

betw 7/62 + 12/62  
obsolete EALP  
7/11/62  
Thompson to NATO  
~~SECRET~~

SOME PROPOSITIONS ON MRBMs

(draft)

1. There is a genuine concern among the Europeans about whether reliance on the American deterrent provides as much security as they can possibly achieve. The concern has been magnified by the recent development of Russian MRBM strength. There is a certain sense in which the concern is rational; there is a certain sense in which it is not. The rational element rests on the proposition that it is neither inconceivable nor literally impossible that an American Government might on some occasion be unwilling to accept the risks and costs involved in the decision to go to general nuclear war in defense of Europe. The irrational element arises from the fact that once this proposition is confronted, it is difficult to assess it merely in terms of probability. It has about it something of the character of doubts as to the faithfulness of a spouse.

2. These concerns are important enough now or will be important enough in the near future so that we must pay attention to them. Their roots are deep enough so that we cannot continue either to ignore them or to put off a serious confrontation with our NATO allies on them in the near future.

3. General Norstad's requirements for MRBM's as expressed in MC 96 are better understood as one response to these needs than in the terms in which they are presented by the NATO Military Committee.

4. There are in principle four ways by which we can move to meet this problem:

- a. creation of national nuclear forces in Europe;
- b. creation of a NATO nuclear force over the use of which the U. S. does not have a veto power;
- c. command arrangements for our own nuclear force which permit both the U. S. and Europe to initiate and veto its use;
- d. NATO agreement on guidelines for targeting the U. S. nuclear force and ordering its use without changing the present locus of decision-making power.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLC-44-50  
NARA Date 12/19/97

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WFR AMER. Gen. 7/62 - 12/62

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5. Of these alternatives, (a) is clearly against American interests. It would put us on the horns of the dilemma of denying the Germans what other NATO nations have, or arming the Germans with nuclear weapons. Further, it is uneconomic and militarily ineffective. All the other three alternatives involve the solution of a common problem: how to organize a multi-national command structure which makes feasible the effective use of nuclear weapons in a variety of contingencies. Of these, (c) appears to be an inferior alternative, offering no advantages lacking either in (b) or (d) and involving domestic political problems probably more difficult than either. The significant issue then is the choice between (b) and (d).

6. This choice does not have to be made immediately provided that some action goes forward in NATO which indicates that we are indeed confronting the problem. Without such an indication, the powerful currents running toward the creation of a national nuclear force may determine the outcome.

Carl Kaysen

~~TOP~~ SECRET

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not '62  
(A/6/30)

5. General Stehlin rationalizes the French nuclear force on the ground that it is the germ of a European nuclear deterrent force. He believes that this is also General de Gaulle's idea although de Gaulle has never said this. Stehlin has discussed the idea of a European force, apparently composed in the first instance of French and British forces, with other European military. The British have, so far, said they cannot discuss it because of their special relations with the U.S. Regarding the Germans, Stehlin feels that some arrangement could be worked out whereby the Germans would not control nuclear bombs on German soil but rather Germany would contribute industrially and financially to the development of a European nuclear deterrent.

6. A European nuclear force would work very intimately with the U.S. There would be the closest coordination. The idea of a European "third force" in between Russia and the U.S. is absurd. Two things are vital: that the countries of NATO remain united, and that the U.S. remain committed to defense of Europe indefinitely. *for the future*

7. U.S. military relations with Europe are in a critical stage. The problem of nuclear relations between Europe and the U.S. is at the heart of the issue. It must be solved in a way that gives Europe a proper role.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. The official French view on the policy of the U.S., especially as put forward by de Rose and de la Grandville is as follows:

a. The U.S., now vulnerable to nuclear attack, is limiting its commitments to the defense of Europe. Our emphasis on non-nuclear forces, on the controlled use of nuclears, on the limited utility of tactical nuclears, on our refusal to base strategic weapons (MIRV's) in Europe, provides a consistent body of evidence to support this view.

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U.S.  
4. McNAMARA's Athens and Michigan speeches and the June 15 position on the MRPM clearly ~~support this view.~~

b. It may be surmised that the French will shortly seize on the U.S. decision to install the permissive link on weapons in Europe as further ~~proof~~ <sup>justification</sup> ~~evidence~~ (There was no discussion of this subject in these meetings.) The argument will probably run: "Now we understand your tactical nuclear policy. It is not, as we had assumed, to remove these weapons, but to leave them in Europe -- neutralized by the link."

c. The multilateral force proposal of the U.S. is intended to divert effort from the French and British forces towards a multilateral force over which the U.S. has a veto.

d. Alternatively, we don't want the multilateral force to come into being; it is a smokescreen to help avoid giving nuclear aid to France. If we did want it to come into being, why do we take the position that there is no urgent military need for an MRPM force?

e. The French see the need for close coordination with the U.S. on nuclear policies and military strategy in general, but there must be a greater voice for France and for Europe in strategic decisions.

2. There seems now to be a strong possibility that the French will propose the creation of a European nuclear force in the near future. This force would be composed of British and French operational units under national command but committed to a European command. Financial and materiel support from Germany ~~might~~ <sup>would</sup> be sought. This force should be closely coordinated with the U.S. through NATO. It seems likely that there have ~~obviously~~ been some cautious discussions between the French and British on this idea.

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SOME PROPOSITIONS ON MRBMS

*(Handwritten signature)*

1. There is a genuine concern among the Europeans about whether reliance on the American deterrent provides as much security as they can possibly achieve. The concern has been magnified by the recent development of Russian MRBM strength. There is a certain sense in which the concern is rational; there is a certain sense in which it is not. The rational element rests on the proposition that it is neither inconceivable nor literally impossible that an American government might on some occasion be unwilling to accept the risks and costs involved in the decision to go to general nuclear war in defense of Europe. The irrational element arises from the fact that once this proposition is confronted, it is difficult to assess it merely in terms of probability. It has about it something of the character of doubts as to the faithfulness of a spouse.

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- b. creation of a NATO nuclear force over the use of which the U.S. does not have a veto power;
- c. command arrangements for our own nuclear forces which shift the power of decision so as to permit either no vetoes or both European and American vetoes.
- d. NATO agreement on guidelines for targeting the U.S. nuclear force and ordering its use.

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*NSP / 26 / MUP, Gen.*

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NLK-94-50  
By: [Signature] NARA Date: 1/31/01

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5. Of these alternatives, (a) is clearly against American interests. It would put us on the horns of the dilemma of denying the Germans what other NATO nations have, or arming the Germans with nuclear weapons. Further, it is uneconomic and militarily ineffective. All the other three alternatives involve the solution of a common problem: how to organize a multi-national command structure which makes feasible the effective use of nuclear weapons in a variety of contingencies. Of these, (c) appears to be an inferior alternative, offering no advantages lacking either in (b) or (d) and involving domestic political problems probably more difficult than either. The significant issue then is the choice between (b) and (d).

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7/2/62  
cc 7/13-MSF

2 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The North Atlantic Council decided at a recent meeting to invite General Norstad to appear in July in order to present his views on the military requirement for MRBMs. When Secretary-General Stikker and Ambassador Finletter were quoted in a report of that meeting to the effect that they regarded this appearance as the presentation of Norstad's "personal and independent" views, his Political Adviser sent a cable to the Secretary of State to stress that, on the contrary, "he would appear as responsible Allied Commander to state military requirements for Allied Command Europe and to discuss broadly the basis on which such requirements are determined."

General Norstad can be expected to express views along the lines of the comments which he addressed to a NATO Standing Group paper in mid-May: "A modern nuclear strike force in Allied Command Europe is an imperative requirement.... In the early nineteen sixties this MRBM force should consist of a mixture of mobile land and submarine based MRBMs.... Finally, and of the greatest importance, such a system is absolutely essential to the defense of NATO Europe." These remarks were routinely made available to all NATO national delegations at the time.

Thus the chances are that Norstad's views will clash to some degree with the June 15 Finletter presentation, which stated that "MRBM forces are not urgently needed for military reasons." How embarrassing such a clash may be is unclear, but even if Norstad manages to low-key the issue in his presentation, individual Council members can if they wish develop by questions the fact that Norstad was not consulted in the preparation of the June 15 US position as SACEUR or as CINCEUR, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the military requirement for MRBMs in NATO.

I raise this matter as a cloud on the horizon without knowing how to dissipate it. Secretary Rusk may have brought back something on this subject.

MSC F89-151 6/22/89  
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in accordance with  
Executive Order 11652  
2005/5/20/63

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

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7/13/68 NATO (Jul-Oct) MDM

#36

7/7/62

~~File~~ ~~J. H. ...~~ See u / mm E  
CR MRBM  
7 July 1962  
III - WEEKEND

GENERAL TAYLOR -

(let me see after this T has reviewed, E)

In this twelve-pager, Finletter does the following:

(1) Strongly registers his conviction that Europeans who might be in favor of truly multilateral NATO nuclear force have been quashed and deterred by our allegedly negative or at least tepid attitude toward it;

(2) Strongly registers his belief that, in order to harness the "EUROPA" surge to NATO instead of to some de Gaulle anti-NATO idea, the U.S. must immediately initiate a strong and positive campaign to "sell" the multilateral force in a NATO context.

As far as I am able to make out, he means the Owen-Rowen "Suggested NATO Nuclear Program" which he presented on June 15. Recent indications of high-level thinking around here would not imply much support for Finletter outside Henry Owen and the other Young Turks in State. Nobody likes to bet heavily on a loser.

We ought to be moving all right, but not in this direction.

There is quite a possibility that this Finletter message was inspired by correspondence or direct contacts with the Young Turks.

*LYL*

LEGERE

ref. fr. Paris Oct 21, 4 Sec.  
7/5/62

Mr. Ball's reference to Henry Owen and Co. as "young Turks" is not particularly appropriate. The young Turks were progressives attempting to bring Turkey into the modern world. Owen and Co. are more like the Congress of Vienna in trying to turn ~~the~~ the clock back to the #9 ~~of comfortable days~~ of U.S. post war supremacy. E  
1 Folder 3: "The NY" RDU

87-MOR-124



(SYG (Stikker's name) ✓

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
FILE: Atomic - Nucl ✓  
MRBM ✓

Index: { Adenauer - de Gaulle } talks ✓  
De Gaulle - A  
SPENDEL, de Gaulle's dislike ✓

FRANCE (force de  
GERMANY  
US

Dear Lem: (Committee)

Through many, many contacts, both political and military, on the subject of organization,



There is here, and perhaps also in the U.S., frequent use of the word "multilateral" in describing nuclear forces, without any very precise idea of what is meant, and this strikes me as being unfortunate since almost any useful solution would be multilateral in some important respect. For the moment, however, it doesn't seem to be worthwhile to try to undertake to clarify this point.

Another subject in which there is increasing confusion, encouraged, I am afraid, by some American visitors over here, the last of which were Bowie and Rowan, is the nature of the MRBM requirement. The arguments, when stripped down to the bone, appear to be based solely on the matter of range; that is, if a weapon can reach a strategic target, it is therefore strategic regardless of the primary function for which it is intended. Fortunately, most informed and responsible Europeans feel that the label should spring from the function. I do not, of course, discourage them in this thinking. This also is a point which will have to be touched on later, but for the moment I think it would be useless to raise it. I may have to touch on some of these things in my presentation to the Council on 25 July but, if so, I will do so only very generally.

You will recall that Secretary Rusk discussed the subject of coordination of nuclear deterrent forces with Couve when he was here and was told that the French consider it premature to discuss

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Agency Case OSD 89-MX-047L  
NLE Case 89-9947  
By JHC NLE Date 12/27/90

Worked up 8/85 / Atomic Warhead Policy 1962 (1)

details which related to a force which was not yet in existence. I have subsequently learned that this was not a casual reaction on the part of the Foreign Minister but was, in fact, a position strongly advocated by several elements in the French Government, including the National Defense Staff. Puget, for instance, who had participated in the preparation of a recommendation to this effect, and who had discussed the matter with De Gaulle, feels very strongly that the best answer from the standpoint of France, the United States and NATO will come in a year or two, when there is something specific to coordinate and when there may be less emotion involved in this topic.

The Adenauer visit to France seems to have been most successful in every respect. As I reported to you by message, the Chancellor appears to have maintained his position that European development should be within the framework of NATO and that defense matters particularly must remain the responsibility of the Alliance.

In response to a question, I have advised the Germans to think this over extremely carefully, since keeping Speidel on even when it was known that De Gaulle didn't like him was one thing, but to extend him beyond the legal limit could very well be taken as a direct affront.

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I had been asked by President Luebke to have lunch with him on the 6th of July, which raised some questions in my mind, since Adenauer was, of course, planning to be in France on that date. There seems to have been some lack of coordination between the offices of the President and the Chancellor, and I was asked to change this to the 12th. I believe I will get a little bit of first-hand information from the Chancellor not only on his visit here, but also on his reaction to some of the U.S. initiatives which are currently under study. At dinner at the Elysee last Tuesday night, he did tell me that he was very pleased with Rusk's visit to Bonn. He said there had been, as I know, some trouble between him and Washington, but that Rusk's visit was a very useful gesture and that Rusk himself was a very "nice man," and he liked him. From the reports I have seen, no decisions of monumental importance were taken on the occasion of that visit, but it was very clear that the Secretary of State did a first-rate job in calming otherwise rather troubled waters.

There are two points which may be of interest to you, but which clearly fall within the realm of gossip. The first is that more and more people, who normally have some feel, if not inside knowledge, of French governmental affairs, say that Couve wants to leave the Government and return to Washington as the Ambassador. Supporting the idea that there would be a change is the understanding of these same people that De Gaulle is very anxious to reward Joxe for his Algerian efforts, and that Joxe, who has spent his career since the war as a diplomat, would like to be Foreign Minister.


The second point comes from more direct information. On Saturday, while talking to Stikker privately, he made several references to the problems of finding a successor to himself and the timing of a change, etc. He left me with a very clear impression that he has in mind staying on for another period of one and a half to two years. This would give him a total of three or three and a half years in office. I was rather surprised at this, because he has been increasingly preoccupied with his health over the last three months and he has just about convinced me that this was a real problem. My personal relationship with Stikker is so close that I ask you to protect both the information in this paragraph and the source.

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To conclude this long epistle, I tentatively plan to come to Washington for a day or two about the 26th or 27th of this month, and I would hope at that time to see you and the Chiefs of Staff, if that is convenient.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,



LAURIS NORSTAD  
General USAF

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

EP34

12/1/62

Approved in S  
6/28/62

JUL 12 1962

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SECRETARY'S MEMORIAL TRIP  
(June 18-28, 1962)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 24, 1962  
Time: 8:00 p.m.  
Place: Charleton Gardens  
Date: 7/19/92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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Participants:

United States

Secretary of State  
Ambassador Bruce  
Mr. Bohlen  
Mr. Kohler

UK

Prime Minister Macmillan  
Lord Home, Foreign Secretary  
Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Ian Smeals

Subject: Berlin

Copies: *sloter-4*

S/S-3 BNA-8  
G-5 RPM-9  
S/P-6 INR/D-10  
EUR-7

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EMIR-2

Lord Home opened the discussion on Berlin by saying that he wondered whether in this period of relative quiet in the Berlin situation we should not be considering new possibilities that might be put forward to the Soviets, for example, the suggestion that the Western troops be converted to police forces. The Secretary replied that we had the impression that for the time being the Soviets were setting aside all peripheral issues and concentrating on the central question of the presence of occupation forces in Berlin. They seemed to be taking for granted the broader issues which had been raised. The Secretary then continued by giving a run-down on the course of the talks he had had with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Both sides, he commented, were trying to penetrate through the words to the realities underneath. There was clearly no chance of making new proposals on the central issue where we had come to the hard core. Perhaps later we could move further on peripheral issues. Also there might be possibilities even in the field of disarmament as well as in expanded contacts between East and West Berlin. We had the impression in Bonn that the West Germans were becoming softer on the question of contacts with the East Germans. At the proper time the trusteeship concept would be worth discussing. In sum, however, he felt that if we could solve

or leave

or leave aside all question of the presence of forces, the other matters would be easy. In theory the Soviets had seemed to harden up but he felt that in practice they had not done so.

[Lord Howe said that there had been two issues he had had in mind as possibilities, the first being the one he had mentioned of turning the armed forces into police forces; the second was the conversion of the occupation into a trusteeship. During the ensuing discussion he clarified that what he had in mind was essentially verbal changes. He did not, for example, contemplate any change in the armament of the members of the Western military in Berlin, or the abandonment of our occupational rights.]

The Secretary commented that in fact the Soviets have no right to raise any question with respect to Berlin at all except on the basis of their own occupation status. He did not believe that a military crisis is what Eisenhower wants. He added that it was possible that there might be a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in July if the Ministers assembled to conclude the Laos settlement. In reply to the Prime Minister's inquiry as to what would then be said to Gromyko, the Secretary replied probably the same thing we have been saying in the talks so far. The Secretary then went on to report that German Foreign Minister Schroeder had agreed to the elimination of the phrase in the revised Principles Paper to which the UK and France had objected, which would limit their participation in a Deputy Foreign Ministers Committee. Schroeder had strenuously objected to the inclusion of Paragraph 5 in the revised Principles Paper but had reluctantly accepted our new 3-3-3 formula for membership on the Board of Directors of an International Atomic Authority. He then reported on his conversations with President de Gaulle and French Foreign Minister Coure de Marville, commenting that they seemed to have softened up somewhat and that there might be some possibilities of their coming back to participation.

[Lord Howe said he realized that the evidence seemed to be against it but he continued to be apprehensive that the Soviets might go ahead with the signature of their separate peace treaty. The Secretary, while recognizing that this was a possibility at any time, again expressed the opinion that the weight of the evidence was against the Soviets either bringing on a military crisis or a complete diplomatic impasse. He added that if there were changes in the government in East Germany or perhaps in both East and West Germany, the situation would probably ease. He had had the impression that German opinion was easier about East Germany in any event, particularly in the SPD and the FDP.]

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*The members sharing  
of some information -  
Contradictory of about  
long standing US pol*

71552 *JL 18/62*  
*(complete copy)*

July 18, 1962

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum of Conversation between the President and  
Ambassador Dobrynin, Tuesday, July 17, 1962, 6:00 p. m.  
(prepared from the President's account and approved by the  
President July 18)

The President met alone with Ambassador Dobrynin and talked with  
him for just under an hour. The atmosphere of the conversation  
was agreeable. After some pleasantries the conversation turned  
on three subjects: Berlin, nuclear testing, and developments in  
Southeast Asia.

On Berlin, the President told Dobrynin that he had prepared and  
would soon have delivered a reply to Chairman Khrushchev's recent  
communication. The President emphasized that the presence of  
Allied troops in West Berlin is a vital interest of the United States.  
For this reason none of the Soviet proposals for alternative ar-  
rangements could be accepted; all of them, in one way or another,  
implied the departure of Western troops -- they would get us out,  
and without so much as a fig leaf of concealment. This would mean  
a major retreat. Europe would lose confidence in U. S. leadership.  
It would be a major victory for the Soviet Union and a major defeat  
for the West.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that Chairman Khrushchev would be greatly  
disappointed in this response to his most recent proposal. He asked  
whether the American position was related to German interests or  
American interests. The President said again that he was speaking  
of a vital U. S. interest. There might well be other issues on which  
we would be willing to press the Germans quite hard -- as, for  
example, on the structure of an access authority. But on the question  
of our presence in Berlin, there was no argument among the Western  
Allies; it was of vital interest to all. The President remarked that  
he had made this point clear to Foreign Minister Gromyko in the  
fall of 1961.

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| E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4                 |
| NUS-88-63                            |
| By <u>SKF</u> NARA, Date <u>9/90</u> |

July 18, 1962

(Berlin--cont'd)

Ambassador Dobrynin argued that in its present condition Berlin is a potential source of dangerous friction and conflict and that a removal of Western troops would lessen the dangers. The President stated that while he could understand Soviet objections to the presence of Western troops, he must emphasize again that the removal of Western troops would be a disaster for us, while their presence was not a disaster for the Soviet Union.

The President also emphasized that Soviet-created tensions in Berlin had caused increases in Western rearmament and that any new crisis would have a similar effect. The President noted the disagreement which the United States has with its Allies on the diffusion of nuclear weapons, and said that Soviet-created tensions could only increase the danger of results which the Soviet Government would not like. Ambassador Dobrynin argued in reply that it was the fact of Western troops in West Berlin which created these dangers. This was the one point of direct confrontation between opposing great powers, and it was naturally a source of danger. If the confrontation could be ended, the dangers would be reduced. The President repeated that the real cause of danger was the Soviet effort to change the existing situation, that the way to reduce tension was to reach an understanding, and that the presence of Allied troops was a vital interest. The Ambassador repeated that the Chairman would be disappointed.

(comments on nuclear testing are on page 3,  
and on developments in Southeast Asia on page 4)



July 18, 1962

Further section of memorandum of conversation between the President and Ambassador Dobrynin, Tuesday, July 17, 6:00 p. m.

Nuclear testing

On testing, the President stated his continuing hope for an agreement. Ambassador Dobrynin inquired about the meaning of the new evidence on which Ambassador Dean had commented in Geneva. The President said it was certain that in response to any renewed Soviet tests American scientists would urge the need for additional American testing, so that it would help if any new series of Soviet tests could be short. The President pointed out that the current American series was a response to Soviet tests, while Ambassador Dobrynin, for his part, argued that the Americans had had many more tests than the Russians.

(comments on Berlin are on pages 1 & 2,  
and on developments in Southeast Asia  
on page 4)

Further section of memorandum of conversation between the President and Ambassador Dobrynin, Tuesday, July 17, 6:00 p. m.

Southeast Asia

On Southeast Asia, the President and Ambassador Dobrynin exchanged compliments on the satisfactory developments in Geneva on Laos. Ambassador Dobrynin inquired about U. S. troops in Thailand. The President replied that 1,000 Marines had been removed and that he expected to remove the remaining Marines after the Laos agreements had been signed. He did not consider that his earlier message to Chairman Khrushchev covered other troops. Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that there would still be an American army combat group in Thailand, but the President stated that his earlier assurances did not refer to that group.

(comments on Berlin are on pages 1 & 2,  
and on nuclear testing on page 3)

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-5-

July 18, 1962

In the meeting between Dobrynin and the President, Dobrynin told the President that the Soviet Union would resume nuclear testing. He did not give a date.

(this portion appears only on the President's copy  
and on Mr. Bundy's copy)



TOP SECRET

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Mr. Gilpatrick

RG 330 FRC 66B3542

18573/1

In reply refer to I-35251/62

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

363

July 20  
1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Summary of BEECON, MARCON and LIVE OAK Plans

In response to your instructions, the following summary of Berlin contingency plans has been prepared. BEECON and MARCON plans are summarized as they now stand. It is anticipated that changes and additions will be made over the next several months as a result of Alliance action.

I recommend that distribution of this summary be kept to a minimum since a compilation of this sort is sensitive. These plans have been closely held both here and in the State Department.

BEECON PLANS

With the exception of BEECON BRAVO (the nuclear demonstration) and BEECON DELTA (the naval plan), each of these plans is predicated upon the use of conventional weapons. In addition, however, provisions have been made for the limited use of nuclear weapons to insure the success of the mission when circumstances so warrant. Naval plans provide for the use of nuclear weapons at sea in self defense.

ALPHA ONE. This plan employs the maximum scale of fighter escort for protection of cargo and passenger planes within the Berlin air corridors. Fighter escorts will attack any Communist planes which attack Allied transports. These fighters will also attack any Communist SAM batteries which fire on these transports.

ALPHA TWO. This plan consists of a major air battle to gain and maintain local air superiority over East Germany, initiated with conventional weapons. It includes the attack of Soviet and East German airfields and surface-to-air missile sites in East Germany and selected Communist airfields and SAM sites in the satellite countries.

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BRAVO. This plan is a nuclear demonstration to insure the Communists are aware that the Alliance stands ready for nuclear action. It includes the employment of approximately five low yield air bursts on strictly military targets (such as a group of attacking aircraft, Communist airfield, a SAM site, or a troop concentration) located away from built up areas.

CHARLIE ONE. This plan consists of an attack by a reinforced division along the axis of the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn for the purpose of seizing and holding a salient into East Germany up to the vicinity of L. Maraleben. NATO air forces would operate in a close support role.

CHARLIE TWO. This plan is a two division attack to pinch off and hold the salient East of Kassel up to the general line Duderstadt-Borbis-Warfried.

CHARLIE THREE. This plan consists of a corps attack of up to four divisions along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn to seize and hold a salient into East Germany up to the line Mittelland Canal - Elbe River.

CHARLIE FOUR. This plan is an attack by a corps of up to four divisions to seize and hold the high ground areas of the Thuringer-Wald.

DELTA. This plan includes the employment of naval forces for surveillance of Soviet Bloc warships and merchant shipping, hindrance of Soviet Bloc ship activity, board and search measures, seizure of Soviet Bloc merchant ships, and excluding or diverting Soviet Bloc ships from or the blockade of, specific areas. Each of these measures will be specifically ordered executed; therefore, this single plan actually is several plans consolidated into one.

#### MARCON FLANK

These plans would be carried out with conventional weapons except that nuclear weapons would be used in self defense.

ONE. To shadow designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships in specified areas.

TWO. To shadow Soviet Bloc warships in specified areas.

THREE. To hinder and directly annoy designated Soviet Bloc ships.

FOUR. To board and search designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships.

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28 F 73B

FIVE. To seize designated Soviet Bloc merchant ships.

SIX. To blockade or enforce diversion and exclusion of Soviet Bloc ships from specified areas.

LIVE OAK PLANS

AIR PLANS

JACK PINE. The tripartite plan for air operations designed to maintain air access to Berlin. Part I is concerned with air transport operations (including airlift support of the Berlin garrison); Part II with air tactical operations (fighter escort, etc.).

\* GRAL. A quadripartite Berlin airlift plan providing for massive airlift operations in support of Berlin populace in event surface access is blocked. It provides for an airlift of 4,000 metric tons daily into Berlin.

GROUND PLANS

FREE STYLE. A tripartite (France, UK and US) plan to probe from Helmstedt to Berlin to determine whether or not the Soviets are prepared to use force to prevent the passage of an Allied convoy on the autobahn. Three alternative courses of action--A, B, or C--include employment of tripartite probe parties of varying sizes and composition.

BACK STROKE. Similar to FREE STYLE, except that it originates in Berlin.

TRADE WIND. A tripartite plan for using force in an attempt to cause the Soviets to reopen autobahn access from Helmstedt to Berlin. A battalion sized force of 1070 personnel and 239 vehicles would be used.

LINKY STRIKE. Similar to TRADE WIND except that it originates in Berlin and would use a smaller force of 681 personnel and 133 vehicles.

\*(Technically this is not a LIVE OAK plan since it is quadripartite rather than tripartite.)

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JUNE HALL. This plan would use a tripartite division aimed  
force to reopen access. Although planning is not yet completed, it  
is anticipated that assembly of the force would be under LEVE OAK  
and implementation under NACG.

/s/ Paul H. Hittner

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

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July 19-26, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 21, 1962  
Time: 8:30 P.M.  
Place: Hotel Richmond

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Harriman  
Mr. Hillenbrand

United States

Lord Home, Foreign Secretary  
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh  
Mr. Samuel  
Mr. Tomkins

Germany

Foreign Minister Schroeder  
Dr. Carstens  
Mr. Krapf  
Mr. Reinkemeyer

France

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
M. Baraduc  
M. Roux  
M. Durand

Subject: Berlin

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US Mission Berlin

Couve, who had seen Gromyko for more than an hour before the Secretary, began by reporting his impressions. After a discussion of Laos, which he described as not important, Couve said Gromyko raised the subject of Germany and Berlin. He attacked France for the closeness of her relations with the Federal Republic, starting back to the Franco-Russian Alliance after World War II. Couve said he responded by pointing out that this was not a useful segment of past history, which also included 1938-1939. French national interests in good relations with the Federal Republic were not

contrary



Contrary to Soviet national interests, and France did not object to good Soviet relations with the GDR. On Berlin, Gromyko made his usual speech about drawing a line under World War II and threatened, if agreement were not reached, that the Soviets would proceed with their peace treaty. In response to a query as to what would follow the peace treaty, Gromyko merely said that the Soviets would sign the treaty and the Western Powers would be responsible thereafter. Couve said he had responded that the Soviets would be responsible for the consequences and had advised against their taking serious risks on behalf of the national interests of the GDR. This could lead to a serious situation. There was no real discussion of this point, he added, and the meeting terminated with a brief further exchange on Laos.

The Secretary and Mr. Kohler then reported at length on the meeting with Gromyko which had taken place later in the day (Mr. Kohler spoke from his notes which are entirely consistent with the memorandum of conversation prepared by Mr. Akalowsky on the conversation with Gromyko). In the subsequent discussion the Secretary stressed we should take note of the fact that the Soviets now seem more insistent on signing a peace treaty. The Western Powers should accordingly review their contingency planning for this eventuality in the light of recent developments. He wondered whether the time would not soon come when we should say to the Soviets that their signing of a peace treaty cannot involve a number of specific points which would add up to an attempt unilaterally to dispose of Western rights in Berlin. The other Foreign Ministers agreed that the suggested review of contingency planning would be appropriate.

Home wondered whether, in hinting points to the Soviets sufficient to cover their retreat, we had really given them enough to do this. The Western Powers were not, of course, certain that the Soviets were interested in this. The Secretary commented that the short "principles paper" he had given Gromyko during the previous Geneva talks had provided such an opportunity for the Soviets if they had wanted to utilize it. Moreover, if it would help to have a UN High Commissioner for Berlin as a whole who would not interfere with our responsibilities in West Berlin, this could be discussed. The Soviets had also showed no interest in pursuing this line. They seemed interested only in driving the West out of Berlin.

In response to Couve's query as to whether the Soviets had ever shown any interest in taking up points in the U.S. "principles paper", the Secretary answered in the negative and indicated that Gromyko had instead complained that they had received no reply to their proposals.

SECRET

- 3 -

their proposals on access. The Secretary had made clear that, since these were connected with the removal of Western forces from Berlin, there was no point in pursuing the subject. If Western force removal could be left aside, we could then talk further about a Four-Power body for access, adding certain control functions to arbitration and eliminating any veto. As far as the Soviet claim of respect for GDR sovereignty was concerned, the Secretary noted that the Soviets had never responded to the suggestion that with respect to access we were not trying to interfere with GDR sovereignty but merely requiring that the GDR not interfere with our access.

Lord Home said he felt the line which the Secretary had been taking was exactly right under the circumstances. However, he noted, we had never specifically told the Soviets that, if they accepted Western troops in Berlin and continuation of the occupation, there would be a number of other points on which they could count, for example, having permanent Soviet troops stationed at the War Memorial in West Berlin and having the Western Powers calling their troops "Police Forces". This might help to save Soviet face.

The Secretary noted that rumors were circulating around Geneva that Gromyko would bring forward some new proposals on Tuesday. The Secretary's present intention was still to leave Geneva on Wednesday to keep his Washington appointments.

Home asked whether the Secretary had received the impression that, if we reiterated the points in the U.S. "principles paper", this would save Gromyko's face. The Secretary said this did not appear in anything said today. His impression was that the Soviets were trying to get the highest price on the troop issue by threatening to sign a peace treaty. They might be trying to find out if they could get anything from us by further negotiations. If they concluded in the negative, a number of alternatives were open to them. We were not sure the Soviets had made a final choice between these. The Secretary then mentioned various possibilities in connection with the peace treaty ranging from a Bois-Zerin type of treaty to the most radical devolution of power to the GDR over Allied access. We had tried to make every effort to clarify that, when all the arguments are put aside, what counts is that we are in West Berlin by right and are not going to be pushed out. This is a fact the Soviets must live with. If they start with this, other things can be worked out. If not, there will be trouble.

Home observed

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-4-

Home observed that, if the Soviets were to drop their demands, they would require some face-saving in order to justify their letting the situation lie, for example, having a contingent of troops in West Berlin. The Secretary said our "principles paper" was intended to get into discussions over time. The Soviets could, of course, say to us privately that they would sign their peace treaty but we would not need to mobilize. We did not have the impression they are now prepared to tell us that our proposed modus vivendi is what they are looking for.

The Secretary and Home noted there were no signs of Soviet military or diplomatic activity indicating they were moving towards an early peace treaty. However, the Secretary added, they might sign an attenuated peace treaty, but we felt it unlikely that they would commit themselves completely to Illbruck. Couve noted that Gromyko had not said what the results of signing a peace treaty would be. The Secretary commented that Gromyko did not want to indicate this clearly at this point. It might be worth trying to find out more as to what respect for the sovereignty of the GDR involved. Couve said this in part meant giving the GDR control of our communications. The Secretary recalled an early Thompson-Gromyko exchange in which the latter had responded to a statement that we cannot recognize the GDR by saying that we already did. However, he had not returned to this formulation. The Secretary also noted that the Soviets in general have used more severe language on Berlin with other people than with us directly. In fact, Gromyko had been relatively mild until he pulled out a paper and read prepared remarks.

The Secretary responded in negative to Home's query as to whether there had been any hints of a Soviet desire for a summit meeting. However, the Secretary said, he had the impression Gromyko had come to Geneva in the hope of working out a general agreement which could then be signed at the summit. He had the impression the Soviets were looking forward to an eventual summit.

The discussion concluded with consideration of guidance to press officers. There was agreement that the Western comment should be restrained and limited to stressing that the meeting today was part of a continuing process of discussion.

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7/24/62

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1962 JUL 23 PM 1 19

FROM: GENEVA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO <sup>30</sup> ~~30~~ JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX)  
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FOLLOWING BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON SECY GROMYKO CONVERSATION AT DINNER JULY 22.

SECY, KOHLER, AND HILLENBRAND HAD TWO AND A HALF-HOUR WORKING SESSION WITH GROMYKO, ILYICHEV, AND KOVALEV AFTER DINNER.

SECY STATED HE HAD REVIEWED OUR NOTES GROMYKO'S REMARKS YESTERDAY, PARTICULARLY THOSE AT END CONVERSATION, AND WISHED MAKE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT BRIDGE OVER IDEOLOGICAL GAP BETWEEN TWO GOVTS AND BECAUSE IT IMPORTANT ESTABLISH REAL CONTACT AND DISCUSSION IN TERMS REAL INTEREST TWO SIDES AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES, EXPRESSED VIEW EARNEST EFFORT NECESSARY TO CROSS SERIOUS GAP ARISING FROM FACT WHAT LOGICAL AND CONSISTENT TO ONE SIDE TURNED OUT BE ILLOGICAL AND INCONSISTENT TO OTHER.

RECALLING HIS OBSERVATION OF YESTERDAY THAT GROMYKO'S REMARKS WERE DISAPPOINTING BECAUSE THEY CONTAINED LITTLE NEW AND FAILED SHOW EFFORT FIND SOME BASIS FOR RECIPROCITY IN TERMS VITAL INTEREST OF WEST, SECY NOTED THOSE REMARKS RESEMBLED GREATLY WHAT HAD BEEN PUBLICLY SAID BY SOVS OVER LAST WEEKS.

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-2- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

COMMENTING ON GROMYKO'S ASSERTION SOVS HAD PUT FORWARD NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON TERMS MEETING INTERESTS BOTH SIDES, SECY POINTED OUT WE HAD BEEN UNABLE FIND IN SOVIET PROPOSALS ANYTHING THAT WAS IN OUR INTEREST. BOTH SIDES HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THEIR RESPECTIVE VITAL INTERESTS AS EACH SAW THEM AND IT WAS IMPORTANT FIND SOLUTION REFLECTING BASIC RECOGNITION THOSE VITAL INTERESTS.

SECY DENIED GROMYKO'S CLAIM US GOVT HAD LOST INTEREST IN REACHING AGREED DECISIONS. US HAD REPEATEDLY TRIED FIND COMMON BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND HAD SUGGESTED PROCEDURES AND FORMULAE WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE DEAL WITH PROBLEMS AT HAND WITHOUT HEIGHTENING CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO SIDES.

REFERRING TO GROMYKO'S STATEMENT WEST PUTTING FORWARD DEMANDS WITH WHICH SOVS CATEGORICALLY COULD NOT AGREE, SECY SAID HE WISHED REMIND GROMYKO WEST WAS MAKING NO DEMANDS AND WAS NOT ASKING ANYTHING FROM USSR. ISSUES HAD ARISEN ONLY AS RESULT SOVIET DEMANDS FROM WEST. WHEN WEST SAID THOSE DEMANDS UNACCEPTABLE, SOVS DESCRIBED THIS AS "NYET, NYET, NYET". SECY POINTED OUT OUR REFUSAL OF DEMANDS DID NOT MEAN WE REFUSED REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. ON OTHER HAND, WHEN SOVS SAID NYET TO OUR PROPOSALS THEY DESCRIBED THIS AS ATTEMPT TO REACH COMPROMISE. SOVS SEEMED INTERPRET OUR VIEWS ON PEACE TREATY AND PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS WEST BERLIN AS DEMANDS ON US PART. SECY REMINDED GROMYKO WE TOO HAD PROPOSALS HOW TO DRAW LINE UNDER WORLD WAR II AND HAD IN FACT MADE SUCH PROPOSALS. WE WISHED SECURE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT GERMAN PROBLEM IN TERMS STABILITY AND PEACE CENTRAL EUROPE, SETTLEMENT AND ENSURING FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR GERMAN PEOPLE. WE BELIEVED THIS WAS ONLY BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT SINCE OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE REVIVAL WORST GERMAN NATIONALISM, SUCH AS HAD CAUSED SO MUCH TROUBLE IN PAST. IN TALKING ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS SOVS SAID FACTS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. DIVISION OF GERMANY, PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS IN

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-3- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

WEST BERLIN, AND ACCESS RIGHTS WERE ALL FACTS. SOVS SAID THOSE FACTS MUST BE CHANGED. WE TOO BELIEVED THEY SHOULD BE CHANGED BUT IN TERMS PERMANENT SOLUTION GERMAN PROBLEM. THUS WE WERE IN VICIOUS CIRCLE: SOVS REFUSE DISCUSS OUR IDEAS BECAUSE OF FACTS BUT SAY THAT FACTS ARE NOT DISCUSSABLE AND ARE TO BE CHANGED. THIS DEMANDS HAS CAUSED SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVTS.

AS TO GROMYKO'S ASSERTION WEST BERLIN REPRESENTED NATO BASE, SECY NOTED THIS ARGUMENT RATHER RECENT INVENTION, ON WHICH SPECIAL EMPHASIS HAD BEEN PLACED DURING RECENT WEEKS. GROMYKO HAD REMINDED US ALL YESTERDAY, IN WHAT WE REGARDED AS SOMEWHAT THREATENING TERMS, THAT WEST BERLIN WAS SURROUNDED BY FORCES WHICH WERE PART OF WARSAW PACT. SECY POINTED OUT WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN HAD NOT GONE THERE AS PART OF NATO AND WERE NOT UNDER NATO COMMAND. THEY REPORTED TO OUR AMBASSADORS IN BONN, WHO WERE SORT OF SUCCESSORS TO HIGH COMMISSIONERS. TRUE, IF US, UK, AND FRENCH FORCES WEST BERLIN WERE ATTACKED THAT WOULD INVOLVE NATO; HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN NO SPECIAL DEVELOPMENTS TO WARRANT DESCRIBING THOSE TROOPS AS NATO BASE. SUCH BASE UNREALISTIC FROM MILITARY STANDPOINT, AS BOTH SOV AND WESTERN MILITARY WOULD AGREE.

SECY RECALLED GROMYKO'S CONTENTION USSR WAS PREPARED RESPECT INDEPENDENCE WEST BERLIN AND RIGHT WEST BERLIN POPULATION LIVE UNDER SYSTEM OF ITS OWN CHOOSING. ALSO RECALLED GROMYKO'S REFERENCE TO WEST BERLIN AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY UNDER UN AEGIS. STATED HE WISHED REMIND GROMYKO WESTERN POWERS CONSIDERED THAT WEST BERLIN WAS INDEPENDENT AND THAT THEY WERE HOLDING IT IN TRUST PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT GERMAN PROBLEM. SECY POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH WE DISAGREED ON THIS WITH WEST GERMANY, WE HAD SUSPENDED THAT PORTION WEST GERMAN CONSTITUTION WHICH STATED WEST BERLIN CONSTITUTED A LAND OF WEST GERMANY. AS TO WEST BERLIN POPULATION'S CHOICE, IF THERE WAS ANY DOUBT RE WEST BERLINERS'

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-4- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

CHOICE BETWEEN PRESENT SITUATION AND ANY ARRANGEMENT DISCUSSED SO FAR, THEY WOULD GIVE AN UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWER IF THEY WERE ASKED. FACT WAS WEST BERLINERS WERE ALREADY LIVING UNDER SYSTEM OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING. AS TO UN AEGIS, IT WAS ONE THING TO SUPPOSE THAT AN INDONESIAN OR NIGERIAN BATTALION, OR SOME OTHER FORCE OF THAT SORT, COULD PROVIDE SENSE OF SECURITY TO WEST BERLINERS LIVING AS THEY WERE SURROUNDED BY FORCES DOMINATED BY ULBRICHT; IT WAS ANOTHER THING TO SAY THAT SOVIET FORCES WERE IN EAST BERLIN AND EASTERN FORCES IN WEST BERLIN AND THAT THEY COULD REPORT THEIR ARGUMENTS TO UN AND HAVE UN PRESENCE TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO SOURCE OF INFLAMATION. HOWEVER, GIVEN PRESENT SITUATION, IT UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT SOME MISCELLANEOUS FORCES COULD PROVIDE WEST BERLINERS WITH SENSE OF SECURITY WHICH THEY NEED IN THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION.

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TO: Secretary of State

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SECY CONTINUED THAT GROMYKO IN HIS STATEMENT HAD TOUCHED UPON ONE OR TWO VERY CENTRAL POINTS. HE HAD CLAIMED THAT US GOVT COULD NOT FAIL REALIZE ITS PRESENT POSITION, BASED ON PRESENCE WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN, WAS NOT PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING AND THAT FACT US CONSTANTLY PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS INVOLVING MAINTENANCE THOSE TROOPS MEANT US HAD CONLUDED THERE WAS NO USE SEEKING AMICABLE SOLUTION. NOTING HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER GROMYKO'S WORDING HAD ANY PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE, SECY DENIED GROMYKO'S ALLEGATION AND REITERATED HIS STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY THAT THERE WAS NO POINT EMPHASIZING WHAT GROMYKO CALLED OCCUPATION STATUS WEST BERLIN BECAUSE WHEN ALL WORDS AND ARGUMENTS WERE USED FACT REMAINED US WAS IN WEST BERLIN AND WOULD NOT BE DRIVEN OUT BY SOVS. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL FACT AND POINT OF DEPARTURE. SECY SAID THIS LED HIM TO A QUESTION HE WISHED ASK GROMYKO, RECALLING GROMYKO STATEMENT THAT USSR AND SOME OTHER STATES WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATY GIVING GDR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT WEST BERLIN WOULD IN THAT EVENT BE REGARDED AS FREE CITY WITH ALL CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM, SECY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT GROMYKO MEANT BUT WAS COMPELLED ASK GROMYKO WHETHER PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS AND ACCESS WOULD IN ANY WAY BE AFFECTED BY SIGNATURE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR BY USSR AND THOSE STATES GROMYKO HAD IN MIND.

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-2- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT, (SECTION TWO OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

*think a new area*

SECY CONTINUED, RECALLING GROMYKO'S REF TO JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND HIS ALLEGATION US HAD SET EXAMPLE FROM USSR TO FOLLOW. SECY SAID HE DID NOT WISH REPEAT NUMBER OF POINTS SUCH AS DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN WAR, EXISTENCE OF A UNIFIED OCCUPATION, SINGLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, ETC., WHICH MAKE IT CLEAR THAT TWO SITUATIONS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. HOWEVER, HE WISHED REMIND GROMYKO THAT JAPANESE PEACE TREATY HAD NOT AFFECTED SOVIET POSITION ON KURILES AND SAKHALIN, WHICH SOVS HAD OCCUPIED AND WHERE EVEN TODAY EXISTED WHAT GROMYKO CALLED OCCUPATION STATUS WHEN REFERRING TO WEST BERLIN. SECY POINTED OUT WHATEVER RIGHTS SOVIETS HAD HAD THERE HAD NOT BEEN TERMINATED AND STILL EXISTED. YET SOVIETS IN TALKING ABOUT PEACE TREATY WITH GDR CONSTANTLY REFERRED TO MATTERS AFFECTING WESTERN RIGHTS. FOR SOME MYSTICAL REASON THEY EMPHASIZED LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN UNDER WORLD WAR II BY PEACE TREATY IN EUROPE, WHEREAS THEY WERE COMFORTABLE WITH REGARD TO ARRANGEMENT IN FAR EAST. WE SAW NO REASON FOR DIFFERENTIATING SITUATION FAR EAST AND GERMANY, IN THIS RESPECT.

*very (too?) subtle allusion to China*

SECY SAID HE WISHED COMMENT VERY BRIEFLY ON POINT OF THREAT, ALREADY DISCUSSED BRIEFLY YESTERDAY. SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHY SOVIETS FOUND IN SPEECHES MADE IN WEST EVIDENCE THREATS AGAINST USSR. WE FOUND IN SOVIET SPEECHES SAME KIND OF PRESSURES AND DECLARATIONS. IF THEY OCCURED ON PROPAGANDA LEVEL, THAT WAS ONE THING; HOWEVER, IN PRIVATE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL DISCUSSIONS THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR SUCH PRESSURES. SECY POINTED OUT US INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SINCE VIENNA HAD BEEN RESTRAINED AND CONTAINED NO SUCH THREATS. TRUE, WE WERE STRANGE ANIMALS AND WOULD DEFEND OURSELVES IF ATTACKED, BUT THAT CERTAINLY COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS THREAT. BOTH SIDES KNEW EACH OTHER'S STRENGTH AND COULD INFLICT GREAT DAMAGE UPON EACH OTHER. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR THREATS IN EITHER DIRECTION. US WAS NOT THREATENING USSR AND DID NOT ACCEPT ANY THREAT FROM USSR. US WAS PUTTING NO DEMANDS TO USSR, BUT SOVIETS HAD MADE DEMANDS FROM US.

SECY THEN REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S FINAL REMARK IN WHICH LATTER HAD ASSERTED USSR WAS SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE IN INTEREST BOTH SIDES. SECY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT THAT SUCH SOLUTION MUST BE SOUGHT AND POINTED OUT US HAD TRIED REACH SUCH SOLUTION, US HAD MADE NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS

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-3- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT, (SECTION TWO OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

HOW TO PROCEED TO ADJUST INTERESTS BOTH SIDES. IT IMPORTANT TO BOTH TO TRY SUCCEED IN THIS EFFORT. OF COURSE, WE COULD ALWAYS FAIL; IN FACT WE COULD FAIL IN FIVE MINUTES IF WE STOPPED TRYING, BUT THAT WOULD BE OF NO PROFIT TO PEOPLES OUR TWO COUNTRIES. SOLUTION MEETING INTERSTS BOTH SIDES WOULD BE IN BEST INTERESTS OUR PEOPLES AND BOTH GOVTS SHOULD THINK ABOUT THIS. IN RESPONSIBLE CONTACTS BOTH SIDES SHOULD TRY HARDER IDENTIFY ELEMENTS OF COMMON INTEREST. SECY NOTED HE HAD MENTIONED SOME SUCH POINTS TO GROMYKO BEFORE DINNER. HOWEVER, AS PRESIDENT HAD STATED IN VIENNA, THERE WERE CERTAIN THINGS NO US GOVT COULD DO GIVEN PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR COMMITMENTS.

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION THREE OF SIX)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 30, INFORMATION LONDON, BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

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GROMYKO RESPONDED SAYING IT NOT POSSIBLE ESCAPE FACT SEVENTEEN YEARS HAD PASSED SINCE WORLD WAR II, BUT STILL THERE WAS NOT PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY. OCCUPATION REGIME CONTINUED IN WEST BERLIN, OCCUPATION FORCES THREE WESTERN POWERS WERE STILL IN WEST BERLIN, AND VESTIGES WORLD WAR II HAD NOT YET BEEN ELIMINATED. SECY'S REMARKS COMPLETELY IGNORED THIS BASIC ASPECT OF PROBLEM. US AND USSR HAD BEEN ALLIES AGAINST FASCIST GERMANY NOT IN ORDER PRESERVE AFTER GERMANY'S DEFEAT A SITUATION SUCH AS THAT EXISTING TODAY, I.E., NO PEACE TREATY AND MAINTENANCE OCCUPATION TROOPS WEST BERLIN. AS USSR HAD STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, PRESENT SITUATION WAS FRAUGHT WITH GRAVE DANGERS, DANGERS TO WHICH US SHUT ITS EYES OR WHICH IT PRETENDED NOT TO SEE. USSR HAD LOST MANY MILLIONS PEOPLE IN LAST WAR NOT TO LIVE ON POWDER KEG IN EUROPE, USSR DESIRED, AND IT WAS ITS INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SEEK, A SITUATION OF COMPLETE SECURITY. THIS DESIRE COINCIDED WITH FEELINGS OF ANY STATE SINCERELY SEEKING PEACE AND STABILITY. USSR HAD NEVER CONCLUDED ANY AGREEMENT WITH WEST PERPETUATING STATIONING US, UK AND FRENCH TROOPS WEST BERLIN; IN FACT IT NEVER COULD HAVE SIGNED SUCH AGREEMENT. ALL ARRANGEMENTS ON THIS MATTER WERE TEMPORARY AND WERE SUBJECT TO REPLACEMENT WITH SOME PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT. SIGNING OF PEACE TREATY WAS MOST FITTING

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| NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: <i>79 Carh CER</i> | DATE OF ACTION: <i>7-23-62</i> |                                 |

SECRET

-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION THREE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

ARRANGEMENT, ONE SANCTIFIED BY HISTORY. THIS WHY USSR HAD PROPOSED THAT ONE OR TWO PEACE TREATIES BE SIGNED. IN VIEW WESTERN REFUSAL DO SO, USSR HAD STATED IT WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH GDR BUT HAD SUGGESTED THAT UNDERSTANDING BE FOUND ON QUESTIONS TO BE SOLVED IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH SIGNING. IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE BETWEEN TWO SIDES. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS HAD YIELDED SOME PROGRESS IN CERTAIN AREAS. MAIN PROBLEM HAD NOW BEEN APPROACHED, I.E., HOW TO DEAL WITH WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN. USSR SAW ONLY ONE WAY OUT, AND NO OTHER WAY EXISTED OR COULD EXIST: OCCUPATION WAS FOR CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME AND TEMPORARY PHENOMENON COULD NOT BE PERPETUATED. GROMYKO STATED HE WISHED STRESS USSR WOULD NEVER, NEVER AGREE TO PERPETUATION OCCUPATION REGIME, OCCUPATION RIGHTS, AND STATIONING FOREIGN TROOPS WEST BERLIN.

GROMYKO CONTINUED IT WAS EVIDENT US LIKED FACT IT HAD WEST BERLIN IN ITS GRIP. HOWEVER, WEST BERLIN WAS NOT A US, UK OR FRENCH CITY; NOR WAS IT A NATO CITY. WEST BERLIN WAS A GERMANY CITY, AND USSR WANTED IT TO BE JUST THAT AND NOT A NATO BASE. SECY HAD ATTEMPTED PROVE WEST BERLIN WAS NO NATO BASE, CITING ABSENCE AGREEMENTS TO THAT EFFECT, ETC. YET, SECY HAD IMMEDIATELY EXPRESSED RESERVATION, STATING IF CONDITIONS AROSE WHERE IT WAS NECESSARY USE FORCES PRESENTLY STATIONED IN WEST BERLIN THEY WOULD ACT IN CONCERT WITH NATO. USSR WAS NOT INTERESTED IN JURIDICAL ASPECTS BUT RATHER IN FACTUAL ASPECTS THIS SITUATION. FACT WAS WEST BERLIN WAS INSIDE CLOSED FIST OF WESTERN POWERS, SOMETHING THERE WAS NO REASON FOR. USSR WAS CONVINCED WEST COULD NOT INVENT CERTAIN RIGHTS, SUCH AS OCCUPATION RIGHTS, AND PERPETUATE THEM. USSR COULD NOT AGREE TO THIS BECAUSE IT MEANT ARBITRARINESS. IT WAS ARBITRARINESS IF AFTER DEFEAT NAZI GERMANY ONE PARTNER IN WAR ARBITRARILY LAID DOWN RIGHTS TO DETRIMENT OF RIGHTS OF USSR, GDR, AND OTHER STATES.

GROMYKO THEN SAID WESTERN POWERS, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITION, HAD FOR LONG TIME CONTENTED WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN WERE NEEDED TO ENSURE FREEDOM WEST BERLIN POPULATION. USSR HAD ALWAYS POINTED OUT ABSURDITY THIS ARGUMENT, SINCE NO ONE WAS ENCROACHING UPON FREEDOM WEST BERLIN POPULATION;

TO ASSURE

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-3- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON, (SECTION THREE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

TO ASSURE THAT FREEDOM, USSR HAD PROPOSED STRICTEST GUARANTEES. THEREFORE, THIS ARGUMENT DID NOT HOLD WATER. PERHAPS THIS WAS WHY THIS ARGUMENT HAD NOT BEEN USED SO EXTENSIVELY IN RECENT TIME. IT WAS WORN OUT AND DID NOT HAVE PROPAGANDA EFFECT DESIRED BY WEST.

GROMYKO CONTINUED THAT SINCE WEST HAD REPEATEDLY ASSERTED WESTERN TROOPS WERE REQUIRED IN WEST BERLIN TO GUARANTEE FREE DEVELOPMENT AND FREEDOM THAT CITY, USSR HAD PROPOSED DIFFERENT VARIANTS, INCLUDING ONE PROVIDING FOR PARTICIPATION, FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, OF WESTERN FORCES IN GUARANTEEING STATUS WEST BERLIN. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD, SINCE IT WAS COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE THINK ABOUT FOREIGN TROOPS WEST BERLIN IN TERMS ETERNITY. US HAD REJECTED ALL THOSE PROPOSALS AND, AS HAD BEEN STATED YESTERDAY, USSR HAD CONCLUDED FROM THIS THAT US HAD EVIDENTLY LOST INTEREST IN SEEKING AGREED SOLUTION.

GROMYKO SAID SECRETARY'S ARGUMENTATION REVOLVED AROUND ONE CENTRAL ARGUMENT, I. E., ON CLAIM IT WAS USSR WHO WAS MAKING DEMANDS AND NOT WEST, AND THAT THEREFORE IT WAS USSR AND NOT WEST WHO WAS COMPLICATING SITUATION. HOWEVER, SECRETARY FORGOT MAJOR ASPECT OF PRESENT SITUATION, THAT IN ABSENCE GERMAN PEACE TREATY SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGNTY GDR WERE GROSSLY FLOUTED. WHETHER ONE LIKED GDR OR NOT, FACT REMAINED WEST BERLIN IN ITS CENTER. THIS WHOLE SITUATION WAS THE BASIC FACT FROM WHICH ONE SHOULD PROCEED; IT WAS POINT OF DEPARTURE IF ONE WANTED HAVE OBJECTIVE CRITERION TO JUDGE WHAT WAS IN ACCORD WITH PRESENT SITUATION. FOR SOME REASON US FAILED SEE THIS ASPECT OF PROBLEM; THIS PROBLEM SIMPLY DID NOT EXIST FOR IT. MATTER WOULD BE SIMPLE IF SECRETARY AND HE, GROMYKO, WERE MERELY TWO PUBLIC DEBATERS ARGUING SOME QUESTION NOT AFFECTING ESSENCE OF SECURITY OF STATES. HOWEVER, THIS PROBLEM AFFECTED WHAT SECRETARY CALLED VITAL INTERESTS, I. E., INTERESTS USSR SECURITY AND INTEREST GDR SOVEREIGNTY. THESE VITAL INTERESTS WERE REAL AND NOT IMAGINARY.

REE

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RMR

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION FOUR OF SIX)

Control: 16637

Rec'd: JULY 23, 1962

12:49 PM

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REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S ANALOGY BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND SAKHALIN AND KURILES, GROMYKO STATED HE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED VALIDITY SUCH ANALOGY. SAKHALIN AND KURILES WERE SOVIET TERRITORY. ON OTHER HAND, WEST BERLIN WAS NOT US, UK, OR FRENCH TERRITORY BUT GERMAN TERRITORY. HOWEVER, THIS ARGUMENT WAS BESIDE POINT ANYWAY. POINT WAS, AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD TOLD PRESIDENT IN VIENNA, THAT US HAD SIGNED PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN WITHOUT USSR AND COUNTER TO LATTER'S POSITION, AND HAD DEPRIVED USSR OF ITS LEGITIMATE RIGHTS. GROMYKO CLAIMED SECRETARY KNEW IN WHAT SITUATION USSR HAD FOUND ITSELF IN JAPAN AFTER SIGNATURE PEACE TREATY.

IN PRESENT SITUATION, US BELIEVED IT COULD DEPRIVE USSR OF ITS RIGHTS AGAIN. HOWEVER, NO ONE COULD DEPRIVE USSR OF ITS RIGHT SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH GDR AND NORMALIZE SITUATION WEST BERLIN ON THAT BASIS. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE HAD USED ILLUSTRATION OF JAPANESE PEACE TREATY.

REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF HIS STATEMENT THAT IF NO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING ON GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, USSR WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH

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JUL 23 1962  
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| NAME OF OFFICER: 4A Cash | OFFICE SYMBOL: GER  |                         |                          |

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-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION FOUR OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

GDR WITH ALL CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM, GROMYKO SAID THAT WOULD MEAN, AS HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY STATED BEFORE, THAT IN THAT EVENT WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOVERNMENT OF SOVEREIGN GDR AND NOT WITH USSR, ON ALL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THEM, INCLUDING ACCESS.

GROMYKO THEN EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT, AS HE PUT IT, WEST GERMANY HAD NO RELATION TO WEST BERLIN AND THAT US HAD SUSPENDED CERTAIN PROVISION WEST GERMAN CONSTITUTION. THIS WAS SOBER POSITION AND HE WISHED SAY THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD POINTED OUT THIS FACT IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS AS A SIGN OF SOBER APPROACH BY US IN THIS MATTER. GROMYKO WONDERED WHETHER HE WAS PERHAPS MAKING MISTAKE IN PRAISING US ON THIS POINT, BECAUSE US MIGHT THINK "WHAT HAVE I DONE? WHY IS HE PRAISING ME?"

GROMYKO SAID ALL THIS WAS A BRIEF AND CLEAR ANSWER TO SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S DENIAL US HAD LOST INTEREST IN SEEKING AGREEMENT ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS, GROMYKO SAID HE WELCOMED SECRETARY'S WORDS IF THEY TRULY CORRESPONDED TO US GOVT'S DESIRE. IF, AS SECRETARY HAD STATED, US WISHED SEEK AGREED SOLUTION, THAT WAS IN ACCORD WITH SOVIET WISHES AS WELL, BECAUSE USSR BELIEVED IT WAS BEST SEEK AGREED ARRANGEMENTS AND CONCERTED DECISIONS. USSR HAD REPEATEDLY STATED IT WOULD ACT UNILATERALLY ONLY IF THERE WAS NO AGREED DECISION. AS TO WHETHER USSR WOULD GO THROUGH WITH THIS, NO ONE, INCLUDING US, HAD ANY DOUBTS THAT IT WOULD, INDEED, NO ONE COULD HAVE SUCH DOUBTS. IF US THOUGHT OTHERWISE, USSR WOULD NOT HAVE AS HIGH AN OPINION OF IT AS IT DID. GROMYKO SAID HE WISHED REPEAT THAT HE NOTED AS POSITIVE FACT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT US WISHED SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

AS TO THREATS, GROMYKO SAID USSR WOULD LIKE SEE US PERSONALITIES, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, AVOID HINTS OR VEILED THREATS DESIGNED INFLUENCE USSR. SUCH EFFORTS WERE WASTE OF ENERGY, NOT TO SPEAK OF FACT THEY ONLY COMPLICATED SITUATION AND MADE WEST LOOK AS IF IT DID NOT WANT AGREEMENT. SOVIETS DID NOT KNOW WHAT RELATIONSHIPS EXISTED IN US AS REGARDS ITS CIVILIANS AND

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-3- SECTO 30, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION FOUR OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

MILITARY; ANYWAY, THIS WAS US INTERNAL MATTER. HOWEVER, USSR WOULD LIKE THOSE PERSONS STOP RESORTING TO SUCH METHODS SINCE IT WISHED NEGOTIATIONS BOTH SIDES PROCEED IN REASONABLE ATMOSPHERE DEVOID OF RECKLESS STATEMENTS BY HOTHEADS.

REFERRING TO LAST REMARK BY GROMYKO, SECRETARY OBSERVED IT WAS NOT US WHO WAS MAKING CLAIMS IT COULD HIT FLY IN SPACE WITH MISSILE, OR SEND MISSILES THROUGH BACK DOOR, AND POINTED OUT THAT SPEECHES WERE MADE ON BOTH SIDES. HE THEN SAID HE WISHED MAKE TWO OR THREE REMARKS BECAUSE IT WAS IMPORTANT SPEAK FRANKLY IN EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. RECALLING GROMYKO'S REFERENCE TO SEVENTEEN YEARS, SECRETARY POINTED OUT POTSDAM AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR PEACE TREATY WITH UNIFIED GERMANY, WHEN GERMANY HAD COMPETENT GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH SUCH TREATY COULD BE SIGNED. US WAS PREPARED TO DO SO AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. HOWEVER, MEANWHILE WE WERE PREPARED SEE WHAT ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICING THAT OBJECTIVE. US HAD IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON WEST GERMANY IN INTEREST ULTIMATE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND WE SAW NO REASON WHY USSR COULD NOT DO SAME WITH REGARD EAST GERMANY. AS TO GROMYKO'S REMARK ABOUT DANGER INHERENT IN WEST BERLIN SITUATION, SECRETARY STRESSED WE DID NOT SEE ANY DANGER THERE THAT WAS NOT COMING FROM EAST. HE THEN STATED WE RECOGNIZED SOVIETS HAD DIFFICULTIES IN EAST GERMANY. THERE HAD BEEN FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM EAST GERMANY, BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN INSTIGATED BY WEST.

RUSK

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57-W

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION FIVE OF SIX)

PRIORITY

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IN FACT IT OUR DELIBERATE POLICY NOT TO ENCOURAGE SUCH FLOW. WHILE WE DID WHAT WE COULD FOR PEOPLE WHO HAD LEFT EAST GERMANY FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS, IT WAS NOT IN OUR INTEREST HAVE FLOW OF REFUGEES. ONE TROUBLE IN EAST GERMANY WAS THAT IT WAS NOT ALLOWED KEEP PACE WITH USSR. USSR HAD CARRIED OUT PROGRAM OF DE-STALINIZATION BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH PROGRAM IN EAST GERMANY. PERHAPS IF SUCH PROGRAM WERE CARRIED OUT IN EAST GERMANY SITUATION WOULD BECOME MORE TOLERABLE. GROMYKO INTERJECTED STALIN HAD LIVED IN USSR AND NOT IN GERMANY.

SECRETARY CONTINUED GROMYKO RIGHT IN SAYING WEST BERLIN WAS GERMAN CITY. WE BELIEVED EAST BERLIN WAS ALSO GERMAN CITY. HOWEVER, MAIN POINT WAS THAT WEST BERLIN SHOULD NOT BECOME EAST GERMAN CITY. WE HAD HEARD ULBRICHT'S STATEMENTS, IN WHICH HE HAD MADE CLEAR HIS INTENTIONS. WE COULD TRUST ULBRICHT AS FAR AS WE COULD SEE BLACK CAT IN DARK ROOM AT MIDNIGHT. IT WAS HERE ILLUSION THAT WEST BERLIN COULD SURVIVE IN PRESENT SURROUNDINGS IF IT WERE DEPRIVED OF ITS PROTECTION, AND WE HAD NO SUCH ILLUSION.

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SECRET

-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION FIVE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

SECRETARY POINTED OUT WE WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT PERPETUAL STATIONING WESTERN FORCES IN WEST BERLIN, NEITHER WERE WE TALKING ABOUT A CERTAIN FIXED PERIOD. WHILE USSR WAS AGAINST PERPETUAL STATIONING WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN, IT WAS NOT AGAINST PERPETUAL DIVISION GERMANY. WE REGARDED BOTH THESE THINGS AS TEMPORARY PENDING FINAL SOLUTION GERMANY PROBLEM.

SECRETARY THEN OBSERVED GROMYKO HAD FAILED ANSWER HIS QUESTION WHETHER WESTERN RIGHTS WOULD BE AFFECTED IN EVENT USSR SIGNED PEACE TREATY WITH GDR. SECRETARY EMPHASIZED SOVIETS HAD NO RIGHT CONCLUDE SUCH TREATY SINCE THAT WOULD VIOLATE POTSDAM, JESSUP-MALIK, AND OTHER AGREEMENTS. USSR BRUSHED ASIDE THOSE AGREEMENTS, AND IN ANSWER TO QUESTION GROMYKO HAD SAID GO AND ASK MY VENTRILLOQUIST DUMMY ULBRICHT. THAT WAS NO ANSWER, GROMYKO INTERJECTED, ULBRICHT WAS A VERY GOOD MAN AND GREAT STATESMAN. SECRETARY CONTINUED SOVIETS HAD SAID THEY WOULD FULLY SUPPORT ULBRICHT, HOWEVER, HE KNEW SOVIETS WERE NOT INSANE TO GIVE BLANK CHECK TO ULBRICHT. USSR HAD TWENTY DIVISIONS IN EAST GERMANY AND COULD NOT ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SITUATION. IT COULD NOT ACT THROUGH ITS PUPPET. SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE GROMYKO WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS.

SECRETARY REITERATED US WISHED FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE BOTH SIDES. IT WOULD BE NO COMFORT IF PEOPLE WHO LIVED THROUGH CRISIS LATER HAD TO WONDER WHY PEOPLE DEALING WITH PROBLEMS HAD BEEN INCAPABLE OF RESOLVING THEM. AS TO US, IT WOULD TRY FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, AND WE HOPED SOVIETS WOULD DO SAME. HOWEVER, EXCHANGES BETWEEN TWO SIDES MUST BE IN FRANKNESS.

SECRETARY THEN SAID HE WISHED MAKE ONE COMMENT WHICH PERHAPS WAS UNNECESSARY, HE POINTED OUT PRESIDENT WAS BY NATURE MAN OF MODERATE LANGUAGE. HE, SECRETARY, HIMSELF WAS REFERRED-

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-3- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION FIVE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

TO IN US AS SOFTSPOKEN MAN. WE HAD DISCUSSED IN MODERATE TONE. HOWEVER, SECRETARY HOPED THAT METHOD OF DISCUSSION HAD NOT LED TO MISUNDERSTANDING WITH REGARD TO FAIT THAT ON ONE SIDE THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN MATTERS WHICH WERE UTTERLY FUNDAMENTAL, WHILE ON OTHER SIDE THERE WAS OUR DESIRE SEEK AGREED SOLUTION.

SECRETARY OBSERVED ONLY FORMINS WERE NOT ON EIGHT HOUR DAY; WHILE HE DID NOT KNOW GROMYKO'S PLANS, HE WAS ALWAYS AT HIS DISPOSITION.

GROMYKO RESPONDED CLAIMING SECRETARY HAD GIVEN IN HIS REMARKS FULL REIN TO HIS DISLIKE FOR SYSTEM IN GDR AND FOR ULBRICHT PERSONALLY. HE RECALLED THAT AT BEGINNING CONVERSATION SECRETARY HAD URGED TWO SIDES SHOULD NOT BE GUIDED BY IDEOLOGY BUT BY NEED FOR REACHING AGREED ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN TWO SOCIAL SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, NOW, AT END OF CONVERSATION, SECRETARY HAD FORGOTTEN WHAT HE HAD SAID AT BEGINNING. PERHAPS THIS WAS DUE TO LENGTH CONVERSATION. GROMYKO CONTINUED THAT IF ONE GAVE FULL REIN TO HIS DISLIKE TO THIS OR THAT QUARTER, THAT ONLY COMPLICATED MATTERS. HE OBSERVED THAT SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT ULBRICHT WERE FROM SOVIET STANDPOINT BEST COMMENDATION OF LATTER'S ABILITY. WHEN SECRETARY USED SUCH TERMS AS "PUPPET" OR "DUMMY", HE USED TERMS US APPLIED IN ITS OWN RELATIONS WITH SOME STATES. HOWEVER, ONE SHOULD BE SOBER AND STAY AWAY FROM SUCH METHODS. GROMYKO SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT HE, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF USSR, OR ULBRICHT, LEADER OF GDR, NEEDED LESSONS RE SCALE OF DE-STALINIZATION OR WHERE IT WAS TO BE CONDUCTED. THIS WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER AND SOVIETS WOULD KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH IT, JUST AS ULBRICHT WOULD. THUS ITNTURNDDFMGLT\* USSR HAD SHOWN GREATER RESTRAINT IN DISCUSSIONS, BECAUSE IT HAD REFRAINED FROM ADVANCING IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THIS WAS MORE BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH.

RUSK

GDW

\* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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FROM: GENEVA

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION SIX OF SIX)

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ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 30, INFORMATION LONDON, BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

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GROMYKO THEN PROFESSED UNABLE SEE WHY HE HAD FAILED ANSWER SECRETARY'S QUESTION. HE THOUGHT HIS ANSWER WAS CLEAR BUT VOLUNTEERED REPEAT IT TO DISPEL WHATEVER LACK OF UNDERSTANDING EXISTED. HE REPEATED THAT IN THAT EVENT WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GDR, AS SOVEREIGN STATE IN CENTER OF WHICH WEST BERLIN WAS LOCATED, ON ALL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THEM; THEY WOULD HAVE TO ACT ON BASIS FULL RESPECT SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF GDR. HE CLAIMED HE CONSIDERED THIS ANSWER PERFECTLY CLEAR.

GROMYKO CONTINUED SECRETARY DID NOT ACCEPT HIS STATEMENT USSR COULD NOT AGREE TO WESTERN POWERS STATIONING TROOPS WEST BERLIN PERPETUALLY AND THAT THEIR STAY MUST BE TEMPORARY. WHEN SOVIETS USED TERM TEMPORARY AND SPOKE OF CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME THEY HAD NO SPECIFIC DATE IN MIND BUT ONLY THAT PERIOD MUST BE LIMITED. TIME ALREADY ELAPSED -- 17 YEARS -- MORE THAN LIMITED. QUESTION OF TROOPS MUST BE RESOLVED AND WOULD BE RESOLVED. THUS THE MAJOR QUESTION, I.E., PRESENCE WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN, HAD BEEN APPROACHED. WITHOUT SOLUTION THAT PROBLEM NO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. QUESTION HAD BEEN APPROACHED FROM DIFFERENT ANGLES, BUT AT END THIS CONVERSATION HE DID NOT SEE WHERE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION LAY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1962 JUL 23 PM 4 17

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SECRET

-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION SIX OF SIX), FROM GENEVA

SECRETARY REJOINED GROMYKO HAD SAID WEST HAD INVENTED CERTAIN RIGHTS. HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAD CREATED SOVEREIGN RIGHTS FOR GDR WHICH AFFECTED OUR RIGHTS, AND THIS WAS REMARKABLE INVENTION IN LAW AND OTHERWISE. IN FACT THIS WAS CREATION OF IMAGINATION. THUS, QUESTION WAS TO USE IMAGINATION TO SEE IF WE CANNOT SURMOUNT PROBLEM. THIS WAS POSSIBLE BUT UNDERLYING REALITIES COULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. WE BELIEVED IT WORTH TRYING.

GROMYKO ASSERTED IT WAS NOT LAW THAT INVENTED LIFE BUT IT WAS LAW THAT WAS REFLECTION OF LIFE. FACT WAS THAT TWO GERMAN STATES EXISTED WITH ALL ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY. US WANTED GO BACK ON THESE FACTS AND KEEP SITUATION AS IT HAD BEEN RIGHT AFTER WORLD WAR II. GROMYKO THEN INQUIRED HOW SECRETARY AND HE SHOULD PROCEED NEXT IN GENEVA.

SECRETARY OBSERVED HE REMEMBERED SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD REMARKED SOME TIME AGO TO THE THEN SECRETARY OF STATE THAT LAW WAS LIKE TONGUE OF A WAGON - IT WENT WHERE ONE TURNED IT. WE, OF COURSE, HAD A RATHER DIFFERENT CONCEPTION. RE GROMYKO'S QUERY ABOUT WHAT TO DO NEXT IN GENEVA, SECRETARY SUGGESTED THIS BE THOUGHT ABOUT OVER NIGHT AND DISCUSSED TOMORROW. HE DID POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD INVITED SOUVANNA TO DINNER IN WASHINGTON NEXT THURSDAY, JULY 26.

RUSK

BAP

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*R*

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6:07 A.M. 1

Info

FROM: GENEVA

*Captain removed by  
Frederick Colek SS-1/TWJ  
3/14/91*

TO: Secretary of State

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FULL RECORD ON CONVERSATION LAST EVENING WITH GROMYKO COMING SEPARATE TELEGRAM. MY GUESS IS THAT WE SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE MORE TALK HERE. I CLEARLY GOT IMPRESSION THAT THEY EXPECT ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS HERE OR LATER BUT THIS IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THEY WILL NOT MAKE SUDDEN MOVE TO PRESS SUDDEN AND SEPARATE PEACE TREATY. HOWEVER, GROMYKO LAST EVENING BOTH IN MANNER AND WORDS SEEMED TO EMPHASIZE THEIR PREFERENCE FOR AN AGREED SOLUTION AND THIS I RECIPROCATED.

MOST IMPORTANT POINT AROSE WHEN I, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH WESTERN FORMINS, ASKED HIM VERY DIRECTLY AND SPECIFICALLY WHAT HE MEANT DAY BEFORE WHEN HE SAID THAT THEY "WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH GDR AND WOULD CARRY OUT NECESSARY MEASURES TO PROVIDE FOR UNDEVIATING RESPECT FOR GDR SOVEREIGNTY". HIS FIRST REPLY WAS THAT THIS MEANT THAT AFTER PEACE TREATY WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THEIR ARRANGEMENTS WITH GDR. I FLATLY REJECTED THIS AS AN ANSWER SAYING THAT HE WAS MERELY SAYING "GO ASK THE VENTRILOQUIST'S DUMMY" AND THAT I KNEW THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE SO INSANE AS TO TRANSFER SUCH VITAL MATTER INTO THE HANDS OF ULBRICHT. HE REFUSED TO ANSWER AGAIN EXCEPT TO REPEAT WHAT HE HAD SAID EARLIER. I SUSPECT THIS MEANS EITHER THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS AT ALL OR THAT SOVIET GOVT HAS NOT REALLY MADE UP ITS MIND.

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| ACTION ASSIGNED TO: <i>EUR</i>                    | ACTION TAKEN: <i>Mr. Bohlen answered</i> |
| NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL: <i>GER-7 Pal</i> | DATE OF ACTION: <i>23 July</i>           |
|   | DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: <i>File</i>          |

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-2- SECTO 25, JULY 23, 10 A.M., FROM GENEVA

IN GENERAL, TONE OF MEETING LAST EVENING WAS SOMEWHAT BETTER THAN DAY BEFORE AND I GOT NO IMPRESSION THAT GROMYKO WAS HERE TO DELIVER US AN ULTIMATUM INVOLVING WAR OR PEACE.

WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE HIGHEST LEVEL DEPARTMENTAL REACTION, INCLUDING BOHLEN'S, TO TWO CONVERSATIONS HELD THUS FAR AS ASSISTANCE MY THINKING FOR POSSIBLE THIRD ROUND.

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Note: Passed White House 7/23/62 per SS-0

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PART I

SECRETARY'S GENEVA BRIEF

July 19-25, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 23, 1962  
Time: 4:15 p.m.  
Place: US Mission Annex, Geneva

Participants:

United States

Germany

The Secretary  
Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Holloway

Foreign Minister Schroeder  
State Secretary Carstens  
Mr. Kusterer, Interpreter

Subject: Talks with Gromyko on Berlin

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US Mission BERLIN

Foreign Minister Schroeder called on the Secretary by appointment just before his departure for Bonn to discuss the recent talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on the Berlin problem.

The Secretary opened by saying that Gromyko seemed less insistent in the July 22 talk than he had in the July 21 talk. However, the Secretary cautioned that we must be careful not to exaggerate this atmosphere. Pravda had carried some hard line articles, which had been published while the Secretary has been in Geneva, and we must definitely consider Pravda as part of the atmosphere. The Secretary said that to him an important fact had been that Gromyko had avoided an answer to the Secretary's direct question whether the presence of Western troops in Berlin and their access thereto would in any way be affected by signature of a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviets and some other states. But, both times Gromyko fell back on the formulation that in such a case the Western powers would have to make arrangements with a

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PART I

-3-

review our political planning to see if we perhaps might bring about a campaign for renewed emphasis on such matters as self-determination.

The Secretary said he also wanted to mention his feeling that we should review our military planning in connection with this political review. He thought the planning in various fields should be more closely interrelated. Some of the military planning seems to be rather abstract, based perhaps too much on a feeling that this is "something that may happen," but which does not seem real at this moment. He also felt that we must look more into the question of economic countermeasures. The trade of Eastern Europe with the West now comes to \$8 billion annually. The whole question of planning and countermeasures might be reviewed particularly the question of sequence of actions because in the event of crisis there would probably be little time for consultation. When the Foreign Minister observed that Khrushchev would be on leave next month, the Secretary reminded him that he had been on leave last August 13.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
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24 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President De Gaulle, 23 July 1962

1. Present: President De Gaulle  
General Lemnitzer  
General de Rougemont

(Note: I knew General de Rougemont for many years when he was assigned to the French Delegation, Standing Group, in Washington. I was informed that he had been called to Paris from leave in Southern France to act as interpreter for this conference.) The meeting began at 1528.

2. President De Gaulle welcomed me warmly when I entered his office in Elysée Palace. He recalled our associations during World War II and our meeting during his last visit to Washington. He stated that he was quite familiar with my military record to include my service in World War II with General Eisenhower, General Mark Clark and Field Marshal Alexander in England, North Africa, Sicily and Italy. He also mentioned the principal positions I had held in Washington and in the Far East since 1945 to include my combat service as a division commander in Korea during 1951-52, and my later service as Commander-in-Chief, Far East and United Nations Commands. He concluded by mentioning my assignments as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1959 and as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1960. (Note: I was amazed by the President's precise and detailed recitation of my military service since 1942 which was made without any reference to notes.

3. I expressed my appreciation of his thorough and comprehensive knowledge of my military record and told him that I had come to

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10. The President then went on to say that in recent years he had noted an increased diversity of opinion in the U. S. regarding nuclear policies and also a shift of the U. S. position away from France on these matters. He felt that the U. S. and France were getting farther and farther apart on nuclear policy and that the departure of General Norstad indicated that an important phase line had been reached with respect to nuclear policy matters. "Therefore," the President stated, "with the departure of General Norstad the subject of his replacement is a most critical matter that will have to be carefully and thoroughly considered by the French Government." The President said that while other reasons had been given for General Norstad's retirement, he considered that differing views on nuclear matters was very much involved in his leaving NATO at this time. (Note: General Norstad assures me that he has never mentioned this as a factor in his discussions with President De Gaulle.)

11. I stated that while I knew some difference of opinion on certain nuclear policy matters may have existed to a minor degree in the past, I felt that the President was over-emphasizing the policy differences vis-a-vis the personal reasons for General Norstad's retirement. I stated that I had been present when, a year ago, General Norstad had informed Secretary of Defense McNamara that he was considering asking for retirement sometime between October 1962 and March 1963. President De Gaulle stated that he realized that such intentions were expressed but nevertheless he could not help feeling that the policy differences on nuclear matters had an even greater part to play than he had ever heard expressed publicly. "Is it not possible," he asked, "that differences in nuclear policy between NATO nations, especially France, could be even greater in the future?" I stated that while I could not predict the future, I did not believe nor was I aware of any impending actions or policy decisions that would justify his concern in this regard.

12. President De Gaulle then expressed the view that in an alliance such as NATO, policy differences on such things as nuclear weapons, conventional forces, etc., were very important from the national point of view as well as from the Alliance point of view, and if differences were permitted to develop unchecked, the objectives of NATO could well be weakened and jeopardized. (Note: In this part of the discussion, the interpreter stated that the "Alliance could be weakened and jeopardized." The President corrected him by saying that it would be

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TO: Secretary of State

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DETAILED REPORT MY LUNCHEON AND THIRD SESSION WITH GROMYKO  
COMING SEPARATE TELEGRAM. FOLLOWING ARE MY PERSONAL COMMENTS  
ON THREE SESSIONS TAKEN TOGETHER IN AN ATTEMPT TO HELP JUDGE  
WHERE WE ARE.

1. STIFFEST MOMENT WAS AT END FIRST SESSION WHEN GROMYKO READ  
FROM HIS PIECE OF PAPER. OTHERWISE OUR DISCUSSIONS IN ALL THREE  
SESSIONS WERE IN MORE RELAXED TONES EVEN IF BUSINESS-LIKE  
ATMOSPHERE. THIS MEANS THAT WHAT GROMYKO HAS SAID IN HIS OWN  
FORMULATIONS HAS BEEN MORE MODERATE THAN LANGUAGE USED PUBLICLY  
BY SOVIETS IN THIS PAST MONTH.

2. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM RECORD I THREW TWO IDEAS INTO THE POT  
IN THIRD SESSION. FIRST, THAT SOVIETS USE WITH EAST GERMANS  
SAME TECHNIQUES WE USED IN 1949 WITH WEST GERMANS IN RESERVING  
OUR RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN, A GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND GER-  
MANY AS A WHOLE. GROMYKO SEEMED TO REJECT THIS SUGGESTION,  
CLAIMING THAT IN ABSENCE OF PRIOR AGREEMENT WEST WOULD HAVE TO  
DEAL WITH EAST GERMANS. AT LATER STAGE, HOWEVER, HE SHOWED

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Date: 6/11/91

Memorandum 48  
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-3- SECTO 48, JULY 24, 8 PM FROM GENEVA

AND KENNEDY WERE TO SAY TO EACH OTHER WHAT WE BOTH HAD BEEN SAYING. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY BAD TO REACH SUCH AN UNSATISFACTORY RESULT. YOU WILL SEE FROM DETAILED RECORD THAT MATTER AGAIN CAME UP AT THE END IN TERMS OF KEEPING CONTACT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. GROMYKO SEEMED GENUINELY DISTURBED WHEN HE, THROUGH A COMPLETE MISUNDERSTANDING, THOUGHT I WAS SUGGESTING THAT EVEN DIPLOMATIC OR INDIRECT CONTACTS NOT BE MAINTAINED. I PROMPTLY REASSURED HIM ON THAT POINT BUT HIS ANXIETY, LINKED WITH OTHER THINGS HE HAS BEEN SAYING, REINFORCES OUR ANALYSIS THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE HOW FAR HE COULD GO IN TALKING US OUT OF BERLIN BUT NOT TO LET THE MATTER COME TO A COMPLETE IMPASSE. I ALSO ADDED, OF COURSE, THAT ON THE MATTER OF POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY I WOULD NOT ADD ANY COMMENTS, WITHOUT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT, TO WHAT HAD BEEN SAID PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. HE DID NOT HIMSELF RAISE OR PURSUE "SUMMIT".

7. I HAVE TRIED TO BE VERY DIRECT AND VERY CLEAR ABOUT THE POINT OF WESTERN FORCES IN WEST BERLIN AND REMINDED HIM TODAY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD MR. KHRUSHCHEV THAT "NO PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES COULD MAKE SUCH A CONCESSION". SUCH DIRECT STATEMENTS MADE MORE THAN ONCE DID NOT BRING FURTHER THREATENING LANGUAGE FROM GROMYKO. INDEED, THE ONLY THREATS HE USED WERE THOSE IN HIS PREPARED PORTION OF OUR FIRST SESSION.

8. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE MAY BE A POSSIBILITY TO WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS GOVERNING A POST PEACE TREATY SITUATION WHICH THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES WOULD AGREE WITH THE EAST GERMANS. THEY COULD CLAIM THAT EAST GERMAN AGREEMENT WAS AN EXERCISE OF GDR SOVEREIGNTY AND OUR RIGHTS WOULD REMAIN INTACT. ALTERNATIVELY, I THINK OUR MODUS VIVENDI APPROACH MAY HAVE A BREATH OF LIFE. FURTHER, THERE IS ALWAYS "SOLUTION C" TO FALL BACK UPON IF GOING GETS TOUGHER.

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-5- SECTO 48, JULY 24, 8 PM FROM GENEVA

13. OF COURSE, IF IT IS FELT THAT I SHOULD TAKE SEVERAL MORE DAYS HERE TO PURSUE PARTICULAR POINTS I SHOULD BE GLAD TO DO SO BUT I AM INCLINED TO THINK THAT THEY WOULD CAUSE RUSSIANS TO EXPECT SOME MAJOR CONCESSION ON PRESENCE OF WESTERN FORCES, WOULD MAKE OUR ALLIED CONSULTATION MORE AWKWARD, AND, ON BASIS OF GROMYKO'S APPARENT PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS, WOULD PROMISE LITTLE RESULT.

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7/31/62

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SECRETARY'S GENEVA TRIP

July 19-26, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 25, 1962  
Time: 10:30-10:50 a.m.  
Place: Soviet Mission

Participants:

United States

USSR

Mr. Kohler  
Mr. Akalovsky

Mr. Gromyko  
Mr. Sukhodriev, Interpreter

Subject: Germany and Berlin

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After exchange of greetings, Mr. Kohler opened the conversation by saying that the Secretary had wanted him to follow up on a few points connected with the conversations in Geneva between the two Ministers. First of all, the Secretary had wanted him to give Mr. Gromyko a copy of the exact text of our reserved powers with respect to Berlin, Germany as a whole and a peace settlement. Mr. Kohler then handed over the attached text, explaining that it was the first two articles from the treaty arrangements concluded at Paris on October 23, 1954, which formalized and continued the reservations which had been accomplished by informal means such as letters and other arrangements since 1949. Mr. Gromyko said that he would consider the matter.

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AUG 13 1962

Mr. Kohler

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Mr. Kohler said the second point was connected with a long private discussion between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko at dinner the other night on the question of nondiffusion of nuclear weapons and the possibility of finding a formula which would be acceptable to both sides. The question had been posed by Mr. Gromyko as to whether the wording, "direct or indirect," could be accepted from the Soviet formulation on this question but which, as the Secretary had explained, would apply only to assistance to national nuclear capabilities. The Secretary wanted Mr. Gromyko to be informed that he would consider and work on this after his return to Washington and would be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin on the subject. Mr. Gromyko replied that this was a question for discussion. Wording must be found which would ensure that there were no loopholes. The Soviet Government wanted an agreement on this subject. However, as he had stressed to the Secretary, if there should be any delay in reaching a broader agreement on the subject, this should not entail any delay in reaching an arrangement on this point with respect to the two German states. The Soviet Union was opposed to making one problem dependent on another.

