

KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**1ST MARINE AIR WING - SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 2 - 7 SEPTEMBER 1950 - 9
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HEADQUARTERS, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 33
1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

ANNEX - ROGER
to
MAG-33 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
For Period Ending
9 October 1950

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT VIF-212

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COPY NO. 1

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INCHON

SEOUL

KIMPO

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"E"

7 September--9 October 1950

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MARINE FIGHTER SQUADRON 212
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 33
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

RWW:aww
A8-2
Ser 01-51
1 January 1951

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 33
Subj: Special Action Report for the INCHON-SEOUL-KIMPO operation
Ref: (a) Para 1141.2 MCM
(b) 1st MAW Memo No. 50-50 as modified
(c) 1st MAW dis 1405052 of 4 Jan 1951
Encl: (1) Subject report

1. In accordance with reference (b), the attached Special Action Report, for the period 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950 inclusive, is herewith submitted.

2. This letter becomes unclassified when enclosure (1) is removed.


R. W. WYCZAŃSKI

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(b)

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Commanding Officer
Marine Fighter Squadron 212
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
1 January 1951

Special Action Report
01-51

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Date 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950 Inclusive

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INTRODUCTION

Marine Fighter Squadron Two Twelve submits the following Action Report in order that an accurate evaluation of all phases of the Squadron's activities during the Inchon-Kimpo Operations may be made, and with the hope that the undesirable situation and conditions which existed may be prevented in future operations.

The mission of the Squadron during this operation was primarily to provide the air support required by X Corps Units.

The next higher echelon during the period of this report was Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three.

TASK ORGANIZATION

There were no attached or organic units attached to this organization during the operation.

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

There was little preliminary planning done for this specific operation. The squadron assumed that it would be committed to combat soon after arrival in Japan, but had no idea of where and under what circumstances. On 16 September, the squadron received instructions from the First Marine Air Wing, at Itami, Japan; that the flight echelon would fly to Kimpo Airfield, Korea, as soon as practicable after the field had been secured.

Twelve aircraft departed Itami, Japan, on 19 September, for Kimpo, a period of five days since the Squadron's arrival at Itami. These circumstances were not conducive to elaborate planning.

Planning at Itami included instruction from G-4 of the First Marine Air Wing to store all TRA equipment at Kobe Docks, Kobe, Japan, which was done. Eighteen pilots were physically joined, a rear echelon to handle squadron property was designated, air and surface personnel were designated, and pilots assigned to fly the squadron aircraft.

Department heads established liaison with the respective Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three and First Marine Air Wing staff sections. Minor details of planning are covered in the Annexes to this report.

There were no written directives received by the Squadron on which to base its planning. The Squadron Commander requested that wartime TO billets for all Group officer aviation personnel be filled by the Wing, who indicated that there were no such personnel available for these jobs. Group personnel promised to divide ground officers assigned to other Squadrons in the Group.

It was unknown to the Squadron, but we were to operate under Tactical Air Commander X Corps operations order 1-50, which the Squadron did not receive until 23 September.

The enemy ground situation was only generally known.

No estimate of the situation was received from a higher echelon, and none was formulated by the Squadron.

Logistic Planning was done by the Wing, which included only air and surface lifts for personnel with their individual equipment, the aircraft and section "U" hand tools.

Intelligence was accumulated from the Wing and Group Intelligence Staff. Intelligence materials received were Air Support Maps, Air Navigation Charts, and Escape Kits. Wing and Group files were made available to the Squadron Intelligence Officer who read all material available concerning past Korean operations.

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TRAINING

No special training was necessary for this operation because the unit and the personnel had been training for several years for an identical type of operation.

To receive a clear picture of training, which of necessity must precede the period of this report, see the general and special department Annexes especially Annex C (operations and training).

Rehearsal was not held due to the time schedule involved, and the lack of proper facilities.

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

There was no loading. Embarkation was accomplished on 15 September, aboard the USS BENAR at Kobe, Japan. See Annex D to this report.

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA

Movement was accomplished by three methods.

- (a) One hundred and one (101) Squadron enlisted personnel and three (3) officers were transported by the USS BENAR leaving Kobe, Japan, on the 17th of September, arriving and disembarking at Inchon, Korea, on 21 September. They were transported by trucks from Inchon to Kimpo Airfield, on 22 September.
- (b) Thirty-two (32) enlisted men and six (6) officers were air lifted to Kimpo, departing Itami on 19 September, and arriving on 20 September. Ten (10) pilots and nineteen men were air lifted to Kimpo from Itami on 24 September.
- (c) Twelve (12) Squadron Aircraft departed Itami for Kimpo on 19 September, but only six (6) arrived. The remaining six (6) remained overnight at U. S. Air Force Base, Itazuke, Japan, due to bad weather, and were flown to Kimpo on 20 September. Twelve (12) Squadron planes were flown to Kimpo from Itami on 23 September.

ASSAULT PHASE

Does not apply

ENEMY TACTICS

No enemy air activity was encountered during the period.

Enemy ground fire encountered varied from medium to light, both in caliber and intensity.

Accuracy of light caliber AA and automatic weapons fire is difficult to judge because a factor would be the number of rounds fired, which is unknown. Hits on aircraft occurred approximately twenty times, but only one aircraft was lost due to this type of fire. Pilots generally agree that small arms fire was usually inaccurate and ineffective.

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This type of fire was received from all types of targets, but was believed to be concentrated near villages, towns, bridges and front lines. Very little medium caliber AA was encountered and was noted near bridges and large towns, and a few were located apparently without rhyme or reason on or near peaks in open country some distance from any apparent targets, probably intended to be flak traps. The only accurate AA encountered was from Pyongyang and Seoul. Some Pyongyang batteries apparently used radar gun laying fire control. Pilots generally estimated the medium AA encountered as inaccurate and ineffective. The enemy was extremely apt in concealment not of his troops, but of his equipment. The enemy apparently was forced to move troops and supplies only at night due to his lack of air superiority. Pilots rate their use of camouflage against air observation as outstanding. The enemy's deployment, probable Order of Battle and equipment was not observed by this organization.

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION AS A WHOLE

Excellent experience was gained by all pilots and enlisted men in furnishing Air Support in the field during routine and maximum effort operations.

It was noted that the X Corps completed its final objective two (2) days ahead of schedule. This Squadron feels that the Air Support it furnished was excellent and materially contributed to the success of the X Corps Operations.

Statistics for the period are as follows: 552 combat sorties and 1295 combat hours flown, 4 aircraft lost, 1 pilot killed, 1 pilot wounded, and 1 pilot injured.

TARGETS DESTROYED	TARGETS DAMAGED
1 AA position	7 AA positions
1 Aircraft	2 Airfields
1 Amphibious tractor	1 Barracks
1 Anti-tank gun (heavy)	43 Buildings
1 Artillery piece	4 Factories
2 Barracks	4 Gun positions
245 Buildings	2 Locomotives
1 Chemical works	1 Machine gun (50 cal.)
5440 Enemy troops	3 Marshalling yards
6 Factories	1 Mortar position
2 Gun emplacements	3 Pillboxes
1 Jeep	12 Rail cars
1 Landing craft	3 Rail yards
2 Locomotives	1 RR station
14 Machine guns	3 RR tunnels
4 Mortars	2 Tanks
1 Motorcycle	12 Towns
1 Power station	7 Trucks
1 Road bridge	9 Warehouses
2 RR handcars	2 20mm guns
3 RR tunnels	
1 Tank Farm	
8 Tanks	

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TARGETS DESTROYED

- 5 Tows
- 21 Trucks
- 26 Vehicles
- 7 Warehouses
- 9 20mm guns

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CHRONOLOGY

7-10 September 1950.

All personnel of the Squadron were at sea aboard the USS CAPE ESPERANCE (CVET-88), except one officer and five enlisted men who were aboard the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON. Squadron TBA and Squadron property was aboard the MORTON and the twenty-four squadron aircraft were aboard the Cape Esperance.

Daily routine during this period consisted of lectures given on Korean Intelligence Studies, Hygiene, Sanitation, and Venereal Disease Prophylaxis. Enlisted men were assigned details daily for cleaning and ship's work. Both officers and men played volley ball and attended nightly movies. Daily recognition periods were held on Russian Aircraft and Tanks.

11 September 1950.

All Squadron planes and 24 pilots were off-loaded at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. The aircraft were parked on the docks and the pilots were billeted at the United States Naval Base, Yokosuka.

12 September 1950.

All aircraft were lightered to Kisarazu Air Force Base.

13 September 1950.

All aircraft were de-preserved by Squadron line and engineering personnel.

14 September.

All Squadron aircraft were ferried to Itami Air Force Base, Japan. The USS CAPE ESPERANCE departed Yokosuka for Kobe, Japan, with remaining squadron personnel aboard.

15 September.

The CAPE ESPERANCE and GENERAL C. G. MORTON arrived at Kobe, Japan. All personnel disembarked from the MORTON and ESPERANCE and embarked on the USS BEXAR, except fifty men who went to Itami. The purpose of bringing the fifty enlisted men to Itami was to perform routine maintenance of the aircraft, prepare the aircraft for combat, and to accompany the Squadron Aircraft when committed to combat operations. These fifty men represented skeleton crews from Line, Engineering, Ordnance, and Electronics.

16 September.

Squadron TBA property and excess personal gear were off-loaded from the GENERAL C. G. MORTON and CAPE ESPERANCE, and stored in warehouses at the docks in Kobe.

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17-18 September.

Training flights, F4U-5 Familiarization Flights for newly joined pilots, tactics, and bombing, were conducted. Crystallization, with the exception of two channels, was completed. On 17 September, the USS BEXAR departed Kobe, for Inchon, with one hundred and one enlisted men and three officers.

19 September.

Tactical training flights were flown in the morning and twelve Squadron Aircraft departed for Kimpo, Korea, with two hours notice. Six planes plus one transport aircraft carrying thirty-two enlisted men and six officers were forced to land at Itazuke, and Ashiya Air Force Bases.

20 September.

All planes and personnel which had to remain overnight at Itazuke and Ashiya arrived at Kimpo, Korea.

21 September.

The USS BEXAR arrived at Inchon, Korea, and all Squadron personnel disembarked. Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three assigned a camp area and furnished tents. Rations were furnished by the Group continuously until the end of the period.

22 September.

All personnel who arrived at Inchon on 21 September, arrived at Kimpo.

23 September.

Twelve Squadron Aircraft arrived at Kimpo from Itami

24 September.

Ten officers and nineteen men arrived at Kimpo by air lift from Itami. This left one officer and five enlisted men as a rear echelon at Itami to handle Squadron property.

25 September - 9 October.

During this period of time, routine combat operations prevailed. The daily routine began about two hours prior to pre-dawn launches which occurred about 0650. Line personnel would pre-flight all aircraft in commission and inform the Squadron Duty Officer of the aircraft available with the ordnance loads for each aircraft. The duty officer posted this information on a status board. An ordnance crew stood by to complete or change ordnance loads as required by the Group. The pilots were briefed at Marine Aircraft Group Operations-Intelligence and returned to Squadron Operations tent for plane assignments and flight leaders briefing. As planes returned from a flight pilots were met by the Line Chief, Ordnance Chief, and Electronics Chief, who received discrepancies from the pilots, and remedied the discrepancies as soon as possible.

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Due to the nature of the operation, many minor discrepancies, not affecting safety of flight, were permitted to go without repair. Malfunctioning of the 20mm cannons, could not generally be repaired during flight operations.

Pilots upon returning from flights proceeded to Group Intelligence where they were de-briefed.

Aircraft were serviced and rearmed as soon as possible after each flight. After the conclusion of each day's flight operations, aircraft were re-serviced and the probable ordnance load loaded.

Often the flight schedule from the Group did not arrive until 2100 or 2130 hours, at which time ordnance loads were changed if necessary.

One water trailer was assigned the Squadron and filled at the water point as often as necessary from a water point two miles distant. The water point was operated by First Marine Division Engineers. All during the period there was one shower erected in the Squadron area. This shower was built by the Squadron pilots from salvaged materials and was so cumbersome to operate that only a few personnel took daily showers. About the middle of the period the Group erected showers which were available daily.

Laundry was collected and delivered by native Korean children and women who washed the clothes in the village.

A mess tent and six field ranges were furnished for the use of this Squadron and VMF(N)-542. Cooks and messmen were furnished by the respective Squadrons, and rations were issued by the Group.

Camp maintenance personnel worked steadily to improve the camp area. Rocket boxes were the primary source of building supplies and firewood. Squadron medical personnel worked in the Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three dispensary and held daily sick calls.

Departmental problems which arose during the period of this report are contained in the Annexes to this report.

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
 1 January 1951

Special Action Report

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COMMANDING OFFICERS' RECOMMENDATIONSPERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

Aviation ground officers should be furnished each Tactical Squadron to fill the following billets.

- A. Adjutant
- B. Engineering Officer
- C. Air Combat Intelligence Officer
- D. Material Officer
- E. Ordnance Officer

A bare minimum of recreation and athletic gear should be taken into the combat area unless there is definite information that time and facilities will not be available for recreation.

The variety of meat and starch preparations contained in rations should be increased to prevent the food's losing its taste appeal.

The Wing administrative section should maintain closer liaison with evacuation hospitals so that proper information concerning wounded personnel will reach Squadron frequently and without delay.

Arrangements should be made to pay men aboard the ships transporting them when they are to go directly from the States to the combat area.

Post Exchanges rations should contain more toilet articles, including toothpaste, razors and blades to fit them, tooth brushes, soap, and towels, only popular brand cigarettes and pipe tobacco, and more stationery and envelopes.

If, in future operations, a Service Squadron is available to support the Squadron, the Squadron could manage quite well with a strength equal to the present peace time Table of Organization with the following exceptions:

- A. Add five (5) aviation ground officers (Adjutant, Air Combat Intelligence, Material, Ordnance, and Engineering).
- B. Increase the naval aviators (7302) to forty-eight (48).
- C. Increase the 6500 field (Aviation Ordnance) to equal the present wartime Table of Organization for that field.

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Under these circumstances Service Squadron Table of Organization would have to be increased so that the Squadron would not be called upon to furnish men for guard duty, working parties, etc. If the Service Squadron were large enough to operate the fuel dumps, ammunition dumps, supply dumps, etc., without help from the Squadron, then the Squadron strength as stated above would be adequate.

It has been noted that the existing facilities for handling administrative files, office machines, and supplies were inadequate. The present typewriter chest is not sturdy enough to stand the constant moving, and consequently a number of typewriters were damaged. It is recommended that the Commanding Officers be assigned one jeep with trailer to be used for administrative purposes while moving. The office equipment could be loaded aboard the jeep and trailer prior to leaving the United States and would be deck loaded upon embarkation. It would be the last of the Squadron equipment loaded aboard, thus allowing the administrative section to function until the last minute. It would be off-loaded first upon debarking and the administrative section would lose no time getting set up. The handling of administrative property in this manner would facilitate the functioning of the administrative section. This type of handling would be possible whether a move was made by land, sea or air.

Proper administration was hampered somewhat by last minute joinings and separations without proper authority, and last minute arrival of movement orders. This situation seems to be inherent in combat operations where rapid and frequent moves are made. It is felt that every effort should be made to remedy this situation. One possible solution would be to leave all administrative and pay master sections from the Squadron level on up in the rear area. Perhaps one or two office clerks would be in the forward area. Under this situation there would be no delay in submitting reports, no loss of service record books or pay cards and no loss of time in showing joinings and transfers.

Finally it has been noted that service record books of Reserve Enlisted personnel and qualification jackets of Reserve Officers have, for the most part, been found lacking in proper information. Perhaps this is due to inexperienced administrative personnel. However it seems that all organizations should make every effort to complete these records when they are found inadequate.

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INTELLIGENCE

An Air Combat Intelligence Officer and two well trained WO1's (1 preferably a Staff N.C.O.) should be assigned to each Squadron during Combat Operations.

The Air Combat Intelligence Officer must accompany the initial group of pilots committed to combat.

Briefing and de-briefing of pilots at the group level is considered desirable and practical, because it assures uniform procedures and makes effective use of qualified intelligence personnel.

The following list of intelligence materiel, (30 days of supplies included) should be airlifted to the Squadron with the highest priority.

- (a) 1 field safe
- (b) 1 typewriter
- (c) 1 Gasoline lantern
- (d) 1 complete set of Air Support and Air Navigation Charts for each pilot, plus an additional 50%.
- (e) 2 complete sets of maps suitable for posting the situation, (1:25,000-1:50,000 or 1:25,000 suitable, depending on the facilities available).
- (f) Cellulose Acetate in sufficient quantity to cover any situation.
- (g) 5 boxes of thumb tacks.
- (h) 5000 Air Attack Report forms.
- (i) 2500 Aircraft Vulnerability Report forms.
- (j) Air Combat forms in sufficient number. To be determined by anticipated enemy air activity.
- (k) 500 Crew and Survival Report forms.
- (l) 3 complete sets of colored pencils.
- (m) 2 boxes of lead pencils.
- (n) 2 reams of bond paper, 4 reams onion skin paper.
- (o) 12 large sheets of transparent overlay paper. (Note-Present standard overlay paper is translucent if not opaque)
- (p) 1 survival kit for each pilot, plus 50%.

All Squadron Intelligence Officers should be encouraged to brief all enlisted men of their organization on the tactical, theater, and world situations as often as possible.

The maps used for the Close Air Support were old and inaccurate. They were compiled in 1945 by Chief of Engineers Army Map Service (LU) U. S. Army from Japanese Imperial Land Surveys of 1912, 1928, and 1932. The heights are in meters and contour lines obscure prominent features necessary for orientation from the air.

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A better map is the U. S. Air Force Aeronautical Chart, Lambert Conformal Conic Projection, Scale 1:250,000, Transposed UTM Grid System, when engaged in large scale land operations. Smaller R/F scales may be more advantageously used in small areas of intense operations.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

This organization entered the combat area with a nucleus of well trained pilots, a peacetime TO of very sufficient enlisted personnel and twenty-four (24) comparatively new F4U-5 type aircraft. It is believed that training was adequate for the mission assigned, although inadequate had enemy opposition developed. Due to the comparatively mild tour the new and reserve pilots were assimilated with ease and training provided in the area.

It is believed that the Squadron accomplished all missions assigned with a maximum of efficiency and expediency under existing conditions.

All ground billets such as Engineering Officer, Material Officer, Personnel Officer, Adjutant, etc., were occupied by pilots. This did not in any way hamper flight operations but did constitute an added burden to officers concerned in these departments. However, one pilot from the Material Department was always maintained in the rear echelon with the Squadron material, and therefore lost to operations.

A Squadron should be alerted as far in advance as possible and every avenue should be explored to provide as complete a briefing as possible for any given operation.

The attachment of a mortar to the Close Air Support team would facilitate the location and identification of targets, thereby saving many low passes for positive identification. This would also be a great help to pilots where charts are not adequate.

A TO of forty-eight pilots is recommended for shore based Squadrons, providing this strength can be maintained at all times while in an operating area. It is imperative that operating units, once committed, not be called upon to furnish pilots for other details, temporary duty assignments, transfers, etc. This also applies to units in training. Let the operating Squadron have full use of all pilots at all times. Naturally certain replacements are expected due to combat or operational losses and these can be absorbed easily.

More time should be devoted to fighter and escort tactics. If possible, tactical instrument training should be increased using only the aids usually available in a combat area. If possible, more training should be given under heavy load conditions. Heavy load flight characteristics should be stressed. Night training should embrace a minimum of four hours per month in type.

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LOGISTICS

In future operations, Squadrons must have available a complete Section "B" at the Group level.

All boxes and crates should be strongly constructed to withstand numerous movements.

Permanent boxes built from plywood should be used for non-expendable items.

Men should carry cots and bed rolls with them.

The Squadron Material Section should pack their own material instead of Group packing teams.

ENGINEERING

Groups should leave sufficient supply personnel at rear bases to issue Section "B" allowance to Squadrons.

Gasoline engine driven refueling pumps, capable of refueling from drums must be available immediately after arrival of aircraft.

Use of the power unit, portable type, single cylinder, two cycle, gas engine driven (Stock No. R86-HL-C10A), should be discontinued, and one maintenance jeep and three power unit four cylinder, Waukesha, gas engine driven (Stock No. R86-WUB-APU) be furnished.

Adequate Section "B" spares should arrive simultaneously with aircraft.

A portable high pressure (2000#) air compressor must be available when aircraft arrive at operating area.

An Aviation Ground Officer should be assigned.

ORDNANCE

It would be to the benefit of a Squadron if a Ground Officer could be assigned to the Squadron as Ordnance Officer. During combat operations this job requires full time work by the officer concerned. There are many highly trained skilled Ordnance Master Sergeants who, if promoted to Warrant Officer, or Second Lieutenant, could fill these billets very well.

It is highly recommended that a Squadron be kept at full strength. This Squadron had twenty-nine men attached to the Ordnance Department while operating at Kimpo. This shortage of personnel greatly reduced the efficiency of the department. Maintenance requirements had to be neglected at times, due to this shortage of personnel. Also the efficiency of the men suffered due to the long hours that they had to work.

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A full war time complement would have relieved this situation.

It is felt that the present war time TO of thirty-eight (38) men would be ample to run a very efficient department if full support is furnished by the supporting Group.

If Squadron aircraft are equipped with any type computing sight it is recommended that the very minimum of three of the personnel assigned be men with some training along that line. As stated before, this Squadron had only one man with experience with the MK-6 Mod 0 Fire Control System. As a result it was impossible to give proper maintenance to this equipment at all times. This meant that full benefit from this fine piece of equipment was not fully utilized. This Squadron commends the efficient manner in which ordnance was airlifted into Kimpo. It wishes to recommend that in the future when a similar operation is planned, that bomb handling equipment be given a higher priority. The MK-3 bomb trailers and the MK-2 bomb trailers should especially be given a higher priority. Gun cameras and adequate film should be furnished and employed.

COMMUNICATIONS

Due to the fact that air to ground, and air to air communications during this period were good to excellent, it is recommended that no radical changes of equipment be made.

A minimum of three channels should be available for Close Air Support at all times.

Since the Service Squadron supports the Fighter Squadrons with VHF crystals they should maintain an adequate supply of all frequencies that will conceivably be used.

MEDICAL

All immunizations should be completed at the earliest possible moment, preferably before leaving the continental limits of the United States.

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
 1 January 1951

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ANNEX A

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

At the beginning of this reporting period the Squadron was organized according to the peacetime Tables of Organization for a Marine Single Engine F4U Fighter Squadron and consisted of the following:

- 32 Marine Officers (All Naval Aviators)
 - 1 Navy Officer (Squadron Doctor)
- 154 Marine Enlisted Men (5 NAP's)
 - 4 Navy Enlisted Men (Hospitalmen)

On 21 September, the Squadron was officially transferred to Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three, First Marine Air Wing. On 22 September, the rear echelon arrived at Kimpo, Korea. On 27 September, fifteen enlisted men arrived at Kimpo from Itami. These men were the last of the original fifty men who had been at Itami working on the Squadron aircraft. The Squadron strength at this time was as follows:

- 50 Marine Officers (All Naval Aviators)
 - 1 Navy Officer (Squadron Doctor)
- 154 Marine Enlisted Men (5 NAP's)
 - 4 Navy Enlisted Men (Hospitalmen)

Eighteen of the fifty Marine Officers mentioned above joined the Squadron physically about 15 September, at Itami, Japan, but orders and personnel records for them were not received until 3 October. One officer and five enlisted men stayed at Itami to handle Squadron property there.

The Squadron operated from Kimpo through the end of this reporting period. The strength of the organization at that time was as follows:

- 47 Marine Officers (All Naval Aviators)
 - 1 Navy Officer (Squadron Doctor)
- 154 Marine Enlisted Men (5 NAP's)
 - 4 Navy Enlisted Men (Hospitalmen)

During the period that this Squadron operated from Kimpo Airfield, one officer (NA) was killed in action, one officer (NA) was wounded in action,

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One officer (NA) was injured operationally, one officer (NA) was sent TAD to the First Marine Division as Forward Air Controller, three officers (NA) were transferred to VMO-6, and one officer (NA) joined from Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three. The Squadron was also called upon to furnish two officers for one week's duty each with MTACS-2 in the TADC and to furnish as many as thirty enlisted personnel some nights for perimeter defense and working parties for the Group during the day.

As a whole the morale of the Squadron was high. The men worked long hours under disagreeable conditions and were able at times to accomplish the almost impossible. The results of their efforts were reflected in the number of missions flown, and they seemed to be very proud of their work. Quite frequently the situation map was taken to the line where the pilots briefed the men on the current situation and informed them of results of missions flown. The men were intensely interested in these briefings, and it is felt that said briefings helped morale considerably.

One of the biggest contributions to the high morale was the fairly frequent delivery of mail. It was received often enough and without undue delay to keep all hands informed of the situation at home, and outgoing mail arrived at home without delay, which kept the men's families from becoming worried.

Facilities for cooking and serving food were suitable. The rations furnished were sufficient and adequate, but the variety in the meat and starch items could have been increased. All of the food served was tasty, but lack of variety made the food unappetizing after a short period of time.

Other factors that contributed to the high morale were Post Exchange rations which supplied them with a minimum of cigarettes, candy and toilet articles, beer, (in limited quantities) which was provided by expenditures of some of the Squadron's recreation funds, movies operated by the Group when conditions permitted, and church services which were conducted regularly by the Catholic and Protestant Chaplains attached to the Group. No recreational facilities were available, and had there been, no time was available for it. Pilot morale, while generally high, suffered due to the Squadron being called on to transfer pilots to other units within the Wing or Division, which happened several times.

Because the rear echelon remained aboard ship from the time the Squadron embarked in the States until debarkation at Inchon, there was no opportunity to pay the men. In some cases this worked a hardship on those who had to send money home to their families, and consequently, was a factor detrimental to high morale.

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
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Commanding Officer
F-4 Phantom II Squadron 212
USS B-7 (CVL-29) 1 January 1951

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APPENDIX I TO MWPY 4

SQUADRON ORGANIZATION



T-1-A

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
 1 January 1951

Special Action Report
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APPENDIX II TO ANNEX A

SQUADRON STRENGTH AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD

Off MOS	OFFICER				ABOARD
	LtCol	Maj	Capt	Lt	
7302	1	3	17	28	49
7304			1		1
			TOTAL		50
Comdr					1
7302			3	15	18

These officers joined physically during the period, but were not picked up on orders until 4 October 1950, and are included in total.

Enl MOS	ENLISTED							ABOARD
	MSgt	TSgt	SSgt	Sgt	Cpl	Pfc		
0143						4	4	
0147			1				1	
0149	1						1	
3067					2	2	4	
3069			1				1	
3371					3	1	4	
3379		1					1	
6400				1		2	3	
6411				1			1	
6413			2	2	9	20	33	
6414						2	2	
6419	3	6	1				10	
6431			1		1		2	
6434				1	1		2	
6439		2					2	
6441					2	14	16	
6444					1	1	2	
6500					1	1	2	
6511			4	1	7	9	21	
6519	2	4					6	
6600						1	1	
6611				6	1		7	
6619		1					1	
7011				1		1	2	
7031						2	2	
7041						2	2	
7113						1	1	
7114						1	1	
7119	1						1	
1300						1	1	
5231						1	1	
3531					2	6	8	
4100						1	1	
1379			1				1	
3516					1	2	3	
1372						1	1	
6436			1				1	
NAVY	HMC	HML	HM2	HM3				
	1	1	1	1			4	
TOTAL	8	15	13	14	31	77	158	

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATTAN (CVL-29)
 1 January 1951

Special Action Report
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APPENDIX III TO ANNEX A

SQUADRON STRENGTH AT END OF PERIOD

OFFICERS

Off MOS	LtCol	Maj	Capt	Lt	ABOARD
7302	1	3	17	25	46
7304			1		1
				TOTAL	47
Condr					1

CHANGES DURING PERIOD:

7302			1		VIA
7302				1	KIA
7302	1				INJURED
7302			1	3	TRANS
7302				1	JOINED

ENLISTED

ENL MOS	MSgt	TSgt	SSgt	Sgt	Cpl	Pfc	ABOARD
0143					4		4
0147			1				1
0149	1						1
3067				1	1	2	4
3069			1				1
3371				2	2		4
3379		1					1
6400				1		2	3
6411				1			1
6413			2	4	19	9	34
6414					2		2
6419	3	6	1				10
6431			1	1			2
6434				1	1		2
6439		2					2
6441					3	13	16
6444					2		2
6500					1	1	2
6511			4	6	7	4	21
6519	2	4					6
6600						1	1
6611				2	4	1	7
6619		1					1
7011				1	1		2
7031					2		2
7041					2		2
7113					1		1
7114					1		1
7119	1						1
1300						1	1
5231					1		1
3531				2	1	5	8
4100						1	1
1379			1				1
3516				1	2		3
1372						1	1
6436			1				1
NAVY	H.C	H.1	H.2	H.3			
	1	1	1	1			
TOTAL	8	15	13	24	57	41	158

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS F T M (CVL-29)
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APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX A
 ROSTER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED DURING PERIOD

ABRAHAMS, Charles W.	1stLt	038626	7302
ARMSTRONG, William D.	Major	011938	7302
BARNEY, Irvin "J"	Capt	023199	7302
BEAN, Walter D.	1stLt	030443	7302
BELL, James P., Jr.	Capt	029498	7302
BERNAL, Leon J., Jr.	Capt	022624	7302
CALDWELL, Gordon W.	Capt	021723	7302
COLEMAN, Thomas A.	Capt	027240	7302
CUNNINGHAM, Charles	1stLt	036622	7302
DAUGHERTY, Frank W.	2dLt	039728	7302
DE HAVEN, Joseph B.	Capt	033804	7302
EDWARDS, Donald H.	1stLt	035242	7302
EISELE, Harold A.	Major	07985	7302
FIGENER, Kenneth G.	Capt	032527	7302
FLANNIGAN, Thomas E.	1stLt	037196	7302
GALLAGHER, Burnette R.	Capt	024234	7302
GRAF, David P.	1stLt	038164	7302
GRASSELLI, Albert A.	Capt	032812	7304
HEATH, Harold H.	1stLt	025768	7302
HEFFERNAN, Neal E.	1stLt	048024	7302
HOLLOWAY, Harding H.	Capt	028187	7302
IRWIN, Roy J.	Capt	018711	7302
JOHNSON, Richard W.	Capt	014328	7302
KNUDSON, Lamar A.	1stLt	037233	7302
LARSON, Wendell M.	1stLt	037119	7302
LEPIRE, John L.	1stLt	026415	7302
LIMBACH, Gustave A.	1stLt	034911	7302
LUCAS, William R.	1stLt	033079	7302
MC CLEERY, James M.	1stLt	037166	7302
MC CIURE, Grover C., Jr.	Capt	018741	7302
MENDENHALL, Herbert E.	1stLt	040310	7302
MULWILL, Thomas E.	1stLt	032703	7302
OLIVER, Samuel C.	1stLt	026293	7302
PATTERSON, Russell G., Jr.	Capt	033294	7302
PAYETTE, James	Capt	023240	7302
PEGUES, Dock H.	2dLt	046649	7302
PRYOR, Bertram H.	1stLt	048079	7302
RICE, Charles I., Jr.	1stLt	035580	7302
ROSS, Bernard H.	1stLt	032493	7302
SCHULTZ, Gerald F.	1stLt	047288	7302
SEIFERT, Clair F.	1stLt	032759	7302
SMITH, Edward D.	Capt	031556	7302
SPURLING, Walter E.	1stLt	037860	7302
SWINFORD, David G.	Capt	029385	7302
TAYLOR, Robert W.	1stLt	037866	7302
THOMPSON, Elmer P., Jr.	Major	09412	7302
TORBETT, Eddie C.	Capt	024531	7302
WILKINSON, Jack H.	Capt	025755	7302
WILSON, Robert H.	1stLt	048917	7302
WOEHRLE, Charles D.	1stLt	029437	7302
WYCZYNSKI, Richard W.	LtCol.	06714	7302

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Roster of Personnel	Cont'd	Page 2
AMEEL, Raymond S.	Cpl	663334 6511
ANDROCHUK, John J.	Pfc	1090540 6441
B.HUR, Alexander	Pfc	667421 6611
B.KER, Frank W.	Cpl	1088277 6511
B.LBACH, Robert E.	TSgt	312047 6519
BARNES, Ralph J.	Cpl	661947 7041
BARTER, William E.	Pfc	1094581 6400
BAYLEY, James C.	Pfc	1126406 1300
BEANE, Aubrey D.	Pfc	1096748 6441
BENNETT, William E.	Pfc	1098134 6413
BISHOP, Bobby F.	Sgt	663146 6511
BIZZACCO, Anthony M.	Cpl	668555 0143
BOURNE, William B.	Pfc	664674 6441
BRANAMAN, Billio U.	SSgt	585347 6431
BRASWELL, Richard T.	Pfc	1087662 6400
BROWN, Emanuel R.	Cpl	669014 5231
CASTOR, Bernard L.	MSgt	222523 0149
CINTO, Harold J.	Pfc	670256 6511
CIRILLO, Georgio R.	Cpl	1090303 6434
CONNOLLY, James J.	Pfc	1112874 6441
CONNOLLY, Thomas P.	Pfc	1089306 6441
CUNNINGHAM, Peter A., Jr.	Pfc	664149 6413
CURTIS, William I.	Sgt	653119 6431
CURTO, Vincent A.	Cpl	661770 6413
DALY, Robert J.	Pfc	1123175 3531
D'AURIA, Salvatore A.	Pfc	662765 6511
DINATALE, Carmelo J.	Cpl	1090588 3371
DONOGHUE, John R.	Cpl	1115286 7114
DORRIS, James M.	Cpl	669155 6413
ECKMAN, Edwin C.	SSgt	434735 6511
ELES, James J.	Pfc	1115530 3531
ELLIOTT, Paul E.	Pfc	545404 4100
FALLER, Ralph A.	MSgt	31855 6419
FANCHER, Clifton C.	Cpl	1100004 7031
FAULKNER, Thomas E.	Cpl	1032301 6413
FESKO, Richard	Cpl	649821 7011
FINN, Robert J.	SSgt	589933 6413
FOUNTAIN, Mack D.	Pfc	1070295 6441
FURSETH, Owen J.	TSgt	428329 6419
GACHEN, Frank Jr.	SSgt	589395 0147
GASKIN, Henry A.	TSgt	377317 6419
GENERAL, William	Pfc	1071548 6441
GERBIC, Francis J.	Cpl	1026692 6511
GIERLACH, Thaddeus F., Jr.	Cpl	662652 6413
GLEASON, John E.	SSgt	325338 3069
GRABOSKI, Robert C.	Cpl	1074588 6611
GREEN, McKinley	MSgt	280413 6419
GREGORY, Raymond T.	Pfc	1070850 6441
GRIFFITHS, Zane A.	Cpl	667417 6611
GUNIA, Robert R.	Cpl	669401 6511
GUNN, George B.	Cpl	1073068 0143
HALLISAK, George	SSgt	635337 6413
HALL, Bernard C., Jr.	Pfc	663758 6441
HARRIS, Frank	Pfc	1070208 3067
HAYES, Richard P.	Cpl	624908 3371
HELLIER, Gilbert L.	Pfc	658655 6413
HENDRICK, Merton	SSgt	806698 6511

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Roster of Personnel	Cont'd	Page 3	
HIBBERT, Francis N.	Pfc	661899	6511
HOLR, Steve P.	Cpl	1078576	7031
HORTON, Gary W.	Pfc	668395	6413
HUDNALL, Robert W.	Pfc	1089470	6441
HUFFMAN, Marcus B.	SSgt	280225	1379
HUNYADI, Louis	Pfc	1079502	6413
HUTTON, John W.	TSgt	908341	6619
IVES, Donald A.	MSgt	303198	6419
J.J. IK, Stanley G.	Pfc	665381	3067
JOHNSON, Stanley P.	Sgt	659353	6611
JONES, Denver R.	TSgt	525204	6439
JUDD, David A.	Pfc	1123218	3531
JURADO, Alfonso	TSgt	675711	6519
KELLER, Jesse L., Jr.	Cpl	1093400	6511
KEMP, Ronald A.	SSgt	806736	6419
KIMBLE, Thomas G.	Cpl	663035	6511
KISNER, Charles H.	Sgt	605541	6411
KUCHEFSKI, William R.	Cpl	664888	6413
LAMARRA, Ralph W.	Cpl	661513	6413
LANKA, Paul Jr.	Pfc	1079255	6413
LARA, Rudy R.	Sgt	633042	6511
LAROCQUE, George W.	Cpl	656622	6441
LEONIY, William	Cpl	1073984	6441
LINEBERGER, Robert F.	Cpl	554483	6413
LINSKEY, Thomas R.	Sgt	661369	6511
LIPSCOMB, William F.	Cpl	1088441	6413
LITTON, Roy B.	MSgt	320853	6519
LOUGHNEY, John E.	Sgt	665100	6511
LYON, Duane E.	Cpl	1100091	3516
MALCORE, Wallace	Cpl	1091995	6413
MANNES, Myron R.	Sgt	658837	3516
MARTIN, Douglas	TSgt	379354	3379
MARTIN, Francis	Sgt	660442	3531
MARTIN, Nelson R.	Cpl	1074307	1372
MARVONEK, Steve	Cpl	1074331	6413
MC CAIG, William J.	Pfc	656758	6441
MC DEED, Donald	TSgt	429786	6439
MC DOELL, Gail "G"	Pfc	663710	3531
MC INYRE, James B.	Cpl	1074224	0143
MC LUGHLIN, Arthur V., Jr.	Cpl	1094162	6413
MC MANNUS, James F., Jr.	Cpl	1090529	6413
MELLAS, John M.	MSgt	253671	6419
MILLAS, Joseph M.	Cpl	1083126	6413
MUNRO, John J., Jr.	TSgt	545482	6519
NELSON, Frank F.	Sgt	594270	6511
NELSON, Robert D.	Cpl	659115	6441
NEUBERN, Richard L.	TSgt	317254	6419
NEYMAN, Maurice C.	Cpl	1073782	0143
NUTT, James V.	Sgt	619968	6611
O'BRIEN, George B.	Cpl	1082928	3067
OEHLI, William L.	SSgt	607592	6436
PAGAN, Peter G., Jr.	Cpl	669585	6511
PAGE, Robert H.	Cpl	1112882	3516
PALADINO, Henry N.	Cpl	1072399	6611
PAYNE, Norman E., Jr.	MSgt	630869	6519
PAZ, William J.	Cpl	473667	6413
PIERCE, Stanley L.	Cpl	1050374	6444

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Roster of Personnel	Cont'a	Page 4	
POORE, William W.	Tsgt	630892	6419
POWELL, Benjamin F., Jr.	Sgt	1040201	6400
RADFORD, Charley L.	TSgt	303246	6519
RAPPOLE, Roger F.	Cpl	1095030	6414
ROBERTS, Robert Jr.	Sgt	661698	6413
ROSSETTI, John L.	Cpl	1095039	6413
ROTHMEL, John F.	Cpl	664433	6611
ROY, Bernard M.	Sgt	627879	6434
RYAN, Gordon G.	Sgt	636593	6413
SCHERFEL, Robert C.	Pfc	1082470	6511
SELENKOVIC, Joseph	Cpl	667301	6413
SPERLAZZA, Joseph	Sgt	1001948	6413
SHAFFER, Walter R.	Sgt	655835	3531
SIMPSON, Johnnie J.	Pfc	1113753	3531
SINGLETERY, Jimmie B.	SSgt	598648	6511
SLATER, Francis X.	Pfc	1112499	6600
SMALLWOOD, Kermit R.	Cpl	662905	6413
SMITH, Charles C.	Pfc	664633	6441
SMITH, George G.	Cpl	1072612	7041
SMITH, James A.	Sgt	656555	3067
SNEAD, Elmore R.	Cpl	594858	6500
SNYDER, Owen A.	Pfc	667251	6413
SPRINGER, Ernest	Cpl	1082469	7113
STEWART, Robert B.	Cpl	1082342	6413
SULLIVAN, Joseph M.	MSgt	270001	0149
SYPIENSKI, Edward L.	Sgt	670449	3371
TRAHAN, Eugene A.	Pfc	659182	6413
TUZ, Walter W.	MSgt	270843	7119
VAN DOREN, Arthur F.	Sgt	680133	6413
VAN FLEET, Vern G.	Cpl	664929	6414
WHITE, Willoughby D., Jr.	Cpl	1088130	6444
WEISS, Seymour M.	Sgt	644504	7011
WESLEY, Claude L.	Pfc	662966	6441
WEIZBOYSKI, Stanley	Sgt	1048407	3371
WILLIAMS, Gerald C.	Cpl	657891	6413
WILLIAMS, Raoford	TSgt	230572	6419
WOODWARD, Eugene V.	TSgt	389418	6419
WOOLDRIDGE, Melvina L.	Pfc	1120626	6500
WOTHERSPOON, Donald L.	Sgt	663421	6511
WYATT, William A.	SSgt	847232	6511
WYMAN, Richard D.	Pfc	653314	6413
ZALASAR, Vincent J.	Cpl	1096271	3531

U. S. NAVY

GOEN, Thomas F.	Ondr	166593	
FOUST, Glenn L.	HM1	2959259	
PHILLIPS, Jimmie L.	HMC	6241903	
POLUBINSKY, Norman P.	HM2	3293884	
WILSON, Raymond E.	HM3	7917354	

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BITTAN (CVL-29)
 1 January 1951

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ANNEX BINTELLIGENCEORGANIZATION

The Intelligence Section was organized as a separate department within the Squadron.

