine, and FORSCOM guidance. Before approval of the long range and short range plans, the respective TAGs will be afforded the opportunity to review and provide comment on the plans developed by units within their state. The long range training plan will be provided to each state at least thirty days prior to the briefing. After review and approval by the Division commander, long range training plans will be published in the Division Circular 350-1 Training Year (TY) program as appropriate.
- (2) **Individual and Collective Training.** All training will comport with FM 25-100 and FM 25-101. A division training meeting will be conducted to finalize the Division training plan and to coordinate support requirements each year. The State Adjutants General will support this meeting, allowing attendance by all brigade commands and separate units deemed appropriate by the Division commander.
- (3) **Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Signal Operating Instructions (SOIs).** The Division will establish an SOP and an SOI addressing all command training, administrative, logistical, and similar requirements of the brigades and other units comprising the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. Division units will operate IAW the Division Circular 350-1(TY), the Division SOP and SOI. Copies of the Division Annual Training Guidance and Circular will be furnished to the TAGs of the respective states whose units are a part of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.
- (4) **Annual Training (AT) and Combat Training Center (CTC) Rotations.** The Division commander, in coordination with the respective TAGs, will have the authority to determine the preparedness of brigades and other subordinate units for a CTC rotation and for scheduling CTC rotations for all brigades and other subordinate units of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.
- (5) **Unit Status Reporting.** The Division commander is the designated official for reviewing, validating, and forwarding unit status reports. Reporting of equipment, systems, personnel, training, and readiness data will be routed to or through the Division headquarters, as determined by the Division commander. Consolidated reports will be prepared by the Division headquarters and submitted to FORSCOM, NGB, and HQDA as appropriate. The Division headquarters will furnish the respective TAGs with a copy of all

status reports submitted for their respective brigades and other subordinate units.

- (6) **Inspections.** The Division commander is the Federal official responsible for conducting all inspections of property, organization, members, training, records, accounts, and readiness deployment by the inspector general or other Regular Army commissioned officers for the brigades and other subordinate units of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division as provided for in 32 USC 105, and as amended by Section 1122, Title XI.
- (7) **State Area Command (STARC) Support.** The Division headquarters will coordinate with each participating STARC to ensure support is provided to subordinate elements of the Division in the event of a practice or actual mobilization. The STARC of each respective state will provide mobilization training and appropriate assistance to elements of the Division. Information copies of plans and directives relating to mobilizing Division elements will be forwarded to the Division headquarters to ensure efficient execution of common objectives. The Division commander and TAGs will mutually resolve concerns, as needed.
- (8) **Deployability Standards.** The Division commander or his designated AC representative will certify when subordinate units of the Division meet deployability standards, requirements for deployment, physical standards and other qualifications.
- (9) **Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) Modifications and Changes.** Any changes or modifications to TOEs must be submitted to and approved by the Division commander before submission to FORSCOM, NGB and HQDA. The Division headquarters will coordinate changes and consider comments by affected TAGs before submission of MTOEs to FORSCOM, NGB and HQDA.
- (10) **Full Time Support (FTS) Fill Meetings.** The NGB will establish FTS requirements and maintain fill of positions at or above 90 percent for all brigades and other subordinate units of the Division. FTS positions, distribution formulae, and fill will equal or exceed other ARNG Enhanced Brigades.
- (11) **School Seat Allocation/Approval.** The Division commander will establish training priorities and allocate quotas to brigades and other subordinate units as needed to improve the overall training readiness of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The Division commander will submit records and reports and initiate memorandums to enhance school seat availability and prioritization over later deploying Reserve Component units.

(12) **Additional Duty for Special Work (ADSW) Requirements.**

(13) **Unique State Mission Training Requirements.**

(14) **Use of State Units Belonging to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division Units for State Emergencies.** In the event of a natural catastrophe or similar event within the respective states, the Governors/TAGs of the affected states have preeminence in the use of ARNG units comprising the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, for a period of up to 60 days. Additional support, to include use of AC forces and expanded periods of time, will depend on the President's declaration of the disaster and the compelling needs at the time.

c. **Personnel**

(1) **Key Staff.** Selection of key staff members will be the prerogative of the Division commander. When a vacancy occurs, the Division commander will notify the respective states and request nominees. Each participating state will submit an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) roster and selected individual files to the Division commander. Every effort will be made to balance membership between participating states, consistent with selecting the most qualified officer/non commissioned officer for a given position. Individuals selected to fill a key staff position will maintain membership in the respective state.