The third point, Mr. Kohler said, was that the Secretary had wished him to remind Mr. Gromyko of the Secretary's remarks on the possibility of arranging for sessions of Deputy Foreign Ministers to deal with some aspects of the issues between us. Mr. Gromyko replied that as he had said yesterday he had no reply to this question as yet and that the Secretary should not expect to receive a reply in Geneva. This suggestion raised a number of questions for the Soviet Union which would have to be considered in Moscow and consequently there was no answer at this point.

Mr. Kohler then said that the Secretary had received nothing new in the way of instructions and that he was planning to leave at 5 p.m. today. If Mr. Gromyko also had nothing new, the Secretary would leave as planned. However, if Mr. Gromyko had new instructions or desired to have a further discussion, the Secretary would be happy to meet with him before his departure or to stay over. Mr. Gromyko replied that he had nothing new at this point. The Soviet position had been expounded with clarity and in full detail. He regretted that the US side had taken a position which did not provide a basis for understanding on the major issue. All of this created a

complicated

complicated situation, the responsibility for which rested not with the USSR but with the United States. Mr. Kohler replied that he was sure the Secretary would want him to say that on our part we regretted the Soviet position but that both sides should think about these problems and what had been said here in Geneva very seriously.

Mr. Kohler then brought up the question of what should be said to the press, expressing the Secretary's view that the conversations should be treated in low key so as not to cause complications or undue speculation. Mr. Gromyko expressed agreement and said that he had no intention of making further public statements here.

Mr. Kohler then said that he was happy to be returning to Moscow and that he was tentatively planning to arrive there around September 15. Mr. Gromyko said that Mr. Kohler would be welcome in Moscow. While the Soviet Government was sorry that his predecessor was leaving, since this was the case they were happy that he, Mr. Kohler, had been named.

Attachment

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Action

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TO: Secretary of State

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FOLLOWING BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON SECRETARY-GROMYKO CONVERSATION  
JULY 24.

SECRETARY, KOHLER, HILLENBRAND HAD TWO AND HALF HOUR SESSION WITH  
GROMYKO, ILYICHEV, AND KOVALEV FOLLOWING LUNCH HOSTED BY GROMYKO.  
GROMYKO INVITED SECRETARY SPEAK FIRST.

SECRETARY OPENED SAYING HE LITTLE PUZZLED AS TO WHAT GROMYKO AND  
HE COULD PROFITABLY SAY TO EACH OTHER AT THIS POINT. PROBLEMS AT  
HAND HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH HERE AND US POINT  
OF VIEW HAD ALSO BEEN EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS.  
SECRETARY NOTED HE HAD REPORTED TO PRESIDENT WHAT HAD BEEN SAID  
IN GENEVA AND THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT SEE ANY PROSPECT FOR  
SATISFACTORY PROGRESS ON ISSUES AT THIS TIME, UNLESS SOVS ADVANCE  
IN ONE OF TWO DIRECTIONS: (A) TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WHATEVER THEY  
THOUGHT NEEDS WERE WITH RESPECT EAST GERMANY THESE WOULD NOT  
INTERFERE WITH WESTERN PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN AND ACCESS TO  
THAT CITY. ON LARGER QUESTIONS IN WHICH THERE IS COMMON INTEREST  
BETWEEN US AND USSR, WEST HAD MADE CLEAR TO WEST GERMANY THAT  
ALL-GERMAN PROBLEMS AND BERLIN RESERVED FROM FULL SOVEREIGNTY  
WEST GERMANY. WE SAW NO REASON WHY SOVS COULD NOT DO SAME WITH  
RESPECT EAST GERMANY. (B) ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD TRY TO SIT DOWN

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-2- SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

AND SEE HOW TO HANDLE FACT OF DISAGREEMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT. US GENERAL PRINCIPLES PAPER SUGGESTED ONE WAY TO DEALING WITH IT. IF THERE WERE OTHER SUGGESTIONS RE HANDLING THIS MATTER IN SIMILAR FASHION, WE WOULD BE HAPPY THINK ABOUT THEM.

SECRETARY EXPRESSED VIEW GREAT DEAL OF TIME HAD BEEN SPENT IN THESE DISCUSSIONS REVIEWING RESPECTIVE POINTS OF VIEW AND IT WAS NOT NECESSARY GO OVER THEM AGAIN SINCE THEY WELL KNOWN. PROBLEM IS WHERE WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE.

SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT IN TERMS OF LONGER-RUN FUTURE, IF THERE WAS NO PERMANENT SETTLEMENT GERMAN PROBLEMS ON AGREED BASIS, THAT WAS LIKELY CAUSE RESTIVENESS AND BE SOURCE OF DANGER CENTRAL EUROPE. SINCERELY, AS WE SAW SITUATION, IF GERMANS STOOD AGAINST GERMANS AND IF GERMANS ON BOTH SIDES WERE TO INDULGE IN ADVENTURES, THAT WOULD GRAVELY AFFECT PEACE CENTRAL EUROPE. WE REGARD EFFECTIVE PRESENCE US AND INDEED USSR AS STABILIZING FACTOR IN THIS SITUATION.

SECRETARY RECALLED GROMYKO'S REMARK AT LUNCH IT GOOD IDEA IF US AND USSR, AND PREFERABLY ALSO UK AND FRANCE, TRIED DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS AND FIND SOLUTION. US HAD MADE SUGGESTION ALONG THESE LINES IN ITS GENERAL PRINCIPLES PAPER. NOTING HE WAS UNABLE SPEAK WITH FULL AUTHORITY FOR TWO ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY SINCE - AS GROMYKO AWARE FROM READING NEWSPAPERS - DE GAULLE HAD HIS OWN VIEWS THIS SUBJECT, SECRETARY STATED THAT IF SOVS HAD ANY IDEAS FOR QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS ALONG LINES WE HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT, WE WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO GET COOPERATION OTHERS CONCERNED.

SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED ADD ONE WORD RE PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHCHEV. NOTING HE HAD ALREADY EXCHANGED SOME COMMENTS ON THIS POINT WITH GROMYKO, SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED GREAT DEAL DEPENDED ON WHETHER THESE TWO MEN COULD FIND SOME BASIS ON WHICH OUR TWO

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-3- SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

COUNTRIES, IN SPITE THEIR DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS, COULD MOVE TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS. HOWEVER, HE ALSO BELIEVED IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHCHEV JUST EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT WITHOUT COMING TO ANY APPARENT RESULT. US HAD TRIED BE IMAGINATIVE AS TO HOW CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BE CREATED WHERE DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THESE TWO MEN COULD TAKE PLACE FRUITFULLY. HOWEVER, SECRETARY SAID, HE DID NOT THINK SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED NOW, AND THERE WAS DANGER TWO LEADERS REACHING SAME POINT WHERE WE WERE NOW, WHICH WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO EITHER SIDE. SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS MAKING THESE COMMENTS ONLY IN CONNECTION HIS EARLIER CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT, AND THAT HE HAD NO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT IN THIS RESPECT. ✓

GROMYKO AGREED BOTH HE AND SECRETARY HAD SET FORTH IN DETAIL AND IN CLEAR MANNER POSITIONS THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVTS DURING THESE MEETINGS IN GENEVA. HE WISHED ONCE MORE EMPHASIZE THAT SOVS REGRETTED US GOVT HAD TAKEN SUCH POSITION RE MAIN PROBLEMS, I. E., WITHDRAWAL WESTERN FORCES FROM WEST BERLIN. HE CONTENDED THIS WAS FURTHER EVIDENCE US GOVT'S DESIRE MAINTAIN OCCUPATION STATUS IN WEST BERLIN AND KEEP THAT CITY IN HANDS THREE WESTERN POWERS AS NATO MIL BASE. THIS CONCLUSION HAD NOT BEEN ARRIVED AT TODAY; USSR HAD THOUGHT SO BEFORE, BUT TODAY WESTERN INTENTIONS THIS RESPECT WERE EVEN CLEARER THAN BEFORE. GROMYKO OBSERVED HE HAD MADE THIS COMMENT IN VIEW SECRETARY'S REMARK AT EARLIER MEETING SOVS HAD ONLY RECENTLY STARTED TALKING ABOUT WEST BERLIN'S BEING NATO BASE. GROMYKO CONTINUED USSR WOULD NEVER AGREE TO PERPETUATION OCCUPATION REGIME IN WEST BERLIN AND TO THAT CITY'S REMAINING NATO BASE ETERNALLY. USSR COULD NOT AGREE TO THAT BECAUSE THAT RAN COUNTER INTERESTS OF PEACE IN EUROPE - AND NOT ONLY IN EUROPE - BUT ALSO COUNTER INTERESTS RELAXATION TENSIONS IN EUROPE AND GERMANY. IF SOVS WERE TO AGREE TO THIS THEY WOULD BE HELPING THOSE WHO WERE POURING OIL ON FIRE AND THUS WOULD BE ACCOMPLICES OF WEST GERMAN REVANCHISTS AND MILITARISTS. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE EXPECT SOV UNION TO AGREE TO THIS. USSR WOULD NOT AGREE AND REGRETTED US GOVT, AND APPARENTLY ITS ALLIES, FAILED DULY APPRECIATE THIS POSITION.

RUSA

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FROM: GENEVA  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION TWO OF SIX)

RMR

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 50, INFORMATION MOSCOW 29,  
LONDON, PARIS, BONN, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

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GROMYKO RECALLED THAT ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION WESTERN INCLUDING US LEADERS, FOR EXAMPLE MACMILLAN, DE GAULLE, PRESIDENT KENNEDY, AND SECRETARY HIMSELF, HAD STATED WEST UNDERSTOOD SOV DESIRE ENSURE ITS SECURITY, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT LESSONS PAST HISTORY, WHEN HITLER HAD ATTACKED USSR AND LATTER HAD LOST MILLIONS OF LIVES IN DEFEATING NAZIS. HOWEVER, WHILE SAYING THIS, WEST FAILED DRAW NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS WHICH WOULD LEND SUBSTANCE TO THESE WORDS. USSR POSITION RE GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND OTHER QUESTIONS TO BE SETTLED IN CONNECTION SUCH TREATY WAS BASED ON DESIRE PREVENT EVENTS IN EUROPE FROM TAKING TRAGIC TURN AND CAUSING NEW DISASTER IN WORLD. SOV GOVT AND SOV PEOPLE WERE RESOLVED TO GO THROUGH WITH THIS AND THEY BELIEVED THIS WAS IN ACCORD WITH INTERESTS PEACE IN EUROPE AND IN WORLD AT LARGE, AS WELL AS WITH US INTERESTS, IF SUCH INTEREST WERE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD. IF US WAS SEEKING PEACE AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH USSR, THIS SHOULD NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH ITS INTERESTS. USSR, JUST AS US, WAS GREAT POWER AND IF IT WAS INTERESTED -- AS IT HAD TO BE -- IN MATTERS OF WAR AND PEACE IN ALL CORNERS OF WORLD, INCLUDING AFRICA AND ASIA, THEN IT WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND REASONS WHY IT WAS DOUBLY INTERESTED IN EVENTS IN EUROPE.

GROMYKO WENT ON, SAYING ANOTHER ASPECT PROBLEM WAS THAT IN PRESENT SITUATION WHERE THERE WAS NO GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND WEST BERLIN

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-2- SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION TWO OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

WAS OCCUPIED CITY IN HANDS WESTERN POWERS, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF GDR WERE BEING CRUDELY FLOUTED. USSR WAS FULLY AWARE OF US DISLIKE FOR GDR, ITS SYSTEM, ITS GOVT, AND ULBRICHT PERSONALLY. HOWEVER, THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT DID NOT DEPEND ON US; FACT WAS THAT GDR, ITS GOVT, AND ULBRICHT EXISTED. ADMITTING HE MIGHT BE REPETITIVE, GROMYKO STATED WEST BERLIN DID NOT BELONG TO WEST AND THERE WAS NO REASON WHY US, UK AND FRANCE SHOULD STAY AS BOSSES OF WEST BERLIN. NEITHER USSR, NOR GDR, NOR SOME OTHER STATES COULD RECONCILE THEMSELVES WITH PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. IT APPEARED TO SOVS WEST FAILED APPRECIATE DULY THESE ARGUMENTS WHICH USSR HAD BEEN ADVANCING IN ITS QUEST FOR MUTUALLY AGREEABLE SOLUTION.

GROMYKO OBSERVED THAT EVERY ONCE IN A WHILE US ATTEMPTED LINK QUESTION GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND NORMALIZATION SITUATION WEST BERLIN WITH QUESTION GERMAN REUNIFICATION. HE SUPPOSED THAT WAS DONE ONLY FOR RECORD. IN HIS VIEW THIS WAS WASTE OF TIME AND ENERGY. NEW SITUATION EXISTED IN GERMANY TODAY; TWO GERMAN STATES HAD EMERGED FROM RUINS HITLER'S REICH AND IT WAS FROM THIS FACT THAT ONE MUST PROCEED. USSR WAS CONVINCED UNIFICATION WOULD BE RESOLVED ONLY BETWEEN TWO GERMAN STATES. ON OTHER HAND QUESTION GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND NORMALIZATION WEST BERLIN SITUATION COULD NOT BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. IT WAS THIS THAT HE HAD WANTED PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZED IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SECY HERE IN GENEVA. IT WAS REGRETTABLE US FAILED DRAW NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS. USSR WAS CONVINCED ITS POSITION CORRECT AND IN FULL ACCORD WITH INTERESTS PEACE AND DETENTE IN EUROPE.

REFERRING TO SECY'S REMARK IT WOULD BE WELL IF USSR MADE CLEAR IN ONE OR TWO DIRECTIONS WHAT SITUATION WOULD EXIST WITH REGARD TO PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS AND WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN IN EVENT SOVS WENT THROUGH WITH THEIR INTENTIONS RE GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT, GROMYKO CONTENDED HE HAD SPOKEN ON THIS DURING HIS MEETINGS WITH SECY IN NEW YORK AND LATER IN GENEVA. DURING PRESENT CONVERSATIONS, HE HAD ALSO TWICE REPLIED TO THIS QUESTION. HE CONTINUED THAT, IF UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED ON APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT, SITUATION WOULD BE SIMPLE; ACCESS WOULD BE UNRESTRICTED AND IT WOULD BE ENSURED BY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING GDR FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATIONS; IT WOULD BE ENSURED ON BASIS RESPECT GDR SOVEREIGNTY,

INCLUDING ITS

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-3- SECTO 50 JULY 25 1 AM (SECTION TWO OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

INCLUDING ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITH REGARD TRANSIT. A DIFFERENT SITUATION WOULD EXIST IF PEACE TREATY WITH GDR WERE SIGNED UNILATERALLY, I.E., WITHOUT WESTERN POWERS' PARTICIPATION OR WITHOUT AGREEMENT WITH THOSE POWERS; THEN WEST WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH GDR GOVT RE ALL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING TRANSIT ARRANGEMENTS; USSR WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THESE. ONLY GDR WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE AND WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH GDR.

AS TO SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT DESIRABILITY AVOID CONFLICT, GROMYKO ASSERTED SOV GOVT HAD ALWAYS PROCEEDED ON THAT BASIS. SOV GOVT BELIEVED BOTH SIDES MUST DO THEIR UTMOST TO AVOID CONFLICT. SOV GOVT BELIEVED CONFLICT COULD BE CAUSED ONLY BY WESTERN POWERS, US IN PARTICULAR, DUE TO THEIR POSITION. IF USSR WANTED CREATE CONFLICT FOR SAKE OF CONFLICT IT WOULD HAVE ACTED DIFFERENTLY, AND IT WOULD HAVE HAD NO PROLONGED NEGOTIATIONS WITH US IN ORDER SEEK POSSIBILITY AGREED SOLUTION.

GROMYKO RECALLED THAT, LAST MARCH IN GENEVA, SECY HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ABOUT SOVT FLIGHTS IN AIR CORRIDORS TO WEST BERLIN. SECY HAD SAID THESE FLIGHTS WERE COMPLICATING MATTERS AND IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THEY STOPPED. GROMYKO CONTINUED THAT, ALTHOUGH USSR CATEGORICALLY REJECTED ASSERTION THAT SUCH FLIGHTS WERE ILLEGAL, UPON HIS RETURN TO MOSCOW HE HAD REPORTED SECY'S REMARKS ON THIS POINT TO SOV GOVT AND KHRUSHCHEV PERSONALLY. HE HAD TOLD HIS GOVT THAT PRESIDENT APPARENTLY SHARED SECY'S VIEWS ON THIS MATTER, BUT ALTHOUGH BOTH OF THEM WERE WRONG, THEY DID APPEAR FEEL THIS WAS COMPLICATING FACTOR FOR THEM. KHRUSHCHEV HAD THEN REPLIED THAT SUSPENSION SUCH FLIGHTS MIGHT PERHAPS FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAD ORDERED THEM SUSPENDED (AT THIS POINT GROMYKO TOLD HIS INTERPRETER NOT TO USE "STOPPED" BUT RATHER "SUSPENDED" IN THIS SENTENCE). GROMYKO SAID SOVS HAD NOT EXPECTED US TO EXPRESS SPECIAL GRATITUDE TO USSR FOR THIS. US HAD TAKEN THIS FOR GRANTED, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS IT HAD NOTED THIS IN ITS OWN MIND. HE HAD MADE THESE REMARKS BY WAY OF REPLY TO SECRETARY'S COMMENT RE NEED NOT DO ANYTHING TO HEIGHTEN CONFLICT. GROMYKO REITERATED THAT IF SOVS HAD WANTED CONFLICT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN ACTING DIFFERENTLY. HOWEVER, NOT TO WANT CONFLICT FOR SAKE OF CONFLICT WAS ONE THING; IT WAS ANOTHER THING WHEN LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF USSR AND LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF GDR AS SOVEREIGN STATE WERE AFFECTED; INTERESTS WHICH WERE IN FULL ACCORD WITH INTERESTS OF PEACE.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

7/25/62

43-41  
Action

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RMR

SECRET

Control: 18147  
Rec'd: JULY 25, 1962  
2:28 AM

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION THREE OF SIX)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 50, INFORMATION MOSCOW 29,  
LONDON, BONN, PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

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COMMENTING ON SECY'S REMARK THAT PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT FAVOR DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHCHEV, GROMYKO NOTED THAT THIS WAS APPARENTLY SECY'S VIEW ON THIS POINT AND THAT SECY WAS OF COURSE FREE DRAW CONCLUSIONS FROM SITUATION AS HE SAW IT. US KNEW SOV POSITIONS, INCLUDING ITS LATEST PROPOSAL RE WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN, WELL ENOUGH AND THERE WAS NOTHING HE, GROMYKO, COULD ADD. HE DID WISH REPEAT HOWEVER THAT HE REGRETTED VERY MUCH US WAS TAKING SUCH POSITION RE WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN. HE WISHED EMPHASIZE WITH ALL VIGOR SOV GOVT WOULD NEVER, NEVER AGREE WITH THAT POSITION AND WOULD NEVER ACCEPT PERPETUATION PRESENCE WESTERN TROOPS WEST BERLIN.

SECY SAID HE WISHED MAKE OBSERVATION RE GROMYKO'S VERY LAST POINT, BECAUSE HE BELIEVED HE SHOULD DRAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTACTS, I. E., COMMUNICATION, AND A SITUATION WHERE WE WOULD HAVE TO IMAGINE WHAT THE TWO LEADERS COULD SAY IF THEY MET FACE TO FACE. THIS WAS OF COURSE UP TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT CONTACTS, I.E., COMMUNICATION, WERE OF VERY CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE.

REFERRING TO GROMYKO'S REMARK THAT WESTERN ATTITUDE ON PRESENCE FORCES WEST BERLIN HAD BEEN DISTINCT IN PAST BUT NOT AS DISTINCT

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-2- SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION THREE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

AS IT WAS TODAY, SECY FIRST OBSERVED HE UNDERSTOOD WORD TODAY TO MEAN RECENT DAYS. HE THEN RECALLED THAT PRESSURE ON THIS POINT HAD COME FROM SOV SIDE IN MOST RECENT CONVERSATIONS. OF COURSE INSISTENCE ON PART USSR CLARIFIED AND MADE MORE DISTINCT BASIS ATTITUDE WESTERN POWERS. SECY POINTED OUT PRESIDENT HAD SAID IN VIENNA NO US PRESIDENT WAS IN POSITION MAKE THIS KIND OF SURRENDER WESTERN POSITION IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

SECY SAID HE WAS AGAIN SORRY HEAR SUCH WORDS AS "ETERNAL" AND "PERPETUAL" BEING USED IN CONNECTION PRESENCE WESTERN FORCES. NO ONE HAD SAID SUCH PRESENCE SHOULD BE ETERNAL OR PERPETUAL. WHAT WE HAD SAID WAS THAT USSR COULD NOT UNILATERALLY, BY ITSELF, SAY WHEN IT SHOULD END. TO SAY WEST INSISTING ON STAYING PERPETUALLY IN BERLIN WAS INCORRECT AND MISREPRESENTATION WESTERN POSITION.

RECALLING GROMYKO'S COMMENT WESTERN LEADERS HAD EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING USSR DESIRE ENSURE ITS SECURITY, SECY STRESSED THIS UNDERSTANDING DID NOT MEAN THAT, IF SOVS ALLEGED BASIC RIGHTS OF WEST WERE SOME KIND OF VAGUE THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY, THEY COULD EXPECT US MOVE OUT AT RISK OF CATASTROPHE TO WEST WITH REGARD TO ITS SECURITY. SECY SAID HE WISHED ASSURE GENUINE UNDERSTANDING SOVT SECURITY DID NOT MEAN WEST WOULD LIE DOWN AND PLAY DEAD WHEN ALLEGED SOV SECURITY AT STAKE.

AS TO GROMYKO'S REMARK THAT TALK ABOUT UNIFICATION WAS WASTE TIME AND ENERGY, SECY STATED SOV POSITION TODAY INEVITABLY LED TO CONCLUSION SOVS WANTED BRUSH ASIDE ALL AGREEMENTS THEY HAD CONCLUDED WITH WEST BETWEEN WORLD WAR II AND MIDDLE "FIFTIES" AND THAT APPARENTLY THEIR SOLEMN ASSURANCES WERE VALUELESS BECAUSE THEY WISHED CHANGE SITUATION TO THEIR ADVANTAGE IN SPITE OF FACT THAT WOULD VIOLATE WESTERN VITAL INTERESTS. SECY

STRONGLY EMPHASIZED

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CONTROL: 18147  
CORRECTION ISSUED: 7/25/62-6 AM

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-3- SECTO: 52, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION THREE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA  
CORRECTED PAGE -3-

STRONGLY EMPHASIZED WE WERE NOT CHILDREN AND UNDERSTOOD SITUATION. IF SOVTS INTENDED THROW EXISTING AGREEMENTS INTO JUNK HEAP, NO ONE COULD EXPECT WEST TO THINK ANY NEW AGREEMENT RE PRESENCE AND ACCESS WEST BERLIN WOULD HAVE SOLID BACKING UNLESS WESTERN POWERS WERE IN WEST BERLIN. AS TO GROMYKO'S ASSERTION THERE WAS NEW SITUATION IN GERMANY CHARACTERIZED PARTICULARLY BY EXISTENCE GDR AND ULBRICHT, SECY STRESSED THERE WAS ANOTHER ELEMENT IN THAT SITUATION, I.E., PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS IN WEST BERLIN WITH ACCESS THERETO, WHICH HAD NOT CHANGED, WAS PART OF SITUATION, AND WAS AS MUCH OF A FACT AS ANY OTHER FACTS CITED. SOVS SAID THAT WHEN PEACE TREATY WAS SIGNED BY THEM, THESE QUESTIONS WOULD BE FOR GDR TO DEAL WITH AND SOVS WOULD HAVE NO RELATION TO THEM. SURELY THIS WAS NOT ACCURATE DESCRIPTION THEIR POSITION. WE COULD NOT BELIEVE SOVS WOULD INDEED TURN OVER WHAT THEY SAY ARE THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS TO ULBRICHT. GROMYKO HIMSELF HAD SAID USSR WOULD BE INVOLVED IN SITUATION IN CASE OF TROUBLE. IN ANY EVENT CONCERN WITH SITUATION MUST REMAIN BETWEEN SIGNATORIES TO AGREEMENTS. AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED USSR AND WEST CONTINUE BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SITUATION. WE SEE NO WAY SOVS COULD, WOULD OR WOULD WANT TO TRANSFER THIS RESPONSIBILITY TO ANOTHER ENTITY.

RE GROMYKO'S ASSERTION THERE WAS DANGEROUS SITUATION IN BERLIN, SECRETARY POINTED OUT SOURCE OF DANGER EASY TO IDENTIFY. THERE HAD BEEN NO SOURCE OF WAR IN THAT AREA FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, EVEN SINCE JESSUP-MALIK AGREEMENT, WHICH HAD RELIEVED DANGEROUS TENSIONS AND WHICH SOVS NOW WANT THROW OUT WINDOW. DANGER OR THREAT DID NOT COME FROM OUR SIDE BUT FROM EAST, BECAUSE SOVS SAID UNLESS YOU DO THIS WE WILL MAKE SITUATION DANGEROUS. WEST MADE NO DEMANDS AND WAS NOT ASKING ANYTHING. SOURCE OF DANGER CAME FROM SOUCE OF DEMANDS. IF THAT WAS PEACE OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, SECRETARY EMPHASIZED, THEN HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THOSE WORDS. THIS LACK OF REGARD FOR INTERESTS AND POSITION OTHER SIDE WAS ELEMENT LACK OF RECIPROCITY WE HAD BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS. SECRETARY AGREED BERLIN WAS SERIOUS PROBLEM.

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7/25/62

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

43-41  
Action

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FROM: GENEVA

Info

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TO: Secretary of State

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FMR

NO: SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION FOUR OF SIX)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 50, INFORMATION MOSCOW 29,  
LONDON, BONN, PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

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HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT, IT WAS ALSO TRUE THERE WERE OTHER PROBLEMS, SOME CONNECTED WITH GERMANY AND SOME NOT. PRUDENCE REQUIRED NOT TO TRANSLATE BERLIN PROBLEM INTO SOLE DETERMINING ISSUE IN US-USSR RELATIONS. IT WAS NOT ONLY ISSUE ON US-USSR AGENDA. PERHAPS PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON OTHER PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, IF BERLIN PROBLEM WAS TREATED WITHOUT ANY ELEMENT RECIPROCITY, THEN INDEED IT WAS MAJOR ISSUE BETWEEN US-USSR.

AS TO CORRIDOR FLIGHTS, SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY MUCH AWARE OF DIFFERENCE IN SITUATION THIS RESPECT AFTER HIS DEPARTURE GENEVA. HOWEVER, SINCE HE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING GROMYKO HAD INTERVENED, AND SINCE HE WAS NOT SURE GROMYKO WANTED TO BE PERSONALLY COGNIZANT OF SITUATION -- SOMETHING THE SOV FONMIN DID NOT WANT IN GENEVA -- HE HAD NOT COMMUNICATED WITH GROMYKO ON THIS POINT. HOWEVER, SECRETARY WISHED EXPRESS GRATIFICATION AT HEARING GROMYKO'S REMARKS, AND THOUGHT THIS HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND HELPFUL ACT ON HIS PART.

SECRETARY RECALLED HE HAD MADE TWO REMARKS RE POSSIBLE WAYS DEALING WITH MATTERS AT HAND.

ONE WAY WOULD BE FOR USSR TO MAKE CLEAR ITS POSSIBLE ACTIONS RE

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-2- SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 AM (SECTION FOUR OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

EAST GERMANY WOULD NOT AFFECT RIGHTS WESTERN POWERS AND ACCESS. FROM WHAT GROMYKO HAD SAID HE APPARENTLY DID NOT THINK WELL OF THIS SUGGESTION. HOWEVER, SECRETARY POINTED OUT, GROMYKO WAS TRYING MAKE EAST GERMANY MORE SOVEREIGN THAN WEST GERMANY. GROMYKO HAD SAID USSR WOULD BACK UP EAST GERMANY WITH REGARD STEPS EAST GERMANY WOULD TAKE IN EXERCISING THAT KIND OF SOVEREIGNTY. OF COURSE THAT WOULD LEAD TO VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION, AND WAS UNWISE ON PART USSR. THE SECOND WAY -- POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS INCLUDING UK AND FRANCE -- US HAD MADE CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS RE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS. SECRETARY WONDERED WHETHER GROMYKO HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS OF HIS OWN.

SECRETARY THEN EXPRESSED VIEW POINT HAD BEEN REACHED WHERE, UNLESS THERE WERE NEW INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED, BOTH SIDES SHOULD REPORT IN DETAIL TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS, GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO WHAT HAD BEEN SAID, AND BE IN TOUCH AGAIN, AS HE WAS SURE TWO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT THEM TO BE. SECRETARY EXPRESSED REGRET IT HAD SO FAR BEEN IMPOSSIBLE MAKE SERIOUS ADVANCE IN GENEVA, DESPITE DEMONSTRATION GREAT EFFORTS ON OUR SIDE DURING PAST MONTHS FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. SOVS NOW CONCENTRATING ON POINT OF MOST VITAL INTEREST TO WEST. WESTERN POSITION ON THIS HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO KHRUSHCHEV BY PRESIDENT IN VIENNA. INDEED IT HAD BEEN CLEAR SINCE EVENTS OF 1948/49, AND THEREFORE OUR ATTITUDE COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE SURPRISE TO USSR. SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT, IN VIEW WHAT HAD BEEN SAID, HE SAW NO DIRECTION IN WHICH GROMYKO AND HE COULD GO AHEAD HERE IN GENEVA. HE WONDERED WHAT GROMYKO'S VIEW WAS ON THIS.

GROMYKO REJOINED BY REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S REMARK USSR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND NORMALIZATION WEST BERLIN SITUATION WERE VAGUE AND REPRESENTED VERY FREE AND EASY INTERPRETATION SOV ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR GERMAN PEACE TREATY AND NORMALIZATION WEST BERLIN SITUATION ON BASIS FREE CITY.

THERE WAS NOTHING

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-3- SECTO '50, JULY '25, 1 AM (SECTION FOUR OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

THERE WAS NOTHING VAGUE OR NEBULOUS IN THIS. IN FACT EVERYTHING WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR. THERE WAS THIS INTOLERABLE SITUATION WHERE WEST BERLIN WAS HELD BY WESTERN POWERS IN THEIR FISTS AND MAINTAINED AS NATO BASE, AND WHERE GDR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS WERE BEING CRUDELY FLOUTED. ALL OF THIS WAS NOTHING NEBULOUS; THESE REPRESENTED WEIGHTY ARGUMENTS MILITATING IN FAVOR SOLUTION THIS PROBLEM. THIS SITUATION WILL UNQUESTIONABLY BE CHANGED, WITH OR WITHOUT PRIOR UNDERSTANDING WITH WESTERN POWERS. HOWEVER, USSR BELIEVED IT WOULD BE BEST HAVE SOLUTION WITH PRIOR UNDERSTANDING WITH WESTERN POWERS.

GROMYKO SAID SECRETARY HAD TRIED PRESENT SITUATION IN SUCH WAY AS TO MAKE IT LOOK AS IF CREATION TWO GERMANIES HAD BEEN CAUSED BY USSR'S VIOLATION ITS SOLEMN OBLIGATIONS. THIS WAS INACCURATE. IT HAD BEEN WESTERN POWERS, AND ONLY WESTERN POWERS WHICH HAD TORN UP AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ALLIES AND HAD SPLIT GERMANY. IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT TWO GERMAN STATES HAD EMERGED. GROMYKO SAID THERE WAS NO NEED REMINDING SECRETARY OF CREATION SUCH THINGS AS BIZONIA OR TRIZONIA, NOR OF CREATION OF REVANCHIST, MILITARIST, BUT INDEPENDENT FRG. THERE WAS NOT NEED TO REVIEW HISTORY. USSR HAD BEEN FROM VERY OUTSET IN FAVOR CREATION SINGLE, PEACEFUL GERMANY, BUT THAT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE DUE TO WESTERN POWERS. APPARENTLY NO COMMON LANGUAGE COULD BE FOUND ON THIS POINT. SECRETARY REPEATED HIMSELF AND SO APPARENTLY DID HE, GROMYKO, TOO. HOWEVER, SINCE SECRETARY HAD RAISED POINT, IT WAS NECESSARY TO RESTORE HISTORY, I.E., TRUTH.

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7/25/62

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Department of State

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43-41  
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FROM: GENEVA  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 A.M. (SECTION V OF VI)

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 50, INFORMATION MOSCOW 29,  
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GROMYKO CONTENDED USSR WOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER HOW ITS ALLIES IN  
WAR HAD ACTED WITH RESPECT THEIR COMMITMENTS AS ALLIES. HARDLY  
WAS INK DRY ON THOSE AGREEMENTS AND HARDLY HAD FIRST GRASS  
GROWN ON GRAVES MILLIONS OF DEAD, WHEN WEST STARTED CRUELY  
TO FLOUT ALL ITS AGREEMENTS WITH USSR, WHICH DUTY BOUND REMEMBER  
THIS AND DRAW NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. GROMYKO ASSERTED THIS WAS  
ROAD THAT HAD LED TO PRESENT SITUATION. THIS ALL A VERY SAD STORY,  
BUT MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

RECALLING SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ABOUT TRANSFER USSR SECURITY  
INTERESTS TO GDR, GROMYKO ASSERTED THIS QUESTION DID NOT ARISE  
AT ALL. USSR DID NOT INTEND TO TRANSFER ITS SECURITY. HOWEVER,  
USSR HAD MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO CERTAIN STATES, INCLUDING THOSE  
UNDER WARSAW PACT, AND IN EVENT ANY AGGRESSION AGAINST GDR,  
USSR WOULD MEET ITS OBLIGATION UNDER WARSAW PACT. AS TO USSR,  
ITS SECURITY WAS FIRMLY IN ITS OWN HANDS.

GROMYKO THEN REFERRED TO SECRETARY'S REMARK SOVS TRYING MAKE  
GDR MORE SOVEREIGN THAN FRG AND WONDERED WHY SECRETARY THOUGHT  
FRG SHOULD BE YARDSTICK OF SOVEREIGNTY FOR GDR. IF FRG NOT  
FULLY SOVEREIGN, IF WEST HAD POCKETED PART ITS SOVEREIGNTY,  
WHY SHOULD GDR TAKE ITS CUE FROM THAT? IN ANY EVENT QUESTION OF  
GREATER OR LESSER SOVEREIGNTY OUT OF PLACE. SOVEREIGNTY WAS

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SOVEREIGNTY  
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-2- SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 A.M. (SECTION V OF VI), FROM GENEVA

SOVEREIGNTY, AND COULD NOT BE CUT UP IN PIECES AND PLACED ON DIFFERENT SHELVES. IT HAD BEEN KNOWN FOR A LONG TIME THAT, IF ANY SOVEREIGN STATE AGREED YIELD SOME OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS BY VOLUNTARILY ENTERING INTO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT, THIS WAS EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY.

GROMYKO THEN OBSERVED SECRETARY HAD FOR SECOND TIME ADVANCED IDEA CONTINUATION DISCUSSION BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS. GROMYKO SAID HE HAD TWO COMMENTS: HE WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT SECRETARY HAD IN MIND -- BILATERAL OR BROADER DISCUSSIONS? ALSO HE WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO DO. HE SAID THIS SUGGESTION WOULD REMAIN UNANSWERED BY USSR HERE IN GENEVA FOR TIME BEING. SECRETARY WONDERED WHETHER GROMYKO'S LAST SENTENCE REFERRED TO FOUR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS OR TO BILATERAL CONTACTS. GROMYKO REPLIED HE WAS TALKING ABOUT SECRETARY'S SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS. AS TO CONTACTS, SECRETARY HAD SAID PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES NOT CONDUCTIVE TO DIRECT CONTACT HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS DID NOT MEAN INDIRECT CONTACTS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE.

SECRETARY CONFIRMED GROMYKO'S UNDERSTANDING ON LATTER POINT, WHILE NOTING HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR PRESIDENT FORMALLY. RE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS, US HAD MADE SOME GENERAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD DISCUSS. WE HAD IN MIND FOUR POWERS RESPONSIBLE FOR QUESTIONS RELATING TO GERMANY; HOWEVER, SECRETARY NOTED, HE WOULD HAVE BE IN TOUCH WITH THOSE NOT PRESENT HERE. SECRETARY EXPRESSED VIEW IT WAS IMPORTANT IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE AGREE ON APPROPRIATE TASKS FOR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS; SOME SUCH TASKS WERE CONTAINED IN US GENERAL PRINCIPLES PAPER GIVEN TO GROMYKO DURING PREVIOUS MEETING IN GENEVA.

SECRETARY THEN NOTED GROMYKO HAD REFERRED TO SOV INSISTENCE RE "GDR INTERESTS." HE WISHED TO REMIND GROMYKO THERE WERE NUMBER OTHER INTERESTS, SUCH AS THOSE OF US AND ITS ALLIES,

SECRET GERMANY



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-3- SECTO 52, JULY 25, 11 A.M. (SECTION V OF VI), FROM GENEVA

GERMANY AND GERMAN PEOPLE AS WHOLE, WEST BERLINERS, AND PEOPLES OF USSR AND US, ALL OF WHOM WERE INTERESTED IN NOT ALLOWING MAJOR CRISIS DEVELOP. IT WAS CLEAR GDR INTERESTS NOT PARAMOUNT WHEN VAST INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE IN THIS SITUATION. SECRETARY AGREED THERE WAS NO USE IN TALKING ABOUT DEGREES OF SOVEREIGNTY. HOWEVER, POINT HE HAD WISHED MAKE WAS THAT WESTERN POWERS RESERVED RE WEST GERMANY CERTAIN POINTS WITH REGARD THIS SITUATION, AND GROMYKO HAD IN FACT PRAISED THIS AS SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE. WE HAD ALSO RESERVED RE WEST GERMANY POINTS REGARDING SETTLEMENT GERMAN PROBLEM AS WHOLE. IN REPLY GROMYKO'S INQUIRY RE SPECIFIC POINTS, KOHLER POINTED OUT WESTERN POWERS IN THEIR AGREEMENT WITH WEST GERMANY HAD RESERVED ALL MATTERS RELATING TO BERLIN, PEACE SETTLEMENT, AND GERMANY AS WHOLE. SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED SIMPLY POINT OUT THIS POSSIBILITY WAS OPEN TO USSR AS WELL.

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7/25/62

COMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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FROM: GENEVA - CORRECTED PAGE 1  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: SECTO 50, JULY 25, 1 A.M. (SECTION YD OF YD)

PRIORITY

R.R.

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 50, INFORMATION MOSCOW 29,  
LONDON, BONN, PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

RE GROMYKO'S REMARK GRANT OF RIGHTS ALSO REPRESENTED EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS AND RECALLED THAT US HAD TOLD USSR THAT, IF IT SIGNED TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY AND IF EAST GERMANY SAID TO USSR WHAT WAS IN ZORIN-BOLZ AGREEMENT, THAT WOULD ALSO BE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY. IF, E.G., FRANCE AGREED TO FLIGHTS BY AIRCRAFT FROM LONDON TO ROME, EVEN IF SUCH AIRCRAFT DID NOT TOUCH GROUND IN FRANCE, THAT WAS ALSO EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY. SECRETARY OBSERVED HE UNDERSTOOD GROMYKO NOT IN POSITION COMMENT ON QUESTION DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS TODAY. MEANWHILE WE WOULD GIVE MORE PRECISE THOUGHT THIS QUESTION AND WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH OTHER SIDE.

SECRETARY THEN RAISED QUESTION SCHEDULE. SAID IN NORMAL COURSE HE WOULD RETURN TO WASHINGTON TOMORROW, TO BE THERE IN TIME FOR HIS DINNER FOR SOUVANNA PHOUMA JULY 26. THIS WAS NOT CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE FOR HIM. HOWEVER, HE HAD RATHER GATHERED IMPRESSION BOTH SIDES HAD SAID ALL THEY COULD HERE, AND PERHAPS IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR EACH TO CONSULT OWN GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF GROMYKO COULD SAY WHEN HE WAS LEAVING FOR MOSCOW, AND WHETHER HE THOUGHT THEY SHOULD BE IN TOUCH AGAIN BEFORE HE LEFT. SECRETARY NOTED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO STAY IF GROMYKO THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER FROM MOSCOW TO DISCUSS BEFORE LEAVING GENEVA, AND OF COURSE WOULD BE IN TOUCH

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SECRET

-2- SECTO 50, JULY 25 1 A.M., (SECTION VI OF VI), FROM GENEVA  
IF HE HAD ANYTHING NEW FROM WASHINGTON.

GROMYKO REFERRED TO SECRETARY'S COMMENT GDR INTERESTS COULD NOT BE COMPARED WITH WESTERN INTERESTS, AND THOUGHT SECRETARY PROBABLY REGARDED WESTERN INTERESTS AS BIG MOUNTAIN AND GDR INTERESTS AS SMALL PEBBLE. WHILE IT TRUE US GREAT POWER AND BIGGER THAN GDR, ANY STATE, EVEN SMALL, CONSIDERED ITS OWN INTERESTS CLOSE AND VITAL TO IT. MOREOVER WHEN SOVS SPOKE OF GDR INTERESTS, THEY HAD IN MIND VITAL, FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS GDR, SINCE WEST BERLIN IN CENTER GDR AND ALL AIR, LAND AND WATER COMMUNICATIONS TO WEST BERLIN RAN THROUGH GDR TERRITORY. GROMYKO REITERATED SUGGESTION RE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD REMAIN UNANSWERED FOR TIME BEING. RE SCHEDULE, GROMYKO INDICATED HE TENTATIVELY PLANNING LEAVE JULY 26. HOWEVER, IF INTERESTS NEGOTIATIONS WARRANTED LONGER STAY AND IF FURTHER MEETING AGREED, HE WOULD NOT OBJECT. THUS WHETHER FURTHER MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE DEPENDED NOT ONLY ON HIM BUT ON SECRETARY AS WELL. MEETING CLOSED WITH AGREEMENT TWO DELEGATIONS WOULD CHECK IN MORNING WHETHER ANYTHING NEW ON EITHER SIDE.

RUSK

DLW

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO SS-0; TEM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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SECRET

July 26, 1962

TO : The Secretary  
The Under Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : EUR William R. Tyler

SUBJECT: European Nuclear Force

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten signature]*

1. Introduction: You should be aware of a reported new turn in Secretary McNamara's thinking on the nuclear/MRBM issue. Our information about the views indicated below comes from Secretary McNamara's staff and should be treated in confidence, unless he raises the matter.

2. New Concept: Secretary McNamara is wondering whether the US should now propose that the NAC abandon consideration of the NATO multilateral seaborne missile force in favor of a multilateral MRBM force geared more directly to US financial needs:

a. The US would propose that this force be all-European, without US financial or other participation. The US would not wait for the Europeans to raise the possibility of a European force with us; the US would take the initiative in pressing for such a force, on financial grounds. (This abrupt shift of tactic would hardly be consistent with either (i) our commitment to the UK and others to avoid new nuclear initiatives during EEC negotiations; (ii) the possible need to save such nuclear concessions as US sale or provision of warheads to a European nuclear force until we can see whether these concessions will be needed to balance off concessions we may be seeking in the economic field; (iii) our general view that we should not rush the nuclear matter, but rather wait for European political integration and thinking to progress further.)

b. The US

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①

SP - Mr. [unclear]

*[Vertical handwritten note]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

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b. The US would propose that the force be large enough to cover all major nuclear targets which threaten Europe, so that the US could concentrate its own strategic forces entirely on targets which threaten the US. (This would mean a force much larger than the 200 missiles we now have in mind, and thus--given the improbability of large increases in European defense spending--one which would involve a much larger cut-back in allied conventional programs. Even more importantly, it would place the US in the position of advocating the very strategy which de Gaulle has been warning Europe we would eventually adopt, i.e., one which makes the nuclear defense of Europe entirely dependent on European resources, and the nuclear defense of the US entirely dependent on US resources. It could thus raise the specter of US "disengagement" in the eyes of allies already too prone to see this specter where it does not exist.)

c. Secretary McNamara's line of thinking seems to be going toward a European force placed on the continent instead of at sea and which would be reserved for the more important nuclear forces covering the nuclear defense of the US. (Land-based deployment would make it very difficult to set up a genuinely multilateral force, since individual European countries would want to control MRBM's deployed on their territory and could readily seize them in time of emergency. Land-based deployment would also make French participation a must, since we would need the real estate; and the need to secure French participation would probably lead to concessions to de Gaulle which would vitiate the multilateral character of the force. Moreover, several countries, including the UK and USSR, would react adversely to plans for MRBM deployment on German soil; and yet such deployment could not be avoided without raising the cry of discrimination.)

3. Response: If Secretary McNamara should raise this approach with you, I would suggest the following answer:

- (a) We do not believe that the US should take the  
initiative

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initiative in proposing a multilateral European force, during the period of EEC negotiations. During NAC discussion of a NATO multilateral force, however, the US should indicate that it is open to alternative suggestions and should respond favorably if our allies raise the question of a European force.

(b) On the question of size, the US should favor a force as large as can be constructed without substantial diversion of resources from conventional weapons. An initial force of 200 missiles seems to us about the maximum likely to be consistent with this precept, but we are open to argument.

(c) We believe that the US should continue to oppose land-based deployment in Europe. We do not believe that a genuinely multilateral force could be based on the territory of national governments, and we are impressed by the specific problems involved in use of French and German territory.

We believe, in short, that we should go forward with the presently planned NAC discussion of a NATO multilateral sea-based MRBM force, if only to educate the Europeans as to how a genuinely multilateral force might be set up, and leave any permutations in this concept to evolve naturally from the discussion, instead of forcing the pace.

Drafted by: S/P - Mr. Owen

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
1 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLRO

E

SUBJECT: Developments on NATO or European Nuclear Force

1. You will recall that Ambassador Finletter recommended that we should not accept the proposal and that we should not accept the proposal. I sent you a cable on 128. both in the morning and in the afternoon; after the meeting, his whole attitude would seem to be a step forward in this problem.



2. The ostensible purpose of the Anglo-American arrangement is to provide evidence of a step forward in this problem, beside the fact that the arrangement is actually used as a bargaining chip. Rostow's, being a step forward in this nuclear business.

3. The message at TAB B deserves a full and careful reading. It does represent some kind of a "baby step" forward from the disastrous position enunciated by Ambassador Finletter on June 15. However, it still insists on "multilateral" as meaning completely integrated, "e.g., through mixed manning", so that no country could withdraw its contribution and reconstitute it as a national force. In establishing US policy, as is his wont, in the last paragraph of this message, Henry indicates that such an arrangement is the "only way of fulfilling such a role on which we would, therefore, look with favor."

4. I came away from your meeting with Walt Rostow with the impression that the United States Government was about to coordinate an orderly position on the subject of a European nuclear force, and that several alternative arrangements would be examined in the process. I cannot read this Henry Owen cable at TAB B in any other way than another uncoordinated, inflexible, unresponsive shot in the dark.

LJL  
LEGERE

~~Direct cable Rostow~~  
mm

Attachments  
a/s

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1/ Folder 2: "The Six"

8/2/62  
Ausland  
WV

Record Number 58172

Berlin Crisis

Yes

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SIGNATOR

Ausland, John C.

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DESTP

Hillenbrand, Martin J.

DRAFT

CLASSIFICATION

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TITLE

Briefing for President on Berlin

CTIT

NAMES

TERMS

ORGAN

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ORGAN

United States. European Command. Air Forces

ORGAN

Live Oak (Tripartite Contingency Planning Staff)

ORGAN

North Atlantic Council

ORGAN

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. European Command.

Supreme Allied Commander

ORGAN

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Atlantic Command.

Supreme Allied Commander

PSS

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#### BRIEFING FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON BERLIN

After the wall went up on August 13, 1961, the US and its allies intensified their planning regarding Berlin. During the summer of 1962, General Maxwell Taylor suggested that President Kennedy should have a briefing on this planning. Since I had prepared such a briefing for presentation to the Berlin Task Force, it was decided that I should give the briefing.

Although my briefing had attracted little interest before, news that it was to be presented to the President produced a number of telephone calls and visitors. After absorbing the comments which I received, I presented the briefing to the staff at the White House, including Mc George Bundy and General Taylor. General Taylor settled the matter by saying that he thought the briefing should be given to the President.

The next step was to give the briefing to Secretary of State Rusk. It is this version which I have obtained recently under the Freedom of Information Act, with some excisions. As I recall, I made several minor revisions as a result of Secretary Rusk's comments, but this is essentially the briefing which I gave to President Kennedy.

Present at the briefing, in addition to the President, were a number of senior officials, including Secretary Rusk, Secretary of Defense Mc Namara, Paul Nitze, General Taylor, and Mc George Bundy. I do not know the date of the briefing, but it would have been in August, 1962. Other than some comments by the President regarding nuclear weapons, the briefing was received in silence.

Shortly after this briefing, I accompanied Paul Nitze to Paris, where he presented the briefing to the NATO ambassadors. On the insistence of the French, however, the part about nuclear weapons was omitted. It is important to understand that what was under discussion here was not so much Berlin planning as US and NATO strategy.

Not long after we returned from Paris, the Berlin crisis took an unexpected turn, when it was found that Khrushchev had decided to install some missiles in Cuba.

John C. Ausland  
Oslo, May 26, 1991

NOTE: The document I received from the State Department was a copy of a carbon copy. It is, therefore, not easy to read. I have, therefore, retyped it, noting where words were unclear and where there were excisions. From the context, the latter seem to concern covert operations and nuclear planning. The briefing was originally classified Top Secret.

August 2, 1962

BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand  
BTF - J.C. Ausland  
Briefing for President on Berlin

I attach a revised draft briefing for the President on Berlin, which takes into account the various comments I have received. Subject to any changes you would like made, I propose to use it for the preliminary presentation for the Secretary tomorrow. I will then further revise the script, in the light of his comments.

cc: White House - Mr. Klein  
JCS - Col. Spragins  
ISA - Capt. Cotton  
White House - Col. Legere

## BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

During the past year, the United States and its allies have devoted considerable time and effort to contingency planning for Berlin. The Berlin Task Force has prepared an inventory of this planning, with the view to determining what has been accomplished and what remains to be done.

This briefing is designed to review the results of this inventory. In doing this, we shall use the four phase framework set forth in NSAM 109 (or Poodle Blanket).

I shall begin by reviewing in general terms the four phases. I shall then examine each of the phases in more detail. This examination will describe military, economic, and covert actions which might occur in each phase. The description will include an account of Allied planning, the extent of Allied agreement, and the degree to which governments are committed in advance to a given course of action.

Following the review of the four phases, I should like to examine briefly the Allied organizational arrangements for Berlin planning and operations.

Finally, I shall review briefly some of the major gaps which remain in our planning.

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|            | FOUR PHASES  | SLIDE 1 |
|------------|--|---------|
| Phase I    | Soviet/GDR interference with access.   |         |
| Phase II   | Significant blockage of access. Diplomatic activity. Non-combatant. NATO Military buildup. Economic and naval countermeasures. |         |
| Phase III. | Non-nuclear ground and/or action to restore access, supplemented by naval measures.  |         |
| Phase IV.  | Nuclear weapons.   |         |

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### FOUR PHASES

National Security Action Memorandum 109 divides a developing Berlin crisis into four possible phases:

Phase I. During which Soviet/GDR interference with access is short of significant blockage of access to Berlin.

Phase II. After there is a significant blockage of access, such as a blockage of civilian ground access to Berlin. This non-combatant phase would be characterized primarily by intense diplomatic activity, a NATO military mobilization, and economic and naval countermeasures.

Phase III. During which substantial blockage of access continues. The dominant event in this phase would be the use of force, which could include non-nuclear ground and/or air action in East Germany and/or in Eastern Europe. This could be supplemented by world-wide naval measures. The purpose would be to induce the Soviets to restore access.

Phase IV. Would take place only after non-nuclear action had failed to restore access. The dominant event in this phase would be the use of nuclear weapons.

I should like to emphasize at this point that this is a

conceptual framework, which indicates the order in which we would prefer events to occur. It is not an attempt to predict how history will unroll. I might also mention that we have no idea of rushing from one phase to another. Our aim rather would be to stabilize the situation as early in the scenario as possible and work out an acceptable arrangement on Berlin with the Soviets.

The four phases have now been examined quadripartitely in some detail. I believe it is safe to say that there is considerable agreement on them. The differences regarding some of the details will emerge in the course of the briefing.

I should now like to examine the four phases in more detail.

REMOVE SLIDE 1

PHASE I

During Phase I, Allied vital interests remain substantially intact but are actively challenged by the Soviets and/or the GDR. I should say that we are at present in this phase. We will remain in it until some means of access to Berlin is interrupted or until an agreement of some sort on Berlin is reached.

The US goal during this phase is to maintain its vital interests and to seek an agreement on Berlin with the Soviet Union.

The bulk of Allied planning has been devoted to this stage. There is general agreement on measures to be taken in this stage, particularly with regard to preservation of ground and air access to Berlin. The major exception is related to naval countermeasures. We, France, and Germany believe that it might be suitable to use naval measures not involving use of force to supplement direct responses to Soviet/GDR harassment of access. The UK, although agreeing to plan quadripartite naval measures, does not believe they should be used before Phase II.

Now I should like to describe the events which might occur in Phase I in more detail.

Phase I

SLIDE 2

1. Diplomatic. - Discussion at Foreign Ministers and Ambassadorial level. Ad hoc action on specific problems.
2. Military. - LIVE OAK. Air Access - JACK PINE. Ground Access - FREE STYLE. Naval measures.
3. Economic. - TTD restrictions (now in effect). Limited selective embargo. Travel restrictions against bloc.
4. Covert. - Preparation.

1. Diplomatic action. This current phase - as Phase II - is dominated by diplomatic activity. Although a summit conference is not excluded, the effort to reach agreement is pursued primarily at the Foreign Minister and Ambassadorial level. As specific problems arise, a resolution is pursued at the appropriate level. This might be the Commandant in Berlin (in the case of sector border incidents) or the Foreign

Ministers in Geneva (as in the case of the air corridors in March.)

2. Military action. In 1959, the US, UK, and France set up tripartite staff in Paris known as LIVE OAK, under the command of CINCEUR. Within the framework of LIVE OAK plans, the Allies have made military preparations to deal with possible interference with Allied access to Berlin.

Considerable tripartite planning has been done to preserve air access to Berlin, for the most part within the framework of the JACK PINE plans. This planning includes provision for dealing with Soviet/GDR efforts to threaten or interfere with civil flights. In event civil flights cease, there is provision to continue flying civil aircraft with military crews. Should the Soviets damage, shoot down, or force down and destroy an aircraft, there is provision for the use of fighter protection. There is also provision for flights over 10,000 feet in certain circumstances. Within the framework of the JACK PINE plans, the US and UK governments -- but not the French -- have delegated certain authority to General Norstad.

There has also been planning to deal with interference with ground access. Since the end of the blockade in 1949, both German and Allied access have been subjected to intermittent but frequent harassment. Methods of dealing with minor harassment have been developed informally. They are characterized by patient resistance and negotiation of each incident until the incident is resolved.

Recent formal planning concerns more serious forms of harassment, bordering on blockage. LIVE OAK has submitted to governments proposals for rules of conduct for Allied convoys in event they encounter unacceptable harassment. The US has approved these proposals (unclear word) for US convoys, pending Allied agreement, which we expect to reach in the near future. These rules of conduct and the delegation of authority under the JACK PINE air access plan constitute the extent of advance commitment by the US government regarding precisely what we will do in various contingencies on Berlin.

If Allied autobahn access appears to be blocked, LIVE OAK plans provide several alternative tripartite military probes, known as FREE STYLE. These range from a few vehicles to platoon size. Governments have, however, not delegated advance authority to employ any of these probes.

Planning has been done to deal with German access, largely through application of countermeasures.

The US has suggested -- and the French and Germans have agreed -- that the Allies might use naval measures not involving the use of force to counter serious interference with access. The British have, however, thus far resisted the concept of using naval measures prior to Phase II.

2. Economic. The nearly complete ban on issuance of Temporary Travel Documents to GDR residents, put into effect in September, 1961, continues. Although there would be advantages to further relaxing ban so as to be able to use it again, on balance we have thought it best not to lift it, in order to bring pressure to bear on the GDR to relax restrictions on travel to East Berlin. Quadripartite agreement has been reached on mildly restricting bloc travel to the West if access to East Berlin is denied the Allies. Tentative agreement has been reached with the Germans and French to take selective economic countermeasures, if persistent harassment of access to West Berlin occurs. The British reserve their decision until the event. NATO has also

agreed in principle to cut off air traffic to and from the bloc if a serious incident of physical interference with an Allied airliner occurs in the corridors.

REMOVE SLIDE 2

It is not possible to predict how long Phase I will last. By definition, it will end when it becomes clear that the Soviets/GDR are prepared to use force to maintain a significant blockage of access to Berlin or until a viable agreement is reached on Berlin. The Soviets have given every indication thus far of preferring to minimize their risks and avoid a step which seriously challenges Allied vital interests. There is no guarantee, however, that this will continue.

There have been indications recently that the Soviets may be planning to sign their long-heralded treaty with the GDR. If they do, the scenario would be significantly altered. I should like, therefore, to examine this contingency briefly.

Allied planning for a peace treaty, which is now once again under review, has been based on two assumptions. First, that while we should seek to discourage the Soviets from signing a treaty, in the last analysis we probably cannot prevent this step without resort to force and, second, that we are prepared to acquiesce in Soviet withdrawal from the checkpoints and accept under protest GDR processing of Allied traffic under the currently established procedures.

These assumptions set the limits for Allied reaction to any Soviet move to sign a peace treaty. Prior to any peace conference called by the Soviets, we would propose to take actions designed to deter the Soviet from concluding a treaty, especially one which would infringe our vital interest. At the same time, we would not want to engage our prestige too heavily on the signature of the treaty itself. Our actions after the treaty would depend on our estimate of the possible effect of the implementation of its provisions. They would be directed toward deterring the Soviet/GDR from taking steps which could lead to infringement of our vital interests with respect to Berlin.

If the Soviets decide to conclude a treaty, we would expect the process to stretch over a matter of months, rather than days. We would also expect the Soviets to proceed cautiously, in order to evaluate Allied reactions and thus minimize their risks.

A peace treaty would undoubtedly precipitate a crisis atmosphere. Nevertheless, given careful handling and determination, it should prove manageable. It is, however, always possible that -- either intentionally or through miscalculation -- Soviet/GDR action will result in infringement on our vital interests, such as a significant blockage of access to Berlin.

In this case, we would find ourselves in Phase II.

#### PHASE II

Phase II would provide our last chance to resolve the Berlin problem without the use of force. The prestige of both sides would be heavily engaged, and tensions would be running high. There would be strong pressures from all sides to make

concessions to the Soviets, in order to avoid the risk of war. The Allied goal during Phase II would be to employ non-

coercive measures to restore their vital interests. The Soviets on the other hand would probably aim at

negotiations without access restored, on the assumption that this situation would exert maximum pressure on the Allies to make concessions.

It has become evident in our quadripartite discussions that the US, UK, France, and Germany are in general agreement as to the preferred configuration of Phase II. Particularly as we have examined the alternatives available in Phase III and IV, it has been agreed in principle that we should be prepared to use all measures short of force to reach a settlement in Phase II.

#### PHASE II

#### SLIDE 3

1. Diplomatic. Security Council. Warnings to Soviets and satellites. Avoid formal conference without access.
2. Military. NATO build-up. Air access - JACK PINE. Ground access - airlift and stockpile. Naval measures.
3. Economic. Countermeasures depend on extent of blockade.
4. Covert. Passive resistance.

1. Diplomatic action. During this phase, diplomatic activity would continue to dominate events. At an early point, we would probably find ourselves in the Security Council if not on our initiative on another country's. Plans have been prepared, for example to go to the Security Council as soon as Soviet activity in the air corridors requires the introduction of fighters.

We would at this point probably want to make unpublicized warnings to the Soviets, as well as the satellites.

We would, however, probably want to avoid a formal conference until the Soviets indicate a willingness to restore access.

This diplomatic activity would be conducted against a background of mounting pressure.

2. Military Action. To make clear to the Soviets our determination and prepare for the possible failure of our combination of diplomatic and non-combatant pressures, there is a quadripartite agreement in principle that NATO should engage in a further military build-up or mobilization.

If Allied ground access were affected, plans exist for a garrison airlift to carry the necessary passengers and freight. If civilian ground access were blocked, it would become necessary to resort to the Berlin stockpile and implement QBAL - The Quadripartite Berlin Air Lift.

The quadripartite powers are also examining the possibility of the allies taking civilian motor traffic at some point under their aegis. This would involve giving civilian motor traffic the outward character of Allied military traffic. If such an attempt were resisted by the Soviets, as seems likely, the Soviets would have directly engaged the Allies on the ground and contingency planning for a blockage of Allied access would be applicable.

If the interruption of Phase I were related to air access, the Soviet challenge would have been met within the framework of JACK PINE plans. These actions - such as the Military Sponsored Air Service - could carry over into Phase II.

Quadripartite agreement has also been reached that naval measures not involving the use of force might be used at this time to bring pressure on the Soviets.

3. Economic action. There is also quadripartite agreement that another form of pressure that we could bring to bear on the Soviets would be economic countermeasures. These fall into three rough categories: severing and limiting exchanges with the bloc in other than trade fields; restrictions on transport and movement of persons; and selective or full trade embargo (including interzonal trade). The NAC has extensively examined these measures, and there is substantial agreement on the manner of their execution.

(PARAGRAPH EXCISED)

REMOVE SLIDE 3

The question is sometimes asked: how long will Phase II last? This is a bit hard to predict with any certainty. Since, however, unless the blockage were ended, it would last until either we or the Soviets resorted to force to resolve the impasse, we could hope that it would be a matter of months rather than days. We and our Allies would want to explore every avenue for peaceful settlement. We would also want to give the pressures we can bring to bear on the Soviets a chance to take effect. Time will also be required for our mobilization to place us in a position to use force if necessary with acceptable risk.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the length of Phase II will be conditioned by the fact Allied prestige will be heavily engaged in restoration of our vital interests.

PHASES III and IV

If, despite the actions taken in Phase II, Allied rights are not restored -- and there is a serious deterioration of the Berlin situation -- the US believes that the tripartite Allies should take appropriate action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of ground and/or air access, while at the same time making clear Allied intention to obtain re-opened access.

1. Military. If it were clear the Soviet/GDR intend to maintain blockage of access, the US believes that NATO should initiate military actions designed to induce the Soviets to re-open access.

This phase -- Phase III -- would mark the commencement of offensive non-nuclear combat, after positive verification of deliberate Soviet/GDR blockage of access to Berlin. It would be implemented by means of a plan, or plans, drawn from LIVE OAK (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED) developed for the purpose. It is the view that Phase III would start under tripartite control and that the shift to NATO would take place at the time a tripartite operation came under attack by Soviet/GDR forces.

PHASE III

SLIDE 4

Ground - LIVE OAK (Trade Wind and June Ball)  
(SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED)

- LIVE OAK (Jack Pine)

(SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED)

PHASE IV

Demonstrative (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED)

Selective

General war

Plans available and suitable for implementation of Phase III include:

1. On the ground - Trade Wind and June Ball, both LIVE OAK plans, and (MOST OF LINE EXCISED)

2. In the air, Live Oak Jack Pine III, and (SEVERAL LINES EXCISED)

3. At sea - quadripartite maritime countermeasures (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED).

Phase IV, beginning, in the US view, with the first use of nuclear weapons in any form, follows Phase III when it has become evident that the conventional measures which have been used have been unsuccessful in inducing the Soviets to restore Allied rights in Berlin, and when the conventional measures still untried offer no reasonable prospect of success.

(SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS EXCISED)

In addition, depending upon the circumstances at the conclusion of Phase II, Phase IV could begin by direct recourse to general war.

REMOVE SLIDE 4

2. Diplomatic. Although it is difficult to predict precisely what diplomatic activity would take place just before and during these operations, it would be important that the Allies make clear to the Soviets their intentions, particularly the terms on which they would discontinue military operations. They should also make clear to the world their reasons for undertaking military operations.

(PARAGRAPH EXCISED)

Planning responsibilities and coordination

Having described the framework within which Berlin planning is taking place, I should like to turn to the machinery.

SLIDE 5

Within the US government, coordination is accomplished by the Berlin Task Force.

The Ambassadorial Group is primarily responsible for the coordination of Berlin contingency planning.

LIVE OAK utilizes the British Commander in Germany for ground access planning, USAFE for air access planning, and the tripartite JACK PINE Command Post to (unclear word but probably supervise) related to air access.

The Bonn Quadripartite Committee is primarily responsible for planning related to civilian access, with the assistance of

Berlin and LIVE OAK.

The Berlin Commandants are responsible for contingency planning regarding Berlin itself and for assisting the Bonn Quadripartite Committee and LIVE OAK in the performance of their functions. The Chairman Commandant has the tripartite Allied Staff for planning regarding Berlin.

The governments look to the Permanent Representatives to pursue their government's interest in NAC and the UN.

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WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

SLIDE 6

Agreement on "four phases"

Phase I. Work on ground access.

Phase II. NATO mobilization, Coordination naval countermeasures.

Phase III and IV. Preparation NATO plans.

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Conclusions

The question now arises as to what remains to be done.

1. We are seeking Allied agreement on the four phases. We are at present discussing this quadripartitely, preliminary to discussion in the NAC (SOME WORD EXCISED).

2. With regard to Phase I, we are still working on several key elements of ground access planning. This involves primarily preparation of agreed rules of conduct for Allied convoys and examination of possible Soviet/GDR actions related to civilian access.

3. With regard to Phase II, we are examining two problems: a possible NATO mobilization and the coordination of quadripartite naval measures.

4. With regard to Phases III and IV, we are now ready for NATO examination (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED). The SACEUR and SACLANC papers are now before the NATO Standing Group, prior to NAC consideration. Field commanders are also preparing the detailed plans.

In a word, although considerable planning has been done, it is by no means complete.

END OF BRIEFING





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SECRET  
Classification

Continued Secretary had impression from Geneva that it might be possible concentrate on single issue of national nuclear capability. If it clear to both we not now trying deal with issue possible multilateral arrangements, seems we might be able reach agreement re non-transfer nuclear weapons either directly or indirectly to additional national forces. We would have to discuss question with allies. If Gromyko thinks possibility of progress, we would be glad to take it up with other nuclear powers. Proposed keeping in touch either in Washington or Geneva. Urged importance of this step and of not abandoning effort because of other factors not directly related to central issue. If can agree on substance, would need consider how proceed. Suggested possibility seeking declarations from other governments that they prepared enter into type of agreement we would advance. Asked Gromyko's reactions at early convenience .

Secretary explained to Dobrynin he asking Gromyko if there is enough prospect for agreement in order to pursue to conclusion. If not, we would not want go through exercise .

In ensuing discussion, Dobrynin stressed German question primarily, Soviets want separate agreement covering Germanies, since general agreement would take too long.

Secretary noted our longstanding policy against proliferation, which we apply even to France, and noted formal Fed Rep commitment on ABC weapons. Saw no advantage in making Germany special case -- other countries important. Soviets interested in Germany, we in China, and we both should be in other countries.

Said

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Said had impression from Gromyko if there any delays in general agreement, he might want come back to agreement on Germanies.

Dobrynin said his impression was Gromyko wanted separate agreement on Germanies. Germany is key problem for Soviets.

Secretary stressed Germany would be included in overall agreement. Thought Soviets were overestimating time difference between overall and separate German agreement. Secretary admitted that in QTE general principles UNQTE paper on German questions handed to Gromyko at Geneva in the spring, reference had been made to nuclear weapons as a suitable subject for discussion. We saw no point however in pulling the question of nuclear weapons out of that paper for discussion apart from other German questions unless we took it up on the worldwide basis at Geneva.

Re multilateral arrangements, Dobrynin agreed this not central issue, but problem with any NATO multilateral arrangement was that Germany would be included. Secretary again stressed whatever multilateral arrangements came out of NATO, we did not intend they would involve transfer of national control. Moreover, agreement he proposed would remove possibility of such a type of multilateral arrangement. This takes care of central problem.

In agreeing transmit Secretary's message, Dobrynin commented he sure Soviets would have difficulties with it.

Secretary said he wished we could announce agreement on non-diffusion at

SECRETClassification

By JTB NADA DED 4/14/45

4 of telegram to Amembassy MOSCOW

SECRET  
*Classification*

NGA.

~~Below~~ Above is for your information only and not for discussion with foreign governments. Instruction re latter would proceed on basis of Soviet reaction.

GENEVA FOR DEAN. This caution does not of course amend your existing instructions. END.

RUSK

SECRET  
*Classification*



dem Eintritt Englands in die EWG

mindestens seit

wie ich sie ausgeführt

im Grunde

Edmund Gierstlitz England  
in die EWG.

54

2

Ich möchte noch eine Frage vorausschicken. Labour - Sie haben 1  
davon nichts gesagt - ist absolut ~~gegen~~ Das hat Herr Gaitskell  
auf der Brüsseler Sozialistenkonferenz gesagt, das hat George  
Brown, der Stellvertreter von Gaitskell, eine Woche vorher auf  
einer Veranstaltung in New York gesagt, und zwar in noch viel  
schärferer Weise, als Herr Gaitskell das eine Woche später in  
Brüssel ~~wieder~~ gesagt hat. Die Konservativen haben, obwohl Mac-  
millan ~~vor~~ ~~neun~~ ~~Monaten~~ ~~sagte~~, daß er entschieden für den  
Eintritt in die EWG eingetreten ist, jede Nachwahl verloren.  
Nach dem englischen Wahlgesetz wird dadurch aber nicht eine große  
liberale Partei entstehen - die Liberalen haben bei den Nachwahlen  
große Gewinne gehabt, wie auch die Labour -, sondern das wird sich  
zu Gunsten der Labour auswirken, so daß also die Möglichkeit, und  
zwar mehr als eine entfernte Möglichkeit - ich vermeide den Aus-  
druck: die Wahrscheinlichkeit - besteht, daß die nächste Wahl in  
Großbritannien von Labour gewonnen wird. Die Wahl muß spätestens  
in knapp zwei Jahren sein; in der Regel wird sie ein Jahr früher  
als zum letzten Termin abgehalten. Sie wird also durchgeführt,  
wahrscheinlich noch während die Verhandlungen zwischen EWG und  
Großbritannien schweben - und die ganze Frage wird zu einem Gegen-  
stand der Wahlpropaganda werden! Wenn Sie die englische Massen-  
presse verfolgen, werden Sie sehen, daß sie gegen den Eintritt  
Großbritanniens in die EWG ist. Ich glaube, die Tatsache müssen  
wir auch berücksichtigen: ob wir nicht am Ende der Verhandlungen  
einer britischen Regierung gegenüberstehen, die dem Ganzen sehr  
ablehnend gegenübersteht; ob sie unterschreiben wird, wissen wir  
nicht; die jedenfalls nicht bereit sein wird, Äußerungen der Kon-  
servativen ~~von vorher~~ ~~wirklich~~ ~~einzulösen~~; ~~sie~~ ~~denkt~~ ~~nicht~~ ~~daran~~.

vielleicht  
Kommunisten  
seit

X

~~was ist für ein Gefühl?~~ wie ich ne ausgeführt habe  
Ganz allgemein möchte ich folgendes bemerken: Wenn Sie einmal in  
der Geschichte zurückgehen, werden Sie finden, daß alle Handels-  
abkommen - und das ist ja ein Handelsabkommen, wie es jetzt da  
ist, wenn auch im ~~bestimmten~~ <sup>besonderen</sup> Sinne des Wortes - werden ~~von~~ der har-  
ten Politik schließlich zerbrechen, und diese harte Politik be-  
steht in der Gefahr von Sowjetrußland aus, die vielleicht dadurch  
noch größer geworden ist, daß Herr Taylor <sup>Maxwell D.</sup> seine Absichten ...  
In dem Buch, das er vor einigen Jahren hat erscheinen lassen, in  
dem er sagt, bei jedem Angriff auf die Vereinigten Staaten müßte  
sofort von nuklearen Waffen Gebrauch gemacht werden, bei einem

X

X

die über unsere Politik entscheidende Frage

sich Deutschland anders

~~Das ist ein sehr unangenehmes Wort, denn auf alle Fälle wird die Bundesrepublik dann in diesem Teil liegen, der vielleicht zuerst verloren geht, wenn hier keine nuklearen Waffen gebraucht werden. Ich möchte aber das Thema nukleare Waffen hier nicht in dem großen Kreis besprechen, ich muß darüber mit Kollegen Strauß einmal sprechen.~~

~~Aber ich sagte, daß dieses Handelsabkommen hinter politischen Fragen zurückstehen werde, und die politische Frage ist für uns nicht das Verhältnis zwischen uns und England, sondern das Verhältnis zwischen uns und Frankreich. Denn nur wenn Frankreich und wir so fest zusammenhalten, daß weder eine französische Regierung es unternehmen kann, gegen Deutschland einen Vertrag mit Sowjetrußland zu schließen, noch eine deutsche Regierung es unternehmen kann, einen Vertrag mit Sowjetrußland gegen Frankreich zu schließen, können wir annehmen, daß dieser Damm in Europa - ich denke jetzt nicht an Krieg - dieser politische Damm in Europa wirklich hält.~~

*über unsere  
über meine  
Politik  
Frage*

Meine Herren, damit Sie mich richtig verstehen, bitte ich, auch einmal in die Vergangenheit zurückzugehen und daran zu denken, daß zwischen Preußen, dem Hohenzollernhaus und dem Zarentum bis in die 80er Jahre des vorigen Jahrhunderts hinein sehr enge Beziehungen bestanden haben, die sich gegen Frankreich richteten, daß dann aber Frankreich uns zugekommen ist und nach dem französischen Flottenbesuch in Kronstadt, ein Jahr nach dem Rücktritt Bismarcks, der Vertrag zwischen Rußland und Frankreich gegen uns zustande gekommen ist. Ich muß in dem Zusammenhang auch darauf hinweisen, daß Herr de Gaulle, als er Ministerpräsident geworden war, 1944 nach Moskau gefahren ist und dort einen Vertrag gegen uns geschlossen hat. Er hat mir das - das möchte ich hier einschleiben - bei der ersten Besprechung, die ich mit ihm gehabt habe, erklärt. Er hat mir gesagt, <sup>nach</sup> ~~er~~ sei damals in Frankreich besorgt gewesen, daß Deutschland Revanche nehmen würde, und Frankreich habe sich deshalb durch das Bündnis mit Rußland gegen uns ~~den~~ nötigen Rückhalt, die nötige Sicherung verschaffen wollen. Er, de Gaulle, habe nun eingesehen, daß ~~sich das nicht so entwickelt hat~~ und deswegen habe er sich zu der EWG-Politik bekannt. Notaber muß ich aber doch sagen, daß der Vertrag zwischen Frankreich und Moskau von Moskau gekündigt worden ist, nicht von Frankreich. Er

*Frankreich  
de Gaulle  
Paris*



suchen müssen

spielt bei vielen

wir Deutschen, die wir Tür an Tür liegen mit Sowjetrußland und den Satellitenstaaten, niemals vergessen dürfen.

Darf ich noch einmal auf Bismarck zurückkommen: Bismark hat schon gefürchtet, daß die Russen eines Tages an der Elbe stehen würden, und er hat Schutz gegenüber Rußland in dem Drei-Kaiser-Bund gesucht, in dem Bund mit dem Zaren, um ihn dadurch festzulegen, und mit Österreich, später im Dreibund, in dem Vertrag mit Österreich und Italien. Bei dieser latenten Gefahr für uns, die wir dicht an dicht mit einem Gegner von der Größe des heutigen SU liegen, einem Gegner von dem entsetzlichen Expansionsdrang, der die Russen beseelt und der sie schon zurzeit des Zarentums beseelt hat, müssen wir immer daran denken, daß wir im kontinentalen Europa einen festen Rückhalt haben *haben müssen*

Ich habe eben gesagt, wir müssen durch unsere Politik auch verhüten, daß etwa eine deutsche Regierung einmal einen Vertrag mit Sowjetrußland schließen wird. Sie werden das vielleicht erstaunlich finden. Es ist gar nicht erstaunlich. Erstens weiß der liebe Himmel, was in 10, 15 Jahren für eine Regierung in Deutschland ist. Zweitens kann ich Ihnen nur sagen, daß im Jahre 1955 Chruschtschow mir angeboten hat ein Zusammengehen Deutschlands gegen die Vereinigten Staaten und gegen Rotchina. ~~Dieses Zusammengehen mit Sowjetrußland hat er mir damals selbst angeboten.~~ Es liegt ja auch für Rußland sehr nahe, zu versuchen, daß es bei ~~auseinander-~~setzungen mit den Vereinigten Staaten und später mit Rotchina eine wirtschaftliche Kraft, wie es das kontinentale Europa darstellt, an seine Seite bringt.

Das möchte ich vorausschicken, damit Sie sehen, wie ich diese ganzen Situationen ~~nur~~ beurteile und daß ich sie in erster Linie in politischer <sup>Hin-</sup>sicht beurteile und in zweiter Linie aus handelspolitischen Gesichtspunkten heraus. Die politische ist für mich die wichtigste Entscheidung. *spielt bei vielen*  
Deshalb ~~spielt~~ *spielt bei vielen* für mich bei allen Entscheidungen das Verhältnis zu Frankreich ~~eine große Rolle.~~ Sie müssen sich einmal vorstellen, welche Stellung wir in der Welt überhaupt haben würden, wenn Frankreich seit ~~zehn oder wieviel Jahren, seit Robert Schuman~~ ihm gebührt wohl das größte Verdienst - in der Welt gegen uns agi-  
*absolut absolut*

*die entscheidende*

Großbritannien

mit dem Ziele

Sie wissen, daß es  
erst ganz allmählich,  
doch vor allem dem  
Franzosen Robert Schuman  
gelingen ist, anderen  
Vorstellungen über die  
politische Zukunft Deutschlands  
zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen.  
Aber schon infolge der  
geopolitischen Lage und  
der Stärke der SU bleibt  
unsere Lage sehr ernst.

Wenn wir <sup>wir</sup> das <sup>westliche</sup> ~~deutsche~~ <sup>Frankreich</sup> werden  
Deutschland <sup>Frankreich</sup> einen  
politischen <sup>Block</sup> ~~Damm~~ <sup>gegen</sup> einen  
gegen den <sup>östlichen</sup> ~~östlichen~~ <sup>Kommunismus</sup> bilden.

den  
auf eine Aufrüstung

weitere  
der britische

reich hatte das Saargebiet. Zwischen Frankreich und Sowjetrußland und den Vereinigten Staaten schwebten sehr ernsthafte Verhandlungen ~~das gesamte Industriegebiet zu neutralisieren und das übrige Deutschland für unabsehbare Zeit zu besetzen.~~ ~~Aus alledem ersieht Sie, daß die politische Lage für ein Land wie das unsere, das mitten drin liegt, sehr ernst ist und daß wir daher im Interesse unserer Sicherheit immer daran denken müssen, daß wir das Verhältnis zu Frankreich pflegen, und zwar unabhängig von den jeweiligen Persönlichkeiten, die in dem einen Land an der Spitze sind oder in dem anderen Land an der Spitze sind.~~ Es muß wirklich so sein, daß die Völker, das französische Volk und das deutsche Volk so nahe zusammenstehen, daß keine Regierung, weder eine französische noch eine deutsche, jemals auf die Idee kommen kann, gegen das andere Land ein Abkommen mit Sowjetrußland zu schließen. Und ich habe mich wirklich gefreut, daß der neue französische Botschafter de Margerie nach Pressemeldungen dasselbe gesagt hat, was auch ich immer sagte: daß es nicht darauf ankommt, daß die leitenden Leute in Staat und Parteien gut zueinander stehen, sondern die Völker. ~~Wenn wir das erreichen werden Deutschland wie wird für nun in diese ganze Sache hineingekommen, und wo stehe wir heute?~~ Der Gedanke der Montanunion war der Anfang. Robert Schuman übersandte mir damals diesen Entwurf und schrieb mit dabei einen privaten Brief. In diesem Brief führte er aus, daß Kohle und Eisen die Grundelemente einer jeden Aufrüstung darstellten und daß deswegen eine besondere Bewegung innerhalb der Kohle oder innerhalb des Eisens ~~verdächtig seien~~ <sup>und neue Verdächtigungen</sup> Er schlug deshalb eine Montanunion vor zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich, damit die beiden Völker <sup>sich</sup> gegenseitig kontrollierten über das, was auf dem Gebiete der Kohlegewinnung und auf dem Gebiete der Eisenerzeugung vor sich ginge und daß <sup>damit</sup> der gegenseitige Verdacht einer Aufrüstung ~~einfach erledigt würde~~ <sup>mit internationalen Vereinbarungen</sup> würde. Ob die drei Beneluxländer dazu kamen, ob England dazu kam, das war ihm im Grunde genommen nicht die Hauptsache. Er hat mir das seinerzeit ausdrücklich geschrieben. Das Wesentliche der Montanunion war vielmehr, daß Deutschland und Frankreich sich gegenseitig kontrollierten in diesen Sparten, die für eine Kriegführung entscheidend sind. Dann schwebte ihm und uns natürlich vor, daß sich an diese Montanunion <sup>ähnliche</sup> wirtschaftlichen Unionen anschließen sollten. ~~Aber dieser Gesichtspunkt~~

Friedensziele

Ein wichtiger Punkt ist es, daß wir alle wirtschaftlich zusammenarbeiten müssen. Robert Schuman hat das schon immer gesagt. Wenn wir das erreichen werden Deutschland wie wird für nun in diese ganze Sache hineingekommen, und wo stehe wir heute? Der Gedanke der Montanunion war der Anfang. Robert Schuman übersandte mir damals diesen Entwurf und schrieb mit dabei einen privaten Brief. In diesem Brief führte er aus, daß Kohle und Eisen die Grundelemente einer jeden Aufrüstung darstellten und daß deswegen eine besondere Bewegung innerhalb der Kohle oder innerhalb des Eisens verdächtig seien. Er schlug deshalb eine Montanunion vor zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich, damit die beiden Völker gegenseitig kontrollierten über das, was auf dem Gebiete der Kohlegewinnung und auf dem Gebiete der Eisenerzeugung vor sich ginge und daß der gegenseitige Verdacht einer Aufrüstung einfach erledigt würde. Ob die drei Beneluxländer dazu kamen, ob England dazu kam, das war ihm im Grunde genommen nicht die Hauptsache. Er hat mir das seinerzeit ausdrücklich geschrieben. Das Wesentliche der Montanunion war vielmehr, daß Deutschland und Frankreich sich gegenseitig kontrollierten in diesen Sparten, die für eine Kriegführung entscheidend sind. Dann schwebte ihm und uns natürlich vor, daß sich an diese Montanunion ähnliche wirtschaftlichen Unionen anschließen sollten. Aber dieser Gesichtspunkt

Wenn wir das erreichen werden Deutschland wie wird für nun in diese ganze Sache hineingekommen, und wo stehe wir heute? Der Gedanke der Montanunion war der Anfang. Robert Schuman übersandte mir damals diesen Entwurf und schrieb mit dabei einen privaten Brief. In diesem Brief führte er aus, daß Kohle und Eisen die Grundelemente einer jeden Aufrüstung darstellten und daß deswegen eine besondere Bewegung innerhalb der Kohle oder innerhalb des Eisens verdächtig seien. Er schlug deshalb eine Montanunion vor zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich, damit die beiden Völker gegenseitig kontrollierten über das, was auf dem Gebiete der Kohlegewinnung und auf dem Gebiete der Eisenerzeugung vor sich ginge und daß der gegenseitige Verdacht einer Aufrüstung einfach erledigt würde. Ob die drei Beneluxländer dazu kamen, ob England dazu kam, das war ihm im Grunde genommen nicht die Hauptsache. Er hat mir das seinerzeit ausdrücklich geschrieben. Das Wesentliche der Montanunion war vielmehr, daß Deutschland und Frankreich sich gegenseitig kontrollierten in diesen Sparten, die für eine Kriegführung entscheidend sind. Dann schwebte ihm und uns natürlich vor, daß sich an diese Montanunion ähnliche wirtschaftlichen Unionen anschließen sollten. Aber dieser Gesichtspunkt

Frankreich ist nicht in der gleichen Weise wie  
wir der russischen Gefahr ausgesetzt,  
aber auch für F. bietet die SU eine  
dauernde Gefahr. Darum haben  
D. und F. gegenüber der SU gleich-  
geartete Interessen. M.E. (meines Erachtens)  
muß die deutsche Politik - wir sollten  
nicht ausschließlich an einen nuklearen  
Vertrag zwischen US und SU denken -  
darauf gerichtet sein, ein möglichst enges  
Verhältnis zwischen D. und F. herzustellen.  
Unsere Interessen sind solidarisch.  
Weder darf in Zukunft es möglich sein, daß  
D. mit SU gegen F. operiert (?), noch F.  
mit SU gegen D. Das deutsche und  
das französische Volk - ich sage absichtlich  
das Volk und nicht die Regierungen weil  
die Regierungen wechseln, die Völker aber  
bleiben - müssen sich immer ihrer Solidarität  
bewusst bleiben.



der die EWG bildenden  
Staaten folgt. wir wollten  
auf dem Wege über den  
wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhalt  
den politischen  
Zusammenhalt schaffen.





einen solchen Vertrag abzuschließen. Entweder fühlen sich diese Commonwealthländer in Zukunft innerhalb der EWG zufrieden - dann geht es uns schlecht, dann bleiben sie ~~mit~~ mit ihrem Mutterreich verbunden; oder aber sie fühlen sich nicht zufrieden, und dann werden sie sich wirtschaftlich den Vereinigten Staaten anschließen, und dann verliert Großbritannien. Das ist dann auch ein Nachteil für uns. Denn Großbritannien - wenn es sich auch nicht als Kontinentaleuropäer fühlt, aber doch einigermaßen als Europäer - hat Verbindungen zur Welt draußen, die für uns alle, für ganz Europa außerordentlich wertvoll sind. Wir ständen dann vor dem Dilemma, wie ich es eben ausgedrückt habe: die Commonwealthländer fühlen sich entweder wohl in der EWG, dann gnade uns Gott, namentlich der Landwirtschaft, oder sie fühlen sich nicht wohl, dann schwimmen sie eben ab.

Ich möchte Ihnen weiter sagen, Herr Lahr - das habe ich Ihnen auch schon gesagt -, daß die Vereinigten Staaten jedenfalls bis vor wenigen Wochen den Standpunkt vertraten, daß die drei sogenannten weißen Commonwealthländer Kanada, Australien und Neuseeland keine irgendwelche Vorteile bekommen dürften durch den Beitritt Englands zur EWG, und zwar aus dem Grunde nicht, weil wenigstens die jetzige amerikanische Administration diese Länder als zu ihrer eigenen wirtschaftlichen Sphäre gehörend betrachtet.