The following personnel were assigned during the period:

1 Captain	7302
1 First Lieutenant	7302
1 Sergeant	7011
1 Corporal	7011

PLANNING

Planning began long before 7 September 1950. The Squadron was schedule to depart Norfolk on the USS CORAL SEA (CVB-43) on about 10 September, 1950, for duty with the Mediterranean Fleet until February 1951. All the expendable supplies the department expected to use had been accumulated. Those were packed and turned over to the Squadron TQM Officer. All classified material for the Squadron was packed into two field safes and delivered to S-2, Marine Aircraft Group Fifteen, for transportation to El Toro.

At Itami, Japan, on 15 September 1950, the Intelligence Officer of Marine Aircraft Group Thirty Three furnished the Squadron with Close Air Support Maps, Navigation Maps, Cloth Survival Maps, Blood Chits, Pontic Talkies, and Identification Cards.

There was an insufficient number of complete sets of survival material and maps for all pilots, so twenty four sets of maps and survival kits were made up. The kits and map sets were furnished each pilot who flew a Squadron plane to Kimpo, Korea.

The department understood that high priority materiel would be airlifted to Kimpo on the date of commitment, and that all other materiel would arrive at Inchon, Korea, by surface lift with the Squadron personnel. Only one box which contained the Squadron's maps was marked for airlift. No Intelligence materiel was to be surface lifted.

Intelligence desired that the Sergeant (7011) be airlifted so that Squadron intelligence might function from the first mission, but the air space was not available.

The Squadron requested that an Air Combat Intelligence Officer be assigned from the Group or Wing. First Marine Air Wing Headquarters advised that no Air Combat Intelligence Officers were available.

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TRAINING

After the Squadron sailed for Japan on the USS CAPE ESPERANCE, a complete series of lectures on Korea were given to all pilots and enlisted personnel. The lectures were given by various officers who used Janis 75 primarily as their source of material. No training of intelligence personnel was conducted, however, during the movement from San Diego to Yokosuka, Japan, pilots were given daily recognition training.

All pilot interrogations and survival literature held by the First Marine Air Wing was read by the Intelligence Officer and disseminated to all pilots.

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

There was no loading of equipment or supplies for this department, other than one box of maps, which was air lifted to Kimpo from Itami on 19 September 1950. The TBA items and expendable items were stored in warehouses at the Kobo Docks in Kobo, Japan.

Both clerks embarked on 15 September 1950, aboard the USS BEXAR at Kobe, Japan.

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA

Movement to the objective area began when the USS BEXAR sailed on 17 September 1950, from Kobe, Japan, with the Squadron personnel. They disembarked at Inchon on 21 September 1950, and arrived at Kimpo, Korea on 22 September, 1950.

Both officers of the Intelligence Department flew Squadron aircraft to Kimpo, Korea.

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION AS A WHOLE

Squadron Intelligence personnel received excellent experience performing duties in their functional field both at the Squadron and Group level.

An accurate estimate of the functioning and practicability of Group level intelligence during and following this amphibious landing may be made.

It is believed that rapid and accurate dissemination of intelligence occurred, contributing to the success of the X Corps Operation.

CHRONOLOGY

7-10 September

All intelligence personnel were aboard the USS CAPE ESPERANCE (CVET-88). Daily lectures from Janis 75 to all Squadron personnel and a recognition class for all pilots was routine.

11 September.

Both officers of Squadron Intelligence disembarked from the USS CAPE ESPERANCE at Yokosuka, Japan.

12-13 September.

No intelligence work.

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14 September

Both intelligence clerks sailed aboard the USS CAPE ESPERANCE from Yokosuka for Kobe, Japan.

15 September.

Both intelligence clerks disembarked from the USS CAPE ESPERANCE at Kobe, Japan, and embarked on the USS BEXAR. All intelligence supplies, equipment, and TBA items were off-loaded at Kobe, Japan, from the USNS C. G. MORTON, and stored in a warehouse on the Kobe Docks.

16 September.

No intelligence activities.

17 September.

Both clerks departed from Kobe, Japan, for Inchon, Korea, aboard the USS BEXAR.

18 September.

No intelligence activities.

19 September.

Pilots were given a survival briefing by the Intelligence Officer. Twelve sets of survival packets, containing a Cloth Survival Map, a Blood Chit, a Pointie Talkie, and Identification Card, were issued to the 12 pilots who departed Itami, Japan, for Kimpo Air Field, Korea. Twelve map packets were also issued to the pilots.

The maps contained in the packet were:

U.S. Aeronautical approach charts (with UTM Grid Imposed)

380 CI

380 CII

380 CIII

380 CIV

380 DIV

380 AIII

380 BIV

380 BIII

U.S. Air Force Flight Chart FC 278.

20 September.

Fifteen sets of the below listed Army Map Service Maps scale 1:250,000, UTM Grid imposed, were issued by the Group.

J52N

J52G

J52S

J52M

J52H

J52T

J52O

J52I

J52U

Seventeen combat sorties were flown without customary intelligence briefing or de-briefing.

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21 September.

Both clerks disembarked USS BEXAR at Inchon, Korea. Nineteen combat sorties were completed without formal intelligence briefing or de-briefing.

22 September.

Clerks arrived Kimpo, Korea, and were assigned perimeter guard that night. Eighteen combat sorties were flown with no intelligence briefing or de-briefing.

23 September.

Both Squadron Intelligence Officers flew a squadron aircraft from Itami to Kimpo. Briefed first mission to be formally briefed on intelligence. One of the first officers to arrive at Kimpo presented intelligence with a flight record with missions, times, pilots, and plane numbers, which was written on the flap of a C-3 ration box.

24 September.

Marine Aircraft Group 33 began briefing and de-briefing of all missions. The Sergeant (7011) was directed to work with the Group S-2. His duties were to type the Air Attack Reports make overlays for the Squadron situation map, occasionally interrogate pilots, maintain liason with the Squadron, and perform other minor duties. The Corporal (7011) plotted bomb lines and other data on the Squadron situation map. On the flight board he posted call signs and passwords, maintained the Map Flight Packets, and performed other minor duties.

It is interesting to note that the situation map was made by stapling maps to a square of plywood removed from a damaged quonset hut. Cellulose acetate was obtained by removing the small sheets used in the plotting boards and then stapled over the map. Only one grease pencil was available, and that was borrowed from Marine Aircraft Group Thirty Three, S-2.

25-30 September.

This period consisted of the following routine. Pilots were generally briefed one hour prior to flights by the Group, which maintained an excellent situation map. However, when the pilots returned to the Squadron area, prior to and after flights, they frequently checked the Squadron map to get an individual and more detailed study of the situation.

Briefings on the current tactical situation were held frequently for the enlisted ground personnel. Pilots also told the crews what happened on their flights, where they went, and what damage they did.

After a few days, enlisted men from other units usually attended these Squadron briefings in large numbers. The briefing officers and pilots had a difficult time bringing the briefings to a close because of the hundreds of questions which would invariably be asked at the termination of the briefing. Often small groups of men would follow the pilots all the way back to their quarters asking incessant questions.

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The daily schedule for the next days operations was generally received from the Group after dark, and the first launch was usually made just prior to dawn the following day. This situation coupled with the fact that no lighting facilities were available complicated briefings for the pilots who had to check maps, schedules, bomblines, etc., by candle or flashlight.

1-9 October.

Operations were routine in nature and varied little from day to day. About the first of October, the Squadron area was wired with electricity, which solved the problem of pre-dawn preparations for flights.

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATMAN (CVL-29)
 1 January 1951

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ANNEX C

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The action phase of this report is bounded by the beginning date of 7 September, and the closing date of 9 October, but in analyzing the problem encountered and the effectiveness with which this organization carried out its mission, it is deemed necessary to review the nine-month period prior to its commitment.

TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

This unit was extremely fortunate in having a nucleus of twenty (20) well trained pilots that had been in the Squadron one (1) year or more when it was alerted at Cherry Point, N. C.

During this period the organization participated in several maneuvers and demonstrations which served to increase its efficiency and prepare it for the mission assigned in the subject action. Among the most important of these were, The Readiness Inspection of the USS PALAU (CVE-122), 5 October 1949 to 21 November 1949; Portrex, flown from the USS SAIPAN (CVL-49), 1 March 1950 to 14 March 1950, and Crossover at Camp Lejeune, April 1950. Other lesser demonstrations were performed and continued heavy training conducted during the interval between these maneuvers.

Prior to the organization's departure from Cherry Point, several well qualified pilots were joined in preparation for the scheduled Mediterranean Cruise which was cancelled and the Squadron diverted to the Korean Theatre. Also during this period the Squadron was equipped with F4U-5 type aircraft. All pilots carrier qualified in this type. However due to maintenance difficulties, lack of trained personnel and other heavy commitments, no training was conducted in aerial gunnery or firing of rockets using the mark VI Mod O Fire Control Instrument. No opportunity was presented for this training prior to the Squadron initial action in the Seoul Area. Ground training was stressed heavily on the use of the instrument. However this was one very serious defect in the Squadron's preparation and training.

Upon departure from the United States the organization had thirty seven (37) well qualified and experienced pilots. It might be well to add that all but four (4) pilots were carrier qualified within the previous three months, therefore fitting the Squadron to operate as either carrier or land based.

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Upon arrival at Itami, Japan, the Squadron joined eighteen (18) reserve pilots which were absorbed with no undue difficulty. Permission was obtained to conduct limited training with the facilities available, i. e. one bombing target.

A thorough ground checkout was given all new reserve pilots in the F4U-5 and as much familiarization as possible.

COMBAT NARRATIVE

On 19 September, the Squadron was alerted and the first echelon of twelve (12) planes, six (6) spare pilots and thirty-two (32) men departed for Kimpo, Korea, within two hours of the notice. It is well known that Squadrons should be ready to move immediately, but it is felt that some warning should be given, so that training can be curtailed if not eliminated and planes readied for immediate movement. Security should be relaxed sufficiently so that pilots can be well briefed on their possible mission well in advance of the actual departure.

In the case at point pilots were given a hasty briefing thirty minutes prior to take-off. Sufficient charts were not available for all pilots and those that were furnished did not cover the entire route. Radio information was extremely limited and emergency procedures were virtually unknown. The Close Air Support Charts furnished the pilots at this time were not those being used in the combat area. It is realized that security is definitely a must, but when it progresses to the point of hindering efficient operation, fails its purpose.

Six (6) of the aircraft arrived at Kimpo, about dusk, on 19 September. The six (6) remaining aircraft remained overnight at Itazuke, Japan, due to weather and mechanical difficulty and proceeded to Kimpo on 20 September, arriving about 0900. These aircraft and pilots flew their first strike forty five minutes after arrival. There were no refueling facilities available at this time and strikes were flown on fuel remaining in the aircraft. Rearming facilities were also extremely limited. Bombs had to be loaded by hand. All rocket brackets had to be changed to fit the F4U-5 racks and the proper tools were not available. This lack of refueling and rearming facilities curtailed operations considerably during the first and second day.

One (1) plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire on 21 September, in the outskirts of Seoul. The pilot, injured seriously, was rescued by helicopter and evacuated.

This loss reduced our aircraft strength to eleven (11) and availability was maintained at ten (10).

An average of seventeen (17) sorties were flown during the first three (3) days of operation. This was done with eleven (11) aircraft, seventeen (17) pilots and thirty-two (32) men. To accomplish this under existing conditions required the utmost effort from all concerned. Pilots helped assemble rockets, handle ordnance, and load aircraft. In addition to the daily routine pilots and men were called upon for perimeter defense at night.

The arrival of the surface echelon relieved this situation on the fourth day.

The balance of the planes and pilots arrived on the 22 September, bringing our aircraft strength to twenty-three (23) and pilot strength to forty-eight (48).

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On 24 September, the Squadron flew a total of forty-six (46) sorties which was the highest daily record for the Kimp'o operation. On 25 September, forty-four (44) sorties were flown. This was over two sorties per day per aircraft in commission.

During the period 20 September to 9 October, this Squadron flew a total of six hundred and seven (607) combat sorties for a total of one thousand three hundred and seven and four tenths (1307.4) combat hours. Sorties referred to do not include flights in or out of the area or ferry trips.

During this period the Squadron lost four (4) aircraft, one pilot killed and two (2) injured. Only one (1) aircraft was lost due to enemy anti-aircraft fire.

The majority of the flights were Close Air Support missions in the Seoul Area. However missions also included almost daily armed reconnaissance which struck targets of opportunity. Helicopter rescue escorts, two (2) Close Air Support Demonstrations for the U. S. Army, and combat air patrols, when needed were flown. Many of these flights involved pre-dawn launches and night landings. It was noted that several reserve pilots experienced difficulty during dusk or pre-dawn operations. This is attributed to the fact that the reserve program did not embrace night flying. Most reserve pilots had not made a night landing since 1945.

The majority of all flights were under maximum load conditions and several accidents in the area were attributed to the non-familiarity of pilots with the flight characteristics under these conditions.

During this organizations tour in the combat area, it was called upon to furnish several pilots for temporary duty assignments and also transferred some on a permanent status to other organizations.

For example, the Squadron had to furnish one pilot for duty with the Tactical Air Control Squadron. This was done on a weekly rotation basis so that the pilots' efficiency would not deteriorate to any great extent. This assignment began shortly after the Squadron arrived and continued until its departure.

The Squadron was next called upon to nominate one pilot for duty as a Forward Air Controller and three for transfer to the WIO Squadron. The stipulation that officers nominated for Forward Air Controller duty must be a pilot that had flown over this area, is hardly deemed a logical reason for selecting the detail from an operating Squadron. It must be remembered that the original Forward Air Controllers had never seen the area before the operation, yet did a very outstanding piece of work.

In return for these transfers the Squadron joined one pilot who had been serving on staff duty for two years, and required a checkout in the F4U-5. This - in an operating area.

These transfers are pointed out for several reasons. One: Transfers such as these are a detriment to pilots' morale, which it is felt should be maintained at a high level for best efficiency, while in the combat area. Two: It is a serious waste of indoctrination training and experience that could have been utilized at a later date. Three: It tends to encourage Squadrons to carry more pilots than necessary as a buffer for just such exigencies.

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In analyzing this personnel fluctuation it is found that the Squadron began its tour with a total of fifty-five (55) pilots and ended the period with forty-four (44). Yet only three (3) were lost due to enemy action or operational accidents. In addition, the Squadron was denied the use of one (1) pilot during its entire tour, who was required in the rear echelon at Isteri.

It is recognized that this was not a strenuous operation and therefore fifty-four (54) pilots were more than adequate. However, it is felt that after commitment, and where the situation is changing from day to day, thereby possibly demanding the use of all available pilots, operating Squadrons should not be called upon to furnish pilots for other duty.

In this situation the average flight was two and two tenths (2.2) hours in duration, the maximum combat hours thirty-eight and three tenths (38.3) and the highest number of combat missions per pilot sixteen (16). This was not a heavy schedule and pilot fatigue was never a factor. The Squadron had a very short tour and therefore a rest program was not instituted.

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATAAN (CVI-29)
 1 January 1951

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ANNEX D

LOGISTICS

ORGANIZATION

The organization of the Squadron Material Section was as follows:

1 Major	7302
1 Captain	7302
1 First Lieutenant	7302
1 Technical Sergeant	3069
1 Sergeant	3067
1 Corporal	3067
2 Private First Class	3067

PLANNING

Prior to departing the MCAS at Cherry Point, N. C., monthly materiel readiness reports were submitted to the Group Supply Officer. The discrepancies noted in these reports were not completely adjusted until the final few days of preparation. In the meantime the packing and crating of the Squadron materiel was going forward as rapidly as possible. There was some delay caused by the unavailability of certain items of equipment.

TRAINING

There was an on the job training program being conducted within the Materiel Section. This was delayed and hindered by several maneuvers conducted during the previous six months. On the other hand the experience that was gained in the handling of materiel during these maneuvers compensated for the lack of formal training.

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The loading of the materiel section into box cars at Cherry Point required twenty-four hours.

Upon arrival on the West Coast the materiel was loaded aboard the USNS GENERAL G. C. MORTON for transportation to Japan. When the ship arrived in Kobe, Japan, the materiel was off loaded and stored in warehouses on the pier.

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA

On 15 September, approximately one hundred of the Squadron personnel embarked aboard the USS BEXAR for movement to Kimpo Airfield, Korea. Due to the rapid movement of personnel, there was approximately 30% of the personnel that were not properly outfitted. This was a result of incorrect sizes in clothing, or no issue at all. The only gear that the men were allowed was that which they could carry in a Field Transport Pack.

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The BEKAR sailed from Kobe, Japan, on 17 September, and arrived at Inchon, Korea, on the 21st of September, and all personnel disembarked.

Before the proposed movement to the objective area the materiel had been separated into the airlift and surface lift sections in the warehouse. Due to the lack of space the materiel was then stacked in one corner of the warehouse making it impossible to distinguish the airlift materiel from the surface lift materiel.

On the 21st of September, all of the materiel was moved to Itami Air Base.

An airlift priority table was compiled and the materiel segregated accordingly. On 1 October, the surface lift materiel was returned to the warehouse on the pier at Kobe, Japan. The only materiel that was airlifted to the objective area weighed two tons. The remainder of the airlift materiel was returned to the warehouse at Kobe. Soon after this materiel was loaded aboard an AKA, and then due to an immediate need for the ship the materiel was off loaded. Due to this constant shifting of materiel from one point to another the crates began to break open. Therefore the remainder of the period covered by this report was spent in repacking and reerating.

The section "U" was carried to Korea as part of the forward echelon's materiel. It is also interesting to note that a number of stub requisitions were submitted, eight of which were unfilled.

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION AS A WHOLE

The operation as a whole showed a definite lack of planning and coordination, in that airlift and surface lift facilities were not available. However it is the opinion of the Squadron that the camp and mess equipment, and transportation supplied by the Group were adequate.

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Commanding Officer
Marine Fighter Squadron 212
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
1 January 1951

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ANNEX E

ENGINEERING

During the few days spent at Itami, Japan, prior to departing for Kimpo, maintenance problems were complicated due to the recent departure of Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three. The remains of a Section "B" was left in a hangar where everyone helped themselves to any spare parts available. The squadrons did not know the exact location of the needed parts and some were opened by mistake and left unpreserved. This situation also caused long delays in procurement.

The first twelve aircraft that flew to Kimpo carried two external fuel tanks (Mark 12). This allowed them to arrive with sufficient fuel remaining to fly one mission before refueling.

Gasoline engine driven refueling pumps, capable of refueling from drums must be available immediately after arrival of aircraft. Only hand operated pumps were available for the first twenty-four hours after arrival.

Early morning starting of the F4U-5 consistently presented a problem. It was seldom that an aircraft could be started without external power, when the temperature was below 40° F. The power unit, portable type, single cylinder, two cycle, gas engine driven (stock No. R86-HL-C10A), is not adequate due to its low amperage output. A line maintenance jeep or power unit, 4 cylinder, Waukesha, gas engine driven (Stock No. R86-WU-B-APU), is required.

Approximately thirty men were airlifted to Kimpo to maintain these twelve aircraft. They consisted of twelve plane captains, ten ordnance men, seven engineering men and a line chief. This number proved adequate for temporary operations. The Squadron was not supported by a service squadron for the first few days after arrival at Kimpo.

No spare parts being available, one aircraft was immediately set aside and furnished spare parts to keep the remainder in commission. An accurate record was kept of all parts removed, and the supporting activity upon arrival thereby replaced the missing parts in a short time.

The earliest possible arrival of Section "B" spares is considered to be extremely important.

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Four aircraft were lost during the operation, only one of which it was possible to salvage.

Aircraft and engine factory representatives were requested about five days after the Squadron's arrival. Their services contributed materially to increasing availability.

The ever present clouds of red dust stirred up by the aircraft and frequent high winds were undesirable, but caused no apparent damage to aircraft or engines at that time. Later, during the Wonsan-Yonp'o operation when a carburetor was removed from an aircraft, which was barely able to return to the field for an emergency landing, a considerable amount of red dust was found internally as the probable cause of the emergency. Two other unexplainable engine failures during this later operation, may have been a result of the dusty conditions at Kampo.

ANG-10 grease, which had been considered absolutely necessary for lubricating the F4U landing gear, was never available, and engine oil was used as a substitute after each flight, without any failures or frozen pivots.

Engine check stands were not available during the first part of the operation. Check stands were constructed from 5" rocket motor boxes and proved very satisfactory - to such an extent that fabricated stands were never used. These wood stands were light weight and could be carried by one or two men, and were quite substantial.

A portable, high pressure (2000#), air compressor should be available, immediately upon arrival of aircraft, to service the emergency landing gear and canopy system.

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
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ANNEX FORDNANCE

TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

When this Squadron received orders to the Korean Theater it had twenty nine experienced ordnance men attached to the ordnance department. The majority of the men had been in the Squadron for more than a year and were a well organized unit. During that previous year the Squadron participated in several manouvers and demonstrations, besides routine training. These manouvers included exercises aboard carriers. The personnel were well versed in both land and carrier operations. The Squadron Ordnance Officer was a pilot, and therefore could not devote but a part of his time to the ordnance department.

During June the Squadron was equipped with F4U-5 type aircraft. Very few of the personnel had previous experience with the 20mm aircraft cannon. A training program within the Squadron was set up to acquaint personnel with the weapon. Due to other commitments, the Squadron had very little opportunity for gunnery. This curtailed experience that could have been gained by extended rearming and maintenance work. All personnel had a thorough working knowledge of the weapon, but the experience was still lacking when the Squadron departed.

The Squadron was fortunate that all ordnance equipment was in very good condition when notice to leave for the West Coast was received. All aircraft had just come out of major overhaul when assigned to the Squadron in June. All guns had been bore sighted and all aircraft ordnance equipment tested by Squadron ordnance personnel, in preparation for a scheduled Mediterranean cruise.

Upon departing for the Korean Theater, one very unfortunate condition existed in the ordnance department. The F4U-5 is equipped with MK-6 Mod 0 Fire Control system and there was only one man in the department with previous training and experience with any type computing sight.

Requests to Wing G-1, before departure from Cherry Point, for more personnel were of no avail.

COMBAT NARRATIVE

On 19 September 1950; the first echelon of men left Itami Air Force Base, Japan, for Kimpo Airfield in Korea. They arrived there early the following morning. Eight of those men were ordnance personnel. Twelve aircraft also left Itami on 19 September. Six of the aircraft arrived at Kimpo, at dusk, that day. The following morning the remainder arrived. The first strikes were airborne within an hour after the first echelon of men arrived.

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During the first three days of operation an average of seventeen sorties per day were flown. During those three days, pilots helped ordnance personnel assemble and transport ordnance, and load aircraft. Without this help, the short handed crew would have been unable to meet all schedules. Several days lapsed before any bomb handling equipment arrived. Until its arrival, all ordnance was moved by jeeps and 6X6 trucks. During the early periods of the campaign, all armament was airlifted into Kimpo. All ammunition was belted by the Service Squadron, which was a tremendous help.

The remainder of the squadron personnel arrived at Kimpo on 22 September 1950. Of this group, twenty-one of them were ordnance personnel. This brought the total ordnance personnel assigned to twenty-nine, counting two aviation pilots. The wartime T. O. calls for thirty-eight. No more men were assigned throughout the squadron stay at Kimpo.

The Group Service Squadron relieved the squadron of most of its assembly after a few days. The Service Squadron was also short handed, making it necessary for the squadron to assemble about half the squadron rocket requirements, and transport all armament loads from the dump to the aircraft. For transportation, the ordnance department had one MK-3 bomb trailer, one bomb service truck and one weapons carrier. The Group had forty-eight MK-2 bomb trailers to support three squadrons. This lack of transportation and bomb handling equipment hampered operations a great deal.

The aircraft parking area at Kimpo was very dusty. This required extra care of the aircraft guns. This could not always be given, due to the heavy loading schedule and shortage of personnel. More breakage and wear of parts in the twenty millimeter cannon was experienced than anticipated. This produced a shortage of spare parts. Salvage of guns from two wrecked aircraft relieved this situation to some extent, but more spare parts were needed.

All ammunition used during this period was bolted with the MK-7 links. Many malfunctions were caused by those links breaking. The MK-8 should have been used. They were not available.

The squadron expended the following ammo during this period from 19 September 1950, to 10 October 1950:

- 104,206 rounds of 20MM ammo
- 1,628 rounds of 5in. rockets
- 117 rounds of 260 lb frag bombs
- 202 rounds of 500 lb G.P. bombs
- 93 rounds of 250 lb G.P. bombs
- 6 rounds of 11.5 in. rockets
- 8 rounds of 325 lb depth bombs
- 6 rounds of 1000 lb G.P. bombs
- 47 rounds of Napalm bombs (150 gallon type)

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATAAN (CVL-29)
 1 January 1951

Special Action Report
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ANNEX G

COMMUNICATIONS

ORGANIZATION

Organized as a Special Staff Section in the Squadron.

1 First Lieutenant	7302
1 Technical Sergeant	6619
2 Sergeants	6611
3 Corporals	6611
1 Private First Class	6611

PLANNING

The department depends upon support of Service Squadron, and the Squadron possessed only seven individual tool boxes. Personnel was up to peacetime Table of Organization strength, upon departure from Cherry Point, and remained at that strength during the period.

TRAINING

No formal training was conducted prior to commitment of the Squadron, other than on the job training of the Junior Enlisted Men, by the Senior Enlisted Men.

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Identical to the other departments of the Squadron's movement to objective area.

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION AS A WHOLE

Excellent communications prevailed during the period, permitting the Squadron aircraft to be as effective as possible on their Close Air Support Missions. Enlisted personnel received experience at maintaining communications equipment during periods of routine and maximum effort operations.

CHRONOLOGY

7-12 September.

No communication activities.

13 September.

All chrystals for inter-island (cross country) channels were set up in all planes at Kisarazu, in preparation for ferrying of all planes to Itami, Japan.

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14-15 September.

No communication activities.

16-19 September.

Frequency plan for X Corps operation received from Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Three Operations. Channels on all aircraft were set up according to instructions received, except for two channels. Crystal shortages prevented these two channels from being set up.

20-26 September.

The daily routine consisted of checking with each pilot after each flight, to determine if any communication difficulties were encountered. If reception or transmission was not satisfactory, the transceiver was removed and a spare set installed and checked. The removed transceiver was taken to Service Squadron Radio Radar Shop, where Squadron personnel repaired the set and used it as a spare.

One man was assigned daily to drive the line maintenance jeep. The jeep was used to start aircraft when the batteries were low, and was also used as an external power source when checking radios.

Several flights aborted during this period, due to the lack of the Primary Tactical Air Direction frequency.

27 September.

Received a new frequency plan from the First Marine Air Wing. The plan previously required a re-arrangement of the channels, and was completed this date, with the exception of two frequencies for which crystals were still missing. The two channels were Naval Gunfire Spot and Primary Tactical Air Direction.

28 September.

Daily routine. Received crystals for Naval Gunfire Spot frequency, which were installed.

29 September.

Daily routine.

30 September.

The crystals for the Primary Tactical Air Direction Net were received and installed.

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1-9 October.

Daily routine was followed during this period. Air to air and air to ground communications, during this period, ranged from good to excellent. The most critical factor, that of maintaining contact with the Forward Air Controller, was excellent and seemed to be much improved, over peacetime operations experienced by this Squadron during the past year. The three channels allotted for tactical work was adequate, when working with Marine Ground Control Units.

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Commanding Officer
 Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 USS BATAAN (CVI-29)
 1 January 1951

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ANNEX H

MEDICAL

ORGANIZATION

The Medical Department of the Squadron was organized as a special staff section consisting of one (1) medical officer, flight surgeon, and one (1) corpsman of each of the following rates: HMC, HM1, (Aviation Medicine Technician) HM2, and HM3. The department was organized to depend upon some larger facility, such as an air group dispensary for all supplies, equipment, and treatments other than simple first aid, rather than being an independent unit.

During the period 7 September to 15 September, the medical department functioned with the medical department aboard the USS Cape Esperance. From 15 September to 21 September, while in route to Korea, the medical department worked aboard the USS Bexar. 21 September to 9 October, the medical department functioned with the dispensary of Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-three at Kimpo, Korea.

PLANNING

Prior to departing from MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C. the medical department personnel consisted of one (1) HM1 (AVT). After arrival on the West Coast, one (1) Commander MC, USN, (#2100), one (1) HMC, one (1) HM2, and one (1) HM3 were assigned to the Squadron.

Upon embarkation, the medical department began immunizations required in Japan, and Korea. This included cowpox, typhoid and tetanus boosters, and complete courses of cholera and typhus. This immunization was completed prior to disembarkation in Japan, however, cowpox was not given because no vaccine was available at that time. All vaccines used were obtained from ship's supplies.

TRAINING

Aboard the USS Cape Esperance two (2) lectures were given to all Squadron personnel, one (1) venereal disease prophylaxis, and another on hygiene and sanitation. No lectures were given to medical department personnel.

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

There were no medical supplies or equipment which required crating or loading.

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA

On 21 September, the medical department personnel, doctor and corpsmen, arrived at Inchon, Korea, aboard the USS Bexar, and the following day were transported to Kimpo Airfield by truck.

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CHRONOLOGY

7-10 September.

Routine sick call held aboard the USS CAPE ESPERANCE.

11 September.

Arrived at Yokosuka, Japan.

12-13 September.

No activity in the department, as it was awaiting transportation to Itami.

14 September.

Departed Yokosuka.

15 September.

Arrived Kobe, Japan.

16 September.

Boarded the USS BEXAR. Routine sick call held aboard ship.

17 September.

Departed Kobe.

18-19 September.

Enroute aboard the USS BEXAR.

20 September.

Arrived Inchon, Korea.

21 September.

Arrived Kimpo Airfield, Korea. After two days the Marine Aircraft Group 33 dispensary was in operation, and the Squadron personnel were assigned duty with that activity. All medical administrative reports were submitted by the Group. The dispensary was fully supplied and equipped, having facilities for surgery, X-Ray, laboratory, etc. All Squadron personnel were treated at the Group dispensary. Practically all Squadron cases treated were upper respiratory infections, gastro-intestinal upsets, and a few cases of acute urethritis. Camp sanitation was conducted on a Group level.

A pilot was shot down by anti-aircraft gunfire. He was recovered by helicopter and after first aid retreatment was evacuated to Japan.

25 September.

A pilot crashed on landing and sustained facial burns,

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back and waist injuries. He was evacuated by air on 26 September.
6 October.

A pilot was killed instantly when his aircraft crashed while on a combat mission.

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF THE OPERATION AS A WHOLE

During the entire operation the Squadron Medical Department worked in conjunction with larger facilities, mainly supplying personnel to assist in routine operation of their dispensary. There was one (1) combat fatality and two (2) casualties resulting from aircraft crashes, all handled by the Group dispensary. Practically all cases seen in sick call from Squadron personnel were upper respiratory infections, gastro-intestinal upsets, and a few cases of acute urethritis. There were no peculiar problems encountered in Chemical medicine, sanitation and preventive medicine, aviation medicine, and administration.

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HEADQUARTERS, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 33
1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

ANNEX - SUGAR
to
MAG-33 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
For Period Ending
9 October 1950

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT VME (N)-542

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SPECIAL
Action Report of



for
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL
7 SEPTEMBER TO 9 OCTOBER
1950

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MARINE ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER SQUADRON 542
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing, FIF
C/O Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT OF
THE
INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL
OPERATION

7 September 1950

To

9 October 1950

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MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER SQUADRON 542
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF
C/O Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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A12
Ser 022
30Dec50

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From: Commanding Officer, Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 542
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 33

Subj: Special Action Report, 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950,
submission of

Ref: (a) 1st MAW Memo 50-50, dtd 9Nov50
(b) 1st MAW Memo 50-50, change no. 1, dtd 14Dec50

Encl: (1) Special Action Report, 7Sep50 to 9Oct50, eighty-five (85)
copies thereof

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.

2. This report covers the period from 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950, while this squadron was serving under MAG-33, during the Inchon - Kimpo - Seoul Operation in Korea.

Max J. Volcansek, Jr.
MAX J. VOLCANSEK JR.

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I N D E X

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- I -

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to summarize the performance of Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 542 during the Inchon - Kimpo - Seoul combat operation, and to present the comments of department heads regarding this operation. Recommendations included herein are proposed for the benefit of the service under similar circumstances in future operations.

The mission of this squadron in the field, in Korea, during this operation, was to provide the most suitable and efficient combat air operation to the Tenth Army Corps and other forces present. On 5 October 1950, the squadron and all other air elements in the area were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Tenth Corps, to that of the Fifth Air Force in Korea, with Headquarters in Seoul, Korea.

The next higher echelon of command during this operation was Marine Aircraft Group 33, stationed at Kimpo Air Field, in the vicinity of this squadron.

During this period, Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 542 was under the command of LtCol Max J. VOLCANSEK Jr., (05435), USMC, and consisted of fifty-six (56) officers, fifty (50) Naval Aviators, two hundred and eighty-six (286) men, four (4) Naval Air Pilots, one (1) Naval officer and four (4) Naval enlisted personnel. Twenty-four (24) F7F-3N type aircraft were attached to this squadron.

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CHRONOLOGICAL
NARRATIVE

- A. Shipboard Activity.
- B. Debarkation at Yokosuka.
- C. Movement of aircraft from Kisarazu to Itami.
- D. Training conducted at Itami.
- E. Movement to Kimpo.
- F. Combat Narrative.
- G. Summary.

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Part A. Shipboard Activity.

7 September 1950

0800 and 1300 musters were held and regular shipboard routine was carried out. Today, radio news was received of President Truman's modification or explanation of his earlier statements regarding the Marine Corps.

Officer and enlisted classes were held as scheduled.

8 September 1950

0800 and 1300 musters were held and regular shipboard routine was carried out. Classes were held for pilots, R.O.'s and the enlisted personnel of the squadron. During the voyage, regular classes have been held for the entire personnel of the squadron. Pilots have received instruction in recognition, intelligence subjects, prisoner sense, navigation, radio and radar, ground support, engineering, ordnance, ground control intercept and health and sanitation. All enlisted personnel have had such lectures of general interest as prisoner sense, health and sanitation, etc. The various departments have scheduled classes for their members.

9 September 1950

Scheduled musters and classes were held and regular shipboard routine was carried out.

10 September 1950

No musters were held. Protestant and Catholic church services were held. Holiday routine was carried out.

Part B, C, and D. Debarkation at Yokosuka, Japan; Movement of aircraft from Kisarazu to Itami; Training conducted at Itami.

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11 September 1950

The U.S.S. Cape Esperance docked at the Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Navy Yard at 1034. The unloading of the F7F-3N and F4U-5 aircraft, belonging to VWF(N)-542 and VWF-212 respectively, was underway by noon. Soon after the ship had docked, the Deputy Commander and Operations Officers of MAG-12 came aboard to greet the Commanding Officers of VWF(N)-542 and VWF-212.

During the afternoon, twenty-four (24) pilots of VWF(N)-542 were debarked and quartered at the station BOQ. It is intended that these pilots shall ferry the squadron planes from Kisarazu Air Field to the Itami Air Force Base near Kobe, Japan, where MAG-33 is situated. The Commanding Officer was among these pilots, the Executive Officer and Squadron Adjutant being left aboard the U.S.S. Cape Esperance in charge of the remainder of the squadron's personnel and gear.

At 1530, liberty on station, was granted to two (2) of the four (4) squadron duty sections. American currency was exchanged for American Military Script and Japanese Yen by the ship's Disbursing Officer. Liberty expired at 2400.

It is intended that the ship remain docked at Yokosuka for three (3) days before proceeding to Kobe due to the threat of an approaching typhoon. This delayed the barging of the planes from Yokosuka to Kisarazu.

12 September 1950

Unloading of the aircraft continued until late afternoon. F7F-3N, WH-18 was damaged fore and aft by two (2) barges that were being used as lighters for the squadron aircraft. At present, the squadron has twenty-two (22) of its twenty-four (24) aircraft available. One (1) plane is aboard the U.S.S. Sitko Bay, still in transit. The squadron's working details have been de-

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tailed to guarding the planes on the dock and to unloading.