(2) **Key Full Time Support.** Selection of all full-time support personnel (O4s and above and E8s and above) is the Division commander's prerogative. The HRMO, ..... will advertise all key full-time support positions by providing bulletins to the HRMOs of the participating states. The HRMOs from participating states will forward applications to the HRMO, .... who will screen applications for eligibility and forward all applications to the Division commander. The HRMO, .... will allow time to distribute and process all applications. Only applications received from participating states' HRMO will be considered. The HRO, .... will process all selectees.

(3) **Other Full-Time Support.** The Division commander has clear supervisory and directive authority over all military FTS positions directly supporting the brigades and other subordinate units of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. Full-time support personnel include AGR personnel assigned to the unit level in a full-time National Guard status (also known as Title 32 AGRs) and any AC positions (the "titled" positions under the AC to RC support program) directly supporting the brigades and other subordinate units of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The Division commander will be afforded the opportunity to review and reject FTS officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for assignment to the Division HHC, brigades, and other divisional units.

- (4) **Unit Vacancy Officer Promotions.** The Division commander will have approval authority for all unit vacancy officer promotions above the rank of second lieutenant for all brigades and subordinate units of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division IAW section 1113(a), Title XI
- (5) **Officer Evaluation Reports.** The rating chain for officers assigned to the Division will be as follows:

Position	Rater	Intermediate Rater	Senior Rater
Division Commander	Corps Commander		FORSCOM Commander
Assistant Division Commander	Division Commander		Corps Commander
Chief of Staff	Division Commander		Corps Commander
Brigade, DISCOM, CAB, and DIVARTY Commanders	Division Commander		The Adjutant General
Separate Battalion Commanders	Chief of Staff		Division Commander

Rating schemes for units not listed, are left to the discretion of the respective states. The Division commander will not be added into any rating chain without his prior approval.

- (5) **Unit Assignment.** Except as noted above, all personnel assigned to a Modified TOE positions in the Division must be members of the ARNG in the state where his/her unit is assigned.
- (6) **Mobilization Authority for Response to State Emergencies.**
- (7) **Federal Recognition.** The Division commander will appoint and convene Federal recognition boards and take other significant personnel actions required of a General Officer by custom or tradition. Actions will be coordinated with the respective TAGs, as appropriate.
- (8) **Military Justice Authority.** The Division commander is the courts-martial convening authority under the Federal Uniform Code of Military Justice



(UCMJ) for all active component soldiers assigned to the division and for all Title X personnel assigned to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division, and the state UCMJ authority for each of the respective states having subordinate units within the Division as pertains to all ARNG soldiers assigned to the brigades and other subordinate units comprising the Division.

(9) **Relief for Cause.**

(10) **Civilian Technicians.** The Division commander exercises supervisory authority over and acts on specific civilian personnel matters with regard to ARNG technicians assigned to the brigades and other subordinate units comprising the AC/ARNG Integrated Division.

d. **Logistics.**

(1) **Equipment/Maintenance Support.** Procedures for equipment and maintenance support will be handled through Division channels. The Division commander or his designated representative will coordinate with the respective United States Property and Finance Officer (USP&FO) for equipment to support mobilization and training requirements.

(2) **Spare Parts.**

(3) **Modernization.**

(4) **Equipment Transfers.**

(5) **Property Accountability.** Property accountability will remain with the USP&FO of the state to which the units within the Division are assigned. Upon Federal mobilization, equipment management will revert to the Command Logistics Section, HHC, Division Support Command.

6. **Command Relationships and Responsibilities.**

a. **Commander, FORSCOM.** See FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2.

b. **Director, Army National Guard.** See FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2.

c. **Corps Commanders.** See FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2.

d. **State Adjutants Generals (TAGs).** See FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2.

**e. Division Commander, AC/ARNG Integrated Division.**

- (1) The Division commander is the sole intermediate authority on all matters between the subordinate units of the AC/ARNG Integrated Division and higher state and/or Federal authorities.
- (2) The Division commander unites the chains of both Federal and state authority over subordinate brigades and other units comprising the AC/ARNG Integrated Division. The three sources of Federal authority are:
  - (a) The Secretary of the Army, as exercised through the Chief, National Guard Bureau/Director, Army National Guard, directly and through subordinate NGB officials;
  - (b) The Secretary of the Army, as exercised through the Army Staff agencies and the Commanding General, FORSCOM; and
  - (c) Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINACOM), as exercised through the Commanding General, FORSCOM in his role as Army Service Component Commander of USACOM.
- (3) The Division commander will accept commissions as an officer in the National Guard for each of the states with brigades or other subordinate units within the AC/ARNG Integrated Division pursuant to 32 USC 315
  - (a).
- (4) The Division commander is the designated official through whom the USP&FOs of the respective states reports with regard to all Federal funds and property issued to or under the control of brigades and other subordinate units of those states.