Einige Einzelheiten möchte ich hier noch sagen, zunächst eine Sache, die bisher gar nicht berührt wurde. Ich glaube, daß die ganze Einrichtung in Brüssel überfordert wird, Ich halte es für unmöglich, daß sie dieser Probleme gerecht wird. Wenn Sie bedenken, daß schon jetzt in den dreien, Montanunion, Euratom und EWG über 5 000 Beamte und Angestellte tätig sind, dann können Sie daraus wohl schließen, welche Fülle von Einzelheiten dort immer zu erledigen ist. Wenn nun Großbritannien mit den Commonwealthländern hinzukommt, dann wird sich diese Zahl noch erheblich vermehren. Weiter kommt hinzu, was zu dem Vortrag gehört, daß Norwegen, Dänemark, Island und Irland den Beitritt in die EWG beantragt haben und daß er auch Griechenland von uns in Aussicht gestellt ist, ebenso, wenn ich nicht irre, der Türkei.

Noch etwas: Gestern war Herr Dittmann bei mir und hat gesagt, daß Japan Anschluß haben müsse an die Wirtschaft Amerikas oder an

die Wirtschaft Europas und daß Japan lieber den Anschluß an Europa haben wolle als den Anschluß an Amerika, weil es sich von Amerika nicht verstanden fühle und weil Schatten der Vergangenheit da eine Rolle spielen. Er hat mir auch gesagt, daß Iketa<sup>?</sup> in einigen Monaten hierher käme; der Besuch ist angekündigt, um diese Dinge mit uns zu besprechen. In Japan wohnen 100 Millionen Menschen. Japan hat aber nur 17 % Boden, der ackerbaufähig ist. Die Leute sind absolut angewiesen auf Fischfang und Export. Wenn die nun auch noch zu uns kommen, meine Herren! Nun sehe ich mir den Apparat in Brüssel an. Ich habe ihn ja von Anfang an mit entstehen sehen. Wissen Sie, die ganze Sache bleibt eines Tages stehen, das sage ich Ihnen sehr offen; es ist ein Wunder, daß er überhaupt noch läuft, und ich verstehe gar nicht, daß er noch läuft. Sicher, die Herren, die jetzt in der Kommission sind, haben auch von Anfang an die Sache mitgemacht und entstehen sehen, insbesondere Herr Hallstein. Herrn Hallstein gebührt ein sehr großes Verdienst daran, daß die EWG so geworden ist, wie sie jetzt ist. Aber Herrn Hallsteins Zeit als Präsident nähert sich auch ihrem Ende, und dann kommt irgend jemand anders dahin. Die anderen Herren werden auch eines Tages ersetzt werden durch andere Leute, die eben nicht von Anfang an die Sache mitgemacht haben und die deswegen als neue nicht die Erfahrungen haben, die ihre Vorgänger sammeln konnten.

Ein ganz schwieriges Problem ist die Frage der Stimmenverteilung. In der Montanunion hat jeder von den Sechs das gleiche Stimmrecht. Das war ursprünglich auch bei EWG so. Man hat dann aber später, ich glaube zu Beginn dieses Jahres ist das in Kraft getreten, eine gewisse Veränderung vorgenommen, dahingehend, daß bei gewissen Entscheidungen die großen Länder - dabei war damals gedacht an Frankreich, Italien und die BR - ein dreifaches Stimmrecht und die anderen ein einfaches Stimmrecht haben sollen. Je mehr nun dazu kommen, desto komplizierter wird das Stimmrecht und auch die Abstimmung. Wir waren zunächst zu sechs; wir werden, wenn allein diejenigen hereinkommen, die jetzt vor der Tür stehen, zu elf sein, und dann sind in der EWG vollkommen andere Mächtebildungen möglich als jetzt. ... Standpunkt ..., infolgedessen können wir die kleinen Länder Norwegen, Dänemark und Island gar nicht aufnehmen, sie müssen assoziiert werden. Ich weiß nicht, ob die Beneluxländer das mitmachen werden. Die Kleinen haben na-

türlich ein Interesse daran, daß die Zahl der Kleinen gegenüber den Großen größer wird. Bei Dänemark haben wir auf alle Fälle ein sehr großes politisches Interesse, Dänemark nicht vor den Kopf zu stoßen. Das sind alles Fragen, die auch noch auftauchen und die auch noch gelöst werden müssen, ehe man sagen kann, die Sache ist fertig; das wird man unter gar keinen Umständen schon sehr bald sagen können.

Wenn Sie das Ganze betrachten, wenn Sie dem Vortrag aufmerksam gefolgt sind, dann sind Sie sich darüber klar geworden, welche Fülle von Nationalen Rechten wir an den Apparat in Brüssel abtreten. Seinerzeit, als die EWG kleingehalten wurde und auch die Politische Union sich in der Zahl der Staaten decken sollte mit den 6 EWG-Mitgliedern, konnte man daran denken. Aber was wir alles an politischen Rechten abgeben müssen, und zwar an politischen Rechten in bezug auf Dinge, die, wie die Landwirtschaft und der Kohlenbergbau, für uns lebensbedingend sind, das müssen Sie sich auch einmal klar machen. Und an wen geben wir sie ab? An der Spitze steht der Ministerrat, das werden in Zukunft 11 Außenminister sein. In Island sind jetzt schon zwei kommunistische Minister an der Regierung, die bisher nicht viel von sich redens gemacht haben. Ich könnte denen auch nur sagen, schweigt möglichst still, desto mehr werdet ihr informiert werden. Das sind also 11 Leute mit u.U. zwei Kommunisten. Der Ministerrat müßte ziemlich in Permanenz tagen, und ich sehe schon kommen, daß wir einen besonderen Minister für diese ganzen Fragen haben müssen, damit das nicht vom Auswärtigen Amt und vom Wirtschaftsministerium mit kalter Hand von einer Seite gemacht werden kann. Dafür stehen hier zu viele vitale Interessen auf dem Spiele, als daß das möglich wäre. Vor zwei Jahren fragte ich Herrn Hallstein: Wie stehen wir in der EWG? Da sagte er: Ich muß Ihnen leider mitteilen, daß die BR an zweiter Linie steht. Ich fragte; Wie ist das gekommen? Da hat er gesagt: Weil nie ein Minister da ist, es sind immer Staatssekretäre da. Von Frankreich ist immer ein Minister anwesend, und die andern richten sich dann nach Couve de Murville und nicht nach dem, was der deutsche Staatssekretär sagt.

Meine Herren, wir werden da, glaube ich, auch noch Änderungen in der ganzen Struktur unserer Regierung, soweit das Kabinett in Frage kommt, vornehmen müssen, denn diese Dinge sind für uns

Im Jahre 1965 haben wir Wahlen. Rehwinkel hat sich zweimal bei mir anmelden lassen. Rehwinkel ad portas! Oder: Wenn die Preise weiter steigen und der Wert der Mark weiter sinkt, wie wird es dann mit dem Ausgang der Wahlen im Jahre 1965? Das sind Fragen, die wir uns auch einmal vorlegen müssen, weil diese Wahlen 1965 von außerordentlich großer Bedeutung sein werden. Notabene: Ich glaube nicht an die Bekehrung der Sozialdemokraten. Ich kann nur wiederholen, was ich früher gesagt habe und darauf hinweisen, daß es nur einmal einen Saulus gegeben hat, der zum Paulus geworden ist. Ich kann nicht daran glauben, daß schlagartig eine ganze Fraktion oder Partei vom Saulus zum Paulus wird. Ich bin fest davon überzeugt, daß bei den Funktionären der Sozialdemokratie der unteren Ebene und bei den absolut sicheren sozialdemokratischen Wählern die alten Ideen und Gedanken nach wie vor lebendig sind. Wer glaubt, daran noch Zweifel haben zu dürfen, der braucht nur die Vorschläge des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes zu lesen, die er für seine Hauptversammlung aufgestellt hat. Und daß die angenommen werden, das ist so sicher wie der Tag. Ich habe noch niemals erlebt, daß auf einer Gewerkschaftsversammlung Vorschläge, die der Vorstand gemacht hat, nicht angenommen worden wären. Wenn Sie lesen, was darin steht! Mich wundert, daß die Presse das nicht aufgreift, daß sie darüber schweigt. Sie schreiben lange Artikel auf Smirnow usw; über eine solche Meldung mit dem, was der Gewerkschaftsbund vorschlagen wird, wird geschwiegen.

Ich komme darauf zurück, daß diesen Wahlen 1965 eine ganz besonders große Bedeutung beigemessen werden muß im Hinblick auf die zukünftige Entwicklung. Ich kam darauf, weil ich von den Preisen sprach und von ~~vielen~~ anderen Sachen, die damit zusammenhängen. Übrigens kann ich Ihnen verraten, daß Herr Wehner auf der Brüsseler Konferenz empört war über Gaitskell, weil er durch seine Opposition gegen diese ganze Sache ihre ganze Wahlpropaganda für das Jahr 1965 vorwegnahm.

Herr Krekeler ist in Euratom ganz anderer Ansicht wie Sie. Er war bei mir und hat mir folgende Schilderung von Herrn Heath gegeben: Heath habe von Euratom alles verlangt, und sie hätten eine ganze Reihe von Sachen, die verändert werden, hätten aber abgelehnt, irgend etwas von England an Euratom zu geben.

Lahr: Stimmt nicht, Herr Bundeskanzler!

Bundeskanzler: Herr Krekeler hat mit Heath gesprochen. Wie können Sie denn sagen, das stimmt nicht? Ich wiederhole nur das, was Krekeler mir gesagt hat. Alles das veranlaßt mich, Sie zu bitten, das sehr sachlich und ruhig zu überlegen, aber auch nach der politischen Richtung hin.

Noch eins möchte ich Ihnen sagen. Sie sagten, wir hätten die afrikanischen Gebiete mit hineinnehmen müssen, um eine Spaltung von Afrika zu vermeiden. Ich bitte Sie, besehen Sie doch einmal eine Karte von Afrika und bedenken Sie, was da alles passiert! Wie können Sie dann sagen, wir könnten dadurch eine Spaltung vermeiden? Nordafrika wird wahrscheinlich ganz unter französischem Einfluß stehen müssen; in Südafrika ist die Politik ganz anders. Auf das, was Nasser macht, möchte ich noch zu sprechen kommen, auch auf das, was am Kongo passiert und in Katanga mit Tschombe. Also, wir haben wirklich nicht den Beruf, eine Spaltung Afrikas zu vermeiden. Erstens sind wir dazu viel zu klein, auch die EWG, selbst eine vergrößerte EWG ist dazu viel zu klein. Zweitens vollziehen sich da Entwicklungen, die ihre Zeit brauchen und denen kein Mensch Einhalt gebieten kann.

Ich möchte damit schließen, daß ich Sie bitte, das genau durchzudenken. Sie wissen, daß England, wenn es Mitglied <sup>wird</sup> geholfen werden muß, wenn es in geldlichen Schwierigkeiten kommt.

(Zuruf: Das haben wir jetzt auch schon getan!)

Sie sind aber dann dazu verpflichtet, und ob Sie das noch lange tun können bei unserem Stand der Ein- und Ausfuhr, ist eine Sache für sich. Bedenken Sie vor allem, daß die ganze politische Sache..

Nun möchte ich Ihnen aus einem Telegramm etwas vorhalten, Herr Lahr, das aus Paris kommt, von unserer dortigen Botschaft. Da heißt es: Die Blätter verhehlen nicht, daß es ... nach Ansicht der meisten Beobachter aber gerechtfertigten Haltung Frankreichs zuzuschreiben ist. Die französische Delegation sei, wie FIGARO berichtet, von der EWG-Kommission und von der italienischen Delegation unterstützt worden, während die Belgier und die Holländer aus politischen Gründen den britischen Beitritt hätten erleichtern wollen. Trotz vielem Hin und Her seien sich jedoch die Sechs im großen einig geblieben. ..., daß die Sechs sich bemüht hätten, Großbritannien gegenüber eine Einheitsfront zu bilden.

Aber es sei offenbar, daß ihre inneren Meinungsverschiedenheiten



polit. Union als organisches Strömen; Entwicklung  
der MU\*, Euroatom. EWG ist erledigt, wie polit.  
X Union mit sozial Mitgliedern ohne ihre Führungsmacht  
ist nicht arbeitsfähig. Wir schaffen eine zu große  
wirtschaftliche Organisation. Sie wird infolge unserer  
Schwierigkeiten nicht lebensfähig sein können. Wir  
übergeben die Verantwortung lebenswichtigen Arbeitsbereichen  
vor allem vor Landwirtschaft und Kohlebergbau eine  
X Organisation in der wir Frauen unmittelbar  
wirtschaftlichen und politischen Einfluss haben. Es ist eine  
Lebensfrage für uns in Mitteleuropa eine polit.  
Raum gegenüber dem kommunistischen Osten (zu  
erörtern. Nach allen Efordrungen der bedrückte Raum  
X nur, muß dieser Raum aus Frankreich und Portugal  
land bestehen, dessen Lebensinteressen solidarisiert sind

\* Montan-Union

\*\* vor allem

und ihre eigenen Interessenkonflikte eine schwerwiegende Rolle spielen. Die Verhandlung habe aber den Charakter einer

Handlung, die sich nicht als einseitig darstellen lässt. Es handelt sich aber um ein

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Lahr: Ich wollte vorhin nicht Meinung ausdrücken, sondern möglichst objektiven Bericht darüber geben, was sich in Brüssel getan hat. Wenn es sich darum handelt, zu einer Wertung zu kommen, so möchte ich sowohl für Frankreich als auch für mich selbst ... für uns ... des engsten Zusammengehens mit Frankreich ... und mit der Auffassung, daß diese Politik, die wir weiterzuführen haben, nicht unvereinbar war mit dem Gedanken, daß auch England in der EWG Aufnahme findet.

Im Zusammenhang mit dem Verhältnis Frankreich-Deutschland muß ich doch noch ein paar Bemerkungen machen. Ich darf exemplifizieren in der Frage Afrika. Wir haben das damals/ Frankreich zuliebe getan. Nachdem diese Gebiete selbständig geworden sind, stellte sich die Frage: Müssen wir das eigentlich weitermachen? In der Bundesrepublik sind wir uns alle einig gewesen, daß es erwünscht wäre, wenn wir versuchten, davon freizukommen. Das hat uns in den schärfsten Gegensatz zu Frankreich gebracht, und wir haben uns bereit gefunden, diese Assoziierung in veränderter Form fortzusetzen, nicht Frankreich zuliebe, um des Zusammengehens mit Frankreich willen. Vor ähnliche Probleme wurden wir immer wieder gestellt - das kann man sagen ohne jede Animosität gegenüber Frankreich -, daß Frankreich in gewissen Fragen der Gemeinschaft doch eine etwas andere Einstellung hat als wir. Während wir uns bemühen, unsere nationalen Interessen auch so etwas wie kommunitären Interessen anzupassen, ist die Hoffnung des französischen Volkes egozentrisch ausgerichtet. In den vergangenen Wochen ist in zwei Punkten die französische Interventionspolitik ganz eindeutig gegen uns gerichtet gewesen. Herr Couve de Murville hatte vorgebracht, in den Gesprächen, die sie vor den Verhandlungen mit den Engländern geführt hätten, hätte sich herausgestellt, die Engländer seien durchaus dafür, daß das Getreidepreisniveau der Gemeinschaft das französische sein sollte. Das sei eine großartige Sache, das müßte jetzt schon in den Verhandlungen festzuhalten; damit würden die Verhandlungen einen großen Schritt vorangebracht. Herr Bundeskanzler, das war gegen uns gerichtet! Wenn man eine solche Forderung annähme, ich weiß nicht, was das in der Landwirtschaft gäbe, wahrscheinlich Aufruhr. Wahrscheinlich war es zu früh, das vorzubringen; das Thema wurde der nächsten Konferenz vorbehalten. Es zeigt sich da, daß die Franzosen sich keineswegs scheuen, so etwas zu machen, wobei das deutsch-französische Zusammengehen dann doch etwas wesentlich

anderes darstellt als wir es sehen.

Ebenso haben wir einen erheblichen Vorstoß gegen unsere Finanzpläne zu verzeichnen gehabt. Die Finanzpläne sind in der Schwebe geblieben, nur weil die Franzosen einen Vorstoß machten, um zusätzliche Vorteile gegenüber dem einzuheimen, was sie schon zu Beginn des Jahres erreicht hatten, wo vereinbart worden war, das ließe sich durchaus vom deutschen Standpunkt aus vertreten; aber andererseits ist nicht zu leugnen, daß Frankreich dabei sehr schön auf seine Rechnung kommt. Das ist geschehen, weil es die zweite Phase nicht aushalten konnte. Jetzt sehen sie es etwas anders, weil die Verhandlungen mit den Engländern auf unsere Kosten geführt werden sollen. Dabei muß ich sagen, obwohl ich durchaus immer die Linie vertrete, mit den Franzosen zusammenzugehen: So wie sie sich hier in sehr konkreter Weise gegen unsere Landwirtschaft und Finanzen gerichtet haben, bleibt den Verhandlern nicht anderes übrig, als für die deutschen Interessen einzutreten. Das sind die Punkte, wo es Differenzen mit den Franzosen gibt, das kennen wir aus der Vergangenheit. Ich habe immer die Erfahrung gemacht, wenn man den Franzosen auch die Zähne zeigt, steigt man in Ihrem Ansehen, und letzten Endes verstößt das nicht gegen die deutsch-französische Freundschaft.

Bundeskanzler Dr. Adenauer: Ich habe mit de Gaulle niemals darüber gesprochen. Zweitens: Als ich neulich in Frankreich war, haben Herr de Gaulle und ich über diese ganzen Verhandlungen jeder nur einen Satz gesagt: daß das ganze englische Verlangen sehr ernsthaft und seriös geprüft werden müsse. Weiter nichts.

Aber ich möchte Ihnen sagen, was mir Herr Hallstein vor drei Monaten gesagt hat: Leider sind die deutschen Verhandler in der Regel in der Nähe der Holländer, aber nicht in der Nähe der Franzosen. - Sie werden mir zugeben müssen, Herr Hallstein ist kein Franzose!

Lahr: Das kann sich tatsächlich mal ergeben, und in der Finanzfrage ist es tatsächlich so. Die Holländer sind in der gleichen Lage wie wir, und das ergibt eine Bundesgenossenschaft.

Dr. Adenauer: Die Holländer bekunden uns gegenüber tatsächlich die Ausübung der Bundesgenossenschaft! Wenn die holländische Haltung nicht so gewesen wäre, hätten wir jetzt die Politische



8/9/62

1002

Folder:  
Berlin Plan  
Box 39  
Taste Papers

Meeting in Cabinet Room  
Berlin Contingency Plans  
9 Aug 62

File  
Berlin

Call Goring

(A)

Difficulty getting agreement re Ph III

M<sup>c</sup> - Allies want use of nuc earlier

Rusk - EU rely on nuc uphs as  
deterrence

Pres - Also eliminates need for econ  
& mil actions

M<sup>c</sup> - Strauss asked M<sup>c</sup> to ask him  
to go above 500,000

Pres News article - background?

loss of credibility - Real fear?

Rusk - Eng fear loss of Germany  
NA don't want some arms to meet

WR

Pres - Thought 30 mins include use  
of notes

MCN - Last summer analysis should  
we could hold for later

Douling - Tac Nuc upms must be used  
is feeling of Germany

Pres - Only to avoid buildup

Douling - No. Gen. fear

MS - ① Overst. of USSR

② Salvator in Tac Nuc  
(lack of understanding)

③ Unwillingness to build to agreed com upms

Rush - Ade did not press D'Hauteville  
to get R comm up

Pres - Why Ade not back US more

Dowling - feels he can get away w it  
Rush also sm. US

Pres - May's in special for much time  
reconstructing Germans

Dowling - Time to start questioning Ger motives.

② Pres - Is there as much disagreement as seems  
Not much difference when use means  
No one ever given on theoretical argument

M<sup>EN</sup> - <sup>Must</sup> try to get over theoretical argument

Pres - How long take

M<sup>S</sup>N: 4-6 hrs

Rush - Events may require us to move  
quickly. Illinois has some mob  
plans

M<sup>S</sup>N - Must make more specific - as we did  
our last spring

Part 4 - Overnighting to get agreement  
on when use of CI

- Say we agree on terms of ~~use~~ you  
build 5 30 days

30 days assume use of nuclear

- Put pressure on them

M<sup>o</sup>W - 25 agree to early use

Very early to need to

Like K. S. S. in article.

Rees - if no Parker - use M<sup>o</sup>W ||

Their position not valid  
considering Parker |

M<sup>o</sup>W - Many to assume immed use  
Heads of Govt want to know

Rees - Part don't want to spend money

M<sup>o</sup>W - Part believe in deference



What to do in next two months

Rusk - Continue pol planning

Principal problem - moving  
on mil plans

Ples - Pres. try over wk-end?

Rusk - Could happen, but believe  
more preparation

P - K L U N Free City:  
Access of E Germany  
Plesnitz is to be taken to choose  
① Berlin?  
② visit plan  
③ Free City under UN

Rusk - They up to us of free determination  
of E Germany

Risk - May have more mtg  
Are ready for weekend symposium  
Unlikely - Doubling  
Rush  
Bundy

R - UN - don't start but talk

P - Powers to call up  
MSN - Unwin to attend now  
Have alternatives  
- Reduced build up  
could avoid

Pres - Call for ~~some~~ auth for small build up  
MSN !

August 24, 1962

09-22/98

~~SECRET~~

Dear General de Gaulle:

Thank you for your message of August 18th. I am sorry that the varying approaches of Mr. Macmillan, yourself and myself made it impracticable to formulate a tripartite declaration with the speed which seemed important if it was to serve its purpose of reassuring the people of West Berlin. I trust that the concrete measures we have taken during the past week have served to do so.

Now I hope it will be possible to reach prompt agreement upon replies to the Soviet Note of August 3rd; you will have received the draft we are proposing from your Embassy here. The most important thing in this draft is its proposal for discussion of negotiations by the Foreign Ministers in New York later in September.

I fully understand, and share, your conviction that we must avoid giving any impression of material or spiritual weakness in indicating willingness to negotiate. As you know, I am convinced that the only possibility of fruitful negotiations lies in the strength which we are building and in the common determination which we are seeking to develop.

Yet I believe you share my view that a successful outcome is dependent upon a two-fold approach; the quiet but evident development of strength and the maintenance of a posture of willingness to negotiate upon a reasonable basis. The two must go forward together. The progressive strengthening of our military posture carries a message which the Soviets understand. But for most of our allies, for all of the uncommitted world, and for vital sectors of American opinion as well, the necessary complement to the military build-up is a clear willingness to negotiate. It is for this reason that I am now certain of the importance of a

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NARS Date 12/85

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prompt public statement in this sense. On the whole, I think the arrangement proposed in the last paragraph of our draft reply is the best available to us. It is important now to announce our readiness to arrange negotiations, but it is also important not to begin the negotiations themselves until we are more fully prepared and the time is more suitable.

I know you have had serious reservations on this subject, and I have waited for some time in the hope that our associates might somehow come to agreement on the matter. But now I must appeal to you directly. A prompt proposal for negotiations is evidently necessary for most of your partners, and it is clearly best if we can go ahead in unison. I believe it of the utmost importance for our three governments to proceed together rather than indicate to the world by separate action that there is disunity even on the relatively minor issue of timing here involved. Moreover, the voice of France will be greatly needed in these discussions, precisely because of your clear understanding of the basic issues. So I hope we may be able to join together in the carefully considered procedure that is now proposed.

While I would prefer to send the reply substantially as drafted, the German Government has suggested inclusion, perhaps in connection with the discussion of self-determination, of a sentence along the following lines:

"If, however, the Soviet Union wishes to pay more than lip service to the principle of self-determination, the United States is prepared to join in conducting a plebiscite, under suitable safeguards, in which all Germans would be asked to express their position on whether they desire that a peace settlement should be entered into with a disunited or a unified Germany."

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While a proposal of a plebiscite has merit and may well be useful in the course of our continuing exchange with Moscow, my own thought is that it would be preferable to reserve it for a later point. However, if in your view the inclusion of such a proposal in our current note would serve to avoid the impression of over-eagerness to negotiate which we all wish to avoid, I should be glad to have it included.

I would hope that our replies to Moscow could be delivered and published well in advance of the opening of the meeting of uncommitted nations at Belgrade on September 1st. If this is to be done, and the other members of NATO are given even a brief opportunity to express their views upon it, it will be necessary to introduce an agreed draft in the NATO Council before the end of this week.

In the high hope that we can move together, and with renewed assurances of the highest personal regard,

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
General Charles de Gaulle  
President of the French Republic  
Paris, France

~~SECRET~~

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file  
8/31  
8/11/62

FLASOS

MM RUDLSK

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M 311315Z

*Aug 6*

FM OSD

TO ZEN/JCS

*0-018*

INFO ZEN/SECY ARMY

*31 Aug 62*

ZEN/SECY NAVY

*JTS  
01/07/62*

ZEN/SEC AF

RUFLCR/USCINCEUR

RUDLSK/USNRP SHAPE

RUFLAM/DEFREPNA MA

DA GRNC

BT

T O P S E C R E T REF 918616 NOFORM FROM OSD

THE FOLLOWING IS FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS CONTAINED IN MC 26/4, NATO FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMB - 1966.

U S POLICY IS THAT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES SHOULD BE USED

TO STRENGTHEN THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY NOW IN EUROPE ONLY WHERE

(1) GOING PROGRAMS ARE SO FAR UNDERWAY THAT THEY COULD NOT BE CHANGED WITHOUT SERIOUS ADVERSE POLITICAL EFFECTS, OR (2) THE INCREASE WILL NOT DIVERT NEEDED RESOURCES FROM NON NUCLEAR TASKS AND IS CLEARLY REQUIRED TO COVER NEEDS EITHER FOR REPLACEMENT

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *ML 89-26102*  
*1/1/02*

*Worstad Rp / 91 / V. Support of NATO  
462 (1)*

TOP SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUEPGR 111

OR EXPANSION THAT CANNOT BE MET FROM ~~AB~~ THE THEATER.

THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE APPROVED NAC 20/2 REQUIREMENTS

FOR PLANNING PURPOSES EXCEPT THE MRBM, WE INDICATED AT THE TIME THAT THESE REQUIREMENTS WERE SUBJECT TO CONTINUING REVIEW; THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT, THEREFORE, BE LED TO EXPECT THESE ADDITIONAL

NONNUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN PROGRAMMING FUTURE DEFENSE EFFORTS,

EXCEPT AS YOU MAY BE INSTRUCTED TO THIS EFFECT BY DOD.

PERSONNEL UNDER YOUR COMMAND, INCLUDING MAAC PERSONNEL,

SHOULD AVOID ENCOURAGING NATO COUNTRIES TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN

OBTAINING NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS ADDITIONAL TO THOSE WHICH WE

ARE ALREADY COMMITTED TO PROVIDE, EITHER THROUGH GRANT AID OR

THROUGH PURCHASE UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED TO DO SO BY DOJ.

ANY APPROACH BY NATO COUNTRIES WITH A VIEW TO OBTAINING SUCH

ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE REPORTED TO DOD

WITHOUT COMMITMENT. FURTHER POLICY GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED,

AS APPROPRIATE.

NATO COUNTRIES RECEIVING DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS SYSTEMS,

SUCH AS THE F-105G, SHOULD, FURTHERMORE, NOT BE ENCOURAGED TO

BELIEVE THAT US SUPPORT OR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING THESE SYSTEMS

IMPLIES A COMMITMENT TO STOCKPILE IN EUROPE NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR

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PPAGE THREE RUEPCR 111

ALL THESE DELIVERY VEHICLES OR WARHEADS OF ANY SPECIFIC YIELD  
CCARACTERISTICS. GROUP 1

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31/151 6Z RUEPCR

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TOP SECRET



*Mr. Bundy*

*mtg w/ President*

*8/31/62*

August 31, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting in the Cabinet Room, August 29, 1962, to Review Berlin Contingency Planning

PRESENT: The President; The Secretary of State, Mr. Ball, Mr. Brandin, Mr. Cash; Mr. Nitze; General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kaysen

The Secretary opened by remarking that General Clay would be in for a briefing on the subject in the morning before seeing the President. The President said he would get Clay's reaction on the problem to be discussed today.

The Secretary then sketched our present situation. The Soviet Union is pushing the Western Powers out of East Berlin, and at the same time striving to make West Berlin a Four-Power city in which they have an active role. We are now nearly at the end of the first process; the second part is beginning to move forward more rapidly. The problem on which we must shortly make a decision is thus whether we should now begin to head off the Soviet efforts to increase their role in West Berlin. The Secretary's first inclination was toward such action, lest there be serious consequences for the confidence and morale of the West Berlin population, which in turn would react on our position in West Berlin. The immediate problem in turn divides as follows: we might try: to increase our own presence in East Berlin, decrease the Soviet presence in West Berlin, or both. He is asking our Mission in Berlin and our Embassy in Bonn to supply us with a complete catalog of Soviet activities in West Berlin. These now go far beyond the activities related to BASC, Spandau and the War Memorial, and include, for instance, TASS offices and Polish and Czech Military Missions. For the present, the Secretary believes that we should keep to our plan of refusing to show identification of allied military personnel to East Germans in East Berlin. If, as a

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
WH Guidelines  
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *5/11/96*

*by Fred Berlin*

*NSF (317) / MTS w Pres. 6/82 - 12/62*

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consequence, the Soviets refuse to permit entry of our military personnel into East Berlin, then we should respond by closing West Berlin to the Soviets.

The President asked whether we should make this trade on the particular point of showing identification. He also remarked that the War Memorial may be a particularly sensitive point with the Soviets, and it might well be an affront to them to be excluded from the War Memorial if we admitted them to West Berlin at all.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. Nitze then presented Ambassador Dewling's argument. We have nothing to lose in East Berlin; our present minimal activity is of marginal significance. On the other hand, if we allow Soviet presence in West Berlin to increase, we run a double risk. First, the show of Soviet military power in West Berlin affects the West Berliners adversely in a way which harms Berlin's long-term viability. Second, we may, through usage, create a situation in which it is easy for the Soviets to tie our access to West Berlin from West Germany with their access to West Berlin from East Berlin.

The President again commented on the probable special sensitivity of the War Memorial. Mr. Nitze noted that the location of the Memorial was the result of a deal between the British and the Russians. He went on to suggest that while there may be no need to deny access to the War Memorial, we could require them to come to it by the Brandenburg Gate, which meant a journey of less than 100 yards in West Berlin. Further, we would require that they come in buses and not APC's. The President thought the alternative: use of APC's and the Brandenburg Gate, or use of buses and the Friederichstrasse Gate, a reasonable one to present to the Soviets.

The Secretary then directed the attention of the group to the draft telegram for Berlin and the European capitals, inviting their comments on the alternatives which the Secretary had stated (attached). The President remarked that there was nothing to prevent the Soviets from doing now what was sketched in the first paragraph of the message; namely, equate Soviet position in West Berlin with allied access to West Berlin. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the importance of usage in

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in this respect. Although there was nothing to prevent them from making this identification now, our acquiescence in the increasing Soviet presence in West Berlin would make such an identification more natural.

The President again asked whether we should not continue to permit Soviet access to the three special areas. Mr. Nitze urged the advantages of early action. Since the immediate tension had lessened, and the hostile actions of the West Berliners which had caused the Soviets to put their troops into APC's are not continuing, this was an appropriate moment for us to ask the Soviets to return to buses. He referred to the arguments of Mr. Hulick in Berlin 282 (attached).

The President asked why it would not be sufficient response to an East German request for papers from our troops, to deny ourselves entrance to East Berlin, and then admit the Soviets on credentials good only at the Brandenburg Gate. Mr. Bundy thought this would be an inadequate response, and that neither the Soviets nor the Germans would feel it sufficiently forceful. General Taylor remarked that relations between East and West Berlin were a microcosm of relations between West Germany and Berlin, and we should consider any action within Berlin in this light. Mr. Bundy pointed to the central question of what trade we were willing to make. In his judgment our access rights in East Berlin for their access rights in West Berlin was an advantageous trade. Mayor Brandt shared this view, and had indeed urged it.

The President asked whether a request for passes was an appropriate issue on which to hand such a trade. Mr. Bundy responded that the significance of the request was not as important as the problem of substantive judgment on whether or not the trade was in our interest. If it was, we should find the earliest occasion to make it. The Secretary pointed out the asymmetry of the "paper" issue. Since the Soviet Union and the East Germans wish to create a state frontier at the sector boundary, they would be happy to show whatever papers we asked for.

The President observed that he saw no specific danger in Soviet presence at the War Memorial, BASC and Spandau. Mr. Nitze and

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Mr. Bundy responded that the issue was not their presence. The issue was our control of the terms on which they could come to West Berlin. If we did not assert our control, then we would be moving rapidly to a Four-Power West Berlin. General Taylor asked Mr. Nitze whether we were not in fact already in this state; Mr. Nitze thought not yet.

Mr. Nitze asked that we return to the question of what should be done now. He would recommend that we request the Russians to return to the use of buses and indicate that we will not permit entry in APC's. The President asked whether he would recommend that we require them to come through the Brandenburg Gate as well. Mr. Nitze said he was willing to wait on this point.

The President asked whether we have ever sent tanks or other armoured vehicles into East Berlin. Mr. Brandin responded that we have sent tanks only as far as the Friederichstrasse checkpoint. Our own patrols in East Berlin have been made in jeeps; the soldiers do carry side arms. Secretary Rusk remarked that if the Soviets come through the Brandenburg Gate, the use of APC's is no longer an issue, since they in fact are not going through any significant part of West Berlin. The President asked Mr. Nitze to repeat his argument, and Mr. Nitze again stated that the central issue was our control of Soviet access for West Berlin. In answer to the President's question as to whether this was in doubt, Mr. Nitze cited the Soviet protests on the issue of our escorts for their APC's as evidence of their efforts to erode our control. General Taylor and Mr. Nitze said that we had yielded to this protest, in part at least, by agreeing to describe our accompanying vehicles in other terms than as "escorts."

The President asked whether we should tie permission for the Soviets to use APC's to acceptance of our escorts. General Taylor responded that we should not accept any restrictions on the use of our own vehicles in West Berlin.

The President summarized the issues as follows. Should we do something now or wait? Should we confine the Soviets to the use of the Brandenburg Gate and permit APC's? Should we give the Soviets the choice of coming in buses or using the Brandenburg Gate, or should we give them only the alternatives of exclusion of the use of the buses

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through the Brandenburg Gate? Should the War Memorial be in the category of BASC and Spandau as points to which we would continue to permit Soviet entry even if we excluded them from the rest of West Berlin, or should it be treated along with the rest of West Berlin? The Secretary indicated that he would have the outgoing telegram re-drafted to request comment on these questions. He agreed that as presently drafted it seemed to reflect decisions on some of them, which in fact have not yet been taken. In response to the President's question, he said that the draft had not been discussed quadripartitely.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that if we are going to make any request, we must be prepared to respond to Soviet refusal to accede to it. He would recommend that we block their access to West Berlin if they do not accede to whatever request we think appropriate. The President again raised the question of whether we should take the initiative in making a request or wait to respond to some Soviet move. His own inclination was to wait. The Secretary pointed out that we were dealing with a symbolic, rather than in a substantive realm. The problem essentially is how do we give the Soviets an unmistakable signal as to our intentions within West Berlin. Mr. Nitze thought it was better to take the risks of action now than to defer them.

The President then remarked that he saw no harm in the APC's as such, since we could stop them at any time. They did not limit our vital rights of access or military presence. Further, we could stop them at any time. The Secretary responded that this was just the problem. Usage might make it more difficult to do so later than earlier. General Taylor observed that although the initial use of the APC's might have been a natural reaction of the Soviet Commander to the violence offered to his troops, their use was no longer justified. The President said that the reaction of the West Berliners to the APC's was understandable and not unexpected, but in itself was not a sufficient reason for us to take action. Further, it might have been easy if we had prevented the entry of the APC's at their first appearance, but now we were in a different position.

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Mr. Nitze pointed out that the West Berliners' feelings were not the issue, but rather our confrontation with the Soviets. The President again raised the question of whether we should take the initiative, and indicated that he preferred to respond to a Soviet move that went outside the existing rules.

The Secretary raised the question of whether it might be useful to move in the opposite direction by putting more American and other Western troops in East Berlin. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bundy pointed out the possible difficulties our troops could create for us. The arrest of a number of American soldiers, in the absence of a Soviet Commandant in Berlin, might well put the President in a difficult position.

Mr. Bundy went on to review the problem of passes. He pointed out that last year we engaged our prestige on the issue of whether American military personnel would show passes to East Germans, and we succeeded in making our point. If we now retreated from this position, the Soviets and Germans both would read it as weakness. The President agreed that American military personnel should not show passes to get into East Berlin and that we should rather deny ourselves entry. He observed that on the Autobahn the situation was of course different. Mr. Bundy remarked that if we denied ourselves access to East Berlin, in order to avoid showing passes to East Germans, we must at that point cut off Soviet access to West Berlin. Without Soviet presence in East Berlin, there was no justification for a Soviet presence in West Berlin. He repeated Mayor Brandt's point that we no longer have any important interest in access to East Berlin, and therefore we should not trade anything in West Berlin for access to East Berlin.

The President asked whether the alternative might be to limit the Soviets to the three areas mentioned, and again raised the question of timing. Mr. Bundy gave his view that now was the time to deal with the ADC's. The President expressed his preference for staying on our present position for the moment. General Taylor

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pointed out that we had a middle course of action; namely, requiring that the Soviets use the Brandenburg Gate for APC's going to the War Memorial. The Secretary said that this was also the notion of the British Commandant. He observed that we probably could get Allied agreement to restrict access to the three places mentioned under specified contingencies. Mr. Bundy remarked that in order to come out with this result, we had to push for a great deal more, rather than merely ask for it.

The President suggested that the message be revised to reflect the discussion and sent out. In response to the President's question, the Secretary gave his judgment that it was not an appropriate moment to send General Clay back to Berlin.

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By RT NARA Date 2-17-95

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This document consists of 3 pages  
No. 5 of 11 Copies, Series A

*See memo from BNA  
5-18-62*

**14846  
RM/R**

SEP 8 1962

**FILE**

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Dear Bob:

You will recall the April 21, 1961 NSC Policy Directive, which states that "over the long run it would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear deterrent business". It also states that the US should not prolong the life of the British deterrent, except to the extent of continuing development of SKYBOLT if this is warranted for US purposes alone.

The present situation in Europe underscores the importance of this policy. After the UK-EEC negotiations, the special US-UK relationship may have to be closely re-examined in connection with the evolving relationship of the UK to the continent, our own relationship with the new European Community, and our desire to ensure that future European nuclear efforts are based on genuinely multilateral rather than national programs. Pending such a re-examination of the US-UK special relation, which will only be feasible when we can get a clearer picture of the future shape of Europe, I believe it is of the utmost importance to avoid any actions to expand the relationship. Such actions could seriously prejudice future decisions and developments and make more difficult the working out of sound multilateral arrangements.

I know we are agreed, in line with the NSC policy referred to above, that any commitment to aid the British in extending their nuclear delivery capability beyond the present V-bomber force, e.g., through their acquisition of Polaris or other missile-bearing submarines, should be avoided at this time and that US decisions relative to SKYBOLT should be made on the basis solely of US interest in this missile for our own forces.

Maintenance of this US posture is particularly important at this juncture, since the British are probably now beginning to try to develop some tentative views concerning the nuclear arrangements that they may favor after joining the EEC.

The Honorable  
Robert S. McNamara,  
Secretary of Defense.

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the ECSC. They probably feel that the V-bomber force, even with SKYBOLT, is a wasting asset and that any effective Europe-based deterrence must be based, in the long run, primarily on missiles rather than aircraft. They have shown past interest in the long-term possibility of Polaris missile-bearing submarines. They may be considering whether to try, in this way, to continue a UK national force into the missile era -- possibly combined with a French national force under some type of "joint" arrangement. Such an arrangement might be termed a European multilateral force, although it would in fact be neither European (since it would discriminate against the Germans) nor multilateral (since it would involve nationally manned and owned forces). By reason of these facts, such an arrangement would be politically divisive and vastly complicate our efforts to hold pressures for a German national program in check.

British decisions in this field will be a long time in the making and I do not think that we should take remarks which suggest that they are now leaning to such an arrangement -- rather than, for example, to participation in a genuinely multilateral force -- as necessarily foreshadowing the ultimate outcome. An important factor will be their assessment of possible eventual US willingness to provide aid -- by facilitating procurement of MGM's and Polaris submarines -- for an extension of the US-UK special relation into the missile era.

I hope, therefore, that both our staffs can hold to existing policies in discussions with Defense Minister Thornycroft -- avoiding any indication of future expansion in the US-UK special relationship and making clear, if he asks, that we hold to the view which we have already expressed that we would only facilitate allied procurement of MGM's for a program involving genuinely multilateral control, manning and ownership.

I do not believe that we should, however, foreshadow any curtailment of the special relation. This would be counterproductive, in view of the state of political developments in the UK and of the UK-ECSC negotiations. I suspect that we can rely on the long-term trends in Europe to bring genuine multilateral courses increasingly to the fore, if we do not indicate a willingness to provide increased aid for less satisfactory alternatives in the meantime.

Thus, if the British raise the question of aid for a hunter-killer (rather than missile-bearing) nuclear powered submarine, such aid would not be precluded by the policy indicated above, in view of our previous sale of a nuclear power plant for a hunter-killer submarine to the UK. In the unlikely event the British raise this question, we might indicate that we would take the matter under consideration and our two Departments could then review timing and other relevant considerations, in the light of pending developments in this field vis-a-vis the French.

In connection

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In connection with the policy of avoiding any extension of the present US-UK special relation it might also be useful if our staffs could undertake a review of the present extensive collaboration with the British under the Tripartite (US, UK, Canada) Technical Cooperation program so as to define its scope with greater precision. I understand that this program of cooperation, stemming from the Eisenhower-Macmillan agreement of December 20, 1957, involves extensive and frequent interchange of ballistic missiles as well as other data with the British, despite the facts that (i) the UK has no national missile program, and (ii) we would not wish them to start one. I understand that arrangements between American and British companies for exchanging information in the ballistic missile field are also involved. I have asked that Bill Tyler's people be in touch with your staff about such a review.

I am sending copies of this letter to Rae Sandy and Glenn Seaborg in view of their interest in the subject.

Sincerely yours,

*/s/ Dean*

Dean Rusk

S/S-RO

SEP 8 1962

A true copy of signed original

S/P:HOwen  
EUR:RPM:JJConroy:bpw  
9/7/62

cc To EUR, RPM, S, RE

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Tyler *HW*  
EUR - Mr. Schaetzle *KS*  
G/PM - Mr. Weiss *AW*  
Mr. Orwick *OK*

MC - Mr. Margrave *MC*  
RPM - Mr. Popper *PC*  
BNA - Mr. Bergesen *BC*

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Luncheon Meeting at Lovena di Menaggio  
16 September 1962

PARTICIPANTS: Chancellor Adenauer  
Secretary-General Stikker  
General Norstad

1. After an exchange of personal pleasantries, the Chancellor stated that he wished to speak first about the relative position of the West vis-a-vis the Soviet Union at this time. He proceeded to emphasize the strength of the Communists throughout the Western World, specifically indicating that in France the Communist Party was the largest single party; in Italy, the Communist influence was very great and Fanfani had moved somewhat to the left and that almost anything could happen in that area. In speaking of the U. K. he cited the possibility of the Labor Party coming to power in the next election

and indicated concern over the possibility of Gaitskell being the Prime Minister, specifically pointing out Gaitskell's position on the Rapacki plan and similar disengagement proposals. The Chancellor then stated that under Pius XII the Catholic Church had been a great bulwark of

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strength against Communism and was a real factor, particularly in the so-called Catholic countries in Europe and in South America. He said the present Pope thinks "everyone is nice" and unfortunately it is no longer true that the Church is an effective force against Communism.

2. Adenauer made reference to the development of the Communist position in Cuba and the loss of American influence throughout all of Latin America. He stated that many South American leaders had come to him and told him almost with bitterness of their concern over the United States. He said that particularly after the Punta del Este conference high ranking South Americans saw him at the instigation of their governments asking the Germans for help in education, industrial and economic aid -- not military -- because they didn't want American influence in South America; they had no confidence in it. Then he made the statement that the United States does not know Communism, and that this is a worry to many Free Peoples. In this connection, he raised the question of recognition of or some accommodation with Red China, indicating his own feeling that such an accommodation would help to build an opposition to the

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Soviet Union and that one could be played against the other. He said that he talked to Shepard Stone (Ford Foundation) and that Stone said that his foundation was studying some program to help to educate American thinking on the threat of Communism and would introduce into this the question of the relationship between Red China, the Soviet Union and the West.

3. The Chancellor raised the question of nuclear weapons by stating that he had received some time ago a very nice letter from President Kennedy in which this subject was mentioned. The letter covered the subject of nuclear weapons in the NATO forces, or in Europe, very generally, but stated that Ambassador Dowling would amplify this statement orally. Dr. Adenauer said that this letter was followed up by a meeting with Dowling, in which the Ambassador had gone very far, as he understood it, to support the idea, or to indicate that the United States supported quite a wide deployment of so-called tactical nuclear weapons and went very far toward meeting the German view that weapons must be in the front line and that there must be a willingness to use them very early. Adenauer said that

Dowling's statement seemed to go considerably beyond the President's

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view. He concluded this by indicating that there was ambiguity not only in his mind but in the minds of most Europeans on the American position on this subject, which comes from what appeared to be more-or-less conflicting statements from U. S. sources.

He said the Europeans, of course, felt that there should be a nuclear capability over here in Europe as their defense depended upon it. In this connection he wanted to tell us why De Gaulle felt that Europe must have its own capability: Every four years there is a Presidential election in the United States. The main political trends and problems of the world are rarely important factors in determining the outcome of these elections and, of course, Europe has no real influence on the outcome. This makes it extremely difficult for Europeans to depend wholly on the United States for nuclear weapons or to accept almost complete control of the weapons for the defense of Europe by the United States. Added to this is the fact that De Gaulle is absolutely convinced that the Americans will leave Europe.

4. The Chancellor then spoke of the great success of the DeGaulle visit; he said that the reception in Bonn was expected; that in Hamburg it was considerably more than what was anticipated; and

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that the one in Munich was far beyond expectations. He then proceeded to talk about the importance of the Franco-German relationship, clearly indicating that he believes that within Europe this is the important, or at least fundamental, relationship. He stressed the historical game of political musical chairs as played between France, Germany and Russia since the time of Bismarck, using this to emphasize his point that France and Germany must be so thoroughly integrated that they cannot separate to an extent that would permit either one to join Russia against the other.

5. He said the interest of the U. K. in the Common Market and political association with Europe was clearly stated by Lord Home when he spoke of the centers of power. The Chancellor indicated that this was always the British position; they made some mistakes in the past, but this had always been their position: they wanted to be in the center of power in Europe. It was now clear that Europe was developing into that position. He said that there were three great powers concerned here: France, Germany and the U. K. The U. K. felt, quite understandably, that Germany was not a contender for leadership because

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He said, for example, one could take the agricultural problem. This is not a problem in Holland, where they don't grow any wheat. The German farmers do and we cannot do anything which will give preferential treatment to those in the U. K. orbit at the expense of the German farmers because, after all, they are the people who vote for us.

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6. The Chancellor had with him a copy of Secretary-General Stikker's paper, NDP/62/10, Subject: NATO Defense Policy, dtd 3 Sept 62, which he had studied with the comments of Von Walther and the Foreign Office. He stated that he was completely in agreement with the Stikker paper in substance and that he believed that the subject should be tackled at this time and not postponed to some indefinite date when, if ever, the problem of the U. K. 's relationship with the Common Market was settled. He further stated that he felt that Stikker's deterrent concept was absolutely sound. Still talking about the Stikker paper, he said that NATO should proceed with a reorganization in order better to fulfill its role and to take its proper place, etc. He cited,

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saying that this was ridiculous. He stated that Secretary General  
Stikker had achieved greater success than Spaak and that consequently,  
on this foundation, he must move forward

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He said that the appointment of Grewe to Washington was a mistake.  
This had been handled by Von Brentano without being brought to his  
attention; by the time he came to know about it, the matter had gone  
too far and it was too late to change.

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Adenauer's leaving office, he indicated that at the time of

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the last election he had volunteered that he was going to leave in time to let somebody else take over and establish himself for the next election, and that he would even put this in writing. He gave no indication of timing, however.

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Adenauer

Index: Adenauer, 16 Sep 62  
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Luncheon Meeting at Lovena di Menaggio  
16 September 1962

NLE MR Case No. 89-367  
Document No. 4

PARTICIPANTS: Chancellor Adenauer  
Secretary-General Stikker  
General Norstad

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7/ Dr. Adenauer spoke about the assignment of Ambassador Grewe to the NATO Council, telling Stikker that he had great confidence in him; he was a very able man and would be particularly useful in the field of international law.

8. As a matter of interest in connection with the discussions in Germany at the present time as to Adenauer's successor and the timing of Adenauer's leaving office, he indicated that at the time of

He said that the appointment of Grewe to Washington was a mistake. This had been handled by Von Brentano without being brought to his attention; by the time he came to know about it, the matter had gone too far and it was too late to change.

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the last election he had volunteered that he was going to leave in time to let somebody else take over and establish himself for the next election, and that he would even put this in writing. He gave no indication of timing, however.

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21 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

*mom*

SUBJECT: Lunch with Mr. Harry Rowen

1. This memorandum covers what I learned this noon from Mr. Harry Rowen, and fits into my longer basic memorandum of this date entitled NATO Policy This Autumn.

2. NATO Defense Policy Conference.

Rowen's view of this Conference is somewhere between Henry Owen's idea of a simple exchange of ideas on how to implement existing policy and my own idea of the Conference as an opportunity for the highest level responsible principals to review the basic US policy toward NATO with an open mind toward proposing modifications. I have the feeling that Rowen is basically on the side of Henry Owen in this matter, but feels himself somewhat inhibited by Secretary McNamara's relatively open mind--for example, in insisting that there be included on the agenda an item on alternatives to a sea-borne multilateral NATO MRBM force. I think Rowen considers that it is all well and good to discuss alternatives for future considerations and use, but that this process should not prevent the Gerald Smith roadshow from going ahead right away with its technical feasibility briefing based on the Navy Department study. When I asked if he didn't think it more logical for the Gerald Smith Group to follow the general briefings of the JCS's NATO Defense Data Program, he countered by saying in effect that he didn't see why the Smith Group, which was all set and ready to go, should have to wait around while the Joint Staff, as usual, ponderously ground away toward an indeterminate readiness date. In short, if you try to persuade Mr. McNamara to agree with you on delaying the Gerald Smith Group, I think you can count on the opposition of Rowen, if McNamara asks him what he thinks.

3. NATO Reorganization.

This paragraph may belong in the previous one above, because what Rowen said was that Mr. Robert Bowie has prepared a paper on NATO reorganization which in one way or another will probably pop up for consideration of some kind at the NATO Defense Policy Conference. This will not be hard to arrange, since Rowen himself is coordinating the papers on all agenda items. The Bowie paper, perhaps as reflected in a Rowen brief on the "NATO Reorganization" agenda item, will probably recommend abolition of the Military Committee/Standing Group and substitution of a kind of NATO Minister of Defense, complete with military and civilian staff. Regardless of the relative radicalness of such a proposal, I don't think it need concern you because the overwhelming opinion within the government is that this autumn is no time to rock the boat with one more new complication.



100-171/112-2-1010

4. NATO Defense Data Program.

Rowen made no attempt to conceal his distress over the ponderousness of the Joint Staff performance on this requirement, which he says goes back to last April. He specifically hopes that you, as JCS Chairman, will order that this DDP briefing team be ready to go at a given early date, although, as mentioned above, he does not think that the Gerald Smith roadshow or anything else should await the readiness date of the DDP. He is especially concerned that this DDP contain some really impressive information for our Allies, and is afraid that by the time the security clearance people get through their hatchet jobs, it will have lost all its bite. He says that the law governing this subject can be interpreted, if necessary, to cover almost anything; in fact, Secretary McNamara last December wrote out what he wanted to say at the Ministerial Meeting and told the lawyers to write something proving it was legal -- which they did.

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I asked Rowen what he thought about a basic review of US policy toward NATO this autumn. As expected, he seemed to fall between the rigidly static position of Henry Owen and a position which would strongly underline the desirability of such a basic "in-house" review. In short, his attitude was that it never hurts to study and review anything, but I could tell his heart was not in favor of any meaningful and substantive change.

6. Other Business.

a. Rowen tells me that he is finishing up a cover memorandum with which to transmit the Joint Staff MRBM study to Secretary McNamara. In this memorandum he will assert that it is an excellent study which is entirely consistent with the current US position that there is no urgent military requirement for MRBMs in NATO.

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There is only one recommendation in my paper entitled NATO Policy This Autumn which I would say Rowen's views materially affect, and that is the recommendation in paragraph 4.b advocating that the Gerald Smith Navy roadshow be postponed. I think Secretary McNamara would be certain to turn to <sup>NITP</sup> Rowen for a reaction to any proposal along these lines from you, and I therefore think that the likelihood of securing any action is even less than I indicated in that paragraph 4.b of my longer memorandum.

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9/25/62

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

September 25, 1962

SUBJECT: Nitze-Laloy Discussion of a Multilateral MRBM Force

During the course of my war-gaming in the Pentagon last week, I had the opportunity to sit in when Paul Nitze debriefed his staff on his recent trip to Paris in connection with NAC consideration of Berlin contingency planning. As a related subject, he reported on the NAC's preliminary discussions of Stikker's paper on NATO defense policy, and in connection therewith he recounted a private conversation he had had with Laloy on a multilateral MRBM force.

Mr. Laloy stated that France could see no real requirement for a multilateral MRBM force as now being proposed by the United States, but in response to questioning he did admit that French national possession of MRBM's (which he said France would attempt to achieve) would ultimately create German pressures for possession on similar terms. Mr. Nitze explained that it was in the main precisely to circumvent this problem that the United States was proposing the NATO multilateral concept. In the course of the ensuing discussion, Laloy suggested that France might possibly contribute to a multilateral NATO force if at the same time she could also retain a sizeable independent national force. When asked whether France might consider committing this independent national force to NATO in the same manner that the United States is committing its Polaris submarines, Mr. Laloy indicated that this might be a possibility if it were clearly understood that this force could be withdrawn for national purposes if necessary - just as in the case of the U.S.

I think this is rather significant because if the French do come around to supporting in some measure a multilateral force, it will undoubtedly be on some such terms as these.

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In reply refer to: I-20221/62

September 27, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CARL KAYSER  
The White House

SUBJECT: SecGen Memo HDP/62/10 "NATO Defense Policy"

1. Mr. Stikker's NATO Defense Policy paper is designed to reopen NAC discussions on strategy and military policy, and to outline the broad areas he would wish such discussions to cover. The paper largely states questions rather than prescribing answers; Mr. Stikker insists it is not his "intention to take sides but simply to seek clarification, where necessary, by testing assertions that have been made." Since, however, the assertions to which he refers come almost entirely from the statements to NAC of Secretary Ruak, Secretary McManara, and Ambassador Finletter, and from other statements by U. S. spokesmen, the effect of his paper is to challenge, over a wide field, the stated U. S. position. In particular: (1) by listing the arguments for MRM he attacks the U. S. thesis that there is not an "urgent military requirement"; (2) by arguments for ACE theatre nuclear forces, by emphasizing supposed limitations of external forces, and by urging a specifically European deterrence, he attacks the U. S. view of major nuclear war as a single, coordinated, over-all operation; (3) by his advocacy of tactical nuclear operations, he attacks the expressed U. S. reservations about the effectiveness of such operations and the danger of relying on them; and (4) by his judgment of the limit of feasible conventional buildup in Europe, his view that this

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I-20221/62

OASD/ISA - Subj: SecGen Memo NIE/62/10 "NATO Defense Policy"

limit is inadequate, and his recommendation that the shortage be filled by tactical nuclears, he attacks the U. S. contention that conventional forces sufficient to hold all but an all-out conventional bloc attack can and should be raised. Perhaps most central is the following: ".....after all the controversy which has taken place in public about our nuclear strategy, the impression is gaining ground, however, incorrectly, that in the eyes of one of the major partners the use of nuclear weapons cannot be contemplated other than in literally desperate circumstances. I do not for one moment question the readiness of that partner to risk its very existence for the sake of any member of the Alliance whose integrity was placed in jeopardy by Soviet aggression. Nor do I take any less seriously the appalling consequences of a general war. But I am deeply concerned lest the Soviet leaders may draw the wrong conclusions, exhilarated as they are by their recent successes in rocketry, and make a fatal miscalculation in the belief that NATO has lost faith in its own deterrent." This argument calls into question the entire U. S. effort, by education and discussion, to bring NATO strategy into accord with nuclear reality, to get away from "primary though not exclusive" dependence on nuclears and from "no concept of limited war with the USSR", and to create an alternative between all-out nuclear war and submission to aggression.

2. None of Mr. Stikker's arguments is exclusively his own; each is shared by a greater or lesser number of informed people throughout the Alliance, not excepting the United States. His paper is thus a useful expression of a broad range of the views which we hope to change as

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DAED/ISA - Subj: SecGen Memo WDF/62/10 "NATO Defense Policy"

discussions continue, and, no doubt, of the reservations about our policy in some minds that we will have to live with.

3. Mr. Stikker's principal points are briefly sketched and discussed in the following paragraphs.

4. The MIRM Requirement. The paper's argument for an ACE MIRM requirement is hung on:

a. Various aspects of the theatre vs over-all Alliance problem (see next paragraph).

b. Replacement of obsolescing ACE nuclear vehicles (Hatefors, Naces, Thors, aircraft). (This is, of course, not a valid argument. The current nuclear program is designed for the expected over-all target system, giving consideration to the increasing vulnerability and obsolescence of Allied forces.)

c. Reaction time in major nuclear war. (Stikker incorrectly assumes major dependence on bombers in the mid-60's, when missiles will cover the most urgent targets. Others, however, contend that the difference in ICBM and MIRM flight time (maximum, about 22 minutes) would be important. This is doubtful. If we initiate, we will wish a simultaneous strike; the flight time difference would not apply. If they initiate, a 20-minute lag might, conceivably catch a few laggards, but would be unhelpful in time for release. POLARIS flight times are equal with MIRM, for any targets where the difference might be vital. In any event, flight time difference would almost certainly be subsumed in decision and communication time.)

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d. Constraints. Stikker makes the case for the low yield, high accuracy land-based Missile "X". (Rebuttal: (1) The MRBM will only be a small fraction of the megatonnage; the reduction in enemy casualties would be at best marginal; (2) MRBM on land would add high-priority Soviet targets in Europe's heavily populated areas; it would be absurd to kill Germans to save Poles; (3) Most appropriate MRBM targets (e.g. Soviet MRBM) are well clear of population centers, where high yield air bursts do the job with no more fall out or collateral damage; (4) the required yield difference (cube of CEP) is less than Stikker's example indicates.)

e. Controlling the land battle during and after a nuclear exchange. (Rebuttal: (1) Full strategic exchange may well be so cataclysmic as to make further fighting meaningless and impossible; (2) If not, (a) time urgency will be less, (b) substantial tactical nuclear capability exists and is programmed, (c) even under unfavorable conditions of nuclear war outbreak, reasonable residual strategic forces are expected under the present program for this task, over and above a final reserve for urban-industrial targets, and not relying (as Stikker alleges) on the second strike of external forces.)

5. The theatre versus over-all (or external force) problem. Stikker makes all the "theatre" arguments.

a. SACEUR has the mission of defending Europe and should be given the tools. (Rebuttal: SACEUR cannot conceivably "defend" Europe

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with any feasible force assignments; extra-theatre forces will always be necessary in support, especially external strategic forces; the question is where to put the boundary between theatre and over-all tasks. SACREU presumably should run the "battlefield" operations, while "strategic" operations are best handled globally. The range and capacity of NDFM make them more appropriate for use in the over-all mix; NDFM targets (e.g. Soviet NDFM) should generally be attacked using the full range of Alliance forces.)

b. Deterrence. Powerful theatre forces pose a separate threat, and insure that the Soviets cannot hope to avoid major retaliation by nuclear attacks on Europe only or by relying on publicly known U. S. reluctance and attacking conventionally only. This adds to the credibility of the over-all deterrent, and adds a specific European deterrent. (Rebuttal: (1) The Europe-U. S. problem is inseparable; U. S. hostages and interests are too great for us to split out, as the Kremlin knows; (2) Deterrence comes from capacity: forces, control, determination. This is best exhibited by a unified retaliatory force; (3) The risks and losses of effectiveness of divided control are worse than any marginal deterrent gain.)

c. Responsiveness. Assigned theatre forces, being physically and organizationally closer, are more quickly and reliably responsive to the commander, and should therefore be provided him for urgent targets of primary interest to him. (Rebuttal: (1) External forces may be more reliable, since less vulnerable and - for the foreseeable future - under

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OASD/ISA - Subj: Section Memo NDF/62/10 "NATO Defense Policy"

less vulnerable command and control; (2) At the current cost of weapons, we cannot duplicate to give commanders attached forces; we must make necessary external support reliable; (3) Target coverage of targets of "particular concern to ACF" can be and must be handled using all Allied forces in coordination; there is no merit to splitting the problem beyond the battlefield level; (4) For transient targets, in any case, missiles are a poor tool. Where deep targets of opportunity are to be engaged by missiles, whether they are theatre or external is not a significant part of the problem.)

6. Multilateral forces. Stikker gives a series of pro-and-cons on multilateral forces. Though he appears to exaggerate the effect of such a force, its deployment mode, or its operational assignment on deterrence, and though his requirement that U. S., U. K., and France must participate seems unnecessary, he recognizes the facts that militarily the force can only be useful as part of the over-all Alliance forces, and that the chief effects would be political: both indicating NATO unity and giving European members concrete participation in nuclear matters.

7. Tactical nuclear warfare. Stikker contends that we are eroding the deterrent effect of tactical nuclears by expressing our reservations about the utility of their use and by over-emphasizing conventional build-up. He recommends a second, tactical nuclear, threshold, known to the Soviets, short of general war. (Initial: (a) Since tactical nuclear war has become two-sided, military advantage from their use has become doubtful, not only because of the high probability of escalation or step-by-step

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escalation but because the tactical exchange itself doesn't look promising in many cases in obtaining military objectives; (b) The non-nuclear/nuclear dividing line is unmistakable; once launched on nuclears there are no firm watersheds, and no less-than-nuclear action has such leverage. We can try tactical nuclears in the event, and that, as well as deterring Soviet use, is why we have such large tac nuc forces, but we do not estimate highly the chances of tactical nuclear stability; (c) The erosion of deterrence, such as it is, comes from the facts of tactical nuclear warfare, not from our other strengthening actions.)

8. Conventional forces. Stikler's view: (a) 30 divisions on the Central Front, fully modernized, are attainable, but no more; (b) This is inadequate for the shield's task; (c) the gap should be filled with tactical nuclears. (Rebuttal: (a) On the order of 30 modernized divisions better deployed, with better logistic backup and good reserve programs, and with appropriate air, appears to be about right for the shield's mission of holding less than all-out conventional attack; (b) However, if more are needed, the Alliance is capable of producing them; (c) Tactical nuclears are not economical.)

9. Conclusions:

a. Mr. Stikler has challenged our U. S. positions, we must meet his arguments.

b. The case for MDM can only properly be made on over-all grounds. The present U. S. position, that MDM would have military utility and political value but are not an "urgent military requirement" appears sound.

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c. Our conventional and tactical nuclear cases need to be more completely made with our Allies.

d. The idea of a sea-based NATO multilateral force (NSAM 147) has been discussed long enough at lofty levels of abstraction. The current Gerard Smith exercise to explore in NAC, without policy commitment, the technical, legal, and operational aspects at a practical level, should be useful.

J. M. LEE  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Director, Policy Planning Staff

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Professor Marc Trachtenberg  
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Dear Professor Trachtenberg:

Mandatory review of the following document has been completed.

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Copies of the declassified document(s) are enclosed.

Copy(ies) of the document(s) may be ordered at a cost of \$.25 per page. Please use the enclosed order form.

If you have any questions concerning this case or the mandatory review process, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Stephanie Fawcett  
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21 September 1962

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*mom*

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In reply refer to: I-20221/62

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limit is inadequate, and his recommendation that the shortage be filled by tactical nuclears, he attacks the U. S. contention that conventional forces sufficient to hold all but an all-out conventional bloc attack can and should be raised. Perhaps most central is the following: ".....after all the controversy which has taken place in public about our nuclear strategy, the impression is gaining ground, however, incorrectly, that in the eyes of one of the major partners the use of nuclear weapons cannot be contemplated other than in literally desperate circumstances. I do not for one moment question the readiness of that partner to risk its very existence for the sake of any member of the Alliance whose integrity was placed in jeopardy by Soviet aggression. Nor do I take any less seriously the appalling consequences of a general war. But I am deeply concerned lest the Soviet leaders may draw the wrong conclusions, exhilarated as they are by their recent successes in rocketry, and make a fatal miscalculation in the belief that NATO has lost faith in its own deterrent." This argument calls into question the entire U. S. effort, by education and discussion, to bring NATO strategy into accord with nuclear reality, to get away from "primary though not exclusive" dependence on nuclears and from "no concept of limited war with the USSR", and to create an alternative between all-out nuclear war and submission to aggression.

2. None of Mr. Stikker's arguments is exclusively his own; each is shared by a greater or lesser number of informed people throughout the Alliance, not excepting the United States. His paper is thus a useful expression of a broad range of the views which we hope to change as

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discussions continue, and, no doubt, of the reservations about our policy in some minds that we will have to live with.

3. Mr. Stikker's principal points are briefly sketched and discussed in the following paragraphs.

4. The MIRM Requirement. The paper's argument for an ACE MIRM requirement is hung on:

a. Various aspects of the theatre vs over-all Alliance problem (see next paragraph).

b. Replacement of obsolescing ACE nuclear vehicles (Hatefors, Naces, Thors, aircraft). (This is, of course, not a valid argument. The current nuclear program is designed for the expected over-all target system, giving consideration to the increasing vulnerability and obsolescence of Allied forces.)

c. Reaction time in major nuclear war. (Stikker incorrectly assumes major dependence on bombers in the mid-60's, when missiles will cover the most urgent targets. Others, however, contend that the difference in ICBM and MIRM flight time (maximum, about 22 minutes) would be important. This is doubtful. If we initiate, we will wish a simultaneous strike; the flight time difference would not apply. If they initiate, a 20-minute lag might, conceivably catch a few laggards, but would be unhelpful in time for release. POLARIS flight times are equal with MIRM, for any targets where the difference might be vital. In any event, flight time difference would almost certainly be subsumed in decision and communication time.)

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d. Constraints. Stikker makes the case for the low yield, high accuracy land-based Missile "X". (Rebuttal: (1) The MRBM will only be a small fraction of the megatonnage; the reduction in enemy casualties would be at best marginal; (2) MRBM on land would add high-priority Soviet targets in Europe's heavily populated areas; it would be absurd to kill Germans to save Poles; (3) Most appropriate MRBM targets (e.g. Soviet MRBM) are well clear of population centers, where high yield air bursts do the job with no more fall out or collateral damage; (4) the required yield difference (cube of CEP) is less than Stikker's example indicates.)

e. Controlling the land battle during and after a nuclear exchange. (Rebuttal: (1) Full strategic exchange may well be so cataclysmic as to make further fighting meaningless and impossible; (2) If not, (a) time urgency will be less, (b) substantial tactical nuclear capability exists and is programmed, (c) even under unfavorable conditions of nuclear war outbreak, reasonable residual strategic forces are expected under the present program for this task, over and above a final reserve for urban-industrial targets, and not relying (as Stikker alleges) on the second strike of external forces.)

5. The theatre versus over-all (or external force) problem. Stikker makes all the "theatre" arguments.

a. SACEUR has the mission of defending Europe and should be given the tools. (Rebuttal: SACEUR cannot conceivably "defend" Europe

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with any feasible force assignments; extra-theatre forces will always be necessary in support, especially external strategic forces; the question is where to put the boundary between theatre and over-all tasks. SACREU presumably should run the "battlefield" operations, while "strategic" operations are best handled globally. The range and capacity of NDFM make them more appropriate for use in the over-all mix; NDFM targets (e.g. Soviet NDFM) should generally be attacked using the full range of Alliance forces.)

b. Deterrence. Powerful theatre forces pose a separate threat, and insure that the Soviets cannot hope to avoid major retaliation by nuclear attacks on Europe only or by relying on publicly known U. S. reluctance and attacking conventionally only. This adds to the credibility of the over-all deterrent, and adds a specific European deterrent. (Rebuttal: (1) The Europe-U. S. problem is inseparable; U. S. hostages and interests are too great for us to split out, as the Kremlin knows; (2) Deterrence comes from capacity: forces, control, determination. This is best exhibited by a unified retaliatory force; (3) The risks and losses of effectiveness of divided control are worse than any marginal deterrent gain.)

c. Responsiveness. Assigned theatre forces, being physically and organizationally closer, are more quickly and reliably responsive to the commander, and should therefore be provided him for urgent targets of primary interest to him. (Rebuttal: (1) External forces may be more reliable, since less vulnerable and - for the foreseeable future - under

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less vulnerable command and control; (2) At the current cost of weapons, we cannot duplicate to give commanders attached forces; we must make necessary external support reliable; (3) Target coverage of targets of "particular concern to ACF" can be and must be handled using all Allied forces in coordination; there is no merit to splitting the problem beyond the battlefield level; (4) For transient targets, in any case, missiles are a poor tool. Where deep targets of opportunity are to be engaged by missiles, whether they are theatre or external is not a significant part of the problem.)

6. Multilateral forces. Stikker gives a series of pro-and-cons on multilateral forces. Though he appears to exaggerate the effect of such a force, its deployment mode, or its operational assignment on deterrence, and though his requirement that U. S., U. K., and France must participate seems unnecessary, he recognizes the facts that militarily the force can only be useful as part of the over-all Alliance forces, and that the chief effects would be political: both indicating NATO unity and giving European members concrete participation in nuclear matters.

7. Tactical nuclear warfare. Stikker contends that we are eroding the deterrent effect of tactical nuclears by expressing our reservations about the utility of their use and by over-emphasizing conventional build-up. He recommends a second, tactical nuclear, threshold, known to the Soviets, short of general war. (Initial: (a) Since tactical nuclear war has become two-sided, military advantage from their use has become doubtful, not only because of the high probability of escalation or step-by-step

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escalation but because the tactical exchange itself doesn't look promising in many cases in obtaining military objectives; (b) The non-nuclear/nuclear dividing line is unmistakable; once launched on nuclears there are no firm watersheds, and no less-than-nuclear action has such leverage. We can try tactical nuclears in the event, and that, as well as deterring Soviet use, is why we have such large tac nuc forces, but we do not estimate highly the chances of tactical nuclear stability; (c) The erosion of deterrence, such as it is, comes from the facts of tactical nuclear warfare, not from our other strengthening actions.)

8. Conventional forces. Stikler's view: (a) 30 divisions on the Central Front, fully modernized, are attainable, but no more; (b) This is inadequate for the shield's task; (c) the gap should be filled with tactical nuclears. (Rebuttal: (a) On the order of 30 modernized divisions better deployed, with better logistic backup and good reserve programs, and with appropriate air, appears to be about right for the shield's mission of holding less than all-out conventional attack; (b) However, if more are needed, the Alliance is capable of producing them; (c) Tactical nuclears are not economical.)

9. Conclusions:

a. Mr. Stikler has challenged our U. S. positions, we must meet his arguments.

b. The case for MDM can only properly be made on over-all grounds. The present U. S. position, that MDM would have military utility and political value but are not an "urgent military requirement" appears sound.

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c. Our conventional and tactical nuclear cases need to be more completely made with our Allies.

d. The idea of a sea-based NATO multilateral force (NSAM 147) has been discussed long enough at lofty levels of abstraction. The current Gerard Smith exercise to explore in NAC, without policy commitment, the technical, legal, and operational aspects at a practical level, should be useful.

J. M. LEE  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Director, Policy Planning Staff

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Prepared by: RAdm J. M. Lee/jh/9/27/62/  
Policy Planning Staff/OASD/ISA  
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Mandatory Review Case: NLK-94-54

Professor Marc Trachtenberg  
Department of History  
3401 Walnut Street  
University of Pennsylvania  
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Dear Professor Trachtenberg:

Mandatory review of the following document has been completed.

Document 3 has been declassified in full. It is available for research use in the Library's Research Room.

Copies of the declassified document(s) are enclosed.

Copy(ies) of the document(s) may be ordered at a cost of \$.25 per page. Please use the enclosed order form.

If you have any questions concerning this case or the mandatory review process, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Stephanie Fawcett  
Archivist, Foreign Policy Materials

Enclosure(s)

9/28/62

MRBMs

September 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

1. Attached is Stikker's paper. It uses the MRBM question as a platform from which to attack U. S. policy in NATO on at least three grounds. First, he argues that there is an urgent military requirement for MRBMs. Second, he uses the same line of argument to raise the question as to whether our insistence on more conventional capabilities does not cast doubt on our determination to defend Europe. In this he reflects a frequent European position that NATO must make an immediate nuclear response to any Soviet attack. Finally, Stikker bolsters this part of his case by expressing skepticism as to whether in fact NATO can raise any more than thirty divisions on the central front, and he argues that these are not enough.

2. The center of Stikker's argument is the proposition that there is an urgent military requirement for MRBMs to replace the present theater nuclear delivery vehicles which are obsolescent. He builds his argument around the proposition that the means to strike at the targets which are threatening Europe must be in the hands of the allied command in Europe. In addition, he has various technical arguments about the superiority of MRBMs based in Europe over more distantly based missile forces.

3. There is not as yet a unified government view on the issue of whether or not there is an urgent need for MRBMs. Secretary McNamara's general position of the unity of any nuclear war would argue against the notion that it is necessary for the theater commander to have weapons under his own control to deal with the targets that threaten him. The technical points which Stikker makes on delivery time and accuracy in relation to yield are disputable.

4. The line-up at present in the various parts of the government is as follows: The JCS have agreed that there is a military need. Paul Nitze's staff have argued to the contrary. While they admit

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| By SKJF             | NLR-88-86 |
| NARA Date           | 9/87      |

check Stikker -  
memoirs?  
articles?

NSF/216 / MLF Gen. Vol I. Stikker Paper on MRBMs (A)  
MR filed an Stikker Paper in same file 6/11/92

that European-based MRBMs might add some useful striking power, they consider it probably not worth the military or political cost and therefore certainly not an urgent military need. The Secretary of Defense has not taken a position as yet. State is still strong for the position that only a seaborne multilateral force should be considered. State accepts the argument that there is no urgent military need but sees an important political need which can best be met by a multilateral seaborne force.

5. Stikker's case for an urgent MRBM requirement and his other arguments are intertwined. The discussion about tactical nuclears is familiar to you. Our own military judgment is that the balance of advantage is far from clear when both sides use it. As to the question of whether the NATO countries can support more than thirty divisions, two things can be said. First, the value of thirty divisions fully modernized with good logistic backup reserve programs and air support is not down-graded by Stikker. Second, if the alliance decided it needed more and had the will to produce more, it would be capable of doing so. This of course is a political judgment of some delicacy. It is clear that so far the alliance has either lacked the will or refused to face the need.

Carl Kaysen

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MULTILATERAL FORCE

General Vol. I, Stikker Paper on MRBM's (A)

DECLASSIFIED NLK-88-84, 9/81

09/28/62 WH..... 2pp ...

DECLASSIFIED C. Kaysen memo to JFK re Stikker paper, below

09/04/62 State S(...) 2pp POLTO 241(Paris)

NLK-88-85, 10/88

~~Reports talk with Stikker re paper (below)~~

08/29/62 NATO S(...) 22pp NDP/62/..

Secretary General of NATO's (Dirk Stikker's) paper on MRBM's

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6/92

General Vol. I, Stikker Paper on MRBM's (B)

..../... .. 1p

Unidentified handwritten notes, headed "Presentation 7"

10/17/62 State TS(...) 5pp POLTO A-438(USRO/Paris)

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NLK-88-85, 10/88

USRO/Paris(Finletter) detailed report on SACEUR/NAC briefing on MRBM requirement, 10/17/62

09/03/62 NATO S(...) 14pp NDP/62/10

Secretary General of NATO (Dirk U. Stikker) paper: "NATO DEFENCE POLICY"

General Vol. I, Stikker Paper on MRBM's (C)

09/03/62 NATO S(...) 14pp NDP/62/10

Secretary General of NATO (Dirk U. Stikker) paper: "NATO DEFENCE POLICY"

09/12/62 State U 1p

~~H. Owen note to McG. Bundy re attached~~

09/12/62 State S(...) 10pp

Draft Deptel to Political Adviser, NATO (Finletter)

DECLASSIFIED NLK-88-85, 10/88 re Stikker paper and related matters

09/15/62 State S(...) 10pp TOPOL 344(Paris)

~~Message, above, as transmitted to Finletter~~

09/17/62 State S(...) 3pp POLTO 300 (Paris)

Finletter's reply to TOPOL 344, above

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NLK-88-85, 10/88

09/18/62 State S(...) 3pp POLTO 309(Paris)

~~Further response to TOPOL 344, above~~

DECLASSIFIED 09/19/62 State S(...) 2pp TOPOL 1369(Paris)

NLK-88-85, 10/88

~~Conveys tentative schedule for Smith group for October presentations on seaborne MRBM force~~

09/22/62 State S(...) 4pp TOPOL 381(Paris)

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NLK-88-85, 10/88

~~Response to POLTOs 300 and 309, above, re Stikker procedures paper and related matters~~

09/22/62 State S(...) 4pp POLTO 336(Paris)

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NLK-88-85, 10/88

~~Response to TOPOL 369, above, procedural issues re Stikker paper~~

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The Secretary observed that the limit is what has come to be the power to act. If there were a significant change in the atmosphere or circumstances, these 4-Power rights can become very important. For instance, if the Berlin question were raised in the U.N., we cannot talk solely about West Berlin. In our talks with Gromyko we had always insisted upon 4-Power rights in all Berlin. True, in 1948 and again in 1955 steps had been taken which had removed any effective Western voice in happenings in East Berlin and East Germany. This question of legal rights is highly relevant to Mayor Brandt's other point, i.e. unless we can express our rights to East Berlin, the Soviets will attempt to exclude us there while trying to insert themselves into West Berlin.

Mayor Brandt said he would like to discuss two points: (1) morale in the city; and (2) a referendum or plebiscite. Re (1) it would be immensely helpful for morale if it were possible to reach some arrangements to counteract the most inhumane aspects of the Wall. Recently he had had a four-hour talk with Adenauer. The West Germans had just received new information from the East Germans in discussing trade matters that they would be perhaps willing to discuss "other things" though they denied any connection or relation to trade. East Germans inferred that they had the approval of their "great ally". The discussion on trade did not involve credits as previously proposed but a larger "swing" in the existing inter-zonal trade agreements. Brandt expressed himself in favor of this extension and this will be discussed through the Leopold-Berendt channel.

As for "other things", Mayor Brandt expressed/hope/East Germans might concede permission to unite or bring closer together divided families (a subject already being discussed through the Red Cross), permission for older people to join families even though not bound by the closest blood relationship, and finally, permission for West Berliners to visit their relatives in East Berlin.

Mayor Brandt continued that there was another idea which they had been discussing among themselves only, namely, a proposal to establish Visiting Centers where relatives might visit for two or three hours at a time. Such Centers might be established on the sector borders or in exclaves. Brandt said personally speaking he does not favor this idea, referring to the circumstances under which relatives could visit at these Visiting Centers as "prison conditions".

Mayor Brandt did not have great expectations of what could be achieved along the above lines but thought even minor things might be helpful. He thought that perhaps one advantage of Visiting Centers was that some church leaders could maintain links between East and West Germany.

As regards using the Leopold-Berendt channel for these negotiations, the former might be authorized by a letter from Lohard and from himself on behalf of Senz to discuss/extension/"swing" in IZB and "other things" such as movement of people by letter from himself and perhaps/letter from Ciocke authorizing talks on all technical matters. The thought might even be given to having a senior Senz official and a Federal trade official to

assist Leopold in these negotiations. However, this was a delicate matter and he realized the thin ice on which they would be skating. He said Chancellor Adenauer was fully informed on this. The Secretary remarked that if this channel could work out easements of the sort mentioned, it should be tried but in the full knowledge it would not solve the main problem.

Turning to a plebiscite, Mayor Brandt said he had not favored the idea when it had been brought up in the past by Adenauer. However, in present circumstances he thought it would be useful to have word from the West Berliners perhaps rather soon. It would be good from a psychological point of view. The people would be expressing their own views instead of having others express views on their behalf. He had mentioned this idea to Bundy and also to the three Deputy Commandants.

For instance, a referendum or plebiscite could be proposed for the whole of Berlin and if refused, as expected, they could then apply a proposal to West Berlin only requesting a vote on (a) continued allied presence and (b) maintenance of existing links with Bonn. Mayor Brandt said he had first been against asking the question about allied presence in West Berlin since this seemed to imply a doubt about the legal right of the Western powers to be there. However, he had found the Afro-Asians were not particularly convinced when occupation rights were mentioned. They tended to point out these rights were 17 years old and circumstances have changed. But if through a referendum we could point to the "will of the people" this could play an important role politically and morally.

The Secretary observed this was an interesting idea. He agreed in one respect that if the Berlin question comes before the U.N. or if there is a harsh confrontation with the Soviets, one of our strongest points would be to say, "Ask the people involved." Self-determination had strong appeal in the U.N.. When the idea of a referendum in Berlin had been previously talked about by the President and Adenauer, there had been a newspaper leak and it was deemed inadvisable to proceed. We ourselves cannot accept the notion that our legal rights have become sterile through the passage of time.

The Secretary added there was another factor we think would have more influence. This is the plain fact that the U.S. is in West Berlin and the U.S.S.R. is not going to push us out. This was very baldly stated, but given our entire world commitments we simply cannot be pushed out of Berlin. If the West Berliners were to make it clear they wanted continued Western troop protection, this would be powerful support. But timing was the important question. Mr. Khrushchev may or may not come to New York in November. Whether a vote should be taken before he comes or later is a question to be considered carefully. In short, the important point is "When do you play this card?"

In response to the Secretary's question, Mayor Brandt affirmed that he thought there would be a strong vote in favor of maintaining allied

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troops in Berlin. They could also ask for international supervision and invite everyone to come and observe the referendum. The West Berlin Senate had prepared a law and all he needed to do is put in a date and publish it. Once the decision to have a referendum or plebiscite were taken, they would need three weeks before the vote was actually carried out. They wanted to do this in a responsible way.

Mayor Brandt then said he would like to touch on another idea. Since the Russians are talking so much about Berlin as a NATO base and are asserting that the FRG cannot have any say in West Berlin, would it be possible to go back to the 1955 agreements on FRG independence and re-examine the annexes how FRG relations with West Berlin could be defined. The Secretary remarked that we would have to look into this in detail before he could comment. There was another thing to consider as a counteraction to Soviet pressure, the Secretary observed. If the Soviets get too gay about East Berlin, perhaps the allies should withdraw the reservations on West Berlin becoming a Land of FRG.

The Secretary said he wanted to speak about another matter, i.e. allied vs. civilian access to West Berlin. There was a certain distinction. While we do not see any existing agreements with the Soviets/clear rights for civilian access, we have insisted in all our talks with the Soviets that civilian access goes hand in hand with our allied rights. So this is perhaps a theoretical difference. We have supposed, under certain circumstances, we should have to incorporate civilian traffic into ours as an exercise of our full rights. We cannot accept a shut-off or closing out of civilian traffic.

Mayor Brandt remarked that in one respect the Paris Agreement of 1949 is better than the 1945 Agreements. The Paris Agreement provided that traffic and movement of persons would be restored to the status quo ante May 1, 1948. One difficulty is the public does not have a clear definition of what is meant by the three points encompassed in Western vital interests: (a) continued allied presence; (b) access to Berlin; and (c) viability. Would it not be possible to put down on paper more precise definitions of what these terms meant so that the public would have a better understanding? He cited difficulties which would arise if the East Germans suddenly introduced a visa requirement. This they could do in various ways to confuse the issue. Many people in Germany and particularly in the outside world would not really understand the import of the GDR action. The Mayor remarked here that he had the impression the 4-Power group discussions in Washington were perhaps going "too fast" on ground access measures while relying more on air access. He thought it was perhaps not good to talk too much about counter-measures.

The Secretary observed that the principal support for expanded civil access with West Berlin lies in the self-interest of the other side in trade agreements. Brandt said he would agree with this only to a certain degree. In his judgment, if Khrushchev decided to go ahead, this would be

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based on a political decision which had already taken into account possible economic counter-measures. The Secretary remarked Khrushchev has other things to worry about and pointed to the \$4 1/2 billion trade of the Soviet Bloc with OECD countries. Khrushchev has been saying to recent visitors that after the signature of a peace treaty, they would cut off allied military access. He may be thinking of gaining support of other nations by saying they are merely throwing out of Berlin the Imperialists and brigands. If Mr. Khrushchev wants to try to cut off military access, he would be faced with a "roaring crisis". The Secretary concluded by saying it was possible, however, that Khrushchev's first target would be military access rather than civilian access.

Mayor Brandt raised the question whether the Western powers had yet given a sufficient answer to the Soviets at this session of the General Assembly. He agreed we must do nothing which would bring the Berlin question into the U.N., but he was constantly getting questions from friends belonging to the non-aligned countries on what they might do. For instance, a recent Malayan visitor to Berlin asked Brandt what they could do for him in New York. If he followed his government's instructions he would have to reply, "Nothing."

The Secretary responded by saying he would like to say something on an extremely confidential basis, since we do not wish to be disloyal to good friends. He said there is a point of difference between us, the French and the FRG in regard to the U.N.. It was U.S. policy to give a great deal of attention to the U.N. when a question of war might be involved. The existence of the U.N. in the United States is the reason why we are not isolationists. The fact was that both deGaulle and Adenauer had an allergy to the U.N.. Thus, we have reached no common view as to the role the U.N. should or can play in the Berlin question though in certain contingencies there was a general agreement we would go to the U.N.. The Secretary asked that Mayor Brandt, for obvious reasons, keep his remarks in strictest confidence.

Mayor Brandt said that the new French Ambassador de Margerie in Bonn had expressed the opinion that after Algeria, the French Government would begin to change its attitude toward the U.N.. The Secretary remarked we had heard such opinions which came from everywhere except the "source that counts". Doubtless the Quai d'Orsay favored greater use of U.N. procedures but this was not enough. Brandt asserted that the German attitude to the U.N. has changed.

The Secretary then touched briefly on the EEC and our own trade legislation, referring to the network of relations stemming from various NATO countries all over the world. He pointed to the vast political potentialities of NATO in their individual relations with other countries. For Europe the possibilities were unlimited. The words to characterize Europe were "expurge, growth". Mayor Brandt commented that Adenauer

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has great power. As regards EE' he had spoken much against UK entry in private. The trouble was, said Mayor Brandt, the Chancellor tends to think in terms of the power politics of the last century. As between France, Germany and the UK, Adenauer is thinking in terms of which two would combine against the other. However, he had found Adenauer's attitude much better toward America than even a month ago.