Two (2) duty sections were granted liberty this afternoon until 2400.

13 September 1950

Our aircraft, at Kisarazu Air Field, where they were taken after unloading are being checked for their forry flight to Itami Air Force Base near Kobe, Japan.

Liberty was granted to two (2) of the duty sections from 1300 to 2400.

14 September 1950

This morning, Engineering, Radio-Radar and Ordnance gear was brought from the hold to the hangar deck. Personnel luggage and bed rolls were stacked and lashed to the hangar deck.

At 1000, the U.S.S. Cape Esperance left Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Navy Yard, for Kobe, Japan. Estimated time of arrival is the afternoon of 15 September 1950.

It is reported that the squadron's planes at Kisarazu Air Field, are in flight condition.

Total flight time for this date is 13.5 hours.

15 September 1950

The U. S. S. Cape Esperance docked at Kobe, Japan, 1230. VMF(N)-542 debarked here. The squadron proceeded to Itami Air Force Base with the exception of five (5) officers and one hundred and seventy-four (174) enlisted men, the squadron's adjutant being in charge. The latter detail was transferred to APA 30, Thomas Jefferson, for the forward area. All of the squadron planes arrived at Itami Air Force Base in spite of in-

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element weather.

The Squadron Material Officer, his assistant and the squadron gear arrived in Kobe, Japan aboard the U.S.S. General Morton. The material was unloaded and stored at Kobe, Japan, under the guard of fifteen (15) men from the squadron.

Total flight time for this date is 22.9 hours; ferry flights.

16 - 17 September 1950

The squadron's personnel aboard the APA-30, assisted in loading the ship's cargo.

The Squadron Adjutant was assigned the duty of Adjutant of Troops aboard. Flight training in firing rockets was accomplished. These were the first rockets fired from an F7F-3N for many of the new pilots.

Flight data for these dates is as follows:

16 September 1950; 11.4 hrs. flown in training flights.

17 September 1950; 25.0 hrs. flown in training flights.

18 September 1950

At 0300, the APA 30 left its berth to proceed to Inchon, Korea. At 0900 she rendezvoused with eight (8) other ships to form a convoy.

A total of 49.2 hrs. was flown in training flights this date.

Part E. Movement to Kimpo Air Field, Korea.

Part F. Combat Narrative.

19 September 1950

Aboard the APA-30, the squadron's personnel performed shipboard duties.

At 1500, the Commanding Officer and five (5) pilots with R.O.'s left Itami Air Force Base, and arrived at Kimpo Air Field, Korea at 1830, being the first fighter squadron to arrive at this field. This flight performed reconnaissance.

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Flight data for this date is as follows:

A total of 40.3 hrs. were flown in training flights.

A total of 19.2 hrs. were flown in recon. flights.

20 September 1950

Three (3) officers and fifty-one (51) men of the squadron arrived, 0530, at Kimpo Air Field, from Itami Air Force Base, Japan, via Air Force transport. At 0900, six (6) of the squadron's planes and crews arrived at Kimpo Air Field from the Itami Air Force Base in Japan.

Aboard the APA-30, the squadron's personnel performed routine ship-board duties, and four (4) platoons were formed for more centralized control and efficiency in debarkation.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

1. 1, 4 plane division destroyed 2 locomotives, expending 3,000 rds 20mm; 0735-0845. This was a recon. mission, and the first combat mission flown from this field.
2. 1, 4 plane division damaged and probably destroyed 2 enemy trucks and fired several bldgs.; 1600-1800. This was a recon. mission. 8 HVAR and 20mm was expended.

Total flight time for this date is 12.7 hrs.

21 September 1950

At 1745, the APA-30 dropped anchor in the Incheon Harbor, Korea.

Today, VIF(N)-542 was transferred from MIG-12 to MIG-33.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

3. 1, 4 plane division damaged a railroad bridge and scattered enemy troops with 4-260# bombs. 14 HVAR and 20mm were expended; 0550-0800. This was a CAS mission.

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4. 1, 4 plane division fired a factory, bldgs. and personnel during a CAS mission; 1100-1245. 5-260# bombs, 25 HVAR and 20mm were expended.
5. 1, 4 plane division on a CAS mission was called away from an attack on enemy troops because of the advance of friendly troops; 1115-1345.
6. 1, 4 plane division on a CAS mission was requested to locate an enemy artillery position. Results were negative, 1115-1345.
7. A 2 plane section on a CAS mission attacked an enemy artillery position and destroyed it with 15 HVAR, 2-260# bombs and 20mm fire.

Total flight time for this date is 80.9 hrs.

22 September 1950

0800, personnel of VFP(N)-542 began to debark from APA-30, via landing craft. The Squadron Adjutant acted as Debarkation Officer, the men served as unloading crew, etc. By 1030, the squadron's officers and men who had debarked were mustered ashore at Inchon. By 1200, the officers and men ashore had been transported, by truck, to Kimpo Air Field. By 1730, seventeen (17) tents had been pitched in the camp area assigned to VFP(N)-542; this afforded adequate protection for the men ashore during the night. At 1730, the Squadron Adjutant reported to the Commanding Officer of VFP(N)-542, at Kimpo, having left a working detail of twenty-four (24) men aboard the APA-30.

An officer of this unit, Capt. C. P. BLANKENSHIP, installed the field lighting system on this date, which permitted night operations for the first time from this field.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

8. A 2 plane section on a recon. flight spotted enemy entrenchments

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- on a peninsula NW of Seoul; 1715-0845.
9. A 2 plane section performed a recon. flight, 1300-1450, with negative results.
 10. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission scattered enemy troops, destroyed their artillery and a road block with 5-260# bombs, 16 HVAR and 20mm; 1035-1155.
 11. A solo heckler mission was held on station, orbiting Kimpo Air Field; 1825-2035. This was intended primarily to hold down enemy mortar fire and artillery fire. This was the first night combat mission flown from this field.
 12. A solo recon. mission orbited the field, 2215-2415. An interception was made and the "bogie" turned out to be an Air Force B-26.
 13. A solo CAP mission patrolled the Han-Gang in the Seoul area. This was quite effective in holding down enemy mortar and artillery fire, 2014-2225. The Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines called into the TADC and reported the first quiet night as a result of this cover.
 14. A solo heckler mission was vectored onto a "Bogie" with "no joy".⁷
A CAS mission assigned was called off 2840-0215.

Total flight time for this date was 14.1 hrs.

23 September 1950

The squadron's tent area was planned and fifty (50) tents were set up today.

At 1230, the remaining twelve (12) F7F-3's and their crews arrived at Kimpo.

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Flight data for this date is as follows;

Missions:

15. A solo recon. mission was carried out; 0154-0410.
16. A solo CAP mission intercepted a "Bogie" which was recognized as friendly; 0350-0550.
- * 17. A solo heckler mission fired a school house and the govt. bldgs. in N. Seoul where from 16 to 24 light AA guns were silenced; 0525-0650. 6 HVAR, and 1-260# bomb were expended.
18. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission, 0945-1150, destroyed a large stake truck at Uijongbu with 2 HVAR.
19. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission was unable to find trucks reported S. of Pohang; 1350-1525.
20. A 2 plane CAP scramble did not locate the "Bogie" reported approaching Kinpo; 1350-1550.
21. A 4 plane CAS mission; 1410-1540; destroyed a truck, damaged 2 RR tunnels, the Chungwa RR yards and a bridge S. of Pyongyang. They expended 14 HVAR, 4-260# bombs and 3,000 rds 20mm.
22. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission, 1535-1750, destroyed a box-car, and a truck with 4 HVAR.

Total flight time for this date is 26.8 hrs.

24 September 1950

* Major J. W. BEEBE and his Radar Operator T/Sgt K. V. KLUDZ were shot down and lost while on a close air support mission northwest of Seoul. It appeared that their aircraft was hit in the port engine nacelle at an altitude of 2,500 feet, the port wing flamed, the craft went into an eighty degree (80°) dive and submerged in the Han-gang, west of Seoul. No traces were found.

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Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

23. (No report No. 23.)
24. A 2 plane heckler mission, 0430-0630, destroyed 2 trucks, a locomotive and several passenger cars between Chonghwa and Hwangju. 6 HVAR and 1,000 rds 20mm were expended.
25. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 0515-0710, expended 10 HVAR, 1-260# bomb and 350 rds 20mm on troops NW of Seoul. Due to ground fog, results were unknown, but all hits were in the target area. Major J. W. DEEBE, the Squadron Intelligence Officer and his radar operator, T/Sgt K. V. KLUDT were lost in action when their F7E-3 was hit in the port wing and engine nacelle by enemy AA. At this time, they were 2,500 ft. over the Han-Gang, west of Seoul. Their craft went into an 80° dive and disappeared into the Han-Gang.
26. A 2 plane recon. mission, 0630-0830, damaged a RR tunnel and destroyed a truck 7 mi. NE of Haeju. They expended 6 HVAR, 1-260# bomb and 400 rds 20mm.
27. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 1212-1500, destroyed or damaged 8 boxcars and RR tracks, and damaged a building, with 32 HVAR and 400 rds 20mm.
28. A 4 plane heckler mission, 1220-1430, NE of Seoul damaged 2 warehouses, 4 boxcars, 1 tank and destroyed 1 truck. They expended 25 HVAR, 7-260# bombs and 1,600 rds 20mm.
29. A 2 plane section, 1515 - 1800, on a recon. mission of Sector 4 destroyed a truck at Eumuba and another at Chorwon. They expended 4 HVAR and 550 rds 20mm.

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30. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 1700-1910, destroyed a ware house with 16 HVAR and 4-260# bombs.
31. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 1700-1919, destroyed a ware house and damaged 2 houses. They were controlled by False 14. 30 HVAR and 7-260# bombs were expended.
32. A solo heckler, 1815-2000, orbited without assignment.
33. A solo recon. mission, 1825-2010, destroyed a vehicle in sector 3, near Seoul. 1 HVAR and 250 rds 20mm were expended.
34. A solo heckler, 1825-2015, orbited without spotting a target or being assigned.
35. A solo heckler, 200-2250, orbited without spotting a target or being assigned.
- 36, 37, 38, & 39. (There were no reports of these numbers.)
40. A solo CAP mission, 2250-0045, orbited the field while Kimpo was under condition "red". The "Bogie" was not spotted. CAP landed after the all clear.

Total flight time for this date is 21.6 hrs.

25 September 1950

* LtCol Max J. VOIGANSEK Jr., Commanding Officer of the squadron, was forced to bail out of his aircraft, three (3) miles northwest of Kimpo. The one hundred and fifty (150) gallon wing gas tank had broken loose from its moorings and had wedged between the fuselage and engine nacelle, throwing the aircraft out of control. The colonel's craft had been damaged by enemy anti-aircraft fire during the mission which he had just completed. He reported his predicament to the base, by radio, before bailing out. After the bail-out, his wing-mates reported his situation, by radio. Within forty-five (45) minutes, VMO-6, stationed at Kimpo, had picked the colonel up, by helicopter.

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He had been wounded by enemy anti-aircraft fire. The Colonel's F7F-3N crashed and was a total loss.

The remainder of the squadron's personnel and pilots arrived at Kinpo from Itani Air Force Base via Air Force transport.

The squadron's Operations, Engineering, Intelligence, Radio-Radar, and Material sections were set up in storage tents on the squadron's line at the SW end of the runway running NE and SW.

Flight Data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

41. A solo recon. mission, 0230-0430, was unable to contact Chinese 14. At 9,000 ft., W. of Seoul, he received heavy AA fire, but avoided it by evasive action.
42. A solo recon. mission, 0508-0708, of Sector 2, destroyed a tank between Chochiwon and Chongju and attacked a troop concentration near Chongju. 4 HVAR and 20mm were expended.
43. A 2 plane recon. mission, 0615-0845, of Sector 3, destroyed a RR crane near Chungwa, and damaged a RR tunnel near Chu-chon. 3 HVAR, 1-260# bomb and 200 rds 20mm were expended.
44. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 0905-1100, attacked enemy troops on a ridge line, 1957FU, and fired at AA positions at 6222E. Troops were scattered and results on AA position unobserved. 20 HVAR and 1,600 rds 20mm were expended.
45. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 0905-1135, attacked enemy positions in the area between 5758 and 2021. Area was well covered and several fires started, and explosions noted. 25 HVAR, 3-260# bombs and 20mm were expended. The Commanding Officer was forced

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to bail out of his aircraft due to damage done by enemy AA fire on return from this mission.

46. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 1215-1340, controlled by Grass-hepper 14, worked over the Seoul area. Area was well covered. Heavy AA fire was observed from the SE part of Seoul. 26 HVAR, 4-260# bombs and 1,600 rds 20mm were expended.
47. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 1230-1450, controlled by Bound 14, destroyed a bldg. in the Seoul area. 25 HVAR, 5-260# bombs and 1,250 rds 20mm were expended.
48. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission, 1515 to 1715, attacked 19 freight cars, 20 mi. W. of Kaesong, results unobserved. A RR tunnel W. of Pakchon was also attacked. 6 HVAR and 300 rds 20mm were expended.
49. A solo recon. mission, 1825-1900, N. and NE of Seoul, attacked trucks and troops moving N. from Seoul. He was controlled by an OY spotter. 1 truck was destroyed, troops scattered and the road was damaged. 8 HVAR and 800 rds 20mm were expended.
50. A solo heckler mission, 1825-1945, controlled by an OY spotter, caused extensive damage and destruction to a 4 mi. column of enemy traffic moving N. from Seoul. 8 HVAR, 2-260# bombs and 600 rds 20mm were expended.
51. A 2 plane section was scrambled, 1850-2010, to hit trucks and troops moving N. along the road leading out of the NE corner of Seoul. 15 HVAR, 3-260# bombs and 1,600 rds 20mm were expended; results unknown due to darkness.
52. A solo heckler mission, 2035-2230, on road N. of Seoul to Chorwon attacked traffic and damaged road with 4 HVAR and 2-260# bombs.

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53. A solo recon. mission of Sector 3, 2225-0025, observed fire fight on a bridge 10 mi. E. of Seoul. No targets attacked.
54. A solo heckler mission, 2250-0120, attacked a truck 5 mi. S. of Uijongbu. 30 rds 20mm were expended; results unknown.

Total flight time for this date is 48.8 hrs.

26 September 1950

The squadron's personnel carried out their regular working routine throughout the squadron area this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

55. A solo heckler mission, 0050-0250, controlled by Coffee Mill, attacked 2 trucks, 2 mi. N. of Uijongbu, dropping 2-260# bombs with the results unobserved.
56. A solo recon. mission of Sector 4, 0230-0500, reported light AA fires at Kapyong.
57. A solo heckler mission, 0235-0445, reported no targets.
58. A solo heckler mission, 0430-0645, reported B-29, DREAMBOAT, dropped 4 flares over Seoul; little activity, no traffic N. of Seoul.
59. A solo heckler mission, 0430-0645, sighted a train SE of Seoul; permission to attack was denied.
60. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission of Sector 3; 0619-0840, reported heavy and medium AA, NE, W., and SW of Pyongyang. No ordnance was expended.
61. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 0845-1050, destroyed 4 RR cars W. of Chorwon. They expended 8-260# bombs and 24 HVAR.
62. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 0900-1100, hit RR yards at Pyongyang, expending 26 HVAR, 6-260# bombs and 20mm.

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63. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission of Sector 4, 1030-1230, attacked Tongduchon-ni. Direct hits on vehicles and bldgs. were observed. They expended 3 HVAR and 1,600 rds 20mm.
64. A solo heckler mission, 1525-1625, on the road between Seoul and Uijongbu, destroyed 2 trucks; it expended 1 HVAR and 600 rds 20mm. Much activity reported on this road.
65. A solo heckler mission, 1530-1645, in the Uijongbu and Tongduchon-ni area, destroyed 3 trucks, an artillery position, a cart and scattered troops. It expended 2 HVAR, 2-260% bombs, 400 rds 20mm. Troop movement N. of Seoul is heavy.
66. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission from Seoul to Songye, 1715-1830, destroyed a truck 2 mi. S. of Songye. They expended 2 HVAR and 400 rds 20mm.
67. A solo heckler mission, 1830-2040, controlled by Coffee Hill, was called off because of the movement of friendly troops.
68. A solo recon. mission of Sector 4, 1900-2030, controlled by Coffee Hill, returned to base with no sightings or targets assigned.
69. A solo heckler mission, 2035-2235, was vectored onto a "Bogie" 25 mi. NW of Kinpo, with "no joy".

Total flight time for this date was 46.3 hrs.

27 September 1950

The squadron's personnel carried out their regular working routine throughout the squadron area this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

70. A solo CAP and heckler mission, 2200-2410, controlled by Devostato

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Baker was assigned a target but called off before target could be attacked.

71. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission 0620-0815, attacked RR yards 4 mi. N. of Pyongyang; 2 locomotives were destroyed, a round house was fired and 4 boxcars were damaged. 11 HVAR and 550 rds 20mm were expended.
72. A solo recon. mission of sector 2, 2240-2400, reported no targets nor movements.
73. A solo recon. mission of Sector 3, 0230-0415, reported no targets nor movements.
74. A solo heckler mission, 0015-0230, reported no targets nor movements.
75. A solo heckler mission, 0215-0415, reported no targets nor movements.
76. A solo recon., Sector 5, 0430-0630, reported no targets, no movements.
77. A solo heckler mission, 0430-0630, reported no targets nor movements.
78. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission, 0610-0815, relayed a call for help, coming from Taejon-Yongdong area. Reported a burning tank near Pyongnonni. Reported 2 transports on field and 1 circling at Suwon, to Devestate Able. Returned to Kimpo because of lack of fuel.
79. A 4 plane division on a CAS mission, 0900-1100, controlled by Good Humor 1, destroyed 3 trucks, 3-80mm artillery pieces and 60-80 troops on road at 2796. Results reported by OY pilot, TAO for the 11th Marines. VIF(N)-542's coordination with TAO considered "EXCELLENT" 23 HVAR, 8-500# bombs and 1,500 rds 20mm were expended.
80. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission, 1515-1715, destroyed a mortar position at 1715N with 5 HVAR and 2-260# bombs.
81. A 2 plane section on a CAS mission, 1520-1720, damaged 4 RR cars,

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4 mi. N. of Sariwon, and damaged a sailing vessel $\frac{1}{2}$ mi. S. Kyonip.
They expended 900 rds 20mm.

82. An 8 plane, 2 division scramble on a CAS mission, 1700-1800, attacked major bldgs. in town with 52 HVAR, 3-500# bombs and 10-260# bombs. No movements of personnel or vehicles were observed.
83. A solo heckler mission, 1830-2030, patrolled the road to 30 mi. N. of Seoul. No targets were sighted.
84. A solo recon. mission of Sector 3, 1830-2030, controlled by Jeremiah 14, saturated all the area NE of Seoul, 2963. 4 HVAR, 2-260# bombs and 800 rds 20mm were expended. Vehicles were observed moving into the area of Haeju from the W.
85. A solo scramble for a CAS mission, 1835-2015, controlled by Jeremiah 14, expended 6 HVAR and 100 rds 20mm on area 2962; unobserved.
86. A solo recon. mission of Area A, 1930-2130, controlled by Jeremiah 14, attacked area 2962, NE of Seoul with 6 HVAR and 2-260# bombs. Area was well covered.
87. A solo heckler mission, 2055-2230, was unable to manage contact with Jeremiah 14, and attacked no targets.
88. A solo heckler mission, 2225-0025, was unable to make contact with Jeremiah 14.
89. A solo recon. mission Area G, 2235-0035, sighted enemy convoy at 3744, 127-12. The convoy was attacked and 1 vehicle was left burning. 7 HVAR and 400 rds 20mm were expended.

Total flight time for this date is 75.0 hrs.

28 September 1950

Squadron mess facilities were set up today. The city of Seoul was secur-

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ed today except for light sniper fire. Then enemy is retreating along the roads to the N. and NW. This created joy within the squadron because of the constant close air support missions performed by the squadron in conjunction with the Marine ground forces in and around Seoul.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

90. A solo heckler mission, 0040-0240, could not contact Jerimiah 14.
91. A solo recon. mission of Sector 2, 0230-0430, sighted no enemy movement nor targets.
92. A solo heckler mission, 0230-0430, controlled by Coffee Mill was vectored after 3 "Dogies", with "no joy".
93. A solo heckler mission, 0430-0630, attacked Tongduchon-ni, N. of Seoul, with 7 HVAR and left the town burning.
94. A solo recon. mission of Area A, 0440-0720, attacked Tongduchon-ni, with 4 HVAR, 2-260# bombs and 400 rds 20mm. He was directed by Coffee Mill. Town was burning fiercely.
95. A 2 plane recon. mission, 0630-0830, attacked 5 large haystacks, 1 mi. S. of Kunhwa with 4 HVAR, 100 rds 20mm. There was no explosion and the stacks did not burn.
96. A 2 plane recon. mission of Areas A, B, and C, 0645-0845, noticed ferry W. of Kaesong carrying 40 white clad persons. No targets.
97. A 4 plane CAS mission, 0800-0930, attacked the town of Uijongbu, 23 HVAR, 5-260# bombs and 1,800 rds 20mm were expended. Much enemy AA was received and many hits were made with bombs and rockets.
98. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission, 1505-1700, attacked and destroyed a truck, NW of Seoul and $\frac{1}{2}$ mi. S. of the 38th parallel, with 200 rds 20mm. The town of Tongduchon-ni was attacked with 11 HVAR, 3-260# bombs and 11 rds 20mm. Flight was controlled by Dev-

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estate Able.

99. A solo recon. mission of Area A. 1515-1715, controlled by Devestate Able, attacked 2 RR tunnels, 1 mi. S. of Haegu, with 2 HVAR and 250 rds 20mm. Tunnels and town were damaged.
100. A solo recon. mission of Area A, 1620-1820, destroyed a truck and started fires around house near airfield at Haeju. 5 HVAR, 2-260# bombs and 100 rds 20mm were expended.
101. A solo heckler mission, 1815-2015, attacked enemy troops along a road and scattered them with 2 HVAR and 2-260# bombs. This position was 3 mi. SE of Chinnampo.
102. A solo heckler mission, 1820-2020, controlled by Booth 14, attacked a troop concentration at 0967, with 8 HVAR and 2-260# bombs. Booth 14 reported that they were well pleased with these ordnance drops. This was another instance of NCAS.
103. A solo heckler mission, 1830-2030, controlled by Devestate Baker, attacked vehicles 17 mi. NE of Seoul, and lights 500 yds. NE of Tongduchon-ni. 7 HVAR and 400 rds 20mm were expended, results unobserved.
104. A solo heckler mission, 2025-2230, controlled by Devestate Baker, attacked 3 trucks on the main street of Tongduchon-ni. 1 HVAR was expended, results unobserved.
105. A solo recon. mission, 2225-0040, attacked a suspicious, dark moving object on the ground 22 mi. N. of Seoul. 20 rds 20mm were expended, results unobserved.
106. A solo heckler mission, 2245-0040, reported no enemy movement nor targets.

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Total flight time for this date is 47.4 hrs.

29 September 1950

General Douglas MacArthur arrived at Kimpo Air Field today on his way to Seoul to present the key of the city to the South Korean President in the Government Palace. Two (2) officers of the Squadron were able to join the General's caravan into Seoul.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

107. A solo heckler mission, 0015-0215, reported no enemy movements nor targets.
108. A solo heckler mission, 0230-0215, reported no enemy movements nor targets.
109. A solo recon. mission of Area C, 0240-0440, directed by Coffee Hill, attacked a troop concentration on a hill crest; 38°16'N and 127°27'E. 2-260# bombs and 500 rds 20mm were expended; results unobserved.
110. A solo heckler mission, 0430-0630, reported no enemy movements nor targets.
111. A solo recon. mission, 0440-0640, was unable to contact Coffee Hill. A friendly troop movement was observed.
112. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission, 1500-1700, dropped leaflets over Tongduchon-ni, and strafed a sand-bagged position 4 mi. N. of Haeju.
113. A 2 plane section on a recon. mission of Sector LEO, 1510-1710, dropped leaflets over Tongduchon-ni, and destroyed 2 freight cars in Nonchonjon; 6 HVAR, 1-260# bomb and 75 rds 20mm were expended.

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114. A solo search mission, 1720-1920, controlled by Klondike 2, observed flashlight signals from a crater at 278S, possibly the downed Klondike OY pilot. AA positions at 2771D, 2786C,D,H, and 2768B were attacked and probably destroyed. 2-260# bombs and 500 rds 20mm were expended.
115. A solo search mission, for a downed OY pilot, 1730-1930, was controlled by Klondike 2. An AA position at 2666F was attacked and destroyed; expenditure was 4 HVAR.
116. A solo heckler mission, 1825-2000, directed by Coffee Hill, lost contact with Coffee Hill and returned to Kimpo.
117. A solo recon. mission of Sector SAL, 1830-2030, attacked a camp site at Yonan and a group of lights at Chongdan. 1-500# bomb, 1 HVAR, and 200 rds 20mm were expended; results unobserved.
118. A solo heckler mission, 1830-2030, controlled by Coffee Hill, was vectored onto 2 "Dogies", 60 mi. W. of Kimpo. Both "Dogies" were C-119's heading S.
119. A solo heckler mission, 2045-2245, sighted artillery fire N. of Seoul. No enemy targets.
120. A solo recon. mission of Sector LEO, 2045-2245, was vectored to 2 "Dogies", with "no joy". Later, Coffee Hill confirmed both as friendly.

Total flight time for this date is 44.7 hrs.

30 September 1950

An officer and six (6) men of the squadron toured Seoul to observe the situation and to locate the forward air control center, "Dovostate Baker".

The squadron strength is fifty-six (56) officers, two hundred and eighty-six (286) enlisted men, one (1) naval officer, and four (4) corpsmen.

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Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

121. A solo CAS mission, 2255-0115, destroyed an AA position on the NE edge of Seoul. False 14 controlled, 5 HVAR and 500 rds 20mm were expended.
122. A solo recon mission of Sector JOE, 2205-0030, reported no enemy movement nor target.
123. A solo heckler mission, controlled by Coffee Hill, 0020-0255, was vectored to 2 "Dogies", which were 50 mi., 020° and 18 mi. 0350. No joy.
124. A solo recon mission of Sector Ann, 0215-0445, was vectored to 3 "Dogies" SE of Uijongbu, with "no joy".
125. A solo recon mission of Sector Ann, 0215-0445, reported no enemy movement nor target.
126. A solo recon mission of Sector SUE, 0235-0420, reported no enemy movement nor target.
127. A solo heckler mission, 0425-0637, reported no enemy movement nor target.
128. A solo recon mission of Sector JIM, 0430-0640, reported no enemy movement nor target.
129. A 2 plane section acted as escort on a photo mission; 0925-1055.
130. 2, 3 plane sections on a CAS mission, 1130-1305, attacked a warehouse and troops, 1 mi. N. of Tongduchon-ni, and a warehouse, 10 mi. S. of Uijongbu. 3 planes returned to Kirpo early. 18 HVAR, 6-25W bombs and 1,200 rds 20mm were expended. Results were not determined. Devestate Baker directed the flight.
131. 2, 3 plane sections on a CAS mission, 1130-1240, destroyed a truck at 2872G, 2 trucks at Ioan-nyon, and fired the village of Tokute.

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14. HVAR, 8-500# bombs and 1,750 rds 20mm were expended.
132. 2, 3 plane sections on a CAS mission, 1220-1325, heavily damaged and burned 2 factories in Uijongbu. 33 HVAR, 8-260# bombs, 3-500# bombs and 1,900 rds 20mm were expended.
133. 2, 3 plane sections on a CAS mission, 1500-1630, were controlled by Playboy Easter 5. A school building at 2877 CH, was attacked and 2-260# bombs and 2,200 rds 20mm were expended.
134. A solo CAP mission directed by Docantor Taro, 1830-2050, searched Incheon Harbor for a small junk. Found it and reported to Docantor.
135. A solo recon. mission of Sector Leo, 1820-2040, reported no enemy movement nor target.
136. A solo heckler mission, controlled by Devestate Baker, 1830-2120, reported no target assignment.
137. A solo recon. mission of Sector JOE, controlled by Coffee Mill, 2030-2230, reported no sightings.
138. A solo heckler mission, directed by Devestate Baker, 2030-2230, reported no target assignment.
139. A solo CAP, directed by Coffee Mill, 2040-2245, orbited Kimpo.
- Total flight time for this date is 74.9 hrs.
- Total flight time for this month, September 1950 is 735.7 hrs.

1 October 1950

The squadron's personnel carried out their regular working routine throughout the squadron area this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

140. 2215-0125, 1 a/c, night recon. mission. No target.
141. 2220-0050, 1 a/c, MAP, vectored onto a "Bogie" 10 mi. S of Seoul,

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- with "no joy".
142. 2235-0030, 1 a/c, night recon. of Area SAL. Attacked road and RR bridge E. of Haeju. Expended 2-500# bombs, missed bridge but damaged road and RR tracks.
143. 2340-0230, 1 a/c, NCAFP, with no target.
144. 0020-0230, 1 a/c, night recon. of area JII; no target.
145. 0030-0245, 1 a/c, night heckler mission; no target.
146. 0215-0439, 1 a/c, night heckler mission; no target.
147. 0215-0440, 1 a/c, NCAFP, with no target.
148. 0315-0525, 1 a/c, night recon. mission. No target.
149. 0425-0615, 1 a/c, NCAFP, with no target.
150. 0430-0630, 1 a/c, night heckler, with no target.
151. 0505-0650, 1 a/c, recon. of area ANN.
152. 0615-0845, 2 a/c, recon. mission, attacked underground gun position at Inhwa-ri, Kanghwa Is. 7 damaging hits were scored with HVARs and 500# bombs.
153. 0820-1045, 1 a/c, search and attack mission, attacked CP and gun emplacement, 37°38'N and 126°38'E, Kanghwa Is. Unknown damage was inflicted with 20mm.
154. 0900-0955, 2 a/c, recon. mission and leaflet drop in target areas 8378, 8478, and 8479.
155. 0910-1110, 1 a/c, recon., carrying an Army engineer as an observer for reconnaissance and leaflet drop over Suwon, Kusan and Taoson.
156. 0955-1110, 2 a/c, recon. of road in Chunchon area obtained information regarding friendly troop movements.
157. 1000-1245, 1 a/c, recon., attacked and damaged a metal bldg. in the factory area in Uijongbu with 2-500# bombs and

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7 HVAR.

158. 1030-1240, 2 a/c, recon. mission, strafed trenches and expended 1 HVAR on a hut. Damage unobserved.
159. 1055-1240, 1 a/c, special recon. of roads and bridges to Wonsan. No target.
160. 1035-1245, 1 a/c, special recon. mission. No target.
161. 1215-1430, 2 a/c, CAP and recon. mission of Kanghwa-do. Attacked a gun emplacement with 20mm fire, damage was unobserved.
162. 1320-1610, 3 a/c, flew as cover for a downed aircraft. They attacked Hujongbu and the surrounding area. 9 HVAR, 4-500# bombs and 400 rds 20mm were expended. Damage unobserved.
163. 1425-1720, 2 a/c, search and attack mission on Island of Kanghwa-do. Pillboxes at SW tip of island were damaged by 7 HVAR, 3-500# bombs and 1,200 rds 20mm.
164. 1640-1800, 1 a/c, CAP on a hill with 5 HVAR and 1-500 # bomb, destroyed a gun emplacement with 2-500# bombs.

Total flight time for this date is 66.9 hrs flown in combat flights.

A total of 25 missions and 32 sorties were flown this date.

2 October 1950

Cold water showers were set up for the squadron personnel this date.

The commandant of the Marine Corps arrived at Kimpo Air Field via R5D, to review his troops in the field.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

165. 0900-1130, 1 a/c, escort for a photo recon.
166. 1320-1540, 6 a/c, search and recon. mission, for 2 pilots and a/c of VFP-312. Area searched was 50 mi. NE of Seoul

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- on the Han-gang and tributaries.
167. 1540-1740, 2 a/c, search for 2 downed VJF-312 pilots vectored on heading of 326° from Kimpo for 75 mi. Recalled to base by Devestate Able.
168. 1400-1630, 1 a/c, local recon. mission, sighted enemy emplacements and friendly troop movements.
169. 1600-1815, 2 a/c, cover for downed Air Force Pilot, 4 mi. SW of Suman, were unable to locate pilot although wreckage was observed.
170. 1830-2045, 1 a/c, recon., Area ANN, attacked a group of lights approximately 3 mi. N. of Yenan. 3 HVAR, 1-500# bomb and 1 flare were expended; damage unobserved.
171. 2020-2240, 1 a/c, hooker mission, with no target.
172. 2020-2245, 1 a/c, NCAP mission, with no target.
173. 1815-2040, 1 a/c, NCAP, over Kimpo area, directed by Bass Drum with no target.
175. 2225-0040, 1 a/c, night recon. of Area JOE, observed heavy AA fire 2 mi. S. of Uijongbu.
176. 2230-0100, 1 a/c, NCAP mission. Attacked small boats between Kanghwa-do Is. and the mainland with 20mm fire. Results unobserved.
177. 2220-0045, 1 a/c, night hooker mission, used as artillery spotter over Uijongbu, controlled by Bass Drum.
178. 0025-0240, 1 a/c, night hooker mission, controlled by Bass Drum, was assigned no target.

Flight time for this date is as follows:

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66.9 hrs. flown in combat flights.

0.5 hrs. flown in a test flight.

67.4 hrs. total flight time this date.

A total of 15 missions and 22 sorties were flown this date.

3 October 1950

The squadron's personnel carried out their regular working routine throughout the squadron area this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

180. 0020-0305, 1 a/c, NCAFP mission, with no target.

180A. 0030-0235, 1 a/c, night hockler, with no target.

181. 0220-0450, 1 a/c, night hockler, patrolled the road SW of Uijongbu.

No target.

182. 0230-0430, 1 a/c, NCAFP, with no target.

183. 042500630, 1 a/c, night hockler mission, with no target.

184. 0430-0645, 1 a/c, night recon. of Area LEO. No target.

185. 0915-1150, 1 a/c, photo escort mission. Sighted 12 enemy vehicles in convoy 3 mi. S. of Chorwan.

186. 0915-1200, 1 a/c, C&P mission. No target.

187. 1430-1630, 4 a/c, CAS mission directed by Driftwood 14, attacked bridge NE of Uijongbu. Destroyed enemy artillery emplacements and troops, expending 24 HVAR, 4-500# bombs, 2-260# bombs and 1,200 rds 20mm. Driftwood 14 was very pleased with the results of the strike.

* 188. 1800-2015, 1 a/c, night recon., area SAL, anti-sub patrol. Contacted "bogio" at 8,000 ft. about 16 mi. NW of Kimpo, reported sighting to Bass Drum. Pilot was unable to interpret "Bog-

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- io" because of its speed, was probably a jet.
189. 1819-2020, 1 a/c, NCAP, of Kimpo area. 1 "Bogie" intercepted, recognized as a friendly a/c.
190. 1830-2045, 1 a/c, NCAS and night heckler mission of Uijongbu area, attacked an artillery and AA position at H-2882, target being located by Duration 14. 5 HVAR were expended. Duration 14 stating that the HVAR were in the target area. This attack was in support of 2 Marine battalions moving into Uijongbu.
191. 2030-2240, 1 a/c, NCAP of Kimpo area. Pilot was vectored onto a "Bogie" by the R.O. but chase was called off by Bass Drum.
192. 2030-2250, 1 a/c, night heckler of the Uijongbu area, made runs on an artillery position 6 mi. NE of Uijongbu. Rockets would not fire, and Duration 14 would allow no bomb drop.
193. 2230-0045, 1 a/c, night recon., of area Leo, with no target.
194. 2230-0045, 1 a/c, NCAP mission, Kimpo-Socul-Inchon area; no target.
195. 2240-0055, 1 a/c, night heckler mission; no target.

Total flight time for this date is as follows:

46.9 hrs. flown in combat flights.

1.5 hrs. flown in test flights.

48.4 hrs. total flight time this date.

A total of 17 missions and 23 sorties were flown this date.

4 October 1950

The Commandant of the Marine Corps spoke to the Marine Corps Personnel at Kimpo Air Field this date, before his return flight to the United States. His most heartening words were that he'd see the Marines aboard in the Un-

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ited states within two (2) months.

Today, demonstrations of Close Air Support, for the benefit of the Army's Seventh Division, have been carried out by this squadron in the Seventh Division area, south of Seoul, Korea.

This squadron has relieved the Air Force of heckling and reconnaissance missions in the Pyongyang area this date. This relief was given because of the poor weather in Japan and Northern Korea.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

196. 0220-0420, 1 a/c, NCAP mission over the Kampo-Seoul-Inchon area directed by Edith, with no target.
197. 0210-0430, 1 a/c, night heckler mission, directed by Edith, with no target. Encountered M. fire 10 mi. N. of Tonduchon-ni.
198. 0020-0240, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith, with no target.
199. 0415-0630, 1 a/c, night recon. of Area JOE, directed by Edith with no target.
200. 0420-0640, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith, was vectored onto a "dog-10"; recognized as a B-26.
201. 0440-0655, 1 a/c, night heckler, with no target.
202. 0606-0845, 2 a/c, CAP mission of the Seoul-Kampo-Inchon area, with no target.
203. 0825-1030, 4 a/c, special recon., road N. of Pyongyang. Flight attacked RR tunnel, 3 to 4 mi. W. of Chongju, expending 10 HVAR and 200 rds 20mm. 5 rockets were placed inside the tunnel mouth, much smoke resulted, damaged, but unobserved.

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204. 0835-1035, 1 a/c, recon. mission over area JOE, reporting enemy troop movements N. of Seoul, and drew AA fire 25 mi. NW of Seoul.
205. 0900-1120, 1 a/c, engineering recon. mission, observed road network from Chongju to Taegu to Seoul.
206. 1107-1333, 1 a/c, special recon. mission of roads from Pyongyang to Songchon to Sunchon to Anju to Pyongyang.
207. 1320-1550, 1 a/c, recon. of area from Pyongyang to Anju to Kunn-ri, attacked barracks at Suokchon, warehouse and vehicle at Kunn-ri, observation tower near Kunn-ri, and also freight cars in RR yard and haystack $\frac{1}{2}$ mi. E. of RR yard in Kunn-ri. The flight expended 19 HVAR, 3-500# bombs to destroy 10 freight cars, 1 vehicle, 1 observation tower and a haystack and severely damaging the warehouse.
208. 1600-1805, 3 a/c, twlt. recon. mission, area N. of Pyongyang, with no target.
209. 1645-1840, 2 a/c, twlt. CAP mission over Kampo-Seoul-Inchon area. 1 "Bogie" was chased with "nb joy".
210. 1745-1840, 2 a/c, twlt. CAP mission directed by Driftwood 14, with no target.
211. 1745-1845, 2 a/c, twlt. CAS mission, directed by Driftwood 14, orbited at the 38th parallel, N. of Uijongbu, no target.
212. 1815-2050, 1 a/c, NCAP over Kampo-Seoul-Inchon area. 2 "Bogies" intercepted, were positively identified as friendly a/c.
213. 1820-2120, 1 a/c, night recon., road and RR N. of Pyongyang, observed huge convoy of trucks moving S. toward Pyongyang.