**f. USP&FOs.**

**7. Administration.**

- a. **Unit Recruiting and Retention.**
- b. **Family Support Programs.**
- c. **Employer Support-Guard/Reserve.**
- d. **SIDPERS Reporting.**
- e. **Unit Logistics Systems.**

**8. Resources.**

- a. The Commander of the AC/ARNG Division is the Program Director/Manager for funds within the respective states identified for support of units assigned to the Division with duties and responsibilities as defined in Army financial management and stewardship regulations.
  - b. NGB will develop a process to separately identify unit training and readiness funds budgeted and programmed for support to AC/ARNG Integrated Division RC forces. This process will allow for monthly/periodic reviews of resourcing and execution levels upon which to base/review fiscal adjustment decisions. This baseline will serve as the basis for all programming and budget decisions within the Army. NGB will provide FORSCOM with a copy of all budget and programming actions affecting the resourcing of units assigned to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division for coordination, concurrence and incorporation in integrated priority lists and the CINCs Integrated Priority Lists. Funds allocated to the support of these RC forces will be controlled and monitored by the Division commander as provided for under current regulations. Reprogramming decisions affecting the overall funding levels for units assigned to the AC/ARNG Integrated Division will be a coordinated action between the respective TAG and the Division Commander. All major fiscal actions will be subject to review by both the Chief, NGB and the Commanding General, FORSCOM. The Division Commander is expected to retain flexibility to deal with minor changes affecting day-to-day operations of assigned units to meet their training and readiness needs.
9. **MOA Modifications.** This MOA will be changed or modified only by consent of the signatories.
10. **Period of Agreement.** This MOA is effective upon signature and will remain in effect until terminated or modified by the responsible parties. The MOA will be reviewed annually and revised, if appropriate. The review will be initiated by the Division commander and be accommodated in conjunction with the Yearly Training Brief for brigades and other subordinate units of the respective states.

## Appendix A

### References

1. AR 10-87
2. AR 135-100
3. AR 220-1
4. AR 310-49
5. AR 310-49-1
6. AR 570-4
7. AR 635-100
8. FORSCOM/ARNG Reg 350-2
9. NGB 600-5
10. NGB 750-2
11. ARNGR 220-1
12. ARNG Troop Structure Program
13. Title 32, US Code
14. Title 11, US Code
15. FM 25-100/101

Working Paper

## Appendix K DECISION BRIEF

The next pages contain the briefing slides that were used to brief the Secretary of the Army, Senior Commanders, Chief of Staff and members of the Army Staff. That briefing took place on 6 August 97 in Washington, DC.

In addition to the Secretary of the Army, other principal attendees at the 6 August 1997 decision briefing were:

- Chief of Staff, Army
- Vice Chief of Staff, Army
- Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)
- Commander, FORSCOM
- Commander, TRADOC
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
- Director, National Guard Bureau
- Director, Army National Guard
- The Adjutant General, Ohio



**AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION STUDY**

**Final Report**

for

**The Honorable Togo D. West  
Secretary of the Army**

6 August 1997

## **AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION STUDY**

**Purpose: Provide the Final Report on AC/ARNG  
Integrated Division Study.**




**PURPOSE OF THE AC/ARNG  
INTEGRATED DIVISION STUDY**

- **Assess viability of concept by addressing doctrinal, organizational, training, mobilization, and warfighting impacts.**
- **Provide recommendations on merits and how to proceed.**


# SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES 1,2,3

## Alternative 1




**Pre Mob: Div Base and 3 ERBs**  
**Post Mob Either: 3 ERBs or AOE Div**

## Alternative 2



**Pre and Post Mob: 3 ERBs**  
**Post Mob: DIV HHC operates Warfighting Center**

## Alternative 3



**Pre and Post Mob: AOE Div or Task Organized BDEs**


**ASSESSMENT AREAS AND  
OVERALL ASSESSMENT**


- ✓ • **Doctrinal**
- ✓ • **Organizational**
- ✓ • **Statutory/Regulatory**
- ✓ • **Pre Mobilization Training**
- ✓ • **Post Mobilization Training**
- ✓ • **Total Force Implications**
- ✓ • **Resourcing**