The Secretary remarked that our principal burden is psychological, not the billions we have to spend on armament and aid. Some people seem to think that unless we repeat every month our assurances and reiterate our commitments, they have no meaning. We, on the other hand, believe that constant repetition inflates words and they become cheap. President Kennedy believes that when he commits the United States to something, say the defense of West Berlin, this should be taken for what it is and does not need repetition. The Secretary complimented Mayor Brandt on his response to the press upon his arrival, that he had not come to attain additional assurances: "We don't need assurances." This was the best thing Brandt could have said.

The Secretary added that frequent demands for repetition of assurances sowed distrust the other way around. We know what is in our mind and when we say it we mean it.

In response to the Secretary's question why the Soviets accommodated themselves to our demands on the Armored Personnel Carriers, Brandt expressed the opinion the Soviets had thought it more important to be in West Berlin than to quarrel and perhaps lose their rights to enter Berlin. The Secretary observed they were quite right on this question and that their intelligence had been very good.

Brandt then asked whether in future talks with the Soviets we might consider proposing talks at the Ambassadorial level in Bonn between the three Western Ambassadors and their Soviet colleague. Brandt added that East and West German experts could be brought in at some point to discuss technical matters. He said that some Soviet officials on the cocktail circuit in Berlin had implied that this might be an acceptable idea. The Secretary responded that he would be glad to look into this matter. If President Kennedy and Khrushchev were at some time to talk together, this suggestion might be of help in saving Khrushchev's prestige. We had proposed to the Soviets the possibility of having talks at the Deputy Foreign Ministers' level and they had nibbled at the bait to the extent of asking who might be named as the Deputy. The Secretary expressed the view that we do not believe the Soviets want a "crushing crisis" over Berlin but Khrushchev has created great prestige problems for himself. If he maintains his position this would mean war. Our suggestions for talks at other levels were to help him save out of his predicament. It

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is also possible Khrushchev's postponement of the Berlin question until after our elections might mean he was seeking excuses to postpone even further his Peace Treaty.

Mayor Brandt then brought up his forthcoming lectures at Harvard, saying he would be placing his main emphasis on the new Europe and European integration but he would say something on Berlin. Since what he would say might appear to be a little critical, he would like to mention it beforehand. He wanted to make the point that the welfare of Berlin was more important than the Wall. Hence, he would not encourage disturbances or revolt in East Germany now. There was one exception, however, and that was if there were a military attack against West Berlin, he could not ask the East Germans to remain quiet. The Secretary agreed and asked whether Mayor Brandt thought East German divisions would fight against Western troops. He himself found it hard to believe. Brandt agreed but said a recent defector had said the East Germans would not fight against Germans but probably against Americans. It was very difficult to know since their experience under a dictatorial regime during World War II revealed the extent to which dictatorships could force the people to obey.

The Secretary said there was one thing we would not permit the Soviets to do in Germany and that was to fight by proxy as they had done in Korea. In our view an East German shooting is a Russian shooting. The U.S. will not accept any Soviet claim of East German sovereign action. It might well be that the confrontation would be first with East Germans.

At this point, there were some inconclusive remarks concerning contingency planning for actions to be taken with regard to East Germany if and when access was blocked. The Secretary asked that the Department look into the possibility of briefing Brandt more fully on contingency planning in regard to this point. The Secretary continued that he had been impressed by Hungary where the troops first used by the Soviets had not been successful. Then they had brought in their central troops. He seriously doubted that the East Germans would offer serious fighting. The Secretary referred to his past conversations with Rapacki in which he had stated frankly that we recognized the Poles did not like the Germans but at the same time they do not like the Russians. Rapacki seemed to realize American presence in West Berlin and in Europe is a stabilizing factor.

The Secretary remarked he did not worry about the U.S. in connection with Berlin. We try to be tolerant about the views of others but in this question it is the issue of war and peace. This is where all the cards are on the table. The other countries of the world, in considering their position on the Berlin issue, must realize this involves the totality of their relations with the United States. If they do not support us

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there will be a fundamental change in their relations with us. It was not often they were called upon but on this issue they would have to "cash the check".

Mr. Bahr said it was difficult for the public to understand when the access problem arises, for instance, would it be when passports or visas are required. The Secretary responded that the FRG must think a great deal more about this question of recognition. We were very sensitive on our proposal for an International Access Authority. When this proposal had first been made we had a sharp reaction from Bonn. When he had met with the other Foreign Ministers in Geneva and this question had arisen, he could only laugh at them. Eleven NATO members have East German trade missions in their countries. The question was "Who is sleeping with this lady?" We resent the reaction to the proposal for an International Access Authority. We were least involved in any recognition of East Germany; we do not have a half billion dollars in trade with the GDR. In short, we resent it when others criticize us for tipping our hat to the lady with whom others have been sleeping.

Brandt said he did not know what de facto recognition is though he recognizes that there are certain de facto relations. He wondered whether it might be useful to try to define de facto recognition. The Secretary referred to the Gromyko-Thompson talks when Thompson had remarked at one point that we would not recognize East Germany. Gromyko had replied, "You already do." The Secretary had told Gromyko at Geneva that we act and adjust our conduct on the basis that something does exist in East Germany. We can adjust to the actual situation and we won't pretend there is nothing there but we will not recognize East Germany de jure. We do not want to try to define de facto recognition. This means nothing in law. Moreover, there are certain advantages in not trying to define this concept.

Brandt came back to his proposal for the Ambassadors to East and at a certain point to bring in East and West German experts. He wondered whether Khrushchev might not tell Ulbricht to keep his mouth shut and to consider this recognition. The Secretary remarked two things bore on this: (1) the astonishing failure of East Germany and Soviet policy therein; and (2) if he could speak quite frankly, the failure of the free Germans yet to develop proper confidence in themselves. The great gravitational force is the drang nach unification. The great attractive capacity was in the West but certain formalities have stood in the way of greater contacts. The Secretary made clear he was not suggesting any new policy but he expressed the opinion that more channels can be opened up whereby it would be possible to achieve more. The important thing was that we not let the barriers come back out again.

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OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE  
Soviet Union, September 1962

RELEASED

Date: October 6, 1962  
Time: 1:15 P.M.  
Place: Soviet Mission, Washington

RESUMÉ OF CONVERSATION

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IS/FPC/ MR Cases Only EO Citations CLASSIFY as DOWNGRADE TS to PARTICIPANTS: DECLASSIFY IN PART ( ) DECLASSIFY ( ) DENY ( ) EXCISE ( ) DELETE ( )

United States

- The Secretary
- Ambassador Stevenson (part time)
- Mr. R.H. Davis
- Mr. Hillenbrand
- Mr. Amblovsky

USSR

- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Samanov
- Mr. Kozlov (part time)
- Mr. Falin
- Mr. Kovalov
- Mr. Sukhodrev

RW/R-2

Subject: Germany and Berlin

Distribution:

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- W-4-3
- S/A-6
- S - Mr. Johnson-7<sup>cc</sup>
- S/P - Mr. Boston-8
- M/R - Mr. Tyler-9<sup>16</sup>
- M/P - Mr. Hillenbrand
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- Ambassy Berlin - Ambassador-19
- Mr. Light-20

After lunch, the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko had a three-hour conversation which was devoted entirely to Germany and Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko opened by saying that he wished to ask a half-serious and half-humorous question, namely, whether Mayor Brandt had exerted such pressure on the United States.

The Secretary replied that Mayor Brandt was in good spirits and form. He had exerted no pressure on us and noted that Mr. Gromyko's point actually involved a serious matter. As a matter of fact, we had gained the impression that Moscow appeared to be under the impression that we were not speaking for ourselves but rather for somebody else, i.e., the Germans. The Secretary emphasized that this was not the case and that we were speaking in our own right. Mayor Brandt had not come here to exert pressure on us and in fact that was not necessary.

The Secretary continued that Mr. Khrushchev and others appeared to have intimated to foreign visitors in Moscow that most everybody in the West, including the President, De Gaulle, Macmillan, Spahn, and Fenford, agreed with Moscow, except Adenauer. This was not the case at all where vital interests were involved. It was true that with regard to certain questions, e.g., unification, we did not expect a solution in the immediate future and therefore we were not pressing the point. The Germans may be expressing a different view, reflecting their hopes and aspirations.

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in this respect, but there was no distinction when vital interests were involved.

The Secretary then pointed out that Mayor Brandt was anxious to find ways to ease the situation in Berlin, such as, for example, reuniting those families that had found themselves separated. Mayor Brandt was not interested in increasing tensions; on the contrary, he was anxious to lessen them. In connection with the question of lessening tensions in Berlin, the Secretary then referred to the fact that some contacts on this matter had been taking place between West Germany, Berlin, and East Germany. The Secretary expressed the view that it was not impossible for them to find ways of lessening tensions and hoped that they could go forward in a constructive manner, which would make a difference in the situation.

Mr. Gromyko replied that Lord Home had also touched upon the Secretary's first point, i.e., that the USSR was wrong in believing that Adenauer and his government were determining the position of the Western powers and that the Western powers only repeated Adenauer's statements. Mr. Gromyko asserted that if the West really had such an impression, it was based on some inaccurate information. The USSR had never believed that the West only spoke for Adenauer and repeated his statements, and that it had no position of its own. However, the Secretary could not deny that Adenauer and his government were taking extremist positions on all questions relating to a peaceful settlement and to a settlement of the West Berlin situation. There could be no doubt on that point. In fact, Adenauer had made numerous statements to that effect. Thus, the Soviet view that such a position of Adenauer's influenced--Mr. Gromyko emphasized the word "influenced"--the Western position was not contrary to obvious facts. To prove this, it sufficed merely to analyze the chain of facts pertaining to the substance of the U.S.-USSR talks in Geneva and earlier in New York; such an analysis would bear out this appraisal of the situation. Mr. Gromyko then said that he wished to repeat that it was incorrect to think that the Soviet Union was under the impression that the U.S. merely repeated what Adenauer was saying. This was not the view of the USSR, and the U.S. apparently had a wrong impression, particularly with regard to Mr. Khrushchev's statements to visitors.

As to the Secretary's second observation, Mr. Gromyko said he believed that any steps aimed at lessening tensions between the GDR and the FRG would be of a positive significance. However, so far the FRG had acted to inflame the situation and to increase tensions between the FRG and the GDR. Yet if the FRG was modifying its position in this respect and if it wanted to lessen tensions, that would only be appropriate and would normalize the relations between the two German states, as well as improve the situation in Europe and Germany.

Referring to the Secretary's remark that Mayor Brandt not only was not pressuring the U.S. into taking a rigid position but was anxious to ease tensions in Berlin, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR could only welcome it if Brandt were really adopting a more sober attitude. However, so far the USSR had not noticed any confirmation of this in practice. So far Brandt and the West Berlin authorities, operating under the guardianship, as it were, of the Western occupation authorities, had been acting to inflame passions, complicate the situation, and increase tensions.

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If Brandt and the West Berlin authorities now intended to take a different line, the USSR could only hope that this would be confirmed by appropriate actions and statements. This would be furthered notably by steps on the part of the West Berlin authorities to guard the border between West Berlin and the GDR.

Mr. Gromyko continued that since the Secretary had mentioned the question of German unification he did not wish to leave that point unanswered, although he did not intend to engage in a detailed exchange of views on this subject. He asserted that the USSR position on this question was crystal clear; the USSR believed that a solution to this problem must be sought on the basis of the irrefutable fact that there were two independent German states in existence. It was from this fact that the Soviet Government proceeded in this matter. Everything the Soviet Union had said in New York and Geneva, and all statements made by Mr. Khrushchev to Western public figures, including his statements at Vienna, with regard to a peace treaty with Germany and to the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty, were based on that fact. The USSR drew serious conclusions from that fact with respect to its policy. The Western powers should draw similar conclusions, provided they wanted to improve the situation and did not wish at all costs to keep West Berlin in their grip as a NATO base and to keep at all costs their troops in West Berlin. All Soviet proposals had been aimed at reaching the one objective of eliminating the existing abnormal situation and of eliminating the vestiges of World War II.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that, as had been repeatedly stated and emphasized in official statements by the Soviet Government, the USSR believed that on the basis of the US-USSR exchanges of views some rapprochement on certain questions had been achieved, although one could not say that the respective positions on those questions were identical. The USSR did not underestimate the importance of that rapprochement. However, there were still obstacles preventing the two sides from reaching accord and from saying that the road was now clear to agreement. The USSR had expounded its position to the United States in all frankness and Mr. Khrushchev had stated it to visitors from the U.S. as well. The USSR still preferred an agreed solution and such a solution was its choice number one. If the West did not want to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, the Soviet Union regretted it but then perhaps agreement could be reached that the Soviet Union would sign such a treaty and agreed arrangements could be worked out on other questions, including the status of West Berlin, the presence of Western forces in West Berlin, and of course the question of access--an agreement which would suit all parties concerned. On the other hand, if the West did not wish such an agreement, then time was approaching to take stock of the situation to see where both sides stood, and that would entail the conclusion the USSR had repeatedly expounded. At any rate, a peace settlement with Germany and a peace treaty with Germany must be made. This was not a question of prestige; it was first and foremost a question of the destinies of peace in Europe. Such was the position of the USSR. It would be good if our two big countries could find a solution to this problem, and the peoples of our countries would be grateful to their leaders for resolving the problem. Unfortunately, however, the USSR saw no indication of readiness on the part of the

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polished speeches to reach such a solution.

The Secretary said he wanted to make a few comments on the points discussed with reference to the self-determination of the Germans and to the unification of Germany, the Secretary said he had indicated that he recognized that as a practical matter we did not see any prospects for unification in the immediate future. As he understood the Soviet view on this matter, the USSR had repeatedly stated that unification was up to the Germans themselves. However, the difficulty was that when the Soviet Union said this it apparently meant that the problem was up to Gibrich and not the German people as such. The Secretary emphasized that it was important, whatever we do or say, that the door to unification not be closed. He noted that it was in the spirit of any people, including the people of our two countries, that if they are divided and told that they could never reunite they became afflicted with illness, fears and ambitions which increase tensions and are not conducive to world peace. As to West Germany, the Secretary continued, we had seen there the development of a moderate leadership which wanted to live in friendliness and cooperation with its neighbors and which was not hostile to either East or West. However, if the door to unification were to be closed even in theory, then the kind of leadership might emerge in Germany, both East and West, in twenty or thirty years. After all, in rising to power, Hitler had played on the frustrations of the German people after World War I, and we did not want to see this kind of the worse Germany appear again on the scene in Central Europe.

The Secretary then recalled that in the course of the numerous exchanges of views in Washington, Moscow, Geneva and New York, the Soviet Union had asserted that it wanted as its first objective a peace treaty with the two Germans, and pointed out that our first choice was a peace treaty with one united Germany, a treaty that would satisfy the wishes of all German people and would establish the situation. In the course of these exchanges of views the two sides had been unable to agree how legally to end World War II. Thus, we had to look at the factual situation and saw that it included the two parts in Germany and the Western presence in West Berlin as a third factor to be fully taken into account. We did not see why arrangements could not be reached, provided the true factual situation was taken into account, and we had made certain suggestions as to how that could be done.

The Secretary then said that if the Soviet Union and its friends felt they were committed to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, that would not be a happy event but it would not be an insuperable situation. After all, a similar agreement had already been signed some years ago. If the Soviet Union did with respect to East Germany what we had done with respect to West Germany, i.e., if it reserved its powers with regard to all matters relating to Berlin and all Germany, the problems could be handled without great difficulty. The Secretary continued that we could not believe that the Soviet Union, any more than the U.S., the U.K., or France, could abandon its interest in all-German problems. Either the Soviet Union was the kind of creature that we did not care what happened in Germany, because they were the makers of agreement to both sides. It was not important a matter to them to the Germans. The Secretary ended that we had talked about the USSR during the

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own arrangements with East Germany but reserving its interests in vital questions for which we would continue to hold the Soviet Union responsible.

The Secretary then referred to Mr. Gromyko's using certain phrases which were not helpful, such as "drawing a line under World War II" and "respect for the sovereignty of the GDR", and said that some such phrases should be opened and their meaning explained in order to see what they meant. The Secretary recalled that when Ambassador Thompson had said in Moscow that we could not recognize the GDR, Mr. Gromyko had replied that the U.S. had in fact already done so. The Secretary pointed out that we were not acting as if nothing existed in East Germany and therefore he did not see why some arrangement could not be worked out on the basis of that fact.

The Secretary continued that he wished to remind Mr. Gromyko with regard to the question of reciprocity. Frankly, one of our difficulties was that we were unable to find expression of reciprocity on the part of the Soviet Union. Starting last summer we had tried to close the gap between the two sides on some points. Mr. Gromyko himself had said that the respective positions had come closer together on certain points. We had tried to identify some points which showed real progress but frankly we had gained the impression that the more we tried to close the gap the more the Soviet Union pulled back on points of most vital interest to us and tried to exert pressure on us to move where we could not move.

Referring to the question of the "occupation status", the Secretary observed that he did not think this was a critical point and thought that it could perhaps be overcome. He had spoken of the possibility of developing an agreement concerning the presence of troops. As to Mr. Gromyko's assertion that the West was seeking perpetuation of the stationing of Western forces in West Berlin, we had stated that this was not in our interest; however, under present circumstances it was impossible for us to withdraw the Western troops from West Berlin. The Secretary then noted that there was an important factor which may make a difference. He said he did not know what situation would prevail in East Germany after liberation, although personally he thought it would improve. Briefly, Mr. Gromyko did not know what would happen in West Germany after liberation. The Secretary continued that he did not know what trade contacts between West and East Germany, or contacts with respect to improving the situation in Berlin would bring forth, but thought that if this was used profitably to move forward agreement could be reached on pertinent points. Also if a line is used to reach agreement on other questions which are known to both sides, such as nuclear tests, then this reduction of issues could bring about a situation where the German and Berlin questions, which were now so difficult, would be easier to resolve. The Secretary emphasized that both sides must seek agreement, and if there was no agreement, then they must see how to encourage disagreement without crisis. Otherwise the prospects for both sides would be very serious.

Recalling Mr. Gromyko's remark about taking stock of the situation, the Secretary

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said he did not know exactly what Mr. Grayko meant, but pointed out that we were prepared to sit down and analyze all questions, both central and peripheral, at any time, so as to see where the points of agreement or disagreement lay. As far as U.S. elections were concerned, the Secretary pointed out that our government was in business and there was no need to wait. By direction of the President, the Secretary of State was to stay out of the elections and there was no point in having a crisis by appointment in November. We were prepared to analyze the situation at any time with Mr. Grayko or through whatever other channel might be preferable.

Mr. Grayko referred to the Secretary's remark to the effect that the Soviet Union believed unflexibility should be up to Ribbentrop and not the German people as such. He said that this was an overqualification of the question, and in fact a distortion of the Soviet position. When the Soviet Union said these qualifications should be subject to agreement between the two German governments, it did not judge the government and the people of the GDR. Any attempt to make such qualifications was wrong and any intimation that there was a difference between the government and the people of the GDR inappropriate. When the USSR referred to the GDR, it did so having in mind the GDR as a state; the government of which represented the views of the population. Mr. Grayko observed that he might be unable to persuade the Secretary on this point, although perhaps he underestimated his ability and could do so, but nevertheless he wished to emphasize the Soviet position on this point. Any attempt to cast aspersions on Ribbentrop or the government of the GDR was without foundation. He went on to say that in attempting to convince the Soviet government that the situation in West Germany was not so bad, that West Germany had undergone leadership, and that therefore the Soviet Union should not be concerned, the U.S. appeared to misunderstand the Soviet concern with respect to drawing the West German World War II. Indeed, the Soviet Union had a different opinion of the West German leadership and it disagreed that that leadership was moderate. The West German government had made rehabilitation the leading banner of its policy; in fact rehabilitation values in Germany after World War I had before Hitler, had not been as strong as they were today and any comparison between the two situations would not be in favor of the Post German leadership of today or its allies. Revisionist calls were today not from Post Germany or Ribbentrop, but rather from Adenauer, Heilmann, Schreiber, Strauss, and other West German figures. How could the Soviet Union, having gone through World War II, take all this. After all, Hitler had unleashed the war on the basis of revisionism and calling for a revision of frontiers. The same kind of demands were now being made by Heam and the Soviet Union must draw appropriate conclusions from the standpoint of its position and policy and, if one wished to go further, from the standpoint of its security. That was precisely what the Soviet Union was doing. On the eve of World War II, Germany wanted to correct its borders. Its borders had now been corrected, the differences being that they were now fair and equitable; thought not to Germany's liking. Only a madman would talk of revising frontiers today, or could think that a revision of the frontiers could be achieved by calls for revisions. These are mere empty words and would only break their necks.

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Mr. Gromyko then referred to the points of view expressed by the two sides on the question of the GDR sovereignty in the course of their exchanges of views in New York, Moscow, Geneva and Washington. He said that in the course of those exchanges a broad range of questions had been discussed. On some questions positions had come closer together and prospect for agreement on them had become discernible. When all these questions were discussed, the Soviet Union stated that one of the main questions relating to a German peace settlement was that of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR--respect not on paper but in deeds, and including respect for that sovereignty in connection with access to West Berlin. The Soviet Union had given the United States certain papers on these points, covering both the general principles of a German peace settlement and the questions of access and transit. The Soviet Union had tried to make its position clear on all the major points discussed between the two sides. It had told the United States that it could never agree to an arrangement which would be prejudicial to the sovereignty and interests of the GDR. It had also stated that the sovereignty of the GDR could not be the subject of any deal. The Soviet Union had also pointed out that if agreement ~~was~~ reached on the main question, the GDR would assume with respect to access and transit certain responsibilities; it would place its signature on the document and would pledge to carry out the arrangements. The GDR would be bound by its obligation. The only reservation placed by the Soviet Union, and Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to confirm that reservation, was that the GDR must be treated as any other sovereign state. The Secretary had said he did not deny the existence of the GDR. The question was how to translate that recognition into practice. The USSR did not have in mind a philosophical recognition, a recognition from the standpoint of a materialistic outlook on the world, i.e., that there was such a thing as the GDR and that a government and people existed in that territory. Recognition must be in the political sense and not in terms of abstract philosophy.

As to the question of taking stock of the situation, Mr. Gromyko said that the USSR did not mean this to be a bookkeeping operation; rather it meant that this should be a political analysis of the positions of the two sides, to see where they stood and to draw appropriate conclusions therefrom. The Soviet Government, and Mr. Khrushchev personally, had stated that the main problem now, which would influence the settlement of the entire set of questions, was the presence of the forces of the three Western powers in West Berlin. The Soviet Union saw that the United States and its allies wanted to keep West Berlin in their fist as a military base, to keep their forces in West Berlin, and to maintain the occupation regime in that city; in other words the West wanted to preserve the existing situation. The Soviet Union could not agree with this and this could not be regarded as

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a platform for agreement. The Soviet Union had made a number of important concessions on several points, including that of troops in West Berlin, but the U.S. somehow seemed not to notice those concessions. The Soviet Union had stated that for a certain period of time troops, including some Warsaw and NATO troops, could remain in West Berlin. One variant of that proposal included even troops of the three Western powers. Again for some reason or other the U.S. seemed not to notice this concession.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Secretary's remark about the Soviet Union's retreating while the U.S. had made concessions was not in accord with fact. On the contrary, as he, Mr. Gromyko, had already stated, on some questions the two sides had come closer together and they had not parted thereafter. The Soviet Union had not retreated from the point which had been reached in the course of the U.S.-USSR exchanges. However, the Soviet Union believed that the chief obstacle in the way toward agreement was now the question of West Berlin, i.e., the question of the stationing of Western forces in West Berlin and of that city's being a NATO military base. Mr. Gromyko then proceeded to analyze the situation and the essential elements required for its solution as follows: (1) The question of German frontiers is obviously one of the most important questions relating to a German peace settlement; it would be impossible to reach any agreement on a German peace settlement without an agreed solution of this problem. (2) A non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries is an essential element of any agreement; after all, how could one agree on a status for West Berlin without at the same time saying that the two sides would stop sharpening their knives against each other. (3) Non-armament of the FRG and the GDR with nuclear weapons is also an essential component of any agreement, both from the standpoint of the general picture of the situation and from the standpoint of security. Mr. Gromyko recalled the exchanges the Secretary and he had had on this subject and noted that they were of some interest to the Soviet Union. (4) Cessation of West Berlin's being a center of subversive activities against the GDR was also a necessary condition for agreement; without agreement on this question no satisfactory agreement could be reached on the entire set of questions. (5) Complete respect for the sovereignty of the GDR is absolutely essential because any arrangement with respect to access is unthinkable without agreement on this question. Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to reiterate that the Soviet Union would use its entire prestige and political weight to ensure with the West or with the UN free and uninterrupted access to West Berlin by land, water and air. The only thing that was necessary was respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. Mr. Gromyko then said that there were other, minor questions which should also be resolved, such as non-introduction of nuclear weapons in West Berlin, questions relating to transit and customs arrangements, etc. He stressed that all these questions today ran into the main stumbling block, which was the question of the presence of Western forces in West Berlin and the occupation status of that city, because of the Western view that Western forces should stay in West Berlin indefinitely and that the occupation regime should continue indefinitely. In other words, the West wished to perpetuate:

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the maintenance of Western forces and the occupation regime in West Berlin, something to which the Soviet Union cannot agree. The Soviet Union believed that this was the central question. The Soviet Union believed that the major issue was that of the withdrawal of Western troops from West Berlin and of ending the occupation status of that city. The Soviet Union was in favor of complete freedom for the West Berlin population. The Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev personally had stated that, if the West Berlin population chose to live under the present social setup, it should be free to do so. If the United States was also in favor of freedom for the West Berlin population, there was no reason why it could not agree to this arrangement. The only reason why the West disagreed with such an arrangement was that it was apparently afraid to give freedom to the West Berlin population. Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to conclude by saying that everything the Soviet Union had been proposing had been put forward in good faith and with the sincere desire to find agreement. The Soviet Government believed, and Mr. Khrushchev had said this to the President at Vienna, that if agreement was found it would be a milestone not only in European history but also in the history of U.S.-USSR relations. If one weighed the narrow interests the Secretary kept mentioning, such as the assertion that the West could not withdraw from West Berlin, against the interests of normalizing the situation along the lines suggested by the USSR, there was no doubt that the scale would tip in favor of the latter. Mr. Gromyko said that, availing himself of this opportunity, he had decided to expound to the Secretary, on behalf of the Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev, the Soviet position once again. He wished to express the hope that that position would meet with understanding on the part of the United States Government and that both sides would be able to move forward on that basis. He said that there was no need to note that the Soviet Union would deeply regret it if it should find itself in a situation where it would have to act without the United States and its allies.

Mr. Gromyko then recalled the Secretary's remark that there was no need to wait for the November elections and said that he would take note of that statement. While he did not believe that the situation in this respect was as simple as that, he did understand what the Secretary had in mind. On the part of the Soviet Union there had never been any lack of readiness to exchange views on the questions the two sides were facing, if the situation really warranted such an exchange.

Mr. Gromyko then referred to the fact that Lord Home, in his conversation with Mr. Gromyko, had mentioned the possibility of creating an international air access authority. He said that, while Lord Home had spoken only in general terms, he had intimated that such an authority would of course include the GDR. Also, Lord Home appeared to mean that such an authority would deal with all air access, without the present division into civil and non-civil air traffic. Lord Home had explained that he was bringing up this possibility because the USSR was so concerned about the sovereignty of the GDR. Mr. Gromyko then said that he had replied to Lord Home by asking him how one could speak of respect for the sovereignty of GDR and at the same time propose an organ which would in effect constitute a state in state, or even a superstate, in spite of the fact

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that it would have somewhat narrow functions related only to access. Mr. Gromyko said he was wanting this to the Secretary because of the fact that the Soviet Union had proposed the creation of an arbitration organ which would act if difficulties arose in connection with transit or communications. Mr. Gromyko said that he had recalled this proposal to Lord Howe, and suggested that perhaps the U. K. and the U. S. Governments, as well as other states concerned, could consider this proposal again, because the Soviet Union believed that it was not a bad proposal and that it could provide avenues to a solution of the problem.

The Secretary responded that Mr. Gromyko had failed to persuade him and said that he suspected he would not be able to persuade Mr. Gromyko either. Nevertheless, he wished to make a few comments on some fundamental points. Referring to the constant use on the Soviet side of the term "renachists," the Secretary said that those people in Germany were not seeking revenge against their World War II enemies, i. e., against the U. S., the USSR, the U. K. or France. Those were Germans who wanted to be together and their reactions were the same as of any other peoples who had found themselves in the same situation over the past hundred years. The people whom the USSR called renachists were simply people who wanted all of their fellow Germans to live in the same society, and therefore the term renachist in the sense it was used by the USSR meant most Germans, including East Germans. The Secretary reiterated that those people were not seeking revenge against their former enemies but simply expressed the normal desire of any people to live together. That desire would surely be felt by the people of any other country, including both of our countries, if they were to experience division.

The Secretary then said that he could not take seriously Mr. Gromyko's remarks that West Berlin was a NATO military base. He pointed out that the West had only a handful of troops in West Berlin, that those troops were encircled by Soviet troops, that they had no nuclear weapons, and that they were in West Berlin for the political purpose of giving physical expression to Western presence in and responsibility for that city and its population. There was no military significance to those troops. We were not such poor strategists or tacticians as to think otherwise, and surely Soviet military people would agree with this appraisal of the situation. The Secretary then noted that this phrase of West Berlin being a NATO military base had been used from time to time in the past, but its constant use over the past six months was an illustration of the point he had made when he said that the more we moved forward the more insistent and harsh the Soviet Union became with respect to the withdrawal of Western forces. Had the Soviet Union used this phrase a year ago, our exchanges would have concentrated on that point at that time, because it was a central issue to us.

Mr. Gromyko interjected that Vietnam was more than a year ago.

The Secretary agreed but observed that there had been no such maintenance on this point at that time. The Secretary continued by referring to Soviet statements on the effect that the creation of Western forces in West Berlin was an end in itself, and stressed that in our view there was an even more important question, and this was the situation of France. Therefore we must deal with all other problems (see next page).

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in relation to this broad underlying question which was of interest to us all. The Secretary then said that he had not referred to the various Soviet combinations of troops for the simple reason that we did not see how any of the variants could ensure freedom for West Berlin. All those combinations were variations on the same theme. All of them were aimed at undermining the presence of the Western powers and their forces in West Berlin, at undermining the spirit of the West Berliners, and at applying psychological pressure on West Berlin so that it became in time different from what it was now. In fact, from what the Soviet Union was saying it seemed that the very existence of West Berlin constituted a difficulty for it.

The Secretary then said that we must remind ourselves from time to time that all these discussions about West Berlin did not mean recognition on the part of the West that West Berlin was the only subject for discussion. The Soviet Union refused to talk about such matters as East Berlin, unification, propaganda emanating from East Germany, and all those things that came from East Germany and which the Soviet Union said they came from West Berlin. Thus there was very little reciprocity on the part of the Soviet Union.

The Secretary stated that Lord Home had mentioned briefly to him his idea about an access authority. The Secretary said that this was an application of the idea we had discussed some time ago. As to the Soviet suggestion for an arbitration group, it had not led to a detailed discussion because it had become evident very quickly that the question was to what access would lead. If an understanding were reached with respect to that question, then other, technical questions might be easier to resolve. The Secretary went on to say that we did not see how the Soviet Union could expect us to rely on fresh agreements as contrasted to the presence of our troops in West Berlin at the very time it wanted to break the existing agreements, because that was what Soviet proposals amounted to. It was hard for us to see the value of a non-aggression arrangement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries at a very time when the Soviet Union was applying aggressive pressure with respect to West Berlin. The Soviet Union was asking for confidence at the same time it was destroying confidence in the existing arrangements. The Soviet side had been talking about being interested in the solution of the problem, but it did not take into account our vital interests as we were prepared to take account of Soviet vital interests.

The Secretary then said that he would report this conversation to the President and that we would study its contents very carefully to see whether anything new had opened up. At the same time he stressed that we could not leave West Berlin, and the matter was as simple as that. In fact, from the Soviet standpoint there was no need for us to do so. Thus on that point we were back to Vienna.

Mr. Gromyko asserted he was surprised to hear the Secretary's definition of revanchism and his description of the attitude of the West German leadership with regard to foreign policy. He wondered whether the Secretary really believed that all Germans were revanchists in the sense that they wanted unification. He thought that most of all the Secretary was taking too much

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upon himself in implying that all Germans wanted reunification on the basis suggested by Adenauer. After all, the GDR had its own point of view in this matter. In any event unification was something for the two German states to decide, and each of them had its own viewpoint. Mr. Gromyko then proceeded to define revanchism as including demands for a revision of frontiers, demands for regaining lost positions, demands for war, and demands for satisfying West German claims by use of arms. All this meant revanchism. Perhaps the U.S. was not following very closely statements by Adenauer, Strauss, et cetera, but the Soviet Union was duty bound to follow very closely those demands, particularly because they were directed against the borders of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other states. Thus these two questions, i.e., unification and revanchism, must not be confused.

As to West Berlin's being a NATO military base, Mr. Gromyko asserted that this was not a new demand on the part of the Soviet Union. He admitted, however, that this point was perhaps now being emphasized somewhat more strongly than earlier, and that perhaps a somewhat greater stress was now being placed on the question of the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin, but said that this was only a difference in appearance rather than in principle. In earlier conversations, a broad range of questions had been discussed, including the questions of Western forces in West Berlin and the status of that city. That was consistent with the logic of discussion. However, as the positions of the two sides drew closer on certain points, the situation became comparable to both sides moving toward the top of a pyramid. The two sides had started at the bottom of the pyramid and had gradually climbed until they reached its pinnacle, i.e., the question of the withdrawal of Western forces from West Berlin. Mr. Gromyko observed that the questions had been reduced not from the standpoint of their solution but rather from the standpoint of the possibility of their being resolved. Thus, Mr. Gromyko continued, the question was not of the Soviet Union's having retreated from the point reached in previous discussions, but rather it was that of whether or not the two sides could move further forward. Mr. Gromyko observed that unfortunately he had to say that today the situation in this respect was unsatisfactory.

Turning to the question of an air access authority, Mr. Gromyko said that he had told Lord Home that this question could be discussed. The West had given the Soviet Union its ideas, and the USSR had presented its own ideas. While a parallel discussion of this question was useful, Mr. Gromyko agreed that it ran into the main problem, namely, access to what? Would access lead to a demilitarized and stable West Berlin a West Berlin which would cease to be a center of subversion and a NATO base and which would have no occupation regime or Western forces? Or would access lead to a city which would continue to be a NATO military base, would continue to have occupation status and occupation forces?

Mr. Gromyko said that he wished to conclude by drawing the Secretary's attention to the Soviet proposal for an international arbitration organ.

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said perhaps the U.S. could take another look at it. Perhaps what Lord Howe and the Secretary had mentioned could be taken into account in the Soviet proposal. After all, Lord Howe's suggestion had not been developed. The Soviet view was that access must be ensured on the basis of the generally accepted international practices, and the West had said a similar thing. If this was so, why couldn't the two sides agree on a body which would be involved whenever difficulties or complications arose. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the Secretary might wish to report to the President about this and that perhaps the two sides could return to the discussion of this proposal at a later date.

Mr. Gromyko concluded by regretting that the Secretary's remarks contained nothing new on the question of Western forces in West Berlin and that therefore the positions of the two sides on this point remained different in principle.

The Secretary stated that we would review very carefully the question of access. He did not believe that access as such was impossible to resolve, but the main question would still remain. As to Mr. Gromyko's analogy to a pyramid, the U.S. had tried with respect to questions at the bottom of the pyramid to take account of Soviet legitimate concerns and the vital interests of security and peace. However, we had not seen any reciprocity on the part of the Soviet Union with regard to taking into account our vital interests and this was the central problem now. The Secretary concluded by remarking that by now the problems had been discussed so fully that we may have reached the point where we could refer by number to the arguments in support of our respective positions.

Mr. Gromyko said that he could not agree with the Secretary's analysis, but as far as the pyramid was concerned, it appeared to be easier not only to climb but even to build one of those ancient pyramids than to reach agreement on the issues discussed.

Drafted by: A. Akalovsky:lr  
10/7/62

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Approved in S, 10/11/62

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October 8, 1962

10/8/62  
= 10/7/62

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION  
TO THE  
SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
New York, September, 1962

DM/R

FILE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PART IV

Date: October 7, 1962

Time: 5:10 p.m.

Place: Waldorf Towers,  
Suite 28-A

Participants:

United States  
The Secretary  
Mr. Richard Davis

France  
Maurice Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister  
Amb. Herve Alphand, Ambassador to the  
United States  
Mr. Jacques Roux, Deputy Director,  
Office of Political Affairs

Subject: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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The Secretary, following his remark that the U.S. was not going to fight World War III over the Oder-Neisse line, said that though he was not certain of the French position, we believe that the U.S., the U.K., and other Western powers have a common interest with the USSR in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to the rest of the world. Couve de Murville replied that in the first instance this means Germany and China. It was perhaps possible that Egypt and Israel could build one or two weapons in the future and create trouble. But in the case of Germany or China acquiring nuclear weapons, this could be a cause for a world war.

The Secretary pointed to the possibility of nations acquiring nuclear weapons in the future and where irresponsible leaders might come into power. What would have happened if Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee had had nuclear weapons? Couve de Murville said it would be much better if the UAR and Israel do not acquire these weapons, but there would not be any world war over an Israel-Egypt conflict.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Part 1 of 4 Parts

DATE: October 9, 1962  
4 p.m.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: US  
The President  
The Secretary of State  
Ambassador Bohlen  
Mr. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

France  
Couve de Murville,  
Foreign Minister  
Ambassador Alphand

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The President asked the Foreign Minister for his judgment on the situation. He replied that the Soviets seemed not to have made up their minds as to what they would do. The Wall had settled the physical problem of the flow of refugees from East to West. What was now left was largely a question of prestige. He thought the Russians would have to do something one day. The question was how much risk they were prepared to take. He thought they were prepared to take some risk but not a major risk leading to war. He thought Khrushchev would want to pull off something like a treaty with the GDR to show that he had brought about a change in the situation from what had existed previously. He thought it not unlikely that Khrushchev would come to New York under cover of the General Assembly in order to talk over Berlin with the President.

The Secretary asked if Berlin had been discussed between de Gaulle and Adenauer during the recent German visit. The Foreign Minister said the subject had been mentioned but not really discussed.

The President said he was worried about the slowness of measures foreseen under our contingency planning and the time needed for a military probe to be carried out. According to present plans, four days would be required to put our troops onto the Autobahn. He felt we should have improved planning not only in the area of possible

NSF/71a/France - General de Murville follow

contingencies, but with regard to the centralization of responsibilities in Berlin. He thought that the idea of a 60-day pause for mobilization was unacceptable.

The Foreign Minister agreed that the contingency planning was not very realistic. He felt it had been in a direction contrary to what should have been done. He said our present position was to probe the Soviets although we knew what the result was going to be. Then we would get stuck and we would then merely think the situation over. He felt that if something were to be done at all, it should be immediate. He said that in 1948 we had been able to carry out an airlift while accepting ground blockade because the Soviets did not then have nuclear weapons. This time if ground access were cut, we would run the risk of being dragged into war. He thought that our present posture was ineffectual, and potentially more dangerous than something more incisive would be.

The Secretary said our planning had been conducted on a basis of Allied forces in being. If the West had had more forces under NATO, we would have had more choice.

The Foreign Minister referred to the reoccupation of the Rhineland by Hitler in 1936, when France didn't move because of the restraining influence of her military advisers. He felt that military advice does not sufficiently take into account essential political factors. He felt we should not wait and think things over while the Russians were mobilizing. It may well be that the Russians feel we are putting on a show to try to impress them, but that they would not be persuaded by this that we mean what we say. The President said we ought to have forces ready to go within one or two hours of the Autobahn.

Commenting on the small number of French troops on German soil, the Foreign Minister explained that he thought it was a little risky to have such a large concentration of troops in Germany itself and that there might be some advantage for them to be deployed in greater depth. At this point the Foreign Minister sought to buttress this view by referring vaguely to views which he claimed General Norstad had expressed to him in the same

sense

sense. However when the President commented that he thought he was familiar with General Norstad's views and that he had always been in favor of forward strategy, the Foreign Minister did not comment further.

The President read from and discussed a report by General Taylor on the time required to move troops in the event of crisis. The Foreign Minister said it was evident that the time envisaged was much too long and that we should react within 24 hours. He said if ground access was cut, the West needed to move immediately on (1) economic and other measures in the field of blockade and (2) sending a small unit onto the Autobahn within 24 hours. He said it should not be difficult to keep a few hundred men on an alert basis. They need not be massed on the Brunswick airfield but should be in a position to be rapidly transported to the checkpoint. The President commented that point 2 above was more important and urgent than point 1.

Ambassador Bohlen commented that one trouble was that governments were unwilling to commit themselves and to delegate authority for action ahead of events, except for matters relating to air access which was a simpler problem. Thus governments had to react and take decisions after the events with which they were confronted.

The President said that Khrushchev was probably counting on a slow reaction from the West. The President thought he might write a letter to de Gaulle setting down some of the things that were bothering him with regard to our present contingency planning, and see whether perhaps General de Gaulle would favor the idea of trying to obtain certain advance commitments by governments. The Foreign Minister said he thought this would be useful.

The Foreign Minister reverted to the subject of the two French divisions under NATO and said he could see that the President was interested and even worried about this matter. He exposed at some length the political reasons why it was desirable to keep French troops on French soil. Twenty years

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had passed since the French Army had been stationed in France. It had lost contact with the people of the country and this had caused serious trouble. It was necessary to readjust the relationship between French forces and the French population. If they were on German soil, they would still be in a foreign country and out of touch with domestic sentiment (the Foreign Minister stressed the sensitivity of what he had just said, adding that this was something which General de Gaulle would never tell the President himself).

The Secretary wondered what interpretation Khrushchev would place on the absence of French troops from German soil.

The Foreign Minister said he didn't wish the President to believe that France was relying on the US nuclear capability as an excuse for not doing her conventional share. He said the problem was to try to prevent misunderstanding on the part of Khrushchev.

The President said that Khrushchev had not moved to seize Berlin militarily because he knew what this would entail but we had a real problem with regard to ground access. He asked for the Foreign Minister's view as to what we should do on the ground after we found our access blocked.

The Foreign Minister said things would move fast. Either we would begin to talk right away or there would be war.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister whether he would favor talking at this point. The Foreign Minister's reply was unclear and generally evasive.

Ambassador Bohlen suggested that consideration be given to a Four Power communication to the Soviet Union, which would include the Germans.

The President referred to the points which Gromyko had made to the Secretary in their conversation in relation to the withdrawal of troops. He said Khrushchev would have to drop his insistence on this point. This was not a matter which could be negotiated.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said we were taking an urgent and searching look at the whole access question. He thought there was a possibility of the Soviets dropping the troops issue. He thought study should be given to the possibility of some variant of the Soviet arbitral commission.

The Foreign Minister said that Khrushchev would not wage war over Berlin. What he was doing was asking us to quit. The Foreign Minister thought that there might be the danger of a new uprising in East Germany, as had happened in 1953.

The Secretary said Brandt felt we had underestimated the potential role of the East Germans.

The Foreign Minister said that a crisis would not last long, but would come to a head rapidly.

The President said that as a result of the Soviet actions on Cuba, there was much less prospect of reaching agreement on Berlin. Thus Khrushchev might try to force something. He asked the Foreign Minister what the French would do if the Soviets were to cut access on the ground. The Foreign Minister replied that if this were to happen both in the air and on the ground, we should begin by taking appropriate action in the air. He said that if they were to cut both military and civilian traffic on the ground, we should use force and go ahead with the probe. If only military traffic on the ground were cut off, we should consider whether it was necessary to use force ourselves by undertaking a probe, because air access could be used for supplying the military garrisons.

The President pressed the Foreign Minister again and asked if his thought was that if military traffic on the ground were cut off, we should not have recourse to a military probe. The Foreign Minister's answer was evasive.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*10/9/62*

October 9, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Couve de Murville

I attach a State Department paper which urges that you concentrate on general problems of Europe and Africa. What the paper says is sensible, but it hardly seems to hit the real issues.

The heart of our problem with the French is that de Gaulle is playing a lone hand. This shows up all over the world, but it is most dangerous in Europe, and especially with respect to a Berlin crisis. If you choose to press Couve, the following are among the legitimate comments you might make:

1. The contingency planning for a crisis is most inadequate, whether we think of day-to-day difficulties in West Berlin or a major test of access rights. This is partly because political agreement has been withheld at critical points and partly because we have neither unified command nor effective political reaction time, except in the very limited case of air access planning.
2. The French Government has been particularly slow in its response to planning problems and sticky in its unwillingness to delegate authority to the man on-the-spot. Some examples follow:
  - a. Tripartite contingency planning within the city of Berlin has come to a virtual halt because of the inability of the French Commandant to participate in these exercises. Either he is under instructions not to participate, or he has no instructions permitting participation. Either way, the situation is most unsatisfactory.
  - b. The French Government still stands apart from even the limited advance authority which London and Washington have given General Norstad in the matter of air access. The French are not signed on, for example, to an authority for substituting military for civilian crews, or to an authority for fighter escort. General Norstad's experience last spring makes it clear that the commander on the spot must be trusted with this kind of discretion.

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E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

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(page 1 of 3 pages)

*W&K*

Oct. 9, 1962

c. The discussion of tactics in reply to a Khrushchev appearance in the UN has been obstructed by French reluctance to discuss anything relating to the UN. Whether we like it or not, the UN is a possible battleground, and it is ridiculous not to get into a strong preparatory posture on this point. The French member of the Ambassadorial group, as late as last week, was operating without instructions on this topic.

d. The French military build-up is surprisingly feeble and can hardly carry conviction of French seriousness to Khrushchev. Even when the French had four divisions committed to NATO, their contribution was lower, proportionately, than might have been expected of so central a power. Now it is clear that the French only plan to have two divisions in Germany, holding the rest in France as "National M-Day Forces." If France proposes to play a full role in the defense of Berlin and the defense of Germany, these targets are absurdly low. If France means to leave these matters to the United States, then at a moment of crisis, the United States may have to act alone.

e. If you want to turn the screw, you might remind him that at one point in the quite small exercise on banning armed personnel carriers, the French were entirely unable to respond because both President de Gaulle and Couve were on tour in Germany and no one else had authority to speak.

3. You might want to say that your own preference would be for intense cooperation and close coordination, leading to effective, rapid and convincing response to any Soviet challenges. What astonishes you in the French posture is that when you talked with de Gaulle in Paris, he appeared to have exactly the same view. Now, as a serious crisis approaches, you are considering one last great effort to improve the performance of the alliance, and you may be communicating directly with General de Gaulle on this point. But whether or not such agreement can be obtained, the United States, for its part, means to take all the necessary actions for the defense of Berlin.

P.S. I have not mentioned, but you may want to, the French coolness toward the ICJ decision on UN costs. Couve is a cynic about the UN, but it might not hurt to point out that in cold terms of national interest a better French position on this issue would be most productive -- especially in Franco-American relations.

Oct. 9, 1962

P. P. S. You might wish to remind Couve of the problem of Laos and our interest in France's doing its share to support the costs of the aid program.

McGeorge Bundy

Attachments:

- Tab A - Memo from the State Department
- Tab B - Memo of conversation between Rusk and Couve
- Tab C - Intelligence report on French UN position
- Tab D - A cable showing a typical French response on contingency planning

# AIRGRAM

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Following detailed report SACEUR/NAC briefing on MRBM requirement, October 17. Because extreme sensitivity information contained in briefing, this report being sent by airgram for restricted distribution. For same reason, Norstad asked attendance briefing be limited to PermRep and one per Delegation.

SACEUR reported that since his briefing some months ago he had somewhat changed his approach. Now before turning over command he did not propose to reargue the case for MRBM's but merely to restate the case as clearly as possible. He hoped to keep the temperature as low as possible. He was not opposing anything.

In thinking about MRBM's one should also consider other forces such as VSTOL and possibilities for hardening and alert measures. Problem should be kept under continuing review.

- SMITH-BUNDY
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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: Gerard C. Smith

Contents and Classification Approved by: Ambassador Finletter

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MANDATORY REVIEW

CASE # NLK-94-37

DOCUMENT # 9

NIP / ML 12 Geny Sticker Mayor

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The Priority target list contains 603 targets falling into four categories -- (there are 1300 or more additional targets in over-all list.)

OR ABOUT 450 MISSILES

This threat to ACE would continue and would assume more dangerous form.

In addition there were contingency type targets numbering more than 1300 including airfields, bridges, communications centers, troop concentrations and ports.

+ ACE does not expect to strike all targets but needs the means to have adequate coverage.

used at briefing available to participants later at SHAPE. Arrangements being made for their further study by this Mission.

Re means of dealing with threat list external forces absolutely essential to deterrent and defense task but SACUR's job is to neutralize threat as rapidly as possible. If external forces would be available in time they would be useful.

While it is technically possible that this coverage could meet ACE defense requirements these weapons are tied into strategic strike plans. Would they be launched before general war? If not, what does this mean for Alliance flexibility? Would they meet the requirements of time? SACUR does not debate their great strategic usefulness, but he has doubts as to their effect on the immediate and direct defense of NATO Europe.

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45 Jupiters for 45 Sov

ARM sites

SACEUR then covered probability estimates noting they are not of SHAPE origin. Conclusion of estimates was that aircraft delivery had thirty percent probability of destroying target with one sortie. Seven sorties needed to achieve 90 percent probability. Comparable estimate for MRBM's 81 percent probability of destruction of target in one sortie and two sorties required to get 96 percent probability.

Regarding restraints policy for which SACEUR ascribed SHAPE origin with acceptance now by some national forces, he pointed out relationship of accuracy and range

SACEUR not arguing for sea or land basing. He recalled views expressed at recent SHAPEX meeting. He wondered whether we yet know what we are talking about but is convinced that ultimately the facts will govern. He inclines toward a mix. Issue so important that the Alliance should not settle for less than adequate solution. As NAC education proceeds it should develop the political parameters and then have further military study of the problem. Sure solution can be found.

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POLTO A- 438

- 4 -

Concluding SACEUR read his June 1960 statement to the effect that regardless of decision or no decision there continues to exist a requirement. Something must be done. This is not a matter of choice. Either the Alliance will have this additional system or it will have no defense and no defense means no NATO in a relatively few years. SACEUR is flexible as to questions of production.

If it is not met NATO is more likely to be challenged and if challenged SACEUR has grave concern regarding NATO's ability to meet the challenge.

MRBM's needed to prevent regrouping of Soviet forces after a strategic exchange. SACEUR said there could be no such thing as "independent" action by MRBM's but they might be used in circumstances short of general war.

Ignatieff (Canada) questioned the need for quick reaction system since general alert procedures would in any event require time.

sea basing would call for more weapons and if a land-sea mix would not lead to confusion. SACEUR answered that he had tried to avoid

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POLTO A- 438

- 5 -

firming up opinion re configuration. The Alliance should first get production and political possibilities clearly in mind and then choose the mix. SACEUR thinks you can control a mix but if not you should eliminate the uncontrollable segment. This question of mix needs working upon by experts.

PermRep asked if new missiles were involved or merely redéploiment existing weapons. SACEUR replied new production, not just realignment.

PermRep asked if land deployment was not unnecessarily dangerous. In trying to destroy them Soviets would destroy all of Western Europe. SACEUR repeated he was not arguing for exclusive system. If threat to Soviets from MRBM's required their destruction he felt Soviets would threaten destruction Western Europe cities if MRBM's used. SACEUR felt mobile missile land deployment might perhaps have greater survivability than sea-based, making comparison "needle in hay stack versus needle on billiard table".

In answer to PermRep's question SACEUR said only general assumption could be made about aircraft vulnerability. We are passing away from era when aircraft can hit targets of great significance but aircraft continues be important since all targets will not be well defended and aircraft of increasing importance in combined reconnaissance and strike role against targets of less than first importance.

PermRep observed that he was struck with precision of SACEUR's statement and with the conclusion that ~~great~~ great advantage lies in having strike forces available in areas near to the possible theatre of operations.

FINLETTER

UNCLASSIFIED



10/19/62-007

17367

18

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

White House approved, Memorandum of Conversation  
10/13/62

DATE: October 18, 1962  
5:00 p.m.  
White House  
Part I

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin; Possible Visit by Khrushchev

- |                       |                              |                             |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>PARTICIPANTS:</b>  | <u>US</u>                    | <u>USSR</u>                 |
|                       | The President                | Foreign Minister Gromyko    |
|                       | The Secretary                | Mr. Semenov                 |
|                       | Ambassador Thompson          | Ambassador Dobrynin         |
|                       | Mr. Hillenbrand              | Mr. Sukhodray               |
|                       | Mr. Akalovsky                |                             |
| <b>COPIES TO:</b>     |                              |                             |
| S/S                   | P - Mr. Manning              | Ambassy London - Amb. Bruce |
| G - Mr. Johnson       | INR/D - Mr. Hilsman          | USUN - Amb. Stevenson       |
| S/AL - Amb. Thompson  | IO - Mr. Cleveland           | White House - Mr. Bundy     |
| EUR - Mr. Tyler       | Ambassy Moscow - Amb. Kohler | DOD/OSD - Secretary Malin   |
| BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand | Ambassy Paris - Amb. Bohlen  | DOD/ISA - Mr. Nitze         |
| S/P - Mr. Rostow      | Ambassy Bonn - Amb. Dowling  |                             |

Mr. Gromyko opened the conversation by stating that the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, had asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President, to Mrs. Kennedy, and to all of the President's family. Mrs. Khrushchev joined in these greetings.

The President thanked for these wishes.

Mr. Gromyko continued that he wished to thank the President for having found time to meet with him and exchange views on certain matters. He said he wished to state the policy and the views of the Soviet Government on a number of important questions. Subject to the President's approval, he thought he might take those questions one by one and listen to the comments the President might wish to make on each of them individually.

The President said this was all right with him.

Mr. Gromyko then stated that Mr. Khrushchev had instructed him to take the opportunity of his trip to the United States and to convey to the President that Mr. Khrushchev continued to hope that the President's efforts, like his own, would be directed toward the elimination of differences and of points at issue between our two countries. Such elimination had been and continued to be the invariable desire of the Soviet Government and of the Soviet people. The Soviet Government regretted that no agreement had been reached in the course of the exchanges of views between the US and the USSR on the question

of a

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E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4  
NLK-91-130  
By: MMS NARA Date 2/27/94

SECRET EYES ONLY

GPO 808881

NSF/187/Gromyko talks (President)

of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. Unfortunately, the latest meetings with the Secretary had not changed the situation. No progress had been made in spite of the fact that, as had been also stressed by US representatives, West Berlin and its status did not present a major problem and was not a vital issue for the United States or its Allies. Indeed, the West Berlin situation was a legacy of the last war. The Soviet Government had stated on a number of occasions that the Soviet Union had no direct vital interests in West Berlin and did not need West Berlin. The Soviet Government deemed it necessary to conclude a German peace treaty and resolve the West Berlin problem on the basis of such a treaty by declaring West Berlin a free and demilitarized city; such a solution would meet the interests of world peace. Of course, the Soviet Union could never agree to West Berlin's remaining a NATO base, to a continuation of the presence of occupation troops of the three Western powers and to the maintenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin; nor could it agree to West Berlin's remaining a hotbed of aggressive explosion. The fact was that presence of occupation forces of the three Western powers in West Berlin yielded nothing to the West strategically, and this proved that there was no reason for keeping those forces in West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Government had already indicated that it would do nothing with regard to West Berlin before the US elections unless it was compelled to do otherwise by the activities of the other side. However, the Soviet Government proceeded from the fact that it was necessary to hold an active dialogue in November to bring about concrete results with regard to a German peace treaty and to the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. The Soviet Government would like to hope that at that time an understanding concerning a German peace treaty, including the question of the forces of the three Western powers and of the status of West Berlin, would at last be reached. If there should be no such understanding, the Soviet Government would be compelled, and Mr. Gromyko wished to emphasize the word "compelled", to sign, together with a number of other states, a peace treaty with the GDR without an understanding with the Western Powers. The Soviet Union would also be compelled to take such steps as were integrally linked with a peace settlement, steps of which the United States Government and the President personally had been informed on a number of occasions, including by Mr. Khrushchev personally. The Soviet Government proceeded from the assumption that the United States Government would take such steps as being only inevitable in this connection and would understand that they represented a peaceful effort. As to the threats that could be heard in the United States in connection with the possibility of the USSR's signing a peace treaty with the GDR in the event that no understanding with

the West

the West was reached, i.e., in the event that the Soviet Union acted as the West had acted with respect to Japan, the Soviet Government wished to emphasize once again that such threats could not produce the effect desired by those who made them. Threats had no effect on the USSR whatsoever; instead of indulging in them it would be better to root out the remnants of World War II.

Mr. Gromyko said he was speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government as sincerely as Mr. Khrushchev had spoken in Vienna when he spoke in favor of an agreed solution of the problem of a German peace settlement. Mr. Gromyko recalled that the President had said that he appreciated frankness. The Soviet Government also appreciated frankness, because frank conversations were the shortest way to understanding and clarification of respective positions. As Mr. Khrushchev had said, the NATO military base and the occupation regime in West Berlin represented a rotten tooth which must be pulled out, and no one would be harmed by that. One could not take seriously assertions that it was necessary to maintain a NATO base in West Berlin in order to protect the West Berlin population. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Government was in favor of respecting the freedom of the West Berlin population, but no NATO base was needed for that purpose.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Government had some specific points concerning what had been discussed in the course of the US/USSR exchanges of views. Recently, in conversations with Lord Home and the Secretary, it had been suggested that an international air access authority be established. It had also been stated that such an arrangement would involve respect for the sovereignty of the GDR. The Soviet Union was prepared to take account of this suggestion and proposed the following two alternatives: (a) creation of an international arbitration authority to be concerned with all types of access; the Soviet views on such an authority had been stated in detail to the Secretary in earlier conversations; or (b) creation of such an authority to deal solely with air access. The latter was a new proposal, and it could be discussed in greater detail later tonight with the Secretary. In making this step forward toward the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Government proceeded on the assumption that at the same time a solution to all other problems relating to a German peace settlement and West Berlin would be found.

Mr. Gromyko then recalled the Secretary's remarks during the last meeting to the effect that United States favored the development of contacts between West and East Germans. The Soviet Union, he said, was also in favor of such contacts because they would promote alleviation of the situation in Germany and Europe as a whole. However, it went without saying that the

development

development of such contacts did not mean solution of the main problem. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Union was also prepared to take into account US views regarding unification and it was prepared to include in a German peace settlement and a German peace treaty provision concerning the possibility of German unification. This could be done either in the form of an agreed joint statement of the powers concerned, or such a provision could be included in a peace treaty with the GDR. As to the Soviet position on unification, it was well known to the United States; the Soviet Union believed that reunification was a matter for the two German states to resolve.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to stress that when a solution of the West Berlin problem was found on a basis corresponding to the interests of peace and the interests of the GDR sovereignty, and when other related problems, on which there had been some rapprochement between the US and the USSR, were also resolved, then actually there would remain no problem on which the two countries were in direct confrontation. Under those circumstances disarmament would also be easier to solve, particularly in view of the invigorated international situation which would then prevail, and particularly in Europe. Mr. Gromyko said that those were the views of the Soviet Government concerning a German peace settlement and the question of West Berlin.

The President said he knew that the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko had discussed the Berlin problem for many months; thus the USSR was familiar with our position. Also, he, the President, had discussed this problem with Mr. Gromyko here at the White House in September of last year. The US, the President emphasized, was anxious to work out mutually satisfactory procedures on access. The US had made several proposals on this point, and the USSR had made some too. However, the matter which was of greatest concern to us was that of the withdrawal of Western forces. West Berlin was not a NATO base and the Western forces there had no offensive capabilities. The United States desired that West Berlin not be used as a base for subversion. However we were unable to withdraw our forces and thus endanger the freedom of West Berlin. We were prepared to engage in a dialogue in November, but this of course involved our friends, including the French. However on the question of withdrawing the Western forces from West Berlin we were in disagreement. As to other matters, the President said he thought they should continue to be explored; those matters included access, both air and ground, the role and the juridical status of forces in West Berlin, etc. All of these matters could be discussed. However there could be no discussion of the presence of Western forces, which was a matter of survival; thus we disagreed on that point. If the US were to accept what the Soviet Union had suggested, i.e., if we were to withdraw our forces, the city and access to it would be under complete control of East Germany, and East Germany could also control movement of persons and goods. Under such conditions the city could no longer remain free; our

commitments

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

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commitments would become invalid, and we would have withdrawn from the positions the US and the West had taken for many years. The President said he did not believe that the Soviet proposal would guarantee the security of West Berlin, and its freedom could not be maintained under such conditions.

Mr. Gromyko said he wished to comment on one particular remark by the President. He said that the Soviet Union had tried to dispel the apprehensions and suspicions voiced by the US Government concerning the creation of a free and demilitarized city of West Berlin. The President had said that if the Soviet proposal were to be accepted West Berlin would come under the control of the GDR and that the social order of West Berlin would be threatened by this. Mr. Gromyko asserted that there was no reason for such fears, or doubts, or suspicions, because the USSR was prepared to undertake solemn guarantees, together with the US and the other Western Powers and also with the UN, insuring respect for the status of West Berlin. He professed not to be able to understand why the President believed that the collective weight and prestige of those nations or the weight and prestige of the UN would not constitute sufficient guarantees of what the President called the freedom of West Berlin. As to access, Mr. Gromyko said that there was no problem here. The Soviet Union favored unrestricted access to West Berlin as a free and demilitarized city, it was in favor of unrestricted ties between that city and the outer world, and it was in favor of the development of trade and cultural relations with that city. In the course of the US/USSR exchanges of views, the Soviet Government had tried to convince the United States that it was in favor of the strictest possible guarantees in this respect.

The President said that he appreciated this, but emphasized that if the Soviet Union desired to continue to permit the people of West Berlin to choose their fate, he did not see why withdrawal of Western forces was of any importance. Contrary to Soviet assertions, West Berlin was not a NATO base and our troops there were symbolic. Since we had said that this point was vital to us, we failed to see why it should not be possible to work out access with our troops remaining in West Berlin. The President reiterated that those troops were a symbolic guarantee of the freedom of the city, and that of course was of great significance. If the Soviet Union desired to let the West Berlin population choose its own government, then presence of those troops should not create any problem. Those troops were not endangering the security of the Soviet Union or any other country in East Europe.

Mr. Gromyko said that it was well known, and the President would not deny this, that presence of Western forces in West Berlin was a result of World War II. Both Western and Soviet troops had come to Germany and West Berlin as occupation troops as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

However,

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

White House approved,  
10/23/62

EX-100-109-61

100-27-211

DATE: October 18, 1962  
5:00 p.m.  
White House  
Part II

SUBJECT: Cuba

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

- The President Foreign Minister Gromyko
- The Secretary Mr. Semenov
- Ambassador Thompson Ambassador Dobrynin
- Mr. Hillenbrand Mr. Sukhodrev
- Mr. Akalovsky

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- |                     |                              |                               |
|---------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| S/S                 | ARA-Mr. Martin               | Amembassy Paris for Finletter |
| G-Mr. Johnson       | P - Mr. Manning              | USUN-Amb. Stevenson           |
| S/P-Mr. Rostow      | IO - Mr. Cleveland           | White House-Mr. Bundy         |
| S/AL-Amb. Thompson  | INR/D-Mr. Hillsman           | DOD/OSD - Secretary McNamara  |
| EUR-Mr. Tyler       | Amembassy Moscow-Amb. Kohler | DOD/ISA - Mr. Nitze           |
| RFI-Mr. Hillenbrand | Amembassy Paris-Amb. Bohlen  |                               |

After a discussion on Germany and Berlin, Mr. Gromyko stated he wished to set forth the Soviet position on Cuba and to voice the views of the Soviet Government with regard to US actions relating to Cuba. Continuing to read from his prepared text, he asserted that the Soviet Government stood for peaceful coexistence and was against interference by one state in the internal affairs of another state, and this also applied to relations between big and small states. This, he said, was the basic core, the credo of Soviet foreign policy, and it was not just a statement.

The President was surely fully familiar with the attitude of the Soviet Government, and of Mr. Khrushchev personally, toward recent developments and toward actions by the United States Government in relation to Cuba. For some time there had been an unabated anti-Cuban campaign in the United States, a campaign which was apparently backed by the United States Government. Now the United States Government wished to institute a blockade against trade with Cuba, and there had also been some talk of organized piracy under the aegis of the United States. All this could only lead to great misfortunes for mankind. The United States Government seemed to believe that the Cubans must settle their internal affairs not at their own discretion, but at the discretion of the United States. Yet Cuba belonged to Cubans and not to the United States. If this was so, why then statements were being made in the United States advocating invasion of Cuba? What did the United States want to do with Cuba? What could Cuba do to the United States? If one were to

compare

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E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4  
DS-1254(T)  
NKK-91-130  
By: MMB NARA Date: 2/28/94

SECRET-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

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compare the human and material resources of Cuba and the United States, one would see immediately that the United States was a giant and Cuba only a baby. Cuba could not constitute a threat to any country in Latin America. It was strange to believe that small Cuba could encroach upon any Latin American country. Cuban leaders, including Castro personally, had stated for all the world to know and in the most solemn fashion that Cuba did not intend to impose its system and was in favor of peaceful coexistence. However, those who called for aggression against Cuba said that Cuban statements were insufficient, in spite of the fact that those statements were substantiated by deeds. If one were to approach problems this way, then it would be easy to justify any aggression. All international problems must be resolved by negotiation between the states concerned. After all, the US and USSR were now negotiating and making statements which should be given credence. Was it not sufficient for Cuba to state that it wished negotiations and a solution of existing problems on a mutually acceptable basis? The President was surely familiar with President Dorticos' speech at the General Assembly. What the Cubans wanted was to make their home and country secure. They appealed to reason and conscience and called upon the United States not to resort to encroachments. Thus the question arose of why it was necessary to fan this campaign, to organize hostile actions, and to take actions directed against those countries which were extending their hand of friendship to Cuba? This was a violation of international law, and how could the Soviet Government just sit by and observe this situation idly?

Mr. Gromyko said he knew that the President appreciated frankness. Mr. Khrushchev's conversation with the President at Vienna had been frank and therefore, with the President's permission, he himself wished to be frank, too. The situation today could not be compared to that obtaining in the middle of the 19th century. Modern times were not the same as those when colonies had been divided among colonial powers. Modern times could not be compared to those when it took weeks or months for the voice of the attacked to be heard. Statements had been made that the US was a powerful and great nation; this was true, but what kind of a nation was the USSR? Mr. Khrushchev had been favorably impressed with the President's statement at Vienna regarding the equality of forces of our two nations. Since this was so, i.e., since the USSR was also a great and strong nation, it could not stand by as a mere observer when aggression was planned and when a threat of war was looming. The US Government was surely aware of the Soviet Government's attitude toward the recent call-up of 150,000 Reservists in the United States. The Soviet Government believed that if both sides were for relaxation of international tensions and for solving the outstanding international problems, such demonstrations could be designed only for the purpose of increasing tensions and should therefore be avoided. If worse should come to worse and if war should occur, then surely 150,000 soldiers would be of no significance. As the President was surely aware, today was not 1812, when

Napoleon

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

- 3 -

Napoleon had relied on the number of soldiers, sabres and rifles. Neither could today's situation be compared to 1941, when Hitler had relied on the number of tanks and guns. Today, life itself and military technology had created an entirely different situation, where it was better not to rely on arms. As to Soviet assistance to Cuba, Mr. Gromyko stated that he was instructed to make it clear, as the Soviet Government had already done, that such assistance, pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba and to the development of Cuba, toward the development of its agriculture and land amelioration, and training by Soviet specialists of Cuba nationals in handling defensive armaments were by no means offensive. If it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance. This applied to any other country as well. Laos was a good and convincing illustration of this point. If the Soviet Government had pursued a different policy, the situation in that country today would be quite different. It was quite evident that the Soviet Union and its friends had broader opportunities of influencing the situation in that country than had the United States. However, the USSR had sought an understanding on that question, since it could not go back on the basic principle of its foreign policy, which was designed to alleviate tensions, to eliminate outstanding problems and to resolve them on a peaceful basis.

Such was the position of the Soviet Government with regard to Cuba. The Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev personally appealed to the President and the United States Government not to allow such steps as would be incompatible with peace, with relaxation of tensions, and with United Nations Charter under which both the US and the USSR had solemnly affixed their signatures. The Soviet Government addressed its appeal to the United States on this question because both our countries were major powers and should direct their efforts only to ensuring peace.

The President said he was glad that Mr. Gromyko had referred to Laos because he believed that the Soviet policy on that problem was as Mr. Gromyko had described it. So far the Soviet Union had apparently met its obligations just as the United States had met them. However, a most serious mistake had been made last summer with respect to Cuba. The US had not pressed the Cuban problem and had attempted to push it aside although of course a number of people in this country opposed the regime now prevailing in Cuba and there were many refugees coming to this country. However, there was no intention to invade Cuba. But then last July the USSR, without any communication from Mr. Khrushchev to the President, had embarked upon the policy of supplying arms to Cuba. The President said he did not know the reasons for that shift in Soviet policy, because there was no threat of invasion and he would have

been glad

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

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been glad to give appropriate assurances to that effect had Mr. Khrushchev communicated with him. Soviet arms supply had had a profound impact in the United States; Ambassador Dobrynin was surely aware of how the American people and the Congress felt on this matter. The administration had tried to calm this reaction and he, the President, had made a statement that in view of the nature of Soviet assistance to Cuba at this time coolness was required. Yet, the President said, he wished to stress that Soviet actions were extremely serious and he could find no satisfactory explanation for them. The Soviet Union was surely aware of US feelings with regard to Cuba, which was only 90 miles away from the United States. The President continued that the US planned no blockade of Cuba; it was only a question of ships taking arms to Cuba not being able to stop in the United States with their return cargo. Thus a very unfortunate situation had developed. The President said he did not know where it was taking us but it was the most dangerous situation since the end of the war. The US had taken the Soviet statement concerning the nature of armaments supplied to Cuba at its face value. He, the President, had attacked last Sunday in Indianapolis a Senator who was advocating invasion, and he had stated that the Cuban problem must be kept in perspective. The President reiterated that this was a dangerous situation, and said he did not know where the USSR planned to have it end.

Mr. Gromyko said that there had already been an invasion, and it was well known how it ended. It was well known now, both from facts and statements, including the President's own, under what circumstances and by whom that invasion had been organized. Everyone knew that if the United States had merely lifted its little finger, Cuban emigres and smaller Caribbean countries which had helped them would not have dared undertake any invasion.

The President interjected that he had discussed with Mr. Khrushchev the April, 1961, invasion and had said that it was a mistake. He also pointed out he would have given assurances that there would be no further invasion, either by refugees or by US forces. But last July the Soviet Union took certain actions and the situation changed.

Mr. Gromyko continued that Cubans and the Cuban Government had before them the vital question of whether they should remain unprepared to resist attack or to take steps to defend their country. He said he wished to reiterate that the Soviet Union had responded to appeals for assistance only because that assistance pursued the sole objective of giving bread to Cuba and preventing hunger in that country; also, as far as armaments were concerned, Soviet specialists were training Cubans in handling certain types of armaments which were only defensive--and he wished to stress the word defensive--

in character

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Secret-Eyes Only

- 5 -

in character, and thus such training could not constitute a threat to the United States. He reiterated that if it were otherwise the Soviet Union would never have agreed to render such assistance.

The President said that in order to be clear on this Cuban problem he wanted to state the following. The US had no intention of invading Cuba. Introduction last July of intensive armaments had complicated the situation and created grave danger. His own actions had been to prevent, unless US security was endangered, anything from being done that might provoke the danger of war. The President then read a portion of his September 4 statement on Cuba and stated that this had been US position and policy on this question. He noted that the Attorney General had discussed the Cuban situation with Ambassador Dobrynin so that the latter must be aware of what it was. The President again recalled his Indianapolis speech of last Sunday and said that we were basing our present attitude on facts as they had been described by Mr. Gromyko; our presumption was that the armaments supplied by USSR were defensive.

Mr. Gromyko stated the Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that on the basis of Soviet Government's statements and his own today the US Government and the President had a clear idea of the Soviet policy on this matter and of the Soviet evaluation of US action in relation to Cuba. He said he had nothing to add to what he had already said.

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SECRET-EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

White House approved,  
10/23/62

October 12, 1962

DATE: 5:00 p. m.  
Time: White House  
Part III

SUBJECT: Test Ban

|               |                     |                          |
|---------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| PARTICIPANTS: | <u>US</u>           | <u>USSR</u>              |
|               | The President       | Foreign Minister Gromyko |
|               | The Secretary       | Mr. Semenov              |
|               | Ambassador Thompson | Ambassador Dobrynin      |
|               | Mr. Hillenbrand     | Mr. Sukhodrev            |
|               | Mr. Akalovsky       |                          |

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|--------------------|--|------------------------------|
| S/S                | INR/D-Mr. Hilsman                                    | DOD/OSD - Secretary McNamara |
| G-Mr. Johnson      | S/P-Mr. Rostow                                       | DOD/ISA - Mr. Nitze          |
| S/AL-Amb. Thompson | IO-Mr. Cleveland                                     | White House - Mr. Bundy      |
| EUR-Mr. Tyler      | Ambassy Moscow-Amb. Kohler                           |                              |
| ACDA-Mr. Foster    | USUN-Amb. Stevenson                                  |                              |
| P-Mr. Manning      | Amcongen Geneva for Disarmament Delegation-Amb. Dean |                              |

Continuing to read from his prepared text.

Mr. Gromyko said he was sure the President was familiar with the Soviet Government's and Mr. Khrushchev's views on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. He said he wished now to call the President's attention to one specific aspect of this problem. Underground tests, in addition to the objections that any nuclear tests aroused, were very costly. Apparently the US Government did not attach any significance to this fact and was willing to have US tax payers pay for them. However, frankly speaking, this path was tantamount to continuing the nuclear arms race and was leading to ever greater expenditures of the funds of the population. The Soviet Union knew what this meant, because it had tested underground. The question was why should the Soviet Union formulate its policy with respect to nuclear tests on the basis of what was convenient to the United States, which did not wish to abandon underground testing. US representatives in Geneva had tried to justify the US position by alleging that the Soviet Union had violated some moratorium. However, it was well known that a moratorium did not constitute an agreement containing obligations which states must fulfill. Furthermore, what was most important, there had not been any moratorium in existence and consequently no violation could have taken place. Indeed when the Soviet Union had ended its tests in accordance with its unilateral decision, President Eisenhower had stated that the United States was free to resume tests and to choose the moment for doing so. How then could one speak of a violation of moratorium? Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union regretted that no agreement had been reached on the test ban. The views of Mr. Khrushchev on this question, which were known to the President, were designed to facilitate agreement. The USSR

understood

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 E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.4  
 NLK-91-130  
 By MMB - NARA Date 2/28/94

understood the situation as indicating that the US wanted to continue testing. The US was seeking ways and means of continuing the build-up of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was against such a build-up; it was firmly in favor of reaching agreement and terminating all tests. However, since the US did not wish to come to an agreement and did not wish to end all tests, the Soviet Union would have to draw the necessary conclusions with respect to its security. No state or government in the world was more earnestly seeking agreement on the prohibition of all tests than was the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union was fully aware of the fact that a test ban would constitute a big step in improving international relations and in improving the prospects for disarmament. If the United States also desired to achieve agreement on a test ban, then it was difficult to understand why it was placing obstacles in the path toward such an agreement.

The President responded that it was difficult to recognize the US policy on most matters discussed today, including the test ban, from the description Mr. Gromyko had given it. The US had sought a test ban agreement for a long time and it wished to end tests. Thus any suggestion that the US was not interested in an agreement was inaccurate. We assumed that if the Soviet Union were not interested in ending tests it would not have continued to negotiate on a test ban. The US was also negotiating and we were interested in reaching agreements. We assumed Soviet good faith and the Soviet Union should not question ours. The problem today was a technical one, because there was no assurance that underground tests would not be carried out while the treaty was in force unless there were some means of verification. We had made some technical progress but no analysis he, the President, had seen had indicated there was a way of distinguishing underground nuclear tests from earthquakes on the basis of instrumentation alone. The Soviet Union had made claims to the contrary, but it had not given us any relevant scientific information. The President continued that he believed that neither of the two sides wanted to test in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space; he also believed that neither side wanted underground tests because there was no need for such tests. He thought there must be some way of providing assurance against espionage and at the same time against underground tests. The Soviet Union had stated that it could not agree to inspection, and we had stated that we could not accept an agreement without assurances concerning underground tests. The President said he understood that there were many areas in the Soviet Union where there were no earthquakes, so he believed some satisfactory arrangements could be worked out for seismic areas, while in other areas there might be no need for inspection. Both sides should continue their efforts in good faith and seek a solution on a scientific basis.

Mr. Gromyko

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

- 3 -

Mr. Gromyko said he took note of the President's statement that the United States was really desirous of achieving agreement on the test ban. It was good that both governments were seeking this objective. He said that he wished to take this opportunity to state again that the Soviet Union was convinced that national means were sufficient to detect any violation of a treaty with respect to underground tests, and the Soviet Union based its conviction on technical data. He also wished to point out that continuing underground tests would be of the same importance from the standpoint of nuclear arms protection and development as atmospheric, under water, and outer space tests. The Soviet Union believed that neither side was interested in the continuation of the nuclear arms race. Moreover, agreement on a ban in three environments only would not promote nondiffusion, since many states could say that they could not be asked not to acquire nuclear weapons when the present nuclear powers would not reach agreement even on a test ban.

The President said that the two sides seem to be in disagreement concerning the scientific facts relating to distinguishing earthquakes from underground tests. He wondered why the Soviet Union could not present its scientific evaluation of this problem, and if agreement could be reached on this matter then early progress toward a test ban could be expected. It was in the interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to find agreement on a test ban and thus to prevent proliferation. If the Soviet Union could give us adequate scientific data so that a treaty could be presented to the Senate which would give adequate assurances against underground tests, then progress could be expected. The President said he wished to invite the Soviet Union to send its scientists and to show us how a ten KT nuclear explosion in soft ground could be distinguished from an earthquake. If that could be done, agreement would come very quickly.

Mr. Gromyko responded that the Soviet Union had repeatedly stated its views on this point to US representatives, including the Secretary himself, and especially to Lord Home, who had raised this point on a number of occasions. He said he did not wish to take the President's time, but wanted to point out there had been a scientific meeting in London, in which both US and Soviet scientists had participated. The President was surely familiar with this. Frankly speaking, Soviet and British scientists had agreed that a mutually acceptable arrangement was possible regarding surveillance of over the observance of a test ban treaty. US scientists in London differed with that point of view, but only slightly. It would be good if the views expressed in London could be used to reach agreement on this matter.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

White House approved,  
10/23/62

EX-107 NOV 19 1961

DATE: October 18, 1962

Time: 5:00 p. m.  
White House  
Part IV

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous

|               |                     |                          |
|---------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| PARTICIPANTS: | <u>US</u>           | <u>USSR</u>              |
|               | The President       | Foreign Minister Gromyko |
|               | The Secretary       | Mr. Semenov              |
|               | Ambassador Thompson | Ambassador Dobrynin      |
|               | Mr. Hillenbrand     | Mr. Sukhodrev            |
|               | Mr. Akalovsky       |                          |

|            |                     |                            |                              |
|------------|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| COPIES TO: | P-Mr. Manning       | Ambassy Bonn-Amb. Dowling  |                              |
|            | G-Mr. Johnson       | INR/D-Mr. Hillsman         | Ambassy London-Amb. Bruce    |
|            | S/P-Mr. Rostow      | ARA-Mr. Martin             | USUN-Amb. Stevenson          |
|            | S/AL-Amb. Thompson  | IO-Mr. Cleveland           | White House-Mr. Bundy        |
|            | EUR-Mr. Tyler       | Ambassy Moscow-Amb. Kohler | DOD/OSD - Secretary McNamara |
|            | BTF-Mr. Hillenbrand | Ambassy Paris-Amb. Bohlen  | DOD/ISA - Mr. Nitze          |

After a discussion on Germany and Berlin, Cuba, and the cessation of nuclear tests, Mr. Gromyko said that he wished, with the President's permission, to make some observations on certain other points.

Continuing to read from his prepared text.

Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union continued to base its policy on the premise that differences in ideology were not a barrier to peaceful coexistence and peace. As Mr. Khrushchev had stated, Americans and the Soviet people were different from the standpoint of ideology; the US was capitalist, and the Soviet attitude toward capitalism was well-known. The USSR was socialist and it was building Communism. The question of who would win must not be resolved by force but by peaceful competition, and the Soviet Union had adhered to this principle ever since Lenin's days. The Soviet Union was against the use of arms in resolving ideological differences. Competition in the economic field and in the satisfaction of spiritual and material needs of the people was a domain where the question of which system would gain the upper hand must be resolved. He said that he wished to reaffirm these views on behalf of the Soviet Government.

Toward the very end of the conversation, after having touched upon the possibility of Mr. Khrushchev's visiting the United States, Mr. Gromyko said he wished to thank the President for this opportunity of discussing with him questions of interest to our two peoples, since those questions related to very important aspects of the foreign policies of the US and USSR respectively. The Soviet Government had always believed that it would be a historical achievement if the US and the USSR found common language on these questions.

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FORM 85-12354 (E)  
E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4  
NLK-91-130  
By: MMB NARA Date 2/28/94

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The President

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The President said he agreed with Mr. Gromyko's last point. As he had said in Vienna, the US was a large country, and the Soviet Union was also a large country. Both had many things to do at home. As to the outcome of the competition between the two systems, history would be the judge. The President emphasized that neither he nor Mr. Khrushchev must take actions leading to a confrontation of our two countries. He said that since he had assumed the office of President, the US had attempted to adjust US/USSR relations. Laos had been a success so far, but there had been no success with respect to Germany and West Berlin until now. What was inexplicable in the light of what he had thought to be Mr. Khrushchev's understanding of the United States was what now happened in Cuba since July. Since Laos, that particular situation had been the most serious one. Finally, the President asked Mr. Gromyko to convey to Mr. Khrushchev his appreciation of the opportunity Mr. Khrushchev had given Ambassador Kohler and other American visitors to meet with him and have discussions.

Mr. Gromyko concluded his conversation with the President asserting that the Soviet Union's policy had been and still was aimed at strengthening peace and eliminating international differences, first and foremost the differences existing between the US and the USSR. Soviet policy was aimed at living in peace and friendship with the United States. This applied to Cuba as well; after all it was not the USSR that had invented this problem. It also applied to the question of a German peace treaty and the normalization of the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty, as well as to other questions on which there was no common language between the US and the USSR. He said he would of course convey the President's remarks to Mr. Khrushchev and that he was sure that Mr. Khrushchev would be happy to receive them.

The meeting ended at 7:20 p.m.

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SANITIZED VERSION

21 October 1962

Cuba NUK-76-334

15M/129/K/107 505#B/M 04N  
140 M47#506 (10/21/62) NSP/

a. Photography obtained on 18 October reveals that construction is in progress on an installation suspected to be an additional surface-to-surface missile site near the town of Remedios in Las Villas province. The analysis is, however, preliminary; the count on SS sites of which we feel confident therefore still stands at six--four of them fitted with mobile-type launchers, two of the fixed type.

b. On the basis of a comparative study of all of the evidence to date, we feel we can refine our judgment as to the readiness state at these six sites. We conclude that work on the sites has been proceeding at an urgent but measured pace. Thus, while the four MRBM sites may now have an emergency operational capability, it does not appear that the Soviets set out to bring them to full operational status on a crash basis.

c. Of the two MRBM sites in the San Cristobal area, we believe that one may now have full operational readiness--the ability to launch in salvo four missiles per site and to fire another four within four to six hours. The second site could reach this condition by 25 October. *more in #1507 file, same way*

d. We estimate that the two sites near Sagua La Grande could be brought to full operational readiness by 1 November.

e. It is believed that work on the two fixed sites for the 2,200-nautical-mile missile in the Guanajay area is somewhat further along than previously thought. Although we cannot be categorical, we estimate that both sites could become operational during the first two weeks of December.



f. Work on the presumed nuclear storage facility near the Guanajay IRBM sites is continuing at a high rate. The rudiments of what may be similar facilities have also been observed in the vicinity of the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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PSC Agenda

October 21, 1962

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Tentative Agenda for off-the-record NSC Meeting, October 21, 1962, 2:30 p. m.

- A. Introduction - New Intelligence (CIA)
- B. Substantial issues in the President's speech  
(third draft will be circulated at the meeting)
  - ✓ 1. How explicit should the description of Soviet installations be?
  - x 2. Is this a "nuclear quarantine" or a "blockade" or something in between?
  - ✓ 3. Do we wish to be clear or unclear on the relation between our blockade decision and OAS action?
  - 4. Is the Caribbean meeting a sufficiently strong addition to include?
  - 5. Is the phrasing of the willingness to meet Khrushchev as we want it?
  - 6. How far should we give explicit warning on Berlin?
  - 7. Political Context.
- C. The diplomatic track before the speech (designated as P-Hour and expected to be Monday evening) (Department of State)
- D. Military arrangements (Defense Department)

The Department of State will summarize the messages and messengers, with particular reference to the message to Khrushchev.

Challenges to  
Sov Navy  
Targeting  
Minds

→  
→

DECLASSIFIED  
REF: (NFK-78-626)  
NARS, DATE: 6/1/79

OPERATING DOCUMENTS: PROCLAMATIONS, ETC.  
Berlin planning (Department of State)

- 1. Proposal for high-level statement on Tuesday on differences between Berlin and Cuba
- 2. Plans for supporting public statements by Europeans
- 3. Plans for intensified Berlin contingency planning

NOTES ON OCTOBER 21, 1962 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. The meeting was held in the Oval Room at the White House and lasted from 11:30 a.m. to approximately 12:30 p.m. In attendance were the Attorney General, General Taylor, General Sweeney and the Secretary of Defense.
2. The Secretary of Defense stated that following the start of an air attack, the initial units of the landing force could invade Cuba within 7 days. The movement of troops in preparation for such an invasion will start at the time of the President's speech. No mobilization of Reserve forces is required for such an invasion until the start of the air strike. General LeMay had stated that the transport aircraft, from Reserve and Guard units, which would be required for participation in such an invasion, can be fully operational within 24 to 48 hours after the call to active duty.
3. The Secretary of Defense reported that, based on information which became available during the night, it now appears that there is equipment in Cuba for approximately 40 MRBM or IRBM launchers. (Mr. McCone, who joined the group 15 or 20 minutes after the start of the discussion, confirmed this report.) The location of the sites for 36 of these launchers is known. 32 of the 36 known sites appear to have sufficient equipment on them to be included in any air strike directed against Cuba's missile capability.
4. We believe that 40 launchers would normally be equipped with 80 missiles. John McCone reported yesterday that a Soviet ship believed to be the vessel in which the Soviets have been sending missiles to Cuba has made a sufficient number of trips to that island, within recent weeks, to offload approximately 48 missiles. Therefore, we assume there are approximately that number on the Island today, although we have only located approximately 30 of these.
5. General Sweeney outlined the following plan of air attack, the object of which would be the destruction of the known Cuban missile capability.
  - a. The 5 surface-to-air missile installations, in the vicinity of the known missile sites, would each be attacked by approximately 8 aircraft; the 3 MIG airfields defending the missile sites would be covered by 12 U.S. aircraft per field. In total, the defense suppression operations, including the necessary replacement aircraft, would require approximately 100 sorties.
  - b. Each of the launchers at the 8 or 9 known sites (a total of approximately 32 to 36 launchers) would be attacked by 6 aircraft. For the purpose, a total of approximately 250 sorties would be flown.
  - c. The U.S. aircraft covering the 3 MIG airfields would attack the MIG's if they became airborne. General Sweeney strongly recommended attacks on each of the airfields to destroy the MIG aircraft.