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Pilot attacked the convoy, estimated at over 100 vehicles expending 6 HVAR, 2-260# bombs, 700 rds 20mm and 1 flare. results were unobserved due to darkness.

214. 1835-2115, 1 a/c, night heckler mission over area N. of Uijongbu, directed by Driftwood 14. There were no targets assigned, but Driftwood 14 expressed appreciation for the aerial cover which held down enemy artillery and mortar fire.
215. 1955-2305, 1 a/c, NCAP mission over Kimpo-Seoul-Inchon area, with no target.
216. 2030-2315, 1 a/c, night recon. of Area N. of Pyongyang, attacked enemy truck convoy of 40 vehicles moving into Pyongyang from the NW. 5 HVAR, 2-260# bombs, 300 rds 20mm and 1 flare were expended. Results unobserved due to darkness.
217. 2040-2325, 1 a/c, night heckler of area N. of Uijongbu, directed by Driftwood 14, expended 100 rds 20mm on a campfire and an anti-tank gun 1 mi. N. of Uijongbu; results unobserved.
218. 2220-0105, 1 a/c, night heckler, directed by Driftwood 14, with no target.
219. 2245-0040, 1 a/c, NCAP over Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area; no target.
220. 2300-0105, 1 a/c, night recon. of area N. of Pyongyang, attacked several vehicles on road 25 mi. NW of Pyongyang. 3 HVAR and 1-500# bomb were expended; results unobserved.

Total flight time for this date is 106.7 hrs. flown in combat flights.

A total of 25 missions and 50 sorties were flown this date.

5 October 1950

Today, Marine Aircraft Group 33, of which this squadron is a member, has been transferred from the jurisdiction of the Tenth Corps of the Army to

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229. 0430-0615, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith; no target.
230. 1645-1930, 1 a/c, recon. for the 7th Div. (Army), moving in-
to Pusan. No target.
231. 1650-1750, 1 a/c, escort for Air Force helicopter flying to res-
cue downed A/F pilot at Pyongyang. flight was recalled
to base when 40 mi. N. of Kimpo.
232. 1700-1830, 2 a/c, twlt. CAP over Kimpo area, vectored, by Edith
onto 2 "Dogs", which were identified as friendly.
233. 1745-1830, 2 a/c, twlt. CAS mission, orbited Seoul, with no target.
234. 1815-2040, 1 a/c, NCAP, orbited Kimpo area with no target.
235. 1855-2045, 1 a/c, heckler mission directed by Edith, orbited area
N. of Uijongbu, with no target.
236. 2015-2320, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith; no target.
237. 2025-2320, 1 a/c, heckler, directed by Edith, orbited Uijongbu, with
no target.
238. 2240-0040, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith, with no target.
239. 2240-0030, 1 a/c, night heckler, with no target.
- 239A. 1100-1230, 1 a/c, recon. mission to Taegu.
- A total of 66.2 hrs. were flown in combat flights this date.
- A total of 21 missions and 31 sorties were flown this date.

6 October 1950

A paymaster was available for officers and men at Headquarters, MAC-33,
this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

240. 0015-0230, 1 a/c, night heckler mission, with no target.
- 240A. 1345-1430, 1 a/c, recon., with no target.

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241. 0015-0215, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith, orbited the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area, with no target.
242. 0025-0440, 1 a/c, night hookler mission, directed by Edith; no target.
- 242A. 1500-1700, 1 a/c, recon. mission, with no target.
243. 0225-0430, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith; with no target.
- 243A. 1145-1530, 1 a/c, photo escort.
244. 0430-0645, 1 a/c, NCAP, with no target.
245. 0430-0640, 1 a/c, night hookler, directed by Edith; no target.
246. 0500-0720, 1 a/c, twlt. recon. mission for the 7th Div. (Army).
247. 1055-1300, 1 a/c, recon. mission for the 7th Div. (Army).
248. 1655-1906, 1 a/c, recon. mission for the 7th Div. (Army).
249. 1700-1930, 1 a/c, twlt. CAP, directed by Edith, investigated troops and vehicles in the Kaesong area.
250. 1700-1900, 1 a/c, twlt. CAP, directed by Edith; with no target.
251. 1815-2045, 1 a/c, NCAP, orbited Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area; no target.
252. 2100-2315, 1 a/c, NCAP, directed by Edith. No target.

Total flight time for this date is as follows:

38.7 hrs. flown in combat flights.

5.2 hrs. flown in test flights.

43.9 hrs. total flight time this date.

A total of 16 missions and 23 sorties were flown this date.

7 October 1950

The personnel of the squadron carried out their regular working routine throughout the squadron area this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

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- 252A. 0030-0215, 1 a/c, NCAP, intercepted 1 "Bogie", identified as friendly and attained "no joy on the second "Bogie".
253. 0940-1235, 2 a/c, search and cover mission for a downed F-80 pilot.
254. 1130-1430, 2 a/c, cover for downed F-80 pilot, 200 yds. W. of RR and 3 mi. SW of Hwangju. Pilot was not found.
255. 1445-1630, 1 a/c, special recon. to Pusan and Taegu.
256. 1555-1815, 1 a/c, special recon. of area VICTOR; steel girders on flat cars were damaged, 5 mi. W. of Pyongyang. 2 junks were sunk at ID-4927, 13 boxcars destroyed and 2 damaged in marshalling yards at Hwangju. 17 HVAR and 5-500# bombs were expended.
257. 1630-1840, 2 a/c, with CAP, directed by Edith, intercepted 1 "Bogie" identified as friendly.
258. 1820-2040, 1 a/c, NCAP, with no target.
259. 2231-0045, 1 a/c, NCAP, with no target.

Total flight time for this date is as follows:

33.7 hrs. flown in combat flights.

2.0 hrs. flown in test flights.

35.7 hrs. total flight time this date.

A total of 8 missions and 18 sorties were flown this date.

8 October 1950

The personnel of the squadron carried out their regular working routine throughout the squadron area this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

- 259A. 0925-1025, 1 a/c, photo escort.

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Total flight time for this date is as follows:

1.0 hrs. flown in combat flight.

2.6 hrs. flown in test flights.

3.6 hrs. total flight time this date.

A total of 1 mission and 1 sortie was flown this date.

09 October 1950

The personnel of the squadron carried out regular working routine throughout the squadron area this date.

Flight data for this date is as follows:

Missions:

260. 0725-1000, 2 a/c, recon. mission, searched Suan area for troop movements.

260. A, B, & C, 3, 1 a/c, photo escort missions.

261. 1500-1700, 2 a/c, special search and message drop mission. POW's were not found.

262. 1100-1315, 2 a/c, recon. of Suan area, searched for POW's, with no results.

263. 1600-1815, 2 a/c, artillery spotting mission, failed to make contact, was then directed by Polygon Mosquito and strafed a pillbox and field pieces 2 and 3/4ths mi. S. of Gonzan.

264. 1700-1805, 4 a/c, tilt. CAS, directed by Mosquito antidote. Numerous enemy troops entrenched on ridge line 1 1/2 mi. NE of Kaosong, and 4 ammo dumps were destroyed. 26 HVAR, 2 depth charges, 2-260# bombs and 2,400 rds 20mm were expended. The Commanding General of the area pronounced it a "Fine Job" and was very pleased; this CAS proved very advantageous to the ground troops in that area.

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265. 1730-2020, 2 a/c, helicopter escort, to rescue downed pilot 10 mi. S. of Sariwon. Pilot was captured and flight was recalled when within 7 mi. of pilot's last known position.
266. 1825-2045, 1 a/c, night intruder mission in area N. of Pyongyang, attacked 23 vehicles and expended 3 HVAR and 2 depth charges. Damage was unobserved.
267. 1845-2055, 1 a/c, night intruder to area N. of Pyongyang attacked 6 vehicles within a radius of 20 mi. NE of Pyongyang, with 2 depth charges; results unobserved. Observed 1 burst of 40 mm AA fire near Pyongyang.
268. 2040-2315, 1 a/c, night intruder, in area from Sariwon to Pyongyang, attacked vehicular traffic on road running N. from Sariwon to Pyongyang, expending 3 HVAR and 700 rds 20mm. Results unobserved. Observed radar controlled AA at Chinnampo.
269. 2120-2225, 1 a/c, night intruder, was vectorod at 300°, out for 50 mi, then to 280° and 240° for May Day call, but was recalled to base before contact was made.
270. 2300-0100, 1 a/c, night intruder of area between Sariwon and Pyongyang, attacked vehicles with 5 HVAR and 2 depth charges. Results unobserved. Light AA observed near Pyongyang.
271. 2305-2345, 1 a/c, night intruder, with no target. Returned to base because of lack of radio contact.

Total flight time for this date is as follows:

53.7 hrs, flown in combat flights,
 3.3 hrs, flown in test flights,
 57.0 hrs, total flight time this date,

A total of 15 missions and 31 sorties were flown this date.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY

This Summary covers the period of this report. 7 September 1950 to
9 October 1950.

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DoD Dir 5200.9

I Total combat missions for this period:

A. 433

II Total combat sorties for this period:

A. 581

III Total combat hours of flight for this period:

A. 1054.1 hrs.

IV. Ordnance expended during this period:

A. 500# G. P. bombs	94
D. 260# G. P. bombs	188
C. 5" HVAR	1,399
D. 20mm Ammo	31,810
E. Napalm bombs	1
F. Flares	5

(a) Total tonnage of ordnance expended:

(1) 131 tons.

V Combat personnel losses:

- A. Major John W. BEEBE, (01206), USMC
- B. T/Sgt Karl V. KLUDT, (285445), USMC

(Both persons were killed in action NW of Seoul over
the Han-Gang.)

VI Aircraft lost during this period.

- A. F7F-3N, Bu. No. 80466
- B. F7F-3N, Bu. No. 80570

(Lost in combat in the Seoul area)

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VII Targets destroyed during this period.

A. Sailing vessels-----	3
B. T-34 type tanks-----	2
C. 80mm artillery-----	11
D. 20 & 40 mm AA-----	19
E. Mortars-----	3
F. Enemy troops-----	350
G. Locomotives-----	6
H. Boxcars-----	58
I. Trucks-----	40
J. Buildings-----	23
K. Factories-----	4
L. Roadblocks-----	1
M. RR tunnels-----	8
N. RR yards-----	1
O. RR crane-----	1
P. RR tracks-----	1
Q. Automobiles-----	3
R. Observation towers-----	1
S. Warehouse-----	1
T. Haystack-----	1
U. Enemy Jeep-----	1
V. Ammo dumps-----	4

VIII Aircraft assigned at end of period:

A. 22 F7F-3N

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Page 2 of 3 pages.

IX Personnel assigned at end of this period:

- A. Officers-----56
- B. Naval Aviators-----49
- C. Enlisted Men-----292
- D. Naval Air Pilots-----4
- E. Naval Officers-----1
- F. Naval Enl. Men-----4

(a) Total personnel:

(1) 353

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ANNEXES

- A. S-1 Comments and Recommendations
- B. S-2 Comments and Recommendations
- C. S-3 Comments and Recommendations
- D. S-4 Comments and Recommendations
- E. Engineering Comments and Recommendations
- F. Ordnance Comments and Recommendations
- G. Electronics Comments and Recommendations

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Annex ABLE to Special Action Report on the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL OperationA D M I N I S T R A T I O NS - 1

I GENERAL:

- A. The squadron, consisting of fifty-four (54) officers and two hundred and seventy-four (274) enlisted men, with the exception of the Materiel Section, embarked aboard the U.S.S. Cape Esperance from North Island, California on 26 August 1950, and sailed on the 27th. The Materiel Section embarked aboard the U.S.N.S. General G. C. Morton from the Terminal Island, Long Beach, California on 1 September 1950. This section consisted of four (4) officers and nineteen (19) enlisted men.
- B. Due to inadequate space and facilities, very little administration could be conducted while underway aboard the U.S.S. Cape Esperance.
- C. On 11 September 1950, the squadron arrived at Yokosuka, Japan aboard the U.S.S. Cape Esperance. At this point all aircraft were taken ashore and a group of twenty-five (25) officers and two (2) USMC enlisted men disembarked to accompany the planes. The remainder of the squadron continued aboard the U.S.S. Cape Esperance and sailed from Yokosuka, Japan on the 14th of September 1950 and disembarked at Kobe, Japan on 15 September 1950.
- D. The Materiel Section which had embarked on the 1st of September 1950 aboard the U.S.N.S. General G. C. Morton, arrived in Kobe, Japan on 15 September 1950, at which time, they disembarked and proceeded to the Itami Air Force Base, Japan.
- E. Another part of the squadron consisting of twenty-three (23) USMC officers, ninety-two (92) USMC enlisted men and one (1) USN enlisted man,

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disembarked from the U.S.S. Cape Esperance and also proceeded to Itami Air Force Base, Japan, on 15 September 1950.

- F. The main body of the squadron embarked aboard the U.S.S. Thomas Jefferson at Kobe, Japan and sailed therefrom on 18 September 1950. This group consisted of five (5) USMC officers, one (1) USN officer, one hundred and seventy-four (174) USMC enlisted men and three (3) USN enlisted personnel. Again, very little by way of administration could be accomplished due to even less office space than had been experienced aboard the U. S. S. Cape Esperance. The voyage was extremely uneventful and on 22 September 1950, the squadron arrived and disembarked at Inchon, Korea. From Inchon, the squadron was moved by truck convoy to the Kimpo Air Field, Seoul, Korea.
- G. A system of centralized administrative control was extremely difficult to maintain due to the wide dispersion of our squadron. The squadron at this time was divided into four (4) separate groups of personnel. However, upon arrival at Kimpo Air Field, the Headquarters Section was set up and a full administrative schedule was put into operation.
- H. Along with the usual administrative problems which were presented, a concentrated effort was made to bring up to date all Service Record Books. All of the personnel present were called in for personal interview in an effort to accurately complete all the details. New confidential statements and emergency data sheets were made on all personnel.
- I. Administration, in relation to the squadron itself was fairly easy, however, due to numerous changes made from one (1) group to another, and because no directive to this effect was received until a much later date, extreme difficulty was encountered in some cases, such as courts-

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martial and group reports. Because this squadron kept its Headquarters intact and all records with them, the administrative problems were greatly simplified.

II COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) Comment: When a squadron has as many echelons as this squadron did, the lack of personnel contact can greatly hamper the entire administration system.

Recommendation: That all squadron headquarters have one (1) or more representatives of the headquarters section with each unit for more positive control.

- (b) Comment: Squadrons should never be without their records at anytime and in this particular operation it was of great value to have the records available.

Recommendation: That no squadron be too widely separated from their records.

- (c) Comment: In the field, the lack of publications and commonly used NAVMC forms can also hamper administration systems. Due to the lack of shipping space and a standardized method of carrying the publications and forms.

Recommendation: That some sort of administrative chest be made up in a compact form to contain a standardized arrangement of NAVMC forms so that all squadrons could operate on the same system.

- (d) Comment: Due to the fact that this squadron was transferred from group to group and at times acting independently, we were greatly hampered as in getting much needed information and correspondence necessary in any efficient operation. We did experience difficulty in clearing up our court martials and reports because of the lack

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of close liason with a group.

Recommendation: That at least one (1) representative of the squadron be left with the group to keep the squadron more closely informed and posted as to the changes that take place.

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Annex DAKER to Special Action Report on the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL OperationI N T E L L I G E N C ES - 2

I GENERAL:

- A. Before leaving the United States, this department inventoried the classified and unclassified material on hand, destroyed superfluous material and packed necessary material in two (2) safes and several boxes.
- B. During the voyage aboard the CVE, U.S.S. Cape Esperance, daily classes were conducted in the ship's Ready Room for pilots and radar-operators; aircraft and tank recognition, the geographic, meteorological, economic, political, cultural, medical and historical aspects of Korea were the principal intelligence subjects covered. The department also arranged for talks on "prisoner sense" for both officers and men. These talks were given by an enlisted member of the squadron who had been a prisoner of war in Japan for three (3) years during World War II.
- C. Upon docking at Kobe, Japan, the Intelligence gear was sent ashore for transport to Itami Air Field, under the guard of one (1) man from the Intelligence Section, with orders to keep subject gear under close surveillance at all times, until relieved by the Intelligence officer at the squadron's final destination. The S-2 officer, one (1) assistant, both pilots, left the U.S.S. Cape Esperance with

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the squadron's aircraft at Yokosuka, and another assistant S-2 Officer was assigned transportation to Incheon, Korea aboard the U.S.S. Thomas Jefferson, at Kobe, Japan.

- D. For a few days after the first twelve (12) of the squadron's aircraft had arrived at Kimpo from Itami, on 19 September 1950, an assistant S-2 officer issued maps and "blood chits" to pilots before each mission, and kept a situation map with overlay carrying the daily situation changes supplied by TAC, Dewestate Baker, located about two (2) miles east of Kimpo.
- E. MAG-33, Intelligence Section, soon took over the briefing and interrogation of all Marine squadrons aboard. From that time, until 10 October 1950, the squadron maintained an intelligence office next to the squadron Operations Office, where map packets and "blood chits" were issued to pilots before flights and situation maps were maintained.
- F. During this period, the S-2 office compiled the squadron's aircraft action, survival and vulnerability reports for distribution, maintained classified files, and established liaison with other units in the Incheon - Kimpo - Seoul area, in preparation for the period of self maintenance, which occurred after 10 October 1950.

II COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) Comment: During this period, this squadron's intelligence section initiated the practice of making up standard map packets to be issued to pilots before each mission. Due to the cumbersome nature of map packets, used in the confines of a cockpit, it is recommended that more satisfactory strip charts be made, which would fold in accordion fashion.

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- (b) It is recommended that the necessary maps be made available in sufficient quantity to the squadrons along with the operation plan, in future operations.
- (c) It is recommended that in future operations, under Air Force jurisdiction, Marine Air Wings and/or aircraft groups be responsible for having Air Force facilities place each Marine squadron upon their distribution lists.
- (d) It is recommended that aircraft action reports be required from each squadron, for distribution, on every combat mission regardless of whether or not ordnance was expended. Only in this way can an adequate and complete picture of the squadron's operations be obtained.
- (e) It has been found that the present units in the field have insufficient recognition material, if they have it at all. Projectors and appropriate slides should be issued to every squadron.
- (f) Before the combat operation, the intelligence officer should be informed, or an escape and evasion specialist should be supplied to brief flight personnel regarding procedures and facilities within the operational area.
- (g) It is recommended that intelligence information and other material applying to the continental United States, not be distributed to squadrons in combat in the field.
- (h) It is recommended that more adequate aircraft action report forms on a single sheet of paper, be issued in sufficient quantity, directly to the squadrons. One (1) aircraft action report form will not adequately cover the actions of different types of squadrons such as night fighters, all-weather fighters, day fighters or photo-

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graphic aircraft.

- (i) It is recommended that adequate survival equipment be included in the squadron table of allowances for issue as personal gear to pilots and radar operators.
- (j) It is recommended that standard inventory, receipt, checkout and destruction logs be made and issued to every intelligence activity.
- (k) It is recommended that the squadron table of allowance should provide at least one (1) safe for each department, to provide security of classified material within the department and the squadron as a whole. The present allowance is not sufficient.

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To not disseminate this information outside the military of the U.S.

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Annex CHARLIE to Special Action Report on the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL Operation

OPERATIONS

S 3

I GENERAL

- A. This report covers the period from 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950. This squadron was embarked in CVE, U.S.S. Cape Esperance, enroute to Japan from the United States. The Operations Section of this squadron conducted shipboard training, ground training and flight operations were conducted at Itami Air Force Base, Japan. Flight operations were conducted from Kimpo Air Field, Seoul, Korea in support of the Tenth Corps and most particularly of the first Marine Division. This annex will be confined to appropriate comments and recommendations resulting from experiences during the period covered.

II COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Comment: Aircraft of this squadron were flown to Kimpo Air Field, Seoul, Korea commencing 19 September 1950. On arrival there, neither ordnance equipment, fueling equipment, adequate maintenance nor field lighting was available to sustain tactical operations. Support was not available from normal supporting units as such units were not present on the air field. This resulted in limited use of aircraft during the initial forty-eight (48) hours. These aircraft were available for normal support of the ground operations. Those aircraft without logistic support and proper maintenance crews are relatively ineffectual until such time as necessary support is provided. This

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cannot but result in impaired efficiency of flight crews from insufficient rest resulting from efforts of pilots and crewmen to fuel, load, and maintain aircraft, (Marine pilots of this squadron will support Marine Infantry, whatever the cost, as long as they can remain on their feet and fly), and decreased aircraft availability due to lack of proper maintenance.

Recommendation: Preliminary planning must recognize the necessity for proper logistic support and maintenance of aircraft. Surface or airlift must be provided to move sufficient personnel and equipment to the area to adequately support the tactical squadron in its operational commitments. Where such air or surface lift is limited, a staging plan serialization should be utilized in order that the proper unit will arrive at the objective air field or beach at the proper time. Where both surface and air lifts are provided, this serialization could be readily coordinated with the landing force by requesting priority of unloading of necessary serials from the shipping available and including such serials in the staging schedules of the air units involved.

- D. Comment: Night fighters were heavily committed to day operations throughout the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul operations and regularly flew a proportionate share of the day sorties assigned. On occasion, as many day sorties were flown by night fighters as by day fighter squadrons employed in the same operation. It must be recognized that maintenance personnel and aircrews cannot sustain extended operations on a twenty-four (24) hour basis under the present TO and TE. In addition, the electronics equipment and instrumentation of

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night fighter aircraft employed on day close support tends to deteriorate much more rapidly than normal, thereby impairing the efficiency of the aircraft for its primary role.

Recommendation: Limited day operations should be conducted by night fighters. Such limited day operations are desirable in order to gain familiarity with the terrain over which pilots must work at night.

- C. Comment: In case of "red alert", no procedure for clearing the area of friendly aircraft was provided by the Kampo Air Field Command. Transport type aircraft operating from Kampo Air Field were not briefed as to proper action in event of air raids. During the two (2) small raids on Kampo Air Field, transport aircraft failed to clear the area during the period of the raid and as a result cluttered the radar screens of GCI units and airborne night fighters in their effort to intercept the raid. In this case, the control units, the base command and the night fighters were in accord as to necessity for clearing the area, but the command controlling transport operation took no action until JOC of 5th Air Force and 8th Army authorized firing on targets without visual recognition. As a result a flat warning was issued by this unit and by base operations to all transports operating in the area that "any slow moving target not showing IFF would be fired on by night fighters during air raids". A plan for clearing the area was immediately developed and incidents of aircraft failing to show IFF decreased considerably.
- Recommendations: At the earliest possible time, all details concerning air defense should be coordinated by interested commands. The primary responsibility for coordination and promulgation of the resulting directive should be that of the Air Base Command.

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D. Comment: Following the withdrawal of the Marine Ground Control Intercept squadron from Kimpo, radar control for night intercept was limited to that provided by Naval units in Inchon Harbor. Communications between the control organization afloat and the night fighter on the ground was makeshift at best and for practical purposes did not exist. This condition was the direct result of the assumption of control by 5th Air Force units at a time when facilities for such control were limited to one (1) VHF radio channel. The Air Force unit which was required to assume control had transported its highly technical radio and radar equipment overland for a considerable distance in order to assume control at a specified time. The state of the equipment, its age, and the beating it took during the movement combined to prohibit the possibility of its operation at the desired time. This resulted in a period of approximately one (1) week of heavy maintenance work at the end of which time the Air Force GCI unit at Kimpo was enabled to commence limited operations which steadily improved thereafter.

Recommendation: Preliminary planning must recognize the capabilities and limitations of highly technical equipment and adjust its schedule for operation of such equipment to permit a logical and orderly movement, erection and maintenance of such equipment.

E. Comment: Instrument and let-down procedures specified by the 5th Air Force directives were based on ADF approaches on a non-directional homer, as were all instrument procedures in the combat area, and were clearly designed for use by transport aircraft. It is mandatory that air fields operating tactical aircraft in combat zones give primary consideration to the operational needs of the tactical aircraft. Such

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aircraft have far more limited facilities than transport aircraft and require operational procedures suitable to their equipment. Recommendation: Air fields operational tactical aircraft should base procedures on the needs of tactical aircraft. Where transport or other aircraft operate from the same base, their requirements should be separately considered and coordinated with procedures established for tactical aircraft. In addition, all aircraft involved in night or weather operation in this area should be provided with IDF equipment. This is particularly important in the case of F7F type aircraft which have no shielded antenna other than radar.

- F. Comment: The F7F type aircraft is clearly not a satisfactory night fighter for many readily apparent reasons, and as a so called All-Weather fighter is satisfactory only for tropical climates. It is realized that the F7F type aircraft being a class II aircraft is not worth any considerable expenditure on modification. It is believed that in its present configuration, with slight changes, the F7F is a satisfactory night intruder and night CAS aircraft under weather conditions which contain no icing. As a night fighter against operational types currently opposing U. S. aircraft operating in this theatre, it is limited to interception of piston engined fighters or bombers. Under no circumstances should it be considered an all-weather fighter due to total lack of anti-icing equipment, other than pilot heat and alternate air, extremely poor cockpit heating, cold running engines, and limited endurance without external fuel. Recommendation: Future all-weather fighter aircraft must contain transport type instrumentation, auto pilot, positive wind screen, wing, tail and propeller (if propeller driven) deicing, added on-

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durance with internal fuel, improved electronic equipment, to include the latest in radio navigational equipment, and more build in stability than the F7F. Finally, any type of deicing or defrosting equipment which ceases operation when the landing gear is extended is dangerously inadequate.

G. Comment: Of the pilots assigned to this squadron when it departed the U. S., no more than twenty (20) trained night fighter pilots were available. The remaining pilots were, in the main, reserve pilots with a good experience level and a desire to become night fighters. It is considered that the night fighter and all weather program should have produced more qualified pilots than were available. Without recourse to statistical data, assumptions are sometimes most fallacious, however, it appears that generally the same group of individuals have been undergoing training in the night fighter and all-weather program throughout its existence and have thereby attained a high experience level. At such time as many of these qualified 7303's were transferred to other duties insufficient trained pilots were available throughout the entire Marine Corps to bring this one (1) squadron to TO strength.

Recommendation: At such time as Marine Corps Aviators reach a satisfactory experience level, (1,000 hours minimum) they should be subjected to a training period in all-weather fighter flight techniques as a member of an all-weather night fighter squadron. During such training, which, if no interruption is permitted, need not be lengthy, the pilot should be permitted to continue in the tactical unit until he is qualified as a 7303 or brought before a reclassification board. It is considered that a six (6) month training period would be adequate, provided no interruption occurred.

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Annex DOG to Special Action Report on the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL OperationLOGISTICS

S . . .

I. GENERAL

A. This report covers the period of 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950.

The Hospital Ship, *USS General G. C. Morton* from San Francisco, California, departed on 7 September 1950, arrived Kobe, Japan on 15 September 1950. Unloading at Kobe, Japan was done by civilian Japanese laborers. Officers of VMF(N)-542 supervised the unloading detail and arranged the storage space for squadron material at the Kobe docks. It was thought at this time that the squadron would be based at Itami Air Force Base for a brief period, and its material section unloaded shortly for Korea.

D. On 19 September 1950, flight elements of the squadron were alerted to fly to Korea (Kimpo Air Field) and start operations immediately. Men were allowed only bed rolls, pack and hand tools for the airlift. Sufficient spare parts for a ten (10) day period were to be airlifted to Kimpo Air Field. It is notable to mention at this time the fact that MAG-12 had the F7F Section "B" and they were to remain at Itami Air Force Base for this operation. When the flight echelon left Japan for Korea, the rear echelon prepared to get all squadron material ready for a loading, this never materialized. This squadron's TMA, Section "M", part of Section "U", NavOrd lists, Section "H", and ninety percent (90%) of Marine Corps Property remained at the warehouse at Kobe, Japan for the entire period covered by

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this report.

- C. Upon arrival at Kimpo Air Field, Korea, it was found that tentage cots and housekeeping supplies were not available in sufficient quantity. These supplies were available at the squadron material warehouse at Kobe, Japan. Normal supply channels were through the M4G-33 Officer. All section "B" spare parts and other items critical to flight operation were airlifted from Itami Air Force Base, Japan. Logistical support was not available to the squadron for two (2) days after its arrival.
- D. Transportation was under Group control. The squadron was assigned two (2) jeeps and one (1) weapons carrier. Refueling was also under Group control on a pool basis. With the squadron working on a twenty-four (24) hour basis, this was inadequate.

II COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) Comment: The operational capabilities of the squadron were seriously handicapped by the lack of its organic equipment authorized in its Sections "H", "M", "U", TD, NavOrd lists and Marine Corps Property. Recommendation: That a squadron be allowed to carry its authorized allowances with it into combat.
- (b) Comment: The operational capabilities of the squadron were further handicapped by the seasonal cold weather encountered during the period covered by this report. Recommendation: That adequate planning should be made in regard to logistical support for the seasonal weather to be encountered (Section "U").
- (3) Comment: The operational capabilities of all departments within the squadron were greatly curtailed by the lack of adequate vehicles

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and Section "M".

Recommendation: That squadrons be allowed to carry their own Section "M" rolling stock with them. Squadron maintenance and personnel pride would greatly increase the life of the vehicles. Numerous breakdowns were encountered when using group transportation.

- (d) Comment: Upon arrival at Kimpo Air Field, there was no field lighting for night operations. The USAF had a field lighting set on the field, but were awaiting the arrival of an engineer team to install the set. Personnel of this squadron received permission and installed the field lighting the second day after arrival for operations that night; squadron personnel also provided the maintenance on the lighting equipment. Due to the lack of familiarizing with the set and numerous breakdowns, it was inadequate.

Recommendation: That an All-Weather squadron have primary priority on taking its authorized field lighting set into combat.

- (g) Comment: It was a week to ten (10) days before PX supplies were available to the squadron. The present pack of PX rations are inadequate in that one (1) tooth brush and five (5) cakes of soap will not suffice fifty (50) men.

Recommendation: That sufficient PX supplies be provided by the group for the health and comfort of the men. That the present PX pack be revised to increase the number of its components.

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Annex EASY to Special Action Report on the INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OperationENGINEERING

I GENERAL

- A. At the commencement of the period covered, the engineering department had a total of one hundred and two (102) men assigned of which sixty-two (62) were experienced in F7F-3N aircraft maintenance and service. Training of newly joined personnel had been conducted on board ship by officers and leading non-commissioned officers on all systems, major components of, and servicing of aircraft.
- B. The lighting ^{of} our aircraft from Yokosuka, Japan to Appoma, Japan and then on to Kiserazu were accomplished with negligible damage, and loss of time due to the outstanding cooperation of FASRON 11 personnel. At Kiserazu, FASRON 11 again assisted in deproservicing and servicing our aircraft for flyaway to Itami Air Force base.
- C. On 19 September 1950, six (6) aircraft flew to Kimpo, Korea, followed by six (6) more on 20 September 1950. Plane captains tool kits were the only maintenance equipment taken with the aircraft. At Kimpo, for a period of four (4) days, eleven (11) of the twelve (12) aircraft were available for operational commitments, the aircraft out of commission for this period had a bad engine starter, for which no replacement was available. This availability was made possible by nineteen (19) engineering personnel, flown to Kimpo by transport on 19 September 1950, who were required to service aircraft with fuel and oil by hand pumps from drums, make repairs on aircraft accessories,

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assist in loading ordnance and stand perimeter guard defense at night.

- D. Additional personnel and gear arrived on 23 September 1950 and the engineering shops were set up in tents.

II COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) Comment: The lightering of our aircraft was an extremely dangerous and time consuming operation. Aircraft were separated from regular trained squadron maintenance personnel and equipment for a period of three (3) days.

Recommendation: If at all possible avoid. The possibility of an aircraft sustaining strike damage was very high during this operation.

- (b) Comment: Planning at the squadron level at Itami Air Force Base for further operations was very difficult to impossible due to lack of information from higher echelons on date, place and number of aircraft required for commitment.

Recommendation: It is very important that squadrons be kept cognizant of any information available, so that some planning may be made in line with the ultimate commitment.

- (c) Comment: Aircraft were operated at Kimpo Air Field with no operational spares available for four (4) days.

Recommendation: Logistics must be prepared to support aircraft committed to combat areas under all conditions. If operational spares do not accompany aircraft, they should be air lifted immediately to the area of operations. Suitable aircraft cargo tanks should be designed, produced and issued to all VF squadrons to allow carrying of limited operational spares.

- (d) Comment: An average of twenty-five percent (25%) of engineering

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personnel were required for squadron and group details. This situation, coupled with the squadron having to operate on a twenty-four (24) hour basis, left the engineering department very short of personnel.

Recommendation: If VMF(N) squadrons are to be required to operate on a twenty-four (24) hour basis, the engineering department TO should be increased approximately another fifty percent (50%).

So-called supporting units should not be committed to an area with squadrons unless they are prepared to support the squadrons tactical operations without recourse to utilization of squadron personnel.

- (e) Comment: The transportation situation was critical at all times. Our flight line extended to over one half ($\frac{1}{2}$) mile from shops and would have been more were adequate space available for proper dispersal of aircraft. Many delays were caused by lack of transportation to bring heavy or bulky parts and equipment from shops and storeroom to aircraft on flight line.

Recommendation: Expedite getting transportation to combat area. Air lift if at all possible.

- (f) Comments: Aircraft tire usage was very high due to operating from a short runway, plus the presence of aircraft and machine-gun links on the runway and taxi strips.

Recommendation: Possible redesign of ordnance link chutes to assure there will be no lodged links that may drop on runway when aircraft are landed. Also expedite delivery of spare aircraft tires to combat area.

- (g) Comments: The poor surface construction of taxi and parking strips, both at Itami Air Force Base and Kimpo Air Field, caused many prop-

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pollers to be damaged when turning up aircraft on the deck,

Recommendation: Assure maximum possible propeller-ground
clearance on all future design.

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Annex FOX to Special Action Report of the INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL OperationORDNANCE

I GENERAL

- A. On 19 September 1950, the first element of this department consisting of fourteen (14) men, departed from Itami Air Force Base, Japan for Kimpo Air Field, Korea. At this time, the only equipment available was hand tools. It was thought that MAG-33 Service Squadron would precede the squadron. Actually the ordnance department of Service Squadron reached Kimpo Air Field two (2) days after the squadron. During this two (2) day period, frag bombs were loaded by hand and five (5) inch rockets were lifted to the wings of the aircraft from fifty-five (55) gallon drums. It was not until the fourth day that there was sufficient equipment available to lessen the manual labor load.
- B. Up until 22 September 1950, operations were restricted to daylight hours. This coupled with a standard loading for close air support allowed the crews to load the planes expeditiously. However, after field lighting was installed, the squadron flew day and night missions, continuously. This required partially changing the load for the different types of missions.

II COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) Comment: This organization was not preceded by a supporting unit of any type, nor were sufficient tools, equipment and spare parts immediately available for smooth operations.

Recommendation: That a supporting unit precede aircraft into any

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combat situation, or at least arrive in time to fully support by the time the aircraft are expected to operate. If this is not possible, then airlift must be provided to lift sufficient tools, equipment and spare parts to arrive with the combat aircraft.

- (b) Comment: Initially, there were no trailers or vehicles available to deliver ordnance to aircraft. A jeep or weapons carrier is more desirable when working around the F7F than a bomb cargo or bomb service truck. The Mark III ordnance trailer is a must for loading rockets.

Recommendation: At least one (1) jeep or weapons carrier and a Mark III ordnance trailer should accompany the combat aircraft by airlift, or be available at the point of operation.

- (c) Comment: It was found that day ammunition load and rockets blind pilots when fired at night. There were no Mark 55 bomb racks available, therefore rockets were used at night throughout the operation.

Recommendation: That night ammunition load be used for night operations, and that all-weather squadrons be equipped one hundred percent (100%) with Mark 55 bomb racks so that bombs instead of rockets can be used at night.

- (d) Comment: Mark V rocket launcher latches failed to hold up under combat conditions. Mark IX rocket launchers need heavier stressing near the latch.

Recommendation: The F7F should be equipped one hundred percent (100%) with Mark IX rocket launchers with more stressing near the latch.

- (e) Comment: Numerous electrical troubles in ordnance circuits were encountered putting a load on squadron electricians.

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Recommendation: That an electrician be assigned to ordnance.

(F) Comment: Prior to this operation, the 20mm cannon was not considered the ideal aircraft gun for combat operations, however, this squadron has had excellent results with the 20mm, far above expectations.

Recommendation: The continued use of the 20mm cannon for all-weather squadrons.

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Annex GEORGE to Special Action Report of the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL OperationR A D I O - R A D A R

I GENERAL

- A. During the period from 7 September 1950 to 21 September 1950, the electronics maintenance personnel, including the Radio-Radar Officer, were aboard ship, with the exception of a few men who were debarked at Kobe, Japan on or about 15 September 1950 for the purpose of providing radio maintenance for squadron aircraft at Itami Air Force Base, Japan. At about this time, the squadron electronics spares and test equipment were unloaded at Kobe, Japan.
- B. On 19 September 1950, the squadron aircraft were flown from Itami Air Force Base, Japan to Kimpo Air Field, Korea and at about this time, certain boxes of electronics material were forwarded by air transportation to Kimpo Air Field, Korea.

II COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) Comment: When the main body of the squadron electronics maintenance personnel arrived at Kimpo Air Field, Korea, late in the day of 22 September 1950, the squadron aircraft were completing their fourth day of operation in that area.

Recommendation: That maintenance personnel precede such a movement of aircraft by sufficient time to establish the necessary maintenance facilities prior to arrival of the aircraft.

- (b) Comment: Upon the arrival at Kimpo Air Field of the maintenance personnel, many hours passed before it was made known to officers in charge of departments where their shop tents were to be erected and still more hours passed before tents were available to be

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erected.

Recommendation: That prior to any movement of an organization, a general plan be promulgated by an officially designated officer and that that officer be on hand at the time of arrival at a new base to make immediate decisions about the allocation of space for shops and quarters areas and to provide such information to officers in charge of departments. Furthermore, tents and stoves, when required should be available for use at the earliest possible moment.