**Concept is viable if:**

## STATUTORY/REGULATORY/ ADMINISTRATIVE/DATA FLOW

- **Statutory/Regulatory Issues Centered on Command, Use of Units, Use of Funds.**
  - No Legal Show Stoppers
  - Different views on how to implement
- **Command and Control.**
  - Division Commander needs requisite Authority/Accountability/ Responsibility
  - Concern over command authority: "Good Will" vice clear authority lines
  - Short Term Solution is MOA
- **Administrative/Data Flow.**
  - Current Systems support current (ERB) command and budgetary structures.
  - Significant manual manipulation required in short term.
  - Systems changes needed for long term solutions.
- **Must resolve issues prior to implementation.**
  - Requires key player participation





## FORCE IMPLICATIONS


CINCUNC  
CINCUSAREUR &  
CINCCEANT - See  
no requirement  
for forces beyond  
M + 90

- Alts 1 (as a Div) & 3 delay deployment of some ERBs and CS/CSS units needed to support early deploying CA units.
- Alt 1&3 generate CS/CSS tail.
- Alt 1 (as a Div) & Alt 3 not IAW existing DPG and JSCP.
- Impact of QDR unknown.

## RESOURCE ANALYSIS

- **All alternatives require resources to implement:**
  - Alt 2 least expensive.
  - Alts 1 & 3 require division base.
  - Alt 1 is most expensive--redundancy between brigades and division base.
- **All three alternatives generate larger than normal mission travel budgets.**
- **Alts 1 (as a Div) & 3 generate CS/CSS tail.**
- **All alternatives generate additional AC support requirements over those briefed in the SOT FAA.**





## COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

	Doctrine	Organization	Statutory	Pre Mob Tng	Post Mob Tng	Force Implications	Resources	Overall
Alternative 1	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	A
Alternative 2	G	G	A	G	G	G	G	A/G
Alternative 3	G	G	A	A	A	A	A	A

GREEN - no show stopper  
 AMBER - issues to be resolved  
 RED - show stoppers exist

**STATUTORY - Must resolve command, funding and data transfer**

**PRE/POST MOB TNG - Alts 1 & 3 train both Bde and Div missions, Alt 2 Bde only**


**FORCE IMP - Alt 1(as DIV) & 3 delay later deploying forces, generate additional CS/CSS tail, and not IAW current DPG (Div deployment)**


**RESOURCES\* - Alt 1 & 3 require significant additional resources for the Div bases**

**\*Note: May be offset by existing ARNG Force Structure**

## ALT 2 - "BEST TO TEST"

- **Because:**
  - Least costly
  - Easiest to implement
  - Meets current DPG
  - Facilitates future decisions
  - Doable in near term
- **Must Resolve Implementation**
- **Issues:**
  - Alignment
  - Statutory, Regulatory
  - Complementary methods of integration
- **Facilitates:**
  - Identification and resolution of issues
  - Transition to Alt 1 or 3





## STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS




PAT Lead: Two points of view...




- **Establish Implementation PAT:**
  - FORSCOM, ARNG, ARSTAF members.
  - Resolve implementation issues.
  - Look at complementary methods of AC/ARNG integration.
- **Near Term - Establish Alt 2 HQ to accomplish "TRO" mission:**
  - Provides opportunity to test.
  - Identify and resolve critical issues.
- **Long Term - Transition to Alt 1 or Alt 3, if appropriate**

# HOW TO PROCEED

## Phase I





## Phase II



Alt 2  
Lessons Learned

Force Structure  
Reductions



## **AC/ARNG INTEGRATED DIVISION**

### ***Issues for Implementation PAT to Resolve***

- **Alignments and HQ type/location**
- **Statutory and Regulatory adjustments**
  - Lines of authority/responsibility/accountability: State and Federal
  - Requirements for Commissions within states
  - Role of USP&FO
  - Conduct of inspections
  - Rating chain responsibilities
  - School seat allocations/prioritization
  - Federal recognition boards
  - Military Justice Authority
  - Allocation of AC assets
  - Allocation/management of full time support: Title 32 and Technicians
  - Title XI: Training program, readiness, resources, equipment compatibility
- **Funding streams for the AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions**
- **Complementary methods of AC/RC Integration**