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 BY [signature]

6. General Sweeney stated that he was certain the air strike would be "successful"; however, even under optimum conditions, it was not likely that all of the known missiles would be destroyed. (As noted in 4 above, the known missiles are probably no more than 60% of the total missiles on the Island.) General Taylor stated, "The best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles." General Taylor, General Sweeney and the Secretary of Defense all strongly emphasized that in their opinion the initial air strike must be followed by strikes on subsequent days and that these in turn would lead inevitably to an invasion.

7. CIA representatives, who joined the discussion at this point, stated that it is probable the missiles which are operational (it is estimated there are now between 8 and 12 operational missiles on the Island) can hold indefinitely a capability for firing with from 2-1/2 to 4 hours notice. Included in the notice period is a countdown requiring 20 to 40 minutes. In relation to the countdown period, the first wave of our attacking aircraft would give 10 minutes of warning; the second wave, 40 minutes of warning; and the third wave a proportionately greater warning.

8. As noted above, General Sweeney strongly recommended that any air strike include attacks on the MIG aircraft and, in addition, the IL28s. To accomplish the destruction of these aircraft, the total number of sorties of such an air strike should be increased to 500. The President agreed that if an air strike is ordered, it should probably include in its objective the destruction of the MIG aircraft and the IL28s.

9. The President directed that we be prepared to carry out the air strike Monday morning or any time thereafter during the remainder of the week. The President recognized that the Secretary of Defense was opposed to the air strike Monday morning, and that General Sweeney favored it. He asked the Attorney General and Mr. McCone for their opinions:

- a. The Attorney General stated he was opposed to such a strike because:
  - (1) "It would be a Pearl Harbor type of attack,"
  - (2) It would lead to unpredictable military responses by the Soviet Union which could be so serious as to lead to general nuclear war.

He stated we should start with the initiation of the blockade and thereafter "play for the breaks."

- b. Mr. McCone agreed with the Attorney General, but emphasized he believed we should be prepared for an air strike and thereafter an invasion.

*Robert S. McNamara*  
Robert S. McNamara

10/21/62

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EXES, Sec. 3.4

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The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary Rusk to read the attached message from Prime Minister Macmillan which had just been received. Secretary Rusk observed that for a first reaction to information of our proposed blockade it was not bad. He added that it was comforting to learn that the British Prime Minister had not thought of anything we hadn't thought of.

The President commented that the Prime Minister's message contained the best argument for taking no action. What we now need are strong arguments to explain why we have to act as we are acting.

Secretary Rusk stated that the best legal basis for our blockade action was the Rio Treaty. The use of force would be justified on the ground of support for the principals of the United Nations Charter, not on the basis of Article 51, which might give the Russians a basis of attacking Turkey.

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The Attorney General said that in his opinion our blockade action would be illegal if it were not supported by the OAS. In his view the greatest importance is attached to our obtaining the necessary fourteen favorable votes in the OAS. Secretary Rusk commented that if we do not win the support of the OAS, we are not necessarily acting illegally. He referred to the new situation created by modern weapons and he thought that rules of international law should not be taken as applying literally to a completely new situation. He said we need not abandon hope so early.

Mr. Salinger reported that Gromyko had departed from New York without making other than a usual departure statement containing nothing about Cuba.

Secretary Rusk said the Department had decided to hold off calling a Security Council meeting despite the possibility that the Russians might ask one first. The basis of this decision was that we would have to name Cuba in the documents requesting the Security Council meeting and this we did not wish to do.

2 81

Director McCone summarized the latest intelligence information and read from the attached document. He added that we have a report of a fleet of Soviet submarines which are in a position to reach Cuba in about a week. He also mentioned that the London Evening Standard had printed a great deal of information about the existence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

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In response to a suggestion by Mr. Bundy, the President outlined the manner in which he expected Council Members to deal with the domestic aspects of the current situation. He said everyone should sing one song in order to make clear that there was now no difference among his advisers as to the proper course to follow. He pointed out the importance of fully supporting the course of action chosen which, in his view, represented a reasonable consensus. Any course is extremely troublesome and, as in the case of the Berlin wall, we are once again confronted with a difficult choice. If we undertake a tricky and unsatisfactory course, we do not even have the satisfaction of knowing what would have happened if we had acted differently. He mentioned that former Presidents, Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover had supported his decision during telephone conversations with each of them earlier in the day.

The President then summarized the arguments as to why we must act. We must reply to those whose reaction to the blockade would be to ask what had changed in view of the fact that we had been living in the past years under a threat of a missile nuclear attack by the USSR.

- a. In September we had said we would react if certain actions were taken in Cuba. We have to carry out commitments which we had made publicly at that time.
- b. The secret deployment by the Russians of strategic missiles to Cuba was such a complete change in their previous policy of not deploying such missiles outside the USSR that if we took no action in this case, we would convey to the Russians an impression that we would never act, no matter what they did anywhere.
- c. Gromyko had left the impression that the Soviets were going to act in Berlin in the next few months. Therefore, if they acted now in response to our blockade action, we would only have brought on their Berlin squeeze earlier than expected.
- d. The effect in Latin America would be very harmful to our interests if, by our failure to act, we gave the Latinos the impression that the Soviets were increasing their world position while ours was decreasing.

8 81

Two questions were raised which the President hoped would be discussed and settled the following day:

- a. What is our response if one of our U-2 planes is shot down by a SAM missile?
- b. If the missile development in Cuba continues, what is our next course of action?

The President concluded by acknowledging the difficulties which he was asking the military to accept because of the necessity of our taking action which warned Cuba of the possibility of an invasion.

Secretary Rusk commented that if anyone thought our response was weak, they were wrong because he believed that a "flaming crisis" was immediately ahead of us.

2 '81

The President read from a list of questions and suggested answers which might be made public. The first question was why we had not acted earlier. The response is that we needed more evidence of the existence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba. This additional evidence was required in order to gain the necessary fourteen votes in the OAS. [In addition, if we had acted earlier, we might have jeopardized our position in Berlin because our European Allies would have concluded that our preoccupation with Cuba was such as to reveal our lack of interest in Berlin, this tempting the Russians to act in Berlin.] Earlier action would undoubtedly have forced us to declare war on Cuba and this action, without the evidence we now have, would have thrown Latin American support to Castro.

2 '81

There followed a discussion of why evidence of Soviet missiles was lacking. Information about the strategic missile sites was reported by the refugees but these reports could not be substantiated from aerial photography. [Aerial photographs taken on August 29th revealed no missile sites.] It was not until October 14th that photographic evidence of the sites and missiles was available. The cloud cover prevented photography for a period of time [and the possibility of an attack on an overflying American plane led to a restriction on the number of U-2 flights.] Mr. McCone

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felt that the information given to Senator Keating about the missile sites had come from refugee sources, which he had accepted without further substantiation. The Attorney General pointed out that [even if there had been U-2 flights,] construction at the missile sites was not far enough along to have been detected by photography much earlier than October 14. It was pointed out that all Soviet experts agreed that Khrushchev would not send strategic missiles to Cuba. Therefore, there was a tendency to downgrade the refugee reports.

Commenting on what should be said publicly about our actions in Cuba, Secretary Rusk cautioned that we should say nothing now which might tie our hands later in the event we wanted to take additional actions.

2 41  
The President referred again to the question of distinguishing between Soviet missiles in Cuba and United States missiles in Turkey and Italy. Secretary Rusk read extracts from the NATO communique of 1959. The President thought that it was most important that everyone be fully briefed as to why these situations with respect to the deployment of missiles do not match. He again called attention to the secret deployment of the weapons and the Tass statement saying that the Russians had no need to position strategic missiles in foreign countries. Soviet missiles in Cuba have a quite different psychological effect than Soviet missiles positioned in the USSR in that the Soviet action in Cuba may in fact be a probing action to find out what we would be prepared to do in Berlin.

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Secretary Rusk added that the threat to the United States from Soviet missiles in Cuba was of worldwide importance because this threat was to a country which in effect provided the sole defense of some forty Free World States.

The President suggested that we should make clear the difference between our Cuban blockade and the Berlin blockade by emphasizing that we were not preventing shipments of food and medicine to Cuba, but only preventing the delivery of offensive military equipment. J

General Taylor asked how we should reply to the question: Are we preparing to invade? The President responded by saying that we should ask the press not to push this line of questioning and to

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accept our statement that we are taking all precautionary moves in anticipation of any contingency. Secretary McNamara agreed that we should say that the Defense Department had been ordered to be prepared for any contingency and that we were not now ready to say anything more than was in the President's speech.

[ In response to a Presidential question, Secretary McNamara said that an information group was working on the problem of voluntary press censorship based on experience during the Korean War.

The President again asked what was being done about Dakar. Under Secretary Ball said a task force was working on this problem and Mr. McCone added that nuclear detection "black boxes" had already been shipped to Dakar.

2 181 Secretary McNamara reported that the Defense Department was working on how we would prevent the introduction into Cuba of nuclear weapons by airplanes. He said some planes could fly non-stop from the Soviet Union if refueled en route. Present arrangements provided that we would be informed of any plane flying to Cuba and we would then decide what action to take against it. J

It was agreed that no reserves would be called today, but that a review would be made tonight as to the necessity of such action.

Acting Secretary Fowler raised several questions involving domestic controls, including gold transfers, foreign exchange controls, and control of the stock market. He said, in response to the President's question, that another look would be taken the following day before any recommendation would be made as to closing the stock market.

2 181 Secretary Rusk said that if we were asked whether our blockade was an act of war, we should say that it was not. The President asked whether friendly ships would be halted and Admiral Anderson replied in the affirmative, saying that we would challenge all ships. The President agreed that we should stop all Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc ships when the order to institute the blockade was given.

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Portion of the NSC Meeting Minutes, Monday, October 22, 1962

The President discussed the reasons why he had decided against an air strike now. First, there was no certainty that an air strike would destroy all missiles now in Cuba. We would be able to get a large percentage of these missiles, but could not get them all.

In addition we would not know if any of these missiles were operationally ready with their nuclear warheads and we were not certain that our intelligence had discovered all the missiles in Cuba. Therefore, in attacking the ones we had located, we could not be certain that others unknown to us would not be launched against the United States. The President said an air strike would involve an action comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Finally, an air strike would increase the danger of a worldwide nuclear war.

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The President said he had given up the thought of making an air strike only yesterday morning. In summary, he said an air strike had all the disadvantages of Pearl Harbor. It would not insure the destruction of every strategic missile in Cuba, and would end up eventually in our having to invade.

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Mr. Bundy added that we should not discuss the fact that we were not able to destroy all the missiles by means of an air strike because at some later time we might wish to make such an attack.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1  
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BY: JEF NARA 0010 3/31/92

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NSC MB9 10/22/62 2a

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NSC MB9 10/22/62

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Commenting on what should be said publicly about our actions in Cuba, Secretary Rusk cautioned that we should say nothing now which might tie our hands later in the event we wanted to take additional actions.

2 41  
The President referred again to the question of distinguishing between Soviet missiles in Cuba and United States missiles in Turkey and Italy. Secretary Rusk read extracts from the NATO communique of 1959. The President thought that it was most important that everyone be fully briefed as to why these situations with respect to the deployment of missiles do not match. He again called attention to the secret deployment of the weapons and the Tass statement saying that the Russians had no need to position strategic missiles in foreign countries. Soviet missiles in Cuba have a quite different psychological effect than Soviet missiles positioned in the USSR in that the Soviet action in Cuba may in fact be a probing action to find out what we would be prepared to do in Berlin.

2 41  
Secretary Rusk added that the threat to the United States from Soviet missiles in Cuba was of worldwide importance because this threat was to a country which in effect provided the sole defense of some forty Free World States.

The President suggested that we should make clear the difference between our Cuban blockade and the Berlin blockade by emphasizing that we were not preventing shipments of food and medicine to Cuba, but only preventing the delivery of offensive military equipment. ✓

General Taylor asked how we should reply to the question: Are we preparing to invade? The President responded by saying that we should ask the press not to push this line of questioning and to

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- 5 -

accept our statement that we are taking all precautionary moves in anticipation of any contingency. Secretary McNamara agreed that we should say that the Defense Department had been ordered to be prepared for any contingency and that we were not now ready to say anything more than was in the President's speech.

In response to a Presidential question, Secretary McNamara said that an information group was working on the problem of voluntary press censorship based on experience during the Korean War.

The President again asked what was being done about Dakar. Under Secretary Ball said a task force was working on this problem and Mr. McCone added that nuclear detection "black boxes" had already been shipped to Dakar.

2 181  
Secretary McNamara reported that the Defense Department was working on how we would prevent the introduction into Cuba of nuclear weapons by airplanes. He said some planes could fly non-stop from the Soviet Union if refueled en route. Present arrangements provided that we would be informed of any plane flying to Cuba and we would then decide what action to take against it.

It was agreed that no reserves would be called today, but that a review would be made tonight as to the necessity of such action.

Acting Secretary Fowler raised several questions involving domestic controls, including gold transfers, foreign exchange controls, and control of the stock market. He said, in response to the President's question, that another look would be taken the following day before any recommendation would be made as to closing the stock market.

2 181  
Secretary Rusk said that if we were asked whether our blockade was an act of war, we should say that it was not. The President asked whether friendly ships would be halted and Admiral Anderson replied in the affirmative, saying that we would challenge all ships. The President agreed that we should stop all Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc ships when the order to institute the blockade was given.

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Portion of the NSC Meeting Minutes, Monday, October 22, 1962

The President discussed the reasons why he had decided against an air strike now. First, there was no certainty that an air strike would destroy all missiles now in Cuba. We would be able to get a large percentage of these missiles, but could not get them all.

In addition we would not know if any of these missiles were operationally ready with their nuclear warheads and we were not certain that our intelligence had discovered all the missiles in Cuba. Therefore, in attacking the ones we had located, we could not be certain that others unknown to us would not be launched against the United States. The President said an air strike would involve an action comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Finally, an air strike would increase the danger of a worldwide nuclear war.

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81  
The President said he had given up the thought of making an air strike only yesterday morning. In summary, he said an air strike had all the disadvantages of Pearl Harbor. It would not insure the destruction of every strategic missile in Cuba, and would end up eventually in our having to invade.

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Mr. Bundy added that we should not discuss the fact that we were not able to destroy all the missiles by means of an air strike because at some later time we might wish to make such an attack.

J

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distribution*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

10/22/62  
Smith 16

*Bennett*

H  
Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 16519/  
Rec'd: OCTOBER 22, 1962  
12:51 PM

SS  
Info

FROM: BONN  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: 1188, OCTOBER 22, 5 PM

*(Taken from Pres.  
week-end reading  
dtd 11/10/62)*

FILE

23

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1188, INFORMATION PARIS 279, LONDON 295.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

RE EMB AIRGRAM A-733

VON HERWARTH (STATE SEC IN PRESIDENT LUEBKE'S OFFICE) GAVE MORRIS IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO ON FRENCH MEMO TO FRG WHICH FOLLOWED DE GAULLE VISIT:

MEMO SO CLOSELY HELD THAT VON HERWARTH HIMSELF UNABLE SEE COPY IN BONN. HOWEVER HE HAD BEEN SHOWN COPY BY BLANKENHORN, FRG AMB IN PARIS. VON HERWARTH DESCRIBED MEMO AS "80-90 PERCENT FINE" BUT SAID IT CONTAINED TWO DISTURBING PROPOSALS:

- 1) SECRET FRANCO-GERMAN STRATEGIC MILITARY PLANNING I.E. OUTSIDE NATO;
- 2) FRANCO-GERMAN CONSULTATION ON PROBLEMS IN GENERAL, IN ENDEAVOR REACH COMMON POSITION BEFORE DISCUSSION WITH OTHER ALLIES. (EMBASSY HAS ALREADY REPORTED IN EMBTEL 839 FONOFF VIEW THAT FRANCE AND GERMANY EXPECT TO CONSULT MORE FREQUENTLY IN INTEREST OF DEVELOPING COMMON POSITION BUT THAT GERMANS INTENDED TAKE DUE ACCOUNT OF SENSITIVITIES OF OTHERS BY AVOIDING ANY APPEARANCE OF SEEKING TO IMPOSE JOINT POSITION. PROVIDED JOINT CONSULTATION IS APPROACHED IN THIS WAY IT NEED NOT HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES, WHETHER IN NATO, EEC OR OTHER ALLIED GROUPS.

ACCORDING VON HERWARTH, CHANCELOR HAD SENT PERSONAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO DE GAULLE, SAYING HE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH LATTER'S

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*NSP (76/62-62)*

SECRET

-2- 1188, OCTOBER 22, 5 PM; FROM BONN

IDEAS AND PROMISING FURTHER DETAILED REPLY. SCHROEDER AND OTHER FRG LEADERS, WHO ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO TWO FRENCH PROPOSALS CITED ABOVE, ARE NOW UNHAPPILY WRESTLING WITH PROBLEM OF HOW TO FRAME THIS DETAILED REPLY. ON ONE HAND THEY WANT TO REBUFF THESE TWO PROPOSALS, POLITELY BUT FIRMLY; ON OTHER HAND, THEY DO NOT WANT TO UPSET EITHER DE GAULLE OR ADENAUER, WHO ATTACHES SUCH IMPORTANCE TO HIS PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH DE GAULLE. THIS IS REASON, VON HERWARTH NOTED, WHY FRG HAS FELT UNABLE FULLY INFORM OTHER MEMBERS OF SIX, LET ALONE US AND UK OR MAKE PUBLIC, OF FULL SCOPE OF FRENCH MEMO.

IDENTITY OF VON HERWARTH AS SOURCE ABOVE INFORMATION SHOULD BE CLOSELY HELD.

DOWLING

JTC

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 5,  
October 25, 1962, 5:00 PM

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Director McCone gave an intelligence briefing which contained no major new information. He listed fifteen ships en route to Cuba, among them the Graznyy, which is one of three oil tankers with deck tanks probably containing ammonia.

Mr. McCone noted that a Bloc ship would be entering the Panama Canal on November 2. It would be searched, as have Bloc ships transiting the Canal during the past seven years.

Mr. McCone said he had no information of any unusual developments in Europe.

Secretary Dillon noted that there had been a run on gold in Germany and to a lesser extent in London. His conclusion was that these gold purchases reflected the fear of the buyers.

Secretary McNamara said that the East German passenger ship Voelker Freundschaft was at the Cuban barrier. It is a fairly large ship, 525 feet long, and has been ordered to report its position every four hours. He said we faced a decision as to whether or not to stop it.

Secretary McNamara reported that the Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded had turned back before crossing the barrier. Late information on the Graznyy revealed that it was lying dead in the water. The result is that to date no ship has yet been boarded.

Secretary Rusk reported on diplomatic developments. He said the question was whether we can get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba or at least under UN control. He added that if there was any prospect of success in following a political track, we would have to keep heavy pressure on the Russians. He reported that Soviet representative Zorin in New York was furious about U Thant's proposals for U.S./USSR talks under UN sponsorship in New York, but that Khrushchev had agreed to such talks. Our position would be that during these next two days of preliminary discussions we must somehow stop the missile buildup in Cuba. We must know what is going on at the IRBM sites in Cuba and we need to know whether warheads have actually been delivered to Cuba. Shortly we must decide if the Soviet signals which they are sending us mean they are getting ready to talk or whether they are getting ready to attack us.


~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

SANITIZED

U.S. ARCHIVE (NOK-82-132)  
BY SPM NARS, DATE 12/24/82

Referring to possible UN action, Secretary Rusk said we would probably be able to get only a seven-to-two vote in the Security Council, but even so, action in the UN General Assembly was a possibility. He specifically mentioned one possibility, i. e. Latin American States proposing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. He thought that many Latin American States would support this zone, along with many other UN members, and the Soviets would have a difficult time opposing it.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the relationship between our quarantine and Soviet-Cuban relations. The Cubans, who would not be able to survive in political isolation, must henceforth rely entirely on the Soviets.




An appeal might be made to Castro to step aside so that a new government might break this complete dependence from here on out on the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk explained the nature of the preliminary talks which are to be held in New York in the next two or three days between U Thant and Zorin on one side and Stevenson and U Thant on the other. The purpose of these talks is to arrive at a solution of the crisis or, if no solution is possible, to provide a basis for later action, having been unable to negotiate a settlement. He said that these talks could not go on for two weeks, but must be limited to a very few days because the IRBM sites in Cuba are becoming operational and the IL-28 bombers will soon be able to fly.

Secretary McNamara said all of his actions were taken with a view to applying force gradually. The ten air reconnaissance missions flown today went well and he recommended that ten more missions be flown tomorrow. Other military actions being taken would be meaningful to the Russians but would still not force escalation.

Secretary McNamara described night reconnaissance flights which involve dropping flares --



Secretary Dillon noted that the urgency of the situation was considerably reduced if the Russians do not try to break the quarantine.

Secretary McNamara expressed his concern that if the New York talks go along very long, a kind of plateau will have been reached which would make the decision to take new actions very difficult.

Secretary Rusk summarized the political track as follows. We might get a unanimous vote in the OAS for our actions. We could expect a veto from the Russians in the Security Council. If the U Thant proposals were rejected, we could go to the General Assembly where as many as eighty States might support a Latin American denuclearization proposal. He was not ready to knock out the possibility of a political solution.

Secretary McNamara said there were many ways of increasing pressure on the Russians by military measures, i. e. quarantine, inspection at sea, surveillance, the addition of jet fuel to the list of products embargoes, and the holding of all petroleum tankers.

The Attorney General noted that if all Bloc cargo ships turn back rather than cross the quarantine barrier, we might let Soviet tankers through in order to avoid an incident at sea during the discussions in New York. He said we might decide that it was better to knock out the missiles by air attack than to stop a Soviet ship on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we might

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Such action would step up pressure on the Cubans without further use of military force.

Director McCone agreed that such action would be effective because it would greatly reduce imports into Cuba and also take away from the Cubans their outgoing cargoes.

Secretary McNamara suggested that we might consider

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which could take up to several weeks. The purpose would be to throttle imports by Cuba.

In a discussion of other military measures, Mr. Rostow said any reconnaissance flights would have a beneficial effect on developments in New York.

Secretary McNamara commented that the dropping of flares on the IRBM sites at night would be highly effective. General Taylor thought that the psychological effect of night reconnaissance would be entirely favorable as well as serving to keep up the pressure and providing more information about the readiness status of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk said that he would seek to define our future political moves later in the evening.

Secretary Dillon stated his support of the idea of a Latin American denuclearized zone.

The Attorney General repeated his question as to whether we really wanted to stop a Soviet ship. He said he believed the Soviets had turned their ships around because they did not want us to see what was on them. The tankers, however, continue to move toward Cuba because they have nothing but petroleum. He said he felt that the measures we take should indicate clearly that we mean business but we should avoid a direct confrontation now.

Secretary McNamara said we should decide tonight to take measures tonight which would put us in a position of being ready to board Bloc ships approaching the barrier. We could let Soviet tankers through the quarantine and announce later we were putting an embargo on aviation gasoline. If we were going to board the East German ship we would have to decide tonight.

Both General Taylor and Secretary Dillon pointed out that we could not permit Soviet technicians to go through the quarantine even though technicians are not on the embargo list.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the East German ship not be stopped because it might be necessary for us to shoot at it or to ram it. There would be great danger to the some 1500 passengers aboard. The current situation is that the ship has been hailed and a U.S. destroyer is following it. If we ask it to stop and it does not, then we would have to use force. If in so doing we injure passengers and then discover there are no strategic missiles aboard, we would be in a very difficult situation. In addition, our world position would appear weak if we allow Soviet ships through the quarantine but stop an East German ship. The Voelker Freundschaft will make a landfall tomorrow and a decision must be made by 2:00 AM this morning if we want to stop it outside Cuban territorial waters.

At this point the President entered the Cabinet Room:

Secretary McNamara reviewed the situation with respect to the Voelker Freundschaft. He said the East German ship had left Rostov on October 11 and Leningrad on October 14.

[REDACTED]

The destroyer Pierce is following the ship which is still outside the barrier. Secretary McNamara recommended that we not stop this ship.

The President referred to the message from U Thant asking us to avoid incidents pending the talks at New York.

Mr. Bundy said the East German ship was not covered by U Thant's message.

General Taylor and Director McCone asked Mr. McNamara

[REDACTED]

The President said the only argument against stopping the ship is U Thant's request for no incidents for the time being. He said that we would have to drop the other shoe soon.

Secretary McNamara repeated his earlier statement with respect to the difficulty of stopping a passenger ship. He preferred to stop the Graznyy tomorrow if Khrushchev did not accept U Thant's proposed mediation effort.

The Attorney General said he wished to describe again the other side of the argument. He said we could let the tanker through the barrier. As of now no other ships were approaching the barrier. Surveillance measures could be taken to keep the pressure on the Russians and provide time for the political measures suggested by Secretary Rusk without appearing to be backing off from a confrontation. He repeated his view that we may decide that it is better to avoid confronting the Russians by stopping one of their ships and to react by attacking the missiles already in Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said he preferred that the confrontation take place in Cuba rather than on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk noted that the quarantine had become fully effective.

Secretary McNamara reported that there had been no response yesterday or today to our low-level reconnaissance flights. He recommended that we continue to fly daylight reconnaissance missions and add night reconnaissance not only to gain information, but also to convince the public that we are increasing the pressure on the Russians.

The President decided that we should not stop the East German ship. Tomorrow we will know the Soviet response to U Thant's proposal. We will let the tanker through the barrier and later add jet fuel to the list of products embargoed.

The Attorney General said that fifteen ships have turned back, which is an impressive action taken by the Russians. We must be careful that the Russians do not think that we are backing down.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance of the first case of our boarding a ship. If the ship carried deck cargo or dry cargo, the case would be different than a passenger ship which is a bad first case.

Mr. Rostow stated the argument for adding petroleum products to the blockade which he said would have a drastic effect on the Cuban economy.

The President again said we should let the East German passenger ship go through and we should seek to avoid any incident in order not to create a bad effect on U Thant's negotiations. We could decide tomorrow afternoon what more we should do after we know Khrushchev's reply to U Thant. He said we must act soon because work on the missile sites is still going on and we must back up very soon the firmness we have displayed up to now.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that we must react very soon to Khrushchev's strong letter.

Secretary Rusk noted that Bloc shipping worldwide was behaving normally except for the ships in Cuban trade.

As the meeting concluded, Mr. McCone reported that some of the strategic missiles deployed in Cuba are now operational.



**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

- 7 -

The President had before him at the meeting a folder containing drafts of alternative next major moves (copy attached).

Bromley Smith


**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 6,  
October 26, 1962, 10:00 AM

Director McCone summarized the attached intelligence memorandum, including a statement on the current status of Soviet air readiness.

Mr. McCone described the celebration which took place in Havana following the arrival of the tanker Bucharest which had been allowed to pass the quarantine line because it was carrying only oil, which is not now contraband. He said non-Bloc ships could be used to carry military materials if they had been chartered on a bare boat basis by the Russians.



Mr. Bundy reported that three subcommittees are at work -- one on Berlin, chaired by Paul Nitze, one on forward planning, chaired by Walt Rostow, and one on worldwide communications problems, chaired by William Orrick, who is working closely with the Defense Communications Agency.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the civil defense problem and obtained agreement that no crash program would be undertaken now, although

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

S. ARCHWEST (UK-82-133)  
myfn NARS DATE 12/24/82

preliminary measures are to be initiated. He referred to the amount of sensitive information which has been leaking to the press and urged that information about future actions must be more carefully guarded.

Secretary McNamara reported on the status of the quarantine. The Defense Department was authorized to release information on the boarding of the Lebanese ship, the Marucla, the first dry cargo ship which had been loaded in a Soviet port. In the event that comparisons were made between stopping the Lebanese ship and permitting an East German ship to go through the quarantine line, the point will be made that the East German ship carried only passengers.

Secretary McNamara read a list of Bloc ships and their locations and noted that there would be no intercepts at sea today. The tanker Graznyy is apparently moving but will not cross the line today. He suggested that shortly we should embargo fuel used by bombers and substances from which airplane fuel is made, i. e. petroleum products.

The President suggested that if we decide to embargo bomber fuel, we should also mention the fact that we were embargoing fuel which was contributing to the operational capability of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk asked that POL not be embargoed for at least twenty-four hours in order to avoid upsetting the U Thant talks now under way in New York.

Under Secretary Ball asked for agreement on the embargo of petroleum as the next step in the effort to increase pressures -- the timing of the embargo to be decided later in relation to the New York talks.

Secretary Dillon stated his reservations concerning this course of action. He said it ended up in stopping Soviet ships. Thus, a confrontation with the Russians would not be over the missiles, but over Soviet ships. He believed we should go for the missiles rather than force a confrontation with the USSR at sea.

A decision on adding petroleum to the embargo list was delayed until the political path was decided upon.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that construction on the strategic missile sites in Cuba was continuing. He asked that public announcement be made

of our continuation of air surveillance. He recommended that daylight reconnaissance measures be flown today and a night mission tonight, including the dropping of flares.

Secretary Rusk asked that the night mission not be flown because of the unfortunate effect which it might have on the U Thant negotiations in New York.

Secretary McNamara thought that one way of avoiding reaction to night reconnaissance was to inform the Cubans and the Russians in advance that we were initiating such flights.

Ambassador Stevenson opposed any public announcement of our surveillance activities.

The President directed that we dramatize the fact that the missile buildup in Cuba is continuing. He authorized daylight reconnaissance measures but decided to delay night flights.

Secretary Rusk praised Ambassador Stevenson's UN performance. He urged that USIA keep the pressure on the Cuban people and mentioned the dropping of leaflets over Cuba.

Acting Director Wilson requested that better aerial pictures be made available to USIA for distribution. The President authorized the use of any reconnaissance pictures, including those used by Ambassador Stevenson in his UN speech.

Secretary Rusk summarized political actions now under way. He said the object of the talks with U Thant today was to set up some form of negotiations with the Russians in New York. The objective would be to obtain a commitment from the Russians that there would be no further construction at the missile sites in Cuba, no further Soviet military shipments, the defuzing of existing weapons in Cuba, UN inspection of all nuclear-capable missiles, and an observer corps on the ground in Cuba of 350 technically able inspectors. The U.S. quarantine would continue until a UN quarantine is in place. UN teams would be put into specified Cuban ports. U.S. Navy ships would stay close to all Cuban ports to ensure that there were no landings unknown to the UN inspectors and no cargoes landed anywhere which UN inspectors did not see.

Mr. McCloy stated that our quarantine was vital and should be kept in place until the Russians had accepted all of our conditions.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that we must make clear to U Thant that the quarantine is related to the Soviet missiles rather than to Soviet military shipments to Cuba.



Secretary Rusk felt that it was better for us not to participate in such action as would be necessary if it were done by an organization, i. e. the OAS, to which we belong.

The President noted that the plan proposed by Brazil not only calls for an atomic-free zone in Latin America, but it also encompasses a guarantee of the territorial integrity on all Latin American States. He asked whether we could commit ourselves not to invade Cuba. Secretary Rusk commented that we are committed not to invade Cuba, having signed the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.

Secretary Rusk read a draft cable

[REDACTED]

In commenting on the draft cable, Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of getting Soviet missiles out urgently.

Mr. McCone expressed his dislike of a situation involving continued control of Cuba by Castro. Even if the Soviet missiles are removed, Castro, if he is left in control, will be in an excellent position to undertake the Communization of Latin America.

Secretary Rusk said the present position is that Cuba ties to the USSR are not negotiable. Mr. Bundy pointed out, and the President agreed, that our objective was to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President said work on the missile sites has to cease and we have to verify what is going on at the sites every day during the talks in New York. As to the message to Castro, he agreed in general, but wanted to have another look at it. He doubted that it would do any good, but it might be undertaken if done now with the greatest urgency.

Ambassador Stevenson discussed the immediate negotiations now under way with U Thant and the longer talks which would follow if agreement can be reached with the Russians in New York. He said the immediate talks were aimed at getting a 24-48-hour standstill on the missile buildup in Cuba. He acknowledged that in these talks it would be impossible to obtain an agreement to make the weapons inoperable. He wanted to know whether he should seek a standstill on all Soviet arms or only offensive weapons. He would seek to get a commitment that there be no further construction, but it would not be possible to set up a system to ensure that the weapons were made inoperable and kept inoperable. In addition, he needed to know whether in return we would be prepared to suspend the quarantine.

Ambassador Stevenson said the aim of the longer term talks would be the withdrawal from this hemisphere of the strategic missiles and the dismantlement of existing sites. He predicted that the Russians would ask us for a new guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and the dismantlement of U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey.

Mr. McCone disagreed with Ambassador Stevenson's linking of Soviet missiles in Cuba to U.S. missiles in Turkey. He said the Soviet weapons

in Cuba were pointed at our heart and put us under great handicap in continuing to carry out our commitments to the free world. He urged that we do not drop the quarantine until the Soviet missiles are out of Cuba. He believed that we must keep up the momentum so far achieved by the quarantine.

The President said we will get the Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba only by invading Cuba or by trading. He doubted that the quarantine alone would produce a withdrawal of the weapons. He said our objective should be to prevent further military shipments, further construction at missile sites, and to get some means of inspection.

Mr. McCone urged that any inspectors sent to Cuba be U.S. inspectors knowledgeable about strategic missiles.

The President said he understood Ambassador Stevenson to be asking for time during which he would try to negotiate the withdrawal of the missiles.

Secretary Rusk doubted that we could get any pre-conditions to negotiation.

Secretary Dillon agreed that the Soviets could not back down merely in return for dropping the quarantine.

Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of obtaining a guarantee that the nuclear missiles would be disassembled from their launchers.

Mr. Bundy said negotiations for a standstill or a standdown were not enough for our security because we must press, in addition, for guaranteed inspection of Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said we could not negotiate for two weeks under the missile threat which now exists in Cuba.

The President noted that there appeared to be little support for Ambassador Stevenson's plan. If the quarantine would not result in the Soviets withdrawing the missiles, what will we do if negotiations break down?

Mr. Bundy said when the interim 24-48-hour talks fail, then our choice would be to expand the blockade or remove the missiles by air attack.

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

General Taylor urged that we increase our reconnaissance activity in order to keep informed as to what was happening in Cuba.

The President decided to delay night reconnaissance missions, at least until the Soviets turn down U Thant's proposal. He also agreed that we should announce publicly that construction work at the missile sites in Cuba was going on and that, therefore, we will continue our aerial reconnaissance flights. The President also wanted attention called by a White House spokesman to his earlier speech which insisted that work at the missile sites in Cuba cease. The President decided that a presentation of the current situation should be made to the Congressional Leaders.

Bromley Smith

**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**




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~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7  
October 27, 1962, 10:00 AM

Director McCone highlighted the intelligence information contained in the first two pages of the attached CIA Cuba Crisis Memorandum.

Secretary McNamara reported on the positions of Soviet Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He said we do not know yet whether any such ships will enter the interception area. He recommended that we be prepared to board the *Graznyy*, which is now out about 600 miles. We would put ships alongside her and follow along for about 200 miles.




Under Secretary Ball pointed out that the Soviets did not know the extent of our quarantine zone.

The President agreed that we should ask U Thant to tell the Russians in New York where we are drawing the quarantine line. The Russians would then be in a position to decide whether to turn back their tanker or allow her to enter the quarantine zone sometime later today.

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, two daylight reconnaissance missions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Secretary McNamara also recommended that a night reconnaissance mission be flown -- Secretary Rusk recommended against a night flight. The President instructed the Defense Department to place the night reconnaissance planes on the alert and to prepare a public announcement of the mission in order that a final decision to be taken this afternoon could be promptly implemented.

The discussion then turned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Mr. Nitze said it would be an anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out. He feared the next Soviet step would be a demand for the denuclearization of the entire NATO area. He urged us to focus attention on Cuba rather than on U.S. bases in other countries.

Under Secretary Ball reported



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~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

U.S. ARCHIVIST (WV 82-133)  
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE 12/24/83

At this point in the meeting the partial text of a Soviet public statement was read by the President as it was received in the room. The President commented that the statement was a very tough position and varied considerably from the tone of Khrushchev's personal letter to the President received last night. The President felt that the Soviet position would get wide support and said we should consider making public the Khrushchev private letter.

Secretary Rusk returned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey and pointed out that this subject must be kept separate from Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Turkish missile problem should be dealt with in the context of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Bundy said we could not accept the Soviet proposal on Turkish missiles because the Soviet missiles were not out of Cuba.

The President recalled that he had asked that consideration be given to the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey some days previously.

Under Secretary Ball replied that the Department had decided it could not raise this question with the Turks at this time for fear of a disastrous Turkish reaction. He said the question had been raised with Finletter in Paris and study was being given to whether any method could be worked out to reassure the Turks if we were going to offer to withdraw the Jupiter missiles.

Mr. Bundy said we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally, i.e. Turkey, to serve our own interests, i.e. getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President commented that the Russians had made the Turkish missile withdrawal proposal in the most difficult possible way. Now that their proposal is public, we have no chance to talk privately to the Turks about the missiles, which, for a long time, we have considered to be obsolete.

Secretary Dillon said that it was possible that the Russians had made their public statement as part of a stalling tactic to provide them with sufficient time for a full-fledged confrontation with us.

The President read a draft statement telephoned from New York by Ambassador Stevenson commenting on the Soviet statement. Ambassador Stevenson argued for releasing his statement in an effort to keep the "peace offensive" from going to the Soviets.

The President left the meeting at this point with Mr. Sorensen. There ensued a discussion of how to handle the discrepancy between the Khrushchev private letter and the Russian offer made public in the Soviet statement. A suggestion was made that the Russian proposals contained in the private Khrushchev letter be made public.

The President returned to the meeting. He said we must ensure that the construction work on the missile sites in Cuba be stopped at once. He suggested that we talk to the Turks about the missiles, pointing out to them the great peril facing them during the next week. He acknowledged that the Turks were now in no position to make a statement to the effect that they would ask that the Jupiters be withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we tell the Turks they must say that the Jupiter problem is a NATO problem and is not associated with the Cuban missile problem.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the fact that the missiles belonged to Turkey and that only the nuclear warheads are under our total control.

The President returned to a discussion of where we now find ourselves, i. e. we now have Soviet public proposals and Khrushchev's private proposals. What we must seek is an immediate cessation of the work on offensive missiles in Cuba. Once this work stopped we could talk to the Russians.

Mr. Bundy reiterated the view that the threat to us in Cuba. One explanation for the varying Soviet proposals is that the hard line Russians wanted to make public their preferred demands in order to make impossible progress toward the Khrushchev private offer which may have been drafted by those who are less hard-nosed.

The President noted that it appeared to him that the Russians were making various proposals so fast, one after the other, that they were creating a kind of shield behind which work on the missile sites in Cuba continued. He said we had a perfectly defensible position, i. e. work on the missile sites must stop. Secretary McNamara added the thought that these offensive weapons must be made inoperable.

Mr. Bundy suggested that we tell Khrushchev privately that the position in their public statement was impossible for us, but that the position

Khrushchev took in his private letter was different and we were studying these proposals. In the meantime, however, time is running out.

The President interrupted to take a telephone call from Ambassador Stevenson in New York. He resumed the discussion by saying that Khrushchev obviously is attempting to limit our freedom of action in Cuba by introducing the question of the missile bases outside this hemisphere.

Mr. Bundy read a draft press statement and Mr. Gilpatric read a statement which he had prepared.

Mr. Alexis Johnson reported that he had just been informed that the Turkish Government had issued a press statement saying that the Russian proposal with respect to Jupiters in Turkey was not conceivable.

(As the remainder of the Soviet public statement was received in the Cabinet Room, it appeared that the Russian base proposal involved not merely Turkey but all of NATO.)

Mr. Sorensen introduced a draft statement which was read by the group.

Revisions were made in the Gilpatric draft, which was issued shortly thereafter in the form attached. This statement emphasized the offensive weapons buildup in Cuba.

The Attorney General said that the statement might make people think that if the Russians stopped the missile buildup in Cuba, we would be willing to withdraw our missiles from Turkey. He desired that we make doubly clear that Turkish NATO missiles were one problem and that Cuba was an entirely separate problem.

Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was crucial for us to stand on the position that we will not negotiate with the Russians while the Soviet missile threat is growing in Cuba.

The President recalled that over a year ago we wanted to get the Jupiter missiles out of Turkey because they had become obsolete and of little military value. If the missiles in Cuba added 50% to Soviet nuclear capability, then to trade these missiles for those in Turkey would be of great military value. But we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and in Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value. From the political point of view, it would be hard to get support on an airstrike

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against Cuba because many would think that we would make a good trade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey in the event the Russians would agree to remove the missiles from Cuba. We are in a bad position if we appear to be attacking Cuba for the purpose of keeping useless missiles in Turkey. We cannot propose to withdraw the missiles from Turkey, but the Turks could offer to do so. The Turks must be informed of the great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over missiles.

The President left the meeting to meet the State Governors who had been waiting for one-half hour to see him.

The discussion continued in the President's absence. It was not possible to say with certainty whether the Soviet public offer included all NATO bases or referred specifically to Turkey.

The Attorney General expressed his concern as to what our position would be if we talked to the Russians for sixty days and then the Cubans refused to permit UN inspectors to continue to ensure that missiles in Cuba were inoperable. The reply was that we could then decide to attack the bases by air.

There was discussion of a second statement to be put out but this proposal was later abandoned.

A draft message to Khrushchev, which had been prepared by Ambassador Thompson, was read and a final version was to be completed for the President's consideration later in the day. The group agreed to meet at the State Department without the President at 2:30 PM and meet with the President again at 4:00 PM.

(Note: At the meeting at the State Department, the Attorney General repeated his view that we should keep the focus on the missile bases. He preferred to let the Soviet tankers through the quarantine line in order to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets over one of their ships. He said if we attack a Soviet tanker, the balloon would go up. He urged that we buy time now in order to launch an air attack Monday or Tuesday.

Secretary McNamara expressed his view that before we attack Cuba we must notify the Cubans.

Bromley Smith

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Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 8  
October 27, 1962, 4:00 PM

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Secretary McNamara reported on today's daylight reconnaissance mission. One mission aborted for mechanical reasons, according to preliminary reports. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.

Secretary McNamara again recommended night reconnaissance missions. The President delayed a decision on night flights pending a full report on today's daylight mission (the night mission was later called off).

There followed a discussion of a draft letter from the President to Khrushchev. The President added to the draft an offer to discuss with the Russians the proposals they had made public. He predicted that Khrushchev would say we had rejected his proposal. The formulation included a comment that Khrushchev must realize that matters relating to NATO must be discussed at a later time. The letter was approved in a revised form.

A message to U Thant was discussed and approved. The purpose of the message was to obtain the halting of work on the bases in Cuba as a condition to discussion of various other problems.

Secretary Rusk reported that one of our U-2 planes had overflown the Soviet Union by accident due to navigational error. Soviet fighters were scrambled from a base near Wrangel Island. The Secretary thought that the Russians would make a loud fuss about this incident.

The President decided not to make the incident public, but be prepared to do so as soon as the Soviets publicized it.

The President asked whether we wanted to continue to say that we would talk only about the missiles in Cuba. He believed that for the next few hours we should emphasize our position that if the Russians will halt missile activity in Cuba we would be prepared to discuss NATO problems with the Russians. He felt that we would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days. He did

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ARCHIVIST (NLK-82-133)  
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feel that if we could succeed in freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there would be a serious reaction in NATO countries if we appeared to be trading withdrawal of missiles in Turkey for withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. The President responded that if we refuse to discuss such a trade and then take military action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult position.

The President left the room to talk to General Norstad on the KY-9 secure telephone to Paris.

In the President's absence the message to U Thant was further discussed. The Attorney General felt we should say to U Thant: "While these and other proposals are being discussed, would you urgently ascertain whether the Soviet Union is prepared to cease work on the bases and render the missiles inoperable?" U Thant would be asked to convey the President's message to the Russians in New York most urgently.

Secretary Rusk questioned whether the Russians are trying at the last minute to obtain more of a quid pro quo from us or whether they are introducing new elements in the picture merely to weaken our public position worldwide.

Secretary McNamara pointed out, in connection with the current military situation, that a limited airstrike on Cuba was now impossible because our reconnaissance planes were being fired on. He felt that we must now look to the major airstrike to be followed by an invasion of Cuba. To do so he said we would need to call up the reserves now.

Secretary McNamara  If we could do this he felt that the Soviets would not attack Turkey when we invaded Cuba. Our objective should be to seek to avoid any Soviet attack in Europe as a response to our invasion of Cuba.

*redefining plan*


Ambassador Thompson commented that it was impossible to draw any conclusions from the fact that one of our reconnaissance planes over Cuba had been shot at.

The President returned to the meeting, accompanied by General Lemnitzer.

The President approved the final revision of the statement to U Thant, which was to be phoned to U Thant and released here publicly. (Copy attached)

The President asked whether we should call together the representatives of NATO to report to them what we had done and were planning to do. If we reject Soviet efforts to tie in NATO problems to the Cuban situation, then we could persuade NATO to take the same position. An additional reason for a NATO meeting then is that if the Russians do attack the NATO countries we do not want them to say that they had not been consulted about the actions we were taking in Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said that current military planning



The President expressed his concern that the alternatives we are facing have not been presented to NATO. NATO does not realize what may be coming and the Europeans do not realize that we may face a choice of invading Cuba or taking the missiles out of Turkey.

Secretary McNamara urged that a NATO meeting be held tomorrow only if we have decided to launch our strike tomorrow. He repeated his hope that we can act in such a way as to reduce the pressure on the Russians to hit Turkey.

Secretary Rusk recommended that mobilization measures be authorized immediately.

The President suggested that we talk immediately to the Turks, explaining to them what we were planning to do with our missiles and then explain the entire situation to the North Atlantic Council.

Secretary Rusk then read a Stevenson draft of a letter to Khrushchev.




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The President said that the key to any letter to Khrushchev was the demand that work cease on the missile sites in Cuba. He predicted that if we make no mention of Turkey in our letter, Khrushchev will write back to us saying that if we include Turkey, then he would be prepared to settle the Cuban situation. The President said this would mean that we would lose twenty-four hours while they would continue to work on the bases and achieve an operational status for more of their missiles. He suggested that we would be willing to guarantee not to invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were taken out.

Secretary Rusk returned to the Stevenson draft, which the President approved as revised. The Phrase "and assurance of peace in the Caribbean" was discussed and the reference to no invasion of Cuba was omitted. The President also agreed not to call a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

The Attorney General commented that in his opinion the Stevenson draft letter was defensive. It sounded as if we had been thrown off balance by the Russians. The State Department draft merely said that we accepted Khrushchev's offer.

General Taylor summarized the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs. Unless the missiles are defused immediately, the Chiefs recommended implementation on Monday/



Secretary McNamara asked what we should do about air surveillance tomorrow. He stated his recommendation, i. e. if our reconnaissance planes are fired on, we will attack the attackers. General Taylor noted that in order to be ready to invade on Monday, we must continue intensive air surveillance.

The President directed that our air reconnaissance missions be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. If our planes are fired on, we must be prepared for a general response or an attack on the SAM site which fired on our planes. We will decide tomorrow how we return fire after we know if they continue their attacks on our planes and after we hear from U Thant the Russian reply to our offer.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

The President considered a draft message to the Turks about their missiles. His objective was to persuade the Turks to suggest to us that we withdraw our missiles. He noted that negotiations with the Turks were very difficult if there was any life left in the proposal which we had asked U Thant to make to the Russians.

General Taylor read a late report of the shooting down of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in Cuba which said that the wreckage of the U-2 was on the ground and that the pilot had been killed. He felt that we should make an air attack tomorrow on the SAM site responsible for shooting down the U-2 plane.

Secretary McNamara said that we must now be ready to attack Cuba. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Invasion had become almost inevitable. If we leave U.S. missiles in Turkey, the Soviets might attack Turkey. If the Soviets do attack the Turks, we must respond in the NATO area. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ However, we should make every effort to reduce the chance of a Soviet attack on Turkey.

In an informal discussion following the formal end of the meeting, the Vice President asked why we were not prepared to trade the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, if we were prepared to give up the use of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Under Secretary Ball responded that last week we thought it might be acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would save Berlin. He felt that we could accept the Soviet offer and replace the missiles in Turkey by assigning Polaris submarines to the area.

Bromley Smith

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**TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE**

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 5,  
October 25, 1962, 5:00 PM

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Director McCone gave an intelligence briefing which contained no major new information. He listed fifteen ships en route to Cuba, among them the Graznyy, which is one of three oil tankers with deck tanks probably containing ammonia.

Mr. McCone noted that a Bloc ship would be entering the Panama Canal on November 2. It would be searched, as have Bloc ships transiting the Canal during the past seven years.

Mr. McCone said he had no information of any unusual developments in Europe.

Secretary Dillon noted that there had been a run on gold in Germany and to a lesser extent in London. His conclusion was that these gold purchases reflected the fear of the buyers.

Secretary McNamara said that the East German passenger ship Voelker Freundschaft was at the Cuban barrier. It is a fairly large ship, 525 feet long, and has been ordered to report its position every four hours. He said we faced a decision as to whether or not to stop it.

Secretary McNamara reported that the Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded had turned back before crossing the barrier. Late information on the Graznyy revealed that it was lying dead in the water. The result is that to date no ship has yet been boarded.

Secretary Rusk reported on diplomatic developments. He said the question was whether we can get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba or at least under UN control. He added that if there was any prospect of success in following a political track, we would have to keep heavy pressure on the Russians. He reported that Soviet representative Zorin in New York was furious about U Thant's proposals for U.S./USSR talks under UN sponsorship in New York, but that Khrushchev had agreed to such talks. Our position would be that during these next two days of preliminary discussions we must somehow stop the missile buildup in Cuba. We must know what is going on at the IRBM sites in Cuba and we need to know whether warheads have actually been delivered to Cuba. Shortly we must decide if the Soviet signals which they are sending us mean they are getting ready to talk or whether they are getting ready to attack us.


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Referring to possible UN action, Secretary Rusk said we would probably be able to get only a seven-to-two vote in the Security Council, but even so, action in the UN General Assembly was a possibility. He specifically mentioned one possibility, i. e. Latin American States proposing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. He thought that many Latin American States would support this zone, along with many other UN members, and the Soviets would have a difficult time opposing it.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the relationship between our quarantine and Soviet-Cuban relations. The Cubans, who would not be able to survive in political isolation, must henceforth rely entirely on the Soviets.




An appeal might be made to Castro to step aside so that a new government might break this complete dependence from here on out on the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk explained the nature of the preliminary talks which are to be held in New York in the next two or three days between U Thant and Zorin on one side and Stevenson and U Thant on the other. The purpose of these talks is to arrive at a solution of the crisis or, if no solution is possible, to provide a basis for later action, having been unable to negotiate a settlement. He said that these talks could not go on for two weeks, but must be limited to a very few days because the IRBM sites in Cuba are becoming operational and the IL-28 bombers will soon be able to fly.

Secretary McNamara said all of his actions were taken with a view to applying force gradually. The ten air reconnaissance missions flown today went well and he recommended that ten more missions be flown tomorrow. Other military actions being taken would be meaningful to the Russians but would still not force escalation.

Secretary McNamara described night reconnaissance flights which involve dropping flares --



Secretary Dillon noted that the urgency of the situation was considerably reduced if the Russians do not try to break the quarantine.

Secretary McNamara expressed his concern that if the New York talks go along very long, a kind of plateau will have been reached which would make the decision to take new actions very difficult.

Secretary Rusk summarized the political track as follows. We might get a unanimous vote in the OAS for our actions. We could expect a veto from the Russians in the Security Council. If the U Thant proposals were rejected, we could go to the General Assembly where as many as eighty States might support a Latin American denuclearization proposal. He was not ready to knock out the possibility of a political solution.

Secretary McNamara said there were many ways of increasing pressure on the Russians by military measures, i. e. quarantine, inspection at sea, surveillance, the addition of jet fuel to the list of products embargoes, and the holding of all petroleum tankers.

The Attorney General noted that if all Bloc cargo ships turn back rather than cross the quarantine barrier, we might let Soviet tankers through in order to avoid an incident at sea during the discussions in New York. He said we might decide that it was better to knock out the missiles by air attack than to stop a Soviet ship on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we might

~~Such action would step up pressure on the Cubans without further use of military force.~~

Director McCone agreed that such action would be effective because it would greatly reduce imports into Cuba and also take away from the Cubans their outgoing cargoes.

Secretary McNamara suggested that we might consider

~~which could take up to several weeks. The purpose would be to throttle imports by Cuba.~~

In a discussion of other military measures, Mr. Rostow said any reconnaissance flights would have a beneficial effect on developments in New York.

Secretary McNamara commented that the dropping of flares on the IRBM sites at night would be highly effective. General Taylor thought that the psychological effect of night reconnaissance would be entirely favorable as well as serving to keep up the pressure and providing more information about the readiness status of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk said that he would seek to define our future political moves later in the evening.

Secretary Dillon stated his support of the idea of a Latin American denuclearized zone.

The Attorney General repeated his question as to whether we really wanted to stop a Soviet ship. He said he believed the Soviets had turned their ships around because they did not want us to see what was on them. The tankers, however, continue to move toward Cuba because they have nothing but petroleum. He said he felt that the measures we take should indicate clearly that we mean business but we should avoid a direct confrontation now.

Secretary McNamara said we should decide tonight to take measures tonight which would put us in a position of being ready to board Bloc ships approaching the barrier. We could let Soviet tankers through the quarantine and announce later we were putting an embargo on aviation gasoline. If we were going to board the East German ship we would have to decide tonight.

Both General Taylor and Secretary Dillon pointed out that we could not permit Soviet technicians to go through the quarantine even though technicians are not on the embargo list.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the East German ship not be stopped because it might be necessary for us to shoot at it or to ram it. There would be great danger to the some 1500 passengers aboard. The current situation is that the ship has been hailed and a U.S. destroyer is following it. If we ask it to stop and it does not, then we would have to use force. If in so doing we injure passengers and then discover there are no strategic missiles aboard, we would be in a very difficult situation. In addition, our world position would appear weak if we allow Soviet ships through the quarantine but stop an East German ship. The Voelker Freundschaft will make a landfall tomorrow and a decision must be made by 2:00 AM this morning if we want to stop it outside Cuban territorial waters.

At this point the President entered the Cabinet Room:

Secretary McNamara reviewed the situation with respect to the Voelker Freundschaft. He said the East German ship had left Rostov on October 11 and Leningrad on October 14.

The destroyer Pierce is following the ship which is still outside the barrier. Secretary McNamara recommended that we not stop this ship.

The President referred to the message from U Thant asking us to avoid incidents pending the talks at New York.

Mr. Bundy said the East German ship was not covered by U Thant's message.

General Taylor and Director McCone asked Mr. McNamara

The President said the only argument against stopping the ship is U Thant's request for no incidents for the time being. He said that we would have to drop the other shoe soon.

Secretary McNamara repeated his earlier statement with respect to the difficulty of stopping a passenger ship. He preferred to stop the Grazny tomorrow if Khrushchev did not accept U Thant's proposed mediation effort.

The Attorney General said he wished to describe again the other side of the argument. He said we could let the tanker through the barrier. As of now no other ships were approaching the barrier. Surveillance measures could be taken to keep the pressure on the Russians and provide time for the political measures suggested by Secretary Rusk without appearing to be backing off from a confrontation. He repeated his view that we may decide that it is better to avoid confronting the Russians by stopping one of their ships and to react by attacking the missiles already in Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said he preferred that the confrontation take place in Cuba rather than on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk noted that the quarantine had become fully effective.

Secretary McNamara reported that there had been no response yesterday or today to our low-level reconnaissance flights. He recommended that we continue to fly daylight reconnaissance missions and add night reconnaissance not only to gain information, but also to convince the public that we are increasing the pressure on the Russians.

The President decided that we should not stop the East German ship. Tomorrow we will know the Soviet response to U Thant's proposal. We will let the tanker through the barrier and later add jet fuel to the list of products embargoed.

The Attorney General said that fifteen ships have turned back, which is an impressive action taken by the Russians. We must be careful that the Russians do not think that we are backing down.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance of the first case of our boarding a ship. If the ship carried deck cargo or dry cargo, the case would be different than a passenger ship which is a bad first case.

Mr. Rostow stated the argument for adding petroleum products to the blockade which he said would have a drastic effect on the Cuban economy.

The President again said we should let the East German passenger ship go through and we should seek to avoid any incident in order not to create a bad effect on U Thant's negotiations. We could decide tomorrow afternoon what more we should do after we know Khrushchev's reply to U Thant. He said we must act soon because work on the missile sites is still going on and we must back up very soon the firmness we have displayed up to now.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that we must react very soon to Khrushchev's strong letter.

Secretary Rusk noted that Bloc shipping worldwide was behaving normally except for the ships in Cuban trade.

As the meeting concluded, Mr. McCone reported that some of the strategic missiles deployed in Cuba are now operational.



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The President had before him at the meeting a folder containing drafts of alternative next major moves (copy attached).

Bromley Smith


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Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 6,  
October 26, 1962, 10:00 AM

Director McCone summarized the attached intelligence memorandum, including a statement on the current status of Soviet air readiness.

Mr. McCone described the celebration which took place in Havana following the arrival of the tanker Bucharest which had been allowed to pass the quarantine line because it was carrying only oil, which is not now contraband. He said non-Bloc ships could be used to carry military materials if they had been chartered on a bare boat basis by the Russians.



Mr. Bundy reported that three subcommittees are at work -- one on Berlin, chaired by Paul Nitze, one on forward planning, chaired by Walt Rostow, and one on worldwide communications problems, chaired by William Orrick, who is working closely with the Defense Communications Agency.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the civil defense problem and obtained agreement that no crash program would be undertaken now, although

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preliminary measures are to be initiated. He referred to the amount of sensitive information which has been leaking to the press and urged that information about future actions must be more carefully guarded.

Secretary McNamara reported on the status of the quarantine. The Defense Department was authorized to release information on the boarding of the Lebanese ship, the Marucla, the first dry cargo ship which had been loaded in a Soviet port. In the event that comparisons were made between stopping the Lebanese ship and permitting an East German ship to go through the quarantine line, the point will be made that the East German ship carried only passengers.

Secretary McNamara read a list of Bloc ships and their locations and noted that there would be no intercepts at sea today. The tanker Graznyy is apparently moving but will not cross the line today. He suggested that shortly we should embargo fuel used by bombers and substances from which airplane fuel is made, i. e. petroleum products.

The President suggested that if we decide to embargo bomber fuel, we should also mention the fact that we were embargoing fuel which was contributing to the operational capability of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk asked that POL not be embargoed for at least twenty-four hours in order to avoid upsetting the U Thant talks now under way in New York.

Under Secretary Ball asked for agreement on the embargo of petroleum as the next step in the effort to increase pressures -- the timing of the embargo to be decided later in relation to the New York talks.

Secretary Dillon stated his reservations concerning this course of action. He said it ended up in stopping Soviet ships. Thus, a confrontation with the Russians would not be over the missiles, but over Soviet ships. He believed we should go for the missiles rather than force a confrontation with the USSR at sea.

A decision on adding petroleum to the embargo list was delayed until the political path was decided upon.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that construction on the strategic missile sites in Cuba was continuing. He asked that public announcement be made

of our continuation of air surveillance. He recommended that daylight reconnaissance measures be flown today and a night mission tonight, including the dropping of flares.

Secretary Rusk asked that the night mission not be flown because of the unfortunate effect which it might have on the U Thant negotiations in New York.

Secretary McNamara thought that one way of avoiding reaction to night reconnaissance was to inform the Cubans and the Russians in advance that we were initiating such flights.

Ambassador Stevenson opposed any public announcement of our surveillance activities.

The President directed that we dramatize the fact that the missile buildup in Cuba is continuing. He authorized daylight reconnaissance measures but decided to delay night flights.


Secretary Rusk praised Ambassador Stevenson's UN performance. He urged that USIA keep the pressure on the Cuban people and mentioned the dropping of leaflets over Cuba.

Acting Director Wilson requested that better aerial pictures be made available to USIA for distribution. The President authorized the use of any reconnaissance pictures, including those used by Ambassador Stevenson in his UN speech.

Secretary Rusk summarized political actions now under way. He said the object of the talks with U Thant today was to set up some form of negotiations with the Russians in New York. The objective would be to obtain a commitment from the Russians that there would be no further construction at the missile sites in Cuba, no further Soviet military shipments, the defuzing of existing weapons in Cuba, UN inspection of all nuclear-capable missiles, and an observer corps on the ground in Cuba of 350 technically able inspectors. The U.S. quarantine would continue until a UN quarantine is in place. UN teams would be put into specified Cuban ports. U.S. Navy ships would stay close to all Cuban ports to ensure that there were no landings unknown to the UN inspectors and no cargoes landed anywhere which UN inspectors did not see.

Mr. McCloy stated that our quarantine was vital and should be kept in place until the Russians had accepted all of our conditions.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that we must make clear to U Thant that the quarantine is related to the Soviet missiles rather than to Soviet military shipments to Cuba.



Secretary Rusk felt that it was better for us not to participate in such action as would be necessary if it were done by an organization, i. e. the OAS, to which we belong.

The President noted that the plan proposed by Brazil not only calls for an atomic-free zone in Latin America, but it also encompasses a guarantee of the territorial integrity on all Latin American States. He asked whether we could commit ourselves not to invade Cuba. Secretary Rusk commented that we are committed not to invade Cuba, having signed the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.

Secretary Rusk read a draft cable

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In commenting

on the draft cable, Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of getting Soviet missiles out urgently.

Mr. McCone expressed his dislike of a situation involving continued control of Cuba by Castro. Even if the Soviet missiles are removed, Castro, if he is left in control, will be in an excellent position to undertake the Communization of Latin America.

Secretary Rusk said the present position is that Cuba ties to the USSR are not negotiable. Mr. Bundy pointed out, and the President agreed, that our objective was to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President said work on the missile sites has to cease and we have to verify what is going on at the sites every day during the talks in New York. As to the message to Castro, he agreed in general, but wanted to have another look at it. He doubted that it would do any good, but it might be undertaken if done now with the greatest urgency.

Ambassador Stevenson discussed the immediate negotiations now under way with U Thant and the longer talks which would follow if agreement can be reached with the Russians in New York. He said the immediate talks were aimed at getting a 24-48-hour standstill on the missile buildup in Cuba. He acknowledged that in these talks it would be impossible to obtain an agreement to make the weapons inoperable. He wanted to know whether he should seek a standstill on all Soviet arms or only offensive weapons. He would seek to get a commitment that there be no further construction, but it would not be possible to set up a system to ensure that the weapons were made inoperable and kept inoperable. In addition, he needed to know whether in return we would be prepared to suspend the quarantine.

Ambassador Stevenson said the aim of the longer term talks would be the withdrawal from this hemisphere of the strategic missiles and the dismantlement of existing sites. He predicted that the Russians would ask us for a new guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and the dismantlement of U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey.

Mr. McCone disagreed with Ambassador Stevenson's linking of Soviet missiles in Cuba to U.S. missiles in Turkey. He said the Soviet weapons

in Cuba were pointed at our heart and put us under great handicap in continuing to carry out our commitments to the free world. He urged that we do not drop the quarantine until the Soviet missiles are out of Cuba. He believed that we must keep up the momentum so far achieved by the quarantine.

The President said we will get the Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba only by invading Cuba or by trading. He doubted that the quarantine alone would produce a withdrawal of the weapons. He said our objective should be to prevent further military shipments, further construction at missile sites, and to get some means of inspection.

Mr. McCone urged that any inspectors sent to Cuba be U.S. inspectors knowledgeable about strategic missiles.

The President said he understood Ambassador Stevenson to be asking for time during which he would try to negotiate the withdrawal of the missiles.

Secretary Rusk doubted that we could get any pre-conditions to negotiation.

Secretary Dillon agreed that the Soviets could not back down merely in return for dropping the quarantine.

Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of obtaining a guarantee that the nuclear missiles would be disassembled from their launchers.

Mr. Bundy said negotiations for a standstill or a standdown were not enough for our security because we must press, in addition, for guaranteed inspection of Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said we could not negotiate for two weeks under the missile threat which now exists in Cuba.

The President noted that there appeared to be little support for Ambassador Stevenson's plan. If the quarantine would not result in the Soviets withdrawing the missiles, what will we do if negotiations break down?

Mr. Bundy said when the interim 24-48-hour talks fail, then our choice would be to expand the blockade or remove the missiles by air attack.

General Taylor urged that we increase our reconnaissance activity in order to keep informed as to what was happening in Cuba.

The President decided to delay night reconnaissance missions, at least until the Soviets turn down U Thant's proposal. He also agreed that we should announce publicly that construction work at the missile sites in Cuba was going on and that, therefore, we will continue our aerial reconnaissance flights. The President also wanted attention called by a White House spokesman to his earlier speech which insisted that work at the missile sites in Cuba cease. The President decided that a presentation of the current situation should be made to the Congressional Leaders.

Bromley Smith



III/04/11 3/10 JFRL/NSF/316/  
Exec Com Mtg 6-10

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7  
October 27, 1962, 10:00 AM

Director McCone highlighted the intelligence information contained in the first two pages of the attached CIA Cuba Crisis Memorandum.

Secretary McNamara reported on the positions of Soviet Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He said we do not know yet whether any such ships will enter the interception area. He recommended that we be prepared to board the *Graznyy*, which is now out about 600 miles. We would put ships alongside her and follow along for about 200 miles.




Under Secretary Ball pointed out that the Soviets did not know the extent of our quarantine zone.

The President agreed that we should ask U Thant to tell the Russians in New York where we are drawing the quarantine line. The Russians would then be in a position to decide whether to turn back their tanker or allow her to enter the quarantine zone sometime later today.

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, two daylight reconnaissance missions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Secretary McNamara also recommended that a night reconnaissance mission be flown -- Secretary Rusk recommended against a night flight. The President instructed the Defense Department to place the night reconnaissance planes on the alert and to prepare a public announcement of the mission in order that a final decision to be taken this afternoon could be promptly implemented.

The discussion then turned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Mr. Nitze said it would be an anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out. He feared the next Soviet step would be a demand for the denuclearization of the entire NATO area. He urged us to focus attention on Cuba rather than on U.S. bases in other countries.

Under Secretary Ball reported



SANITIZED

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

U.S. ARCHIVIST (WV 82-133)  
BY *fmj* NARS, DATE 12/24/83

At this point in the meeting the partial text of a Soviet public statement was read by the President as it was received in the room. The President commented that the statement was a very tough position and varied considerably from the tone of Khrushchev's personal letter to the President received last night. The President felt that the Soviet position would get wide support and said we should consider making public the Khrushchev private letter.

Secretary Rusk returned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey and pointed out that this subject must be kept separate from Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Turkish missile problem should be dealt with in the context of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Bundy said we could not accept the Soviet proposal on Turkish missiles because the Soviet missiles were not out of Cuba.

The President recalled that he had asked that consideration be given to the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey some days previously.

Under Secretary Ball replied that the Department had decided it could not raise this question with the Turks at this time for fear of a disastrous Turkish reaction. He said the question had been raised with Finletter in Paris and study was being given to whether any method could be worked out to reassure the Turks if we were going to offer to withdraw the Jupiter missiles.

Mr. Bundy said we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally, i.e. Turkey, to serve our own interests, i.e. getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President commented that the Russians had made the Turkish missile withdrawal proposal in the most difficult possible way. Now that their proposal is public, we have no chance to talk privately to the Turks about the missiles, which, for a long time, we have considered to be obsolete.

Secretary Dillon said that it was possible that the Russians had made their public statement as part of a stalling tactic to provide them with sufficient time for a full-fledged confrontation with us.

The President read a draft statement telephoned from New York by Ambassador Stevenson commenting on the Soviet statement. Ambassador Stevenson argued for releasing his statement in an effort to keep the "peace offensive" from going to the Soviets.

The President left the meeting at this point with Mr. Sorensen. There ensued a discussion of how to handle the discrepancy between the Khrushchev private letter and the Russian offer made public in the Soviet statement. A suggestion was made that the Russian proposals contained in the private Khrushchev letter be made public.

The President returned to the meeting. He said we must ensure that the construction work on the missile sites in Cuba be stopped at once. He suggested that we talk to the Turks about the missiles, pointing out to them the great peril facing them during the next week. He acknowledged that the Turks were now in no position to make a statement to the effect that they would ask that the Jupiters be withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we tell the Turks they must say that the Jupiter problem is a NATO problem and is not associated with the Cuban missile problem.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the fact that the missiles belonged to Turkey and that only the nuclear warheads are under our total control.

The President returned to a discussion of where we now find ourselves, i. e. we now have Soviet public proposals and Khrushchev's private proposals. What we must seek is an immediate cessation of the work on offensive missiles in Cuba. Once this work stopped we could talk to the Russians.

Mr. Bundy reiterated the view that the threat to us in Cuba. One explanation for the varying Soviet proposals is that the hard line Russians wanted to make public their preferred demands in order to make impossible progress toward the Khrushchev private offer which may have been drafted by those who are less hard-nosed.

The President noted that it appeared to him that the Russians were making various proposals so fast, one after the other, that they were creating a kind of shield behind which work on the missile sites in Cuba continued. He said we had a perfectly defensible position, i. e. work on the missile sites must stop. Secretary McNamara added the thought that these offensive weapons must be made inoperable.

Mr. Bundy suggested that we tell Khrushchev privately that the position in their public statement was impossible for us, but that the position

Khrushchev took in his private letter was different and we were studying these proposals. In the meantime, however, time is running out.

The President interrupted to take a telephone call from Ambassador Stevenson in New York. He resumed the discussion by saying that Khrushchev obviously is attempting to limit our freedom of action in Cuba by introducing the question of the missile bases outside this hemisphere.

Mr. Bundy read a draft press statement and Mr. Gilpatric read a statement which he had prepared.

Mr. Alexis Johnson reported that he had just been informed that the Turkish Government had issued a press statement saying that the Russian proposal with respect to Jupiters in Turkey was not conceivable.

(As the remainder of the Soviet public statement was received in the Cabinet Room, it appeared that the Russian base proposal involved not merely Turkey but all of NATO.)

Mr. Sorensen introduced a draft statement which was read by the group.

Revisions were made in the Gilpatric draft, which was issued shortly thereafter in the form attached. This statement emphasized the offensive weapons buildup in Cuba.

The Attorney General said that the statement might make people think that if the Russians stopped the missile buildup in Cuba, we would be willing to withdraw our missiles from Turkey. He desired that we make doubly clear that Turkish NATO missiles were one problem and that Cuba was an entirely separate problem.

Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was crucial for us to stand on the position that we will not negotiate with the Russians while the Soviet missile threat is growing in Cuba.

The President recalled that over a year ago we wanted to get the Jupiter missiles out of Turkey because they had become obsolete and of little military value. If the missiles in Cuba added 50% to Soviet nuclear capability, then to trade these missiles for those in Turkey would be of great military value. But we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and in Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value. From the political point of view, it would be hard to get support on an airstrike

*JFK the subject in the group on this work*

against Cuba because many would think that we would make a good trade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey in the event the Russians would agree to remove the missiles from Cuba. We are in a bad position if we appear to be attacking Cuba for the purpose of keeping useless missiles in Turkey. We cannot propose to withdraw the missiles from Turkey, but the Turks could offer to do so. The Turks must be informed of the great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over missiles.

The President left the meeting to meet the State Governors who had been waiting for one-half hour to see him.

The discussion continued in the President's absence. It was not possible to say with certainty whether the Soviet public offer included all NATO bases or referred specifically to Turkey.

The Attorney General expressed his concern as to what our position would be if we talked to the Russians for sixty days and then the Cubans refused to permit UN inspectors to continue to ensure that missiles in Cuba were inoperable. The reply was that we could then decide to attack the bases by air.

There was discussion of a second statement to be put out but this proposal was later abandoned.

A draft message to Khrushchev, which had been prepared by Ambassador Thompson, was read and a final version was to be completed for the President's consideration later in the day. The group agreed to meet at the State Department without the President at 2:30 PM and meet with the President again at 4:00 PM.

(Note: At the meeting at the State Department, the Attorney General repeated his view that we should keep the focus on the missile bases. He preferred to let the Soviet tankers through the quarantine line in order to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets over one of their ships. He said if we attack a Soviet tanker, the balloon would go up. He urged that we buy time now in order to launch an air attack Monday or Tuesday.

Secretary McNamara expressed his view that before we attack Cuba we must notify the Cubans.

Bromley Smith

3/10 JPR L/USF /316? /Exec Com  
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~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 8  
October 27, 1962, 4:00 PM

elroy +  
from  
South  
talks was  
Oct 27

Secretary McNamara reported on today's daylight reconnaissance mission. One mission aborted for mechanical reasons, according to preliminary reports. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.

Secretary McNamara again recommended night reconnaissance missions. The President delayed a decision on night flights pending a full report on today's daylight mission (the night mission was later called off).

There followed a discussion of a draft letter from the President to Khrushchev. The President added to the draft an offer to discuss with the Russians the proposals they had made public. He predicted that Khrushchev would say we had rejected his proposal. The formulation included a comment that Khrushchev must realize that matters relating to NATO must be discussed at a later time. The letter was approved in a revised form.

A message to U Thant was discussed and approved. The purpose of the message was to obtain the halting of work on the bases in Cuba as a condition to discussion of various other problems.

Secretary Rusk reported that one of our U-2 planes had overflown the Soviet Union by accident due to navigational error. Soviet fighters were scrambled from a base near Wrangel Island. The Secretary thought that the Russians would make a loud fuss about this incident.

The President decided not to make the incident public, but be prepared to do so as soon as the Soviets publicized it.

The President asked whether we wanted to continue to say that we would talk only about the missiles in Cuba. He believed that for the next few hours we should emphasize our position that if the Russians will halt missile activity in Cuba we would be prepared to discuss NATO problems with the Russians. He felt that we would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days. He did

SANITIZED

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

ARCHIVIST (NWK-82-133)  
NARS, DATE 12/24/82

feel that if we could succeed in freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there would be a serious reaction in NATO countries if we appeared to be trading withdrawal of missiles in Turkey for withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. The President responded that if we refuse to discuss such a trade and then take military action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult position.

The President left the room to talk to General Norstad on the KY-9 secure telephone to Paris.

In the President's absence the message to U Thant was further discussed. The Attorney General felt we should say to U Thant: "While these and other proposals are being discussed, would you urgently ascertain whether the Soviet Union is prepared to cease work on the bases and render the missiles inoperable?" U Thant would be asked to convey the President's message to the Russians in New York most urgently.

Secretary Rusk questioned whether the Russians are trying at the last minute to obtain more of a quid pro quo from us or whether they are introducing new elements in the picture merely to weaken our public position worldwide.

Secretary McNamara pointed out, in connection with the current military situation, that a limited airstrike on Cuba was now impossible because our reconnaissance planes were being fired on. He felt that we must now look to the major airstrike to be followed by an invasion of Cuba. To do so he said we would need to call up the reserves now.

Secretary McNamara

If we could do this he felt that the Soviets would not attack Turkey when we invaded Cuba. Our objective should be to seek to avoid any Soviet attack in Europe as a response to our invasion of Cuba.

*a revision  
to the  
defensive  
plan*

Ambassador Thompson commented that it was impossible to draw any conclusions from the fact that one of our reconnaissance planes over Cuba had been shot at.

The President returned to the meeting, accompanied by General Lemnitzer.


The President approved the final revision of the statement to U Thant, which was to be phoned to U Thant and released here publicly. (Copy attached)

*was it sent?*

*wasn't it?*

The President asked whether we should call together the representatives of NATO to report to them what we had done and were planning to do. If we reject Soviet efforts to tie in NATO problems to the Cuban situation, then we could persuade NATO to take the same position. An additional reason for a NATO meeting then is that if the Russians do attack the NATO countries we do not want them to say that they had not been consulted about the actions we were taking in Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said that current military planning



The President expressed his concern that the alternatives we are facing have not been presented to NATO. NATO does not realize what may be coming and the Europeans do not realize that we may face a choice of invading Cuba or taking the missiles out of Turkey.

Secretary McNamara urged that a NATO meeting be held tomorrow only if we have decided to launch our strike tomorrow. He repeated his hope that we can act in such a way as to reduce the pressure on the Russians to hit Turkey.

Secretary Rusk recommended that mobilization measures be authorized immediately.

The President suggested that we talk immediately to the Turks, explaining to them what we were planning to do with our missiles and then explain the entire situation to the North Atlantic Council.

Secretary Rusk then read a Stevenson draft of a letter to Khrushchev.




*From Papp  
previous day*

The President said that the key to any letter to Khrushchev was the demand that work cease on the missile sites in Cuba. He predicted that if we make no mention of Turkey in our letter, Khrushchev will write back to us saying that if we include Turkey, then he would be prepared to settle the Cuban situation. The President said this would mean that we would lose twenty-four hours while they would continue to work on the bases and achieve an operational status for more of their missiles. He suggested that we would be willing to guarantee not to invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were taken out.

Secretary Rusk returned to the Stevenson draft, which the President approved as revised. The Phrase "and assurance of peace in the Caribbean" was discussed and the reference to no invasion of Cuba was omitted. The President also agreed not to call a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

The Attorney General commented that in his opinion the Stevenson draft letter was defensive. It sounded as if we had been thrown off balance by the Russians. The State Department draft merely said that we accepted Khrushchev's offer.

General Taylor summarized the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs. Unless the missiles are defused immediately, the Chiefs recommended implementation on Monday/



Secretary McNamara asked what we should do about air surveillance tomorrow. He stated his recommendation, i. e. if our reconnaissance planes are fired on, we will attack the attackers. General Taylor noted that in order to be ready to invade on Monday, we must continue intensive air surveillance.

The President directed that our air reconnaissance missions be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. If our planes are fired on, we must be prepared for a general response or an attack on the SAM site which fired on our planes. We will decide tomorrow how we return fire after we know if they continue their attacks on our planes and after we hear from U Thant the Russian reply to our offer.

The President considered a draft message to the Turks about their missiles. His objective was to persuade the Turks to suggest to us that we withdraw our missiles. He noted that negotiations with the Turks were very difficult if there was any life left in the proposal which we had asked U Thant to make to the Russians.

General Taylor read a late report of the shooting down of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in Cuba which said that the wreckage of the U-2 was on the ground and that the pilot had been killed. He felt that we should make an air attack tomorrow on the SAM site responsible for shooting down the U-2 plane.

Secretary McNamara said that we must now be ready to attack Cuba. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Invasion had become almost inevitable. If we leave U.S. missiles in Turkey, the Soviets might attack Turkey. If the Soviets do attack the Turks, we must respond in the NATO area. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ However, we should make every effort to reduce the chance of a Soviet attack on Turkey.

In an informal discussion following the formal end of the meeting, the Vice President asked why we were not prepared to trade the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, if we were prepared to give up the use of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Under Secretary Ball responded that last week we thought it might be acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would save Berlin. He felt that we could accept the Soviet offer and replace the missiles in Turkey by assigning Polaris submarines to the area.

*how?*

*seems minimal*

Bromley Smith

1452/1304

October 27, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, October 27, 1962, 4:00 PM Meeting No. 8

1. Secretary McNamara gave fragmentary reports of today's daylight reconnaissance mission. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.
2. The President directed that the planned night reconnaissance mission be held up until the full report on the daylight mission was received. The night mission was later called off.
3. The President ordered the immediate dispatch to U Thant of the following message:

"A number of proposals have been made to you and to the United States in the last thirty-six hours. I would appreciate your urgently ascertaining whether the Soviet Union is willing immediately to cease work on these bases in Cuba and render the weapons inoperable under UN verification so that various solutions can be discussed."

4. Secretary Rusk summarized the air incident in the Far East involving a U-2 overflying the USSR due to navigational difficulties which resulted in Soviet fighters being scrambled from a base near Wrangel Island. The President decided not to say anything about the incident unless the Soviets publicized it.
  5. A letter from the President to Khrushchev was discussed and approved.
  6. General Taylor reported on current military planning, recommending that air surveillance be continued. The President directed that the day air reconnaissance mission be flown tomorrow without fighter escort.
- A decision on the appropriate response will await reports as to whether tomorrow's reconnaissance missions encounter opposition and upon replies to messages sent to U Thant and Khrushchev.

SANITIZED

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

CH. DAVIS (NLK-82-133)  
NARS DATE 12/24/82

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

- 2 -

7. There was a general discussion of how to handle the response to Khrushchev's public letter to the President, including the question of missiles in Turkey.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

*made only then?  
empirically before?*

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

10/22/82

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 9  
October 27, 1962, 9:00 PM

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Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, the call up of twenty-four air reserve squadrons, involving 14,000 personnel and 300 troop carriers. The call up of the air reserve squadrons is necessary to the invasion plan and will also serve to keep the pressure on the Russians. He said mobilization of private U.S. shipping should be initiated tomorrow in order to have sufficient ships available for an invasion.

The President said that if our reconnaissance planes are fired on tomorrow, and if we know the results of U Thant's talks with the Russians, then we should take out the SAM sites in Cuba by air action.

With respect to the Soviet tanker Graznyy approaching the quarantine zone, the Attorney General recommended that we take no action against it.

The President agreed that if the tanker crosses the barrier, we should let it through, but thereafter no Bloc ships would be allowed to cross into the zone.

The President directed that Ambassador Stevenson in New York be asked to tell U Thant of the location of the Soviet tanker and ask him to remind the Russians of their statement that their ships would not enter Cuban waters. A decision on whether to intercept the tanker could be taken tomorrow.

Secretary Rusk agreed, adding that the actions we had taken already had created sufficient pressure on the Russians for today.

The President said that tomorrow we could consider increasing the pressure by adding POL to the list of prohibited goods and by publicly announcing the mobilization of U.S. shipping.

The President read aloud the message from General Norstad concerning the tactics to be followed in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The message included a list of questions to be answered and ended with a recommendation to reject Khrushchev's offer to trade European missiles for U.S. missiles in Turkey.

There followed consideration of a draft cable to Ambassador Finletter in Paris instructing him as to how the NATO meeting should be handled. (A copy of this message is attached.)

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

NSC APPEAL No. (NLK-77-17 APPEAL)  
By MAM NARS, Date 11/77

Secretary Rusk recommended that we not state our preferred position first but present the various alternatives to the NATO members and oblige them to state their preference. We would make clear that we must stand unified with the NATO countries.

The President agreed that our posture should be that of consulting the NATO countries -- not pushing for only one course of action.

The Attorney General recommended that we should not take our final position for a few more hours. In the NATO meeting we would do not more than recite the facts and express our objective of trying to keep the situation limited to the Western Hemisphere. We would report the following day to NATO and hold off one more day a decision on accepting the Turkish/Cuban missile trade offer of the Russians. The President agreed to delete from the message the section on our preferred course of action. The NATO meeting tomorrow is to be a briefing and a request for their views. Ambassador Finletter is not to bring up the question of the possible withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey.

The President did not approve a draft message to Khrushchev dealing with the shooting down of a U.S. plane.

The President agreed that Ambassador Hare would not raise with the Turks the question of withdrawing the Jupiters, but that the State Department would inform Ambassador Hare, for his information, of what we are considering.

Personal letters to de Gaulle and Adenauer were given to the President for signature.

The President asked the group to meet the following morning at 11:00 o'clock.

Low-level reconnaissance missions were authorized. If these planes were attacked, the attacking planes would be fired upon.

Bromley Smith

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B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

October 27, 1962

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, October 27, 1962, 9:00 PM  
Meeting No. 9

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1. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, the callup of 24 air reserve squadrons, involving 14,000 personnel.
2. The President directed that Ambassador Stevenson tell U Thant that a Soviet tanker was approaching the quarantine zone and reminding U Thant of the Soviet statement that Soviet ships would not enter Cuban waters.
3. There was discussion of next steps including the calling up of U.S. ships and the addition of POL to the list of prohibited goods.
4. The President read a message from General Norstad which presented the difficulty for NATO of any trade tying Cuban missiles to Turkish missiles.
5. There was a general discussion of a draft message to Ambassador Finletter giving him guidance as to his presentation to the NATO meeting of Permanent Representatives called for tomorrow. (Copy of message to Finletter attached.) It was agreed that this NATO meeting should be limited to reporting on actions we have taken and reviewing NATO problems arising out of Khrushchev's public letter.

*McG Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 1.55, 1.61, 1.62, 1.63, 1.64, 1.65, 1.66, 1.67, 1.68, 1.69, 1.70, 1.71, 1.72, 1.73, 1.74, 1.75, 1.76, 1.77, 1.78, 1.79, 1.80, 1.81, 1.82, 1.83, 1.84, 1.85, 1.86, 1.87, 1.88, 1.89, 1.90, 1.91, 1.92, 1.93, 1.94, 1.95, 1.96, 1.97, 1.98, 1.99, 2.00

NSC (tr.) NLK-86-117 [REDACTED]  
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE DATE 9-21-87

Att: TOPOL 578

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

N4F 316 / ER On M/S: M/96 6-10 (JFRL)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

October 27, 1962

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, October 27, 1962, 4:00 PM Meeting No. 8

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5. A letter from the President to Khrushchev was discussed and approved.
6. General Taylor reported on current military planning, recommending that air surveillance be continued. The President directed that the day air reconnaissance mission be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. However, if MIG planes attack the reconnaissance planes, U.S. fighters will attack them. Planning is under way for a general air response and for an attack on any SAM site firing on U.S. planes. A decision on the appropriate response will await reports as to whether tomorrow's reconnaissance missions encounter opposition and upon replies to messages sent to U Thant and Khrushchev.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

By MyM NAK 86-112 9/87  
NARA Date

7. There was a general discussion of how to handle the response to Khrushchev's public letter to the President, including the question of missiles in Turkey.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy





1

Dear Mr. President,

I want to convey to you confidentially some considerations which, if you agree with them, could serve, in my opinion, our common cause, that is, prompt elimination of the remnants of the dangerous crisis which you and we have in the main liquidated. This would help to finalize the settlement more quickly so that life would resume its normal pace.

First of all, I would like to express a wish that you already now remove the quarantine without waiting for the procedure for the inspection of ships on which an agreement has been reached to be put into effect. It would be very reasonable on your part. You yourself realize that the quarantine will in fact accomplish nothing since those ships that are now heading for Cuba naturally, after we have agreed on the removal of our missiles from Cuba, do not carry not only any offensive weapons, but, as I have already stated it publicly and informed you confidentially, any weapons at all. Immediate lift of the quarantine would be a good gesture. It would be appreciated both by us and world public opinion as a major step to speed up liquidation of the aftereffects of the crisis. For practical purposes the quarantine is of no use to you, but being a manifestation of the crisis, it continues to poison relations among states, relations between you and us and produces a depressing effect on world public which would

like to see a complete relaxation. You would lose nothing but you would score a gain as far as public opinion is concerned.