(c) Comment: The initial air lift of electronics material from Itami Air Force Base, Japan to Kimpo Air Field, Korea consisted almost entirely of maintenance parts whereas it should have been of test equipment, tools and spare major components of electronic equipment. The Radio-Radar Officer was not consulted in regards to which equipment should be sent first. The materials needed for the establishment of adequate maintenance facilities were not received at Kimpo Air Field until about two (2) weeks after the squadron commenced operation there. Obviously if an officer in charge of a department is not permitted to retain control of his department at all times it is impossible for him to control the effectiveness of his department.

Recommendation: That officers in charge of departments be included in all operational planning that affects or will affect their departments.

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

HEADQUARTERS, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 33
1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

ANNEX - TARE
to
MAG-33 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
For Period Ending
9 October 1950

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT MOCIS-1

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

7 September 1950 through 9 October 1950

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INTRODUCTION

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 was alerted to begin moving supplies and equipment to Kobe, Japan for embarkation aboard the USS George G. CLYMER (APA-27) on 5 September 1950. MGCIS-1 although operationally under the control of Marine Aircraft Group 33, was transferred to the 1st Marine Division for transportation by Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing Operation Plan 2-50 of 2 September 1950. This transfer was for the period covering embarkation, transportation enroute and debarkation at Inchon, Korea. Loading was completed on 9 September 1950 and APA-27 sailed on 11 September 1950. MGCIS-1 debarked on 16 September 1950 (D plus 1), and moved to a staging area to assemble squadron equipment for further movement to Kimpo Airfield. The first convey of equipment moved to Kimpo Airfield on 19 September 1950, where the squadron remained until 10 October 1950.

The mission of MGCIS-1 during the period covered by this report was to provide air defense, homing, and Combat Cargo Command reporting in and out facilities for the Inchon-Seoul area. During this period MGCIS-1 worked in conjunction with Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 in the control of friendly aircraft and the reporting and evaluation of unidentified aircraft. From the period 20 September 1950 to 9 October 1950 MGCIS-1 gave homing assistance to ninety-three (93) lost aircraft and checked in one thousand five-hundred and fifty-six (1556) airlift aircraft.

TASK ORGANIZATION

The task organization was composed of Marine Aircraft Group 33 commanded by Colonel F. G. DAILEY and Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 commanded by Major Harold E. ALLEN. The strength of MGCIS-1 was one hundred and eighty-seven (187) marine enlisted, three (3) navy enlisted and twenty (20) officers.

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

From the date the squadron was alerted, 2 September 1950 through 10 October 1950, this unit operated under 1st Marine Air Wing Operations Order Number 3-50, 1st Marine Air Wing (Forward Echelon) Administrative Order Number 1-50 and 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) Fleet Marine Force Embarkation Order Number 2-50.

After leaving Kobe, Japan the second day, the Commanding Officer of MGCIS-1 held a briefing in which the destination was announced. We were to set up at Kimpo Airfield, Korea and provide air defense facilities for that area.

It was known that the enemy could and probably would send air strikes against the field and we would have aircraft on patrol or standing by for immediate take off.

Small bands of enemy ground forces could raid the field and we would set up ground defense against such attacks. The squadron was prepared for such attacks as all personnel were assigned to platoons. Two (2) platoons were assigned for a perimeter defense and the remainder was to be used for interior guard and the safeguarding of all equipment.

Ten (10) men were left at Itami Air Base as a rear echelon to be used to forward third lift equipment when called for.

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TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

No rehearsals were conducted prior to the landing at Inchon. Abandon ship drills and situation briefings were conducted aboard ship. No other training as such was conducted, however, the past training of personnel proved invaluable in making MGCIS-1 a more efficient organization.

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

On 5 September 1950 the squadron began loading out equipment for embarkation at Kobo Base, Japan from Itami and completed the move on 6 September 1950. Embarkation of equipment aboard the USS George C. CLYMER (APA-27) began 5 September 1950 and was completed 9 September 1950. One hundred and seventy-four (174) men and eighteen (18) officers boarded the USS George C. CLYMER (APA-27) on 10 September 1950.

One (1) officer and six (6) men accompanied four (4) 2½ ton 6x6 trucks, one (1) tractor (TD18) and one (1) refueler aboard the LST Q076. One (1) officer accompanied one (1) RACON-YE radio beacon van aboard the USS WHITESIDE (AKA-90).

All equipment and personnel of MGCIS-1 were embarked aboard ships on 10 September 1950.

The palletized equipment had to be broken for better storage and to expedite loading. Forty-two (42) vehicles and ten thousand (10,000) cubic feet of bulk cargo of MGCIS-1 was put aboard during this period. All loading was done by Japanese stevedores and supervised by enlisted marines and officers. The necessary carpentry work in the holds was done by ships crews and marines.

MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

MGCIS-1 less sixteen (16) men and two (2) officers departed Kobo Base, Japan aboard the USS George C. CLYMER (APA-27) on 11 September 1950. One (1) officer and six (6) men departed Kobo Base, Japan aboard the LST Q076 on 8 September 1950. One (1) officer departed Kobo Base, Japan aboard the USS WHITESIDE (AKA-90) on 11 September 1950. Ten (10) men were left at Itami as a rear echelon to be used to forward third lift equipment when called for.

A secondary Tactical Air Control Center was set up aboard the USS George C. CLYMER (APA-27) and a twenty-four (24) hour listening watch was maintained on all tactical frequencies and two (2) intelligence nets. An up to date situation map was also maintained. In the event that anything happened to the Control Ship the secondary TACC was to take control of all air support and coordination of supporting units.

The squadron arrived at Inchon Harbor, Korea on 15 September 1950 and began disembarking 16 September 1950.

ASSUALT PHASE

Arrived at Inchon Harbor, Korea 15 September 1950 and MGCIS-1 continued to man the secondary TACC throughout the assault phase.

The first echelon of MGCIS-1 went ashore with equipment and supplies on 17 September 1950 and the TACC was secured 18 September 1950 when all but one (1) officer and twenty-seven (27) men went ashore to the staging area at Suin railroad station in Inchon.

All men and equipment were disembarked on 20 September 1950 and proceeded to move from Inchon to Kimpo Airfield.

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ENEMY TACTICS

A report of five hundred (500) to six hundred (600) North Korean troops were reported on 21 September 1950 to be preparing an assault on the airfield. No enemy were contacted and only a few mortar rounds fell on the airstrip from an undetermined position but no casualties or damage resulted.

ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

Since no enemy aircraft were ever identified within a seventy-five (75) mile radius of Kimpo Airfield the primary mission of MGCIS-1 was never put to a test; however, many valuable lessons were learned which are, for the most part, included in comments and recommendations. Early in the operation it was learned that new controllers, especially reserves, did not know the proper coordination and functioning between the Ground Control Intercept Squadron and the Tactical Air Control Center. This was especially true in that many controllers on duty in the TACC did not know the exact capabilities and limitations of a GCI Squadron. Most of these difficulties e.g., the fact that GCI used only the air defense grid and conversion to another type grid was slow, were smoothed out very early in September after we began twenty-four (24) hour operations.

The fact that the GCI Squadron and the TACC were located only a few hundred feet apart made it possible to lay telephone lines for communications which were not cut by vehicles. This fact alone, that the RRN and AGCI nets were always loud and clear accounted for a great deal in successful operation.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

During the period covered by this report, Air Defense was neglected in that a continuous combat air patrol was not maintained and scramble aircraft were not in a sufficient condition of readiness to be of any value. Many opportunities existed for enemy aircraft to raid Kimpo Airfield successfully even though detected by this squadron. Also it was entirely possible for raids to enter the area undetected because an organization of this type is not sufficiently manned or equipped to quickly interrogate a large number of plots in 360° radar surveillance. It is recommended that at least three (3) GCI reporting stations be employed in the air defense of a large area.

Scramble alert aircraft, when employed, should be on an immediate alert status and directly under the control of the intercept squadron. This would enable the controller to almost immediately intercept unidentified targets or to reinforce combat air patrols already airborne.

It should be mandatory that all aircraft check in and out with the TACC when entering the designated air defense area. Because of the failure to check in or to show proper identification many friendly aircraft were unnecessarily intercepted or caused the Inchon-Seoul area to be falsely alerted.

On several occasions night fighters were assigned to combat air patrol when either their guns or radar were not functioning. Night interceptions are rarely successful unless the airborne radar is operative. The fact that guns are necessary, needs no comment.

Because of the delicate nature of electronics equipment GCI Squadrons should be shown special consideration in the loading of their equipment and whenever practicable, should be loaded aboard an LST. Many loadings by cargo nets when all pallets had to be broken caused great difficulty in the maintenance of equipment and in several cases, parts obtainable only in the United States were dropped down hatches with devastating results to major components. Also during this period no electronic supplies were received through normal supply channels.

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For the first time the AN/MPS-4 height finder was used under field conditions and proved to be an excellent piece of equipment, both operationally and in case of maintainance. A report on the operation of the AN/MPS-4 has been forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The present equipment used by this organization and the present Table of Organization are considered inadequate for a Ground Control Intercept Squadron demanding mobility. Recommendations for changes are being prepared and will be included in the Special Action report ending 15 December 1950.

MARINE GROUND CONTROL INTERCEPT SQUADRON 1
 Marine Aircraft Group 33, 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF,
 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

STATION LIST

10 October 1950

<u>NAME</u>	<u>JACKET NUMBER</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DUTIES</u>	<u>DEP US</u>	<u>DATE JOINED UNIT</u>
ALLEN, Harold E.	07124	Major	7304	Sq CO	14Jul50	25Aug49
BOYLE, Robert S.	013482	Capt	2710	Electronics0	15Aug50	30Aug50
LINDELL, Carl W.	021746	Capt	7301	Air Support0	14Jul50	22Aug49
FERRIES, Robert L.	019164	Capt	7302	Executive0	14Jul50	25Feb48
VON HORN, Charles S.	027505	Capt	7302	Material0	14Jul50	22Apr50
WENDT, Harvey E.	031836	Capt	7302	TQMO	14Jul50	8Jul50
WHITCOMB, John M.	028007	Capt	7304	Transportation0	14Jul50	18Oct49
BOLDUAN, Frederick F.	035215	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
CHARST, Eugene C.	030149	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
CHRISTIAN, Neil G.	035780	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
CROAKE, Frank J.	022707	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
JULINE, Edward L.	025119	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
KIDD, Donald S.	026020	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
OPKA, Francis C.	038790	1stLt	7302	Personnel0	14Jul50	16Mar50
HUBY, William S.	025200	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
SCHOFIELD, Marillo S.	038284	1stLt	7386	AirDefCon0	15Aug50	30Aug50
WOOD, Drury V., Jr.	037446	1stLt	7302	Operations0	14Jul50	22Nov49
CORY, Oris E.	047307	2ndLt	7302	Radio0	14Jul50	8Jul50
MC CARTHY, Frank J.	050273	2ndLt	0130	Adjutant	15Aug50	30Aug50
VOGT, Timothy S.	049200	2ndLt	6610	RdrO&RegPub0	14Jul50	5Oct48

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

HEADQUARTERS, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 33
1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

ANNEX - UNCIE,
to
MAG-33 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
For Period Ending
9 October 1950

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT MTACS-2

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SQUADRON 2
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 33, (REINFORCED)
1st MARINE AIR WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

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The following Special Action Report is submitted to cover the activities of MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SQUADRON 2 for the INCHON-SEOUL-KIMPO operation, 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950. Due to the fact that the Air Defense Section and the Close Air Support Section of this squadron were employed separately it is felt that separate reports from each section must be made to properly cover the information desired.

SECTION I AIR DEFENSE SECTION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

SECTION II CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SECTION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

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SECTION I

AIR DEFENSE SECTION

1. INTRODUCTION.

A. This report is submitted to cover the activities of the Air Defense Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 during the INCHON-SEOUL-KIMPO operation from 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950.

B. The Air Defense Section, MarTACRon 2 was assigned the mission of providing, maintaining and operating the control facilities for the control of aircraft within the sector of responsibility of the Tactical Air Command, X Corps.

C. During the period covered by this report the next higher echelon administratively and logistically was Marine Aircraft Group 33. Operationally, the next higher echelon was the Tactical Air Commander, X Corps.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

A. There were no attached or subordinate organic units within this period.

B. The strength of the Air Defense Section was 18 Marine officers, 2 Navy officers, 114 Marine enlisted and 5 Navy enlisted.

C. The Officer in Charge of the Air Defense Section was Major James A. ETHERIDGE, U. S. Marine Corps. The Commanding Officer of MarTACRon 2 was Major Christian C. LEE, U. S. Marine Corps.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING:

Not applicable.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS.

Not applicable.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

A. During the period of 7 September to 10 September 1950, the squadron was engaged in moving all supplies and equipment to KOBE, JAPAN for loading aboard the USS ACHENAR (AKA-53).

All personnel, supplies and equipment were embarked 10 September 1950.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE.

A. The USS ACHENAR (AKA-53) arrived in the transport area in INCHON harbor on 15 September 1950. Debarkation of personnel, supplies and equipment commenced on 17 September 1950. Unloading progressed without incident, and the move to the initial staging area was completed by 17 September 1950.

7. ASSAULT PHASE (NARRATIVE).

17 September: Arrived at initial staging area located three miles northeast of INCHON, KOREA. Routine protective measures were taken to provide security against enemy infiltration.

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SECTION I NTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

- 18 September: Squadron remained in staging area awaiting to orders to move forward and establish a
 20 September: Tactical Air Control Center.
- 21 September: Orders received to move to KIMPO airfield and establish the TACC. Movement accomplished by dark on this date.
- 22 September: *76 21 Sept No Control*
 Assumed control of all combat aircraft within the sector of responsibility of the Tactical Air Commander, X Corps at 0800 this date. 53 flights of a total of 174 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 13 Close Air Support. *CAS*
 17 Deep Support. *D.S.*
 5 Combat Air Patrols. *CAP*
 3 Photo.
 16 Miscellaneous.
- 23 September: Continued control of aircraft. 64 flights of a total of 177 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 13 Close Air Support.
 17 Deep Support.
 15 Combat Air Patrols.
 3 Photo
 16 Miscellaneous.
- 24 September: Continued control of aircraft. 64 flights of a total of 200 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 16 Close Air Support.
 31 Deep Support.
 4 Combat Air Patrols.
 3 Photo.
 10 Miscellaneous.
- 25 September: Continued control of aircraft. 66 flights of a total of 247 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 20 Close Air Support.
 15 Deep Support.
 6 Combat Air Patrols.
 2 Photo.
 23 Miscellaneous.
- 26 September: Continued control of aircraft. 50 flights of a total of 156 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 12 Close Air Support.
 28 Deep Support.
 4 Combat Air Patrols.
 1 Photo.
 5 Miscellaneous.
- 27 September: Continued control of aircraft. 103 flights of a total of 289 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 27 Close Air Support.
 54 Deep Support
 6 Combat Air Patrols.
 6 Photo.
 10 Miscellaneous.

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SECTION 1 MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

- 28 September: Continued control of aircraft. 80 flights of a total of 226 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 11 Close Air Support,
 44 Deep Support,
 5 Combat Air Patrols,
 15 Miscellaneous.
- 29 September: Continued control of aircraft. 92 flights of a total of 247 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 10 Close Air Support,
 45 Deep Support,
 12 Combat Air Patrols,
 7 Photo,
 17 Miscellaneous.
- 30 September: Continued control of aircraft. 94 flights of a total of 239 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 26 Close Air Support,
 43 Deep Support,
 9 Combat Air Patrols,
 4 Photo,
 12 Miscellaneous.
- 1 October: Continued control of aircraft. 104 flights of a total of 261 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 15 Close Air Support,
 40 Deep Support,
 14 Combat Air Patrols,
 5 Photo,
 30 Miscellaneous.
- 2 October: Continued control of aircraft. 93 flights of a total of 227 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 14 Close Air Support,
 36 Deep Support,
 9 Combat Air Patrols,
 9 Photo,
 25 Miscellaneous.
- 3 October: Continued control of aircraft. 81 flights of a total of 159 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 10 Close Air Support,
 32 Deep Support,
 7 Combat Air Patrols,
 32 Miscellaneous.
- 4 October: Continued control of aircraft. 82 flights of a total of 160 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 9 Close Air Support,
 36 Deep Support,
 9 Combat Air Patrols,
 4 Photo,
 24 Miscellaneous.

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SECTION I NTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

- 5 October: Continued control of aircraft. 87 flights of a total of 154 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 6 Close Air Support.
 25 Deep Support.
 9 Combat Air Patrols.
 3 Photo.
 21 Miscellaneous.
- 6 October: Continued control of aircraft. 92 flights of a total of 172 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 2 Close Air Support
 35 Deep Support.
 9 Combat Air Patrols.
 4 Photo.
 42 Miscellaneous.
- 7 October: Continued control of aircraft. 110 flights of a total of 187 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 53 Deep Support.
 5 Combat Air Patrols.
 2 Photo.
 50 Miscellaneous.
- 8 October: Continued control of aircraft. 104 flights of a total of 203 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 11 Close Air Support.
 69 Deep Support.
 2 Photo.
 22 Miscellaneous.
- 9 October: Continued control of aircraft. 110 flights of a total of 191 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 12 Close Air Support.
 75 Deep Support.
 8 Photo.
 15 Miscellaneous.
 This date concluded operations included on this Special Action Report. 1539 flights of a total 3672 aircraft were controlled during this period.

NOTE: Miscellaneous Missions include the following:

Air Evacuation
 Air Supply Drop
 Naval Gunfire Spot
 Message Drops
 Leaflet Drops
 Search and Rescue
 Helicopter
 Observation
 Transient
 Anti-Submarine Patrol
 Anti-Mine Patrol

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SECTION I MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

8. ENEMY TACTICS.

Not applicable.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS.

Not applicable.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. From the 28 August 1950 table of organization D-106 (w) Revision -), it is assumed that the general concept of the utilization of the air control system will be one of a Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron with attached Ground Control Intercept Squadrons, under the Air Wing. From the experience gained in this operation, it is felt that the experience gained in this operation, it is felt that the basic employment of the air control system should be at Marine Air Control Group level. The employment of the Marine Air Control Group would have the additional advantage of alleviating the squadron of much of the present administrative and logistical effort required to effectively accomplish the mission of this organization. In addition it would provide staff officers to effect liaison between all of the echelons of other services and would bring about a and more workable air control system. The supply system for the squadrons within the control organization should be at Group level and not at squadron level as is indicated in the present table of organization. The basic reasoning behind this recommended employment is that the burden of as much logistical and administrative effort as possible should be lifted from the squadrons and leave them free to perform their tactical mission.

(1) In paragraph 10 of Section II of this report is a recommended table of organization which encompasses all recommended changes to the Table of Organization for the Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.

B. It is recommended that whenever a Tactical Air Commander is assigned a sector of responsibility for control of aircraft that he should have, within the task organization and at his immediate disposal, search and rescue facilities to meet the requirements of this area.

11. ANNEXES.

Not applicable.

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SECTION I MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

12. UNIT STATION LIST.

NAME	RANK	SER NO	MOS	DATE JOINED	COMP
AUSMAN, Charles W.	1stLt	035755	6710	31Aug50	USMCR
BAITES, Lonnie F.	1stLt	047059	7302	1Jun50	USMC
BRUCE, Vernon W.	1stLt	028088	7302	27Sep50	USMC
CHANDLER, Robert W.	Lt(jg)	049879	DCR	1Jan50	USNR
ETHERIDGE, James A.	Major	010128	7303	2Aug49	USMC
FEES, Fred J.	1stLt	039447	7302	2Sep50	USMC
HALLMEYER, Wallace H.	Capt	011954	3710	27Sep50	USMCR
JARAND, Paul A.	Lt(jg)	487699	MC	31Aug50	USNR
JESSUP, Foster H.	Capt	019182	6710	31Aug50	USMCR
LAHLBERG, Dwayne R.	1stLt	029540	7302	2Sep50	USMCR
MARSHALL, John B. Jr.	1stLt	031541	7303	12Feb50	USMC
MATHESON, Kenneth A.	Capt	029114	7301	13Dec49	USMC
MELVIN, Martin J. Jr.	1stLt	032024	0130	31Aug50	USMCR
O'NEIL, John L. Jr.	WO	044113	6701	31Aug50	USMCR
OSTREYKO, Nick J.	1stLt	032041	2710	31Aug50	USMCR
PERTLE, Lester C.	Capt	034970	2710	31Aug50	USMCR
READ, John E.	1stLt	037123	7302	2Sep50	USMCR
STIGALL, Robert L.	1stLt	026502	7302	2Sep50	USMC
WASHBURN, Arthur R.	1stLt	029574	7302	2Sep50	USMCR

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SECTION II

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SECTION

1. INTRODUCTION.

A. This report is submitted to cover the activities of the Close Air Support Section, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 during the INCHON-SEOUL-KIMPO operation from 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950.

B. The Close Air Support Section, MarTACRon 2, was assigned the mission of providing the control facilities for close air support aircraft within the X Corps Tactical Air Command zone of responsibility.

C. During the period covered by this report the next higher echelon administratively and logistically was Marine Aircraft Group 33 and operationally the Tactical Air Commander, X Corps.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION.

A. There were no attached or subordinate organizations.

B. The strength of the Close Air Support Section was sixteen (16) Marine officers, eighty-nine (89) Marine enlisted and three (3) Navy enlisted.

C. The Officer in Charge of the Close Air Support Section was Major Christian C. LEE, U. S. Marine Corps. The Commanding Officer of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 was Major Christian C. LEE, U. S. Marine Corps.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

Not applicable.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS.

No applicable.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

A. On 7 September 1950 the Close Air Support Section, MarTACRon 2 was located in a schoolhouse in the city of CHINHAE, KOREA. The Section moved from this location at 1000 10 September 1950 and loaded aboard LST Q-079 at the CHINHAE Naval Base. Loading was completed at 1700 and all personnel were embarked. The LST was underway at 2000 and docked at PUSAN at 1300, 11 September. Additional supplies were loaded aboard during the afternoon and at 1900 the LST was again underway.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA.

A. During the period 11 September to 15 September the LST Q-079 was underway to the objective area. The Close Air Support Section arrived at INCHON Harbor the afternoon of 15 September and beached at 1830, 16 September.

7. ASSAULT PHASE (NARRATIVE).

A. The unloading of equipment was completed at 2330, 16 September 1950. Personnel went ashore at dawn the morning of 17 September and at 1000 the movement of personnel

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

and equipment to a schoolhouse 3 miles northeast of INCHON at target area 9347 T was completed. All communications equipment was in operation at 1400, 17 September. On 20 September personnel and equipment moved to a position 2 1/2 miles southeast of Kimpo airfield at target area 0757 S and remained at this location until 29 September. On this date the Section moved to SEOUL at target area 2157 G.

B. On 17 September, no aircraft were controlled.

- 18 September: 12 flights of a total of 37 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 7 Search and attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 4 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 1st Marines
 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 1st Marines
- 19 September: 15 flights of a total of 80 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 9 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Marines.
 4 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 5thMarines.
 1 Close Support, controlled by VMO-6.
- 20 September: 22 flights of a total of 109 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 13 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 1stMarines.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 1stMarines
 3 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 5thMarines.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Marines.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 32ndInf Reg., USA.
- 21 September: 18 flights of a total of 104 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 13 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 5thMarines.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 32ndInf., Reg., USA.
 1 Close Support, controlled by VMO-6.
- 22 September: 24 flights of a total of 72 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 8 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 11 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 5thMarines.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 5thMarines.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 32ndInf., Reg., USA.
- 23 September: 25 flights of a total of 72 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 13 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn 32ndInf, USA
 1 Close Support, controlled by 32ndInf, USA,
 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 5thMarines.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 32ndInf, USA
 1 Close Support, controlled by ROK
 1 Close Support, controlled by 7th Marines.

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SECTION II NTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

- 24 September: 26 flights of a total of 103 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 16 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 5thMar.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 7thMar.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 32nd Inf., Reg. USA.
 1 Close Support controlled by 1stBn, 5thMar.
 1 Close Support controlled by 1stBn, 1stMar.
- 25 September: 30 flights of a total of 140 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 17 Search and Attack, controlled by the Close Air Support Section
 2 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn 32ndInf.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn 5thMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 7th Marines.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn 1stMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 31stInf.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 5thMar.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 7th Marines
 1 Close Support, controlled by VMO-6.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn 32ndInf.
- 26 September: 31 flights of a total of 102 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 22 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 3 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 1stMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 32ndInf.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 1stMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 31stInf.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 7thMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 31stInf.
- 27 September: 29 flights of a total of 106 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 11 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 5 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 1stMar.
 4 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 7thMar.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 5thMar.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 7thMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 7thMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by VMO-6.
 4 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 32ndInf.
- 28 September: 9 flights of a total of 67 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 5 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 1 Close Support, controlled by VMO-6
 1 Close Support, controlled by 187th Airborne.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 1stBn, 7thMar.
- 29 September: 8 flights of a total of 93 aircraft were controlled on the following missions:
 4 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 1stMarines.
 2 Close Support, controlled by 2ndBn, 1stMar.
 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rdBn, 7thMar.

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SECTION II ITACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

30 September: 30 flights of a total of 93 aircraft were controlled on the following missions: 17 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section;

1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 7thMar; 1 Close Support, controlled by 2nd Bn, 7thMar; 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rd Bn, 7thMar; 1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 17thMar.

1 October: 20 flights of a total of 86 aircraft were controlled on the following missions: 14 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section;

1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 7thMar; 1 Close Support, controlled by 2nd Bn, 7thMar; 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rd Bn, 7thMar; 1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 17thMar; 1 Close Support, controlled by 2nd Bn, 17thMar; 3 Close Support, controlled by 3rd Bn, 7thMar.

2 October: 17 flights of a total of 76 aircraft were controlled on the following missions: 2 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section;

5 Close Support, controlled by 3rd Bn, 6thMar; 2 Close Support, controlled by 7th Marines; 6 Close Support, controlled by ROK, 17thReg; 2 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 7thMar.

3 October: 15 flights of a total of 46 aircraft were controlled on the following missions: 2 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section;

2 Close Support, controlled by 7th Marines; 5 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 7thMar; 3 Close Support, controlled by 3rd Bn, 5thMar; 3 Close Support, controlled by 3rd Bn, 7thMar.

4 October: 11 flights of a total of 53 aircraft were controlled on the following missions: 3 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section;

1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Marines; 2 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 7thMar; 2 Close Support, controlled by ROK, 17thReg; 2 Close Support, controlled by 3Bn, 7thMarines; 1 Close Support, controlled by 2nd Bn, 32ndInf.

5 October: 7 flights of a total of 35 aircraft were controlled on the following missions: 3 Search and Attack, controlled by Close Air Support Section;

1 Close Support, controlled by 1st Bn, 17thInf; 1 Close Support, controlled by 3rd Bn, 32ndInf; 2 Close Support, controlled by 2nd Bn, 7thMarines.

C. During the period of 20 September to 25 September 1950, while this section was located 2 1/2 miles southeast of KIMPO airfield, at target area O757-X, sporadic enemy artillery fire was received in the immediate area of the Command Post and encampment of this section. It is believed that the defiladed position of the CP and encampment prevented casualties to personnel or damage to equipment.

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8. ENEMY TACTICS.

Not applicable.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS.

Not applicable.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

This report is a summary of recommendations and comments arrived at by this organization during its operations in the KOREAN Campaign. The following subdivisions have been established to better collate the information presented.

A. COMMENTS.

- (1) Communications.
- (2) Command Relationships.
- (3) MarTACRon Table of Organization.
- (4) Tactical Air Coordination.
- (5) Radar Control for Close Air Support.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS.

- (1) Communication Equipment.
 - (a) Recommended modifications for existing equipment.
 - (b) Recommendations for new equipment.
- (2) Table of Organization.

C. ENEMY TACTICS.

- (1) COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) The Close Air Support Section of MarTACRon-2 was being reorganized at the outbreak of the KOREAN war, and much of its communications equipment, at least the manner in which it was to be employed, was still in the development stages. However, techniques had been developed sufficiently so that it was known that the system being used was a workable one, and tactical operations against the enemy were begun with the idea in mind that techniques and equipment would be improved upon as the operation progressed. The basic principles that this unit established for communication within the MarTACRon have remained unchanged. This is accomplished by employing a control center into which all radio communications are remoted. A simply designed switching console (patch panel) is used to route the remoted radio circuits to their proper position within the center. To keep interference between the various equipments at a minimum, the various units are physically separated within the limits of the remotes and the terrain conditions. The KOREAN campaign has shown no weakness existing within the foregoing basic ideas of communications employment.

(b) The radio equipments used in this campaign were the MBB-3, the SCR-399, and the AN/WIG-1. From the first part of this campaign, it became apparent that some changes in the radio equipments used were necessary. The MBB-3 and the SCR-399 units proved to be too large and bulky for use by the Air Support Section. Their weight was much too heavy for many of the bridges encountered, and their overall height was too high for many of the tunnels and underpasses. In one

the Close Air Support Section of MarTACRon-2 was being reorganized at the outbreak of the Korean war, and much of its communications equipment, at least the manner in which it was to be employed, was still in the development stages. However, techniques had been developed sufficiently so that it was known that the system being used was a workable one, and tactical operations against the enemy were begun with the idea in mind that techniques and equipment would be improved upon as the operation progressed. The basic principles that this unit established for communication within the MarTACRon have remained unchanged. This is accomplished by employing a control center into which all radio communications are remoted. A simply designed switching console (patch panel) is used to route the remoted radio circuits to their proper position within the center. To keep interference between the various equipments at a minimum, the various units are physically separated within the limits of the remotes and the terrain conditions. The KOREAN campaign has shown no weakness existing within the foregoing basic ideas of communications employment.

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particular instance the entire Air Support convoy had to drive an extra 40 miles because of the load limitations on one of the bridges along the proposed route. Also concealment against enemy observation when they are still mounted in their transporting 6X6 cargo trucks, is very difficult. The AN/VRC-1 equipments has a serious limitation in that MHF communications over a 15 mile range are a rare occurrence. It became difficult for the Air Support Section to locate itself in such a place that this range limitation would not be exceeded for any of the subordinate units it has to support. If the Air Support mission is to be properly accomplished, it is mandatory that this MHF communications link be functioning at all times. With the Marine Corps participating in mass land warfare long after the amphibious assault phase was finished, the separation of the units to be supported became even greater, and a system of radio relays was established. In some instances an aircraft provided the necessary relay, and at other times a SCR-399 was used, but in both of these situations, delay and confusion resulted, and the efficiency of the entire mission suffered.

(c) With the foregoing limitations in view, two sets of recommendations are being incorporated in this report. One set will contain suggested changes in existing equipments to bring about a better solution to our problems in the immediate future. The other set of recommendations will contain specifications for an entire new control facility incorporating ideas and equipments that should provide a ready means of carrying out any control mission.

(d) Throughout both the SOUTH KOREA and the INCHON-SEOUL-KINPO campaigns there was considerable interference on all MHF radio nets used by this section. This interference caused a noticeable drop in operating efficiency of this section. It is felt that with the added importance that Air has played in the role of supporting arm in this campaign that special consideration should be given to allotting clear channel frequencies for the Tactical Air Command and the Tactical Air Request nets. Additional consideration should be given to the allotting of secondary frequencies for these two nets in the event that atmospheric conditions do not permit satisfactory communications on the primary nets. This also would provide an alternate communications channel in the event that radio jamming is used against the primary frequencies. It is believed that future training programs should place considerable emphasis on techniques to be used when jamming is employed against friendly units. At the present time, enemy jamming of any of the basic MHF frequencies used by this squadron would virtually paralyze operations of this and other control agencies.

(2) COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.

(a) A study of the operational control of the Close Air Support Section should be made to determine whether the Air Wing (or Tactical Air Commander) or the Division, Corps, or Landing Force Commander, should have operational control of the Close Air Support Section insofar as its physical location is concerned. It is suggested that when the tactical situation necessitates the separation of the Close Air Support Section from the Tactical Air Control Center that this Section be included on the respective Ground Commanders

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movement order. Close liaison between the Air and Ground Commanders will be necessary to insure that the location of this Section follows the basic communication requirements.

(3) MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SQUADRON T/O.

From the 28 August 1950 table of organization (D-106-(w), Revision 1), it is assumed that the general concept of the utilization of the air control system will be one of a MarTACRon with attached Ground Control Intercept Squadrons, under the Air Wing. If this assumption is correct, we have the MarTACRon, with its mission of providing, maintaining, and operating the facilities for control of all aircraft in the objective area, by the Tactical Air Commander, with the additional burden of the logistical and administrative support of the attached Ground Control Intercept Squadrons. It is felt that the basic employment of the Control Organization should be at Marine Air Control Group level, so that the Group Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron could provide the four tactical squadrons, within the control organization, with this logistical and administrative support. In order for the squadrons to carry out their basic missions most efficiently and expeditiously, it is felt that they should not be burdened with these additional logistical and administrative duties. In addition to the foregoing, the procurement of personnel for the Air Support Section of the Tactical Air Control Center from the attached Ground Control Intercept Squadrons, seems to be a concept of employment that is not followed by this Command. With this type of organization, the training of these personnel will be the responsibility of the respective Ground Control Intercept Squadron Commanders, who have no requirement for these personnel within their mission, and their utilization in the field will be the responsibility of the MarTACRon commander who has had no say in this training. The employment of the Marine Air Control Group with one MarTACRon and three Ground Control Intercept Squadrons under the Air Wing would provide a more efficient organization for the air control system. In addition, assigning a General Officer to this Air Control Group, would provide all of the personnel necessary to staff the Tactical Air Command. This addition of a General Officer to the Air Control Group would place all of the personnel in the control system in one central and consolidated organization. This Marine Air Control Group Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron would also provide the necessary logistical and administrative effort required for all of the attached squadrons. There is contained within the recommendations of this report a recommendation for a new table of organization for the MarTACRon, based on this concept of employment.

(4) TACTICAL AIR COORDINATOR.

Another phase of the Close Air Support mission is the employment of airborne control directly over the target area. The use of the Tactical Air Coordinator, as explained by USF publications, is ideal for the mission. However, the type aircraft used as airborne control has varied greatly during the KOREAN campaign, and each type has certain advantages and limitations. The use of VF aircraft as a Tactical Air Coordinator, provides excellent means of target designation to the striking aircraft through the use of smoke rockets or by strafing. Also the striking aircraft can join up on

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the Tactical Air Coordinator and somewhat better coordination of the strike is effected. However, observation of the ground situation is not too good from a VF type aircraft due to its speed. Unless the Tactical Air Coordinator has been very well briefed before being airborne, positive target identifications in the vicinity of friendly units, becomes difficult. An OY-1 has no normal ordnance, and the stalking VF cannot join up on him for a dummy run over the target. Smoke grenades have been employed to good advantage under these circumstances. It is realized that the OY-1 should not be employed beyond gliding distance of the front lines due to its vulnerability to anti-aircraft or enemy air, but it has been used with great effectiveness in this campaign on this type of mission, and consideration should be given to this type of control in any future standardizing of Tactical Air Coordinator employment. Another use of OY-1 aircraft in the close air support mission is the wealth of intelligence information available to the control center from this source. The OY-1 does not normally carry VHF radio equipment. To properly carry out the TAC mission, it is mandatory that VHF communications be made available to OY observer. It is strongly recommended that VHF transceivers be made standard equipment in this aircraft in addition to present MHF equipment now in use.

(5) RADAR CONTROL FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.

The development of an electronic aid similar to the AN/MPQ-2A, but with a great reduction in size and weight, is a much needed substitution in the positive ground control system for night work or during inclement weather. The present AN/MPQ-2A could not be used in the current KOREAN campaign due to its lack of mobility over the rough terrain conditions. Bridges particularly made it impossible to transport this equipment into the combat area. The development of a light, mobile equipment that will furnish this electronic aid, along with the incorporation into the standard Night and All Weather Fighter Syllabus of this type of training, would greatly facilitate the employment of this aircraft in close air support missions under night or inclement weather conditions. At present, a certain amount of coordination and control during the above conditions can be provided by the MRD-8 (VHF homing equipment, direction finding equipment). Due to the multiplicity of uses that can be found for this equipment, it is strongly recommended that this unit be made an item of basic allowance for both the Air Defense and Close Air Support Section of the MartACRON.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(1) Communication Equipment.

(a) Recommended Modification to Existing Equipment.

Until such time as the hereinafter recommended communication equipment (or other similar equipment suitable for this employment) is available to the MartACRON, the following modifications in existing equipments are recommended.

(i) Specially designed shock mounts must be provided for all component units in the receiver van of the MBB-5 equipment. The rough roads and rugged terrain encountered

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SECTION II TACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

in KOREA caused several receiver mounts and shelves to break loose from the walls of the van. The resulting damage can well be imagined. It was necessary to effect these many repairs in the field, and to remount all of the component units in a more sturdy manner, before proper operations could be resumed.

(ii) Wiring changes should be made to eliminate the patch panel now in use in the MBB-3 receiver van. The wiring in this patch panel causes an undue amount of cross-talk which is eliminated when the panel is removed.

(iii) Two ARC-1 transceivers should be added to the component units of the MBB-3 receiver van. These can be fitted easily into the extra space available on the shelves in the van. Antenna mountings for these equipments should be located near the top at the corners of the van. These mountings should be removable if they are unprotected to a degree where they would be subjected to external abuse when the vehicle is in motion. The mountings on separate corners provides sufficient antenna displacement to avoid interference between the two VHF sets. A suitable power pack to provide the required voltages to the ARC-1 equipments will also be required.

(iv) The TCM transmitter in the MBB-3 transmitter van should be replaced with two smaller MHF transmitters having a Navy rating of 60 watts when voice modulated. Another MHF channel is required to man all nets required by USF publications.

(v) The antenna lead-in wires for the TCS equipment could be shortened. This would eliminate some of the RF loss now present in this lead-in which becomes appreciable in a low powered equipment of this type.

(b) Recommendations for New Equipment.

(1) In the accomplishment of the Close Air Support Mission, it has become apparent that there is a decided need for some communication equipment that will be particularly adaptable for this work. With this in mind, some specialized radio equipment, with the following characteristics, is recommended to replace the existing units now in use within the air control organization. (Note: MBB-3, SCR-399, SCR-573, SCR-574) This new recommended equipment embodies improvements in ability to conceal, utilization of motor transport, size, mobility, weight, compactness, remote operation, antenna displacement and adaptability to use by the Tactical Air Control Squadron. In addition, it is felt that this equipment will be equally suited for use in Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadrons, field aircraft tower control installations and many other situations where both VHF and MHF communications requirements are in demand. This new unit contains the following components:

Two (2) MHF transmitters.

Two (2) MHF receivers.

Two (2) VHF transceivers.

Antennas, remote operation facilities, mounting, power supply.

These component units would be mounted in a van constructed on a trailer similar to that used for the transportation of searchlights.

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(A) MHF TRANSMITTERS.