On the other hand, immediate lift of the quarantine would give us an opportunity to use our ships that are approaching Cuba to take out the weapons which are being dismantled now and, I think, have been already dismantled. After the ships are unloaded the dismantled weapons could be loaded on them and shipped to the Soviet Union.

Naturally, after the elimination of the crisis it is impossible to continue the blockade and discrimination in trade and communications. All this must be gone away with. But you, as we know, undertook measures and put pressure on your allies and other countries so that even flights of civilian passenger planes be not permitted. Do you really think that IL-18 carries any means of destruction? This is laughable.

All this is being done not to ensure security, but as pin-pricks and cannot but cause irritation and worsening of our relations. Why should it be done? Who needs it? It serves only the aggressive forces to strain nerves and thus to reach their goal which is to push the world into the abyss of a thermonuclear war.

Therefore I believe, that you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly and will draw appropriate conclusions aimed at clearing the way for bettering the relations between our states.

Next question. I do not know what you will think about it but if you were prepared already now to proclaim the liquidation of your base in Guantanamo, this would be an act which would give world public opinion real satisfaction and would contribute to the easing of tension. I think that you yourself realize what significance the base in Guantanamo may have now after your statement that you do not pursue the aim of invading Cuba. Then the question arises: at whom this base is aimed, what purposes does it serve, from whom can it guard the approaches to America? I do not see forces that can threaten America from that direction. Therefore the base in Guantanamo is only a burden for your budget, and what is the main thing, it is a great burden of a moral nature for political leaders in the USA. And everybody realizes that the functions of the base in Guantanamo - and this is in fact the case - are aggressive, not defensive.

You know our position with regard to the bases. We are against military bases in general and that's why we liquidated those our bases that we had in Finland and China and we think that we acted rightly. That was an act that manifested our good intentions in ensuring peaceful coexistence. By that we did not diminish our defensive capability but raised our moral prestige among the peoples of all the world. The more true it is now when there are perfect means of war the range and destructive power of which are so great that no bases could in any degree replace them.

This would be a good preparation to an agreement between you and us on the liquidation of all military bases in general since military bases have lost now their importance. Those are not my words. I think, you yourself said and even stated it publicly that you want to reduce the number of your military bases. Of this spoke Bowles and others, and they spoke correctly.

Such your step would be highly appreciated by world public.

I would like also to tell you my following consideration.

My colleagues and I consider that both sides have displayed restraint and wisdom in liquidating the military conflict which might have resulted in a world thermonuclear war. I take the liberty to think that you evidently held to a restraining position with regard to those forces which suffered from militaristic itching. And we take a notice of that. I don't know, perhaps, I am wrong, but in this letter I am making the conclusion on the basis that in your country the situation is such that the decisive word rests with the President and if he took an extreme stand there would be no one to restrain him and war would be unleashed. But as this did not happen and we found a reasonable compromise having made mutual concessions to each other and on this basis eliminated the crisis which could explode in the catastrophe of a thermonuclear war, then, evidently, your role here was restraining. We so believe, and we note and appreciate it.

Our systems are different and my role was simpler than yours because there were no people around me who wanted to unleash war. My efforts aimed at eliminating the conflict were supported by both our military men and my colleagues in the leadership of the party and government.

Mr. President, we have now conditions ripe for finalizing the agreement on signing a treaty on cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons. We fully agree with regard to three types of tests or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of tests in atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In this respect we are of the same opinion and we are ready to sign an agreement.

But there are still some differences with regard to underground explosions. Therefore it would be good if you gave instructions to find a compromise in the decision on the underground test ban, but without inspection. We shall not accept inspection, this I say to you unequivocally and frankly. Of course, if one aims at delaying or torpedoing an agreement then there is sense in insisting on the inspection of underground explosions.

We do not carry on underground tests, we did it but once and we are not going to do it anymore. May be such a necessity will arise sometime in future, but in any case I do not envisage it.

It would be very useful to agree on ending tests after such strain when people lived through great anxiety. It would

be a great reward for the nervous strain suffered by the peoples of all countries. I think that your people felt as much anxiety as all other peoples expecting that thermonuclear war would break out any moment. And we were very close to such war indeed. That is why it would be good to give satisfaction to the public opinion. This would contribute to easing the tension.

We appreciate it very much that you took the initiative and in such a moment of crisis stated your readiness to conduct negotiations with the purpose of signing a non-aggression treaty between the two military blocs. We responded and supported it. We are prepared to come to an agreement on this question confidentially or through diplomatic channels and then make it public and start negotiations. This also would contribute to lessening tension. The world public would learn with satisfaction that in the moment of crisis not only declarative statements were made but certain commitments with signatures affixed were taken as well.

But the best thing to do would be - I do not know how you will look upon it - to disband all military blocs. We are not coming up with this now though we spoke of this before; however we believe now too that this would be most reasonable. But if you and your allies are not ready yet for that we are not pressing. However I must say that in the interests of the same elimination of tension this would be greatly useful.

We have eliminated a serious crisis. But in order to foresee and forestall appearance of a new crisis in future which might be impossible to cope with everything in our relations capable of generating a new crisis should be erased now. It would seem that now when we possess thermonuclear weapons, rocket weapons, submarine fleet and other means the situation obliges all states, every state to adhere to such norms of conduct which would not generate conflicts, to say nothing of wars. From our point of view, this is quite obtainable. This would be a big step forward at a time when we in effect have not yet disarmed. I think that this would be not a loss but a gain for the supporters of peaceful coexistence, a mutual benefit which the peoples of the U.S. and other countries participating in military blocs would enjoy. It can also be said with confidence that this would be highly appreciated by all peoples and would give great reassurance and satisfaction to people interested in securing peace. More efforts should be made already now to solve the problem of disarmament. To do it with regard not to one stage but to a real solution of the whole problem.

In our proposals on general and complete disarmament which we have made we have taken into consideration your wishes as well. Our recent proposals on this point were expressed by the USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko at the XVII session of the



U.N. General Assembly. In those proposals of ours adjustments were made to take into account your wishes. What we considered to be reasonable we took into consideration.

And of course, Mr. President, I am again reminding you of the necessity to solve the German question because next crisis, possibly of no lesser danger, can be caused by the German question. And the main thing is that that crisis will be foolish as all crises are.

There was war, two German states emerged, or actually three states, which are in existence since the end of World War II. Specific relations among them have already developed. But these relations - economic and political - exist because the German Democratic Republic regulates traffic through its territory on the basis of some substitutes for treaties though in reality, in daily life, in practice such treaties are already operative.

Besides, we and you, our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State, have agreed on all questions. And the only question which remains unsolved is that of the presence of troops in West Berlin and in effect not even of the troops but under what flag those troops will be and of what states, naturally within certain period of time.

Could not we both understand it? And who needs that the present unsolved situation continue? Not you and not your people. This is not in our or your interests, and not in the interests of our or your allies. This is only - and I repeat again - in the

interests of revanchist forces who do not want to recognize the borders and conditions emerged as a result of the defeat of the Hitlerite Germany. Only they benefit from that. Nobody else.

Who expresses such policy now - Adenauer or somebody else - that is of no particular importance to me or to you. But if one takes a realistic view, if you, Mr. President, analyze the situation then you in your heart will undoubtedly agree with me. What you say publicly is another matter. But that comes not from how you personally understand the situation but, so to say, from political expedience, from desire "not to offend" your ally. However it would be better to be guided by a desire not to offend the public opinion and to give satisfaction to it, to give satisfaction to all peoples, the American people included - to eliminate the hotbed of international tension in the center of Europe. And we would be able to eliminate it. If you and we come to an agreement on this question - and we do want it - this would be a great joy for all peoples because this would mean consolidation of peace.

There would remain many unsettled matters in the world but the main thing after that - and I would like to tell you about it - is the question of China. It is anomalous that China is not having her seat in the U.N. Similar anomalies already existed in history and were overwhelmed by life. When the Revolution broke out and won in America the Russian Emperor showed stubbornness and did not recognize America for 26 years. But America did not

cease to exist because of that. So, that was a foolish policy. The United States answered with the same lack of cleverness. But that happened, however, in different times. Therefore the U.S. acted unreasonably for roughly half that time: the Russian Emperor - for 26 years, you - for 16 years. But then the U.S. realized that it was unwise, and your great President Roosevelt took the courage and responsibility and displayed wisdom.

You would greatly raise your prestige, personal and that of your country, in the eyes of the peoples if you take an attitude facilitating China taking its lawful seat in the U.N. This is possible only if it is understood that there cannot be two Chinas. No state which respects itself can agree to a part of its territory, a part of its population being cut off, it applies even more strongly to a great power. This is an internal question of China and let the Chinese decide it among themselves. When China participated in the creation of the U.N. and when it was made a permanent member of the Security Council, then it was one China. And that one China exists now. If China occupies again its lawful seat in the U.N., if you understand the necessity of it - and I think that you do understand it - then it would be good, it would be a great contribution to the cause of peace.

It is impossible to come to an agreement on disarmament without China. There are countries with population of half a million and even less which are members of the U.N. and have

voice in this international organization. Iceland, for instance, has the population of 180 thousand people. China has 650 million people and does not have such voice. We have respect for the people of Iceland and their will as well as for all peoples. But from the point of view of ensuring peace - even if there seems to be a contradiction here - the contribution of a given people and that of another people, the real contribution to the cause of ensuring peace may be different.

Therefore it would be proper to solve the question of the restoration of China's rights in the U.N.; the peoples are waiting for it. And this will happen, it is only a matter of time. Therefore in order not to prolong this time, if you understood now the necessity for such a step, then, it would in effect be possible to solve this problem at the present session of General Assembly. What satisfaction it would give to the world public opinion, you would see from the expression of feelings of all peoples because it would be a real step, indeed, towards stabilization and strengthening of peace all over the world.

We, the Soviet people and the peoples of Asian and European countries saw war. War often rolled through our territory. America participated in the two wars but it suffered very small losses in those wars. While huge profits were accumulated as a result of the wars. Of course, it was monopolists who benefited but workers, working people got something out of it, too. War

did not touch the soil of the United States. The American people did not experience destruction, sufferings, they only received notifications about deaths of their kin. Now during this crisis war was knocking at the gates of America.

These, in effect, are my considerations after the crisis situation. I want to tell you that in this crisis, as our saying goes, there is no evil without good. Evil has brought some good. The good is that now people have felt more tangibly the breathin of the burning flames of thermonuclear war and have a more clear realization of the threat looming over them if arms race is not stopped. And I would say that what has just happened will serve especially good the American people.

Mr. President, I believe that you as a military man, and your military people understand that we were not preparing for war when we delivered means of defense to Cuba. Those means were not meant against the U.S., but were the means to ensure the security of Cuba. Do you really think that we are so narrow-minded in our understanding of military matters that in preparing for war against the U.S. we picked up Cuba as a bridge-head for such a war? And the means there - a certain number of missiles. This is foolish. For Cuba is no good as a bridge-head for a big war and it cannot be used for those purposes and, of course, nobody ever contemplated that. Those were the means for deterring agressor, to use the language of the late Dulles.

It is our opinion that the crisis has been eliminated on the compromise basis through reciprocal concessions. We are satisfied with it. We also appreciate your cooperation in the elimination of the crisis and your understanding of the necessity for reciprocal concessions and compromise so that the conflict be prevented from going beyond the limits that might really break into a thermonuclear war. All the peoples of the world, the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the peoples of all other countries, are interested in eliminating this conflict. In particular, I think, it will be highly appreciated by the people of Cuba who have now been assured that their borders will be respected and there will be no threat of invasion of their land on the part of stronger states. In other words, the Cuban people will have the long-awaited opportunity to enjoy the benefits of their labor and they will have the guarantee of their independence on the basis of the U.N. Charter which provides for non-interference into internal affairs of other states and respect for sovereignty and integrity of states.

These are the considerations, Mr. President, which I wanted to express to you. I understand that I listed a great number of questions. Therefore, if we started after breakfast we would not have finished solving them before dinner. It would require more time but they have to be solved. They face the world. And the more we delay the solution of these questions, the more of unknown will appear which can prove to be fatal in a future crisis.

Therefore, the sooner we clear away the roadblock, the wind-fallen wood, which has piled up in the international relations, and make clear the roads to correct mutual understanding the better it would be.

Mr. President, you lived through this crisis yourself. For us too, it presented the Rubicon: whether to agree to a compromise, whether to make concessions. Indeed, from the point of view of the legal standards your claims had no grounds whatsoever. Therefore there was a great trial and there were hesitations. We still believed, however, that you might have difficulties too since how could it be that you could not know that the unjustified demands of the USA exposed the world to the hazards of catastrophe. However, we decided to make a compromise proposal which would suit both you and us. We received your assurances that you would not invade Cuba and would not permit others to do it and on this condition we withdraw the weapons which you called offensive. As a result, there has been practically achieved the purpose which had been intended to be achieved through the shipments of means of defense. Now this question is solved on these compromise and reciprocal concessions.

And we consider it to be reasonable. Having eliminated this crisis we gave each other mutual satisfaction: you promised not to attack and not to permit attack against Cuba on the part of others, and we moved forward to make the USA feel confident that we do not contemplate anything bad against it and that there is no threat against the USA on our part. You certainly possess means

of destruction. But you know that we also have these means and they are of a different nature than those that were in Cuba. Those were trifles there. Our means were brought to the state of combat readiness, they were of a more serious nature and they were pointed at the USA and your allies.

To our mutual satisfaction we may be even sacrificed self-esteem, Apparently, there will be such scribblers who will engage in hair-splitting over our agreement, will be digging as to who made greater concessions to whom. As for me, I would say that we both made a concession to reason and found a reasonable solution which enabled us to ensure peace for all including those who will be trying to dig up something.

Such is our understanding of this whole question.

I would like to sum up the above said and express in conclusion the following considerations on the questions touched upon in this letter.

I think it would be possible to pick up from the questions listed by me those which are more ripe and which should, perhaps, be prepared for taking decisions on them. Then it would be possible to meet, may be, at the U.N. or may be at a specially arranged meeting. I repeat, I have in mind a meeting in case questions are prepared for taking decisions on them so that the appropriate agreements could be signed during the meeting. It would be a good gift for the peoples of the whole world.



We have a different understanding of the mentioned questions. Therefore I would like to know your considerations as to whether you believe that some or other of the questions raised by me are ripe for decision. If you do not consider them ripe, then there should be no meeting because a meeting in such conditions would not only fail to justify hopes of the peoples, but would distress them.

Sincerely,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

October 30, 1962.

10/30/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: Tuesday, October 30, 1962 3:00 p. m.

|||

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: James Reston, New York Times  
W. Averell Harriman

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Scotty Reston called on me at 3 o'clock and spent the better part of an hour. He told me he had seen the President, and that the President had told him that Mac Bundy would give him the run-down of what happened during the past days. He and his staff spent an hour and a half with Reston, and he told me he had been given the details of what had happened. I told him I couldn't discuss our end of it. In the first place, I had not been in any of the meetings and I wouldn't want to discuss it, but I would be willing to exchange views with him about the Kremlin, on what went on in the Kremlin during this period before and after, and the reaction of other countries, because I hadn't talked to anybody else and it would be purely my personal opinion.

He said that he had just seen Georgi Zhukov, and that Zhukov said that now that we have Cuba settled, it should be possible to settle other things. Scotty said, "Such as?" Zhukov replied "the Chinese-Indian conflict. These two countries represent almost half the population of the world. It is not in our joint interest to permit this conflict to go on. Couldn't Kennedy and Khrushchev settle it either together or each working on parallel lines?"

Scotty indicated that he thought it was interesting that no mention has been made by Khrushchev, or in this case, Zhukov, about Berlin.

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*v. & G. NW*  
*Macmillan*

We discussed what the Russians thought about Germany and agreed that they were concerned over the revival of militarism in Germany, specifically if Germany had independent nuclear capability. Scotty spoke of a talk he had had with Macmillan, in which Macmillan had indicated that each country had its particular fears. With Britain, unemployment was its great fear, and if Britain had had 5 million unemployed as we had, the Prime Minister would have nothing else on his mind. Scotty said, "But our preoccupation is something else -- it is surprise attack because of Pearl Harbor, and for this reason Cuba is very sensitive to us." (Macmillan had previously said he didn't understand why we were so worried about Cuba). To this, meaning Pearl Harbor, Macmillan replied, "Our great fear is Germany."

I told Scotty that I was expressing a personal opinion, not checked with anyone else, that Khrushchev had been able to make the decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba because of his strong domestic position. He would not have been able to retreat so rapidly if he had not been on top of the situation in the Kremlin. I felt he had been induced to undertake the Cuban adventure by the more aggressive elements in the Kremlin who are in the minority, and that he had agreed to do this with the reservation that if it didn't work they would retreat. He could now tell the aggressive group they were wrong and it might mean an opening for some further progress in other directions.

It had been obvious during the last several months that the Soviets had not negotiated on anything with any sincerity, particularly with regard to the end of nuclear testing.

We discussed why the Kremlin had dropped Nehru so rapidly. I offered the opinion that the rapidity was just callousness of the Kremlin and that I hoped it would affect other so-called neutrals who were depending on the good will of the Kremlin.

Reston told me something that Couve de Murville had told him when he left the U. S. as Ambassador to go to Germany. Scotty asked him whether he thought we could avoid a war, and he said yes, a major war, but of course there would be a number of small wars. The great

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danger might be if Russia and China had a conflict over who was to control India. I told him I considered that was illogical. India was a liability, and an asset to nobody. I told him the story about Stalin in 1945, when he said they couldn't fulfill the capital expenditures needed by China and that the problems of India were even more difficult. I said that if there was to be a conflict between Russia and China, it would obviously come over Siberia at some later time. The fertile fields that China would be looking for would be Southeast Asia which already has a substantial surplus of rice, is under-inhabited, under-developed, with agricultural resources which could stand large immigration and achieve substantial increase in surplus food.

Reston seemed to be in a mood to take a look at the world and where we were going, rather than attempting to get any specific information about what had happened in this country. He asked me what my judgment was of President Kennedy, and I told him that the decisions that were reached by him were extraordinarily skillful; that each move had been well thought through and the results achieved were due to his leadership.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Summits and All That

The only way to test the assumption that the events of the last week have created the potential for a major change in US-Soviet relations and consequently in the international political scene is to act on it. We can act in two directions--Berlin and disarmament. There is reason to believe that these are complementary not competing possibilities.

Discussions on both subjects have been going forward and there exist channels for continuing them; however, disarmament discussions have been languishing and Berlin discussions are almost dead. It seems reasonable as a first hypothesis to assume that in order for a useful initiative to be taken, it must be taken in a new channel. A bilateral summit directed at reaching agreements in principle on Berlin and disarmament, to be followed by foreign ministers' meetings of four powers would seem to be the best way to organize an initiative with a maximum chance of securing big results. The powers involved in the German negotiation include all those that would be required to deal with nuclear test-ban and non-diffusive agreements; if more on the disarmament front is attempted, a wider forum will be necessary. There are two kinds of counter arguments to be made against a bilateral summit. The first is that our allies do not like it. If we assess the probability of a useful outcome as being at all high, we are justified in ignoring this consideration. The other is that the internal turmoil in Moscow is such as to make it unlikely that the Soviets want a bilateral summit now. The assertion of fact upon which this argument rests is probably true; however, the conclusion does not follow. Indeed, it is precisely the existence of turmoil which makes the opportunity for a productive summit. Absent uncertainty and an ongoing prospect of re-evaluation on the Soviets' side, it is unlikely that we could achieve any significant

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change in the terms on which we confront each other. Further, a Berlin summit properly arranged may indeed be a way of avoiding what must be a most difficult problem for the Soviets in entering into any negotiations at the moment--that of appearing to the rest of the world as bowing to U. S. demands. This argument points up in turn another condition of a successful summit, that we view our situation in relation to the Soviets as symmetrical; namely, that recent events have enabled us both to see with greater clarity where our joint interests lie and how it is in our joint interest to limit occasions of conflict and direct confrontation between us and to reduce the potentiality for any remaining occasions to escalate into general war.

On disarmament, the minimum results worthwhile aiming at appear to be a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nuclear non-diffusion agreement. Some further trimmings could be added to this minimum in a way of an agreement to refrain from putting weapons into outer space and agreement on a list of measures to reduce the dangers of surprise attack. The former appear easy; the latter not particularly significant.

Khrushchev's recent letters to the President suggest that the events have themselves been enough to move the Soviets from their previous position on a comprehensive test ban treaty to an acceptance in principle of inspection, although this is not yet evident in Tsarapkin's statements at Geneva. It will be necessary for us, however, to take some risks with respect to the number of control posts and the number of inspections. This is a problem which we have examined fairly carefully, and we have the bases for decision on this.

On Berlin, our problems are more difficult. The course of events has probably caused the Soviets to abandon any plans they have for cutting off allied military access in a drastic way in the near future. If by the immediate threat in Berlin we mean the threat of a sharp enough interference with allied access to lead to a military confrontation, we can then say that the immediate threat has vanished for some (indefinite) time. If, however, we view the existence of even last Summer's degree of tension and uncertainty and the prospect that it might increase at any time as in themselves undesirable, then we can say that the Berlin crisis is still with us. Moreover, the

pains of the present situation to the Berliners themselves and the importance of the German problem in intra-European politics, argue that the problem demands a major effort absent a Berlin crisis in the immediate sense.

The minimum results we might seek in Berlin would almost certainly require substantial movement by us from our past positions if we are to do more than ratify the status quo in the narrowest sense which we have failed to do in a year-and-a-half of effort. An international access authority with full control, ideally, of an autobahn, a railway line and a canal route, plus operation of the relevant airways, would be our access guarantee. In addition, we must ask for some provisions covering movement of persons, both between East and West Berlin, and East and West Germany. This might well take the form of minimum quotas which can be revised upwards by mutual agreement but not downwards, and with the right to reject specific individuals on the admitting authority of either side. Further, we should seek a clear contractual basis for the presence of western troops. It might be desirable to make West Berlin legally part of the Federal Republic, but subject to certain limitations on the kinds of armaments and the number of troops that can be put into it, on the basis of reciprocal engagements and conditions for East Berlin. This would be useful as a precedent for an arms control agreement. The case against this particular provision in the settlement is the traditional German fear that we would be contracting out of our responsibility for the defense of West Berlin. This is also in large part the case for it. On balance, my judgment leads me to be for it.

In order to achieve so much, what must we be prepared to give? At a minimum, enough recognition of the authorities in East Germany to accomplish some of the Soviet purposes. This would certainly include defining the borders of Germany to the east, as well as the sector borders. It would certainly include allowing the East German membership in the access authority. It would include that degree of recognition implied by East German bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic on a variety of subjects. It could include an explicit declaration that Germany would be unified on the basis of discussion and agreement between the authorities of the two parts of Germany. If we add renunciation of the use of force to change the boundaries between the two, and mutual declarations

of non-aggressive intent between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, we have the substance of the 10 points which we never succeeded in selling either to the Germans or to the Soviets last year.

The double package of Berlin and disarmament proposals might be negotiable on a bilateral basis. To test its negotiability, however, we would have to take the step of substituting a policy of informing our allies for a policy of consulting them in advance. It is not clear that the week's experience has had a powerful enough effect on the principal ally concerned, the Federal Republic, to warrant the conclusion that we can achieve this result. But here again only the attempt can provide the test.

Having gone so far, it may be worthwhile to go much further. Much further in the Berlin direction would involve trading some kind of all-Berlin solution involving neutralization, with either four-power or UN troops and guarantee, for explicit recognition of East Germany and a German peace treaty. The treaty would provide for ultimate unification and contain the kinds of provisions described above for movement between the two Germanies and between each Germany and Berlin. To make this offer now would certainly offend the West German Government deeply. In my own judgment, the temperature of last week's events was not sustained at a high enough level over a long enough period of time to make this proposal acceptable either to the Russians or the Germans. It might be made more acceptable to the Russians and less acceptable to the Germans by adding to it provisions limiting the number of troops in both Germanies and providing some troop-free zone for a short distance around Berlin and on either side of the boundary between East and West Germany. This would be very difficult for the West Germans to accept unless NATO integration went a great deal further than it has gone to date.

On disarmament it is obvious that the step beyond is a first-stage agreement of some sort. Here again the difference between the U. S. and Soviet positions is very substantial. Even if we are prepared to move a good deal in dismantling bases, and speeding up the rate of disarmament in the first state, we would be very far from the Soviet position, which calls for something like nuclear parity by the end of the first stage. The experience of last week probably reinforces our judgment that we are not now ready for nuclear parity.



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With disarmament, as with Berlin, the conclusion seems to be that a radical change is unlikely. Thus, the final question is: Is there enough in the limited program in two spheres to justify the risks of summit failure and alliance alienation? This writer votes "yes", loudly. (Oxymoron?)

CK  
Carl Kayser

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11/1/62

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-81-62  
1 November 1962

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By LAW NARA Date 5/5/64  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Lemay *copy 1 w/cy 1 of attachment*  
Admiral Anderson *copy 2 " 2 " "*  
General Wheeler *copy 3 " 3 " "*  
General Shoup *copy 4 " 4 " "*

SUBJECT: Berlin in Light of Cuba

1. The attached draft paper, "Berlin in the Light of Cuba," which has been prepared by ISA, is being referred to the NSC Executive Subcommittee-Berlin/NATO this date for comment. It is understood that Mr. Nitze may discuss the paper as revised with the President some time within the next day or two, possibly as early as 2 November.

2. In view of the military considerations and implications involved I consider it important that the views of the JCS on the proposed paper be made known to Mr. Nitze prior to his meeting with the President. Accordingly, it is suggested that we be prepared to discuss the paper at the JCS Meeting at 0900, 2 November.

3. Mr. Nitze has requested in view of the sensitivity of the document that its distribution be limited to the JCS and their immediate advisers.

(S) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment  
as stated

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By

LAW

NARA, Date 5/5/84

D R A F T / RAdm J. M. Lee/jh/1 November 1962

BERLIN IN THE LIGHT OF CUBA

I. The Problem

If the Cuba settlement goes forward as outlined in the President's letter of October 27th and accepted by Mr. Khrushchev, a Summit meeting may be necessary within a reasonable period, and may be desirable. At a Summit, Berlin would undoubtedly be an important item of discussion. Such Berlin discussions would take place against a variety of proposals from the U. S. and the Soviets on other items of importance to one or both sides.

It follows that we need a theory of our Berlin interest from which a variety of positions can be developed, depending upon the actual setting which emerges and which is not now accurately predictable.

It would be useful to have the broad lines of this theory tentatively agreed before Mr. Adenauer's visit of November 7th, so that questions put to Mr. Adenauer can be pointed to the appropriate targets.

II. The Assumed Setting

a. The United States. The country has gone through a traumatic exposure to the imminence of war, the relationship of the military situation to the political outcome, and the necessity for firm but moderate diplomacy. Its confidence in itself and its leadership has been enhanced. It does not, however, wish to live indefinitely with a series of Cubas, one of which might be in a less favorable geographic position, or might be handled, by one side or the other, with less care and restraint, or might be the occasion for some accidental aberration. Both

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this enhanced confidence and enhanced concern dispose the U. S. to take a firmer line with our Allies, where this is required to further our aims, as well as affecting our attitude to the USSR.

In this situation, the U. S. interest is:

- at the maximum, for a long-term solution of the Berlin situation, one apt to last for twenty or more years;
- at the minimum, for measures in other areas which will hold off serious Berlin discussions or pressures until a more propitious time for negotiation;
- at the middle, for an agreed modus vivendi to carry us along with reduced friction, at least for some years.

b. The Soviet Union. A central question is whether the Soviets will have emerged from the Cuban experience with the feeling that avoidance of a comparable crisis over Berlin is paramount and that they must therefore be prepared to give on Berlin in light of demonstrated U. S. determination, or whether they will feel they must counter our Cuban success with gains of their own in Berlin or elsewhere. While there is great uncertainty as to the Soviet reaction, it probably combines a new wariness about U. S. response with a compulsion to recover lost prestige.

At a minimum, the Soviets can probably be expected to take political and diplomatic steps to counter the effects of the Cuban backdown on the Soviet power image, and to disabuse the U. S. of any notion that tactics like those applied in the Cuban crisis can be used to force concessions from the Soviet Union on long-standing issues

under dispute, including Berlin. We cannot exclude the possibility that they may feel driven to exert strong pressures in the reasonably near future. ~~They may feel driven to immediate and rising pressures.~~

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The Soviets may estimate that the Cuban crisis will open up room for maneuver. By making the danger of nuclear confrontation real and visceral for all the world, the crisis may seem to them to provide the catalyst needed to put new flexibility into the stalemated Berlin situation. It could create an environment where radical solutions are possible.

The Soviet judgment of this possibility will probably be conditioned by their assessment of the U. S. temper. If the U. S. seems in a mood to press its gains hard, the Soviets would probably consider prompt initiatives unpromising. If, however, the U. S. appears sobered by the crisis, Khrushchev would be likely to press for his objectives, and to feel a Summit would be advantageous.

The Soviets may well be motivated toward a serious attempt to stabilize the situation, not only by the prospect of nuclear confrontation in a disadvantageous balance, but also by a real desire to focus on economic competition.

The Soviets probably also face reappraisal of their strategic posture. It was an inadequate deterrent in Cuba; they may consider the alternatives of even more energetic efforts to redress the imbalance, or measures to reduce instabilities.

Finally, having apparently misread our reactions in the Cuban case, the Soviets may confine themselves to highly tentative moves until they reassess the situation.

c. Allies. Our NATO Allies now have greater confidence in the U. S. They have seen success result from our firmness and moderation. The

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U. K., in particular, was reassured by our restraint; France and Germany by our determination, under the risk of major conflict. U. S. prestige is higher; its capacity and maturity more respected; its freedom to lead enhanced.

We should be able to brush aside trivial Allied objections and reservations, and insist on concentrating on major issues.

At the same time, while the Allies supported our Cuban actions with minimum consultation, we can expect increased sensitivity about consultation in the future, both because the issues will be closer to them and more within their responsibility and because they naturally oppose any U. S. disposition to act unilaterally. Further, our Allies will be unsettled until they can explore the changed situation resulting from Cuba and can know through consultation our reading of it.

On balance, it appears that while our scope for unilateral action may be restricted, we have increased our capacity, with consultation, to bring our Allies along with us.

European suspicion that a sudden, secret, Berlin deal underlay the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba is a possible side effect of U. S. initiatives.

A variety of Allied interpretations of the Cuban outcome is possible (e.g., as to Soviet motivations, Soviet future intentions, the effectiveness of various elements of U. S. power, and the continuity-discontinuity question). It will be important to present and support U. S. conclusions.

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### III. Long-Term Solutions

#### a. Sources of Instability

The basic source of instability is obviously the division of Germany. Even if East Germany were prosperous, under a more liberal regime, and without the problem of Berlin, it is doubtful that the underlying sentiment for reunification would die out either in East Germany or West Germany.

Other important sources of instability are the division of Berlin symbolized by the Wall, the uncertain access to Berlin, the unsettled boundaries, and the absence of a definitive German peace treaty. The interaction of military threat and defense, viewed differently from each side, adds to the seriousness of the other instabilities.

Any long term solution should cut as deeply as possible into these instabilities. The Soviet Union has in the past had a clear and unambiguous policy with respect to Berlin and Germany; a solution of all the above instabilities, perhaps over an extended time frame, in a manner acceptable to it. It has rejected all Western proposals not consistent with eventual progress toward the Soviet objectives. The Western powers, not having the means, diplomatic or otherwise to reverse this position, have attempted to stand firm against further encroachments.

The question cannot now be answered whether Soviet policy on Berlin will have hardened or relaxed as a result of Cuba. Undoubtedly, however, it will be different. It is possible that they too will see the danger of another Cuban crisis over Berlin. If so, it is possible they will want a prompt solution of the important German and Berlin instabili-

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ties in a manner mutually agreeable to them and the U. S. Only on this hypothesis, which will be substantially affected by the possibilities of U. S. - Soviet agreement on other important areas of instability apart from Germany, can one see the possibility of a long-run solution of the Berlin situation satisfactory to the West.

b. Possible Approaches

(1) All-German Approach

Objectively, and certainly from the U. S. interest, an all-German solution is the best. It would permit the removal of all the instabilities listed in the preceding section, other than Soviet fear of enhanced German military power. To achieve this solution, were Mr. Khrushchev prepared to consider it, we should be prepared to make substantial concessions on our side, short only of removing Germany from the Atlantic and European political and economic communities.

Some form of confederation of the existing two states would seem called for initially, and a wide variety of sequences and phasings of the various steps toward eventual unification would be possible. The nature of the arrangements, and the duration of the process would have to be designed to reduce Soviet resistance. Among the steps toward, or elements of, an all-German solution would be:

- Increased economic intercourse between the two Germanies, with substantial economic aid from West to East designed to equalize the economies.

- Arms control measures in the Germanies: a surprise attack inspection and warning system, progressive limitations on external forces, perhaps a phased reduction of GDR and FRG forces.



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- Gradually ~~existing~~<sup>evolving</sup> integration of political institutions, beginning with a confederal administrative organ, leading toward ultimate common government.

(2) All-Berlin Solutions

If the unity of Germany cannot be achieved, the other major sources of instability could be removed or mitigated through an all Berlin solution. Such a solution would eliminate the wall dividing Berlin, though it would probably require, from the Soviet viewpoint, maintenance of a wall surrounding all of Berlin. The instability of access could be greatly reduced by the cession of an autobahn corridor to the city. Under such a solution, we might be able to force through the renunciation of West German hopes for reunification through a definite peace treaty signed by both West and East, a settlement of German boundaries, and the recognition of the GDR. It would then be possible to remove occupation forces and rely on a UN presence and guarantee of the unified city. The remaining instabilities could be mitigated through liberalization of the GDR regime, and increased FRG trade with and credit to the GDR.

If a corridor is not ceded, the instability of access would be greatly increased. An air or autobahn access authority with clear non-bloc control would mitigate but not eliminate this instability. Western concessions in the previous paragraph would probably be excessive.

(3) Removal of West Berlin

It is possible to conceive of solutions in which a substantial part of GDR territory, say all that part lying south and east of the Elbe, from Magdeburg to the Czech border, is transferred to the

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FRG in return for removal of the West Berlin populace out of West Berlin. The populace of West Berlin, and all of the GDR, would be given a free choice of opting to stay in the GDR or moving to the enlarged FRG. The area south and east of the Elbe is the industrial heart of the GDR. The political wrench to both sides would be immense. Boundaries, access, etc. would, however, be definitely settled. It is possible that as a part of a serious effort to resolve the whole East - West tensions problem, the USSR would prefer some such long-term solution to those suggested under (1) and (2) above.

#### IV. Hold-Off Serious Berlin Discussions; Improve Climate in Other Areas

A second broad line of approach for the U. S. at this time is to refrain from any further initiatives on Berlin, on the assumption that the Soviets would also be willing to let the atmosphere cool before making new moves in the hyper-sensitive Berlin area.

This approach is essentially a device for allowing both sides to reassess the situation without altering the outstanding issues which underlie instability in Berlin. Under this approach, we would stress the need to create a more favorable environment for a Berlin solution by progress toward agreement and easing of tensions elsewhere. Since the status quo is the essence of the existing Western Berlin position, this approach may appeal more to us than to the Soviets.

Measures for this approach might include:

- Progress in arms control: a test-ban agreement, a non-diffusion agreement, surprise attack measures, perhaps a Latin-American nuclear-free zone.

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NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Agreement.

- Satisfactory carrying through of LAOS neutrality measures; reduction of external pressures on South Vietnam.

- Progress toward space cooperation.

Soviet receptivity to this kind of hold-off approach on Berlin is uncertain. It might have some appeal to them as a way to dissipate U. S. momentum from Cuba, and to allow time for strengthening the Soviet posture against a future confrontation. Apart from possible repercussions of the Cuban crisis upon the Soviet attitude toward Berlin, a Soviet hold-off position is supported by some evidence that GDR and Soviet propaganda is stressing that further delay must be expected before the signing of a peace treaty. This would also be consistent with the trend noted in current discussions between West and East German representatives on the inter-zonal trade.

From the U. S. standpoint, however, the hold-off approach does no more than postpone a possible Cuba-type crisis over Berlin. Further, in negotiating agreements unrelated to the principal crisis, we risk using up our bargaining counters on peripheral issues; our possible concessions are needed for vital objectives.

From a Soviet viewpoint, even if there is a disposition to avoid initiatives for the moment on Berlin, an extended moratorium on this issue seems most unlikely.

In any case, should a Summit take place, substantive Berlin discussions could hardly be avoided.

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~~TOP SECRET~~V. Modus Vivendi

Intermittently since Geneva in 1959, and steadily over the past year, we have been seeking without success to establish an agreed Berlin modus vivendi.

It may be that the Cuban crisis will increase elasticity to some degree on both sides. The Soviets have had an example of U. S. firmness. They could now feel that rather than test us again, closer to the jugular, it would be preferable to either continue the debate, in the vicinity of the status quo, or agree on a workable modus vivendi. On the Western side, the Cuban success has made less compelling the need to avoid any appearance of elasticity in order to preserve Allied confidence in our guarantees.

On the other hand, if the Soviets feel their recent losses strongly, they may find it even less possible to make concessions on long-debated issues.

Components of a modus vivendi have been combed over many times, especially in the last year. Aside from significantly reduced tension in Berlin and prospects for reasonable stability there, several other general criteria would have to be met. Allied vital interests would have to be safeguarded; these appear to be unchanged by the Cuban outcome, so that the presence and security of Allied troops, unhindered access, and economic viability cannot be adversely affected. On the Soviet side, assured control over East Germany and some enhancement, possibly nominal, of GDR status appear to be minima. Having these in hand, and depending on how one assessed the likely tone of Soviet

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... toward Berlin, micrometer adjustments could be made in the following general schemes:

1. A series of interlocking declarations by the USSR, GDR, FRG, and tripartite powers about guaranteed access, troop presence, the name "Free City", and a separate treaty.
2. Some form of international access authority, accompanied by a separate treaty and unilateral declarations about Berlin (troops remain, no nuclear weapons, etc.).
3. Some new form of purely local arrangement juxtaposing the removal or amelioration of the Wall, guarantee of access, addition of UN forces without changing the occupation powers troop strengths or responsibilities, and a separate treaty.

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November 3, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I wish to thank you for your letter of October 30. I am commenting now only on a problem raised in your letter which relates to the Cuban affair.

With respect to the quarantine on shipments to Cuba, I am hopeful that arrangements can be worked out quickly by the United Nations which would permit its removal. We were happy to agree to your suggestion that the International Committee of the Red Cross undertake responsibility for inspection. You are, of course, aware that Premier Castro has announced his opposition to measures of verification on the territory of Cuba. If he maintains this position this would raise very serious problems. So far as incoming shipments are concerned, I understand that efforts are being made to have the International Red Cross carry out the necessary measures at sea and I hope that these will be successful. In the meantime, perhaps the existence of the quarantine can be of assistance to Mr. Mikoyan in his negotiations with Premier Castro. I should also like to point out that in an effort to facilitate matters, I instructed our delegation in New York to inform your representative there, Mr. Kuznetsov, that for the next few days any Soviet ships in the quarantine area would be passed without inspection and only the hailing procedure which was carried out in the case of your vessel, the Bucharest, would be applied.

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I am hopeful we can dispose of this pressing matter quickly so that we can go on in a better atmosphere to the broader questions. We both must make our best efforts to this end.

Sincerely,

IS/ JPK

His Excellency  
Nikita S. Khrushchev  
Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

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Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 18  
November 3, 1962 -- 10:00 AM

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary, emphasizing reports about the construction of a submarine base in Cuba. He called attention to the increasing number of reports of missiles being stored in Cuban caves.

Secretary McNamara reported that a peripheral flight of a U-2 about five miles off the west coast of Cuba had been authorized by the President. The weather for reconnaissance was poor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated a requirement for fourteen low-level sorties, covering harbors, roads, storage areas, the IL-28 air base, and Banes, which is suspect as a possible submarine base site. Secretary McNamara said he recommended fewer low-level flights.

Mr. McCone predicted that it would take from two weeks to a month to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President, commenting on the recommended low-level flight over the port of Havana, said he thought this target would be a day off and deferred authorizing this reconnaissance mission.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the presence in Havana of Mikoyan and stated his view that the port of Havana was not a good target for today.



The President authorized three low-level sorties of two planes each, one over the IL-28 base, the second over the Banes area, and the third over the San Julian port area.

General Taylor asked that the President authorize a major aerial reconnaissance mission Sunday or Monday in order to see what had been moved in Cuba. He said we need pictures of the ports in order to know what was being loaded on outgoing ships and pictures of assembly areas where Soviet equipment is being moved prior to being shipped out.

The President said that he wanted by Sunday or Monday a recommendation on the future use of U-2 planes. Secretary Rusk said daily pictures of the IL-28 planes are most important.

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BY MM NARS. DATE 10/9/84

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Secretary Rusk referred to a preliminary draft of inspection arrangements. Certain measures can be taken if Cuba agrees, but other measures will have to be taken if Cuba refuses to accept inspection arrangements satisfactory to us. He noted that there was no real resistance from anywhere except Cuba to the continuance of overflights.

The President said the major issue is the inspection of outgoing Soviet ships which will be returning Soviet missiles to the USSR. He said he believed we would have to work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles in order to be certain that all were removed. He asked that we work out what arrangements we think we must have and what we think the Soviets would accept.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson suggested that the International Red Cross inspectors might look at cargo being loaded on outgoing Soviet ships to be certain that it had been properly identified on the ships' manifests.

Director McCone said we had seen thirty missiles in Cuba and we estimate that forty-eight were brought in. He agreed that we must work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles.

Secretary Rusk said one major problem was how to inspect armaments in Cuba after the strategic missiles had been removed. One way to do this would be to propose an atom-free zone in Latin America. Treaty inspectors could go to Cuba to ensure that no nuclear weapons remained on the island or were introduced.

The President requested a paper stating exactly how we understand the agreement we have reached with the Russians. He wanted for his consideration the instructions to be sent to McCloy to govern McCloy's talk with Kuznetsov. He suggested that we raise with the Russians the question of Cuban caves as an illustration of the need for an inspection procedure which would reassure us that the missiles were removed, even if we did not inspect each missile. He suggested that the New York negotiating group, including Ambassador Stevenson, be asked to come to Washington later today to discuss inspection arrangements with the Executive Committee. He made it clear that we could not live with a Soviet submarine base in Cuba. He wanted to hold Khrushchev to every single one of the points he had agreed to. He felt that we should insist on the general demilitarization of Cuba and he emphasized again the serious

situation which would arise if there were an incident involving one of our U-2 planes and the SAM sites in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk commented that we must have acceptable inspection on the ground in Cuba before we make any commitment about our not invading the island.

Mr. McCone noted that evidence to date indicates the missiles are being dismantled, but apparently everything else is being built up, including communication complexes and possibly even a submarine base.

The President said he wanted to see detailed instructions covering the negotiations on inspection. He thought that we should give the Russians the impression that because the missiles are mobile and can be put back in place, we will have to insist on demilitarization of Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson suggested that we ask the Russians if they intend to keep a military base in Cuba. We would tell the Russians that this was not negotiable.

At this point the following joined the Executive Committee: AEC Chairman Seaborg; Commissioner Haworth; Dr. Wiesner; and Mr. Kaysen.

A draft announcement of the ending of our current nuclear test series was read and discussed.

In response to the President's question, Dr. Seaborg said that the Commission tests in 1963 would be for the purpose of exploiting the Ripple development. He thought that by May we would be in a position to resume tests above ground. He acknowledged that weapons development would be possible if testing were limited to underground shots.

Secretary Rusk opposed stating in the announcement a time limit on our suspension of testing. He did not want us to tie our hands because at a later time we might have to resume tests in order to keep pressure on the Russians.

The President commented that we had a greater capability than the Russians to conduct useful underground tests. He felt that we would not lose if the Russians did not conduct atmospheric tests and we continued our underground testing.

The draft release was revised and approved, it being understood that underground tests would continue.

Bromley Smith

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NLK Chancellor  
NSF79  
Visit

11/9/62

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November 9, 1962

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Main Line of Argument with the Chancellor

At 12 noon today, you will be meeting with the people most involved in Adenauer's visit. The object is to get a clear line of purpose for this visit and to make sure that there is time for preparation of whatever supporting materials you may want. After our discussion the other day I put forward the following outline for discussion: what we hope for from the visit are two things: (1) increased German defense effort, and (2) increased German readiness to join in a possible Berlin modus vivendi.

A. Defense effort

The need for defense effort is clear, and it is plain from recent cables that there is a real slackening in Bonn. The problem here is tactical, and there is a real question whether percentages of gross national product and other technical arguments are as persuasive with the Chancellor as a simple and repeated assertion that the Bundeswehr is not up to its job. The materials on this are being put together, but there is no substitute for your own argument with the Chancellor. He will not listen to military men on military subjects, and his basic reason for acting will be simply that you insist on it.

B. Berlin negotiation

On Berlin negotiations the problem is more complex. The Chancellor really prefers not to talk about terms of agreement, and it is almost certain that discussion of the terms of anything like our 10-point modus vivendi would be very unsatisfactory. What we want, instead, is to get his agreement in principle to the preparation of an agreed proposal for a modus vivendi, and to make it clear that any such new position will have to offer something that Khrushchev can point to with pride.

To get even this much from the Chancellor will not be easy, but the moment is favorable, and the following line of argument is suggested:

1. After the Cuban episode the West is stronger than it has been for many years, and the Soviets somewhat weaker. This is therefore a favorable time for a settlement, if one can be reached at all.

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November 9, 1962

2. The Soviet Government still has it in its power to sign a separate peace treaty, and to apply miscellaneous minor harassments to West Berlin. While we can certainly survive a merely paper treaty, it will have a certain depressing effect, and we have an obligation to see if something better cannot be worked out.

3. If we do not work out a modus vivendi now while we have time and a high measure of confidence in one another, we may find ourselves making hasty proposals under pressure at a later and more dangerous time.

4. The two countries who must agree -- both in defense and in negotiation -- are Germany and the U. S.

5. This line of argument should of course be surrounded by reiterations of our determination on points of vital interest, but it should also be made fairly plain that if the Germans do not participate in such planning, we shall have to think about making proposals of our own.

If these two objectives seem right to you, the next question is that of timing of the argument. Here I repeat the staff proposal that you should talk about Cuba and its lessons in the morning, butter the Chancellor privately during lunch about his own chance to leave a Berlin settlement as his crowning accomplishment, and turn to matters of defense and Berlin negotiation in the afternoon.

This scenario leaves the problem of Berlin contingency planning to one side. The visa issue is one which I would suggest that you leave to the Secretary. We need progress on the other two issues more than on this one, and the Chancellor can be pushed only so far in one visit.

McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

NLK Chancellor  
NSF79

11/9/62  
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November 9, 1962

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McG. B.

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November 14, 1962

ISA DRAFT

SOME LESSONS FROM CUBA

In drawing lessons from the Cuban experience one should generalize with caution. The Cuban case, like all cases, was unique. Developments were influenced by a number of peculiarities not apt to reappear in the next crisis. Thus, the problem of controlling the development of events, for example, was in some respects simpler here than can be expected as a rule. A lot of operational information was quickly at hand to us but not to the Soviets, the focal military actions had few effects outside the immediate area which was dominated by U. S. power, and escalation barely got started. Each feature aided control.

Two limits of the observations to follow deserve notice. First, they cover only a portion of the lessons learned, being concerned mostly with political-military aspects at the national level. Lessons of importance for policy makers and bearing on the integrated use of national power are sought here. Many other lessons of a different sort no doubt are there to be learned. Second, the data on which the material below is based have some gaps. Some of the more closely held material may bear other lessons or have impact on these.

1. Soviet Objectives

It seems likely that the Soviet decision makers agreed on putting missile and bomber bases in Cuba without agreeing completely on the objectives for doing so. The list below includes some plausible, consistent, objectives:

- a. To display to the world, and especially to our allies, that the US is too indecisive or too terrified of war to respond effectively to major Soviet provocation, even when possessing great local superiority backed by nuclear superiority. US acceptance of Soviet action in Cuba would then set the stage for action on Berlin and would weaken US alliances.
- b. To step up suddenly the Soviet ability in a first strike to deliver nuclear weapons against our nuclear strike forces, especially our command and control systems.
- c. To contrast an expanding USSR with a receding US:
  - (1) by breaking through the ring of US bases around the USSR.
  - (2) by suddenly creating a base posture more nearly symmetric to that of the US.



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(3) and by seeming to make up deficiencies in inter-continental nuclear capability.

d. In the course of making a forward step toward Berlin to discover empirically in a less explosive arena the US determination to fight.

e. To deter a US invasion of Cuba--or, at least, to use this argument with Castro.

f. As a fall back position, in the face of a strong US reaction, to enter into a negotiation on Soviet bases in Cuba vs. US bases abroad.

Finally, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would have undertaken this Cuban excursion without thinking there was enough of a chance of only a feeble US reaction. Something for us to reflect on is what in our behavior over the past year led them to think they could get away with it or would not be badly hurt by trying.

## 2. Renewed Credibility of Soviet Expansionism

In the last few years, the West has tended to fear Soviet expansion less and less. In Cuba, the Soviets made their first long distance leap into "third areas," first politically, then in concrete military power. Moreover, this deployment threatened the main nuclear force of NATO. Now not only their Premier travels across oceans but also their missiles. They deployed forces to threaten the Atlantic deterrent, a major military move to signal a dramatic shift in the "relationship of forces" on a world scale. No longer are the Soviets confining their expansionist activities to political, economic, and military efforts against only the underdeveloped regions. It should now be clearer to our European Allies that the Russians were willing to make a major move with significant military implications against the West.

## 3. US Nuclear Threshold

The US did not launch nuclear weapons, nor come close to doing so. It did apply limited, non-shooting force, and it was actively preparing to launch non-nuclear combat operations. It was of course prepared to face such risks of escalation by the Soviet Union as these actions might bring. The Soviets, our Allies, other nations, and we ourselves have seen that nuclear retaliation by the US requires more serious provocation than the sudden appearance of a nuclear base 90 miles from our shores.

## 4. How Far the Nuclear Writ Runs

Our nuclear strength was a continuous restraint on the Russians against a nuclear attack or, perhaps, a markedly broadened non-nuclear operation. However, over-all, and especially local, US nuclear superiority did not deter the Soviets from military and nuclear intrusion into Cuba.



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5. How Far the Non-nuclear Writ Runs

Nor were the Soviets put off by the immense US superiority in non-nuclear strength usable locally. At the outset, the Soviets clearly lacked conviction that the US was determined to use force on this issue. Once we decided to use force, however, we faced the Soviets with an impossible military problem locally. Moreover, they could not be certain how far a local conflict would escalate, and they know it to be generally true that any direct US-USSR conflict would be carried out against the background of a possible nuclear war. Demonstrated US willingness to begin non-nuclear combat action against a nuclear-armed opponent surely made evident to the Soviets that the US was willing to take risks of nuclear consequences.

6. Soviet Advance and Withdrawal

The Soviets undertook a limited-objective, limited-means operation. By deploying nuclear strike forces, they used bold means to widen the struggle with the US, but they took care not to let widespread shooting start (they did shoot down a U-2). In making the confrontation military and injecting the nuclear element, they evidently did not credit an immediate US nuclear reply. When opposed with the certainty that we would use non-nuclear force they backed off, probably because (a) in non-nuclear combat in the area of Cuba, defeat was certain; (b) there was a high risk of escalation into nuclear war if conflict were extended to areas where the local balance of forces was favorable to them.



It is possible that some Soviet actions were responses to signals that we did not intend to send. One example might be the straying of the U-2 over Russia, and another the apparent interpretation by a Soviet ship captain of night photography with a flash cartridge as an attack on him. On the other hand, one signal that was intended to be heard loud and clear was sent by the President on September 4th and repeated on September 13th: the warning that we wouldn't tolerate bombardment vehicles in Cuba. This signal was met initially by an elaborate attempt at deception probably accompanied by a belief that faced with a fait accompli we would back down.

On withdrawal, the timing of their decision gives us probably our best clue. It did not come on the heels of the President's speech, with its mention of "full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union," and the immediate SAC alert which followed. It came instead when non-shooting coercion had already been applied, and when it must have seemed unmistakable that the US was on the point of using shooting force to enforce the quarantine and probably either to destroy Soviet systems in Cuba or to invade the island. It is probable that the most impressive thing was confirmation through their intelligence channels that we had taken all the measures consistent with serious military action.

The Soviets saw they were going to face conflict in Cuba and lose.

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## 7. Our Views of Soviet Advance and Retreat

The crisis highlighted some contrasting American views of likely Russian calculations. On one view of the Kremlin, when the Russians advance and then withdraw, one faction in the Kremlin pressed the advance and another led the retreat. An alternative interpretation regards decisions on advance, and retreat in the event the advance is unsuccessful, as mutually consistent policy. There is undoubtedly disagreement in the Kremlin, but it is not necessary to assume that Khrushchev is in either an "advance" faction or a "retreat" faction.

Divergent views on how the Soviets calculate in withdrawal, particularly, led to contrasting US policy recommendations as to concession, standstill, or pursuit of the Russians in retreat.

According to the first view of the Kremlin in retreat, as the magnitude of the withdrawal increases, so does the psychological cost of the act--until the readiness to retreat gives out. Hence we must be careful not to ask for too much, or we must soften deprivations with indulgences (for example, the "pledge" not to invade, commendations of the other side, Lippmann's proposal to trade Turkish bases) if we want to have the opponent retreat at all.

In the other conception Soviet leaders view it as impermissible to concede an iota more than the situation "forces" them to do, it is also obligatory to engage in whatever degree of withdrawal is required to prevent even worse damage or annihilation. The graver the penalty we impose on them for not withdrawing, and the more certain we make it appear the penalty will actually be applied, the more probable becomes their compliance and in fact the easier we make it for them to withdraw.

Clearly, a wide variance in policy recommendations resulted.

## 8. Nuclear Risks

While Khrushchev could know that he was not going to use nuclear weapons and that he would lose in Cuba, the US Government was obliged to take into account other possible outcomes. The possibility of nuclear war drew therefore a share of attention proportionate perhaps to its gravity but greater than was warranted by its likelihood, given the assumption that Soviet policy conforms to Soviet interests and known strategy. Concern with remote nuclear possibilities not only prompted consideration of some highly improvident courses of action but also counseled hesitation on pursuing our interest on immediate inspection and on withdrawal of IL-28's.

Certainly our public statements exaggerated the risks of nuclear war. We could get our way without initiating the use of nuclear weapons. This burden was entirely on Khrushchev. And for him such a



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decision would be suicidal. Our public stance should have de-emphasized the nuclear risks to the extent possible (even if we weren't entirely sure).

#### 9. Analogies with Berlin

Berlin, like Cuba, provides a testing point for the East-West confrontation. In neither case is the immediate prize of the first importance for its own sake, but the stakes riding on the local outcome, in both cases, but especially in Berlin, are great.

Tactically, the same principles which underlie the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict were applied in the Cuban operation. Phases I and II were executed and Phase III lay just ahead at the denouement. We first established definitely for ourselves and the world that Soviet action had endangered our vital interests (Phase I). We then began an integrated, ascending program of political, economic, psychological, and non-combatant military moves against a background of military preparations for combat (Phase II). Our aim was a limited one from the outset, not conquest of territory nor destruction of enemy forces, but simply the removal of certain delivery systems. We kept the Soviets aware that our objective was this limited one, and that by granting it they would bring an end to US military action. But they could hardly mistake our preparations to move into Phase III, the application of non-nuclear combat force toward that objective. And, inevitably, any conflict with the USSR would involve some heightened risk of nuclear war--and our alerting action gave point to this possibility.

Berlin, like Cuba, is an island surrounded by superior opposing forces. But Soviet non-nuclear military power in the Caribbean area is minute by comparison with US and NATO strength in Central Europe. We had leverage in Cuba that the Soviets don't have in Berlin. (Moreover, the waters surrounding Cuba are politically neutral, while GDR territory surrounding Berlin is politically explosive.) Neither side should expect to be able to keep conflict or near conflict concerning Berlin under the tight control of Cuban actions. There would be very much more uncertainty as to events and objectives, side effects, greater communications problems, and much more complex Alliance coordination problems.

In Cuba, the Soviets had no great interests at stake, but we do in Berlin. To be short, in Cuba we have dominance; in Berlin the Soviets do not.

#### 10. The Role of Intelligence

We had timely, reliable intelligence data, and it helped immensely. Soviet performance was probably hampered by a paucity and slowness of

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intelligence. And thanks to our continuing prior surveillance, we had a solid factual basis for evaluating new material. Both in laying the intelligence base and in getting the new facts swiftly, air reconnaissance was a priceless asset. US conduct of future crises elsewhere would be substantially helped if a similarly solid base of intelligence data were created before that geographical area attracted intense interest.

11. Reconnaissance and Stability

In the last few years, it has been common for peacetime surveillance to be called provocative. The Cuban experience has abruptly changed the world's image of outside surveillance. Reconnaissance and inspection are widely viewed today as major tools toward preventing violence. Our reconnaissance aided control and stability. For a time the US should be able to conduct, and urge others to conduct, fuller reconnaissance of more areas. Aerial reconnaissance ..... for example, is less likely to meet with widespread opposition if the matter were to become public; the common good could be more plausibly argued than before Cuba.

12. Control

Control over the Cuban operation was affected by many unique features. Developing swiftly, and initially in deep secrecy, with US forces vastly overmatching those of the Soviet, the Cuban problem permitted continuous, intense, central control. Before military moves had much more than begun, Washington and Moscow were exchanging notes. The military actions provided time for communications, had delimited scope and well-defined terminal points, and the method of exchanging notes provided time for thought and evaluation. (This suggests that the purple telephone, between President and Premier, might not be an unmixed blessing.) All this made the control problem simpler, as did the exceptionally good intelligence and operational information available. But it still was not easy, even with centralized control, for decisions to be made and translated into action at the pace required to keep the US in control of the situation.

In most military operations of a large scale, it will ordinarily be necessary and more efficient to decentralize control over execution to a greater extent than in Cuba. Especially will this be true where overseas operations are involved. But the Cuban operation points up some difficulties that delegation would bring. Even where the interconnection of political and military aspects is thoroughly appreciated, not all significant political and military information can be quickly accessible in the field. Even where workable packages of delegated control have been arranged, accidental or unforeseeable events may interrupt the process. It is often useful to design

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operations so that control can be transferred, new instructions issued, and communications with opponents occur. In all such operations there is the problem of clarity about what matters will be dealt with at what levels. Cuba shows how helpful it would be to have in advance a common understanding on whether, for example, the executive agent concept will be used for command of military forces, and, if so, what matters will be decided above, at, and below the executive agent. Delegation is also less easy to manage where Allies are intimately involved, and especially their military forces.

### 13. Allied Reactions

The NATO Allies were remarkably willing for the US to manage the Cuban operations, with fewer complaints about our putting them into jeopardy than seemed likely before the event. This was true despite rather than because of our consultation which was little and late. The relatively favorable NATO reactions stemmed mostly from the attitude that this was an American show, despite the fact that their interests were very much at stake and that they might have become directly involved at any time. Fortunately, the US had become, through continuing contacts and discussions in NATO, reasonably well equipped to judge the acceptability to its Allies of various courses of action. This was essential, for we needed one, and only one, hand on the valve to apply increasing pressures with the least risk of unwanted escalation.

The Latin American attitude was determined by shock at the Soviet move, fear of what might follow, the deflation of Castro's pretensions, and respect for the vigorous action by the US. This attitude is unlikely to persist in full strength, but perhaps it will last long enough to help bring about change in Cuba. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that a high degree of unity cannot be generated in similar situations in the future.

### 14. Politico-Military Inseparability

The military and the political aspects of every action of both sides were closely interwoven: at the outset, our assessment of Soviet objectives, our reconnaissance activities, expected Soviet reactions, and timing of our moves. As the political situation developed through OAS action, initial UN discussions, and first Soviet reactions, it was considered politically desirable to make detailed changes in such military matters as rules of engagement, instructions for conduct of the search, and even the selection of which approaching vessels to handle first. The

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planning of possible strikes or assaults was subject to many specific political restrictions, owing to expected effects on the Cuban people, the Castro government, the OAS, NATO governments and populations, and US public opinion.

Thus, at no stage in the operation as executed or foreseen did the problem ever seem wholly political or wholly military. Advisors and decision-makers at the seat of government, whether diplomats, military men, or political officials, at every stage found it essential to take into account factors which might ordinarily seem beyond their individual spheres of cognizance. It was not possible to predict at what point a political detail would require change in minor military details normally left to be decided in the field; similarly, military detail at unexpected times necessarily altered political decisions and actions, large and small. In the basic policy decisions at high levels, there was complete interdependence of military and political factors. The selection of the objective was a combined problem. Only out of the interplay of military capabilities and limitations with the political elements of the setting could courses of action be set up and choices made.

#### 15. Alliance Indivisibility

The defense of the Alliance is not geographically divisible. Although the Caribbean is outside the NATO area, Soviet action there affected the US not only as homeland but also as Alliance arsenal. The US was acutely aware that Alliance nuclear strength was threatened and that Berlin repercussions might follow US actions over Cuba. The Soviet attempt to connect their bases in Cuba with NATO bases in Turkey underlined the fact of indivisibility.

#### 16. Inspection and the United Nations

The crisis has prompted the spontaneous emergence of ad hoc arms control proposals from many sources. Both internal and external pressures have developed for their hasty implementation unsupported by prior analysis and planning. These pressures contrast strikingly with the lack of preparations for rapidly implementing even temporary inspection arrangements with competent neutral observers and adequate modern equipment. One of the lessons of the crisis is that many proposals for international inspection considered abstractly are, in the event, woefully inadequate to meet our needs for information in a crisis. Once again the United Nations has been proved not a reliable or quickly responsive device to verify Soviet performance of an agreement. Even when we push an exceptionally strong case with insistent force, the results are inadequate. The neutral powers are eager to avoid enmity

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
and damaging responses from great powers. The UN Secretariat is not in a position to act against member nations without their consent and in any case lacks the technical capacity to inspect. Perhaps the latter defect can be corrected.

17. Secrecy in Planning

It has been shown possible to conduct over a period of at least a week an intensive analytic and planning activity at a high level without having its nature revealed in the press. Furthermore, judging from the apparent confusion produced in Moscow by the President's speech of 22 October, it would appear that Soviet intelligence was surprised. In the climactic stages of the planning, many people and many widely separated locations were involved, yet security still remained very tight. The effect of this was to deny to the Soviets much opportunity for political pre-emption, by announcing commitments or conditions prior to the President's speech. Such actions by the Soviets, putting us in the position of reacting rather than initiating, could have restricted US freedom of action and substantially changed the effect produced on Allied governments and public opinion. Several conditions offered unique opportunity for avoiding press attention over the first five or six days. That the problem itself was unknown to the public was foremost.

..... Perhaps third was the fact that the problem quickly became an operational one involving the risk of American casualties; people were therefore much more concerned of security than normally. It would be imprudent to conclude from the Cuban experience, fortified as our security was by luck, that this degree of secrecy is routinely attainable. It should be noted that security deteriorated rapidly when the problem passed into the stages of finally closing the deal; here the press was less restrained.

However, secrecy was achieved at a cost in effectiveness. Severe restrictions were applied to the dissemination and availability of sensitive information. The result was some reduction in coordination, in governmental capacity for analysis of events and trends, and in the possibilities of intelligent initiatives.



18. The Importance of Communications and Information

It is important that information of importance to national decisions move with great speed to the locations where these decisions are made. Part of the problem is mechanical. Effective execution of much political planning on Cuba was hampered by imperfections in the communications system. Major improvements in communication, especially for the State Department, are clearly called for. But there is also need for discrimination. Sending too much information to the top slows not speeds the

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process. And operating levels need to know what policy levels are concerned about. This need conflicts with the need for secrecy.

While it is not a cardinal necessity that all advisors whom the President consults have the same information, it is highly undesirable that their advice diverge merely because some lack certain key facts. Whether this actually ever occurred in the Cuban operation is not so significant as the fact that it was certainly possible. The handling of factual data in Washington is susceptible of much improvement, particularly at the boundary where diplomatic and military data intersect. Improvements here could prevent future troubles, possibly serious ones.

#### 19. Prior Analysis of Contingencies

Each of the high-level decisions during the Cuban operation involved a choice among alternatives, but more searching contingency planning beforehand would have permitted more informed, thorough comparison. Actions to cause removal of offensive weapons from Cuba have effects upon the tenure of Castro, the orientation of the Cuban people, and the general question of how far we can go toward aiding resistance in Communist satellites, for example, as well as upon more direct and crucial issues of US-Soviet power confrontation. These and other relationships were noted during the recent decision-making processes, but in the heat of immediate problems they were often treated anxiously not analytically, without benefit of as balanced and searching an examination as prior planning would permit.

#### 20. Overseas Bases

Judging by the repercussions in the Communist world, the Soviet setback in Cuba was more than a local one. And not because of the importance of the base in Cuba. Retreat in Cuba suggests retreat closer to home. The lesson for us should be clear. No matter how valueless an overseas base, the time to give it up is before or well after a crisis--not during it--if we want to have allies believing that association with us is to their interest. With few exceptions, however, ridding ourselves of bases should not be a consuming concern; as we increase the emphasis on non-nuclear forces to meet the more likely contingencies abroad, overseas bases will become more, not less, important.

#### 21. Power at Sea

The ease with which the US was able to apply its will on the high seas, little hampered by prospects of local enemy action, shows vividly how immense is our superiority at sea. While this is especially so in

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the Caribbean where our naval power is supplemented by shore-based air power, everywhere, except in waters subject to Soviet-based air control, our naval superiority is very pronounced indeed. Cuba in particular is a hostage to the US Navy. US manipulation of a few among the great many available non-nuclear naval moves, in concert with a carefully managed program of political moves, forced the Soviets into a reactive position. Our power at sea, visibly capable of destroying enemy sea forces but used instead to apply political-military pressures, permitted us to retain the initiative and to succeed.

22. The Moral Element

It can be argued that the US broke the strict bounds of past legal interpretations in invoking the quarantine, or would have been in such a position had the OAS not ratified the October 23d Resolution, but the world quickly recognized that it was acting with great restraint to defend an important national and regional interest in the face of blatant provocation. This increased the strength of public support. More importantly, the action is not likely to leave bad after-effects when there is time for reflection and discussion about its morality. A similar recognition abroad similarly expanded the base of the wholehearted support which Allied governments gave.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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11/19/62

15 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with General Heusinger, 15 November

On General Taylor's invitation, General Heusinger met with him for an hour of lunch and discussion today. I was also present.

The President, following his first meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, had asked General Taylor to do this. General Heusinger said that the Chancellor had discussed with him the matters raised with the President which led to this request.

The first, General Heusinger indicated, had to do with small atomic weapons. The Chancellor had told the President that German Defense authorities had told him the Soviets now have, in large numbers, a very small weapon similar to the Davey Crockett. They had also indicated that American units have introduced Davey Crockett launchers and weapons into their forces in Europe. The Chancellor spoke of these weapons as having a yield in the megaton range. General Heusinger said he had clarified these matters with the Chancellor, indicating that there is no intelligence of which he is aware to the effect that the Soviets have a weapon of this type, that he understands the Davey Crockett may not be in an operational status with American forces as yet, and that its yield is very small rather than of megaton range.

General Heusinger then spoke of the multilateral/multinational MRBM. (The extent to which he was reflecting the Chancellor's views was not clear.) He thought the need for this system has been established, and it should not necessarily be limited to the sea-borne version. He thought this matter should be considered by the NATO Military Committee in December.

General Taylor then covered the two points the President had asked him to take up: the question whether the German forces were receiving less tactical nuclear support than American forces in Europe, and the question of escalation if tactical nuclear weapons were used in Europe.

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
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As to the first, General Taylor pointed out that general support forces, including external forces, aircraft in Europe, and the Redstone and Corporal are available to support the whole battle, and would be employed, he was sure, as the needs of the battle would dictate. Close support forces, principally the Honest John and 8" howitzer, involved two questions, number of launchers and number of rounds available. The German forces have substantial numbers of Honest Johns and 8" howitzers available for their support, and if any nation's forces need more, it is up to the nation to procure them. (We are inclined to think the Germans would be advised to add to their artillery support.) As to rounds available, allocations are made by the NATO operational commanders from SACEUR on down, depending on the needs of the units, location of the main threats, development of the battle, etc. So far as he knows, there is no discrimination in this regard. As to the Davey Crocketts, this is a special question. Our intelligence also gives no indication that the Soviets have this weapon. In fact, considering that the Soviets are, we believe, inferior in total amount of fissionable material, it is very doubtful that they would use it on a weapon which requires as much as this weapon does. As to the Davey Crocketts for our own forces, this must still be regarded as an experimental weapon, in large degree. General Taylor said he had seen this fired in Nevada, and was much interested in it. There is some belief that a longer-range weapon is needed. Also he understood that only token quantities of the weapon are in Europe, and these are still centrally stored. We are a long way from putting these in the hands of troops on a mass basis.

General Taylor then turned to the question of the dangers of escalation if tactical nuclear weapons were used. He said that no one can be certain on this, and that there are many different opinions. It is very clear that there is a need to have these weapons and be capable of using them. However, his approach is that we should keep our options open, to use conventional forces, conventional forces plus "battlefield" nuclear weapons, these plus "interdiction weapons", in which he would class the MRBM's, (for which he does see a use in Europe) and beyond this the all-out forces of the Strategic Air Command. He recalled that the multilateral MRBM question had been raised as a proposal to see if the Europeans were interested in it, and added that a great variety of reactions have occurred.



General Heusinger spoke of the need for a scale of responses paralleling those General Taylor had mentioned. He seemed to accept General Taylor's comments as meeting his points of concern.

In other discussion, General Heusinger asked whether General Taylor would have any difficulty if General Norstad made the presentation to the Military Committee that he recently made to the Council. General Taylor saw none, inasmuch as he understood General Norstad was talking about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and on this there is no military disagreement.

General Heusinger said he would seek an opportunity to talk further to the Chancellor about these points this afternoon. Both he and General Taylor will see the Chancellor this evening. He hoped to be able to say that the matter had been cleared up with the Chancellor.

A. J. GOODPASTER  
Major General, USA  
Spec. Asst. to Chairman

11/19/62

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19 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Developments on Military Requirement for NATO MRBMs

1. I sense a few interesting recent developments in the NATO MRBM field:

a. The latest JCS paper continues to press for NATO MRBMs, but seems considerably more open-minded than heretofore to a multilateral solution. This paper is a good one; a short summary is at Tab A, and I will be consolidating the paper itself with other material for your dossier at the November 30 NATO Policy Conference.

b. Henry Owen and Co. now seem perhaps to have sold themselves on the intrinsic merits of a multilateral NATO MRBM force. Heretofore I have always felt that their real desire was for NATO to accept the adequacy of U. S. external forces, with a multilateral NATO force preferred as a reluctant fallback position.

c. The external-forces-only advocates seem to be becoming increasingly isolated. At Henry Owen's invitation, I attended a briefing over at State on Friday by RAND's very able Malcolm Hoag, who plumped for reliance on U. S. Minutemen only. The State crowd present (Henry, Gerald Smith, Schaetzle, Weiss, Popper, inter alia) were by no means sold, and he had already indicated that the Pentagon, both Joint Staff and ISA, had given him a rough time.

L. J. Legere

Attachment:

a/s

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20 November 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for an item to be discussed at the JCS/SECDEF meeting

Subject: Failure to Obtain Approval of the FY 1962 Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan (C)

Background:

FY 1961 DISPERSAL PLAN

- On 16 January 1961, the FY 1961 nuclear weapons dispersal plan as recommended by the JCS was approved by the President (Eisenhower).

- In a letter dated 7 February 1961, the Acting Chairman, AEC, advised the President (Kennedy) that the AEC planned "to defer action to implement the directive of January 16, 1961 for a reasonable period in order to give you an opportunity to review it."

- In a memorandum dated 6 April 1961, the Chairman, JCS, advised the SECDEF of the impact of the AEC action. This memorandum concluded "The JCS consider the unilateral AEC action of withholding implementation of approved dispersal of new and improved weapons and the large shortfall in weapons production should be brought to your attention."

- In a memorandum dated 11 April 1961 to the President, the Deputy SECDEF recommended that, pending a decision on the future course of action with regard to allocation of nuclear weapons in support of non-US NATO forces, the President authorize the AEC to proceed with the FY 1961 dispersal plan previously approved on January 16, 1961 with the understanding no further dispersals to non-US forces would be made under this authority.

- In a letter to the Deputy SECDEF dated 20 May 1961, the President authorized dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of US forces as requested by the SECDEF. In addition, he directed that no further dispersals in support of non-US forces would be made pending completion of related studies then underway.

- By memorandum dated 25 May 1961, the Deputy SECDEF advised JCS of the partial approval of the FY 1961 dispersal plan as it applied to dispersals in support of US Forces.

- In a letter to the President dated 16 March 1962, the Deputy SECDEF referred to his earlier letter of April 11, 1962 and advised that studies were underway to determine long-range programs and policies with regard to dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of non-US NATO forces. The SECDEF recommended that, pending completion of these studies further dispersals nuclear weapons in support of certain non-US NATO forces be approved. Specific dispersals recommended in support of non-NATO forces were contained in an attachment to the letter.

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- In a memorandum dated 11 April 1962, the Deputy SECDEF advised the Chairman, JCS, that the President by NSAM 143 dated 10 April 1962 had approved further dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of non-US NATO forces as requested by the SECDEF memorandum of 16 March 1962. Approval was subject to the following:

a. Only the lower yield two-stage and the single stage versions of the MK-23 and MK-43 yields were authorized for dispersal.

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DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

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b. No two-stage weapons could be placed on alert fighter strike aircraft land-based in the NATO area, exclusive of the United Kingdom. (NOTE: This restriction has since been modified to permit loading on alert aircraft of weapons with yields up to 130 KT).

c. Further dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of non-US NATO Air Forces in Turkey was withheld pending State-Defense review of the situation.

FY 1962 DISPERSAL PLAN

- On 17 March 1962, the JCS forwarded to the SECDEF the recommended nuclear weapons dispersal plan.

- In a memo to the President dated 6 Jun 62, the Deputy SECDEF recommended approval of the FY 1962 nuclear weapons dispersal plan. Although the JCS recommended FY 1962 dispersal plan did not identify specific nuclear weapon dispersals in support of non-US forces, the SECDEF memorandum did so. The recommendations were identical with the dispersals previously approved by NSAM 143.

- In a memorandum dated 18 August 1962, the Deputy SECDEF advised the Chairman, JCS, additional information was required by the White House in support of the FY 1962 dispersal plan and requested the information be provided by 31 August 1962. Specifically, the JCS were requested to provide the number of weapons planned for dispersal in the FY 1962 plan and the on-hand inventory as of 30 June 1962 by weapon yield and type in Cuba, Greenland, Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, Spain and Morocco.

- In a memorandum to the SECDEF dated 31 August 1962, the JCS provided the information requested. The memorandum transmitting the information concluded with the comment "The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to discuss this subject with you and the President."

- In response to a request from Dr. Johnson, ATSD(AE), a meeting was held on 25 September 1962 between Dr. Johnson and Admiral Riley to discuss a requirement from the White House for additional information in support of the FY 1962 dispersal plan. Dr. Johnson requested that the JCS provide answers to the following questions:

a. Why is the FY 1961 dispersal plan being exceeded in certain instances? For example, the Philippines, United Kingdom and Spain.

b. Why is additional dispersal authority being requested in the FY 1962 dispersal plan in certain instances when the on-hand inventory as of 30 June 1962 is less than the FY 1961 dispersal plan?

c. What recommendations, if any, do the JCS have for possible reductions in the FY 1962 dispersal plan requirements?



11/25/62

1 of 3 11/25/62

RETYPE COPY

November 25, 1962

15 Series B

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: IO-Harl Cleveland

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. McCloy on Cuba

Mr. McCloy called in at 2:15 p.m. to summarize the results of the meeting which he and Ambassadors Stevenson and Yost had just completed with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendlovich.

We will have a NIACT cable here, probably before the end of the day, so I will summarize here only the highlights:

1. Mikoyan did almost all of the talking. He was clearly influenced by commitments to Castro to make a strong case on Castro's behalf; he also agreed to be motivated by the burden Cuba represents to the USA. These two motivations produced many references to the "normalization" of relations with Cuba.
2. Mikoyan said our declaration was unsatisfactory, and represented a retreat from correspondence between the President and Khrushchev. He particularly objected to making the non-invasion assurance with intention rather than an unequivocal commitment as it seemed to be in the President's letter of October 27th. Mikoyan also jumped on our overflights and objected to US subversion activities in Cuba.
3. Mikoyan went back to the idea of a protocol signed by all three countries, and seemed to attach a good deal of significance to Cuba being one of the signatories. He would like to have a resolution, not merely a collection of unilateral declarations, in the Security Council.
4. Mikoyan's plea for the Castro's conditions seemed more determined and comprehensive than in any of the Xuanot ov-McCloy discussions. Mr. McCloy's guess is that this is still pro forma, but it was spelled out at great length and will undoubtedly be spelled out once again for the President. Mikoyan repeatedly came back to the difficulties in which Castro would find himself, if the situation in the Caribbean could not be "normalized". "Normalization" of the Caribbean was, Mikoyan said, implied in all of the exchanges between the President and Khrushchev.

(Continued)

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority: NLS 84-6  
 By ira, NARS, Date 7-29-85

5. On inspection

Copy LBJ Library

## RETYPED COPY

5. On inspection, the emphasis was on reciprocity, and Mikoyan lectured the American group on the importance of not being obstinate on this point. "Some note of reciprocity should be in the picture, and then we would not have any trouble with Castro on getting international inspection in Cuba". Mikoyan did not address himself to the US gambit that inspection in the United States would require inspection in the Soviet Union, even though this gambit was used again on this occasion. The Soviets mentioned Puerto Rico specifically, but the American negotiators said flatly that the inspection of any part of the United States was not in the cards, as a matter of reciprocity with Cuba alone. On reciprocity inspection, they referred to the "U Thant" proposal. Cuba, Mikoyan said, could not possibly accept a "one-sided inspection"; he said he had told Castro that his (Castro's) position was right on this point.

6. Mikoyan mentioned Guantanamo, indicating he did not expect us to withdraw right away but thought it would be reasonable for us to set a time at which we would begin to negotiate about withdrawal.

7. Mikoyan pressed hard on the U.S. commitment to bring the other members of the Western Hemisphere into line. The U.S. representative emphasized that it came with bad grace from the Soviets to put any emphasis on this point, since they hadn't even been able to bring into line the one Western Hemisphere country with whom they presumably had especially friendly relations.

8. Mikoyan objected to the reference in our declaration to the Rio Pact. He said he had read the Rio Pact (Mr. McCloy got the impression that perhaps he had read it for the first time) and did not like it. The Americans said that it was absolutely necessary to refer to the Rio Pact, since it was the basic document of Western Hemisphere security and we owed it to our co-signers to make clear that we were not, in our arrangements with the Soviets, watering down our commitments under the Rio Pact.

9. There was no detailed discussion of our draft declaration as such; Mikoyan said he would leave that to the negotiators. The Americans did indicate that we were not wedded to the reference in the declaration to U Thant; but no other concessions were made.

10. A tentative date was made for Friday to continue the discussion.

\* \* \* \*

(Continued)

RETYPE COPY

Mr. McCloy's prediction is that Mikoyan will rehearse for the President the Soviet position on the non-invasion pledge, on overflights, and on the need for a reciprocal form of inspection, and that it will not be possible to make any final arrangements with the Soviets in the course of Mikoyan's short visit to Washington. It is, indeed, not clear that Mikoyan expects to wrap this up personally, in which case they might look forward to a somewhat longer negotiation than we had previously assumed they wanted.

Mr. McCloy's suggestion is that the President make clear to Mikoyan:

a. That there is a considerable record of conciliation and performance on both sides, and that the Soviets should not take this moment to turn unreasonable just because they are having difficulty with the unreasonable Mr. Castro.

b. We can't think of giving up overflights, which everybody in the Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere.

c. That the kind of non-invasion statement that is contained in our draft declaration is really the most that the President can constitutionally do, especially in the absence of the arrangements for verification and safeguards that were agreed to in the correspondence between the President and Khrushchev.

d. That it would be useful on both sides to wind the matter up quickly and with maximum good will, without trying to make a bargain out of every word. The Cuban problem will remain; if the Cubans want to normalize relations we are ready and willing to talk with them about it.

On the basis of today's conversation, it does not appear that there will be a quick wrap-up of the matter in the present negotiating framework. We will want to consider the possible alternative of saving off the negotiations unilaterally if the Soviets stick to their intention to draw the Cubans into the windup arrangements.

COPIES TO:   Amb. Thompson           ARA - Mr. Martin  
              EUR - Mr. Tyler        WH - Mr. Bundy

IO:HG:mtb

TOP SECRET

1985/12/22

RETYPE COPY

November 25, 1962

1 of 3 1135/6  
#5  
Series B

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: IO-Harl Cleveland

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. McCloy on Cuba

Mr. McCloy called in at 2:15 p.m. to summarize the results of the meeting which he and Ambassador Stevenson and Yost had just completed with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendlovich.

We will have a NIACT cable here, probably before the end of the day, so I will summarize here only the highlights:

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(Continued)

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority: NLS 84-6  
 By ira, NARS, Date 1-29-85

5. On inspection  
 Copy LBJ Library

RETYPED COPY

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\* \* \* \*

(Continued)

RETYPE COPY

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b. We can't think of giving up overflights, which everybody in the Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere.

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COPIES TO:   Amb. Thompson           ARA - Mr. Martin  
              EUR - Mr. Tyler           WH - Mr. Bundy

IO:HG:mtb

TOP SECRET

11/27/62

DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Priority NUD 949501

ATB NARA Date 4/14/85

Approved WH  
28 NOV 62 -  
(attached)

(10)

19

X-194-3

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 27 1962

RM/R

~~TOP SECRET~~ MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FILE

Subject: Agreement on Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons

You are aware of the conversations which I have been having with the Soviet Foreign Minister and with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on the question of restricting the spread of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities.

At the last meeting, August 23, a potentially important shift occurred in the Soviet position. The Soviet Union now appears willing to consider reaching an agreement on non-diffusion couched in more general terms than its previous position which had specified that a prior agreement had to be reached separately concerning the specific problem of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the East German regime. In addition, although the language is ambiguous, the Soviets have not apparently precluded considering an understanding which would not rule out international nuclear weapons arrangements of a truly multilateral nature of the type which might be developed within the NATO framework.

In view of these potential shifts in the Soviet position, I have, as you know, consulted with the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Federal Republic of Germany. The response of the British Foreign Minister was entirely favorable. The French Foreign Minister stated that France would accept if the terms of the agreement were acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Foreign Minister has only recently advised me that the Federal Republic could accept a non-proliferation agreement of the kind we have in mind, provided that Communist China adhered to the terms of the arrangement. I made it clear in all of my consultations that we did not propose to give up our right to work out a truly multinational NATO nuclear force, with appropriate safeguards to assure that nuclear weapons assigned to that force could not be used on

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CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified by RM/R

Devin Rusk

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MB NARA Date 4/14/45

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

the basis of a national decision alone.

I believe we are now in a position again to approach the Soviet Union. I propose that we do so promptly in order to accomplish two objectives. The first is to determine whether the Soviet Union is in a position to state that its allies, including Communist China, will adhere to the terms of a non-proliferation agreement. I believe we are now in a position to inform the Soviet Union that our allies can be expected to adhere to such an agreement if the allies of the Soviet Union adhere. The second objective is to give the Soviet Union a somewhat more precise indication of what we have in mind concerning the obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons. We should, of course, make it clear that we reserve the right to cooperate in the establishment of a multinational nuclear weapons force within the NATO alliance.

I am attaching a talking paper which would form the basis for the exploration of whether the allies of the Soviet Union can be expected to sign a non-proliferation agreement. There is also attached an oral statement containing the relevant portions of a draft declaration. Both of these papers would be used in our next approach to the Soviet Government. Finally, there is attached the actual text of a Draft Declaration and Minute. I would recommend they not be used at the forthcoming meeting with the Soviet Union but am transmitting them so you can see what we have in mind.

I am advised that the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose the measure on the grounds that it contains no provisions for inspection; that it may have a very bad effect on our defensive alliance within NATO; and that the measure prohibits transfers which the U.S. itself may wish to make. I am advised that the Department of Defense does not oppose the measure but rather thinks it might be in our long-term interest.

Accordingly, I request your approval for carrying out the

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Priority NND 949501

by AB NARA Date 4/14/95

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

necessary discussions with the Soviet Government in order to pursue the objectives discussed in this memorandum.

*/s/ Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

S/S - RO

NOV 27 1962

A true copy of signed original

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ACDA - 2 S. S. 16



11/28/62

Record Number 55617

SET Berlin Crisis  
DOCUMENT TYPE Briefing Paper  
DOCUMENT TYPE Cable  
DATE 11/28/1962  
CIRCD  
TIME  
CABNO  
DOCNO  
ORIGIN United States. Department of State la o  
SIGNATOR Rusk, Dean la p  
DESTO  
DESTP Kennedy, John F. la p  
CLASSIFICATION [Classification Excised]  
TITLE Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's Appointment with You on  
November 29  
[Includes Briefing Papers]  
CTIT  
NAMES Mikoyan, Anastas I.  
NAMES Dobrynin, Anatoly F.  
NAMES Adenauer, Konrad  
NAMES Thompson, Llewellyn E.  
NAMES McCloy, John J.  
NAMES Khrushchev, Nikita S.  
NAMES Dean, Arthur H.  
NAMES Pushkin, Georgi M.  
NAMES Mikoyan, Ashkan Lazarevna  
NAMES Kennedy, John F.  
NAMES Dryden, Hugh  
NAMES Blagoravov, A.A.  
NAMES Semenov, Vladimir S.  
NAMES Roberts, Frank  
NAMES Souvanna Phouma  
NAMES Vinogradov, Vladimir  
TERMS  
ORGAN United Nations la o  
ORGAN West Berlin. Senate  
ORGAN North Atlantic Treaty Organization la o  
ORGAN United Nations. Acting Secretary General  
ORGAN Organization of American States la o  
PGS 14

27843



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's appointment with you on November 19

You have agreed to receive Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan on November 19 at 10 p.m. We have been informed by the Soviet Embassy that Mikoyan will be accompanied by Ambassador Gorkyain and by his interpreter, Mr. Vinogradov. I shall bring with me Ambassador Thompson, and my interpreter. I have enclosed a biographic sketch of Mikoyan. (Attachment 1)

We agree with Mr. McCloy's suggestion that you wish to make the following points clear on Cuba.

a. There is a considerable record of conciliation and performance on both sides and the Soviets should not become unreasonable at this time just because of their difficulties with Castro.

b. We cannot give up our overflights, which everyone in the Western Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere.

c. The kind of non-invasion statement that is contained in our draft declaration is the most that a President can constitutionally agree to, especially in the absence of the arrangements for verification and the safeguards which were agreed to in your correspondence with Khrushchev.

d. It would be useful to both sides to wind up the matter quickly and with maximum good will, without trying to haggle over every word. The Cuban problem will remain; if the Cubans wish to normalize relations, we are ready and willing to talk with them about it. You may wish to discourage Mikoyan from discussing future Cuban-Western Hemisphere relations on the grounds that Castro should know what is necessary for Cuba to improve its relations with the countries of the Western Hemisphere. A position paper on this point and a paper on Chinese Communist influence in Cuba are attached (Attachments 2 and 3).