The MHF transmitters shall be Navy rated 100 watt, voice modulated. The component parts of each of these transmitters shall be of interchangeable drawer type units. All transmitters must be equipped for both master oscillator and crystal control, utilizing appropriate ovens for proper crystal temperature maintenance. (Comment: It is hoped that future operation orders will provide similar frequencies for successive operations to permit crystal controlled frequency stability on all radio nets authorized for use by the Close Air Support Section.) These transmitters shall have a continuous frequency range of from 1750 kc to 15,000 kc.

(B) MHF RECEIVERS.

The MHF receivers shall be of a standard high quality communications type utilizing all receiving aids, such as crystal phasing, automatic volume control, beat frequency oscillator for CW reception and the like. These receivers shall have a minimum frequency range as for the transmitters noted above. Incorporated in the input end of this receiver shall be a wave trap or other filter network to permit tuning out any undesirable local signals of strong magnitude in the MHF frequency range which might bombard the receiver and cause interference.

(C) MHF TRANSCEIVERS.

The VHF transceivers shall be of standard aviation type with a minimum of ten channel operation without resorting to crystal changes and subsequent retuning. The ARC-1 is an equipment that has proved very satisfactory for this purpose. (Note: If and when UHF becomes available, the substitution of the UHF for the ARC-1 will be feasible.)

(D) ANTENNAS.

Antenna mountings for this radio van shall be such that four fixed mountings (possibly one on each corner) be used for the operation of all the component equipments contained. In regard to MHF transmitters and receivers, relay operations shall be provided so that the same antenna may be used for both receiving and transmitting on the same frequency. In addition to this, transmission lines of the characteristic impedance type shall be available to permit antenna displacement to a distance of 1500 feet. These remote antennas may be either of the whip type or the long wire type as dictated by the needs of the tactical situation. In regard to a remote whip type installation a suitable base for supporting the whip must be provided. It is also realized that a small tuning unit will be required to match impedance from the flat line to the whip antenna at its remote position. This displaced antenna installation shall be applicable as well to the VHF antenna at its remote position. All antenna remote lines for the entire van shall be similar in order that an interchange of these lines may be used as needed. (Note: It is realized that the great frequency differences may make the design of a universal antenna transmission feeder difficult, however, such a design would greatly facilitate operations in the field.)

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

(E) REMOTE OPERATIONS.

It is intended that the above recommended radio equipment be used in connection with the Tactical Air Direction Center or the Tactical Air Control Center as presently set forth in USAF publications. In order to permit this type of operation, all equipments within this van must be adapted for remote operation from the control centers. All remote connections for this van shall terminate in a single suitable ordnance or other type receptacle. This receptacle shall have its counterpart in a plug which shall be the termination of a single cable running between this van and the control center. This cable must be of the proper shielded construction to preclude any possibility of cross talk or other interference developing along its length. It is further realized that proper impedance matching to standard headsets and microphones at this remote distance will not be obtained. However, our experience in the field has proved conclusively that the slight mismatch, attenuation or other interference present in this situation may be considered negligible. A simple adapter plug or device shall be furnished with this cable to permit easy access to any one of the transmitting or receiving circuits available within the master cable. The termination receptacle of this adapter shall be of an identical type to that specified for use with the controllers table described in another section of this report.

(F) MOUNTING OF ORGANIC EQUIPMENT.

The mounting of the organic equipments contained in this van must be of the shock mounted type and of a construction sufficiently rigid to preclude any possibility of damage or breakage under the most rugged terrain conditions. The actual placement of the units will necessarily be the subject of considerable engineering application, however, it is suggested that all of the unit components be faced outboard from the center of the van. This makes necessary all tuning procedures, drawer component replacing and other similar work be done at the exterior faces of the van. This may be accomplished by using suitable ingress and egress doors for each of the respective units. The van itself should be of light, durable construction but must have sufficient strength to withstand the normal hard usage obtained in the field. The construction shall be made further water tight to afford the proper shelter against the elements and appropriate protection in amphibious operations. (Note: It is not intended that the actual van housing be absolutely water tight, but shall be of such design that simple modification kits, utilizing masking tape and similar materials, can make this unit suitable for amphibious operations.) It is recommended that the maximum overall height of this van not exceed seven (7) feet. Within the confines of the van there shall be room for the remote operating cable, antenna remote cables, antenna base mountings, and required field operating spares. Additional space will have to be provided for the dynamotors which will supply proper voltages for the aviation type VHF units. Proper moisture control within the van should be given consideration. Basic maintenance tools, and test equipment shall be included with this equipment.

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SECTION II NTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

(G) POWER SUPPLY.

All power furnished to this unit shall be admitted through a single receptacle and shall be 110 volt 60 cycle AC current. The power cable for this unit shall be of a standard type to permit a variety of power sources, utilizing either standard armed forces type generators or commercial power.

(11) TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY RADIO EQUIPMENT.

In the accomplishment of the close air support mission, it has become apparent that there is a decided need for some communications equipment that will be particularly adapted for use by the Forward Air Controllers and the Close Air Support Section. The AN/VRC-1 or AN/MRC-19 radio jeep has proven adequate radio equipment for this mission, but has serious limitations that can be overcome by incorporating the following changes. It is believed that this unit should be mounted in a weasel which would permit more available space and better ease in operation over difficult terrain. Recommendations will be made as noted below for remote operating positions and for antenna displacement. This necessitates space for the operating equipment and storage for cables of considerable lengths. It is believed that the weasel can be readily adapted to provide suitable space for the operating equipment and storage of the necessary cables as well. The foregoing method of providing transportation for this equipment is merely a suggestion and serious consideration by competent motor transport authorities should be given before a decision is reached as to the most ideally suited vehicle to be used. These recommendations are made with the sole purpose in mind of providing better communications between the Tactical Air Control Parties and the Close Air Support Section of the Air Control Organization. It should be noted however, that this unit can be readily adapted to other uses particularly in the case of recent operations being conducted utilizing small ground control intercept parties in connection with the air defense picture. This unit will contain the following components: MHF Transmitters, MHF Receiver, Antenna, Remote Control Facilities, Power Supply and VHF Transiever.

(A) MHF TRANSMITTER.

The MHF transmitter shall be of an aviation type having a Navy rated output of 30 watts for voice modulation operation. This transmitter shall have frequency selection of both the master variable oscillator and crystal control types. The crystal frequencies shall permit a minimum of four band changes without resorting to retuning, and the crystals themselves shall be contained in suitable ovens to maintain a maximum of frequency stability considered necessary for this type of field operation. (Note: The ART-13 or ATC-1 equipment should provide these requirements satisfactorily).

(B) MHF RECEIVERS.

The MHF receiver here again shall be of the aircraft type and shall embody all normal receiving aids consistent to modern communications doctrine.

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(C) VHF TRANSCEIVER.

The VHF Transceiver shall be of the aviation type and shall be capable of operating on a minimum of four channels, however, the ARC-1 equipment appears very suitable for use in this instance and the possibility of having ten channel operation will permit this equipment a wide latitude of uses.

(D) ANTENNAS.

Antenna mountings for this unit shall be of the conventional type found in mobile equipment now in use. In addition, these antennas shall be provided with means of remoting both the VHF and MHF radiators. This should be accomplished by using a transmission line of the characteristic impedance type and should be a maximum of 1,500 feet. In the case of the MHF antenna operation, the whip type or the flat top type must be available. It is realized that a small tuning unit must be used at the base of the remoted whip type antenna to properly match the impedance over a wide range of frequencies. For both MHF and VHF antennas, a suitable base mounting must be provided for antenna use at the displaced position.

(E) REMOTE OPERATION.

These equipments shall be so designed that the actual operators position may be dispatched from the vehicle a maximum distance of 1,500 feet. Some arguments may be raised that remote operation at this distance is difficult without resorting to additional amplifiers or other impedance matching networks. However, in the experience of this organization in the field, the resulting mismatch attenuation and other interference may be considered negligible. A single cable can be utilized to carry all facilities required at the remote operator's position.

(F) MOUNTING OF ORGANIC EQUIPMENT.

The mounting of these equipments shall follow conventional practices now in effect. Normal consideration must be given to shock mounting and rigidity of construction that will be required when operating under the most difficult conditions.

(G) POWER SUPPLY.

The power supply for this unit shall be of the conventional aviation type that will supply the voltages required by the component units of this equipment and shall have a dynamotor driven by the internal combustion engine equipment used to propel the vehicle. Consideration should be given to coupling the dynamotor to the engine in such a manner as to provide a fairly constant dynamotor speed both when the vehicle is moving and when it is stationary. In the event space limitation will allow, it is recommended that a power pac be provided which would permit equipment operation from an exterior 110 volt AC source.

(iii) CONTROL CENTER.

Recent experience of the MarTACRon has proven that the use of locally constructed equipment is adequate

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SECTION II NTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

for the mission of the squadron and far superior to the use of the AN/TTQ-1. With this experience in mind, the following equipment is recommended for use in the control centers of the WarTACRON and other units where coordination or control centers are required. The design of this equipment shall be such as to permit a maximum of flexibility in all the components throughout the center. Each unit is intended to be basic in itself and any number of these units may be employed in any manner desired to care for the requirements of any given tactical situation. With these basic requirements, it can be seen that these equipments will readily adapt themselves to both amphibious operations and to air transportability. To properly outline the ideas and recommendations that have been developed, the below listed components will be discussed separately:

- A. Controllers Table.
- B. Switching Central (patch panel).
- C. Status and plotting boards.
- D. Control Center housing.

(A) CONTROLLERS TABLE.

This controllers table shall be considered the basic unit in the development of any control or coordination center designed. The table top shall be 24 inches by 36 inches overall, and shall be of standard desk height. The legs shall be of the folding type equipped with a suitable hinged base plate to provide stability in soft ground. The top of this table shall be provided with a removable plexiglas covering to facilitate the marking of information on this space and the placement underneath of papers and forms containing information necessary to the proper performance of the controllers duties. The edges of the table shall be so designed that when similar units abutt them, a continuous top surface will result. Provisions shall be made to provide devices for interlocking so similar units on both sides and at the rear of the table. The interlocking device shall be so arranged that either two ends or one end and one rear side of similar tables may be joined. Each table will be provided with an outlet box. This box will provide jacks for use in remote radio operation. If a single receptacle can be provided for both microphone and headset, (head and chest set) this is desirable. Within the radio receiving lines there shall be incorporated a potentiometer across the line to provide volume control at the local position. In addition to the radio facilities, there shall be included one telephone hand set hanging from an appropriate cradle with a preformed coiled cord. A drop mechanism, which will provide both visual and audio attention to an incoming call, without resorting to the use of lights, shall be provided. A ringer of the button type, to attract the switchboard operators attention, is specified in preference to the hand generator type. Separate termination at the outside of the box shall be provided; one receptacle for the radio and one for the telephone. The physical location of this termination box shall be at the forward left hand corner of the table with proper clearances being provided so that the cradled handset will not be subject to external abuse. It shall also be mounted beneath the table top leaving the entire work table area free of obstructions. All connections, terminations and other equipment within this box shall be properly shielded to preclude any possibility of

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cross talk developing. It is intended that the apron or skirt used to make the frame of the table shall be of sufficient depth to provide storage space for the handset and or microphone, head and chest set, when the table is in the traveling position. The use of the telephone and radio from any two positions will also provide for easy relay for HF and VHF communications. It is also believed that the termination box should be so designed as to be flush mounted within the confines of the apron. Included as an integral part of this unit will be one steel, padded, folding type, chair with a padded back. To place this unit in the traveling position, the hand sets, head sets, microphones, and the two twenty-four (24) foot cables, (hereinafter described that connect the controllers table with the patch panel), will be stowed in their appropriate places. The chair will be folded and also stowed within the apron, and then the legs of the table will be folded. To secure the legs to the table in the folded position, two metal straps will be used. One end of the strap shall be hinged and the other end secured with a suitable fastener. These straps shall have another important use in that they shall provide cable support when the unit is in the operating position. The entire unit shall be placed in a light, sturdy carrying case designed especially to receive this unit.

(B) PATCH PANEL

In order to properly provide the flexibility desired for remoted communications positions within the control center, it is necessary that a switching station in the form of a patch panel be provided. Here again it is intended that this particular unit shall be so designed that any multiple of them may be used to meet the requirements of any given tactical situation. It is proposed that a single panel of this type be made to handle twelve (12) separate radio communications channels. In addition to the twelve (12) channels, it is desired that a separate monitoring station be made available for each of the receiving input terminals to this panel. The design shall be so arranged that receiving circuits and transmitting circuits are made available separately on the patch panel. Basically, we will then require one output jack for the transmitting channels to each of the twelve (12) remotely located transmitters. In the case of the receiving circuits of these same twelve (12) remoted equipments, two (2) paralleled output jacks will be required. On the outgoing side of the switching station the exact duplicate arrangement will be necessary. One jack to carry the transmitting circuit for each transmitter and two (2) paralleled jacks for each receiving circuit. Each termination for a circuit leaving the switching console shall be of an ordnance type or other similar type receptacle. Input receptacles for this unit shall be of the ordnance type receptacle capable of carrying four transmitting and four receiving channels in each of the input cables. Color coated patch cords, one for transmitting and one for receiving, shall be provided with this unit in a number sufficient to completely utilize all of the positions available at the switching console. In addition to this, similarly colored patch cords

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of a length approximately twice as long as the standard cord, shall be provided for instances in which an adjacent similar switching station is employed. To carry the various circuits on the output side of the patch panel to the various controller tables, a single cable will be employed. This cable will have a standard length of twenty-four (24) feet and shall terminate in such a manner that connections of the ordnance type will be easily facilitated between the switching central and the outlet box at the controllers position. Male and female outlets shall be so arranged that this cable may be extended by using a like cable of identical type.

As an auxiliary to the patch panel, it is necessary that a special selector console be provided. In this particular console, it shall be possible to transmit and receive on any one of the twelve (12) transmitting and receiving channels available at the output side of the switching central. This selector console shall consist of twelve switches of the "push to talk" or equivalent type. Each switch shall have sufficient poles to completely energize or deenergize an entire transmitting or receiving circuit. The output side of all switches shall terminate in a single receptacle containing the standard number of conductors used for the outlet box at the controllers table. A short cable shall connect the output of the selector console to the controller's table outlet box. A single cable of the required number of conductors shall be provided to make the necessary circuits from the output side of the switching central to the selector console. This cable shall be twenty (20) feet in length. Here again, male and female outlets shall be so placed that an extension of this cable may be effected using a like cable of identical type. All cables, outlet boxes, terminations, plugs and receptacles shall be such as to provide positive shielding to eliminate the possibility of any cross talk or other interference developing anywhere within the system.

Past experience in the field has shown that it is not necessary to provide variable voltage relays, amplifiers and other devices to bring about a workable system. Items such as these have proved unsatisfactory in the field and much more satisfactory operation is made available without resorting to their use. The cables on the output side of the switching central are those previously mentioned as carried with the controllers table equipment. The cables energizing the patch panel from the remotely located radio vans will be carried in the radio vans. It then becomes necessary that the patching panel provide stowage space for all previously mentioned color coated patch cords plus two selector console cables described above, and the selector console itself, with its short connecting cable, to the controllers position. It is believed that the entire switching central with its auxiliaries, as noted above, can be contained in a single carrying case. It is also believed that in this instance the carrying case can be used as the exterior housing for the switching central when set up in its operating position. This will require appropriate access doors and recessed receptacle positions in order that the unit in its carrying position will not be subject to external abuses normally encountered in the field. It can be readily seen that here again this unit adapts itself ideally to amphibious and to air transportability.

(C) STATUS BOARDS AND VERTICAL PLOTTING BOARDS.

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

To provide a completely flexible system, using the facilities normally required for any control or coordination center, it is necessary that a uniform status situation or plotting board, of the vertical type, be provided. With this thought in mind, the following design of a single unit capable of multi unit use, is recommended.

It is believed that the basic board size in its operating position should have a working surface of three feet by six feet in dimensions. It will be shown later that a verticle board of double this size is available by merely adding another similar unit. The boards themselves shall consist of three-eighths (3/8) inches plexi-glass sheets, each sheet will have the basic working area of three by three feet square. The frame for this board shall be made of hollow metal fabrication, having a square cross section of five inches. The metal used in making this frame should approximate number sixteen gauge or heavier. This hollow metal frame will border the plexi-glass sheet at the bottom then proceed vertically a distance of three feet. At this point, a hinge will be incorporated in the design to permit folding when in the carrying position. Above the hinge, the standard hollow metal frame will continue to a point three feet higher and then border the upper sheet of the plexi-glass across the top. The plexi-glass sheets themselves will be rigidly secured to the hollow metal frame continuously along the two abutting edges. It is desired that the plexi-glass be edge lighted to permit necessary visibility of the material written or marked on the plexi-glass. In order to do this, flourescent lights shall be placed inside the hollow metal frame to provide a continuous light penetration at the secured edges of the plexi-glass sheet. Appropriate inspection plate access doors and the like will have to be provided to permit maintenance and replacement of the fluoresecent tubes when required. Wiring and control switching will all be self contained within the hollow metal frame. The stand shall be provided at the bottom of such design as to provide the upmost in rigidity of the erected frame. This stand shall also be of the folding type to permit easy stowage in the traveling position and shall be free from any diagonal braces that might cause obstructions to the personnel working around the board. Each board shall provide facilities for attaching a standard type outlet box recommended elsewhere in this report. This mounting shall place the box in a position free from external abuse. The mountings shall also be constructed so that the outlet boxes may be made to face either to the front or back of the board. In order to place two of these units in the operating position, the free edges of the plexi-glass sheet will be placed to abutt one another and the ends of the hollow metal frame will be locked together at the top and at the bottom. In order to provide for the attachment of more than one board, it is suggested that hinge and pin type locking mechanisms be places on all four corners, front and back of the single unit in the operating position so that an unlimited number of boards may be attached together to form any desired combination of boards. By the simple expedient of withdrawing one of the pins in the double locking mechanism, it would be possible to set the boards at any desired angle to the attached board.

To place this board in the traveling position, each unit is disconnected from its adjacent board. The

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

flexible connection at the center of the verticle column is then unlocked and the upper section of the board folded downward, placing it in a position alongside the lower section. The folding type stands are then placed in their non-operating position. The entire unit is then stowed in the carrying case especially designed for proper protection for this unit.

(iv) POWER.

Recent changes in the power generation systems employed by this organization has shown that a number of advantages can be found through the use of a single high capacity generator (with an alternate similar standby unit) to produce all of the power required by this organization. To accomplish this, a diesel type 15 KW 3 phase 220 volt generator unit was used. It was necessary to make field changes on this unit to bring about the 3 phase 4 wire system. This change permitted 3 phase 220 volt operation of the refrigerator and other associated equipment, and with proper load distribution, 3 separate 110 volt circuits provided power for all the communication facilities, lighting and other needs. In order that generator failure would not put the entire squadron out of operation, a switching power distribution panel was developed to provide almost immediate re-supply of power required from the standby generator. Through using these two larger units, considerable saving in prime movers would be made. Moving an equivalent number of gasoline powered generators necessary to supply the required power would call for more motor transport.

It is recommended that generators similar to the above mentioned type, but of 25 KW capacity, be developed along with the switching and power distribution panels as outlined above. Power cables carrying the load from the distribution panels should be developed to provide a universal power cable to satisfy all distribution requirement likely to be met in the field. A standardized plug shall be placed at the termination of the power cable to permit easy connection to all communications and other electrical equipment necessary for squadron operation. To provide mobility for this unit, a trailer shall be designed which can be pulled with a minimum of tractive effort and still be sufficiently stable to permit movement over rugged terrain conditions. Also in this trailer, storage space shall be provided for all power cables required. The switching and distribution panel shall be mounted for easy accessibility by the operator. For switch-over from main to standby units, a single patch cord between the units should be provided. This patch cord shall be long enough to provide for proper dispersal of the main and standby generators under combat conditions. Adequate interlocking mechanisms shall be provided to prohibit feeding power from one generator to the other. Normal meters, controls, indicator lights and such shall be provided in accordance with current practices with generators now in the field.

(v) SHELTER FOR THE CONTROL CENTER.

To properly house the control center operating in the MartACRon installation, it is recommended that a new

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SECTION II. WTACS-2. SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

type tent be developed. This tent shall have a floor area of sixteen by twenty (16 X 20) feet. The side walls shall have a full height of seven feet. This tent shall follow the normal gabled roof fabrication but the total rise at the center shall not exceed ten (10) feet. To properly support this tent, light, durable metal posts and ridge poles will be provided. There will be ridge poles supporting the top edges of the side walls as well as incorporating a center ridge pole. Knockdown or telescoping devices shall be provided so that the maximum post or ridge pole length shall not exceed seven feet. Within the canvas itself, there shall be provided openings for at least two stove pipes, suitable framing pieces to provide doors on either end with appropriate blackout measures. It is imperative that the tent frame be so fabricated that the entire floor area will be free of any obstructions such as center poles, braces or the like.

(vi) GENERAL DISCUSSION.

The advantages to be found by using the equipment previously described are readily seen; however it is felt that by explaining a few of the most obvious possibilities that a more comprehensive picture of the many utilizations of this equipment can be realized. To provide both Air Defense and Close Air Support in the objective area with communications, it will be necessary to employ the following equipments within the Control System.

The MartACRon will require:

- 9 Radio vans.
- 3 Radio jeeps.
- 2 MRD-8's.
- 1 MPQ2A (new equipment).
- 2 OCM's.
- 10 Status or plotting boards.
- 4 25 KW generators.
- 29 Controller's tables.
- 3 Switching centrals.
- 2 Control center shelters.
- 2 BD-96 telephone switchboards.

When the Air Defense and Close Air Support are employed together, it will be necessary to utilize:

- 6 Radio vans.
- 1 MRD-8.
- 1 MPQ-2A (new equipment).
- 1 OCM, 8 status or plotting boards.
- 4 25 KW generators.
- 23 Controller's tables.
- 2 Switchboard centrals.
- 2 Control center shelters.
- 2 BD-96 telephone switchboards.

When the Air Defense and Close Air Support section are employed separately, the Air Defense Section will require:

- 5 Radio vans.
- 1 MRD-8.
- 1 OCM.

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

- 6 Status or plotting boards.
- 2 25 KW generators.
- 16 Controller's tables.
- 2 Switching centrals.
- 1 Control center shelter.
- 1 BD-96 telephone switchboard.

The Close Air Support Section operating separately, will require:

- 4 Radio vans.
- 3 Radio jeeps.
- 1 WRD-8.
- 1 OCN.
- 1 MPQ-2A (New equipment)
- 4 Status or plotting boards.
- 2 25 KW generators.
- 13 Controller's tables.
- 1 Switching central.
- 1 Control center shelter.
- 1 BD-96 telephone switchboard.

The foregoing picture is complete as far as the communications within the MartACRon is concerned in the tactical situation where this unit is used to support an Amphibious Corps landing.

Additional uses for this equipment can be seen in field tower control operations with either the equipment recommended to replace the An/VRC-1 or the van installation, to provide necessary MHF and VHF radio communications. The controllers table would lend itself to use as the tower operator's position. The remoted antenna principal can be used to a decided advantage in this. The flexibility found in these equipments can readily be adapted to use in the Ground Control Intercept, Fire Support Coordination, and many other control agencies.

The standardization of all radio equipment into three basic transmitter and receiver combinations, greatly facilitates the spare parts problem. Also the fact that much of this equipment is of the aviation type further expedites the procurement of needed electronic spares.

(2) TABLE OF ORGANIZATION.

The following recommended table of organization is based on the following:

That the Air Control system will be employed at Marine Air Control Group Level.

That the personnel of the Close Air Support Section will be a permanent part of the MartACRon.

That the officer strength of the squadron will be increased to provide adequate personnel to man all nets required by USF publications.

That the squadron will be provided with a mess section.

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SECTION II NTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

RECOMMENDED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION FOR MARINE TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SQUADRON.

UNIT	PERSONNEL			LIFTS	
	NA	AG	ENL	FIRST	SECOND
COMMAND SECTION	2			1	1
ADJUTANTS SECTION		1	14	2	13
INTELLIGENCE SECTION	1		2	3	
AIR DEFENSE SECTION	9	11	84	104	
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING	1	3	7	7	4
AIR SUPPORT SECTION	9	16	33	58	
CLOSE SUPPORT RADAR	2	3	20	16	9
FATRIEL SECTION	2	12		7	7
CAMP MAINTENANCE			8	4	4
MESS SECTION			7	5	2
MOTOR TRANSPORT			32	32	
DENTAL SECTION		1	1		2
MEDICAL SECTION		1	7	4	4
TOTAL MARINE CORPS	24	36	219	239	40
TOTAL NAVY		2	8	4	6
AGGREGATE	24	38	227	243	46

UNIT	MOS	NA	AG	ENL	TOT	FIRST LIFT	SUR LIFT
1 COMMAND SECTION	6710	2			2	1	1
2 LtCol. Command Officer		1				1	
3 LtCol. Executive Officer	6710	1					1
4 Adjutants Section							
5 Capt. Adj & PersO	0130		1	14	15	2	13
6 MSgt. Sergeant Major	0149		1				1
7 TSgt. Pers ClassChief	0119			1		1	1
8 Sgt Clerk Typist	0143			1		1	
9 Cpl Clerk Typist	0143			3			3
10 Pfc/Pvt Clerk Typist	0100			1			1
11 Pfc/Pvt Mail&File Clerk	0100			3			3
12 Pfc/Pvt MessageCenterMan	2500			4			4
13 INTELLIGENCE SECTION							
14 Capt. Intello.	6710	1		2	3	3	
15 SSgt AvIntell Clk	7011			1		1	
16 Cpl AvTell Clk.	7011			1		1	
17 AIR DEFENSE SECTION							
18 Maj Officer in Charge	6710	1	9	11	84	104	104
19 Capt Asst OinC	6710			1		1	
20 Capt Air ControlO	6710	3		3		6	
21 Lt Air Defense Cont	7386	5		5		10	
22 Capt CommunicationsO	2502			1		1	
23 Lt AvElectronicsO	6610			1		1	
24 MSgt AvControlMan	6719				1	1	
25 MSgt CommChief	2629			1		1	
26 MSgt AC ElectronicsChf	6619			1		1	
27 MSgt RadRelay&CarrierChf	2660			1		1	
28 TSgt RadRelay&CarrierChf	2669			2		2	
29 TSgt Telephone Tech	2639			1		1	
30 TSgt Air Controlman	6719			3		3	
31 TSgt AvRadioRepairman	6619			2		2	

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

	UNIT	MOS	NA	AG	Enl	Tot al	First Lift	Surf Lift
36	SSgt AvRadioRepairman	6611			4		4	
37	SSgt Radio Relay Repair	2663			2		2	
38	SSgt Telephone Repairman	2636			1		1	
39	SSgt Teletype Repairman	2631			1		1	
40	Sgt Electrician	1143			1		1	
41	Sgt AvElectronics Op	6714			3		3	
42	Sgt AvRadioRepairman	6611			6		6	
43	Sgt RadioOpHighSpeed	2533			9		9	
44	Sgt Radio Relay Rep	2663			3		3	
45	Sgt Telephone man	2511			1		1	
46	Sgt TelephoneRepairman	2636			1		1	
47	Sgt Teletype Repairman	2631			1		1	
48	Cpl Aviation Plotter	6713			6		6	
49	Cpl AvRadioRepairman	6611			9		9	
50	Cpl Telephone Repairman	2636			1		1	
51	Cpl Teletype Repairman	2631			1		1	
52	Cpl Telephoneman	2511			2		2	
53	Cpl RadioOpLowSpeed	2531			6		6	
54	Pfc/Pvt Avn Plotter	6700			6		6	
55	Pfc/Pvt Basic AvElectronic	6600			8		8	
56								
57	AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING		1	3	7	11	7	4
58	Maj Air Control O	6710	1	1			1	
59	Capt AirDefenseContO	7386		2			1	1
60	Lt AvElectronicsO	6610		1			1	
61	MSgt AvElectronicsChf	6619			1		1	
62	TSgt Radar Technician	6619			1		1	
63	SSgt AvElectronicsOp	6714			1		1	
64	Sgt AvElectronicsOP	6714			2		1	1
65	Pfc/Pvt BasicAvElectronic	6600			2			2
66								
67	CLOSE SUPPORT SECTION		9	16	33	58	58	
68	Maj AirSupportController	6710	3				3	
69	Capt AsstAirSupportCont.	6710	3	3			6	
70	Capt AvIntello	7010			1		1	
71	Lt AsstAirSupportCont	7384	3	9			12	
72	Lt AsstAvIntello	7010		2			2	
73	Lt/WO AvElectronicsO	6610	1				1	
74	MSgt AvElectronicsChf	6619			1		1	
75	TSgt AvElectronicsChf	6619			1		1	
76	SSgt AvRadioRepairman	6613			6		6	
77	SSgt AvIntellClk	7011			1		1	
78	SSgt TelephoneRepairman	2636			1		1	
79	Sgt AvRadioRepairman	6611			3		3	
80	Cpl AvRadioRepairman.	6611			3		3	
81	Cpl TelephoneRepairman	2636			3		3	
82	Cpl Aviation Plotter	6713			3		3	
83	Cpl AvIntellClk	7011			2		2	
84	Pfc/Pvt Aviation Plotter	6700			6		6	
85	Pfc/Pvt BasicAvElectMan.	6600			3		3	
86								
87	CLOSE SUPPORT RADAR		2	3	20	25	16	9
88	Capt Air SupportControlO	7384	1				1	
89	Lt AirSupportControlO	7384	1	2			3	
90	Lt/WO Av ElectronicsO.	6610		1			1	
91	MSgt Radar Technician	6619			1		1	
92	TSgt AvControlman	6719			1		1	
93	TSgt Radar Technician	6619			1		1	

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONTINUED)

	MOS	NA	AG	ENL	TOT	FIRST LIFT	SUR LIFT
94	SSgt AvElectronicsOp	6714		2		2	
95	SSgt Radar Repairman	6613		1		1	
96	SSgt Topographic Surveyor	1443		1		1	
97	Sgt AvElectronicsOp	6714		3		2	1
98	Sgt Radar Repairman	6611		1			1
99	Cpl Aviation Plotter	6713		6		2	4
100	Pfc/Pvt Aviation Plotter	6700		3			3
101							
102	MATERIEL SECTION		2	12	14	7	7
103	Lt/WO ElectronicsSupO	3030	2			2	
104	MSgt AviationSupplyChf	3069		1		1	
105	TSgt AviationSupplyChf	3069		1		1	
106	TSgt ElectronicsSupChf	3034		1			1
107	TSgt Loading Chief	0439		1			1
108	SSgt ElectronicsSupClk	3033		2		1	1
109	Sgt ElectronicsStockman	3031		2		2	
110	Cpl ElectronicsSupClk	3033		1			1
111	Pfc/Pvt Basic Supply Man	3000		3			3
112							
113	CAMP MAINTENANCE			8	8	4	4
114	MSgt Utilities Chf.	1129		1		1	
115	Sgt RefrigSpec	1161		1			1
116	Cpl Carpenter	1372		1		1	
117	Cpl Plumber	1131		1			1
118	Cpl Water Sup Man	1111		1		1	
119	Pfc/Pvt Carpenter	1300		1		1	
120	Pfc/Pvt LaundryMachOp	3200		1			1
121	Pfc/Pvt RefrigerationSpec	1100		1			1
122							
123	MESS SECTION			7	7	5	2
124	MSgt Mess Man Chief	3379		1		1	
125	TSgt Mess Man Chief	3379		1		1	
126	Sgt Cook	3371		1		1	
127	Cpl Baker	3311		1			1
128	Cpl Cook	3371		1		1	
129	Pfc/Pvt Cook	3300		2		1	1
130							
131	MOTOR TRANSPORT			32	32	32	
132	MSgt MotorTransportChf	3529		1		1	
133	TSgt AutoRepairChief	3519		1		1	
134	SSgt Auto Mechanic	3516		1		1	
135	Sgt Auto Mechanic	3516		1		1	
136	Sgt Diesel Mechanic	3511		2		2	
137	Sgt Truck Driver	3531		2		2	
138	Cpl AutomotiveMech	3516		2		2	
139	Cpl Truck Driver	3531		2		2	
140	Cpl Power Supply Man	1141		6		6	
141	Pfc/Pvt Auto Mechanic	3500		4		4	
142	Pfc/Pvt Truck Driver	3500		4		4	
143	Pfc/Pvt Power Supply Man	1100		6		6	
144							
145	DENTAL SECTION		1	1	2		2
146	Lt Dental Officer (DC)		1				1
147	DT3 DentalTech, Third Cl			1			1
148							
149	MEDICAL SECTION		1	7	8	4	4
150	Lt Medical Officer		1			1	
151	HMC HospitalCorpsmanChf			1		1	
152	HM1 HospitalCorpsman,1st			1			1
153	HM2 HospitalCorpsman,2nd			2		2	
154	HM3 HospitalCorpsman,3rd			3			3

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 SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

RECAP NA

<u>MOS</u>	<u>LtCol</u>	<u>Maj</u>	<u>Capt</u>	<u>Lt/WO</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
6710	2	5	7		14
7384			1	4	5
7386				5	5
	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>24</u>

RECAP AG

<u>MOS</u>	<u>Capt</u>	<u>Lt/WO</u>	<u>Total</u>
0130	1		1
2502	1		1
3030		2	2
6610		4	4
6710	7		7
7010	1	2	3
7384		11	11
7386	2	5	7
	<u>12</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>36</u>

RECAP ENLISTED

<u>MOS</u>	<u>MSGT</u>	<u>TSGT</u>	<u>SSGT</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PFC/PVT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
0100						4	4
0119		1					1
0143				1	3		4
0149	1						1
0439		1					1
1100						7	7
1111					1		1
1129	1						1
1131					1		1
1141					6		6
1143				1			1
1161				1			1
1300						1	1
1372					1		1
1443			1				1
2500						4	4
2511				1	2		3
2531					6		6
2533				9			9
2629	1						1
2631			1	1	1		3
2636			2	1	4		7
2639		1					1
2663			2	3			5
2669	1	2					3
3000						3	3
3031				2			2
3033			2		1		3
3034		1					1
3069	1	1					2
3200						1	1
3300						2	2
3311					1		1
3371				1	1		2

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SECTION II MTACS-2 SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

<u>MOS</u>	<u>MSGT</u>	<u>TSGT</u>	<u>SSGT</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PFC/PVT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3379	1	1					2
3500						8	8
3511				2			2
3516			1	1	2		4
3519		1					1
3529	1						1
3531				2	2		4
6600						13	13
6611			4	10	12		26
6613			7				7
6619	4	5					9
6700						15	15
6713					15		15
6714			3	8			11
6719	1	4					5
7011			2		3		5
TOTAL:	12	18	25	44	62	58	219

11. ANNEXES.

Not applicable.

12. UNIT STATION LIST.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>DATE JOINED</u>	<u>COMP</u>
CLARK, Amil K.	Capt	029407	7303	20Sep49	USMC
CLARK, John G. Jr.	1stLt	046417	6701	31Aug50	USMCR
DEVARAY, Harry M.	2ndLt	048544	7302	7Jan49	USMC
FALK, Earl H.	Capt	025559	7302	8Jul50	USMC
HARRIS, Donald R. Jr	1stLt	037751	7302	19Apr50	USMC
HOFFMAN, Robert C.	2ndLt	023964	7302	4Dec48	USMC
HORNER, Theodore J.	Capt	017022	7302	6May50	USMC
JOHNSON, Harvey B.	2ndLt	037825	7302	12Apr50	USMC
LANSFORD, Breen G.	1stLt	036475	7302	28Jun50	USMC
LARKIN, Wade W.	Capt	09992	2710	31Aug50	USMCR
LEE, Christian C.	Major	07378	7302	1Jun49	USMC
MUELLER, Elton	Major	08043	7302	15Aug49	USMC
MC CARTHY, James J.	1stLt	041258	6710	31Aug50	USMCR
OVERBY, Eber V.	1stLt	044160	7302	25Mar49	USMC
SCHNEIDER, Arthur C.	2ndLt	027319	7302	4Jan49	USMC
SMITH, Ned M.	1stLt	035659	7302	30Oct50	USMCR
WITTE, Karl B.	Capt	027459	7303	8Jul50	USMC

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

BLANK

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

C*O*N*F*I*D*E*N*T*I*A*L

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1st Marine Air Wing
Special Action Report
7 September-9 October 1950

SECTION III

ANNEX JTG

Special Action Report
Marine Aircraft Group 12
and subordinate units


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SER 02185

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWELVE



SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

SEPT 7TH THRU OCT 9TH

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIALSPECIAL ACTION REPORT1. INTRODUCTION

This report covers the activities of Marine Aircraft Group 12 from 7 September 1950 through 9 October 1950.

Units of Marine Aircraft Group 12 began their movement overseas on 1 September 1950 in accordance with Air, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and First Marine Air Wing Embarkation Order No. 4-50, dated 25 August 1950, and First Marine Air Wing Movement Order No. 7453-30, dated 30 August 1950. The first contingents arrived at Kobe, Honshu, Japan, on 14 September 1950. Units were moved to Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan, immediately upon their arrival in Kobe. On 17 September 1950, Headquarters for Marine Aircraft Group 12 was set up at Itami Air Force Base. On 21 September 1950 Marine Fighter Squadrons VMF-214, VMF-323, and VMF(N)-513 were transferred from Marine Aircraft Group 33 to Marine Aircraft Group 12. At this time, VMF-214 was operating from the aircraft carrier USS SICILY (CVE-116) and VMF-323 from the USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) as a part of task Group 96.3 under the operational control of Commander, task Force 90. The forward echelon of VMF(N)-513 was operating from Itazuke Airfield, Kyushu, Japan, under the operational control of the 5th Air Force with a rear echelon at Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan.

The mission of Marine Aircraft Group 12 was logistic and administrative support of Marine Aircraft Group 33. It was the additional responsibility of the operating squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 12 to provide close and deep air support, night intrusion, air defense and other missions as directed by the Commanding General, 5th Air Force and Commander, Task Force 90.

Logistics support of VMF-214 and VMF-323 by Marine Aircraft Group 12 was confined to the provision of replacement aircraft and a limited number of spare parts. All logistics support other than gasoline was provided VMF(N)-513.

This action was carried out in support of United Nations Forces and particularly Marine Ground Forces in the Pusan area, Korea and later in the Incheon-Kimpo-Seoul area, Korea.

The next higher echelon for Marine Aircraft Group 12 is the First Marine Air Wing.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Marine Aircraft Group 12 was composed of the following units under the command of Colonel B. C. BATTERTON, USMC:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HqSq-12	16	97	113
SMS-12	30	474	504
VMF-212	32	154	186
VMF-312	53	221	274
VMF(N)-542	54	291	345
	<u>185</u>	<u>1237</u>	<u>1422</u>

The following reassignments were effected on 21 September, 1950, as directed by CG, 1st MAW speedletter serial 153A-50 of 20 September 1950.