You may wish to make the following points regarding the Sino-Indian dispute. A position paper is attached (Attachment 4).

a. The United States is assisting India to meet its defense requirements at the specific request of the Government of India.

b. United States assistance is designed to permit India to maintain its territorial integrity. It, therefore, does not constitute a threat to Communist China.

c. The United States would like to see peace restored but not on terms imposed by force by Communist China.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 58A, 58B AND 59

State NLK-77-1068  
BY MIM DATE 5-21-78

Page 10



(Page One)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's Appointment  
with You on November 29

You have agreed to receive Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan on November 29 at 4:30 p.m. We have been informed by the Soviet Embassy that Mikoyan will be accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin and by his interpreter, Mr. Vinogradov. I shall bring with me Ambassador Thompson and an interpreter. I have enclosed a biographic sketch of Mikoyan.

We do not believe it desirable for you to raise the subject of Berlin. Should Mikoyan raise it, you may wish to discuss the problem along the lines of the instruction sent Ambassador Kozler for his talk with Semenov (copy attached, attachment 5).

Regarding Laos, you may wish to remind Mikoyan that in your talks with Khrushchev in Vienna and in subsequent talks between Harriman and Pushkin in Geneva, the Soviet Union committed itself to obtain two things which are of vital interest to the United States: the cessation of Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam and the withdrawal of the Viet Minh from Laos. The final international agreement embodying these understandings was signed on July 23 of this year. Our information is clear that neither of the two promises has been fulfilled.

We are also particularly concerned over the recent unwarranted attack by the Pathet Lao on an Air America plane attempting to deliver Rice to the Plaines des Jarres. This attack, which resulted in the death of both the pilot and co-pilot, is a direct challenge to the authority of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma who requested the flight.

The United States engagement in Southeast Asia is most serious and, consequently, fulfillment of Soviet pledges there is of first importance. A position paper is attached (attachment 6).

Regarding a nuclear test ban, you may wish to point out that it is imperative that the nuclear powers reach early agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing. We are now ready to conclude an agreement banning tests in outer space, the atmosphere and underwater without prejudice to the continuing effort to reach agreement on banning underground tests. It is our firm view that agreement on the banning of underground tests should involve the principle of on-site inspection.

In connection with these steps, we would be interested in learning what possibilities the Soviet Government envisages of inducing Communist China to adhere to whatever nuclear test ban may be agreed on.

Regarding measures to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation, you may wish to note that Ambassador Dean has mentioned to the Soviet delegation in Geneva that there appear to be certain measures designed to reduce the risk of war concerning which a substantial amount of similarity already exists between our two countries. We have in mind such measures as (1) the establishment of improved communications between your side and ours, (2) advance notification regarding major military movements and (3) the exchange of military missions between our states, or groups of states, respectively. We are interested in exploring the prospects of agreement on these or similar measures designed to achieve

the same

the same end. We have heard that the USSR may again be interested in observation posts. We wonder if the Soviet Government has any further views on this matter. You might wish to state that if the Soviet Government were interested in proceeding with an arrangement for mutual exchange of observation posts apart from stage one of a disarmament agreement we would be glad to discuss such a plan.

If the Soviet Government agrees, we would like to give joint notification to the Acting Secretary General of the UN in the near future concerning the program for US-Soviet cooperation in outer space which was worked out by Dr. Dryden and Professor Blagonravov. If such notification is agreeable to the Soviet side, we would anticipate moving shortly thereafter to practical steps for implementing the program. A position paper is attached (attachment 7).

There are no strictly bilateral issues which merit being raised by you in this conversation. However it is possible that Mikoyan may raise the question of US-USSR Civil Air Agreement which was initialled but not signed in August 1961. A background memorandum on the subject is attached (attachment 8). Should Mikoyan urge that the agreement be signed now, you may wish to reply that after a satisfactory Cuban settlement has been reached and if progress can be made in one or two other fields, then the time may be ripe to sign the agreement.

Mikoyan may also raise the question of increased trade between the United States and the USSR. You may wish to reply that given the current state of our relations, it is understandable that American businessmen are reluctant to enter into extensive business relations with the USSR. An improvement in the political climate would probably lead to increased trade between our two countries.

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Biographic sketch of A. I. Mikoyan.
2. Cuba - United States Relations.
3. Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba.
4. Sino Indian Border Conflict.
5. Copy of telegram to Moscow regarding Kohler talk with Seenov.
6. Laos.
7. Background of US-USSR Outer Space Cooperation.
8. US-Soviet Bilateral Air Agreement.

SECRET COPY OF DOCUMENT TO BE KEPT

Re: Semenov's 1959

LEAD DISTRIBUTION- S/S

1. We have assumed that in post-Cuba phase Soviets might (a) show us their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have embarked upon a fairly radical course of policy change within which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) more likely, in absence of such broad policy change, resume talks on Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that, if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for time being.

2. Although certain aspects of Cubas situation remain unresolved, we want to take advantage of opportunity provided by Semenov's opening to initiate probe present direction of Soviet thinking on Berlin. (While you should make clear at outset that you are undertaking talks with him on personal basis without any governmental commitment although both you and he will presumably be reporting to your principals, we realistically assume that you will be regarded as speaking on basis of at least general instructions.)

3. A solid settlement in Berlin on terms that keep the city free and viable is a target of high priority for us, and we do not wish to miss any opportunity that may now exist for a Berlin settlement. You should maintain the position that since the Soviet Government started the Berlin crisis, the initiative for new proposals should rest with Moscow, but you should leave no doubt that we are much interested in a workable settlement. You should point out that we see no good in facing difficult negotiations with Germans and French except in terms of a real prospect of settlement.

4. As we see it, there are two broad possibilities for such a settlement. One is a de facto continuation of the status quo, in which any peace treaty would leave the real situation unchanged, and each side would interpret the position in its own way. This is probably easier to negotiate but less satisfactory for the long pull than a broader settlement. The terms of a wider agreement must include for us plainly acknowledged right of Western troop presence and improved access rights like those proposed under our international access authority. A number of adjustments of interest to the Soviets could be made in return for improved access and wholly acknowledged presence. Without communicating all of the above to Semenov, you should make it plain to him that any Berlin settlement which shifts from the status quo must include advantages for us as well as for them, and that the advantages of greatest interest to us are improved access and a wholly acknowledged right of Western presence. It would be appropriate to indicate that we would be interested in knowing how Soviets would conduct a wider agreement including these two features.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, SEC. 2(E), 3(D), 3(E) AND 11

State (11K-77-1068)  
 at [Signature] W.D.S. DATE 8/24/98



(Page Nine)

Verbatim Copy of Telegram to Moscow

Ref: Moscow 1389

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

1. We have assumed that in post-Cuba phase Soviets might (a) show by their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have embarked upon a fairly radical course of policy change which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) more likely, in absence of such broad policy change, reopen talks in Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that, if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for the time being.

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

5. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this point, you should also endeavor to [word illeg] him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problem. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which has been put out through both satellite and direct sources is that lesson of Cuba in that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Semenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 16 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, comprise cannot extend to what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in endeavor to examine modalities provided any chances are consistent with safe-guarding of those vital interests.

7.

f) a UN role in other respects than troop presence - as for example access or perforation of wall. You should probe as to the role and authority of West Berlin Senate, Western garrison and Federal Republic under any such arrangements. In all this, you should make it clear that we could accept no arrangement which did not allow visible continuation of our guarantee of the freedom of West Berlin, and we repeat that you should avoid any suggestion of a U.S. position on such possibilities.

5. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this point, you should also endeavor to press him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problem. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which has been put out through both satellite and direct sources is that lesson of Cuba is that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Semenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 15 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, compromise cannot extend to what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in endeavor to examine modalities provided any changes are consistent with safeguarding of these vital interests.

6. A further point which it might be useful to probe would be role now assigned to peace treaty by Soviets. We have noted recent de-emphasis of peace treaty in both Soviet and GDR statements. Semenov will undoubtedly continue to pay lip service to peace treaty, but we would be interested in your impressions from talking with him that this is definitely on back burner.

7. We are much interested in Khrushchev's recent conversation with Ambassador Roberts and his suggestion that troops might remain temporarily under a certain unspecified UN role. In the degree that this could be a face-saver for Soviets while Allied troop presence and guarantee remain, this proposal is of real interest to us. A major purpose of your talks with Semenov should therefore be to ascertain whether this suggestion represents a real shift in the Soviet position or is merely a device for limiting both the duration and the effectiveness of Western presence. You should make it clear that we cannot express any judgment on what they have in mind until they have spelled it out. You might, for example, seek to determine what the Soviets have in mind among such possibilities (without offering them a catalog for shopping) as following: (a) simple registration of any agreement on Berlin with UN, (b) agreement to report to UN on such matters as the size, composition, and activities of forces in Berlin, (c) some form of UN representation and authority in West Berlin, (d) some new status involving West Berlin request for Allied troops under some UN umbrella, (e) move of elements of UN itself to West Berlin, (f) a UN role in other respects than troop presence - as for example access or perforation of Wall. You should probe us to the role and authority of West Berlin Senate, Western garrisons, and Federal Republic under any such arrangements. In all this, you should make it clear that we could accept no arrangement which did not allow visible continuation of our own guarantee of the freedom of West Berlin, and we repeat that you should avoid any suggestion of a U.S. position on such possibilities.

8. You are familiar with standard arguments made repeatedly by Secretary in his numerous conversations with Soviets over past 16 months. To extent you deem desirable, you should repeat these arguments as appropriate. Be

TIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

would want to avoid giving impression that our position has weakened [words illeg] on what we have defined as our vital interest in Berlin situation. Our position is that of reasonable man whose strength and restraint have both been demonstrated.

9. We building [word illeg] should [word illeg] for exchange with Semenov. With your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges you will recognize anything really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgement as to whether to pursue it by discrete questioning.

[REDACTED]

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...and that we have a general agreement that the situation has worsened to an  
...any amount we have a right to our right positions in the situation.  
...the situation is that of responsibility and power struggle and we remain here  
both been demonstrated.

9. We believe forgoing should suffice for exchange with Semenov. With  
your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges, you will recognize anything  
really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgment as  
to whether to pursue it by discreet questioning.

10. We would hope that you could have lunch with Semenov without this  
getting to press corps. While we accept inevitability of your having to brief  
French, British, and German colleagues, at least in general, on your discussion,  
we would also hope that information would be limited to them. In talking with  
them, you should be careful to avoid giving impression that you are in any  
way negotiating rather than engaging purely in probing operation on informal  
basis at Soviet initiative. President is cautious about possibility of carrying  
our really useful exchanges with Soviets if we follow usual procedure of full  
briefings for three and then for NATO. In past, this has led either to leaks  
and public discussion of Allied differences before reactions of Soviets have  
been ascertained, or to debate within Alliance on theoretical points which have  
not played role in talks with Soviets. While President is therefore, prepared  
to have you initiate probe with Semenov, at appropriate point he may wish  
to use other channels.

[REDACTED]

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11/28/62

Authority MND 949501

By JB NARA Date 4/14/95

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL

November 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has approved your memorandum of November 27th on the subject of Non-Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons and authorizes the necessary discussions with the Soviet Government in the terms set forth in that memorandum with its attachments.

with our suggest approval a formal ting will m (TAB A) decide old n to Defense,

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

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(TAB C) which ions if that e relevant al statement. irst meeting minute be erving a t the first

meeting in the manner you have used in past discussions. This

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Memo No. 4

Approved in S  
12/5/62

November 30, 1962  
1:00 - 3:40 p.m.

SECRET

- 1. Nuclear Test Ban
- 2. Non-proliferation

The United States:

The Secretary  
 The Under Secretary  
 Ambassador Thompson  
 EUE - Richard H. Davis  
 Mr. Korman, Interpreter

The Soviet Union:

First Dep. Premier Anastas Mikoyan  
 Ambassador Dobrynin  
 Mr. Korotenko, Counselor, Sov. Emb.  
 Mr. Chistov  
 Mr. Vinogradov, Interpreter

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 G OSD/ISA Amembassy Paris  
 S/AL ACDA Amembassy Bonn  
 G/PM WH Amembassy Moscow  
 OSD

1. Nuclear Test Ban

Mr. Mikoyan picked up the Secretary's reference to the nuclear test ban and observed the Soviet Union had made a number of proposals. The Soviets had learned last summer that American and British scientists had proposed that sealed boxes could be used to detect underground tests. This would eliminate the need for 'on ground' personnel. These sealed boxes would be placed in earthquake zones in neighboring states provided their governments agreed. Soviet scientists had agreed with the conclusions of their fellow-American-British scientists on the feasibility of such a system.

The question had been asked, Mr. Mikoyan continued, how one could guarantee that these sealed boxes would actually be set up in the Soviet Union. This was a difficult question to ignore. Chairman Khrushchev had told Sir Frank Roberts some time ago, and the day before yesterday Ambassador Soldatov in London had said to Lord Howe that during the construction of these stations and for the delivery of these sealed boxes,

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pp 1-4  
pp 9-11  
VOT 15

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MIC. SWM 4517

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ASU ~ PA 003 PDIA 9047211  
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[unclear] OADR

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Mr. Mikoyan replied, yes, that is the question. If the scientists find it possible to agree, then the question moves into the sphere of political policy.

1. Non-proliferation

For example, the Secretary continued, one aspect of NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship was the question of the non-transfer of nuclear weapons. This question too had been touched on in his conversation with Gromyko and he thought we were coming to a point where we could speak about this in precise terms. The Secretary expressed the hope that he would see Ambassador Dobrynin before going to the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris. Some progress had been made on this subject over the past year and the Secretary had talked with certain of his colleagues in other governments, but only in general terms. He emphasized that reaching agreement on this question could be an important step.

Turning again to the nuclear test ban, the Secretary observed that the attitude of Peiping was important. If the Chinese would not cooperate on the test ban or a non-proliferation agreement, then there could be no agreement. He noted there had been certain articles published in Jen Min Jih Pao in Peiping which indicated Chinese opposition. He asked Mr. Mikoyan if he had an impression whether or not the Chinese would cooperate. The Secretary expressed the personal belief that the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons regardless of the political or ideological system of other states.

Mr. Mikoyan replied, the United States does not recognize China and yet the Secretary was asking him. He could only speak on behalf of the USSR interest, not China. This question should be addressed to the Chinese.

Mr. Mikoyan

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Mr. Mikoyan continued, "we should defend our own positions. He then asked the Secretary whether he understood him correctly to say that if China opposes these two proposals there could be no possibility of agreement."

The Secretary answered the two proposals were somewhat different. In the case of the test ban, there was a provision in the treaty that the signatories could elect to free themselves of their obligations if someone else tests. As regards a non-transfer agreement, the proposal which he and Mr. Gromyko had been discussing began with two important paragraphs. First, it was proposed that the four existing nuclear powers agree not to transfer to national governments or to help national governments obtain nuclear weapons. The second paragraph provided that non-nuclear powers would agree not to receive or to manufacture nuclear weapons. If there was a government capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons and refuses to sign this agreement, then it is hard to see how the agreement would have meaning. For instance, we assure the Soviet Union would be greatly concerned if Germany refused to sign. On our part, we would be greatly concerned if China, or indeed any one of twenty other countries capable of developing atomic weapons, refused to sign.

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Mr. Mikoyan observed he was not a specialist in this matter, but he was apprehensive that this proposal might provide a loophole through which nuclear weapons could come under some other flag, such as an international body. Through this the Germans may have access to nuclear weapons. This the Soviets cannot accept. Even now the west Germans (Strauss) are saying don't give us nuclear weapons in our own hands, since we will have access to them through NATO. If this proposal is designed to provide a by-pass, it would not be acceptable to the USSR.

The Secretary

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The Secretary replied that Mr. Mikoyan was correct. This was a key issue. The United States was prepared to agree on no transfer, either directly or indirectly, of nuclear weapons to national governments, but we must be absolutely clear on what we mean. We must discuss this more, as we believe it has real possibilities. The United States is not interested in increasing the number of governments who have nuclear weapons. We have had differences with our friends in Paris. We consider the point made by Mr. Mikoyan a serious one and we will want to be more precise and have further discussions in detail with Ambassador Dobrynin.

Mr. Mikoyan responded that he understood the United States as a country did not want to increase the number of governments who have nuclear weapons, but, he asked, can the United States withstand pressure from its Allies to transfer to national governments or to a supranational body these weapons? In case war should break out, the Soviet Union would use nuclear weapons in the interest of its Allies but it would not give weapons to them.

The Secretary remarked that we must be clear on what we are talking about. Both the USSR and the USA have nuclear weapons in direct support of our Allies, though the warheads remain in our hands and cannot be used without our consent. This does not prevent us from consulting with our NATO Allies to the greatest extent possible about the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union could also consult with its Warsaw Allies. This would not prevent an agreement being reached. The United States does not want other governments to be in a position to use nuclear weapons by their own decision.

Mr. Mikoyan concluded his remarks by saying he understood that the Secretary would continue his talks on this subject with Ambassador Dobrynin.

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Approved in S  
12/5/62

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Memo No. 5

November 30, 1962  
1:00 - 3:40 p.m.

Berlin

The United States:

- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Ambassador Thompson
- Mr. Richard H. Davis, EUR
- Mr. Kamman, Interpreter

The Soviet Union:

- First Dep. Premier Anastas Mikoyan
- Ambassador Dobrynin
- Mr. Kornienko, Counselor, Sov. Emb.
- Mr. Chistov
- Mr. Vinogradov, Interpreter

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 S/AL                                OSD/ISA                    Amembassy London  
 INR/D                               U.S. Berlin Mission      Amembassy Bonn  
 OSD

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*Handwritten notes and initials*

Turning from the discussion on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mr. Mikoyan said he had another question to raise. The Cuban question, he observed, could have brought us to nuclear war, but now the crucial period was over and we should be able to settle this question peacefully. However, there was a second question which could lead us to war, and this is Germany. We have consulted with, and submitted many proposals to our World War II Allies. Two or three years have passed during which there have been extensive negotiations with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko. This has brought about considerable progress. When Mr. Dulles complained about the Soviet ultimatum of six months in the first Soviet proposal on Germany and said it could not possibly be worked out in this time, the Soviet Union had not insisted. Moreover, it was not an ultimatum. A time limit is not as important for us as the willingness of our World War II Allies to finalize this question. Looking back, we do not regret postponing the issue because in our discussions certain progress has been made.

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The Soviet Union could not, Mr. Mikoyan continued, go beyond the proposals already made by Chairman Khrushchev. The Soviet Union was concerned by the presence of Western troops in Berlin. He would like to ask a question: since the Western powers were not making new proposals, or apparently making any constructive efforts, did the United States think that this situation could be frozen in perpetuity? Did the United States expect the occupation forces to remain in West Berlin for all time? All these questions were legitimate but the United States did not answer them. If the Soviet Union became convinced that their World War II Allies don't want an agreement, then the Soviet Union would proceed alone. It did not wish to do so but we could not live together with an occupation regime in West Berlin and no peace treaty. However, Mr. Mikoyan concluded, he would not repeat the thoughts in Chairman Khrushchev's messages to the President on this subject.

The Secretary stated that we had had many discussions in the past but he was glad to tell Mr. Mikoyan of our position. In the course of these past discussions a number of points had arisen on which considerable progress had been made. We had tried to meet the USSR in a spirit of reciprocity. Now we have come to a point where in trying to meet the Soviet Union on one point, it is then set aside and the USSR moves on to another point. In all frankness, more genuine reciprocity from the Soviet side is needed. For example, we were told East Berlin cannot be discussed, i.e., Allied interests in East Berlin are not for discussion. We were told we must discuss West Berlin. This position reflects an absence of the spirit of reciprocity. We have said for years that the presence of Western troops and a guaranteed freedom for Berlin is a vital interest of the United States. We haven't said

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Mr. Mikoyan said the Secretary's last remark was constructive and he entirely shared it. With many of the Secretary's past remarks he could not agree. West Berlin was situated in the territory of the GDR. East Berlin is the capital city of a sovereign state. Accordingly, by all the rules, West Berlin should be considered a part of the GDR, and it could have claimed West Berlin. But the USSR and the GDR, understanding the position of the Western Powers, had agreed that West Berlin remain a special unit without becoming part of the GDR. There was no intention to interfere with West Berlin unless it became a member of military pacts. The Soviet Union had agreed to talk with the United States on how to finish the occupation status. It would be much better if a peace treaty were signed by all the Allies against Germany in World War II, but if this were not possible, because of the stubbornness of Adenauer or other western Allies, the Soviet Union could sign a separate treaty. But the Soviet Union would prefer to find an agreed solution. Time does settle questions, but time can also create contradictions and explosions can occur. The Berlin and German questions have been delayed for a long time but such delay makes the situation more dangerous. The United States should give more thought to its position but it should not delay too long.

The Secretary said we were prepared to go into this question at any time. If there was introduced an element of genuine reciprocity, he thought a solution could be found. However, he felt that we had had agreements in the past on questions with the USSR but these agreements haven't lasted very long. In this connection the Secretary referred to the 1945 agreements when Allied troops had withdrawn from a considerable portion of East Germany, and to the 1949 agreements which through certain events we felt had been violated to some degree. The United States wants

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to remove Berlin and Germany as a constant source of difficulties, but we must recognize the difficulty in finding a solution.

The Secretary said he wanted to comment on Mr. Mikoyan's remark about delay. The United States is not attempting to delay discussions. The delays which have occurred are bilateral responsibility. One can always hurry into a crisis, but it is much better if we can find a way to resolve this question without a crisis. The Secretary said he was confident that he could speak for President Kennedy in that he wants to find a satisfactory solution to this issue. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have many other things to do for their peoples.

Mr. Mikoyan responded that in order to find an end to this issue, questions must be discussed. The President should not expect from the Soviet Union additional proposals. The Soviet Union expects constructive proposals from the United States.

The Secretary observed the United States had made quite a few proposals but received the reply that these could not be discussed.

Mr. Mikoyan said it was really the other way around and urged that the United States think the situation over. The Soviet Union believes that there must be movement ahead. Mr. Mikoyan disclaimed any intention of conducting negotiations, but he wanted the Secretary to understand the seriousness of this issue for the USSR.

The Secretary expressed the hope that Moscow would give a great deal of thought to this issue; indeed all of the Powers concerned must give hard thought to it.

Referring

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Mr. Mikoyan jokingly remarked "so there is an independent policy of the United States". He concluded by remarking that Soviet interests and ours could be reconciled, which was a good omen.

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Approved in S

12/5/62

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Memo No. 5

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November 30, 1962

1:00 - 3:40 p.m.

Berlin

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The United States:

- The Secretary
- The Under Secretary
- Ambassador Thompson
- Mr. Richard H. Davis, EUR
- Mr. Kamman, Interpreter

The Soviet Union:

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that this situation will be perpetuated for eternity. We would like to see a peace treaty for all Germany and we have made many proposals, but we are faced with the fact of disagreement between us.

Mr. Mikoyan asked on what basis did the United States intend to keep its troops in West Berlin and for how long.

The Secretary responded that time limits were difficult to talk about except in terms of a general settlement of the German question. At this point there is a sharp difference between the Soviet Union and the United States. This can be managed so as not to produce other crises while we proceed to other questions which might help our relations. In this way time can be of help, and in the long run will improve the possibilities of agreement. Also the time factor can be affected by relations between the East and West Germans, for instance, in the matter of trade, which would indicate they were prepared to live in peace. Again time would be a factor when the West Berliners no longer have the threat of a man with opinions and objectives like Ulbricht hanging over them.

The Secretary continued that our approach had been broadly along three lines: First, to settle the German question as a whole, which would mean the end of the occupation; secondly, recognizing existing facts, of which there are three important elements -- the existence of East Germany, West Germany and West Berlin; thirdly, given the fact of disagreement, we must consider how we might manage this problem in order to promote the possibilities of agreement in the long run, but handle the fact of disagreement peacefully. This was one of the reasons why we had proposed Deputy Foreign Ministers. Unfortunately, we had not been able to reach agreement on any of these three variants. Both of our countries possess great power and Berlin was important to both. Therefore we must prepare to discuss the question with great care. We feel that if the Soviet approach is the same, we can find a way to deal with this issue.

Mr. Mikoyan

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Referring

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USBER BERLIN 476

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Dec 3 (Deliver Finletter 8:00 a.m., Dec. 5)

Thompson ~~secretary~~ briefed Ambassadorial Group on Mikoyan

with President and Secretary.

discussion

Talk with President did not include any ~~reference to~~

Berlin and except for reference to Soviet failure to fulfill obligations in Laos only Cuba was discussed.

On Cuba, Mikoyan took line that Soviet missiles had been only defensive and had been erected because of invasion threats by QTE Nixon and Pentagon generals UNQTE.

Mikoyan had no new instructions and it was agreed that negotiations would continue in New York.

Conversations with Secretary covered wider field, but

on Berlin

Dictated by: **JKH:jkh**  
12/3/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

S/AL **Thompson**

Clearances: **BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand** **MTH** **RPM - Mr. Spillman (subst)**

**SOV - Mr. Guthrie (subst)** **S/S - Mr. Little** **REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".**

**S - Mr. Swan**

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS TOPOL

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on Berlin Mikoyan only reviewed history of Soviet proposals in standard terms. Secretary briefly reviewed our attitude, to which Mikoyan responded that President should not expect additional proposals from the Soviets as they are waiting for us.

In reply to question from Alphan, Thompson said that if New York talks failed, in that no on-site inspection can be arranged,  and we would assume that US surveillance will continue.

*Paris*  
B1

Alphan gave French analysis that change in Soviet attitude on UN status for Berlin troops between Khrushchev talks with Roberts and with Canadian Amb (as well as letter to Macmillan) was tactical to show no Soviet weakness in light of Cuban affair and that Cuba could not be considered standard for solutions of outstanding problems. Other Alphan points were (1) Berlin problem has not disappeared and West is now receiving warning of this from Soviets; (2) resumption of tensions in Berlin is not immediate; (3) Khrushchev, knowing the risk of a separate peace treaty, does not plan one; (4) Khrushchev attempts to use UN vindicate French opposition to any UN formula for Berlin arrangements; (5) French amazed at instability of Khrushchev.

British views on Soviet Berlin tactics given other three in writing.

These being pouched principal addressees.

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS TOPOL

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*Classification*

With exception French views, foregoing may be used NAC meeting

December 5.

END

RUSK

SECRET

84/2428  
12/4/62

EUR:WCBurdett/hm  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 4, 1962  
4:30 p.m.  
White House

SUBJECT: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Per Haekkerup, Foreign Minister of Denmark  
Count Kield Gustav Knuth-Winterfeldt, Ambassador of Denmark  
William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for EUR

COPIES TO: S/S BTF  
G GER  
S/P Amembassy Copenhagen  
EUR-2 Amembassy Oslo  
BNA  
INR

The President informed the Foreign Minister [redacted], Khrushchev had gone back to the same old Soviet position on Berlin. Some months may go by, but the Berlin problem will be agitated again.

Reverting in another part of the conversation to Berlin, the President said that the defense of Europe was vastly complicated by the need to protect the access routes to Berlin.

The President expressed the view that we should not at this time make any move with respect to Berlin. When he saw Gromyko in Washington, Gromyko was very belligerent. The President believed we should let the Soviets initiate any discussions now. The Berlin situation was very unsettling. Khrushchev could heat up the problem at any time.

The Foreign Minister reported that he had talked with German Foreign Minister Schroeder and understood that the West Germans were prepared to move a little on Berlin. The President confirmed this, but added our position was a long way from Soviet demands. The Soviets wanted surrender. Both Foreign Minister Schroeder and Mayor Brandt were anxious to work out a solution.

FORM DS-1254  
3-61

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SANITIZED

NW-83-115

12/6/62

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CM- 158-62

6 December 1962



MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COUNCIL *Aug 13*

1. Looking to the future, the possibility exists that in the next decade the USSR may cease to be the principal military threat to the U.S. and its allies and may come to share that distinction with Communist China or even be obliged to accept displacement. In any case, Communist China seems certain to grow in military as well as political importance during the coming period.

2. The JCS should give consideration now to the ways in which military means can be brought to bear on Red China in the coming years to assure a behavior favorable to U.S. national objectives. As the persuasive effectiveness of military power depends on a visible capability to impose appropriate punishment for misbehavior, the problem is to maintain a military posture (forces, installations, support elements and other activities such as MAAG's) clearly capable in conjunction with those of allies of holding China to a course of action satisfactory to us if a clash of wills occurs.

3. As a basis for future planning, the JCS need an analytical study bearing on the following:

a. Possible future situations and Chinese actions or capabilities for action, calling for the use of military force against China, or for confronting the Chinese with U.S. capability and readiness to use force against them.

b. Possible theaters of operations in which military operations may occur, or the deploying of U.S. military forces in readiness may be required.

c. Characteristics of such operations and deployments, and the weapons systems, forces and supporting activities which may be required.

d. Contingencies for which detailed plans should be prepared.

DECLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/18/87

*Ref 248 / JCS Taylor / CM 1962 / CM 146-62 thru 188-62*

4. The JCS desire the JSSC to prepare the foregoing study to serve as a basis for further consideration of the military preparations required to cope with the growing military threat of China.

(Sgd) MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: DJS  
CM FILE  
FILE 0  
*Legen*

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| DECLASSIFIED     |
| BY 10/24/07      |
| NARS Date 5-2-94 |

NG TELEGRAM

Department of State PERMANENT RECORD COPY

ACTION COPY

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MESSAGE CENTER

12/10/62

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SECRET

1962 DEC 11 AM 7 38

Control: 4853  
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12:14 PM

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FROM: BONN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1538, DECEMBER 10, 5PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1538, INFORMATION PARIS 378, LONDON 375

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

PARIS ALSO PASS USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

SINCE JOINT US-UK RPT US-UK ESTIMATE LAST SUMMER OF POSSIBILITIES OF FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR FIELD (EMBTTEL 243, EMBTEL 6), DEVELOPMENTS HAVE REINFORCED OUR VIEW THAT NO RPT NO SUCH COOPERATION ACTIVELY UNDER CONSIDERATION.

IN LATE AUGUST ADENAUER PUBLICLY STATED THAT DE GAULLE HAD NEVER DISCUSSED SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH HIM (A-466). SUBSEQUENT DE GAULLE VISIT HERE, AS WELL AS COMMUNICATIONS THEREAFTER EXCHANGED BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS, DID NOT RPT NOT, AS FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE ASCERTAIN, INVOLVE NUCLEAR SUBJECTS. AT SAME TIME, DE GAULLE'S HAMBURG SPEECH SEPT 7 TO BUNDESWEHR RPT BUNDESWEHR ACADEMY, IN ITS REFERENCE TO "ORGANIC COOPERATION" IN MILITARY FIELD, PRODUCED CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION THAT HE MEANT NEW TYPES OF COOPERATION, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (A-757). ALTHOUGH FRENCH OFFICIALS (PARIS A-610) FLATLY DENIED THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF SUCH NUCLEAR COOPERATION TOOK PLACE, WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY PARIS' ESTIMATE THAT IT UNDOUBTEDLY REMAINS SUBJECT RESERVED FOR POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION IN FUTURE. ANOTHER SOMEWHAT UNSETTLING FACTOR IS RECURRENT STORY THAT FRENCH MEMORANDUM SENT AFTER VISIT CONTAINED SOME POTENTIAL "DYNAMITE", POSSIBLY EVEN INTIMATING PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION, AND HENCE WAS EXTREMELY CLOSELY HELD BY GERMANS (EMBTTEL 1188). NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS STILL NO RPT NO FIRM EVIDENCE OF FRENCH PUSHING FOR GERMAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR MATTERS.

Handwritten notes and stamps: "ef", "751.5", "8-3162", "XR-757,5611", "762A.B", "751.5611/12-10-62", "XR-762A.5211", "1538", "12/10/62".

Handwritten vertical note: "COPY # 56" and "751.5611/12-10-62".

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

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| ACTION ASSIGNED TO: eur      | ACTION TAKEN: [initials] | DATE OF ACTION: 12 Dec 62 | DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: hle |
| NAME OF OFFICER: [signature] |                          |                           |                         |
| OFFICE SYMBOL: [signature]   |                          |                           |                         |

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-2- 1538, DECEMBER 10, 5 PM, FROM BONN

ON GERMAN SIDE, CONTINUING STRONG LINE WHICH US RPT US HAS TAKEN RESPECTING NEED TO BUILD UP CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND RECENT CUBAN EXPERIENCE, HIGHLIGHTING PROBLEMS INHERENT IN STRATEGY RELYING PRIMARILY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HAVE SOMEWHAT DAMPENED EARLIER GERMAN ENTHUSIASM FOR GREATER NUCLEAR EMPHASIS AND CAPABILITY. CURRENT GOVERNMENT CRISIS WHICH HAS REMOVED STRAUSS RPT STRAUSS FROM DEFENSE MINISTRY ALSO AFFECTS SITUATION SINCE HE HAS BEEN MOST PROMINENTLY IDENTIFIED WITH CONCEPT THAT DEFENSE OF FRG RPT FRG ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AT SAME TIME, AS EMBASSY HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, PROBABLY ALL LEADING POLITICIANS HERE, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO STRAUSS, MAY BE RELIED UPON TO SEEK ARRANGEMENTS ASSURING EQUAL TREATMENT FOR FRG RPT FRG IN ANY NUCLEAR PROGRAM DEVELOPED WITHIN ALLIANCE, SUCH AS CURRENT AMERICAN CONCEPT OF SEA-BORNE MLF RPT MLF.

ALTHOUGH ADENAUER CONTINUES PERSONALLY TO BE ATTRACTED TO BILATERAL FRANCO-GERMAN ARRANGEMENTS IN ALL FIELDS, HIS INFLUENCE IS NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY DECISIVE, PARTICULARLY IF FRENCH ARE NOT RPT NOT PRESSING ANY JOINT NUCLEAR PROGRAM. EMBASSY UNAWARE OF ANYTHING TO SUBSTANTIATE BLANKENHORN RPT BLANKENHORN COMMENT (PARIS 139) THAT GERMANS HAD OFFERED TO BEAR SOME OF COST OF FRENCH FORCE DE FRAPPE RPT FORCE DE FRAPPE DESPITE HIS COMMENT (WHICH CONFORMS TO OUR OBSERVATIONS) THAT GERMANS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO INDEPENDENT FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE. MOST RANKING GERMAN OFFICIALS CLEARLY CONTINUE TO APPRECIATE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES WHICH ANY FRANCO-GERMAN PROGRAM MIGHT HAVE.

NEVERTHELESS, AS REPORTED REFTELS 6 AND 243, EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT: (1) AT SCIENTIFIC LEVEL FRANCO-GERMAN CONTACTS DO EXIST WHICH HAVE PROBABLY GIVEN COMPETENT GERMAN SCIENTISTS NECESSARY THEORETICAL AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED IN EVENT EITHER JOINT OR INDEPENDENT PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE LAUNCHED; AND (2) IF ALLIANCE FAILS SIGNIFICANTLY TO MEET GERMAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AS SEEN BY GERMANS, FRG RPT FRG COULD STILL BECOME ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN INDEPENDENT OR FRANCO-GERMAN PROGRAM. ANOTHER PERTINENT FACT WOULD BE ADMITTED FAILURE TO MEET PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN DISARMAMENT

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-3- 1538, DECEMBER 10, 5 PM, FROM BONN

CONTEXT. FURTHER LONG-RANGE RELATED POSSIBILITY WHICH DESERVES WATCHING BUT WHICH DEPENDS ON OUTCOME BRITAIN'S EEC RPT EEC NEGOTIATIONS AND SHAPE OF FUTURE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY IS. INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE INCLUDING BOTH FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR COMPONENTS. BOTH OF LATTER FACTORS, HOWEVER, REMAIN TOO PROBLEMATICAL TO AFFECT PRESENT ANALYSIS AT THIS TIME.

DOWLING

HLN

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317 Military

NATO 1-8/1  
July 11/12

27

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1962

12/13/62  
(12/10/62)

SECRET

Last conversation with the President before NATO meeting of  
December 1962

Time: Monday, December 10, 11:00 a.m.

Participants: The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,  
and McGeorge Bundy

The two Secretaries brought to the President three questions which  
required last-minute review: Skybolt, the Azores, and the multilateral  
deterrent.

On Skybolt, Secretary McNamara explained that he would go first to  
London for talks with Thorneycroft. He intended to present the  
strongest possible case for the technical decision which was anticipated,  
and he proposed to offer the United Kingdom three alternative means  
of meeting its requirements. The British could meet the remaining  
development cost of Skybolt themselves and buy what they wanted for  
their own use; an adaptation of Hound Dog might be developed and  
supplied; or there might be UK participation in a multilateral system  
of some sort.

Mr. McNamara did not believe that the British would be pleased by any  
one of these three alternatives, at least at first. He indicated his  
substantial agreement with a suspicion I had expressed earlier, to the  
effect that the British might not have bought Skybolt, in the end, anyway.  
What he thought we might consider, at some stage in the negotiations,  
was a proposal to give the British access to a more up-to-date weapons  
system on the condition that the venture become multilateral if and when  
a multilateral force should be developed. Such a course might conceivably  
be taken, for example, with Polaris.

The Secretary of State, while not disagreeing with Mr. McNamara's  
presentation, indicated his own deep concern with the difficulties that  
would be posed for the British by a cancellation of Skybolt. He appeared  
to incline toward a major effort to assist them in meeting the remaining  
development costs, so that the cost of Skybolt to them would not be  
prohibitive, and they would at least have a fair shot at obtaining what  
they had been counting on.

Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President

2

FRUS 13-15 SUMMARY

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12/13/62

The President indicated his general approval of Secretary McNamara's proposal, and said that he was not eager to join in a large share of further development costs for a weapon to be supplied only to the British.

On the Azores, the Secretary of State reported his strong conviction that it was important now to emphasize to the Portuguese that the United States could not allow itself to become a satellite of Portugal because of any base, even the Azores. The Secretary intended to say to the Portuguese that if the current Portuguese attitude was sustained, the United States would have to begin to comment more strongly on Portuguese behavior in various ways. The Secretary warned that this course of action might possibly lead to an unreasoning Portuguese decision to end the Azores agreement entirely. The Secretary of Defense and Mr. Bundy indicated their belief that this result was quite improbable, and the Secretary of Defense said that while it would be most inconvenient for a period of time, the Armed Forces could in fact survive such a blow, though the Joint Chiefs would probably not agree. The President approved the Secretary's planned position.

On the problem of the multilateral nuclear deterrent, it was agreed that Secretary McNamara would begin discussions in directing the attention of Mediterranean NATO members away from the existing obsolescent missile system and toward better arrangements. The Secretary of Defense planned to begin with the Italian Minister of Defense, Andreotti, and to continue with the Turkish Defense Minister. As the discussion developed, it was agreed that in the light of the uncertainties surrounding the problem of multilateral and seaborne deterrents, it might be well to begin the conversations simply with an effort to clear up the problem of the Jupiters itself, since any arrangement that would remove them would clearly be a step forward for the Alliance as a whole. The Secretary planned to point out to the Italians and the Turks that the Cuban experience had brought it home to us how dangerous these soft, vulnerable, first-strike weapons are. They are expensive as well as dangerous, and all the countries concerned could better apply the resources which they require to other military or civil undertakings. The Secretary of Defense planned to offer to the Italians, in this connection, an opportunity to participate in the manufacture of the M113 armored vehicle, and he proposed to discuss with the Turks the possibility of certain further deployments of fighter aircraft. It was agreed that he would also be ready to consider the problem of a strengthened Mediterranean deterrent -- perhaps initially in terms of a rearrangement of Polaris deployments.

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NAT 158/E

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- 3 -

12/13/62

In the course of this discussion there was also conversation about the planned speeches of the two Secretaries at Paris. Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara indicated that comments and suggestions from the President could well be sent later in the week, and so there was no detailed discussion of the draft texts. The President did raise the question whether the planned argumentation for conventional forces was really well based, except in the context of Berlin. He wondered whether, absent the problem of Berlin, there would really be a need for large-scale conventional forces along the main lines dividing Europe. He suggested that after all, any incursion across this line would in fact lead promptly to nuclear warfare, and that for that reason the nuclear deterrent would be effective. Mr. McNamara answered that he himself would argue that the additional conventional forces would be needed even without Berlin. He thought the Soviets could find many other opportunities in Europe over a period of years, which would not seem worth a thermonuclear war to the West and against which the only safe deterrent would be adequate conventional strength. The President did not seem persuaded, but he did not press his point.

h. G.

McG. B.

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12/10/62 12/17/62  
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SF

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1962

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Last conversation with the President before NATO meeting of December 1962

Time: Monday, December 10, 11:00 a.m.

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(about Berlin)

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McN had already offered details to Gromyko on 11/9! - see 90-11/19/62  
DATA 100-1218

Newstand 1/19/skybolt - Nassau  
(Classified) (9/)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLK-90-81  
By SF NARA Date 9/15/92

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McG. B.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 13, 1962

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLK-90-81  
By SF NARA Date 9/10/97

12/13/62

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- 3 -

12/13/62

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M. J. B.

McG. B.

SECRET



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12/11/62 63-3

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12/11/62 Copy 18

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(63)

card: date 11 Dec-ber 1962  
Ruled for file.  
"Memorandum -  
Thorneycroft  
7 JUN 1963 Dec 11, 1962

Smiley Courtney

11 December 1962  
"McNamara - Thorneycroft"

This is a transcript and, in some places, a slight expansion of the notes I took at the meeting (11 December 1962) between Mr. Thorneycroft and Secretary McNamara in London concerning the cancellation of SKYBOLT.

The meeting was attended by Thorneycroft, Solly Zuckerman, Sir Robert Scott, and one other British officer whose name I forget. On the American side we had Mr. McNamara, Paul Nitze, myself, David Bruce and another gentleman from the American Embassy whose name I don't remember. The meeting took place in the Ministry of Defence in a small conference room which I believe adjoins Thorneycroft's office. Before we went to the meeting we had had lunch at the American Embassy and had discussed the forthcoming meeting somewhat. Mr. McNamara had a number of copies of the aide memoire and it was decided that he would read it aloud. He also indicated that he hoped that Mr. Thorneycroft might suggest the possibility of substituting a POLARIS force that would be assigned to NATO to replace the SKYBOLT, indicating that the alternatives in the aide memoire were not likely to be accepted.

Polaris  
in alternative

After the usual pleasantries were exchanged Mr. McNamara suggested that we all follow his reading of the White Paper. He then proceeded to read it aloud virtually word for word. When he was finished Mr. Thorneycroft began speaking, addressing his remarks directly to Mr. McNamara.

Thorneycroft: "I won't comment on the technical judgements that you have made," he said. "Experts are good at arguing both sides. I am confident that your experts have advised you as you have indicated in your paper. I am equally confident that other experts could be found to argue the other side.

"I will discuss the political implications. This

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4  
MLK-95-57  
By MME NARA, Date 10/31/95

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Newstead Pp 19 / Skybolt - Norman (Classified) 18A = Folder 2  
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The meeting was attended by Thorneycroft, Solly Zuckerman, Sir Robert Scott, and one other British officer whose name I forget. On the American side we had Mr. McNamara, Paul Nitze, myself, David Bruce and Philip Courtney. The meeting took place in the Ministry of Defence In a small conference room which I believe adjoins Thorneycroft's office. Before we went to the meeting we had had lunch at the American Embassy and had discussed the forthcoming meeting somewhat. Mr. McNamara had a number of copies of the aide memoire and it was decided that he would read it aloud. He also indicated that he hoped that Mr. Thorneycroft might suggest the possibility of substituting a POLARIS force that would be assigned to NATO to replace the SKYBOLT, indicating that the alternatives in the aide memoire were not likely to be accepted.

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missile is at the heart of British defence policy. It is the key to the continuing of the V-bomber force. It is the only example of complementarity between the U. S. and Great Britain.

"Moreover, the SKYBOLT project arose as part of the context and complex of other decisions. We made the U.K. a target by agreeing to base POLARIS at Holy Loch. That agreement and the SKYBOLT agreement were both taken in the same context.

"A decision to cancel the SKYBOLT would not only have grievous political consequences to me and to my party. It would not only be seized by the opposition for that purpose. They have said right along that we couldn't count on you, for we have counted on you absolutely. They will say that America has failed us, and they will claim they always said you would.

"We, on our side, of course, always said you would never let us down. We had to say that because we put our reliance in you absolutely. Now they will be able to say that they were right and we were wrong.

"Moreover, the position is made harder by recent statements by American spokesmen concerning the independent British deterrent. A number of U. S. spokesmen have made themselves heard on this subject recently. Even your speech at Ann Arbor, Bob, which may have been misquoted in the newspapers here, suggests that U.S. policy does not favor the continuation of a British deterrent. Perhaps that is the wrong interpretation, but it will be said. Perhaps they will be wrong and perhaps this stems from a misunderstanding, too, but the British press, and many others will say the SKYBOLT decision is part of that policy. They will say this decision is really taken to force Britain out of having an independent nuclear deterrent. The recent speech by Mr. Acheson, and Walter Lippmann's article in Paris are further examples that will be seized upon to place this action in that context....

"And so, Bob, I would like to ask you a question. If you are going to cancel the project, are you going to say that it won't work, or are you going to say that it will cost too much?"

McNamara: "We won't say that it is impossible, but we will say that technical problems dominate the decision. We'll say that the objectives of the project will not be achieved; objectives of meeting the schedules, of obtaining the necessary reliability, accuracy, and so forth. We are confident that the reliability objectives will certainly be missed."

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Thorneycroft: "Of course, but most missiles slip their schedules. Most of these projects cost more than they were originally expected to cost. Many of them are less accurate than they might be desired to be. But to cancel this project tears the heart out of our relations in the defence field."

McNamara: "Would you continue the SKYBOLT project alone if we did cancel it?"

Thorneycroft: "That is the only interesting alternative."

McNamara: "We'll certainly make it as easy as we can for you to take that alternative. We'll keep the project going for a few weeks to give you time to make that decision if you wish to do so."

(There then ensued some discussion of where the project would be conducted if it were to be continued by the British and the conclusion was that it would have to be done in the U.S., it would be impossible to move the project to the United Kingdom.)

Thorneycroft: "Of course, Bob, this matter goes far beyond the question of where the project is to be continued. It really relates to the political factors. These dominate. It really concerns the interpretation that is going to be placed upon this action. The opposition is bound to say that this is part of U.S. policy with respect to Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. They are bound to say that the U.S. really wishes to put an end to British possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. They're going to say that you are not cancelling this project for the reasons that you cite. They're going to say that those are just the reasons you're bringing forth in order to cover up your real reason. They're going to say that your real reason for cancelling the SKYBOLT is to end this relationship and to change the posture of Britain with respect to an independent nuclear deterrent. What do you say to that?"

McNamara: "Well, I'd say that we have spent and we are spending a lot of money to keep you in the position of having an independent nuclear deterrent. We've already spent a lot of money on SKYBOLT and we've kept the project up faithfully for several years." (McNamara then recapitulated a speech that Watkinson had given on the subject of American support for SKYBOLT in the House of Commons concerning SKYBOLT problems and recapitulated our continued willingness to make the British decision as easy as possible. I don't remember what speech of Watkinson's he was referring to.)

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didn't record about the possibility of HOUND DOG.) "We would extend the BLUE STREAK rather than take HOUND DOG. We really don't want to think of its penetrability. Such questions are not the issue. The central issue is the British independent deterrent."

(There must have been some further discussion that was repetitive of points that had gone on before at this point. The idea of possible multilateral arrangements then arose. Thorneycroft then said that such arrangements might be fine for the future, but not now. The issue now is the British independent deterrent. "I am the greatest multilateralist of all," he said. "But after I have my forces, not before. It is easy for you to favor multilateral arrangements, but you already have your forces and we have none. After we have them, then we too will be able to discuss multilateral arrangements.")

Thorneycroft: "I notice you've dropped POLARIS from your paper. We talked about POLARIS on the telephone, why have you dropped it?" (My notes don't show exactly what McNamara said at this point. My recollection is that he said he didn't recollect having discussed POLARIS on the telephone. Once again Thorneycroft repeated his phrase "We have relied on you absolutely. We made ourselves a target by permitting POLARIS to berth at Holy Loch.")

McNamara: "Would you buy POLARIS systems if we could make them available?"

Thorneycroft: "Yes, or we might build it if we had to consider this alternative. We'd have to build it here. Of course, there is a long-range as well as a short-range aspect to this. We couldn't get them soon enough to provide continuity in the absence of the SKYBOLT. We'd have to hire some submarines from you to fill the gap. Then we would build them for ourselves and buy the missiles from you."

McNamara: "Would you use British crews? It takes a long time to train crews. This is a very complex system."

Thorneycroft: "Well, we could work that out. We could build a submarine by 1969. The United States could train a crew for us by 1965 or 1966 to fill the SKYBOLT gap [with hired] submarine or submarines."

McNamara: "Have you considered the relative costs of the two systems? The POLARIS is very expensive."

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Thorneycroft: " Yes. " (At this point McNamara asked whether the U. K. would consider the possibility of utilizing a POLARIS-type fleet that would be set up in coordination with other forces such as U. S. forces, and which might utilize certain facilities with the U. S. in common.)

Thorneycroft: " Yes, we could consider that. But we are talking and thinking here of a British independent deterrent. What you do, or what we do after we have acquired it, is another matter. " (Then the discussion went back to costs.)

McNamara: " We estimate that it costs \$20.0 million per POLARIS missile and only fifty-five per cent can be kept on station. " (There was further discussion about costs.)

" We, in the U. S., must announce a decision on this matter by mid-January. We can continue SKYBOLT in Fiscal Year 1963 for a while to tide you over while you are making a decision. "

Thorneycroft: " Frankly, we must decide this in only a short time. I'd say we have no more than ten days to make such a decision. It must be made between us or probably between the President and the Prime Minister. "

(Solly Zuckerman asked how much it would cost between now and the end of 1967 if we made the very best assumptions concerning the SKYBOLT project. The estimate was that it would cost 200 to 250 million for research and development and 300 million dollars to produce 100 missiles. This meant that, assuming there were no important modifications required, it would cost \$500.0 or \$600.0 million exclusive of the war heads to furnish the British with a 100 missile force. There must have been some additional discussion about the difficulties in getting the system to work and the various R&D hurdles that would have to be overcome.)

Thorneycroft: " Yes, but we can always get these things working. Maybe it won't be as good as it was hoped. But they generally work. Don't you think the SKYBOLT will work too? "

McNamara: " No. We have developed many systems that are worthless from a Defense standpoint. The B-58 is a good example. We have spent \$3.5 billion and it doesn't work. It is worthless from a Defense point of view. "

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Thorneycroft: "But I am speaking now as a politician. If you cancel it it would be very helpful to us for you to assert that it won't ever function usefully."

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McNamara: "Sure, I'll say that. There will be differences of viewpoint. Some people are going to say that it would work. The contractors will oppose it, it means \$2.0 billion to them so that there will always be a disagreement on this point."

Thorneycroft: "Why is furnishing POLARIS a problem to you?"

McNamara: "Well, there are legal problems, especially with respect to the nuclear parts of the submarine such as the reactor." (There was considerable discussion about legalities; the role of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Then there was some further discussion of costs. It was stated that it would cost about \$160.0 million for 16 missile submarines and that 65% of them could be on station the first year and after that the requirements for overhaul lowers the rate to 55% on station so that it comes out about \$20.0 million per missile ~~per year~~ and that you need to include the costs on shore for communications, training and so on. The missiles cost about \$2.0 million dollars all by themselves, the communications are elaborate, they must be very reliable and these provisions are expensive.

*in  
station*

(Solly Zuckerman then said that if most experts feel that SKYBOLT is no good it really wouldn't make very much sense for the U.K. to support it. If the U.S. decides that that's why SKYBOLT should be dropped, then the U.K. shouldn't pick it up.)

McNamara: "The public should not be misled by our statements. We have kept it up only because of the British interest in it. You, Solly, have always known this. Your other experts have always known it too."

Thorneycroft: "No, the question goes beyond SKYBOLT or the problems of SKYBOLT. The decisions were all taken in context. It was the context of interdependence. We had your missile and a U.K. warhead. We had SKYBOLT and we had the POLARIS berthing at Holy Loch. You must go out of the decision on SKYBOLT, if you do, with another decision that is taken at the same time. That other decision must be a positive one--namely, the decision to publicly specify that the U.S. supports the British independent deterrent."

(Then the discussion went back to the question of filling the gap

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McNamara: "Well, there are legal problems, especially with respect to the nuclear parts of the submarine such as the reactor." (There was considerable discussion about legalities; the role of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Then there was some further discussion of costs.) It was stated that it would cost about \$160.0 million for 16 missile submarines and that 65% of them could be on station the first year and after that the requirements for overhaul lowers the rate to 55% on station so that it comes out about \$19.0 - \$ million per missile on station and that you need to include the costs on shore for communications, training and so on. The missiles cost about \$2.0 million dollars all by themselves, the communications are elaborate, they must be very reliable and these provisions are expensive."

*Actually cost  
\$19.2 million*

with American POLARIS submarines that might be hired for the purpose. After that the discussion turned to the legal and extra-legal difficulties associated with assistance to the U.K. and the development of their nuclear submarine. Paul Nitze pointed out that the Joint Committee might pose certain problems with respect to the NATO problems with respect to POLARIS matters.)

(Solly Zuckerman said that the U.K. is considering "hybrid" submarines which could serve both as a hunter-killer and as a POLARIS-carrying machine. It was not clear to what extent the U.K. had given this or any other related matter much consideration, but a few minutes later Solly revealed that they had a single sheet of paper on which they had written down their thoughts. Insofar as I was able to discover, this was the only document in his possession, or anybody else's, concerning this matter. The next day I met Solly at his office in the morning and we rode to the airport together in the back seat of a taxicab and discussed the document and the kind of additional information needed to be developed on our side based upon his thinking and the results of the conference. Insofar as I could make out, that was the extent of his preparation for the meeting. No other technical person of consequence was there. At Nassau, where additional British technicians were present but where technical matters were not discussed, I met with Solly privately and finally gave him one of the White Papers that we had written here after this Thorneycroft-McNamara meeting, but before Nassau. Solly requested that paper because they had not done and didn't think they had the ability to perform the analyses that we had on this subject.)

Sir Robert Scott then said that the U.K. couldn't do both the missile and the control for it, that the first boat would be ready by 1969 and the full force of submarines by 1972 in the course of a normal program.

At this point, Mr. McNamara proposed the alternative that he had indicated before the meeting he hoped the British would advance on their own.

McNamara: "Would you consider saying that after you got your own POLARIS-type submarine force you would make it part of a multilateral force?"

*not quite same as "agreed" to NATO*

Thorneycroft: "Not as a condition upon us. After the announcement and the decision, then the U.K. can go in with multilateral arrangements just as the U.S. can. But the U.K. must enter any

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Paul Nitze asked Thorneycroft if they had considered the effect upon their relations to the common market of the U.K. acquiring an independent Polaris force. Thorneycroft said that, first of all, this was a matter for them to worry about and not for us to concern ourselves with, and secondly, that de Gaulle would have no legitimate grounds for complaint. After all de Gaulle was the man arguing most loudly for the legitimacy of an independent national deterrent.

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such arrangement as an independent power. No matter what the savings in cost might be, we have no option except to go in that way."

Nitze then asked about the possibility of a U.S./U.K. collaborative operational arrangement. He mentioned the manner in which our Strategic Air Forces coordinate their plans.

Thorneycroft: "Yes, we could make collaborative arrangements of that kind. Are these forces operable on their own? That is the test. We have no objection to integrated operations, but there must be the possibility of separate even if degraded operations."

(I haven't looked at these notes for a long time. I am sure that if these are collated with those that were taken by Paul Nitze, by the British side, and also by our State Department message writer who did a pretty good job at the time, you could get a more complete picture.)

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card: date 11 December 1962  
Ruled for file  
"Memorandum -  
Thornycroft  
7 JUN 1963 Doc 114

11 December 1962  
"McNamara - Thornycroft"

This is a transcript and, in some places, a slight expansion of the notes I took at the meeting (11 December 1962) between Mr. Thornycroft and Secretary McNamara in London concerning the cancellation of SKYBOLT.

The meeting was attended by Thornycroft, Solly Zuckerman, Sir Robert Scott, and one other British officer whose name I forget. On the American side we had Mr. McNamara, Paul Nitze, myself, David Bruce and another gentleman from the American Embassy whose name I don't remember. The meeting took place in the Ministry of Defence in a small conference room which I believe adjoins Thornycroft's office. Before we went to the meeting we had had lunch at the American Embassy and had discussed the forthcoming meeting somewhat. Mr. McNamara had a number of copies of the aide memoire and it was decided that he would read it aloud. He also indicated that he hoped that Mr. Thornycroft might suggest the possibility of substituting a POLARIS force that would be assigned to NATO to replace the SKYBOLT, indicating that the alternatives in the aide memoire were not likely to be accepted.

After the usual pleasantries were exchanged Mr. McNamara suggested that we all follow his reading of the White Paper. He then proceeded to read it aloud virtually word for word. When he was finished Mr. Thornycroft began speaking, addressing his remarks directly to Mr. McNamara.

*Thornycroft:*

Thornycroft: "I won't comment on the technical judgements that you have made," he said. "Experts are good at arguing both sides. I am confident that your experts have advised you as you have indicated in your paper. I am equally confident that other experts could be found to argue the other side.

"I will discuss the political implications. This

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By MMK NARA, Date 10/31/95

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missile is at the heart of British defence policy. It is the key to the continuing of the V-bomber force. It is the only example of complementarity between the U. S. and Great Britain.

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"A decision to cancel the SKYBOLT would not only have grievous political consequences to me and to my party. It would not only be seized by the opposition for that purpose. ~~They have said right along that we couldn't count on you, for we have counted on you absolutely. They will say that America has failed us, and they will claim they always said you would.~~

"We, on our side, of course, always said you would never let us down. We had to say that because we put our reliance in you absolutely. Now they will be able to say that they were right and we were wrong.

"Moreover, the position is made harder by recent statements by American spokesmen concerning the independent British deterrent. A number of U. S. spokesmen have made themselves heard on this subject recently. Even your speech at Ann Arbor, Bob, ~~which may have been misquoted in the newspapers here, suggests that U. S. policy does not favor the continuation of a British deterrent. Perhaps that is the wrong interpretation, but it will be said. Perhaps they will be wrong and perhaps this stems from a misunderstanding, too, but the British press, and many others will say the SKYBOLT decision is part of that policy. They will say this decision is really taken to force Britain out of having an independent nuclear deterrent. The recent speech by Mr. Acheson, and Walter Lippmann's article in Paris are further examples that will be seized upon to place this action in that context...~~

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McNamara: "Would you continue the SKYBOLT project alone if we did cancel it?"

Thorneycroft: "That is the only interesting alternative."

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(There then ensued some discussion of where the project would be conducted if it were to be continued by the British and the conclusion was that it would have to be done in the U.S., it would be impossible to move the project to the United Kingdom.)

Thorneycroft: "Of course, Bob, this matter goes far beyond the question of where the project is to be continued. It really relates to the political factors. These dominate. It really concerns the interpretation that is going to be placed upon this action. The opposition is bound to say that this is part of U.S. policy with respect to Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. They are bound to say that the U.S. really wishes to put an end to British possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. They're going to say that you are not cancelling this project for the reasons that you cite. They're going to say that those are just the reasons you're bringing forth in order to cover up your real reason. They're going to say that your real reason for cancelling the SKYBOLT is to end this relationship and to change the posture of Britain with respect to an independent nuclear deterrent. What do you say to that?"

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Thorneycroft: "Assuming that you were to cancel SKYBOLT, would you be prepared to state publicly that the United States is willing to do everything possible to assist Britain to keep its independent nuclear deterrent?"

McNamara: "Yes, I would. Of course, we would have to consider Germany, France and, for that matter, you and your commitments to the Common Market."

Thorneycroft: "If you would support us publicly, we're not worried about the Common Market."

McNamara: "We could do that in the framework of our willingness to let you continue the project."

Thorneycroft: "I'm talking of policy."

McNamara: "But the best evidence of policy is specifics, such as our willingness to support SKYBOLT until you take it over."

Thorneycroft: "Yes, but how can we realistically expect to do that. ~~We have taken lots of decisions here. We've cancelled the BLUE STREAK. We have cancelled other projects, we have made ourselves absolutely dependent upon you in this matter. Besides, we can't really afford to take the project over in any case.~~

"But the issue is one of principle. Alternatives are not the issue. The issue is: will the U.S. continue to help us. This was part of the Holy Loch agreement. Are we going to continue to have such arrangements or are we not. That is the fundamental question."

McNamara: "Within our power to do so and within the framework of our laws, yes. But, for example, we couldn't sell you a POLARIS submarine system, even without the warheads."

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Thorneycroft: "None of these alternatives that are set forth in the paper are viable. The production cost for SKYBOLT would be excessive."

McNamara: "No, that's not it. It's the research and development that would cost a lot and be unpredictable."

Thorneycroft: "We'd never consider the HOUND DOG, ~~we~~ don't have it in my notes, but I imagine there was some discussion."

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didn't record about the possibility of HOUND DOG.) "We would extend the BLUE STREAK rather than take HOUND DOG. We really don't want to think of its penetrability. Such questions are not the issue. The central issue is the British independent deterrent."

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McNamara: "Have you considered the relative costs of the two systems? The POLARIS is very expensive."

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(Then the discussion went back to the question of filling the gap.)

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such arrangement as an independent power. No matter what the savings in cost might be, we have no option except to go ~~in~~ that way."

*regular spacing* [ Nitze then asked about the possibility of a U.S./U.K. collaborative operational arrangement. He mentioned the manner in which our Strategic Air Forces coordinate their plans. *Thornycroft replied:*

*Thornycroft:* "Yes, we could make collaborative arrangements of that kind. Are these forces operable on their own? That is the test. We have no objection to integrated operations, but there must be the possibility of separate even if degraded operations."

(I haven't looked at these notes for a long time. I am sure that if these are collated with those that were taken by Paul Nitze, by the British side, and also by our State Department message writer who did a pretty good job at the time, you could get a more complete picture.)

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9

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

*Rubel notes,*  
with American POLARIS submarines that might be hired for the purpose.  
"After that, the discussion turned to the legal and extra-legal difficulties associated with assistance to the U. K. and the development of their nuclear submarine. Paul Nitze pointed out that the Joint Committee might pose certain problems with respect to the NATO problems with respect to POLARIS matters.) *asked Thorneycroft if they had considered the effect upon their relations of the UK acquiring an independent "Polaris force"*

(Solly Zuckerman said that the U. K. is considering "hybrid" submarines which could serve both as a hunter-killer and as a POLARIS-carrying machine. It was not clear to what extent the U. K. had given this or any other related matter much consideration, but a few minutes later Solly revealed that they had a single sheet of paper on which they had written down their thoughts. Insofar as I was able to discover, this was the only document in his possession, or anybody else's, concerning this matter. The next day I met Solly at his office in the morning and we rode to the airport together in the back seat of a taxicab and discussed the document and the kind of additional information needed to be developed on our side based upon his thinking and the results of the conference. Insofar as I could make out, that was the extent of his preparation for the meeting. No other technical person of consequence was there. At Nassau, where additional British technicians were present but where technical matters were not discussed, I met with Solly privately and finally gave him one of the White Papers that we had written here after this Thorneycroft-McNamara meeting, but before Nassau. Solly requested that paper because they had not done and didn't think they had the ability to perform the analyses that we had on this subject.)

Sir Robert Scott then said that the U.K. couldn't do both the missile and the control for it, that the first boat would be ready by 1969 and the full force of submarines by 1972 in the course of a normal program.

*Rubel notes,*  
At this point, "Mr. McNamara proposed the alternative that he had indicated before the meeting he hoped the British would advance on their own." *He asked:*

*Supporting him in order to assist you with your mission*  
McNamara: "Would you consider saying that after you got your own POLARIS-type submarine force you would make it part of a multilateral force?"

Thorneycroft: "Not as a condition upon us. After the announcement and the decision, then the U. K. can go in with multilateral arrangements just as the U. S. can. But the U. K. must enter any

12/11/62 12/11/62

12



Dear Mr. President,

It would seem that you and we have come now to a final stage in the elimination of tension around Cuba. Our relations are already entering now their normal course since all those means placed by us on the Cuban territory which you considered offensive are withdrawn and you ascertained that to which effect a statement was already made by your side.

That is good. We appreciate that you just as we approached not dogmatically the solution of the question of eliminating the tension which evolved and this enabled us under existing conditions to find also a more flexible form of verification of the withdrawal of the above mentioned means. Understanding and flexibility displayed by you in this matter are highly appreciated by us though our criticism of American imperialism remains in force because that conflict was indeed created by the policy of the United States with regard to Cuba.

More resolute steps should be taken now to move towards finalizing the elimination of this tension, i.e. you on your part should clearly confirm at the UN as you did at your press conference and in your messages to me the pledge of non-invasion of Cuba by the United States and your allies having removed reservations which are being introduced now into the U.S. draft declaration in the Security Council and our representatives in

New York should come to terms with regard to an agreed wording in the declarations of both powers of the commitments undertaken by them.

I believe that you already had an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the text proposed by us of a brief declaration of the Soviet Government in which the Soviet Union's main commitments resulting from the exchange of messages between us are formulated. We proceed from the assumption that an analogous brief declaration should be made by the U.S. Government and that the main U.S. commitments resulting from the exchange of messages will also be fixed in it. Have a look, Mr. President, at this proposal submitted by us through your representatives in New York.

But notwithstanding what the agreement on the concrete texts of our declarations at this concluding stage will be, anyway the basic goal has been achieved and tension removed. I will tell you frankly that we have removed our means from Cuba relying on your assurance that the United States and its allies will not invade Cuba. Those means really had the purpose of defending the sovereignty of Cuba and therefore after your assurance they lost their purpose. We hope and we would like to believe - I spoke of that publicly too, as you know - that you will adhere to the commitments which you have taken, as strictly as we do with regard to our commitments. We, Mr. President, have already fulfilled our commitments concerning the removal

of our missiles and IL-28 planes from Cuba and we did it even ahead of time. It is obvious that fulfilment by you of your commitments cannot be as clearly demonstrated as it was done by us since your commitments are of a long-term nature. But it is important to fulfill them and to do everything so that no doubts are sown from the very start that they will not be fulfilled. I already told you at one time that our friends especially those of them who regard us with certain lack of understanding are trying to convince us that imperialism cannot be trusted, that is that you cannot be trusted, as a representative of such capitalist state as the United States of America.

It goes without saying that you and I have different understanding of these questions. I shall not go into details as to what my understanding is because in this regard you and I cannot have common opinion since we are people representing different political poles. But there are things that require common understanding on both sides and such common understanding is possible and even necessary. This is what I would like to tell you about.

Within a short period of time we and you have lived through a rather acute crisis. The acuteness of it was that we and you were already prepared to fight and this would lead to a thermonuclear war. Yes, to a thermonuclear world war with all its dreadful consequences. We took it into account and, being convinced that mankind would never forgive the statesmen who would



not exhaust all possibilities to prevent catastrophe, agreed to a compromise although we understood - and we state it now - that your claims had no grounds whatsoever, had no legal basis and represented a manifestation of sheer arbitrariness in international affairs. We agreed to a compromise because our main purpose was to extend a helping hand to the Cuban people in order to exclude the possibility of invasion of Cuba so that Cuba could exist and develop as a free sovereign state. This is our main purpose today, it remains to be our main purpose for tomorrow and we did not and do not pursue any other purposes.

Therefore, Mr. President, everything - the stability in this area and not only in this area but in the entire world - depends on how you will now fulfill the commitments taken by you. Furthermore, it will be now a sort of litmus paper, an indicator whether it is possible to trust if similar difficulties arise in other geographical areas. I think you will agree that if our arrangement for settling the Cuban crisis fails it will undermine a possibility for manoeuvre which you and we would resort to for elimination of danger, a possibility for compromise in the future if similar difficulties arise in other areas of the world, and they really can arise. We attach great significance to all this, and subsequent development will depend on you as President and on the U.S. Government.

We believe that the guarantees for non-invasion of Cuba given by you will be maintained and not only in the period of your stay in the White House, that, to use an expression, goes without saying. We believe that you will be able to receive a mandate at the next election too, that is that you will be the U.S. President for six years, which would appeal to us. At our times, six years in world politics is a long period of time and during that period we could create good conditions for peaceful coexistence on earth and this would be highly appreciated by the peoples of our countries as well as by all other peoples.

Therefore, Mr. President, I would like to express a wish that you follow the right way, as we do, in appraising the situation. Now it is of special importance to provide for the possibility of an exchange of opinion through confidential channels which you and I have set up and which we use. But the confidential nature of our personal relations will depend on whether you fulfill - as we did - the commitments taken by you and give instructions to your representatives in New York to formalize these commitments in appropriate documents. This is needed in order that all the peoples be sure that tension in the Carribean is a matter of yesterday and that now normal conditions have been really created in the world. And for this it is necessary to fix the assumed commitments in the documents of both sides and register them with the United Nations.

You, Mr. President, do not want to agree with the five conditions put forward by Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro. But, indeed, these five principles correspond fully to the provisions of the United Nations Charter which is a legal basis for the relations among states, a sort of foundation for securing peace and peaceful coexistence. I will tell you frankly that such position of yours is surprising. Maybe you have some difficulties. But, Mr. President, we who occupy such responsible position in the world and who are endowed with high trust, have to overcome those difficulties. The peoples will appreciate that because for them it means insuring lasting peace on earth.

I would like to express to you my disapproval of certain things. We read now various articles by your columnists and correspondents and we are concerned that in those articles they are widely commenting on the confidential exchange of opinion and it is being done by the people who as it would seem have no relation to confidential channels set up between us. Judging by the contents of these articles it is clear that their authors are well informed and we get an impression that this is not a result of an accidental leak of the confidential information but a result of benevolence for those people into whose hands gets the information they make public. This evidently is done for the purpose of informing the public in a one-sided way.

Frankly speaking, if we use the confidential communications this way, it will be far from facilitating confidence in those

channels. You yourself realize that if your side begins to act in the way that our exchange of opinion by way of confidential channels will leak through fingers these channels will cease to be of use and may even cause harm. But this is up to you. If you consider that those channels have outlived themselves and are of no use any longer, then we also will draw appropriate conclusions in this respect. I tell you this straightforwardly and I would like to know your opinion on this matter. I have been denouncing American imperialism. But on the other hand I consider it useful for us to continue to maintain the possibility of confidential exchange of opinion because a minimum of personal trust is necessary for leading statesmen of both countries and this corresponds to the interests of our countries and peoples, to the interests of peace all over the world.

Let us, Mr. President, eliminate promptly the consequences of the Cuban crisis and get down to solving other questions, and we have them in number. As far as nuclear test ban is concerned this is a minor question on the whole. I am going to address to you a confidential letter and proposals on this question and I hope that we will overcome difficulties existing in this question. The problem of disarmament is a different matter; it is a major and difficult question now.

But, of course, the main question is the German question and it is an easy and at the same time difficult one. I say

6.

that it is an easy and at the same time difficult question. But this is really so. It is easy because our proposals for concluding a peace treaty do not demand any concessions from either side, neither do they demand any losses from either side. These proposals only fix the situation which has developed as a result of World War II.

After the talks that our Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Gromyko had with your Secretary of State D.Rusk, only one question in effect remained unresolved - that of troops in West Berlin: troops of what countries, for what term and under what flag will be stationed there.

I would like you to understand me correctly on this question. Let us solve it. We will not escape the necessity to solve this question anyway. To tell the truth, this question is not worth an eggshell if a realistic approach is employed in appraising the situation in Germany where two sovereign German states have developed and if a course followed is aimed at an agreement on West Berlin and not at leaving it to remain a dangerous hot-bed of collision between states. Should really you and we - two great states - submit, willingly or unwillingly, our policy, the interests of our states to the old-aged man who both morally and physically is with one foot in grave? Should we really become toys in his hands? By concluding peace treaty we would lose nothing but we would gain a possibility to strengthen

friendly relations between our states, would untie the knot in Europe which is fraught with danger for the whole world only because most extreme aggressive militarist forces in West Germany are interested in this.

Please, excuse me for my straightforwardness and frankness but I believe as before that a frank and straightforward exchange of opinion is needed to avoid the worst.

Please, convey to your wife and your whole family wishes of good health from myself, my wife and my entire family.

Record Number 60345

|                       |  |
|-----------------------|--|
| <u>SET</u>            | Berlin Crisis  |
| <u>CABNO</u>          |  |
| <u>DOCNO</u>          |  |
| <u>DOCUMENT TYPE</u>  | Letter   |
| <u>DATE</u>           | 12/11/1962   |
| <u>CIRCD</u>          |  |
| <u>TIME</u>           |  |
| <u>ORIGIN</u>         | Soviet Union. Chairman of the Council of Ministers   |
| <u>SIGNATOR</u>       | Khrushchev, Nikita S.  |
| <u>DESTO</u>          |  |
| <u>DESTP</u>          | Kennedy, John F.   |
| <u>CLASSIFICATION</u> | Unclassified   |
| <u>TITLE</u>          |  |
| <u>CTIT</u>           | [Now that the Cuban Question is Nearly Settled, Khrushchev<br>Wants to Proceed to a Settlement of the German Question] |
| <u>NAMES</u>          | Gromyko, Andrei A.   |
| <u>NAMES</u>          | Rusk, Dean   |
| <u>TERMS</u>          |  |
| <u>ORGAN</u>          | United Nations   |
| <u>PGS</u>            | 9  |

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Cj. 2 of 3 5  
12/12/62

Mitchelt from Paris  
(Richard C. Smith)

Received Dec. 12, 1962

Mr. Henry Owen

Henry,

We are presently thinking of putting a memorandum to Rusk and Holmsworth in somewhat the following terms.

The Mission held talks with the Italian Defense and Foreign Office officials in Rome on December 3. The Italians are favorable in principle to the implementation of the MLF concept and are inclined to a sea-borne deployment structure. On December 4th we met with German Foreign Office and Defense officials in Bonn. Germans evidenced substantial interest in the concept and appear ready to accept the mixed manning concept. On December 6th we briefed the North Atlantic Council and gave preliminary answers to a series of questions raised by the Belgian, Dutch and German delegations. The Government has earlier expressed an interest in a MLF force.

We are to call on the French this afternoon and would insert here a paragraph about the French reaction. Molay, Lucet, Desmarchais, de Rose and Legendre and de la Grassville.

Today we briefed some 45 high ranking officers of NSAS and JCS.

having had a bilateral technical discussion with us in London did not wish further technical briefings -- this position may be changed in the backdrop of the STURDLIFF decision.

CONCLUSION

The education process appears to have served its purpose. In the absence of specific Allied requests for further briefings, we believe it would not be productive to continue the

feasibility

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feasibility briefings until some political decisions, however preliminary, are taken.

Allied countries such as Belgium, Germany, Italy and Canada, if they specifically request, should be technically assisted in their efforts to formulate the a proposal responsive to President Kennedy's Ottawa offer of 1961.

We submit the following general observations.

1. The Administration should review the MLF elements of NSA and 147 in the light of developments since April, 1962.

2. We doubt that the present passive and restrictive MLF policy will be adequate for the near term future. Either US policy should become more affirmative or more negative. It may be useful to attempt any future planning on the assumption that the UK/US negotiations will succeed and on the assumption that they will not succeed. It would be useful to expand any review to include simultaneous consideration of international burden sharing problems like those in the conventional force field, in the foreign economic and military aid field, and in the balance of payments assistance question.

The UK is a central factor in the current process of devolution of nuclear power in the Alliance. British expectations are being seriously discounted by the SUKSULT termination. The end of the US/UK special relationship may be in sight. To ease this wrench for the British and to enlist their support for a sensible European approach to nuclear weapons, we think the US should make a special effort to consult candidly with the UK on our future nuclear weapons policy toward Europe. This process may need a start before the UK/US negotiations are completed and before US policy again is crystallized as a result of the proposed review.

Henry, I think we'll probably put something like this into Back/Tinaletter, if Tinaletter agrees during the course of the Secretary's visit here. This probably will get to you

on 13 December

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Page 3 -

on 12 December and I would suggest if it gives you any strain, pain you could get on the phone and let us know in which event we can doctor it accordingly or if it has gotten into the Secretary, present your thoughts to him.

I think it is in line with what I understand Walt's views to be as well as not too far away from yours.

We had a very ~~productive~~ time with the EUSOM officers; very few questions which was somewhat surprising in view of their known ~~particular~~ for national forces, land-based forces, MEBM requirements, etc.

Gerard C. Smith  
(Dickbolt from Paris)

Gerard C. Smith:ml  
December 12, 1962

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12/13/62

DRAFT CABLE FOR THE SECRETARY

REF A: 2195

1. Aware your on the scene appreciation of the nature of Skybolt issue puts you in best position to assess possible avenues of solution. We felt, however, you might find it of some use if we advanced ideas which might provide additional avenues for exploration in present discussions and retain maximum flexibility for Nassau talks. Following comments offered in this light.

2. While at some point in time a direct confrontation with British on subject of their maintaining independent nuclear force might be unavoidable clearly this is not the time best calculated from US point of view to accomplish our objectives.

3. If current trends toward European economic and political integration can be permitted time to mature and if growing complexity and cost of maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent can in time permeate British thinking the possibility over the likelihood that they might be willing to relinquish their independent nuclear pretensions in foreseeable. The confluence of these events is presumably two to four years in the future, thus providing sufficient time for the British Government to ease out of a fixed prior position when clearly an early and abrupt change (i.e., virtual abandonment of the V-Bombers and an independent role) is not now possible in practical political terms.

Sent H. Owen Dec 14  
to note: "through 2 lines  
given approval with policies  
British here we discussed an agreement's complete?"

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around - stopped  
Wether -

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4. Against this background it appears to us that US interests would best be served if some formula could be found which did not push British into making a premature decision without at the same time forcing the US to openly accept indefinite maintenance of and US support for an independent UK nuclear force.

*Let's evade*

5. Several lines for accomplishing objective in 4. above, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive suggest themselves:

(a) First effort might be made to clarify magnitude of Skybolt funding problem. Based upon informal indications, British apparently anticipated an expenditure of about \$240 million for 180 missiles, this being exclusive of R&D and of warhead costs. Same number of missiles would now cost them \$408 million. If lesser number desired, e.g., 100 missiles, cost would presumably be in neighborhood of \$225-230 million, (actual figure we have is \$206 million for 90 missiles). Thus, if lesser number of missiles desired financial gap in terms of what British originally had expected to have to pay is non-existent while in terms of larger missile buy gap would appear to be about \$167 million. This latter gap, while not insignificant, would not appear overwhelming in a UK defense budget of over \$4.5 billion annually, especially if missile is as politically important as British contend. Thus one wonders whether it is not so much the cost factor which is bothering the British as the fact that

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the US cancellation: (a) places them in difficult position of buying a missile which US would publicly reject for its own use (no matter how qualified this is what US position would look like) and (b) comes at a time when, in conjunction with our events, British choose to interpret US action as a sign US is attempting to accelerate UK exist as an independent nuclear power. If these are the real British concerns it would be well to bring them into the open so that we do not concentrate our efforts to find a solution on the wrong issue. (Though what avenues one might follow to find a solution to these hypothetical British concerns, is not clear.)

(b) On the other hand, if the British problem is largely financial we might consider ways and means for the US to help subsidize some portion of the \$168 million gap. We gather that this might be possible through detailed study of legal, financial and accounting aspects has not been undertaken.

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- 3 -

c) Third, further investigation of Polaris alternative might be explored. We do not believe it possible or desirable to agree to provision of nationally owned vessel to British without essentially reversing entire basis for US nuclear policy of this administration with all the adverse consequences this would portend. We might however find either of two variants on the Polaris theme viable:

(1) Agree to accept in principle and subject to working out details British participation in US strategic forces including SAC and Polaris. This would include, at a minimum, manning but could extend through some degree of participation in actual political control of force, or

(2) Agree to provide to British a Polaris submarine under an arrangement mid-point between national control and multi-lateral control but to be a transitional forerunner of the multilateral MRBM force. Vessel would be committed to that force if and when it comes into being. It would moreover have some degree of multi-national manning (e.g., some degree of participation by two other European nationalities and by US, latter maintaining custodial control over warheads). Object should be to meet competing desire to, i.e., maintain considerable degree of UK national identification on one hand, in order to meet UK political problem, while overlaying with multilateral approach in order to meet long range US policy objectives.

6. We do not underestimate difficulties connected with all of the foregoing proposals, the last two obviously being the

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most difficult. We would not therefore, think it advisable to try and reach definitive decisions at this time. (Clearly British would resist doing so until Nassau or later in any event.) Even though it would involve a significant short term cost to the US for keeping Skybolt alive, we think best course open to us at this stage is to lay open some or all of the lines suggested in 4 above with the proposal that a senior politic-military team of US and UK officials meet in Washington starting immediately to review these (and possibly other) alternatives as a means for reaching mutual agreement between two governments. Such agreement might be concluded at Nassau though probably this would require slipping time schedule for that meeting by two weeks or so to give US/UK teams time to staff out proposed alternatives.