From MAG-12 to MAG-33:
VMF-212, VMF-312, VMF(N)-542
From MAG-33 to MAG-12:
VMF-214, VMF-323, VMF(N)-513

With these changes the composition of Marine Aircraft Group 12 was changed as follows:

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	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HqSq-12	16	97	113
SMS-12	30	474	504
VMF-214	34	211	248
VMF(N)-513	49	208	257
VMF-323	29	157	186
	<u>158</u>	<u>1117</u>	<u>1308</u>

Commanders of the Squadrons under the control of MAG-12 during the period 7 September, 1950 to 9 October, 1950, are as follows:

HqSq-12	Major J. E. HAYS
SMS-12	Major C. H. WELCH
VMF-212	LtCol R. W. WYCZAKSKI (7Sep50-25Sep50)
	Major H. A. EISELE (26Sep50-90ct50)
VMF-312	LtCol J. F. COLE
VMF(N)-542	LtCol M. J. VOLGENSEK, Jr.
VMF-214	LtCol W. E. LISCHIED (7Sep50-28Sep50)
	Major R. P. KELLER
VMF(N)-513	Major J. H. REINBERG
VMF-323	Major A. A. LUND

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

On 1 August, 1950, the Commanding Officer of Marine Aircraft Group Twelve in conference with Officers of his Staff and all Squadron Commanders, alerted the Air Group to be prepared for embarkation for overseas assignment on 10 hours notice by 1 September, 1950.

The work of preparing the Air Group for movement was begun immediately. Due to the urgency of the situation and the necessity for speed, paper work was cut to an absolute minimum. Orders were largely verbal and were carried out immediately upon receipt. Normal planning was in progress.

For a report of logistical planning refer to Annex (H) Directives and planning Schedules included:

- (a) AIRFMFPAC & 1st MAW GO#69
- (b) AIRFMFPAC & 1st MAW Embarkation Order # 4 - 50
- (c) 1st MAW Movement Order No. 7453 - 30, of 30 August 1950.
- (d) MAG Embarkation Instructions, Letter Ser, 1416 dated 29 Aug. 1950.

All combat operations of Squadrons of MAG-12 were conducted under the operational control the 5th Air Force and C T F 90. No estimate of Enemy potentialities was formulated by the Group. For a detailed Intelligence Analysis refer to Daily Intelligence Summaries disseminated by the 5th A.F., X Corps and the 8th Army.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Very limited training and no rehearsals were carried out for the particular operation covered by this report. Both Regular and Reserve pilots of MAG-12 were considered to be in a state of effective combat readiness as a result of training carried out in the Continental U. S. prior to assignment to overseas duty.

A very limited amount of training was carried out at Itami Air Base, Honshu, Japan. For an account of this training refer to annex (C).

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

For information concerning the loading and embarkation of Marine Aircraft Group-12, refer to annex (D) and annex (H).

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

For information concerning movement to and arrival at objective area, refer to annex (D) and annex (H).

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The assault phase is covered in the reports of the individual squadrons, refer to annexes (E), (F), (G).

8. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, PROBABLE ORDER OF BATTLE, AND EQUIPMENT

Enemy opposition in the air was either negligible or entirely absent. For a complete report of the enemy ground and air situation refer to the daily Intelligence Summaries disseminated by the 5th Air Force, X Corps and 8th Army for the period 7 September to 9 October, 1950.

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CONFIDENTIALMARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-12
ANNEXES TO THE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ANNEX ABLE----- PERSONNEL
ANNEX BAKER ----- INTELLIGENCE
ANNEX CHARLIE ----- OPERATIONS
ANNEX DOG ----- SUPPLY
ANNEX EASY ----- VMF-214
ANNEX FOX ----- VMF-323
ANNEX GEORGE ----- VMF(N)-513
ANNEX HOW ----- LOGISTICS
ANNEX ITEM ----- MEDICAL
ANNEX JIG ----- COMMUNICATIONS
ANNEX KING ----- BUILDINGS & GROUNDS
ANNEX LOVE ----- ENGINEERING
ANNEX MIKE ----- ORDNANCE
ANNEX NAN ----- TRANSPORTATION
ANNEX OBOE ----- BASE SECURITY
ANNEX PETER ----- ELECTRONICS
ANNEX QUEEN ----- MESS
ANNEX ROGER ----- PLANS AND DIRECTIVES

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ANNEX "A"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, o/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

- Encl: (1) HQSq-12, Unit Station List
 (2) SMS-12, Unit Station List
 (3) VMF-214, Unit Station List (see VMF-214 Special Action report)
 (4) VMF-323, Unit Station List (see VMF-323 Special Action report)
 (5) VMF(N)-513, Unit Station List

1. MAG-12 consisted of the following units during the period 7Sept 50 through 9Oct50:

- (a) HQSq-12 Arrived Kobe, Japan on 14Sept50 aboard USNS GEN. MORTON
- (b) SMS-12 Arrived Kobe, Japan on 14Sept50 aboard USNS GEN. MORTON
- (c) VMF(N)-513, Forward Echelon, Based at Itazuke Air Base, Fukuoka, Japan, 10 Pilots and 37 enlisted personnel
 VMF(N)-513, Element of Rear echelon, arrived Kobe, Japan, 1Sept50 aboard USS WIEGEL 61 enlisted personnel.
 VMF(N)-513, Element of Rear echelon, arrived Kobe, Japan, 18Sept50 aboard USS SITKO BAY, 35 officers 71 enlisted personnel.
 VMF(N)-513, Element of Rear echelon, arrived Kobe, Japan, 1Sept50 aboard USS OGLETHORPE, 13 enlisted personnel.
- (d) VMF-214 joined MAG-12 from MAG-33 on 21Sept50; based aboard CVE USS SICILY
- (e) VMF-323 joined MAG-12 from MAG-33 on 21Sept50; based aboard CVE USS BADOENG STRAIT
- (f) VMF(N)-542, main body, arrived Yokosuka, Japan on 11 Sept50 aboard CVE CAPE ESPERANCE; 54 officers and 274 enlisted personnel. All aircraft were off loaded plus 25 officers and 2 enlisted men.
 The remainder of this group sailed from Yokosuka on 14Sept50 and arrived at Kobe, Japan on 15Sept50
 VMF(N)-542, Materiel Section, arrived Kobe, Japan on 14 Sept50 aboard USNS GEN. MORTON; 4 officer and 19 enlisted personnel.
 VMF(N)-542, element of the CAPE ESPERANCE group, 23 officers and 93 enlisted personnel disembarked at Kobe, Japan on 15Sept50 and proceeded to Itami Air Base, Japan.
 VMF(N)-542, remainder of the CAPE ESPERANCE group, 6 officers and 177 enlisted personnel transferred from the CAPE ESPERANCE to the USS Thomas Jefferson and arrived Kimpo Air Field, Korea, on 22Sept50.
 Flight echelon of VMF(N)-542 departed Kobe, Japan on 19Sept50 and arrived Kimpo Air Field, Korea, on 19Sept50.
- (g) VMF-212, main body, arrived Yokosuka, Japan on 11Sept50 aboard CVE CAPE ESPERANCE; 32 officers and 154 enlisted personnel. Twenty four aircraft were off loaded.
 The remainder of this group sailed from Yokosuka, Japan on 14Sept50 and arrived at Kobe, Japan on 15Sept50 and proceeded to Itami Air Base, Japan.
 VMF-212, Materiel Section, arrived Kobe, Japan on 14Sept50 aboard USNS General MORTON; 1 officer and 6 enlisted personnel.
 Flight echelon of VMF-212 consisting of 24 aircraft departed Itami Air Base, Japan on 19Sept50 and arrived Kimpo Air Field, Korea on 19Sept50.

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

- (h) VMF-312 arrived Kobe, Japan, 18 Sept 50 aboard USS SITKO BAY; 52 officers and 153 enlisted personnel.
 VMF-312, element, arrived Kobe, Japan, 1 Sept 50 aboard USS WIEGEL; 51 enlisted personnel.
 VMF-312, element, arrived Kobe, Japan, 1 Sept 50 aboard USS OGLETHORPE; 7 officers and 19 enlisted personnel.

2. During the period 7 September to 9 October 1950 personnel of MAG-12 were deployed as indicated below:

- (a) HQSq-12 - Itami Air Base, Honshu, Japan
 (b) SMS-12 " " " " " "
 (c) VMF(N)-513 (RE) 17 Pilots, 71 enlisted and 12 aircraft to Itazuka Air Base making total personnel; 27 Pilots and 108 enlisted personnel.
 VMF(N)-513 (RE) composed of 168 enlisted and 12 pilots at Itami Air Base, Honshu, Japan
 (d) VMF-214 aboard CVE, USS SICILY
 (e) VMF-323 aboard CVE USS BADOENG STRAIT
 (f) All Personnel of VMF(N)-513 returned to Itami from Itazuka on 8 Oct 50.
 (g) VMF(N)-542 - Kimpo Air Field, Korea
 (h) VMF-212 - Kimpo Air Field, Korea
 (i) VMF-312 - Itami Air Base, Honshu, Japan
 (j) VMF-212, VMF-312 and VMF(N)-542 were transferred to MAG-33 effective 21 Sept 50.

3. During the period from 3 October through 9 October 1950 the following preparations were made for air and surface lifts of MAG-12 units from Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan to Wonsan, Korea.

- A. Surface lift consisting of two (2) LST's; total capacity 360 enlisted and 20 officers.
 B. Air lift consisting of seven (7) R5D Aircraft; capacity 30 personnel each.
 C. Above lifts included Air Force and Army personnel to assist MAG-12 personnel in the operation and maintenance of the Airfield at Wonsan, Korea.
 D. Elements of the above lifts included personnel of HQSq-12, SMS-12, and VMF(N)-513, sufficient in number to maintain operations of an unlimited nature but only for a limited period of time.

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 * Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

Station list of officers of Marine Headquarters Squadron 12

Name	Jacket No.	Rank	MOS	Duties	Dep U.S.	Date Jd Unit
ARONOW, Cedor B.	036850	Lt	7030	Ass't S-2, MAG-12	1Sep50	21Aug50
BATTERTON, Boeker C.	04702	Cpl	9907	CO, MAG-12	31Aug50	22May50
BROWN, William E.	02303	Capt	7302	Communications Officer	1Sep50	4Apr50
CONKLIN, Robert C.	02382	Lt	7302	Secret & Confidential Files	Aug50	23Sep50
CORLEY, Ruel H., Jr.	02351	Capt	7302	Ass't S-3, MAG-12	1Sep50	4Apr50
CORN, Clifford D.	047643	Zlt	7302	Ass't S-2, MAG-12	Aug50	23Sep50
COURCHESNE, Burton Y.	047644	Zlt	7302	Ass't S-2, MAG-12	Aug50	23Sep50
FOLSOM, Samuel B., Jr.	09901	Maj	7303	S-2, MAG-12	Aug50	10ct50
FONTANA, Paul J.	05344	LtCol	7302	Deputy Group Commander	31Aug50	15May50
FRASER, Robert W.	045779	Lt	0108	Ass't Provost Marshal	1Sept50	1Aug50
GORMAN, Calvin M.	050113	Zlt	6601	Ass't Communications Officer	1Sep50	21Aug50
HARPE, Lilburn L.	04071	Lt	7302	Provost Marshal	Aug50	22Sep50
HAYS, John E.	022745	Maj	7302	CO, HQSq-12	1Sep50	26May50
KLIMEK, Walter J.	023032	Capt	7302	MAG-12, Adjutant	1Sept50	26Jun50
KENNEDY, Lawrence J.	049282	Zlt	7302	Ass't S-4, MAG-12	16Aug50	22Sep50
KINNEY, John T.	05983	LtCol	7302	S-3, MAG-12	31Aug50	15Jul50
LEMLEY, Alan E.	023508	Capt	7302	Ass't S-3, MAG-12	1Sept50	23May50
LESAGE, William E.	024844	Capt	7302	Material Officer, HQSq-12	1Sep50	29Jul49
MORGAN, John	028051	Zlt	7302	TAD 1stMARDiv	14Jul50	23Sep50
MURPHY, Joseph T.	029089	Capt	7302	Ass't S-4, MAG-12	24Oct50	23Jun50
PINKSTON, Mose T.	028504	Lt	6610	Ass't Communications Officer	1Sep50	29Aug50
PROSSER, Bruce	06430	LtCol	7304	CO, Rear Echelon & Personnel MAG-12	1Sep50	11Jul50

Enclosure (1)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o EPO, San Francisco, California

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Station list of officers of Marine Headquarters Squadron 12 (CONT'D)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Jacket No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Duties</u>	<u>Dep U.S.</u>	<u>Date Jd Unit</u>
RICHARDS, Samuel., Jr.	09022	Maj	7302	Ass't S-3, MAG-12	Sep50	15May50
SANKIN, Berthold	016440	Capt	7301	Ass't S-3, MAG-12	Aug50	23Sep50
SMITH, Mercer E.	024054	Capt	7302	Ass't S-4, MAG-12	Sep50	20Jul50
YOST, Donald K.	05453	LtCol	7302	MAG-12, Executive Officer	1Sep50	19Jul50

Enclosure (1) CONT'D

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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Station list of officers of Marine Service Squadron 12

<u>Name</u>	<u>Jacket No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Duties</u>	<u>Dep U.S.</u>	<u>Date Jd Unit</u>
WELCH, Claude H.	07164	Maj	7302	Commanding Officer	1Sep50	19Jul50
WACHIN, Joseph W.	011246	Maj	7302	Executive Officer	1Sep50	21Dec49
HAAS, Albert I.	09097	Maj	6410	Aircraft Engineering Officer	1Sep50	24May49
GORDON, Joseph	010410	Capt	6410	Material Officer	1Sep50	21Jul50
KUCKYA, Hubard D.	018667	Capt	7302	Special Services Officer	1Sep50	27Jan50
LAMONT, William A.	018619	Capt	7302	Ass't Aircraft Engineering O.	1Sep50	6Jul50
LEWIS, Woodrow B.	022809	Capt	0301	Aviation Supply Officer	1Sep50	1Mar50
MAC CRONE, Charles A.	012169	Capt	6510	Aviation Ordnance Officer	1Sep50	23May49
STEPANUK, Tony	09340	Capt	3060	Aviation Supply Officer	1Sep50	20Jul49
ZINGHEIM, Clarence F.	013607	Capt	7302	Mess Officer	1Sep50	20Apr49
CAMERON, Merton K., Jr.	022515	Capt	7302	Legal Officer		23Sep50
HAYNER, John B.	036436	1stLt	7110	Flight Equipment Officer	1Sep50	21Aug50
NIL, Kenneth M.	036130	1stLt	6401	Ass't Special Services Officer	1Sep50	16Aug50
ARMSTRONG, James B.	039999	1stLt	7302	Squadron Officer	1Oct50	23Sep50
HATSON, Allan G.	028675	1stLt	7302	Ass't Mess Officer	Aug50	23Sep50
FLICKINGER, Judson	026258	1stLt	7302	Ass't Supply Officer	16Aug50	23Sep50
JENSON, Lihl D.	028046	1stLt	7302	Ass't Special Services Officer	16Aug50	23Sep50
MITCHELL, John D., Jr.	023337	1stLt	7302	Squadron Officer	Aug50	23Sep50
SPOONER, Mike E., Jr.	025619	1stLt	7302	Ass't Engineering Officer	24Aug50	23Sep50
WAGNER, Arthur	032680	1stLt	7302	Ass't Engineering Officer		23Sep50
WOODBUFF, William B.	028164	1stLt	7302	Utilities Officer	Aug50	23Sep50
YORG, George J.	028164	1stLt	7302	Ass't Ordnance Officer	Aug50	23Sep50
JOHN, Edward S.	020517	2dLt	7302	Aircraft Electronics Officer	1Sep50	30Dec49
MEYER, William A.	032538	2dLt	7302	Ass't Aircraft Electronics O.	1Sep50	27Dec49

Enclosure (2)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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Station list of officer of Marine Service Squadron 12 (CONT'D)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Jacket No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Duties</u>	<u>Dep U.S.</u>	<u>Date Jd Unit</u>
DIXON, Andrew O.	023149	CWO	6410	Ass't Material Officer	1Sep50	18Aug50
LEE, Joseph O.	019776	CWO	6410	Motor Transport Officer	1Sep50	24Oct50
WALLENBORN, Raymond J.	87341	Comdr	DC	Dental Officer	1Sep50	5Aug50
CUMMINGS, George W.	172658	LComdr	ChC	Chaplain Officer	1Sep50	28Sep50
LYONS, Jack A.	490098	Lt(jg)	DC	Dental Officer	1Sep50	30Nov50

Enclosure (2) (CONT'D)

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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Station list of officer of Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 513						
<u>Name</u>	<u>Jacket No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Duties</u>	<u>Dev U.S.</u>	<u>Date of Unit</u>
BOAG, Arthur R.	011850	Maj	7303	Engineering Officer	14Jul50	3Aug49
BRUSHERT, Jack L.	010577	Maj	7303	Operations Officer	14Jul50	31Dec49
CLARK, Albert L.	011852	Maj	7303	Aviation Training Officer	14Aug50	28Aug50
COCHRAN, Robert L.	08718	Maj	7303	Executive Officer	24Aug50	23Aug48
HEY, Richard (n)., Jr.	011268	Maj	7302	Ground Training Officer	14Jul50	31Aug50
REINBURG, Joseph H.	07464	Maj	7303	Commanding Officer	14Jul50	7Jul50
BERG, Marvin L.	030918	Capt	7303	Company Commander	24Aug50	17Mar49
BOSWELL, Charles E., Jr.	031278	Capt	7303	Landing Signal Officer	24Aug50	8Mar49
BURRIS, James M.	017177	Capt	7303	Communications Officer	24Aug50	24Mar50
CORMAN, Otis W.S.	024745	Capt	7302	Insurance Officer	24Aug50	29Jul50
DENHAM, Lawrence R.	031250	Capt	7303	Technical Publications O.	14Jul50	11Aug49
EGAN, Charles W.	032252	Capt	7302	Company Commander	14Aug50	30Aug50
FORNONZINI, Benjamin A., Jr.	025603	Capt	7303	Ass't Aviation Training O.	24Aug50	24Jun49
FURTON, Floyd K., Jr.	028200	Capt	7303	Transportation Officer	14Jul50	27Jan50
HAZLETT, Wesley W.	016436	Capt	7303	Logistics Officer	14Jul50	15Dec49
MC BARRON, Alden (n).	027577	Capt	7303	Company Commander	24Aug50	7Jul50
PEESLES, Vernon J.	021948	Capt	7303	Ordnance Officer	14Jul50	14Mar49
PENDREY, Edwin (n).	031536	Capt	7303	Company Commander	24Aug50	7Jul50
PHILLIPS, Arthur E.	030185	Capt	7303	Flight Officer	14Aug50	30Aug50
PIPPIN, Franklin N.	024514	Capt	7303	Radio/Radar Officer	14Jul50	14Feb49
POLEN, Richard A.	028132	Capt	7303	Internal Security Officer	14Jul50	20Jul49
RAY, Grady W.	031764	Capt	7303	Company Commander	14Aug50	30Aug50
WILLIAMS, Lynn F.	031361	Capt	7303	Special Services Officer	14Jul50	13Jun49
BERCK, Henry A.	037735	1stLt	7303	Flight Safety Officer	14Aug50	28Aug50
BEYES, Warren J.	037321	1stLt	7302	Savings Bond Officer	24Aug50	1Aug50
BRYANT, William W.	035005	1stLt	7303	Navigation Officer	14Jul50	30Jan49

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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Station list of officer of Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 513 (CONT'D)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Jacket No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Duties</u>	<u>Dep U.S.</u>	<u>Date Jd Unit</u>
CHILDERS, Lloyd F.	034968	1stLt	7303	Radiological Safety & Chemical Warfare Officer	24Aug50	5May49
CLARK, John C.	035428	1stLt	7302	Platoon Commander	24Aug50	1Aug50
CLARK, Truman (n).	037094	1stLt	7303	Ass't Landing Signal Officer	14Jul50	29Jun49
CORBOY, Leo J., Jr.	035669	1stLt	7301	Platoon Commander	Aug50	3Sep50
GROFF, Herbert (n).	029517	1stLt	7302	Ass't transportation Officer	24Aug50	1Aug50
HADCOCK, Kenneth G.	037058	1stLt	7303	Platoon Commander	14Aug50	28Aug50
HAIL, Leslie R.	036150	1stLt	7303	Ass't Special Services O.	14Aug50	29Aug50
JENNINGS, William E.	036079	1stLt	7303	Platoon Commander	24Aug50	1Aug50
JENNIGAN, Curtis D.	035019	1stLt	7303	Public Information O.	24Aug50	28Jun49
KING, Paul D.	039000	1stLt	7303	Survival O.	14Jul50	27Jan50
LOSSE, Robert N.	033480	1stLt	6610	Ass't Radio/Radar O.	24Aug50	1Aug50
MILLER, Richard R.	048152	1stLt	7302	Platoon Commander	24Aug50	26Aug49
MURPHY, John J.	037117	1stLt	7303	Ass't Engineering O.	14Aug50	30Aug50
OLIVER, Roy E.	037270	1stLt	7303	Platoon Commander	14Aug50	27Aug50
SIAR, Malcolm M., Jr.	026124	1stLt	6410	Aircraft Maintenance O.	24Aug50	1Aug50
THAYER, George F.	049311	1stLt	7301	Platoon Commander	24Aug50	16Mar50
WORSHAM, Edward (n).	029659	1stLt	7040	Material Officer	24Aug50	1Aug50
HOLDRIDGE, Forrest B.	037947	2Lt	7303	Fire Marshal	14Jul50	
LEARY, James F.	050494	2Lt	7001	Intelligence O.	1Sep50	29Sep50
SHELDON, Walter J.	050393	2Lt.	0130	Adjutant	24Aug50	1Aug50
WILLIAMS, Carl D.	033416	2Lt	7303	Platoon Commander	24Aug50	17Jul50
COLEMAN, Elbert H., Jr.	017025	6WO	6601	Ass't Ordnance Officer	24Aug50	1Aug50

Enclosure (5)

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ANNEX "B"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

The Intelligence Section of Marine Aircraft Group 12 boarded the USNS GENERAL C.G. MORTON at Long Beach, California on the morning of 1 September 1950 and sailed at 1400 of the same day.

During the time that the section was at sea, Intelligence work was limited to the preparation and deliverance of several lectures on Korea and Japan; their topography and climate, their customs and other allied subjects.

Debarcation took place from the USNS GENERAL C.G. MORTON at Kobe, Japan on 15 September 1950 and the Intelligence section was immediately transported to Itami Air Base, Honshu, Japan. The work of setting up an office was begun on 16 September 1950. The Intelligence work performed during the entire period from 7 September through 9 October was limited to the organization of an Intelligence office, the procurement of maps and other material essential to normal operations, and the routine Intelligence work of a training Group. All Combat Intelligence work was carried out by the organizations to which the operating squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 12 were attached for operational control.

Complement of MAG-12, S-2 Section

7 September 1950

OFFICERS

Capt. E.P. CAREY
 1st Lt. C.B. ARONOW
 2nd Lt. J.F. LEARY

ENLISTED

T/Sgt. W.H. KERR
 S/Sgt. R.T. O'KEEFE
 Sgt. J.E. GREGORY
 Cpl. W.H. PEAKE
 Pfc R.B. SCHMECHEL

2nd Lt. J.F. LEARY, Detached as of 28 September 1950.
 Capt. E.P. CAREY, Detached as of 8 October 1950.

Major S.B. FOLSOM, Attached MAG-12, S-2, on 7 October 1950.
 2nd Lt. C.D. CORN, Attached MAG-12, S-2, on 7 October 1950.
 2nd Lt. L.J. KENNEDY, Attached MAG-12, S-2, on 7 October 1950.

9 October 1950

OFFICERS

Major S.B. FOLSOM
 1st Lt. C.B. ARONOW
 2nd Lt. C.D. CORN
 2nd Lt. L.J. KENNEDY

ENLISTED

T/Sgt. W.H. KERR
 S/Sgt. R.T. O'KEEFE
 Sgt. J.E. GREGORY
 Cpl. W.H. PEAKE
 Pfc R.B. SCHMECHEL

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ANNEX "C"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

By 7 September 1950, key operations personnel of Marine Aircraft Group 12 had arrived at Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan, and were made available to Marine Aircraft Group 33 in preparing plans for the Inchon-Seoul-Kimpo operation in Korea. The group arrived at Kobe, Honshu, Japan, on 14 September 1950. Off-loading of supplies and personnel began on 15 September 1950. At this time, VMF-214 and VMF-323 were operating from CVEs on the Yellow Sea. VMF(N)-513 was operating eight aircraft from Itazuke Air Force Base, Kyushu, Japan, under the operational control of the 5th Air Force. See Annexes E, F, and G for details of the operations of these squadrons.

On 16 September 1950, VMF-312, VMF-212, VMF(N)-542 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513 arrived by carrier. Aircraft were off-loaded at Kisarazu, Honshu, Japan and flown to Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan. Under the supervision of Marine Aircraft Group 12, the squadrons did a limited amount of training prior to departing for Kimpo AFB, Korea. The Yonago Gunnery Range near Miho Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan, was obtained for bombing and rocket practice. Emphasis was placed on low angle dives in the anticipation of low ceilings expected in Korea. Bad weather during the few training days precluded many of the flights from reaching the range. However, it is felt that the training received was beneficial in preparing the squadrons for the conditions under which they subsequently operated.

On 19 September 1950, the Deputy Group Commander and the Assistant Operations Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 12 briefed the pilots of VMF(N)-542 and VMF-212 and led the first elements into Kimpo AFB, Korea.

Because the airfield at Kimpo, Korea had been captured ahead of schedule and the unloading at the port of Inchon, Korea progressed slowly, the squadrons operated without benefit of a group staff from 19 September 1950 through 21 September 1950. The Deputy Group Commander and the Assistant Operations Officer of MAG-12 planned for and operated the squadrons until the staff of MAG-12 arrived and was able to assume operational command. 33

MAG-12 Operations was called upon to airlift supplies to MAG-33 to enable the squadrons to operate until their surface lift could be off-loaded and the materiel and equipment moved to Kimpo AFB. This airlift consisted of such things as hand fuel pumps, bomb hoists, bomb dollies, ammunition belting machines, sleeping bags, cots, tents and other vital items which had not been off-loaded from the ships. In addition, an extensive training program was conducted for reserve officers who had been sent to Japan without the benefit of the newly organized training squadron at El Toro, California. These reserve pilots were sent to tactical squadrons as replacements became necessary.

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ANNEX "D"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF THE SUPPLY DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIR GROUP-12

From 7 September 1950 through 15 September 1950, the personnel and stores of Marine Aircraft Group 12 were enroute from Long Beach, California to Kobe, Honshu, Japan aboard the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON and the USNS FURMAN VICTORY. The Supply Department personnel consisted of two officers (MOS) 3060 and twenty-seven enlisted men with the following MOS designations:

<u>No. of Personnel</u>	<u>MOS</u>
5 -----	3069
2 -----	3068
5 -----	3067
5 -----	3066
1 -----	3064
2 -----	3063
2 -----	3061
4 -----	3000
1 -----	3111

The Supply Officer's stores totaled more than 2,000,000 pounds. These stores consisted of a Section "B" for eight FAU-4Bs, twenty-four FAU-5Ns, two TEMs, four SNBs, five R4Ds, twenty-four F7Fs, and a portion of a Section "B" for the HO3S-1; Section "R" for each type of aircraft supported; Section "W" for MAG-12 consisting of 109 engine covers, 4 APUs, 10 small pre-heaters, 20 large pre-heaters and 96 units of electrically heated pile lined winter flight clothing; a complete Section "O"; a complete Table of Basic Allowances for a 90 day period; a full allowance of Marine Corps property; five R2800-32W engines and four R2800-34W engines over and above Section "B" for the HO3S-1, were complete except for minor deficiencies. Material needed to complete the Section "B" for the HO3S-1 was not available on the West Coast at time of departure. In addition to the above allowances for MAG-12, material requested by MAG-33 and not received prior to their departure from the United States was assembled and brought overseas for delivery to that activity by this department.

On 14 September 1950 at approximately 1800 the two ships docked at Pier Six in Kobe, Japan and started discharging cargo immediately. The Supply Officer was notified that only material deemed necessary for immediate operation would leave the docks; this material would be taken to Itami Air Base, Honshu, Japan by truck. All other material was to be stowed in Warehouses W and X on Pier Six in Kobe until notice of further disposition.

The off-loading from Ship to Shore was performed by long-shoremen under the supervision of members of the MAG-12 Supply Department. The unloading details worked on a twenty-four hour basis from 15 September 1950 through 19 September 1950. On the afternoon of 19 September 1950 all of the Supply Officer's stores had left the ship and were stowed in Warehouses W and X by allowance and aircraft type. This initial arrangement of material proved to be a great asset in later movement of allowances and material to forward areas on emergency requests.

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On the 20th and 21st of September 1950 all members of the Supply Department were utilized in the policing of the supply area in preparation of receiving MAG-12 Supply Officer's stores. An urgent request was received from Kimpo AFB, Korea, for 40 pyramidal tents and a Section "B" for the F7F and F4U-5. Request also came for a 20mm belting machine, gas pumps, bomb dollies, sleeping bags and cats. These requests were filled immediately from MAG-12 supply stocks and flown to Kimpo.

Priority was given to the movement of equipment and supplies belonging to the First Marine Aircraft Wing and to the tactical squadrons from Kobe to Itami Air Base. From the 25th through the 29th of September 1950, trucks bringing supplies and equipment from Kobe to Itami carried return loads of B rations, formerly in possession of MAG-33, to Kobe where they were turned over to the Army Supply Depot. All rations brought from the United States by MAG-12 were turned over to the Army Supply Depot at Kobe.

On 1 October 1950 the Supply Officer's stores started moving to Itami Air Base. All of the large surfaces and engines of the Section "B" and all of the large "slow-moving" items of the TBA were left in the warehouses at Kobe and were brought to Itami AFB only when needed. All of the Marine Corps property except clothing was taken to Itami Air Base. Priority was given to the Section "B" and the Section "R". These sections were set up ready for issue on the afternoon of 2 October 1950. A 1400 man clothing pack was then set up in Building 9E at Itami AFB for emergency issues to all personnel of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Emergency issues of clothing were made almost immediately to VMF-214 and VMF-323 on form NAVMC-604-SDX. TBA material was brought to Itami AFB and set up for ready issue by 7 October 1950.

On 8 October 1950 two supply men (MOS 3066) were transferred from MAG-12 Supply Department to the Supply Department of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to facilitate the activating of a Shipping and Receiving Section for the Supply Department Rear Echelon at Itami AFB.

In addition to moving and assembling various sections and allowances for MAG-12, all miscellaneous aeronautical spares, formerly in possession of MAG-33, were assembled by aircraft type and were made ready to support applicable aircraft.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Both written and verbal requests were being made for material without the knowledge of the responsible Supply Officer. This was being done predominantly by officers of high rank, making the requests impossible to ignore and resulting in unnecessary shipments of vital material and the using of shipping space needed for actual requirements. Later, a policy was established by MAG-12 Supply whereby no requests would be honored unless cleared by the G-4 section of the Wing or the Supply Officer of MAG-33.

On 8 October 1950 an urgent request from Kimpo was received requesting that all Section "B", "O" and "R" material be air-lifted to Korea at once. It was obvious that this request was in error as MAG-12 had in its possession eight section "B"s and twenty-seven Section "R"s most of which were not applicable to aircraft at that time used in Korea. Upon verification it was found that only the Section "B" for the F4U-5 and F7F was required. Those sections, less engines and large surfaces were air-lifted accordingly. It is recommended that requests of such nature be more specific and that they be screened by competent authority prior to being released.

It was during the initial movement from Kobe to Itami AFB that it became apparent that the allowance for fork lifts for a Marine Air Group was inadequate. Recommendations had been submitted repeatedly by MAG-12 for an increase in fork lifts since November 1948. Movements and operations at this stage were greatly hampered by lack of fork lifts and spare parts to repair the few available. It is recommended that an allowance of five fork lifts per Service Squadron and one fork lift for each squadron supported be set up for Marine Air Groups.

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Although the direct support of MAG-33 did not begin until MAG-12 arrived in Japan, MAG-12 supported MAG-33 indirectly from the 5th of July 1950. The MAG-12 Supply Department was called upon to furnish material not only to MAG-33 but also to the USS BADOENG STRAIGHT when there was little or no time to re-prepare MAG-12 for combat duty. It is believed that the burden placed on MAG-12 Supply Department was unnecessary and that the proper supply activities, i.e., shore supply activities, should have been contacted to furnish the material directly to MAG-33 and the USS BADOENG STRAIGHT. It is recommended that such procedure be followed, when at all possible, in the initial outfitting of Marine Air Units.

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ANNEX "E"

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MARINE FIGHTER SQUADRON 214
Marino Aircraft Group 33, 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FOR PERIOD

7 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 9 OCTOBER 1950



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12826

MARINE FIGHTER SQUADRON 214
Marine Aircraft Group 33, 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to preserve the experience and knowledge gained from the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul Operation, by Marine Fighter Squadron 214, during the period 7 September to 9 October 1950. While participating in this operation the squadron was assigned the primary mission of providing close support for the First Marine Division.

During the entire operation the squadron was under the tactical control of Commander Task Group 96.8. The administrative control passed from Marine Aircraft Group 33 to Marine Aircraft Group 12, on 21 September 1950.

TASK ORGANIZATION

The task organization of VMF-214 was as follows: Marine Fighter Squadron 214, Marine Aircraft Group 33 (reinforced), 1st Marine Air Wing (Forward Echelon), 7 September through 20 September; Marine Fighter Squadron 214, Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing, 21 September through 9 October. Commanding Officers: Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. LISCHTID (06626) USMC, 7 September through 25 September; Major Robert P. KELLER (06855) USMC, 26 September through 9 October.

Strength 7 September 1950: 34 officers and 183 enlisted men.
Strength 9 October 1950: 37 officers and 187 enlisted men.

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

As the squadron had been in continuous action since 3 August 1950, and there being no change in primary mission; no preliminary planning was necessary to prepare the squadron for the Inchon Invasion.

Logistical support was obtained from the USS SICILY; no specific problems in logistics were encountered.

Intelligence planning was hampered due to the lack of advance notice of the operation; a critical shortage of proper maps developed.

TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

The squadron did not participate in any pre-invasion rehearsal. Combat experience gained in the Pusan Perimeter Defense proved to be excellent preparation for this operation.

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

As the squadron had been operating from Ashiya AFB, Japan, it was necessary to transport all squadron personnel, less twenty pilots required to fly aircraft, via rail transportation to the port of Sasebo, Japan, where they embarked the USS SICILY on 6 September 1950. No squadron gear had been off-loaded for operations at Ashiya, so with the return of the personnel, the USS SICILY and VMF-214 were ready to commence operations.

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MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE AREA

On 6 September the USS SICILY sailed from Sasabo, Japan, and the squadron aircraft rendezvoused with the carrier in the Korean Straits on 7 September 1950. The carrier joined Task Group 96.8 and arrived in the Incheon area on 8 September 1950.

ASSAULT PHASE

A narrative of each days operations during the period 7 September - 9 October follows:

7 September - At 0800K the SICILY was halfway between Tsushima and Quelparte Island, thirty miles off the Korean coast, proceeding to rendezvous with the BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and her escorts. At 1139K the SICILY commenced recovering the 20 planes of VMF-214 which were flown out from Ashiya Air Force Base. At this time the ship was approximately thirty miles off the southwest tip of Korea.

8 September - At 0745K off Korea, the SICILY joined with the BADOENG STRAIT to form Task Group 96.8 with the OTC in the BADOENG STRAIT, Rear Admiral R. W. RUBLE the Task Group Commander.

The squadron stepped out of their usual role of close support for our troops and conducted attacks on enemy logistics, supply lines and communications by interdiction bombing and strafing.

The first strike composed of six Corsairs, carrying 500 pound bombs and 5" rockets, hit predesignated targets. The first attack was made on a double track railroad bridge which spans a river just below Hwangju. This railway is the most important on the west coast and the main artery between Pyongyang and Kyongsong, two of the largest cities in Korea, both occupied by the North Koreans. Six 500 pound bombs were dropped, one of which made a direct hit on the south end of the span. About twenty miles north on the same rail line the flight hit a train of two locomotives and nine cars. Both locomotives sustained direct hits from 5" rockets and the cars were severely strafed. Another train farther up the line, consisting of a locomotive and ten cars was strafed and the engine was hit with a rocket. A single locomotive found in a railyard at Hwangju was hit with rockets and 20MM.

The second flight struck the railyard at Haeju, which is on the coast above Incheon and on the same rail line hit by the first strike. At the railyard there were about 100 cars of various types, some of which had been previously damaged. Many were metal cars which showed no reaction to strafing. Two cars were burned, one derailed and an estimated 50 were damaged seriously. In addition, considerable railbed was torn up by rockets. A large roundhouse was set afire with napalm and four other adjacent buildings were hit and burned. A transformer station hit with rockets caught fire and burned. On the return trip to the ship these fighters swept low across the airfields at Haeju and Ongin but observed no activity.

Four of the eight Corsairs which composed the third strike followed the rail line from Tosong-ni on the coast adjacent to Kaesong, to Kuum-ni where they met the other four fighters which had flown from Haeju north to Sariwon and east to Nan Chonjon and Kuum-ni. The first four hit five oil tanker cars with rockets and these exploding sent smoke to 5000 feet. Sixteen boxcars were hit, five of which were left burning and eight damaged. A two story transformer station at Kuum-ni was burned out with napalm, and a vehicle hidden in a hay-

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stack was strafed and burned. A large warehouse in the same area was burned down with napalm. Near Kuncheon an eight car train and another oil car were strafed and rocketed but no fires were observed. In this area three large stock piles of material were piled near a loading platform. A well placed napalm got all three and the platform as well. A 6 x 6 truck, parked in close to an embankment and well camouflaged was detected and destroyed. The other four Corsairs coming from Haeju burned out two transformer stations at Sinwan-ni also a large loading shed. Another 25 railroad cars were strafed and rocketed along this route. Five miles southwest of Seohong a direct placement of a rocket tore up the railroad at the tunnel entrance. After joining up over Kuum-ni the eight Corsairs burned out three more warehouses and blew up another oil car.

9 September - Interdiction of the rail line between Pyongyang, capital of North Korea, and Haeju was the primary mission.

The first strike struck the rail line from Yenan to Mansan-ni. Between these points 46 rail cars were attacked, all were strafed, 5 were burned with napalm and 3 suffered direct rocket hits. Three rail tunnels, two of which had smoke coming from one end, indicating hidden locomotives, were hit with napalm and rockets. A direct hit was scored with a 500 pound bomb on one end of a double track bridge span, curling the track back and jeopardizing the bridge support strength. All along the track where bridges had previously been hit were signs of reconstruction preparations. The returning strike made low sweeps across the airfields at Seoul, Suwon and Haeju but observed no aircraft, other than wrecks previously hit, and saw no activity.