7. Foregoing has been cleared with White House.

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12/12/62

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Action

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10:02 AM

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FROM PARIS

Info

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 8, DECEMBER 13, 11 AM

PRIORITY

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MAR 21 1963

SECRETARY, ACCOMPANIED BY BOHLEN AND TYLER, CALLED ON DE GAULLE AT 3:30 PM DEC 12. DEGAULLE SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE SECRETARY AND HAD WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT TO CONGRATULATE HIM ON HANDLING CUBA CRISIS. THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HAD BEEN RESULT OF PRESIDENT'S "FIRMNESS AND LUCIDITY." DE GAULLE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THINGS NOW STAND BUT ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN REACHED OF WITHDRAWAL MISSILES AND BOMBERS. SECRETARY CONVEYED WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENT AND CONGRATULATIONS ON SUPPORT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM FRENCH PEOPLE IN RECENT ELECTIONS. SECRETARY EXPRESSED OUR PLEASURE AT PROSPECT VISIT BY MONA LISA TO WASHINGTON AND ADDED WE WOULD GREET HER SAFE RETURN TO FRANCE WITH SENSE RELIEF. DE GAULLE SAID HE WAS SURE NO HARM WOULD COME TO THE LADY AND WANTED SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT HAVE ENTRUSTED HER TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR DE GAULLE'S REMARKS ABOUT CUBA AND FOR HIS FIRM SUPPORT AT THE TIME. THE SECRETARY THEN GAVE DEGAULLE EXTENSIVE ACCOUNT PRESENT CUBAN SITUATION, STRESSING THAT PROBLEM NOT YET RESOLVED. DE GAULLE THANKED SECRETARY AND SAID FRENCH SUPPORT HAD AMOUNTED TO LITTLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN PRINCIPALLY A US AFFAIR. IF WORLD WAR HAD RESULTED, FRANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE SIDE OF UNITED STATES. SECRETARY SAID WE HOPED THAT CUBA HAD BEEN WHOLESOME EXPERIENCE FOR SOVIETS AND HAD REMOVED ANY ILLUSIONS THEY MIGHT HAVE ENTERTAINED AS TO ANY US HESITANCY IN COMPARABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. SHOULD CRISIS OCCUR OVER BERLIN WE FEEL MOST IMPORTANT WE SHOULD BE IN BEST POSITION TO MEET IT. THIS WOULD REQUIRE INCREASED CONSULTATION TO HARMONIZE OUR

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-2- SECTO 8, DECEMBER 13, 11 AM FROM PARIS

POLICIES AND TO ORGANIZE OURSELVES SO AS TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY. DE GAULLE AGREED AND REVEALED SOME FAMILIARITY WITH CONTINGENCY PLANNING. ASKED SECRETARY WHAT HE MEANT BY SAYING THAT WE SHOULD GO FURTHER IN OUR PREPARATIONS. SECRETARY GAVE EXAMPLE OF BETTER AND FASTER COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISIS, NEED TO SPEED UP MILITARY MOVES ENVISAGED UNDER LIVE OAK, AND TO BE PREPARED TO APPLY RAPIDLY ECONOMIC AND OTHER COUNTER MEASURES. DE GAULLE CONCURRED IN NEED FOR DEVELOPING AND REFINING AGREED MEASURES FOR EXECUTION OF PLANS. SAID WE HAD TO FORESEE THREE CATEGORIES OF EVENTS WITH REGARD TO BERLIN: (1) SOVIETS MIGHT HARASS AND THREATEN WESTERN TO POINT BARRING GROUND ACCESS SHORT OF HOSTILITIES. IN THIS CASE WE SHOULD APPLY COUNTER MEASURES. (2) SOVIETS MIGHT CUT OFF WEST BERLIN FROM REST OF WORLD. IN THIS CASE WE SHOULD CUT OFF SOVIET LINKS WITH REST OF WORLD. (3) THERE MIGHT BE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACKS ON BERLIN. THIS WOULD MEAN ALL-OUT WAR. SAID THAT IF QUESTION OF COMPLETING PLANS FOR COUNTER MEASURES, HE AGREED WE SHOULD DO THIS AND IF SOVIETS WANT TO MAKE THINGS ROUGH FOR US IN BERLIN, WE SHOULD REACT WITH APPROPRIATE MEASURES. SECRETARY SAID QUESTION WAS HOW WE COULD PREVENT SOVIET LEADERS FROM MISCALCULATING IN BERLIN AS THEY HAD IN CUBA. ALL REPORTS RECEIVED BY MOSCOW SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO BRING HOME TO THEM OUR DETERMINATIONS. DE GAULLE AGREED AND SAID IF SOVIETS MISCALCULATE IT IS THEIR BUSINESS NOT OURS. THIS WAS WHY HE HAD NEVER BEEN VERY HAPPY ABOUT INTERMINABLE TALKING AND PROBING BY US AND BRITISH GOVTS ON BERLIN. THIS MADE IT SEEM AS THOUGH WE THOUGHT THAT SOME AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, WHEREAS ALL WE HAVE TO DO IS TO WAIT UNTIL SOVIETS REALIZE THAT THEY CANNOT OBTAIN ANYTHING BY THEIR PRESSURE. SECRETARY SAID THE ISSUE WAS REALLY ONE OF CREDIBILITY ABOUT INTENTIONS. WE HAD ALWAYS STRESSED TO THE SOVIETS THAT PRESENCE WESTERN TROOPS BERLIN NON-NEGOTIABLE. HOWEVER IT WAS FACT THAT WE ARE SHORT OF OUR FORCE GOALS IN NATO. IF WE HAD TOO FEW

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-3- SECTO 8, DECEMBER 13, 11 AM FROM PARIS

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Action

Control: 6860

Rec'd: DECEMBER 13, 1962  
10:02 AM

SS Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 8, DECEMBER 13, 11 AM

PRIORITY

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FILED  
MAR 21 1963

SECRETARY, ACCOMPANIED BY BOHLEN AND TYLER, CALLED ON DE GAULLE AT 3:30 PM DEC 12. DEGAULLE SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE SECRETARY AND HAD WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT TO CONGRATULATE HIM ON HANDLING CUBA CRISIS. THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME HAD BEEN RESULT OF PRESIDENT'S "FIRMNESS AND LUCIDITY." DE GAULLE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THINGS NOW STAND BUT ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN REACHED OF WITHDRAWAL MISSILES AND BOMBERS. SECRETARY CONVEYED WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS FROM PRESIDENT AND CONGRATULATIONS ON SUPPORT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM FRENCH PEOPLE IN RECENT ELECTIONS. SECRETARY EXPRESSED OUR PLEASURE AT PROSPECT VISIT BY MONA LISA TO WASHINGTON AND ADDED WE WOULD GREET HER SAFE RETURN TO FRANCE WITH SENSE RELIEF. DE GAULLE SAID HE WAS SURE NO HARM WOULD COME TO THE LADY AND WANTED SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT HAVE ENTRUSTED HER TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY. SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR DE GAULLE'S REMARKS ABOUT CUBA AND FOR HIS FIRM SUPPORT AT THE TIME. THE SECRETARY THEN GAVE DEGAULLE EXTENSIVE ACCOUNT PRESENT CUBAN SITUATION, STRESSING THAT PROBLEM NOT YET RESOLVED. DE GAULLE THANKED SECRETARY AND SAID FRENCH SUPPORT HAD AMOUNTED TO LITTLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN PRINCIPALLY A US AFFAIR. IF WORLD WAR HAD RESULTED, FRANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE SIDE OF UNITED STATES. SECRETARY SAID WE HOPED THAT CUBA HAD BEEN WHOLESOME EXPERIENCE FOR SOVIETS AND HAD REMOVED ANY ILLUSIONS THEY MIGHT HAVE ENTERTAINED AS TO ANY US HESITANCY IN COMPARABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. SHOULD CRISIS OCCUR OVER BERLIN WE FEEL MOST IMPORTANT WE SHOULD BE IN BEST POSITION TO MEET IT. THIS WOULD REQUIRE INCREASED CONSULTATION TO HARMONIZE OUR

REVIEWED BY: [initials] DATE: 11/27/90  
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| NAME OF OFFICER                | DATE OF ACTION |                                 |
| 8 OFFICE SYMBOL                |                |                                 |

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-2-

SECTO 8, DECEMBER 13, 11 AM FROM PARIS

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THE SIDE OF UNITED STATES... POLICIES AND TO ORGANIZE OURSELVES SO AS TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY. DE GAULLE AGREED AND REVEALED SOME FAMILIARITY WITH CONTINGENCY PLANNING. ASKED SECRETARY WHAT HE MEANT BY SAYING THAT WE SHOULD GO FURTHER IN OUR PREPARATIONS. SECRETARY GAVE EXAMPLE OF BETTER AND FASTER COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISIS, NEED TO SPEED UP MILITARY MOVES ENVISAGED UNDER LIVE OAK, AND TO BE PREPARED TO APPLY RAPIDLY ECONOMIC AND OTHER COUNTER MEASURES. DE GAULLE CONCURRED IN NEED FOR DEVELOPING AND REFINING AGREED MEASURES FOR EXECUTION OF PLANS. SAID WE HAD TO FORESEE THREE CATEGORIES OF EVENTS WITH REGARD TO BERLIN: (1) SOVIETS MIGHT HARASS AND THREATEN WESTERN TO POINT BARRING GROUND ACCESS SHORT OF HOSTILITIES. IN THIS CASE WE SHOULD APPLY COUNTER MEASURES. (2) SOVIETS MIGHT CUT OFF WEST BERLIN FROM REST OF WORLD. IN THIS CASE WE SHOULD CUT OFF SOVIET LINKS WITH REST OF WORLD. (3) THERE MIGHT BE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACKS ON BERLIN. THIS WOULD MEAN ALL-OUT WAR. SAID THAT IF QUESTION OF COMPLETING PLANS FOR COUNTER MEASURES, HE AGREED WE SHOULD DO THIS AND IF SOVIETS WANT TO MAKE THINGS ROUGH FOR US IN BERLIN, WE SHOULD REACT WITH APPROPRIATE MEASURES. SECRETARY SAID QUESTION WAS HOW WE COULD PREVENT SOVIET LEADERS FROM MISCALCULATING IN BERLIN AS THEY HAD IN CUBA. ALL REPORTS RECEIVED BY MOSCOW SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO BRING HOME TO THEM OUR DETERMINATIONS. DE GAULLE AGREED AND SAID IF SOVIETS MISCALCULATE IT IS THEIR BUSINESS NOT OURS. THIS WAS WHY HE HAD NEVER BEEN VERY HAPPY ABOUT INTERMINABLE TALKING AND PROBING BY US AND BRITISH GOVTS ON BERLIN. THIS MADE IT SEEM AS THOUGH WE THOUGHT THAT SOME AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED, WHEREAS ALL WE HAVE TO DO IS TO WAIT UNTIL SOVIETS REALIZE THAT THEY CANNOT OBTAIN ANYTHING BY THEIR PRESSURE. SECRETARY SAID THE ISSUE WAS REALLY ONE OF CREDIBILITY ABOUT INTENTIONS. WE HAD ALWAYS STRESSED TO THE SOVIETS THAT PRESENCE WESTERN TROOPS BERLIN NON-NEGOTIABLE. HOWEVER IT WAS FACT THAT WE ARE SHORT OF OUR FORCE GOALS IN NATO. IF WE HAD TOO FEW

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December 14, 1962

K. A.

12/14/62

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was glad to have your message of December 11th and to know that you believe, as we do, that we have come to the final stage of the Cuban affair between us, the settlement of which will have significance for our future relations and for our ability to overcome other difficulties. I wish to thank you for your expression of appreciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display.

I have followed with close attention the negotiations on the final settlement of the Cuban question between your representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, and our representatives, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, in New York. In these negotiations we have tried to understand your position and I am glad to note that Mr. Kuznetsov has also shown effort to understand our problems. It is clearly in the interest of both sides that we reach agreement as soon finally to dispose of the Cuban crisis. To this end, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy presented on Wednesday a new draft of a joint statement which by now has certainly reached you. I wish to assure you that it is our purpose to end this affair as simply and clearly as possible.

You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the very start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war in Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not re-introduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you would accept our position -- but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I

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quite agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of promptly settling the rest without further acrimony.

With regard to your reference to the confidential channels set up between us, I can assure you that I value them. I have not concealed from you that it was a serious disappointment to me that dangerously misleading information should have come through these channels before the recent crisis. You may also wish to know that by an accident or misunderstanding one of your diplomats appears to have used a representative of a private television network as a channel to us. This is always unwise in our country, where the members of the press often insist on printing at some later time what they may learn privately.

Because our systems are so different, you may not be fully familiar with the practices of the American press. The competition for news in this country is fierce. A number of the competitors are not great admirers of my Administration, and perhaps an even larger number are not wholly friendly to yours. Here in Washington we have 1200 reporters accredited to the White House alone, and thousands more in other assignments. Not one of them is accountable to this government for what he reports. It would be a great mistake to think that what appears in newspapers and magazines necessarily has anything to do with the policy and purpose of this government. I am glad to say that I have some friends among newsmen, but no spokesmen.

But let me emphasize again that we do indeed value these confidential channels. I entirely share your view that some trust is necessary for leading statesmen of our two countries; I believe that it is important to build the area of trust wherever possible. I shall of course continue to hold and to express my convictions about the relative merits of our systems of government, and I will not be surprised if you do the same.

In particular, we have been very glad to have opportunities for private exchanges with and through Mr. Dolzhikov, and I am sorry to learn that he is returning to Moscow. It is our impression that he has made a real effort to improve communications and understanding

between our two governments, and we shall miss him very much.

I appreciate your writing me so frankly, and in return I have tried to be as straightforward, for I agree with you that only through such frank exchanges can we better understand our respective points of view. Partly for this reason I refrained in my last press conference from commenting on certain aspects of your speech before the Supreme Soviet with which you realize, of course, we could not agree.

We also are hopeful that once the Cuban crisis is <sup>behind</sup> us, we shall be able to tackle the other problems confronting us and to find the path to their solution.

I cannot refrain from commenting briefly on your reference to the German question, though I do not think that it would be useful in this message to expound our full position once again. But your suggestion that the interests of our two countries are toys in the hands of Chancellor Adenauer seems to me to miss entirely the true nature of the problem which confronts us in Central Europe. For here the vital interests of many states are involved -- on your side as well as ours. If this is recognized, then I am confident that a way can be found which will accommodate these interests and which will lead to a peaceful settlement. I cannot quite agree with you that Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko have settled everything on Berlin but one issue. They are skillful and experienced diplomats, but I do not think we should give them too much credit yet. Still it is quite true, as you say, that the main issue which seems to separate us on Berlin is that of the presence of allied troops in West Berlin. I am confident that if you could begin from an understanding of our position on this vital point, our chances of making progress would be greatly improved.

I look forward to receiving your confidential letter and proposals on the test ban question, and I think there is every reason to keep working on this problem. I hope that in your message on this subject you will tell me what you think about the position of the people in Peking on this question. It seems to me very important for both of us that in our efforts to secure an end to nuclear testing we should not overlook this area of the world.

Thank you for your expressions of good wishes to me and my family,  
and let me in turn send you and your wife and family our personal  
good wishes for the coming year.

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US/MC/7  
December 15, 1962

UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
TO THE  
THIRTIETH MINISTERIAL MEETING  
OF THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
Paris, France, December 13-15, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 12, 1962  
Time: 8:30 p.m.  
Place: Quai d'Orsay

NS/EPC/COA  
Date: 9/29/75  
MR Cases Only:  
EO Citations  
TS authorized  
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( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info  
FOIA Exemptions  
PA Exemptions

Participants:

United States

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Tyler  
Ambassador Bohlen  
Ambassador Thompson  
Ambassador Kohler  
Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Home  
Lord Hood  
Ambassador Pierson Dixon  
Mr. Samuel  
Mr. Ledwidge

France

Foreign Minister Couyè de Murville  
M. Lacet  
M. Roux  
M. Laicy  
M. de Beaumarchais  
M. Froment-Meurice

Germany

Foreign Minister Schroeder  
Ambassador Blankenhorn  
Mr. Carstens  
Mr. Krapf  
Mr. Reinkemeyer

Subject: Berlin

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O - 11 WE - 15  
Ambassy PARIS - 17  
Ambassy MOSCOW - 18  
Ambassy LONDON - 19  
Ambassy BONN - 20

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After dinner the four Foreign Ministers had a lengthy private discussion. In a larger group, the Secretary subsequently summarized the conclusions reached noting the Ministers had agreed that the Ambassadorial Group in Washington should review Berlin contingency plans in order to insure the

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In discussing the handling of Berlin at the NATO Ministerial Meeting the following day, the Ministers concluded there was no need for particular emphasis of the subject but that something would have to be said about it in the NATO communique, since the absence of any reference to Berlin would otherwise be noted unfavorably. Schroeder suggested that a reference to the December 1958 formula might be the simplest approach.

The Ministers agreed on the following press line: the four had taken advantage of their presence in Paris for the NATO Ministerial Meeting, as was customary, to consult on Berlin and related subjects. They had reviewed the work of the Ambassadorial Group and had given directives for the further work of that Group.

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MJHillenbrand:rmc  
December 14, 1962

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12/15/62

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



December 15, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Fall-Back Position on SKYBOLT for U. K.

The attached Memorandum for the President on the above subject does not state one alternative that you and I had discussed and which I had hoped would be practical, namely, to offer the British technical assistance and perhaps parts of the POLARIS weapon system with the objective of their being able to fabricate and assemble their own missile which, while having many of the characteristics of the POLARIS A-3, would not be the identical system. John Rubel tells me that this concept does not make sense from a technical or production standpoint and that, while we can rack up a proposal along these lines, it would not be convincing to the British and, indeed, would not be a proposal which we could in good faith urge upon them. Nevertheless, I am asking our people to give further consideration to this other alternative, and we will try to have something spelled out on it in the form of a paper tomorrow.

It goes without saying that Bob McNamara has not been exposed to the thinking behind the attached paper. I will see that he gets the paper tomorrow so that he will be in a position to discuss it with the President Monday.

The political implications of the proposal suggested in the attached paper, from the standpoint of NATO as a whole or those members of it who are also interested in acquiring a POLARIS capability, have not been gone into. We will be giving thought to that as I assume State will as well.

Attachment

cc: Secy Ball

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Gilpatrick to Bundy  
Ball Po 1/15/62

Lab I, B in

Kennedy - Macmillan  
Meeting 1/15/62



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12/15/62

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum will outline a proposed U.S. position in discussions with the UK following confirmation of our tentative decision to abandon the SKYBOLT program, and assuming that the British do not wish to pursue any of the three alternatives that we have already suggested: takeover of the SKYBOLT program at this point, adaptation of HOUND DOG, or immediate steps towards participation in a multilateral force.

Three major alternatives are open to the United States at this juncture:

1. To continue a limited development program for SKYBOLT, eliminating concurrent production expenditures, in order to provide a form of subsidy for the British effort;
2. To make no further contribution to the British independent deterrent in any form; or
3. To offer to provide technical information and/or to sell component parts of an alternative nuclear weapons system to take the place of SKYBOLT. This offer would not cover warheads, which the British would be expected to supply themselves. It would extend the principle but alter the equipment covered by the SKYBOLT agreement.

The first alternative is the simplest solution to the immediate problem. But it would only put off the day of reckoning, while inviting the same kind of running fight that has developed with the SS-70. It is not recommended.

The second alternative is probably too drastic to consider seriously at the present time. It is doubtful that any form of words indicating continuing U.S. support in principle for a British independent

Gelpatire to JPK  
11/11/62

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deterrent would overcome the effect of SKYBOLT cancellation plus failure to offer any practical substitute.

The third alternative is designed to rescue the British from their present predicament without suggesting that the United States is retreating from its stand against proliferation. By substituting another weapon system for SKYBOLT, it would interpret and treat the U.S. obligation under the SKYBOLT agreement as if it extended beyond the success or failure of that particular development project. This is consistent with the UK assertion that the SKYBOLT agreement must be read in the context of other decisions, including the Holy Loch agreement and the abandonment of BLUE STREAK. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that SKYBOLT was first authorized as a development program in February 1960; it was offered and accepted by the UK at Camp David in March, and cancellation of the British BLUE STREAK was announced in April.

The best choice to carry out this alternative is probably the offer to sell POLARIS missiles and certain missile-peculiar equipment, ex warheads.

The British are well along in the development of a nuclear powered submarine. They would neither need nor request U.S. assistance for the submarine-unique part of the system. It becomes analogous to the Vulcan Mark II bomber that would have carried SKYBOLT. They would require our agreement to sell POLARIS A-3 missiles ex warhead, and to sell (or perhaps only to describe) equipment uniquely required to operate and launch the missiles. These parallel the SKYBOLT arrangements. Details will be outlined in an accompanying paper.

The UK would probably not expect to have an operational nuclear POLARIS-type submarine until 1969, although this date could be advanced a year or two if they undertook a crash program. In discussions with Mr. McNamara, Mr. Thorneycroft stated that the U.S. would have to "fill the gap" created by the SKYBOLT cancellation by permitting the UK to "hire" U.S. POLARIS submarines in the interim. He argued that only by preserving "continuity" in this way could U.S. support of the UK independent deterrent be adequately demonstrated and the deterrent preserved. This gap-filling procedure seems unnecessary, however, since in any event SKYBOLT would not have been operational realistically before 1967. It could not be accomplished without interfering with the current U.S. POLARIS

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program. It presents a host of domestic and international political problems. It is not recommended.

Provision of POLARIS missile information and/or the sale of components would require a new agreement with the British, which should contain appropriate recitals to indicate that it is in the nature of a substitute for the existing SKYBOLT agreement. A form of agreement appears at attachment B. This agreement between principals would have to be considerably amplified by a further agreement at the working level.

If these recommendations are accepted in principle, certain changes are likely to be made before and during the meeting with Mr. Macmillan. It is possible that the UK may try to associate the continuation of the Holy Loch berthing agreement with the proposed agreement to sell POLARIS missiles and related equipment as a quid pro quo. It is recommended that these two subjects be kept entirely separate. Documents treating the new offer should describe it simply as a follow-on to the SKYBOLT arrangements.

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ATTACHMENT A

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President  
of the United States

Recalling that in 1960 the U.S. Government had agreed, in a  
desire to be of assistance in improving and extending the life of the  
V-Bomber force, that, if the SKYBOLT missile were successfully  
developed, the Government of the United States would sell SKYBOLT  
missiles, minus warheads, to the Government of the United Kingdom;

Considering that the program for the development of the  
SKYBOLT missile undertaken in 1960 has failed to produce satisfactory  
results and that both Governments have concluded that it would not be  
in their individual or collective interests that the SKYBOLT program  
be continued;

Considering that, anticipating the discontinuance of the SKYBOLT  
program, the Government of the United Kingdom has requested the  
assistance of the Government of the United States in equipping another  
deterrent force; and

Considering that the Government of the United States desires to  
respond positively to the request of the United Kingdom:

Have agreed as follows:

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REGRADING; DOD DIR 4390.10  
DOES NOT APPLY

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1. That upon the cancellation of the U.S. SKYBOLT program, the United Kingdom will not exercise its option under the Technical and Financial Agreement of September 1960 to take up the program.

2. That in lieu of providing SKYBOLT missiles for Vulcan Mark II aircraft of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States is prepared, subject only to U.S. priorities, to provide, for use in UK nuclear submarines, POLARIS A-3 missiles (minus warheads) and auxiliary equipment uniquely required to operate and launch such missiles. These missiles and associated equipment will be furnished on a reimbursable basis, beginning in 1966 or thereafter.

3. Sales of the missiles and other equipment shall be without any conditions as to use other than those contained in the usual Military Assistance military sales agreements.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 15, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Fall-Back Position on SKYBOLT for U. K.

The attached Memorandum for the President on the above subject does not state one alternative that you and I had discussed and which I had hoped would be practical, namely, to offer the British technical assistance and perhaps parts of the POLARIS weapon system with the objective of their being able to fabricate and assemble their own missile which, while having many of the characteristics of the POLARIS A-3, would not be the identical system. John Rubel tells me that this concept does not make sense from a technical or production standpoint and that, while we can rack up a proposal along these lines, it would not be convincing to the British and, indeed, would not be a proposal which we could in good faith urge upon them. Nevertheless, I am asking our people to give further consideration to this other alternative, and we will try to have something spelled out on it in the form of a paper tomorrow.

It goes without saying that Bob McNamara has not been exposed to the thinking behind the attached paper. I will see that he gets the paper tomorrow so that he will be in a position to discuss it with the President Monday.

The political implications of the proposal suggested in the attached paper, from the standpoint of NATO as a whole or those members of it who are also interested in acquiring a POLARIS capability, have not been gone into. We will be giving thought to that as I assume State will as well.

Attachment

cc: Secy Ball

Circular to Bundy

Ball Pp 154 / ML

at 10:00 AM

(copying)  
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Kennedy - Macmillan - Pearson Mr. Brennan Book

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12/15/62



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This memorandum will outline a proposed U.S. position in discussions with the UK following confirmation of our tentative decision to abandon the SKYBOLT program, and assuming that the British do not wish to pursue any of the three alternatives that we have already suggested: takeover of the SKYBOLT program at this point, adaptation of HOUND DOG, or immediate steps towards participation in a multilateral force.

Three major alternatives are open to the United States at this juncture:

1. To continue a limited development program for SKYBOLT, eliminating concurrent production expenditures, in order to provide a form of subsidy for the British effort;
2. To make no further contribution to the British independent deterrent in any form; or
3. To offer to provide technical information and/or to sell component parts of an alternative nuclear weapons system to take the place of SKYBOLT. This offer would not cover warheads, which the British would be expected to supply themselves. It would extend the principle but alter the equipment covered by the SKYBOLT agreement.

The first alternative is the simplest solution to the immediate problem. But it would only put off the day of reckoning, while inviting the same kind of running fight that has developed with the SS-70. It is not recommended.

The second alternative is probably too drastic to consider seriously at the present time. It is doubtful that any form of words indicating continuing U.S. support in principle for a British independent

Gilpatrick to JFR  
Fall App 1154

12/15/62

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deterrent would overcome the effect of SKYBOLT cancellation plus failure to offer any practical substitute.

The third alternative is designed to rescue the British from their present predicament without suggesting that the United States is retreating from its stand against proliferation. By substituting another weapon system for SKYBOLT, it would interpret and treat the U.S. obligation under the SKYBOLT agreement as if it extended beyond the success or failure of that particular development project. This is consistent with the UK assertion that the SKYBOLT agreement must be read in the context of other decisions, including the Holy Loch agreement and the abandonment of BLUE STREAK. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that SKYBOLT was first authorized as a development program in February 1963; it was offered and accepted by the UK at Camp David in March, and cancellation of the British BLUE STREAK was announced in April.

The best choice to carry out this alternative is probably the offer to sell POLARIS missiles and certain missile-peculiar equipment, ex warheads.

The British are well along in the development of a nuclear powered submarine. They would neither need nor request U.S. assistance for the submarine-unique part of the system. It becomes analogous to the Vulcan Mark II bomber that would have carried SKYBOLT. They would require our agreement to sell POLARIS A-3 missiles ex warhead, and to sell (or perhaps only to describe) equipment uniquely required to operate and launch the missiles. These parallel the SKYBOLT arrangements. Details will be outlined in an accompanying paper.

The UK would probably not expect to have an operational nuclear POLARIS-type submarine until 1969, although this date could be advanced a year or two if they undertook a crash program. In discussions with Mr. McNamara, Mr. Thorncroft stated that the U.S. would have to "fill the gap" created by the SKYBOLT cancellation by permitting the UK to "hire" U.S. POLARIS submarines in the interim. He argued that only by preserving "continuity" in this way could U.S. support of the UK independent deterrent be adequately demonstrated and the deterrent preserved. This gap-filling procedure seems unnecessary, however, since in any event SKYBOLT would not have been operational realistically before 1967. It could not be accomplished without interfering with the current U.S. POLARIS



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program. It presents a host of domestic and international political problems. It is not recommended.

Provision of POLARIS missile information and/or the sale of components would require a new agreement with the British, which should contain appropriate recitals to indicate that it is in the nature of a substitute for the existing SKYBOLT agreement. A form of agreement appears at attachment B. This agreement between principals would have to be considerably amplified by a further agreement at the working level.

If these recommendations are accepted in principle, certain changes are likely to be made before and during the meeting with Mr. Macmillan. It is possible that the UK may try to associate the continuation of the Holy Loch basing agreement with the proposed agreement to sell POLARIS missiles and related equipment as a *quid pro quo*. It is recommended that these two subjects be kept entirely separate. Documents treating the new offer should describe it simply as a follow-on to the SKYBOLT arrangements.

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ATTACHMENT A

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States

Recalling that in 1960 the U.S. Government had agreed, in a desire to ~~be of~~ assistance in improving and extending the life of the V-Bomber force, that, if the SKYBOLT missile were successfully developed, the Government of the United States would sell SKYBOLT missiles, ~~minus~~ warheads, to the Government of the United Kingdom;

Considering that the program for the development of the SKYBOLT missile undertaken in 1960 has failed to produce satisfactory results and that both Governments have concluded that it would not be in their individual or collective interests that the SKYBOLT program be continued;

Considering that, anticipating the discontinuance of the SKYBOLT program, the Government of the United Kingdom has requested the assistance of the Government of the United States in equipping another deterrent force; and

Considering that the Government of the United States desires to respond positively to the request of the United Kingdom:

Have agreed as follows:

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1. That upon the cancellation of the U.S. SKYBOLT program, the United Kingdom will not exercise its option under the Technical and Financial Agreement of September 1960 to take up the program.

2. That in lieu of providing SKYBOLT missiles for Vulcan Mark II aircraft of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States is prepared, subject only to U.S. priorities, to provide, for use in UK nuclear submarines, POLARIS A-3 missiles (minus warheads) and auxiliary equipment uniquely required to operate and launch such missiles. These missiles and associated equipment will be furnished on a reimbursable basis, beginning in 1966 or thereafter.

3. Sales of the missiles and other equipment shall be without any conditions as to use other than those contained in the usual Military Assistance military sales agreements.

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Mtg. 20/11/62

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum of conversation in the Oval Room of the White House proper, at noon, Sunday, December 16, 1962

Present were: The President, Secretary McNamara, Acting Secretary George Ball, Alexis Johnson, Jeffrey Kitchen, Roswell Gilpatric, Dr. Wiesner and McGeorge Bundy

At the President's request, Secretary McNamara opened the meeting by discussing the course of his discussions with Mr. Thorneycroft in London and after. In essence he summarized the discussion as previously reported by cable, noting the insistent desire of the British to obtain a categorical assurance that the United States was in favor of the independent British nuclear deterrent, and his own refusal to give such an assurance. Secretary McNamara remarked that the British had seemed wholly unprepared for his Aide Memoire on the technical weaknesses of Skybolt, although he had given preliminary notice to Ambassador Ormsby Gore on the 8th of November and to Mr. Thorneycroft on November 9. The British had, however, apparently accepted the proposition that Skybolt was in trouble, and their inclination was to seek Polaris as a substitute. The preferred solution would be to buy components for a missile-carrying submarine of their own which might at best be ready by 1969, and Thorneycroft had argued that it was important to have some other instrument between the time at which Skybolt would have become available and that later date. In particular the British had asked to rent Polaris, but Secretary McNamara had indicated his opposition, because of the very great complexity of Polaris submarines and the corresponding difficulty of training effective crews.

Secretary McNamara indicated his opinion that we could consider selling the Polaris missile with its associated guidance and navigation systems. We could link it to the same rules of use and control as those applied to Skybolt and to the existing UK/US mutual defense assistance agreement. Secretary McNamara presented a draft paper indicating the conditions of such an agreement.

Secretary Ball expressed his grave concern with respect to the political implications of any arrangement with the British on MRBM's. He pointed out that any arrangement which appeared to give the British a national capability in this field would lead us at once to the question of what we would do to the French, and so, inexorably, to the question of the role of the Germans. A decision in favor of a national force in this range of weapons would change our entire policy and would represent a major political decision.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLK-90-81  
By SF NARA Date 9/10/92

There followed an extended discussion of varied aspects of this confrontation of views. The President pointed out that in the eyes of the British there could well be a claim that the cancellation of Skybolt implied some obligation to provide a substitute, on our part. "Looking at it from their point of view, which they do almost better than anybody," he said, "it might well appear to them that since Skybolt was a substitute for Blue Streak, which they had cancelled in reliance on our assurances, we should now provide an alternative." In this connection, Ambassador Bruce indicated that in his judgment this was primarily a political problem -- and a political problem which would come to a head on the 29th of January, when Parliament met again. The old question was what would meet the Prime Minister's needs for this hour, and he thought only the Prime Minister could decide this question.

Secretary McNamara argued strongly that the discussions of recent months have demonstrated that our current position with respect to a multilateral force simply will not work. He had been told repeatedly by different delegates in Paris that they would be glad to follow the United States if they could only tell what it was that the United States was for. There is no way in which we can persuade the Europeans to buy and pay for both a multilateral force and a full compliance with NATO conventional force goals, but that is what our current policy requires. Secretary McNamara believed that it was time to move on to a more realistic arrangement and one which would better serve our own interests.

Secretary Ball, continuing to urge caution, told the President that this might be the biggest decision he was called upon to make. The President's reply was, "That we get every week, George." Yet the President clearly recognized the complexity of the problem which appeared to involve grave political risks for Mr. Macmillan if we should not help him, and serious risks also for our own policy in Europe if we should help him too much.

Dr. Wiesner argued for the possibility of helping the British, at least in an interim period, by providing them with Hound Dog missiles which could be properly and easily represented as substitutes for Skybolt, while the MRBM problem was being worked through. Secretary McNamara indicated his view that this arrangement would be without military or economic justification. The President interrupted this argument to return discussion to the principal question, and indicated his preliminary view that if we should offer Polaris to the British it must be in the context of a continuation of our undertakings with respect to Skybolt. To this Secretary Ball replied that if we should offer

Polaris to the British and not to the French, we would appear to have intensified our special relationship to the British and our refusal to cooperate with the French.

After considerable further discussion, a program which reflected both the desire to be helpful to the British and the requirement of respect for our European allies led the President to approve, for planning purposes, the following general proposal:

1. We would offer appropriate components of Polaris missiles to the British
2. It would be a condition of this offer that the British would commit their eventual Polaris force to a multilateral or multinational force in NATO
3. It would be a further condition of this arrangement that the the British should undertake to build up their conventional forces to agreed NATO force levels
4. The terms governing the use of SKYBOLT would apply also to the use of such Polaris missiles .
5. It would be publicly assumed that deliveries might take place effective in 1967, but it would be privately recognized that the probable date of effectiveness of this new system would be 1969.

This conclusion was much influenced by the advice of Ambassador Bruce that since we had told the world we would not help national nuclear forces, we should relate any assistance to the British, in this new field of MRBM's, to a large-scale solution of the broad problem of the Atlantic deterrent. (Ambassador Bruce emphasized this point later in the week by indicating his strong belief that the multilateral and conventional force requirements of the proposed understanding with the British were absolutely fundamental and should on no account be discarded.

McG. B.

TOP SECRET

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Copy w/Pres.

12/16/62  
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Memorandum  
w/Pres  
12/16/62

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w/Pres  
12/16/62

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLK-90-81  
By SF NARA Date 9/10/92

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McG. B.

II  
12/18/62  
  
Secret

December 16, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob McNamara, George Ball and the rest of us have talked about the Skybolt problem and your first meeting with Macmillan, and we suggest the following agenda for your first private talk:

1. Probably you will want to let Macmillan lead. We assume he will begin with Skybolt, but one way of keeping our concerns forward would be to make sure that you ask him about his talks with de Gaulle. These may even be the best place to begin.

2. We assume that you will want to let him give his full speech on Skybolt, and we assume it may be quite fervent.

3. In reply, we would recommend that for today you should stick close to the proposals Bob McNamara made to Thorneycroft in London, to wit:

a. Cooperation in helping the British to keep Skybolt for themselves (on this point you could well indicate a willingness to share in the remaining development costs on some formula to be worked out, along the lines of your instruction to Bob McNamara this morning.)

b. Provision of Hound Dog missiles at production cost.

c. (And this is the touchy one) -- participation in some MRBM multilateral force.

d. We believe you should explain briefly at least how dangerous we think it would be for the British and

SECRET

Bundy to VPK  
Ball Pp / 154

the Americans to form a bilateral partnership in new missile systems -- first from the point of view of France and second from the point of view of Germany.

5. We suggest that you should indicate that U. S. cooperation in any new missile system for NATO partners simply must be conditioned upon improved European performance in the conventional area. You might choose to hint that this is more important to us than sharing the costs of nuclear participation as such.

6. Within these guidelines we see no danger in asserting flatly that it is our policy to cooperate in a continuing British role in the Western deterrent.

McG. E.

12/8/62

Secret

December 18, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Bob McNamara, George Ball and the rest of us have talked about the Skybolt problem and your first meeting with Macmillan, and we suggest the following agenda for your first private talk:

1. Probably you will want to let Macmillan lead. We assume he will begin with Skybolt, but one way of keeping our concerns forward would be to make sure that you ask him about his talks with de Gaulle. These may even be the best place to begin.

2. We assume that you will want to let him give his full speech on Skybolt, and we assume it may be quite fervent.

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Bundy → JAR  
W all P p / 154

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- 2 -

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McG. B.

SECRET



Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassy Bonn

SECRET  
Classification

both Britain and America, quoting article 7 of the agreement, "Agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of the Polaris missiles must be the development of a multi-lateral NATO deterrent force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies and that they will use their best efforts to this end."

3. You can tell Schroeder that we contemplate that participation in the proposed multilateral force may be available to non-nuclear member nations of NATO through the contribution of personnel and resources for the operation of nuclear facilities, including submarines, manned by units of mixed nationality. An early invitation will be extended to such countries to participate in the discussion and development of such units.

4. Schroeder will also be interested in the fact that ~~which~~ we have offered the French Government an opportunity to engage in a similar undertaking to that which we have agreed at Nassau with the British. We do not, of course, have any French reaction, but in any event the US and the UK would not make their own interest contingent on France. But we will of course seek French participation.

Finally, advise Schroeder that we intend to keep in close touch with him for we would hope that Germany will be in the forefront in

the

Pa 3 of telegram to AmEmbassy Bonn

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the discussions within NATO which will lead to the development of the multilateral force. We intend to pursue actively the multilateral approach ourselves and expect to initiate discussions of the subject in NATO in January.

For Reinhart:

You should draw on the foregoing in briefing Piccioni.

RUSK

END



EYES ONLY

12/19/62  
20778  
(1)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 19, 1962

at (K) on  
(KAV) (041) 8

SUBJECT: Skybolt

PARTICIPANTS:

U. S.

- The President
- Secretary McNamara
- Mr. Ball
- Ambassador Bruce
- Mr. Bundy
- Ambassador Thompson

U. K.

- The Prime Minister
- Lord Home
- Mr. Thorneycroft
- Ambassador Ormsby Gore
- Mr. de Zuleta
- Mr. Bligh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copies to: (See page 13)

The Prime Minister began the conversation with an expression of appreciation for the handling of the Cuban affair by the United States. In reply, the President expressed his appreciation for the attitude of the Prime Minister and the British Government which was in striking contrast with that of the British press.

The Prime Minister said that he regretted that the wide range of the talks in which he had expected to engage at this meeting had been overshadowed by the Skybolt problem. He thought he was probably the oldest of those present and knew the story from its beginning which he would like to recount. He fully appreciated the U. S. feeling of the danger of doing something which might be considered obnoxious or unfriendly by the other European powers. He did not want to cause trouble with the Germans, the French, the Italians and others or to impede developments which were wanted both by the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the first place, he wanted to mention that the atomic bomb had been developed almost entirely in the beginning by British scientists. The British Isles had been found too small to carry out tests. Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that the development of the bomb should be carried out in the

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United States. The whole world knew about the partnership in this matter which was governed by agreement. He was not referring to a legal document but rather to the nature of the agreement. Then there had come the incidents of spies in Great Britain and the McMahon Act. There were many, including some in the United States, who felt that Britain had been treated harshly. Amendments to the McMahon Act had been made which made greater cooperation possible. At this time, the emphasis was on the bomb. Later the emphasis shifted to the means of delivery. Britain had spent about sixty million pounds on the Blue Streak missile. Then there arose the decision as to whether the development of this missile should be continued. Britain was a small and heavily populated island, and the missile would have to be situated near towns where it would be subject to observation and would be exposed to agitators. The Prime Minister had talked to President Eisenhower about the problem and had indicated the British were going to chuck it if they could get anything else.

Then Skybolt came along as well as Polaris. The British made an agreement to buy Skybolt. He was not basing himself on the terms of the agreement but rather on the gentlemen's understanding. Eisenhower had said he wanted something in return, namely the submarine base at Holy Loch. The British had favored another location but had agreed on Holy Loch which was more remote and harder for Lord Russell and his friends to reach. The Prime Minister said that from time-to-time doubts had been cast on the Skybolt development, and he had assumed that in the United States as in England there were always these rumors circulated by rival firms or services. He went on to say it did now seem that Skybolt was in trouble.

The Prime Minister said he understood the U. S. anxiety for the effect any US-UK agreement might have on other allies. He thought the main allies understood the US-UK relationship as a kind of founder company as well as the special arrangement brought about by the amendment of the McMahon Act. He said the other problem was the possibility of bringing into being a larger grouping of powers as well as the possible effect of any such agreement on the Common Market negotiations. The Prime Minister said flatly that he thought the effect of a new agreement on the Common Market agreement would be "frankly, absolute, none." These negotiations now depended on whether the French could maintain the good deal they have in agricultural products vis-a-vis the Germans. If it failed, it would be on that basis. The French and the British have a different concept about the Common Market, the French favoring an autarchical system. There was the question as to what effect an agreement would have on European-multilateral arrangements. It was

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difficult to know what was meant by a multilateral deterrent. The Prime Minister saw no conflict between independent and interdependent forces. Until a supernational authority developed, it did not matter whether it was army troops or air force. Any contribution would be under the control of the Government contributing it. He remarked that the problem of control of allied forces had been with us "since Marlborough" and really was not difficult. He was aware that the French would go on and spend a lot of money. They were grateful for the aid the United States had given, and he had tried to explain this to de Gaulle. He gave the example (which he had not cited to General de Gaulle for reasons of tact) of British forces in the last war which were put under the command of the French General Gamelin, but at a certain time, Churchill had to issue orders to Lord Gort to save the British forces and any French who wanted to come along by going to the channel ports. This enabled the air force to save Britain. Until there was a single state developed, there must be a combination of independent and joint forces. The question was whether the switch of horses from Skybolt to Polaris would upset the principal allies. He thought not.

At present, Britain had a powerful bomber force which was important strategically, particularly because of its location in England. If there were to be a role for the bomber in the future, it would probably pass from a strategic one to a tactical one. Why should they not hand over one squadron to Saceur? They could ask the French to do the same. This would show the purpose of developing the philosophy of building a joint force. They could inform the others what the targets of such a force were to be. He thought that at present others were feeling left out and could well be brought in and given more information about these matters. He did not see the difference in principle whether one fired a ballistic missile from the sea or the air. He pointed out that the Skybolt was a ballistic missile. Many in Britain thought that Great Britain should not be in this game, but Britain could not have such a decision forced on them.

The President said he agreed that there was a danger that some would think that cutting off the Skybolt was an effort to cut off the British national deterrent. He pointed out that the United States had alternative means. In considering this matter, we were conscious of the importance of the British to our relationship to Europe. He had told the Prime Minister last night that the United States would divide the cost of Skybolt, which would amount to some \$200 million. It was possible that we could use it in the future if we could develop an airplane capable of staying in

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the sky for several days, but we have no great need for Skybolt. We were prepared to join equally in finishing it. He pointed out that this was a new position beyond that which had been given to Mr. Thorneycroft. All of the U. S. judgments in regard to Skybolt were made in consideration of the existence of our other systems. He pointed out that for \$100 million the British could get \$450 million worth of work which we had put in it. Skybolt should be capable of deterring Mr. Khrushchev. He pointed out that twenty missiles in Cuba had had a deterrent effect on us. For an amount of money that was not large, the British could maintain a deterrent that would take them through to a later period. For \$100 million, they would get a \$500 million system.

The second point the President wished to make was that he was aware of the history of the atomic weapon and wished to point out that we were still cooperating.

We had supported Britain's entry into the Common Market although this was bound to have adverse effects upon us. The reason was that we felt that British influence was important in the balance and that Britain would contribute to the stability of Europe. We had refused help to the French because of our concern of what might happen in Germany. If we should assist the French, this would not change de Gaulle at all, but pressure in Germany would rise. If we helped the French it meant that any other country which became an atomic power would expect help from us. We hoped that we could use the time available to develop a multinational force.

The President went on to point out that there was a great difference between Polaris and Skybolt. Moreover, the problem was what these things looked like and not what they were. This point had been illustrated by the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba. These missiles had been less a military threat than a major political act. [If we join with the British in Polaris and refuse de Gaulle atomic or missile cooperation, we would feed the concept he already has of America and raise new problems.] The President said he did not believe that if we went ahead together on Polaris that it would not shake our European allies. All of our people who had recently been in Europe, and this included Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball and Ambassador Bohlen, were convinced that such action would cause great difficulties. He did not want the British people to think that because of our view in opposition to the proliferation of atomic weapons

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that we had opposed a British deterrent. If we could work out a solution in regard to Polaris which would move Europe away from national deterrents, we would be prepared to consider such a move but it should be in that context. The President pointed out that all the implications would have to be considered and that this was a new problem on which study was needed. The United States had made a fair offer on Skybolt so that the British people should not think that we want to cut them down.

The Prime Minister said we ought to think about what a multilateral deterrent is. It need not be one in which the weapons are manufactured by the others.

The President said the question was one of how these weapons should be put in and how they could be taken out. As the Prime Minister had described the matter last night, it seemed rather synthetic. Of course, in extremes they could be taken out. He pointed out that there was a question as to whether we could get the French in and what the effect on the Germans would be of United States, British, and French participation.

The Prime Minister said we would create a force to which the United States, the French, and British would contribute. The President pointed out that if others developed atomic weapons they would expect us to give the delivery system. The Polaris was not just an extension of Skybolt which was not much good after 1970 when bombers would fade out.

The Prime Minister pointed out that Skybolt would be good into the early seventies. The Prime Minister asked if there were a multinational force was it the case that the United States would contribute part of their force while the others would contribute all of theirs?

The President replied in the affirmative, stating this was the greatest hope for a Polaris arrangement which would not upset other members of the alliance. He thought we should discuss two possibilities. The first was Skybolt. If the United States did not have Polaris, we would take Skybolt, but we had two other systems. The British did not. We were continuing our bomber force with the Hound Dog missile. He pointed out that we would have to discuss this whole problem with Congress, and he suggested that we and the British should set up a group to discuss these two problems and reach a judgment during the winter.

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Mr. Ball said that this should be done in a multilateral context. We had a different concept of a multinational force from the British. We had in mind mixed manning and that the right of withdrawal would not be envisaged, but a commission should consider this problem.

The President said that if after study the British judgment of the effect on Europe was correct we could consider the British concept or that described by Mr. Ball.

Lord Home said he did not share the anxiety the President had expressed. France was going ahead anyway. Even if there were a row with France, it would be far less damaging to NATO than a rift between the United States and Great Britain.

The President asked if we should make a similar offer to the French. Our cooperation with them now was minimal. De Gaulle was beginning to realize that the problem was not the atomic warhead, but the missile. If he asked for the missile, what do we do? (French)

Lord Home pointed out that if the proposal was a multinational force as described by Mr. Ball, it would be voted down because it was impossible to have fifteen fingers on the trigger,

He thought that the U. S. and the U. K. and later the French should have a joint force with NATO targets.

Mr. Ball pointed out that we had different assessments of the German problem. We thought that after Adenauer, pressure would mount for some kind of participation.

Lord Home thought that the pressure would be for participation in political decisions.

Mr. Ball replied he thought we should face the situation and enable Germany to have participation in a manner that is controllable.

The Prime Minister asked what we meant by participating. He doubted if Germany would be satisfied with having one of fifteen sailors.

The President asked what was the alternative to national deterrents.

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The Prime Minister said that he had taken his country a long way in participating in Europe in the economic field. This was not all very agreeable for Britain, but he had done it. But if the whole of Europe was to be dependent upon the United States, why should they do anything? It was not satisfactory to have one out of fifteen sailors.

The President pointed out that Europe could use the same argument against Great Britain, though he agreed there was more logic in the present arrangements than in a multilateral force.

Lord Home thought that the Europeans would be satisfied to see the United States, Britain and France cooperate in a nuclear force if the Europeans knew about the deployment, targeting, etc.

De Gaulle had made clear his view that if Germany were to get atomic arms this would unite Eastern Europe. The Europeans did not want Germany to have atomic weapons and were opposed to a multilateral force.

The Prime Minister said that de Gaulle wanted to keep alive his distant hope that the Eastern European satellites, whom Germany had treated badly, could achieve freedom.

The President said Adenauer had expressed the hope that we would not give atomic weapons to France because of the pressure this would arouse in Germany.

The Prime Minister remarked that de Gaulle had quoted Adenauer as saying exactly the opposite.

Mr. Ball said

History had demonstrated that we could not keep Germany in an inferior position forever, and any attempt to do so would stir up latent forces in Germany. For this reason we supported a NATO approach.

Mr. Thorneycroft said we should not force the creation of a multinational force which was not wanted, but rather have the Europeans come in at the shallow end of the pool, informing them regarding targeting, etc.

Mr. Ball remarked that this would not work.

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Lord Home said we did not have a single ally in Europe that would allow Germany to have its finger on the trigger.

The President referred to the diminishing cost of atomic weapons and said they might become attractive to the Italians and others. If we gave the French Polaris submarines, we would save them a good deal of money and some time. He said that Secretary McNamara did not think the time saved would be very great, but the saving in money would be considerable. Secretary McNamara confirmed this statement. He thought the great protection with respect to delivery systems was their cost. He thought that it was important to keep the attention of the Germans in particular on conventional weapons because of Berlin, although if it were not for Berlin Europe could be defended with four divisions and a nuclear strategy.

The President asked what the argument was against giving such assistance to the French.

The Prime Minister said the British had made a contract which had not worked out.

The President observed that France had objected to our 1958 decision and to the Norstad proposals.

Now it was suggested that we come up with a new position which would represent a change of policy, and it would be wise not to hasten this decision.

The Prime Minister said it was simply a question of one horse being lame while the other was able to run. The President rejoined that these were two different races. The Prime Minister said he did not accept this.

Lord Home suggested that if we got a multinational force we could give the French Polaris at a later date.

The President suggested we should consider the whole situation and perhaps have a statement that should state:

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1. We had offered to make the Hound Dog missile available and he referred, in this connection, to the treatment of our position by the British and American press, which had made it look as though we were being unfair.
2. We had offered to continue the Skybolt program and to put \$100 million more into its development, which would enable Britain to continue its national deterrent.
3. We discussed the problem of Polaris, which was a new field and which should be looked at with care.

The President went on to say that we should look at what we meant by multinational force. How should control be exercised? Whether a similar offer should be made to France? And, finally, we should make judgment on what the effect of our action would be in Europe. The statement he had outlined would answer the charges of United States bad faith, and the charge that Britain was without any alternative. He did not think, however, that we could decide these matters here.

Mr. Ball said this should be on the basis of a private discussion.

The Prime Minister asked that if the present position had not arisen when the Skybolt would have been operational.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would have been operational in 1966.

The Prime Minister asked if the Skybolt was likely to be reasonably effective and if it would be safe to carry.

Secretary McNamara replied that it would be safe to carry and would be an effective deterrent, but would have low reliability -- something on the order of twenty to thirty percent operational reliability.

The President pointed out that if we did not have other systems available we would go ahead on Skybolt. Secretary McNamara said that in such circumstances we would certainly consider going ahead, but he did not feel that we could do so in view of the availability of alternate systems and the low reliability of Skybolt.

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The Prime Minister inquired if the record of failure was worse than normal.

Mr. McNamara replied in the affirmative, stating that this was the most complex system we had yet attempted. He pointed out that an error of one foot per second meant an error of one thousand feet at target.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that he was in a difficult situation in explaining to Congress why we had spent \$200 million since 1961. He had asked Congress for \$100 million for 1962 and for \$130 million for 1963.

The President suggested that these figures might be useful to Mr. Thorneycroft in explaining the situation to Parliament.

Mr. Thorneycroft said that his difficulty in Parliament was that the Skybolt would be late, expensive and unreliable, and these facts had been made public.

The President said the British press had been carrying stories to the effect that our action had not been taken on technical grounds but on political ones.

Mr. Thorneycroft said the British press was looking at the alternative.

The Prime Minister said he agreed that the press must be dealt with and not utilized. He pointed out that the Hound Dog was difficult to use on British planes.

Mr. McNamara pointed out that the Hound Dog could be adapted to British planes, although some changes in the missile would have to be made.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that this would take a long time, and even when accomplished would leave only eighteen inches of clearance at take-off. In any event, this could not be accomplished until about the time when bombers would no longer be used.

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The Prime Minister said the problem was for him as it had been for Britain in 1940 -- whether to chuck it or go on.

*n new report  
6-21-50*

He would not engage in anything petty. We could stay at Holy Loch. He pointed out that he had taken big risks in his policies. People had said that Britain was in the front line where they were all targets, but had none of the power. He would be prepared to put in all of his part of a Polaris force provided the Queen had the ultimate power and right to draw back in the case of a dire emergency similar to that in 1940. He thought the United States would do the same if we did not have a superfluity of weapons. Britain could make submarines -- not nuclear ones -- to carry missiles. This could be accomplished in six years, but the cost would have to be compensated elsewhere. He hoped not in the Far East, where the British contribution was in some ways more important than in Europe. They would have to tax their people more as well. There was no use prolonging the life of the bomber, which was bound to die in any event. Submarines were much more suitable for an island like Britain, which also had a great naval tradition. Such a course, however, would lead to a deep rift with the United States. He said he would not accuse America, and reminded the President that he was one-half American himself.

The President said that in the first place we were prepared to do what we said we would do. He pointed out that we had spent a great deal of money in carrying out the commitment which Eisenhower had made, and that there could be no suggestion of bad faith. We placed great

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value on our relationship with Great Britain. He pointed out that the British had their own scientists at the Douglas Plant, and asked what they had been saving during the last six months.

British scientists at the Douglas Plant were apparently saying that the trouble was not technical but political.

Mr. Thorneycroft suggested that such reports might have come from U. S. personnel, particularly those interested in continuing the project. In reply to a question from the President as to his own opinion on Skybolt, Mr. Thorneycroft said he had to rely on Mr. McNamara's judgment, as he had gone thoroughly into the matter and had publicly said that Skybolt would be late, expensive, and unreliable.

The President pointed out that McNamara's judgment was based on the fact that he had alternative systems. He pointed out that for \$250 million investment the British could get a good buy which would deter Khrushchev.

Mr. Thorneycroft pointed out that his own experience was that systems of this kind could be successfully developed only if you went flat out in your effort and there was the prospect of a good order at the end of the line.

The President thought our only difficulty was the different judgment we had on the effect a bilateral arrangement would have in Europe, and he repeated that all of our experts thought this would be very serious.

The Prime Minister said this appeared to be based on the assumption that this was a different weapon.

The President said we could not settle this matter today, and then read excerpts from a U. S. draft paper which listed: (1) our offer of Hound Dog; (2) our offer to share equally in cost of completion of Skybolt; (3) a plan for the two governments to cooperate in a NATO missile force.

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The President said that after consultation with NATO the two governments might agree (a) that the forces developed under our agreement would be assigned to the NATO deterrent forces and assigned targets under agreements approved by NATO; (b) the U. S. would undertake to make similar assignment of parallel and equivalent forces; (c) the U. S. and U. K. would support the creation of a NATO multilateral force; (d) the U. S. and U. K. forces would be included in such a NATO multilateral force.

The Prime Minister inquired what would happen about SEATO. The British would be contributing all of their force to NATO and he inquired what would happen if the Chinese attacked Hong Kong. He threw out the suggestion that the British contribution might be made proportionate to that of the United States. He said that the British force might be of the most value in the Far East.

The President said the same assistance might be made available to France, which probably would not want it.

The Prime Minister thought the French might be tempted by the time that would be gained.

At this point the meeting broke up for lunch.

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12/21/62

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SECRET

December 21, 1962

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : S/P - W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Meeting With Secretary McNamara

1. It would be helpful, if the occasion arises during your meeting with Secretary McNamara tomorrow, to underline the fact and the importance of our commitment to mixed manning for a multilateral force. He has shown some signs of wavering on this point.

2. The fact of our commitment is reflected in para 2 of the Minute given to the Prime Minister by the President: "It is also contemplated that participation in the proposed multilateral force may be available to non-nuclear member nations of NATO through the contribution of personnel and resources for the operation of nuclear facilities, including submarines, manned by units of mixed nationality. The President understands that an early invitation will be extended to such countries to participate in the discussion and development of such units."

3. The importance of the commitment derives from these facts:

(a) We must be able to offer the Germans an opportunity to participate in the Polaris deterrent force, if alliance and EEC cohesion is to be maintained. They can accept some discrimination, but not exclusion.

(b) The prospect of a nationally manned and owned Polaris submarine would, on the other hand, create politically intolerable strains in East-West relations and in the alliance

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(e.g., turmoil in the UK which would seriously damage Macmillan and EEC negotiations). This strain would not be removed by the prospective application of US permissive links to the warheads; neither our allies nor the Soviets would have any confidence that this would surely prevent diversion of a German nationally owned and manned Polaris to national purposes.

We have been able to find no other way than mixed manning to reconcile authentic German participation with denial of a national capability to Germany. Mixed manning is, therefore, at the heart of our position on a multilateral force.

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-2- 1638, DECEMBER 22, 2PM, FROM BONN

I GAINED DISTINCT IMPRESSION FROM CARSTENS' MANNER AND HIS "PRELIMINARY" COMMENT THAT GERMANS ARE DECIDEDLY UNEASY RE THIS DEVELOPMENT ALTHOUGH NOT QUITE SURE YET WHAT IT MAY MEAN FOR FEDREP. I HOPE DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE ME BEFORE EARLY JANUARY (WHEN I ANTICIPATE SCHROEDER MAY BRING UP QUESTION AGAIN) WITH FURTHER INFORMATION RE OUR THINKING ON MULTILATERAL FORCE AS NOW ENVISAGED.

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12/23/62

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FOLLOWING CONVERSATION WITH CARSTENS ON MORNING DEC 22  
(EMBTel 1638) STATE SECRETARY HOPF, NORMALLY SOFT SPOKEN  
AND VERY PRO-AMERICAN, EXPRESSED HIMSELF BITTERLY THAT  
EVENING TO EMBOFF ABOUT PRESS REPORTS OF NAUSSAU AGREEMENT.  
HOPF STATED THAT FOR PAST FOUR YEARS HE HAD STAUNCHLY DEFENDED  
U.S. AGAINST THOSE ELEMENTS IN FEDGOV WHO INCLINED TO DOUBT  
WILLINGNESS OF U.S. TO DEFEND FEDREP TERRITORY WITH NUCLEAR  
POWER. ANNOUNCEMENT OF "TRILATERAL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT" AT  
THIS TIME TENDED TO CONFIRM UGLIEST SUSPICIONS OF THOSE  
DOUBTING ELEMENTS THAT U.S. HAD DRAWN NUCLEAR LINE WEST OF  
RHINE AND GERMAN CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE TO BE USED MERELY  
AS EXPENDABLE CUSHION.

HOPF SAID HE FOUGHT HARD FOR ADDITIONAL DM 1.1 BILLION ALLO-  
CATION TO 1962 MOD BUDGET WHICH APPROVED DEC. 5 AND ASKED

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-2- 1641, DECEMBER 23, 6 PM FROM BONN.

"IS THIS NOW OUR REWARD?"

WHEN EMBOFF ATTEMPTED TO ARGUE THAT PRESS TREATMENT OF NASSAU CONFERENCE INTENDED LARGELY FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION IN U.K., HOPF RETORTED THAT THE ONLY INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM WAS FROM PRESS AND THAT ACCOUNTS IN FRENCH, GERMAN AND ENGLISH PRESS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME. IF THE FACTS WERE DIFFERENT, NO ONE, TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, HAD BOTHERED TO INFORM GERMAN GOVERNMENT. HOPF ADDED THAT HE HAD FOUR HOUR BRIEFING SESSION WITH VON HASSEL ON DEC. 21 ON OVERALL NATO PLANNING AND STRATEGY AND THAT WHEN NEWS FROM NASSAU BROKE MORNING OF DEC. 22 HASSEL CALLED HIM TO INQUIRE WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HOPF SAID HE COULD OFFER NO EXPLANATION, WHICH MADE HIM, AS WELL AS FEDGOV DEFENSE PLANNING, LOOK TERRIBLY FOOLISH. GEN. HAUGEN WAS REQUESTED TO INFORM UNDERSECRETARY GILPATRIC OF HOPF'S REACTION BY PHONE AND WAS PROVIDED INFORMATION TO RELAY TO HIM ON GILPATRIC'S INSTRUCTION. HAUGEN CALLED ON HOPF AT HIS HOME ABOUT 10 P.M. TO EXPLAIN SITUATION. POINTS STRESSED WERE:

1. THE DISCUSSION WITH THE U.K. WAS TIED TO THE SKYBOLT DECISION.
2. FAR FROM BEING BILATERAL (US-UK) OR EVEN TRILATERAL (US-UK-FRANCE), IT IS HOPED AND INTENDED THAT THE ARRANGEMENT WILL BECOME MULTILATERAL.
3. THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN TIME TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED.
4. AT THE MOMENT, ONLY BRITAIN AND U.S. HAVE FIRM AGREEMENTS. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES WILL TAKE TIME.
5. MR. GILPATRIC WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH HOPF IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THIS MATTER.

/ 6. PRESIDENT

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-3- 1641, DECEMBER 23, 6 PM FROM BONN.

6. PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD SENT A PERSONAL LETTER TO CHANCELLOR ADENAUER GIVING FULL EXPLANATION OF US-UK AGREEMENT AND THE PROPOSAL MADE TO FRENCH.

HOPF WAS HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE PROMPT ATTENTION GIVEN TO HIS CONCERN. HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO LEARN THAT MR. GILPATRIC WOULD CONTACT HIM SHORTLY. IN THIS WAS EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH HOPF HAVE BEEN PRESERVED. HOWEVER, THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS CONCERN REMAINS SERIOUS.

HOPF EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN AS FOLLOWS:

1. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SKYBOLT ISSUE STARTED THE ACTION - AND EXPRESSED NO COMMENT ON THIS ASPECT.

2. HE REFERRED TO "INCREASING DOUBTS AND FEARS OF NATO COUNTRIES" WHICH WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IN THAT THEY LEARNED THROUGH THE PRESS OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT (WITH AN OFFER ALSO TO THE FRENCH), ONLY A FEW DAYS AFTER THE NATO CONFERENCE IN PARIS WHERE THERE HAD BEEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER NATO PARTNERS.

3. HOPF FEARS THAT THE PRESS WILL CLAIM THAT THE TIMING OF THE DECISION WAS CHOSEN TO COINCIDE WITH THE DEPARTURE OF MINISTER STRAUSS.

4. HOPF FEARS THAT THE NEW DEVELOPMENT (WHICH HE LEARNED FROM THE PRESS) WILL LEAD TO BITTER PUBLIC DISCUSSION BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT CAN INFORM THE PRESS. PRESS IS ALREADY PICKING UP THE THEME THAT THE ERA OF STRAUSS IS AT AN END. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE QUICK TO ARGUE FOR CLOSER ALIGNMENT WITH NEW U.S. DEFENSE POLICY - BUT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMITTING ANY MORE MONEY OR SOLDIERS TO SUPPORT IT. HOPF

/FEELS UNABLE

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-4- 1641, DECEMBER 23, 6 PM FROM BONN.

FEELS UNABLE TO CONTROL OR TEMPER THE PUBLIC REACTION WHICH HE EXPECTS TO BE SERIOUS.

5. HOPF FEARS PUBLIC REACTION WILL BE THAT GERMANY IS NOTHING BUT A SATELLITE, NOT A PARTNER. HE ALSO FEARS REACTION THAT GERMANY WILL BE REGARDED MERELY AS AN EXPENDABLE COMBAT ZONE.

HOPF MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ABOVE WERE HIS PERSONAL OPINIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT, IN SPITE OF THESE DOUBTS, HE WOULD SUPPORT THE NEW DEVELOPMENT IN PUBLIC SINCE WE MUST CARRY ON TOGETHER. HE SAID THIS IS NO TIME FOR GERMANY TO BE CAUSING TROUBLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

DOWLING

MBK-25

NOTE: RELAYED TO DOD, 12/23/62

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12/23/62  
43b

COMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

W

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Action  
SS  
Info

Control: 12858  
Rec'd: DECEMBER 23, 1962  
1:37 PM

002

FROM: BONN  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: 1641, DECEMBER 23, 6 PM

**EYES ONLY**

PRIORITY.

ACTION DEPARTMENT PRIORITY 1641, INFORMATION PARIS 414,  
LONDON 413.

EYES ONLY.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

LONDON, PARIS EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR.

PARIS ALSO EYES ONLY FOR FINLETTER.

DEPT PASS DEFENSE - PERSONAL FOR GILPATRIC.

FOLLOWING CONVERSATION WITH CARSTENS ON MORNING DEC 22  
(EMBTel 1638) STATE SECRETARY HOPF, NORMALLY SOFT SPOKEN  
AND VERY PRO-AMERICAN, EXPRESSED HIMSELF BITTERLY THAT  
EVENING TO EMBOFF ABOUT PRESS REPORTS OF NAUSSAU AGREEMENT.  
HOPF STATED THAT FOR PAST FOUR YEARS HE HAD STAUNCHLY DEFENDED  
U.S. AGAINST THOSE ELEMENTS IN FEDGOV WHO INCLINED TO DOUBT  
WILLINGNESS OF U.S. TO DEFEND FEDREP TERRITORY WITH NUCLEAR  
POWER. ANNOUNCEMENT OF "TRILATERAL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT" AT  
THIS TIME TENDED TO CONFIRM UGLIEST SUSPICIONS OF THOSE  
DOUBTING ELEMENTS THAT U.S. HAD DRAWN NUCLEAR LINE WEST OF  
RHINE AND GERMAN CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE TO BE USED MERELY  
AS EXPENDABLE CUSHION.

HOPF SAID HE FOUGHT HARD FOR ADDITIONAL DM 1.1 BILLION ALLO-  
CATION TO 1962 MOD BUDGET WHICH APPROVED DEC. 5 AND ASKED

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NSA / 76 / Ger - Ger = US copy in file

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-2- 1641, DECEMBER 23, 6 PM FROM BONN.

"IS THIS NOW OUR REWARD?"

WHEN EMBOFF ATTEMPTED TO ARGUE THAT PRESS TREATMENT OF NASSAU CONFERENCE INTENDED LARGELY FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION IN U.K., HOPF RETORTED THAT THE ONLY INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM WAS FROM PRESS AND THAT ACCOUNTS IN FRENCH, GERMAN AND ENGLISH PRESS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME. IF THE FACTS WERE DIFFERENT, NO ONE, TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, HAD BOTHERED TO INFORM GERMAN GOVERNMENT. HOPF ADDED THAT HE HAD FOUR HOUR BRIEFING SESSION WITH VON HASSEL ON DEC. 21 ON OVERALL NATO PLANNING AND STRATEGY AND THAT WHEN NEWS FROM NASSAU BROKE MORNING OF DEC. 22 HASSEL CALLED HIM TO INQUIRE WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HOPF SAID HE COULD OFFER NO EXPLANATION, WHICH MADE HIM, AS WELL AS FEDGOV DEFENSE PLANNING, LOOK TERRIBLY FOOLISH. GEN. HAUGEN WAS REQUESTED TO INFORM UNDERSECRETARY GILPATRIC OF HOPF'S REACTION BY PHONE AND WAS PROVIDED INFORMATION TO RELAY TO HIM ON GILPATRIC'S INSTRUCTION. HAUGEN CALLED ON HOPF AT HIS HOME ABOUT 10 P.M. TO EXPLAIN SITUATION. POINTS STRESSED WERE:

1. THE DISCUSSION WITH THE U.K. WAS TIED TO THE SKYBOLT DECISION.
2. FAR FROM BEING BILATERAL (US-UK) OR EVEN TRILATERAL (US-UK-FRANCE), IT IS HOPED AND INTENDED THAT THE ARRANGEMENT WILL BECOME MULTILATERAL.
3. THERE HAS NOT YET BEEN TIME TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED.
4. AT THE MOMENT, ONLY BRITAIN AND U.S. HAVE FIRM AGREEMENTS. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES WILL TAKE TIME.
5. MR. GILPATRIC WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH HOPF IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THIS MATTER.

/ 6. PRESIDENT

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-3- 1641, DECEMBER 23, 6 PM FROM BONN.

6. PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD SENT A PERSONAL LETTER TO CHANCELLOR ADENAUER GIVING FULL EXPLANATION OF US-UK AGREEMENT AND THE PROPOSAL MADE TO FRENCH.

HOPF WAS HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE PROMPT ATTENTION GIVEN TO HIS CONCERN. HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO LEARN THAT MR. GILPATRIC WOULD CONTACT HIM SHORTLY. IN THIS WAS EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH HOPF HAVE BEEN PRESERVED. HOWEVER, THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS CONCERN REMAINS SERIOUS.

HOPF EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN AS FOLLOWS:

1. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SKYBOLT ISSUE STARTED THE ACTION - AND EXPRESSED NO COMMENT ON THIS ASPECT.

2. HE REFERRED TO "INCREASING DOUBTS AND FEARS OF NATO COUNTRIES" WHICH WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IN THAT THEY LEARNED THROUGH THE PRESS OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT (WITH AN OFFER ALSO TO THE FRENCH), ONLY A FEW DAYS AFTER THE NATO CONFERENCE IN PARIS WHERE THERE HAD BEEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT WITH THE OTHER NATO PARTNERS.

3. HOPF FEARS THAT THE PRESS WILL CLAIM THAT THE TIMING OF THE DECISION WAS CHOSEN TO COINCIDE WITH THE DEPARTURE OF MINISTER STRAUSS.

4. HOPF FEARS THAT THE NEW DEVELOPMENT (WHICH HE LEARNED FROM THE PRESS) WILL LEAD TO BITTER PUBLIC DISCUSSION BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT CAN INFORM THE PRESS. PRESS IS ALREADY PICKING UP THE THEME THAT THE ERA OF STRAUSS IS AT AN END. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE QUICK TO ARGUE FOR CLOSER ALIGNMENT WITH NEW U.S. DEFENSE POLICY - BUT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMITTING ANY MORE MONEY OR SOLDIERS TO SUPPORT IT. HOPF

/FEELS UNABLE

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-4- 1641, DECEMBER 23, 6 PM FROM BONN.

FEELS UNABLE TO CONTROL OR TEMPER THE PUBLIC REACTION WHICH HE EXPECTS TO BE SERIOUS.

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DOWLING

MBK-25

NOTE: RELAYED TO DOD, 12/23/62

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12/27/62  
Mr Carl Kaysen

Copy 12 of 20 copies

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MEMORANDUM

DEC 27 1962

Subject: Post-Nassau Strategy

I. Our Objective.

1. A Definition


In laying out Post-Nassau courses of action we need first to define the objective to which these courses should be addressed.

This objective must be to reinforce our basic European policy. Three successive US administrations have sought to promote: (i) a strong integrated Europe; and (ii) a close partnership between that Europe and the US in the performance of common tasks. This concept of an Atlantic partnership lies at the heart of our post-war efforts to build a viable world order. It converges with our military interest that nuclear forces be targeted and controlled, to the maximum extent possible, on a unified basis.

While remarkable progress is being made toward fulfilling this concept in the economic field, it is coming to be increasingly recognized on both sides of the Atlantic that the issue -- in respect of both European integration and Atlantic partnership -- will be even more urgently and

powerfully

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NS/P/376 / Rayson. NATO, EU, Nassau Agreement

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powerfully influenced by the way in which nuclear matters are handled.

## 2. Criteria

How can our post-Nassau nuclear courses of action best contribute to this objective? Or to put the question more precisely, what kind of nuclear situation do we wish to fetch up with as a result of those courses of action? Four criteria are important here:

(a) European Role. We do not want to wind up with a situation in which Europe feels that US intransigence prevents it from achieving a self-respecting nuclear status. It is difficult to conceive of a viable long-run partnership in which one of the partners feels permanently excluded from authentic participation in manning, ownership, and control of the strategic weapons which will determine its survival.

(b) Intra-European Equity. Nor do we wish to wind up with a situation in which major European countries cannot share in that participation on a basis which they consider equitable. A cohesive European Community cannot be constructed if some of its members -- notably Italy and

Germany

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-3-

Germany -- feel that they are consigned permanently to second-class citizenship, relative to other members of the Community, in this vital field. Clearly there will be important distinctions, at least for some time, arising out of World War II relationships and the 1954 WEU accords; no one with a sense of history could suppose, however, that a powerful and resurgent Germany -- while accepting these distinctions for the present -- would admit that it expected to be bound by these legacies of the past for an indefinite future. Any German Government which supports the cause of European integration and Atlantic partnership must be able to convince its electorate that, in so doing, it is following a course which holds promise of a nuclear position for Germany which is, in practical terms, no less favorable than that which Germany's major European partners are likely to achieve. If it cannot plausibly make this case, it will sooner or later make way for a government which is committed to more nationalistic approaches, including an exploitation of its powerful East-West bargaining leverage; and further progress toward European integration and a tighter partnership will grind to a halt.

*What does this mean?*

(c) National

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(c) National Programs. On the other hand, a situation in which the equitable and authentic European nuclear participation referred to above was achieved via a proliferation of national nuclear programs would be even more damaging to our objectives. This would be true even if it were not for the effects which a national German program would have on both Western cohesion and East-West relations: One cannot simultaneously work for European integration while spreading about and embedding in concrete the power of national European governments to trigger a nuclear war which would engulf the whole Community -- especially when the case for such national programs rests on the proposition that no country can trust any other country when survival is at stake.

(d) U.S. Role. And, finally, the nuclear situation at the end of our post-Nassau track must not be one in which Europe achieves its self-respecting nuclear status by cutting itself off from intimate association with the U.S. in the nuclear field. A European attempt to go it alone in the nuclear field could

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could be as disruptive in the trans-Atlantic partnership as spreading national European attempts to go it alone could be in the European Community.

4. Solution.

*ultimate*

These four criteria suggest the kind of nuclear solution we wish to work towards in following the tracks laid out at Nassau: A multilateral force in which the European countries can participate -- preferably with the US -- on a basis which satisfies their long-term aspirations to share in some meaningful way in nuclear business, and which makes for cohesion rather than division in the European Community, plus close relations between this force and US strategic forces and intimate allied involvement in the planning, targeting and control of these forces.

The crucial characteristic of such a multilateral force must be that each of the participants feels that: (i) it shares fully in manning, ownership, and control, but that (ii) no other participant could divert elements of the force to national purposes. British and other sensitivities to German national  
manning

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manning and ownership of MRBMs (particularly in Polaris submarines), allied skepticism that such technical safeguards as permissive links could prevent eventual diversion of national units to national purposes, and the inability of smaller members of the alliance to finance and operate Polaris submarines single-handedly all make it unlikely that this purpose could be achieved without mixed manning.

Transitional arrangements in developing such a force are clearly called for, to respond to the different situations of the UK, France, Germany, and other NATO non-nuclear powers. But these arrangements should be viewed as a means of moving toward this solution, rather than an end in themselves, if they are to fit together into a coherent over-all strategy addressed to our basic political objective. The problem of U.S. policy is so to dispose our diplomacy from the present forward as to tilt the transitional arrangements towards this end result.

The rest of this paper considers the implications of such a strategy for each of the major post-Nassau issues.

II. Implications

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## II. Implications

### 5. UK Arrangements.

*2 fair system*

(a) Financial. We should conform to the intent of Nassau in determining the price to be charged for US hardware and technology. These terms should reflect the fact that this is a business-like arrangement, in which fair value is given and received, not a US subsidy for the UK national deterrent. If this principle is followed, the high cost of that deterrent will be one of the factors which may incline the UK over time to participate in a genuine multilateral mixed manned force. The UK should be asked to make a contribution to relevant US research and development costs as from, say, January 1, 1963.

(b) Timing. The pace at which we provide Polaris equipment should be governed by British progress in building the boats. We should not anticipate that progress. The longer the time required to set up a national UK Polaris force, the more opportunity for UK attitudes to evolve in the direction outlined above, even before the force comes into being.

(c) Inclusion in Multilateral Force. We should not now seek any more precise agreement as to how the UK Polaris effort

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effort would be "included" in a multilateral force. At present, the UK could only agree to inclusion on terms which nailed down the national identity and independence of its contribution; this would be salt in German wounds and a barrier to later constructive changes in the UK view.

(d) UK Participation in Initial Multilateral Study and Planning. We should seek, in consummating detailed post-Nassau agreements with the UK, to confirm that the reference to the US and UK "using their best endeavors" to set up a multilateral force, means that the UK will take an active and positive/multilateral mixed manned force open to NATO non-nuclear powers, including the possibility of early token UK participation in such a force -- quite aside from the eventual "inclusion" of its projected national force.

(e) UK Attitudes and Noises. The Nassau Agreement was designed, in part, to solve an acute short-run British domestic political problem which appeared to require assurance that Britain could persist along a national nuclear track. We must expect the British Government to cling to and strongly to articulate this element in the Agreement; and in the face of this posture we must be prepared resolutely to keep our main weight behind the multilateral course.

6. French

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6. French Arrangements.

The points indicated above are as relevant for France as for the U.K.

There is one additional issue here, however: Should we go further in offering post-Nassau aid to France than to the U.K.?

It seems fairly clear that we should not do so initially. Our immediate purpose in making the Nassau proposal to France was to prevent an instant French reaction to the U.S.-U.K. agreement which would further worsen U.S.-French relations and weaken British chances of joining EEC. This purpose seems to have been achieved by our present proposal. To go further now would compound the adverse German reaction to Nassau, and thus prejudice the future of the multilateral force, without necessarily securing any French concession of value in return

Our present posture should, therefore, be one of resting on our Nassau proposal and waiting on the French response. The logic of that proposal is clear: This administration is determined not to enter into new forms of cooperation

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*which will be*

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of cooperation with the U.K. without extending them on the same terms to France. A wholly separate question is posed by the 1958 agreement with the U.K., which this Administration did not consummate and whose extension to other countries would have to rest on considerations that seemed persuasive for this administration in themselves, rather than on what its predecessor had or had not done vis-a-vis the U.K.

It would then be up to the French to determine whether they wished to solicit wider forms of nuclear aid and, if so, what concessions, other than those envisaged at Nassau, they were prepared to offer in return.

To avoid an abrasive and fruitless U.S.-French negotiation, it may be useful, however, to find some way of conveying soon to the French the limitations on our freedom of action in responding to certain kinds of proposals which they might make. The President specifically assured the Chancellor after Nassau that we were not offering warhead help to France: the need to avoid so soon discarding this Presidential commitment to an ally already troubled by the specter of new forms of

discrimination

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discrimination, plus JCAE sensitivities, may well make help on nuclear propulsion a more rewarding field in any future U.S.-French negotiations. (Even there we face some JCAE problems, given the terms of the agreement reached with Senator Anderson regarding the rate of release of "Skipjack" technology to the French.)

If the French decide not to pursue the matter, our ability to pursue the larger strategy outlined under I, above, would not necessarily be prejudiced. A multilateral mixed-manned force can be formed by the U.S. and other NATO countries with U.K. support (moral or otherwise), even if France rejects Nassau. And, indeed, France's agreement to use its "best endeavors" to bring about a multilateral force might be a mixed blessing at this stage; General de Gaulle's strong personal feelings on the subject of integration might well make it more difficult for the other NATO countries to set up a mixed-manned force, if his government was an active participant in their deliberations.

If the French, instead, make a counterproposal, there are these other considerations to be borne in mind:

-- The U.K.

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-- The U.K. government's domestic problems are already compounded by charges that it has failed to maintain the "special" U.S.-U.K. relation; vide, the U.S. offer to France on equal terms. Proposing still wider forms of aid to France would intensify this difficulty.

-- Our long-term hope is that the U.K. and France will eventually merge their national forces into a mixed-manned force. The costs and difficulties faced by the first phase French programs will be vital factor in determining its disposition, post-de Gaulle.

-- The Germans are clearly more sensitive to discrimination across the Rhine than across the Channel. The more dramatic and ambitious our help to France, the more difficult we make life for those in Germany who are trying to divert German energies from resentment into positive action on the multilateral force.

-- However we may resolve the issue, in the light of these and other considerations we will wish to avoid becoming so preoccupied with this aspect of our post-Nassau track as to lose sight of the larger goal. We  
should not

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should not defer pressing ahead on the multilateral front pending the rather slow motion U.S.-French nuclear dialogue which may be ahead. Indeed, progress on the multilateral front, plus some movement on political consultation (see below), may well do more to generate a constructive French response than anything we can do in the nuclear field. France will be the more reluctant to stay on the sidelines if the alliance is moving forward in areas where French leadership could help to shape the outcome. The immediate question to establish, however, is whether the French are prepared in any serious way to throw their weight behind a European multilateral force and to contribute positively to its creation.

7. Command and Control.

(a) Allied participation in Omaha. The best way to get across to our allies that the separate nuclear defense of Europe is neither feasible nor desirable is to expose them to the full range of U.S. strategic deterrence and to give them a share in its planning and targeting. A special NATO targeting staff might be set up at Omaha; it could

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it could be responsible, among other things, for ensuring that U.S. strategic plans provided full coverage of targets directly related to the defense of Europe. The technical possibilities involved lie beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that this general course of action holds great promise in strengthening trans-Atlantic partnership in the nuclear field and in ensuring that any unilateral MRBM force which may be set up does not widen or prejudice the essential unity of Atlantic nuclear defense.

(b) NATO nuclear commands. In general, it would seem undesirable to set up a NATO strategic nuclear command, because of the credence that such a step would give to the proposition that a separate nuclear defense of Europe is envisaged. Strategic forces now to be committed to NATO should thus probably be assigned to existing major NATO commands, notably SACEUR. The same probably holds true for a multilateral MRBM force if one is set up, although the range of problems involved here is such as to require considerable further study before a confident answer can be returned. This is not to say, of course, that special command channels should not be set up within existing NATO commands

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commands to accommodate the needs of strategic forces, as is done in the case of Italian and Turkish IRBM's. Moreover, there may well be a case for setting up special command arrangements under SACEUR to handle tactical nuclear weapons deployed in NATO, to permit their centralized and discriminating control at a very high level in the event of hostilities. Clearly, however, there are serious technical patterns involved here which call for detailed analysis by competent authority. Conceivably, in the long run, these tactical weapons could be included in a multilateral force of their own; indeed, some such move may be necessary if our allies want a larger share in control of these, as well as in strategic, weapons. Eventual creation of such a force could parallel creation of a multilateral MRBM force in cementing both European cohesion and trans-Atlantic ties. But this is well down the road.

(c) NATO Executive Committee. Of equal importance with military control over nuclear forces in hostilities is the question of political crisis management before hostilities. Indeed, the two questions are intimately related and must be considered in tandem. De Gaulle has steadily

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steadily been concerned with this problem; in the post-Cuba setting our European allies are generally interested; and movement in this area might mitigate in the short term the features of the Nassau agreement most distasteful in Bonn and in Rome. The most promising means of crisis management yet suggested would involve setting up a NATO Executive Committee (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and one rotating smaller country)\* to: (i) handle issues that fall \_\_\_\_\_ within

\*Other possible characteristics of such an institution might be:

-- A special first class secretariat for this Executive Committee to include individuals from the smaller nations not on the Executive Committee;

-- A system for interplay between the initiatives of the Executive Committee and the NATO Council as a whole more formal than that which now exists on the Berlin question;

-- Provision for permitting full participation, on an equal basis, in the Executive Committee of NATO members who have a direct major interest in specific outside areas problems, when they are under consideration; e.g., Netherlands on Indonesia, Portugal on Angola, Belgium on the Congo, etc.

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within a specified area of urgent crisis action, as the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group now deals with Berlin;

(ii) recommend to the NATO Council broader courses of action related to the avoidance or to the aftermath of crises. Such an arrangement would recognize both the unique responsibilities of the greater powers, particularly in crises, and the need for broad alliance concurrence in long-term courses of action they may wish to launch. There would be considerable advantage in having such a committee sit where the game is actually played; e.g., in Washington. The difficulties posed by allied sensitivities are considerable, but the results could be most rewarding in making a reality of the Atlantic political consultation that must parallel greater nuclear cohesion. If Washington-NATO secure communications could be guaranteed, location in Paris need not be ruled out if the Europeans insisted; although it would have to be made clear that this location would probably dilute the effectiveness of the Committee's work.

8. Multilateral force. (To be written after Friday morning's discussion of the multilateral paper, in summary of conclusions reached.)

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3. Multilateral. Our object here should be to get moving on a mixed manned multilateral force soon enough to mitigate any post-Nassau German and Italian resentment and to provide an opportunity for the UK and France to move toward meaningful inclusion in such a force before their own national Polaris forces come into being around 1970. This means that we must move quickly on a scheme which will appeal to Germany and Italy now and seem an attractive alternative to national programs for European-minded groups in the U.K. and France over the longer term.

We might go to the three countries which have already approved the multilateral force in principle (Germany, Italy, and Belgium) and propose that they and we now take the following immediate steps, while a working group which includes them and any other interested countries hammers out the detailed arrangements necessary to set up a multilateral force:

(a) Order a specified number of Polaris submarines, whose <sup>would</sup> \$160 million cost apiece/be allocated as follows: \$62.5 million-US, \$62.5 million - FRG, \$25 million - Italy, \$10 million - Belgium. The number of submarines to be ordered would depend on how much money these countries were prepared to put up; if the UK is to build 7 boats it does not seem too much to envisage an 8-boat program for these countries. Since they may not wish to exclude the eventual possibility of European production, however, they may wish to limit the initial order for U. S. production to about 4 submarines. If these were ordered in 1963, they would be available in 1967-8, and the annual cost of construction to each of the countries would be on the order of the figures cited above. The most doubtful contributor is Italy; the chances of an Italian contribution might

ction 8a

be enhanced if the GOI viewed this as a substitute for the Jupiters and did not, therefore, procure additional Sergeants.

(b) Agree that each of the participating countries would now second personnel for training in U. S. schools. The ratio of personnel to be secured from each country would be determined by technical availabilities, with the general object of securing some such ratio as the following: 1/3 - U. S., 1/3 - Germany, and 1/3- Italy and Belgium. Larger U. S. and/or German shares would produce the impression of a force which was largely dominated by the U. S. and/or Germany, which would be poor in terms of political impact on Europe as a whole.

(c) The allocation of personnel to individual submarines should also be determined largely by technical considerations, with the proviso that at least three nationalities should be represented on each boat and no one nationality should be predominant. To have only two nationalities on some boats would create the possibility of U. S. - German boats, which would be an exceedingly unappetizing prospect, both for our allies and for the USSR. The concept that this was a predominantly European operation, in which the U. S. was a participant, would tend to be obscured and the appeal of the operation to European-minded groups in the U.K. and France greatly diminished.

(d) U. S. warhead custody would be maintained to protect design data. The participants would agree that the force should be fired when (i) SACEUR requested release of NATO-committed nuclear forces for attack on the USSR in response to a massive Soviet nuclear attack on NATO; (ii) the participants agreed in all other circum-

stances. It would be understood that these arrangements were subject

to revision in the course of more detailed planning.

(e) The force would be targetted under arrangements to be worked out by SACEUR with Omaha, so as to ensure its effective coordination with U. S. strategic forces.

Agreement now to go forward on this basis would start the long lead-time items (construction and training), while these countries then considered at greater length how to set up an international agency to manage the force, what long-term control formula they favored, ~~favord~~, etc.

**INITIALIZED COPY**

At 12/16/62 '62

~~Secret~~

Hold for meeting with German

1. There are several issues raised by the German proposal:

(a) Is this force conceived of as a tactical or strategic force? This decision will be reflected in the kind of MRBM selected ~~x~~ for it. If we pick the new MRBM, it will be essentially a tactical force, since it will have only [redacted]. If we pick the Polaris MRBM (whether in a sub or otherwise), you will get a [redacted]. The basic European, and especially German and French, desires will run to a strategic force. If we do meet these desires through this force, we will have wasted an awful lot of money.

(b) Do they really have mixed manning in mind? The paper is silent on this point. Amb. Finletter says that they do. Our first reaction to the paper, in any discussion with Stikker or the Germans, should be to emphasize this as an absolute sine qua non. DOD now says (at least ISA now says) this is feasible.

(c) Should it be merchantmen or subs? The argument for merchantmen is that they are cheaper and that mixed manning is easier on them. The argument for subs is that they are more invulnerable- hence generate less pressure for pre-emptive firing in case of non-nuclear hostilities- and this makes them more suitable for a strategic hold-back force. Also you need less units, both because there are more missiles on each unit and because they are more invulnerable; hence less political difficulties associated with a lot of @ "hot" merchantmen putting into port and getting Holy Loch-type receptions. If you have enough less subs, the cost differential is not so great, and you don't really need so many missiles for a strategic (break their arm, a la de Gaulle) force.

2. Perhaps even more important, there is a substantial tactical issue: Is this something that we believe is needed militarily (to take part in a tactical land battle in Europe) and which we ought to be pushing the Europeans on, or is it something we want to be receptive on, but say is not needed urgently from a military standpoint, and we are willing to consider in order to respond to their concerns.

If we take the first tack, we're back in the EDC and 1957 IRBM rut- pushing something on the Europeans which they are doing us a favor in taking. All the political juice is taken out of it. And we generate such a feeling that there is an urgent military requirement that when they start running into trouble trying to figure how to set up a multilateral force, the temptation is strong to say- Oh, to heck with it, let's have national manning. Otherwise we won't meet the military need on time.

If we take the more relaxed approach, we get the political credit, we can plausibly hold to full multilateral criteria. It will take quite a while for them to do it in this case, and this will be all to the good. It will mean that the expenses for this project won't cut across the bow of our non-nuclear buildup which is what the President said at OTTawa- a multilateral force after the non-nuclear goals have been achieved. (Which is also NSC policy.) And there will be some chance that sufficient progress will have been achieved

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European political integration by the time the force is set up to make a sensible resolution of the multilateral control problem possible- or at least easier.

3. All of this suggests that in any meeting with Stikker we ought to hit:

(a) Mixed manning.

(b) We're not pushing this to meet a military need. As Secy MacNamara said at Paris we can cover targets which threaten Europe with forces outside the theater. We are willing to do something along these lines if there is strong European political pressure behind it, but the test of this is how much our allies want it. And, in this case, the size and character of the force should be geared to those desires, which run to a strategic rather than tactical force. And we should take the time to do it right.

4. Stikker's view will be quite different: We need these to cover tactical targets, we need lots of them quickly, and let's not fool around with the multilateral device if it would take too long.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 29, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Herve Alphan

You will probably be seeing Herve Alphan in the next few days while he is at the Wrightsmans, and you may be interested in some background on the French reactions to Nassau as Alphan is reporting them.

Alphan reports a very sour view of Nassau from Paris -- apparently not from de Gaulle personally but from Couve. Alphan says that the French regard this as merely a device for destroying their nuclear independence and increasing in an unacceptable way their expenditures on nuclear forces. Actually, as you know, the whole theory is that we can save them money if they'll let us.

Meanwhile, here in Washington there is evident tension between those, led by Bob McNamara, who want to make the Nassau pact lead on to prompt new arrangements with France and other NATO countries, and the convinced multilateralists of the Department of State who continue to believe that serious cooperation with France on the Nassau model would be a mistake. The most immediate point of focus for this debate will come with the framing of instructions to Chip Bohlen at the first of the week, and it is understood that these instructions must be referred to you for approval. The draft should be ready Monday.

Dean Rusk suggests that you may want to be very cautious with Alphan until you have had a chance to settle in your own mind just what Chip's marching orders should be. My only supplementary suggestion would be that you might want to say flatly to Alphan that the letter to de Gaulle was intended as an honest effort to open a serious discussion of the whole problem of our respective roles in the nuclear defense of the West over the long run. The French are so very suspicious, and there has been so little serious communication between our two Governments on this subject, at any level, that it seems more and more plain that a careful and extended discussion of all aspects of this complicated problem is essential to any real progress. The current danger is that such a dialogue may be cut off before it begins by those on both sides who prefer to nourish their suspicions of each other.

McG. B.

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