The second strike group of eight Corsairs swept the rail line in the same area that the first strike hit. Their primary targets were bridges at Ansongdong and Chuiya-ri.

The third strike again hit the railroad in this area strafing approximately 80 cars some of which were previously hit, 8 cars were left burning and 5 cars were hit with rockets. One 1000 pound bomb overshot a bridge span about 10 yards and hit dead center on a double track east of Haeju disrupting the tracks for 20 yards either side of the hit.

The last strike for the day consisting of seven F4U's struck a military training camp near Pyongyang. There were 140 to 160 huts and tents in two camp areas. Approximately 100 of these were burned out with napalm. The camps appeared to be deserted, however, there was considerable small arms fire in the area. The strike also hit a very large transformer station at Chaeryong that burned and sparked violently. Two smaller power stations on the north side of Ongin were also hit but evidently were inoperative at the time.

10 September - Three strikes of eight Corsairs carrying a double load of napalm, were launched against installations on Wolmi-do. These strikes in conjunction with VMF-323 completely burned out the target area.

11 September - The SICILY entered Sasobe Harbor, Japan for replenishment.

12 September - The SICILY, the SMILL and TAUSSIG proceeded out of Sasobe at 1735I, following the BADOENG STRAIT, the HANSON (DD-832), and the MCKENZIE (DD-836). These units joined to form Task Group 90.5, assigned to be Air Support Group for the Attack Force, Task Force 90.

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13 September - Task Group 90.5 proceeded to the Yellow Sea operating area about sixty miles southwest of Incheon, Korea.

14 September - Task Group 90.5 spent the day at a position 245°, 60 miles from Incheon to fly Combat Air Patrol over the target area. The first target CAP consisted of four F4U fighters. After completing their CAP duty, this flight was released from their patrol and reported in to a coordinator at Incheon who directed them onto gun emplacements in the park and adjacent hills in NW Incheon.

The second target CAP was released to strike installations at Kimp'o airfield. No targets or activity was observed at the field and the effectiveness of the strafing attack was undetermined.

The third target CAP upon release from their patrol assignments struck trenches along the beach area south of Incheon with undetermined results. Two replacement aircraft arrived from Itami and were recovered with the last flight.

15 September - D-day for the seizure of Incheon was executed in accordance with Operation Order No. 14-50 of Commander Task Force 90.

The first strike after providing cover for the assault group was directed to targets in Incheon. Machine gun positions, gun emplacements and a spit of land south of Wolmi-do were hit with 500 pound bombs, napalm, and rockets.

The second strike of eight fighters were sent on a search and attack mission along the main highway from Incheon to Seoul. They destroyed two trucks and damaged three others with strafing. An aircraft of this flight was hit by anti-air fire, estimated as 50 caliber, and the pilot was forced to ditch his aircraft in the channel approach to Incheon. The pilot was uninjured and was immediately picked up by the USS PLEDGE (AM-277).

The last strike hit gun emplacements, dugouts, and trenches in the Incheon area and then swept up toward Seoul to strike 15 vehicles some of which had previously been damaged.

16 September - The lack of immediate opposition by enemy ground forces permitted the advance of our own forces with little close air support required. Therefore, this ship's aircraft were diverted from close air support to attack various targets between Seoul and the front lines.

The first strike of eight Corsairs discovered six T-34 Russian built tanks advancing from Seoul towards our troops and engaged them at the village of Konsong-ni, five miles from Incheon. The planes hit one with napalm, blew the tracks off another with a rocket hit, and started a bad fluid leak from a third. The squadron suffered its second casualty of the Korean conflict when Captain William F. Simpson crashed to his death while making a bombing run on an enemy tank.

The second flight attacked these same tanks and with a direct napalm hit, a direct bomb hit and numerous rocket hits knocked out the three remaining tanks. In addition, the strike eliminated a jeep and a weapons carrier. Two other camouflaged vehicles were strafed with unassessed results. Buildings adjacent to the tank targets, into which tank crews had been seen dispersing, were burned with napalm.

The third strike flew along the Seoul-Incheon highway and bombed out two artillery pieces located by a controller, and an AA auto-

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matic weapon observed by one of the pilots. A truck adjacent to the matic weapon was strafed and burned. At the Seoul marshalling yards the strike hit eight loaded freight cars, setting two ablaze and damaging the rest with strafing.

The fourth strike made what appeared to be a fruitless attack on the facilities and area adjacent to Kimp'o airfield. The Tactical Air Observers strafed a large truck and two jeeps in that area.

The last strike for the day switched to naval targets. Three power boats, resembling motor torpedo boats, were located in a tidal inlet about twenty miles north of Inchon Harbor. Although previously hit by a flight from the BOXER, the strike completed their destruction with rockets, napalm, bombs and strafing.

17 September - D plus 2 day, the assault forces of the First Marine Division fanned out from their beach head at Inchon to a radius of about seven miles. The squadron continued to supply close air support and search and attack missions.

The first strike was composed of four Corsair strike aircraft and one Corsair to act as Tactical Air Coordinator. The pilots observed 800-1000 people dressed in white moving toward the front from Suwon in scattered groups. Some of these groups, on sighting the approaching aircraft, would reverse their directions so as to appear to be leaving the area as refugees. Aware of these tactics the pilots strafed, rocketed, and bombed various groups as well as the push carts. Invariably when the white robed "civilians" saw that their ruse had failed and the aircraft were making an attack, they would dive for ditches and open fire with small arms. When hit, their white clothing would be blown off, revealing the olive drab of enemy troops. Some of these harmless looking push carts, when hit by rocket fire, scattered rifles about the highway. This attack killed about 200 of these troops.

The second strike, patrolled the road from Seoul to Suwon to Ansan-ri strafing several carts and motorcycle along the way. Two wagons were burned with napalm. Upon completion of this patrol they received an urgent call for close support between Seoul and Inchon from a tank column under enemy fire. They effectively strafed, rocketed, and bombed the enemy positions and relieved the tanks of fire.

The next flight was directed to patrol the road from Seoul to Ichon (not Inchon) about sixty miles southeast of Seoul. One vehicle on the outskirts of Seoul was strafed and burned and another vehicle one mile north-west of Ichon was destroyed by strafing. While on patrol in this area the flight discovered two groups of emplacements on either side of a bridge being repaired at Yangsu-ri a few miles east of the junction of Pukhan-gang and the Han-gang rivers. Two emplacements were blasted by direct hits from 500 pound bombs and HVAR. The other was silenced by machine gun fire.

18 September - The marines ashore had advanced eastward to a rise four miles from Seoul where it was possible to see buildings of the city from the ground positions, and to the south as far as Sanchon-ni on the road to Suwon. Kimp'o airfield was taken the night of 17 September and reported available for landings.

The first strike, after providing air cover for the troops at Kimp'o located a light tank and destroyed it by a direct hit with napalm.

The second strike cruised ahead of a Marine tank column advancing toward Seoul and strafed troops retreating before the ground attack.

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These Corsairs also found a T-34 medium tank which they destroyed with napalm and another group of four tanks which they attacked without scoring any visible damage. A large stock of supplies on the ground near these tanks was set on fire incidental to the attack. A nearby AA position was silenced with 20MM.

On the next launch six Corsairs struck the large river island on which Seoul Airfield is located. One group of buildings on the northwest side of the island, about which considerable activity had been observed, were blasted with 500 pound bombs and napalm. Seven of these were burned down and two gutted. On the opposite side of the island two warehouses were attacked and although no direct hits were scored with heavy ordnance on these buildings, many fires were started in smaller adjacent buildings which appeared to be spreading toward the warehouses. An observer saw this area begin erupting in a series of explosions after the flight had retired. This island seemed to be the main funnel of supplies from Seoul to points south. The roads evidently were ferrying the supplies to a pier on the northwest corner of the island and to the main routes south. All of the main spans across the Han to the South had been bombed out for some time.

The fourth strike of eight F4U's was called on for close air support. This time it was for front line assault vehicles which were being held up by a pocket of resistance about seven miles east of Inchon. The aircraft struck machine gun and mortar positions on high ground impairing the Marine advance. The mortars and machine guns were silenced.

19 September - The U. S. Marines ashore, though continually advancing, met stiffer resistance from a reported regiment of enemy troops. The rest of the 10th Corps continued to disembark on the favorable tides throughout the day.

The first strike of six fighters, loaded with napalm, 500 pound bombs, HVAR, and a full load of 20MM, attacked a small village in which troops had concentrated. This flight then attacked a ridge holding back a tank column.

The second strike strafed the same ridge the first flight had hit and the troops were routed and could be seen fleeing into the adjacent small town of Tekhyen. Troops and light weapons on another ridge, harping the advance of a Marine tank column, were hit with bombs and napalm and they likewise abandoned their positions and were soon swimming across the Han River to the Seoul area.

The third strike hunted out an observation post that was directing enemy artillery fire from a reverse slope toward Marine tank elements. The position was identified on a ridge crest and strafed. No further fire was reported by the tanks and the fighters were released to strike troop concentrations in a small village where they started three severe fires with bombs and rockets. One artillery position suffered a direct hit with a 500 pound bomb and two others, camouflaged, were assessed as probably damaged by near misses. An ammunition truck parked near the two camouflaged pieces was strafed, began to burn, then exploded violently. Seoul Airfield, which had a large number of AA positions, was hit next and approximately 10 positions were demolished.

The last strike, caught short on time, was forced to drop all their ordnance in two passes on Seoul Airfield and the damage to the supplies and troops was undetermined. The Tactical Air Observers were directed to a clump of trees under which fox holes, troops, and vehicles were clearly visible. Rockets and strafing caused an undetermined amount of damage and a jeep speeding out of the area in an

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attempt to escape was blasted off the road.

VMF-214 suffered its only enlisted casualty of the Korean conflict when Technical Sergeant George C. Underwood (322614) USMC was killed by the accidental discharge of a 20MM cannon.

20 September - The first strike of four Corsairs supplied cover for the Marine troops which had crossed the Han River at Hwangju and fanned out in a radius of about two miles from that point. These forces cut the rail line from Seoul to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, and the adjacent highway. These aircraft struck two hills in the advance area from which fire was being directed at our ground forces. Their bombs, napalm, rockets and strafing relieved the pressure from the Marine forward elements. Two of the aircraft were sent to search the highway leading north out of Seoul. One jeep and one truck were located and destroyed and fifteen or twenty ox carts were also hit.

The next strike was directed to a ridge where the pilots could see enemy troops lying on the reverse slope. They swept in with 500 pound GP bombs and strafing and about 75 casualties could be observed. They also strafed troops in the Yongdung-po area and destroyed two trucks in the same place. Two 500 pound bombs were used to assist the artillery in destroying some factory buildings.

The third strike gave close support and after working over a ridge could observe numerous troops fleeing toward Seoul. A row of oil drums, a city block long, and four drums wide in the city of Yongdung-po was hit on both ends with napalm resulting in a large fire with smoke rising to 8000 feet. The fire was spreading to adjacent buildings when the flight retired.

A strike of six Corsairs attacked a train northwest of Seoul from which troops were reported unloading. A direct hit was made with a 500 pound bomb and napalm and an estimated 11 rail cars were seriously damaged. About half a mile up the track toward Seoul six camouflaged tank cars were struck with HVAR and 20MM, no explosions resulted, although the camouflage was burned off. Evidently the cars were empty at the time of attack.

The TAO for the last two strikes reported that the conflagration started by the third strike had continued to spread and was intensified by attacks from other support aircraft. The TAO aircraft strafed and rocketed a barracks building which exploded in a manner indicating that it was an ammo storeroom.

21 September - The first strike of four F4U's hit enemy troops in the Seoul area and assisted a column of tanks under fire entering Yongdung-po.

The second strike worked over a ridge of enemy troops.

The third strike of four Corsairs struck troops that could be seen out on the dike areas across the Han west of Seoul.

The last strike of six Corsairs, hit the same area, a little farther east along the Han River. Many casualties both from napalm and strafing attack could be observed. Also the pilots could clearly observe troops attempting to change into white civilian clothing. By this time American troops were on the outskirts of Seoul to the northwest and across the Han River from Seoul to the south.

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22 September - In accordance with orders from CTG 90.5, VMF-214 launched no strikes during the day but did maintain a combat air patrol over Task Group 90.5 from 1710I to 1840I. The task group remained in the operating area about ninety miles southwest of Incheon refueling auxiliary units.

23 September - With the SICILY operating singly, VMF-214 flew all strikes for Task Group 90.5.

The first strike of five Corsairs attacked and destroyed eleven ferry barges on the south bank of the Han river at Yongdung-po.

The next three strikes assisted the advance of Marine ground elements with rockets, bombing, and strafing attacks on heavily dug in troops concentrations in Seoul. Mortar positions in Seoul prison, and machine gun nests and observation posts in the Governor General's Palace were destroyed in the attacks.

The next flight, on a search and attack mission near Kunchon, saw the loss of another squadron pilot when Major Robert Floock's plane, hit by AA fire, caught fire and crashed. The remainder of the flight immediately attacked the AA position and destroyed it with rockets and bombs.

The last strike, flying in close support of our troops in Seoul, inflicted numerous casualties on two pockets of enemy resistance and knocked out two nearby AA positions.

24 September - Repeating the pattern of the previous day's operation, six strikes of five aircraft each were launched every two hours on close air support missions in and around the city of Seoul.

The first three strikes, launched at 0600I, 0800I, and 1000I, flew through heavy layers of smoke caused by the burning of numerous buildings in Yongdung-po and the southern edge of Seoul. The Seoul prison yard and ridges in the vicinity overlooking the same area were known to contain many dug in emplacements and gun positions hampering the advancing Marine ground units. All three flights hammered at these positions with bombs, rockets, and strafing. Many casualties could be observed and the gun positions were put out of action.

The last two strikes, hit the same area, a little farther south on the edge of the Seoul business district. A total of six tanks were found by these flights and all the tanks were put out of action with bombs and napalm. In addition, one strike eliminated a truck and three other vehicles.

25 September - This last day of VMF-214's participation in the Incheon-Seoul operation found the 1st Marine Division on the verge of securing Seoul, the final objective.

The first strike, four Corsairs launched at 0600I, was sent into the southeastern section of Seoul to search out and attack tanks. While searching the area at low altitude Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischoid, USMC, Commanding Officer of VMF-214, was hit by AA fire. Shortly thereafter, the squadron suffered its fourth pilot loss of the Korean conflict when the Colonel's crippled aircraft burst into flames and crashed near Kimpo airfield. The remainder of the flight expended all ordnance on the enemy gun positions.

The next four strikes of five Corsairs each continued to hammer at the buildings and houses in southeastern Seoul. The last strike of the day was sent to the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang. Numerous warehouses and thirty boxcars in the railroad yards of Pyongyang were bombed, rocketed, and strafed, with good results.

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Upon recovering the last strike, the SICILY proceeded towards Incheon Harbor for seven days maintenance work in accordance with ComNavFE dispatch orders.

26 - 30 September - On 26 September the SICILY anchored at berth E-8 in Incheon Harbor about twelve miles out from the city and remained at anchor for the rest of the month undergoing repairs and taking on supplies. On 28 September, VMF-214 pilots were transported by air to Itani, Japan, for a three day rest.

1 - 2 October - The SICILY at anchor in Incheon Harbor completed a week of maintenance work. VMF-214 pilots returned aboard on 2 October from their three day rest period at Itani AFB, Japan.

3 October - At 1109I, the SICILY sailed from Incheon Harbor into the Yellow Sea, headed for Sasobo, Japan.

4 October - Following a night and day of steaming southward in the Yellow Sea, the SICILY moored at buoy 26, Sasobo, Japan at 1928I.

5 - 9 October - With VMF-214 embarked, the SICILY spent this period in Sasobo Harbor standing by on twelve hour sailing notice.

ENEMY TACTICS

No enemy air activity was encountered by this squadron for the period of this report. The enemy's anti-aircraft fire was moderately accurate and was of heavier caliber and intensity than the squadron had previously encountered. Eighteen planes were hit, four planes were lost and three pilots were killed due to enemy fire.

The heaviest concentrations of anti-aircraft positions were located in the city of Seoul. Batteries were often placed on the tops of the tallest buildings.

At this time the squadron first encountered the use of flak traps. These traps were constructed by the enemy placing an apparently usable vehicle in an open valley, and covering the approaches with anti-aircraft fire. In one instance an aircraft was placed on the Seoul airfield in such a position that maximum fire was brought to bear on our attacking planes.

Six enemy tanks were encountered attempting to move into Incheon. This was the first time this unit made contact with a group of tanks moving during daylight hours and without camouflage.

In general the camouflage tactics of the enemy were similar to those used in the Pusan engagement.

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ESTIMATED RESULTS

Between 7 September and 9 October 1950, Marine Fighter Squadron 214 flew a total of 1502.9 hours. This was accomplished by flying 484 combat sorties and as a result the following enemy equipment and personnel were destroyed:

Artillery	
Anti-aircraft	4
Field	3
Machine Guns	9
Mortars	5
Buildings	
Factories	2
Transformers	2
Warehouses	9
Miscellaneous, barns & sheds	5
Enemy casualties	
North Koreans	770
Railroad targets	
Bridges	2
Freight cars	45
Locomotives	2
Loading platforms	3
Tank cars	3
Round house	2
Boats	
Cargo boats	5
Cargo barges	2
Motor boats	3
Tanks	
T-34 type	15
Vehicles	
Jeeps	7
Motorcycle	1
Trucks	16
Carts, horse & hand	19
Additional military type targets	
Observation Posts	2
Bunkers	2
Oil Drums	500

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations made in the Special Action Report for the period 14 July to 6 September 1950 pertain to this period also. The following recommendations are in addition to the previous recommendations and based solely on this operation:

1. It is recommended that no more than 190 enlisted men be assigned to a squadron based aboard a CVE type carrier.
2. It is recommended that close air support charts be furnished on the basis of one and one half times pilot complement.
3. It is recommended that the charts 1:250,000 with transverse mercator grid, be used universally for close air support.
4. It is recommended that VHF radio sets be installed in artillery spot aircraft, and an additional AN/ARC-1 be installed in air support aircraft.
5. It is recommended that air support aircraft have vulnerable parts protected by armor plate.

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ANNEX A

(Personnel and Administration)

This annex is divided into three sections: (1) Calendar of Events, (2) Personnel (3) Administration.

1. Calendar of Events.

7 September - VMF-214 consisted of thirty-four officers and 183 enlisted men aboard the USS SICILY, with a rear echelon at Itami Air Base, Japan, consisting of two officers and forty-five enlisted men.

8 October - The administrative section of the rear echelon consisting of one officer and six enlisted men embarked the USS SICILY at Sasobe, Japan. Camp maintenance and transportation personnel were transferred to Service Squadron, MAG-12.

9 October - On this date VMF-214 had its entire assigned strength of thirty-seven officers and 187 enlisted men aboard the USS SICILY.

During this period six officers were joined and two officers and forty enlisted men were transferred. Three officers and one enlisted man were combat casualties.

2. Personnel.

a. Officers (Pilots). Based on the wartime T/O of fifty-three officer pilots the squadron was still considerably understrength. This shortage required each pilot to fly an average of three flights for every two days operation. As a result of the experience gained during this period, the recommendation of the previous Special Action Report for the Pusan operation that a carrier based squadron have no less than forty officer pilots assigned, is upheld.

b. Officers (Aviation Ground). Prior to this period VMF-214 joined three Aviation Ground Officers, holding the following MOS and job titles: 0130 Adjutant, 6410 Aircraft Maintenance & Repair Officer, and 0201 Basic Intelligence Officer. These officers were integrated into the organization and immediately assumed a great deal of the work load from the officer pilots who had been assigned those duties. These officers were members of the Organized Reserve called to duty on 1 August 1950 and were well qualified for their squadron assignments. The other Aviation Ground Officers authorized by the wartime T/O were not available but it is believed that the squadron would have benefited materially by the addition of an Ordnance Officer, Material Officer and Assistant Operations Officer while carrier based.

c. Enlisted Personnel. Prior to this period the squadron joined an augmentation detail of fifty-eight enlisted men of which approximately one-half were members of the Organized Reserve. With few exceptions, these men were qualified to take their place in the squadron according to their MOS and rank.

d. Adequacy of the T/O. During this period the squadron was operating with an enlisted complement of 187 men, the authorized wartime T/O less the Camp Maintenance and Transportation sections. The recommendations for the increase in the T/O allowance for the Intelligence and Ordnance sections as made in the Special Action Report for the period 14 July - 6 September 1950 are reiterated. The Ordnance section continued to receive definite assistance from the navy crews and the Intelligence section continued to be augmented.

e. General.

The squadron was required to assign approximately one-fourth of its personnel to the ship for such duties as plane handlers, stewards, laundry men, etc.

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The mail delivery continued to be dependant upon the ship's position and its operational requirements. Mail was routed through the postal facilities at the Air Force Base at Itami.

With the augmentation at the beginning of this period which brought the squadron strength up to 187 enlisted men and thirty-seven officers aboard ship, the limit of available berthing spaces for Marine personnel had been reached. It is recommended that no more than 190 enlisted men be assigned to a CVE type carrier for squadron operations.

f. Casualties. There were four casualties during this period. Captain William F. SIMPSON (026126) USMC was killed in action at Inchon, Korea, on 16 September; Major Robert (n) FLOECK (010315) USMC was killed in action at Kunchon, Korea, on 23 September; Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. LISCHIED (06626) USMC was killed in action at Kimpo Airfield, Korea, on 25 September; and Technical Sergeant George C. UNDERWOOD (322614) USMC was killed accidentally in line of duty on 19 September 1950.

3. Administration.

The squadron was notified of a change in parent group, MAG-33 to MAG-12, on 21 September 1950. This change caused considerable delay in forwarding and receiving of official mail.

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 ROSTER OF VMF-214 OFFICERS AND MEN 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950

<u>NAME</u>	<u>SERVICE NO.</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>COMPONENT</u>
ANDROSKO, William E.	044866	1stLt	7302	MC
*BIBBY, Joe R.	046961	1stLt	7302	MC
CONROY, Donald	032233	Capt	7302	MC
CURTIS, Oliver W.	027924	Capt	7302	MC
**DAVIS, Jefferson A., Jr.	031552	Capt	7304	MC
**DE CLOUD, John	032249	Capt	7302	MC
DODENHOFF, George H.	037766	1stLt	7302	MC
DUNPHY, James C.	035634	1stLt	7302	MC
*DYER, Phillip G.	025836	Capt	7302	MC
FINN, Howard J.	013672	Capt	7302	MC
#FLOECK, Robert	010315	Maj	7302	MC
GALBREATH, Don W.	015185	Capt	7302	MC
GARBER, Charles D.	014349	Capt	7304	MC
HANES, John V.	036028	1stLt	7302	MC
HEILMAN, Roland B.	035097	Capt	7302	MC
JAMES, Kenneth R.	032386	1stLt	0130	R II
*KELEHER, Philip J.	025398	Capt	7302	MC
KELLER, Joseph	029448	Capt	7304	MC
KELLER, Robert P.	06855	Maj	7303	MC
*KUPRASH, George	035732	1stLt	7302	MC
#LISCHEID, Walter E.	06626	LtCol	7302	MC
LONGFELLOW, William J.	028580	Capt	7302	MC
LUNDIN, William M.	07998	Maj	7302	MC
MALONEY, Emmons S.	028320	Capt	7302	MC
MC CONBER, Franklin J.	030996	1stLt	6410	R II
MINICK, Robert W.	034820	1stLt	7302	MC
MOORE, Theodore R.	036127	1stLt	7302	MC
*O'NEAL, William T.	018658	Capt	7302	MC
OSSELMAN, Stanley J.	047097	2dLt	7302	MC
PERKIN, John S.	022616	Capt	7302	MC
REUSSER, Kenneth L.	011066	Maj	7302	MC
RIEDEK, Alvin R.	046389	1stLt	7302	MC
ROSS, John D.	029179	Capt	7302	MC
SCHWENDIMANN, Henry N.	028069	Capt	7302	MC
#SIMPSON, William F.	026126	Capt	7302	MC
SKORICH, John	018542	Capt	7302	MC
SMITH, Jerry B.	030011	Capt	7302	MC
SUNNER, Bruce W.	045947	1stLt	0201	R II
TOSDAL, Orlando S.	013628	Capt	7304	MC
TOWNSEND, Forrest I.	033849	Capt	7304	MC
*WITT, William T., Jr.	025464	Capt	7302	MC
ALLEN, Donald F.	669357	Cpl	0143	MC
ALVAREZ, Francisco M.	667704	Pfc	6511	MC
ARCUNI, Oreste K.	599796	SSgt	6413	MC
BABICH, Raymond D.	620639	Pfc	6500	MC
BAIRD, Bobby	1083499	Cpl	6511	MC
BARKER, Ray M.	1083946	Cpl	6441	MC
BATROOT, George T.	1029426	Cpl	6413	R II
BEAMAN, Harold R.	277445	TSgt	6419	MC
BEAN, Donald W.	963774	SSgt	0147	MC
BEARD, Donald E.	378815	SSgt	6413	MC
**BEHLMAN, Paul H.	667703	Pfc	6400	MC
BELL, Elbert T.	814345	SSgt	6413	MC
BIDDLE, James W.	547531	Sgt	6413	MC
BISCHAK, Alexander Jr.	319630	MSgt	7119	MC
BLOOM, Melvin R.	657080	Cpl	7031	MC
BORDEN, Duncan K., Jr.	663594	Pfc	3061	MC
**BOSTICK, Jerry D.	1113089	Pfc	1300	MC
**BRACEWELL, Ernest W.	659895	Pfc	3531	MC
BROCIUS, Bill S.	478928	TSgt	6439	MC
BROOME, Thomas W.	293261	TSgt	3379	MC
**BROWN, Danny E.	662051	Pfc	3531	MC
BRUGGEMAN, Homer F.	1029421	Cpl	6413	R II

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BUNCE, Truman G.	319841	TSgt	6519	MC	
BURKE, Albert R.	824698	Cpl	6400	R II	
BURNLEY, Dewey W.	662809	Pfc	3613	MC	
BURNS, William A.	663684	Pfc	6413	MC	
BUTTERFIELD, Richard S.	659826	Pfc	6400	MC	
**BUYSSE, Robert R.	600139	Cpl	7113	MC	
**CALANIA, Guy A.	1091344	Pfc	3500	MC	
**CHAMBERS, Carl F., Jr.	1114803	Pfc	3531	MC	
CHICK, Clarence E.	1055552	Sgt	6413	MC	
CHORICE, Charles C.	634979	Sgt	6611	MC	
CHRISMAN, Dannie M.	587769	Sgt	6413	MC	
CHROUCH, Kenneth R.	1068824	Cpl	6413	MC	
CLARK, Robert S.	670840	Cpl	6511	MC	
CLINKSCALES, Ollie F., Jr.	1117941	Pfc	7000	MC	
COMPTON, Orril	1092159	Cpl	6443	MC	
**COOK, Eugene G.	455713	TSgt	3539	MC	
CORNETT, Bogus	1046608	Pfc	3613	MC	
CRAIN, Samuel E.	662570	Cpl	6413	MC	
**CROCCO, Frank	1072857	Pfc	3371	MC	
DARBY, Samuel F., Jr.	629967	SSgt	6413	MC	
DAVIS, Billy H.	665929	Cpl	6413	MC	
**DAVIS, Robert J.	649149	Pfc	3531	MC	
DEAN, Leon T.	1085087	Pfc	3611	MC	
DELGADO, Raymond C.	659799	Pfc	6511	MC	
DEMOND, Jack W.	349203	TSgt	6419	MC	
**DEVINE, Edward J.	664590	Pfc	6431	MC	
DIEMERT, William A.	276707	TSgt	6519	MC	
DOMINY, James T.	1114135	Pfc	6400	MC	
DROLET, Arthur D.	1112900	Pfc	1300	MC	
DUNN, Neil P.	1083326	Cpl	0143	MC	
DURSE, Paul F.	320995	TSgt	6419	MC	
FAIN, Theodorick G.	663196	Pfc	3611	MC	
**FERGUSON, Billy L.	666310	Pfc	3531	MC	
FERGUSON, Joseph H.	334467	SSgt	6413	R II	
**FILAK, Laddie V.	662586	Cpl	1372	MC	
FIXICO, Willie	666243	Pfc	6413	MC	
**FLINK, Frank L.	1123352	Pfc	3200	MC	
FLONES, Jose P.	668107	Cpl	6511	MC	
FOX, Cecil L.	665904	Sgt	6611	MC	
GANT, Frederick D., Jr.	635983	SSgt	6413	MC	
GARCIA, Ramon	597154	Sgt	0143	MC	
GEIGER, David N.	1023330	Sgt	6441	R II	
GLASPY, Charles W.	324219	TSgt	6500	R II	
GONZALES, Alessandro	549072	Cpl	6431	MC	
GOOSSEN, Eddie D.	650581	Sgt	6413	MC	
**GREENE, Lawrence E.	1075667	Cpl	0143	R II	
GRIFFITH, John R.	1054170	Sgt	6413	R II	
**GRUENKE, Alfred A.	279112	MSgt	3379	MC	
GUY, Willie Z.	1100948	Pfc	3613	MC	
HALCHISHAK, William	816680	TSgt	6449	R II	
HANCOCK, Robert E.	665210	Pfc	6413	MC	
HANKINS, Thomas J.	1114312	Pfc	0143	MC	
**HANSEN, Oscar J.	1113540	Pfc	3500	MC	
**HARTIN, Harold Jr.	539689	Sgt	6413	R II	
**HARTIN, Verdun P.	346327	TSgt	7041	R II	
HATHAWAY, Melvin R.	525256	Sgt	6511	MC	
HAWKINS, Frienden D.	611752	Cpl	7031	MC	
HEIMHICK, LeRoy E.	294089	MSgt	6619	MC	
HENDERSON, Andrew C.	819389	SSgt	6413	MC	
HENDERSON, Clifford D.	443661	SSgt	7119	MC	
HENNEMANN, Thomas L.	454626	SSgt	6511	MC	
HICKEY, Bryan S.	505372	Sgt	7000	R II	
HOGAN, Ernest J.	1088493	Cpl	6444	MC	
**HORELIGA, Louis F.	665901	Pfc	3371	MC	
HOSFELT, Millard L.	481793	MSgt	6519	R II	
HOWARD, Richard G.	658897	Cpl	6511	MC	
**HOWELL, Henry N.	1083441	Cpl	1372	MC	
HUDSON, Willie Z.	658937	Sgt	3611	MC	

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HUFFMAN, Herbert T.	403072	TSgt	6419		MC
HUSKEY, Warren W.	276261	TSgt	6419		MC
**JACKSON, Wayne A.	1126357	Pfc	6400		MC
**JIMENEZ, Adolfo N.	1083636	Pfc	3531		MC
JIMENEZ, Narcizo D., Jr.	667659	Sgt	7114		MC
**JOHNSON, Frank W.	1114683	Pfc	3371		MC
JOHNSON, Norman L.	1103256	Pfc	0143		MC
JONES, Lee W.	669879	Sgt	6414		MC
JUDS, Stanley P.	1103212	Pfc	6400		MC
**KENDALL, George P., Jr.	1103292	Pfc	3500		MC
KERN, John D., Jr.	811255	Sgt	6413	R II	
KIEFNER, Vernon J.	394556	Sgt	6413	R II	
KING, Robert S.	1120801	Pfc	6400		MC
KINLAW, Primus L.	900652	Sgt	3611		MC
KIRKNESS, Richard A.	1110507	Pfc	6511	R II	
**KIRSCHBAUM, Willard	275356	MSgt	6419		MC
KLOTZ, Gene	613991	SSgt	6511		MC
KOLASA, Casimer S.	1096956	Sgt	3371		MC
KOMOROSKY, Clarence P.	1100827	Pfc	6511		MC
KUCHERA, Carl J.	269636	TSgt	6419		MC
KURTZ, Joseph A.	1069974	Cpl	6400	R II	
LADD, Jerreld D.	662502	Cpl	6413		MC
LAMB, Thomas C.	383522	TSgt	6449	R II	
LANDRY, Harry J.	625457	Pfc	5200		MC
LANGSTON, Charlie E.	387160	SSgt	6413	R II	
LAWLEN, Herman R.	1046958	Cpl	6611	R II	
LESHEA, Robert E.	393025	TSgt	3069		MC
LEWITT, Charles R.	533210	Sgt	7041	R II	
LEWIS, Hugh G.	306983	MSgt	0149		MC
LEWIS, Thomas H.	1078876	Sgt	3613		MC
LOCKWOOD, John E.	1093522	Pfc	6413		MC
LOCOE, Alvin J.	611751	Sgt	6413		MC
LOPEZ, Dolores	666258	Cpl	4134		MC
LORBECKI, John A.	567805	Sgt	7011	R II	
LORD, George W., Jr.	644354	Sgt	6413		MC
LOYD, Thomas L., Jr.	663583	Pfc	6413		MC
LYDA, Stuart D.	1072715	Pfc	7011		MC
MAC ISAAC, Harold J.	413940	Sgt	6413		MC
MAC KAY, James H.	252748	MSgt	6519		MC
MAGGARD, Allen D.	606216	SSgt	7011		MC
**MC DOWELL, Donald G.	1091395	Cpl	6511		MC
MICHELS, Robert W.	667692	Sgt	6511		MC
MILLEN, Richard W.	663577	Cpl	0143		MC
MITCHELL, John W.	815132	Pfc	3611		MC
MITCHELL, William F.	1126859	Pfc	6400		MC
**MIX, Ralph E.	1103195	Pfc	3500		MC
MOE, Gerald R.	1105912	Pfc	6511	R II	
**MOONE, James A.	1123699	Pfc	3500		MC
MORGANTI, Charles III	325602	TSgt	6519		MC
MOSSMAN, Robert J.	262924	MSgt	4611		MC
NELSON, Ervin Y.	1054119	Pfc	6611	R II	
**NETHERTON, Charles H.	1097897	Pfc	6500	R II	
NIEDERKORN, Darrold H.	1020635	TSgt	6519	R II	
**NIEMANN, Donald G.	1113492	Pfc	3500		MC
NIESEN, Gerald L.	1021524	TSgt	6519	R II	
**OCHOA, Johnnie M.	632787	Cpl	3531		MC
**OHNSTAD, Keith O.	1114189	Pfc	3500		MC
OLDSON, William J.	649421	Sgt	3067		MC
OLMHEIM, John A.	523026	SSgt	6413	R II	
OLMSTEAD, James M.	302537	TSgt	6619		MC
OLSON, Carl W., Jr.	1103903	SSgt	6413	R II	
ORVEDAHL, James J.	666330	Cpl	3066		MC
OVERBY, Richard K.	1062801	Cpl	6511	R II	
PANHAM, Julius Jr.	1078859	Cpl	3613		MC
PENKETH, George	386493	Tsgt	6449	R II	
PETERS, Carl W.	819980	SSgt	6511		MC
PETERS, Sterling R.	1044720	Cpl	6511		MC
PETERSON, Billy J.	655658	Sgt	3371		MC

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PEVEY, Robert S.	662545	Cpl.	6413	MC	
PIER, Larry T.	665907	Cpl.	6511	MC	
PIERCE, Julius B.	409978	TSgt	6419	MC	
PINCKNEY, David S.	1103900	Pfc	6500	R II	
PRICE, James E.	646125	Cpl	3613	MC	
**PRINCE, John R.	597048	Sgt	6511	MC	
RAMON, Jesse H.	659805	Pfc	6400	MC	
**RAMSEY, Jerry E.	537325	SSgt	1379	MC	
RAMSTROM, Robert G.	669209	Sgt	6511	MC	
REYES, Adan Z.	659777	Pfc	6511	MC	
RIDGWAY, George A.	381157	MSgt	6419	MC	
ROBERTS, Charles R.	1117276	Pfc	6413	MC	
ROBINSON, Andrew	643532	Cpl	3613	MC	
ROBINSON, Harold E.	316014	MSgt	6519	R II	
ROBIRDS, Freddie D.	667028	Pfc	6511	MC	
**ROMBKOWSKI, Robert	584559	Cpl	3516	MC	
**RONNING, Kenneth E.	1117275	Pfc	3500	MC	
ROSS, Jack H.	1118404	Pfc	3500	MC	
ROVNEY, Richard H.	560926	Sgt	6441	MC	
SANCHEZ, John	660712	Sgt	6413	MC	
SANKEY, James L.	408320	SSgt	6511	MC	
SARABIA, Emerico	933293	Sgt	7041	MC	
SARTIN, Hervie L., Jr.	315784	MSgt	6419	MC	
SCANLON, John H., Jr.	421897	SSgt	6413	MC	
SCHOPPA, Raymond L.	1095786	Pfc	6444	MC	
SEARLES, Raymond H., Jr.	632757	Cpl	6441	MC	
SELMAN, Billy M.	668137	Cpl	6411	MC	
SHANK, Paul S.	666797	Pfc	3500	MC	
SHARKEY, William L.	319159	TSgt	6419	MC	
SHOEFSTALL, Adrian A.	1083459	Cpl	6511	MC	
**SIMMONS, Herbert L.	666347	Pfc	3531	MC	
SKINNER, Harry G.	611686	Pfc	6413	MC	
SLOCUM, Walter T.	1123238	Pfc	6400	MC	
SMITH, Charles K.	512108	Sgt	6413	MC	
SMITH, Ronald G.	667791	Sgt	6511	MC	
SMITH, Thomas R.	1114383	Pfc	6413	MC	
SMITH, Vernon L.	667661	Pfc	6431	MC	
SOUTH, Bobbie E.	602513	Cpl	6413	MC	
STOCKMAN, Russell J.A.	1114350	Pfc	1300	MC	
STOCKS, Floyd P.	324856	SSgt	6413	MC	
STONE, William L.	1060176	Cpl	6413	MC	
STUETTGEN, Charles F.	670889	Pfc	6413	MC	
SYKES, Leon	657385	Sgt	6511	MC	
TANNER, Lee	662507	Cpl	6611	MC	
TAYLOR, Irving G.	631149	TSgt	6419	MC	
TAYLOR, Richard W.	988705	Cpl	5231	MC	
TEMPLETON, James E.	665891	Cpl	6413	MC	
TETER, Ernest I.	596623	SSgt	6431	MC	
THIBODEAUX, Percy	665934	Cpl	6413	MC	
THOMAS, Morris	642673	Cpl	3613	MC	
TIMMERMAN, Edwin O.	1024927	TSgt	6419	R II	
TIMS, Franklin L.	1079084	Cpl	6441	MC	
TOLER, Albert E.	609295	Cpl	6441	MC	
TREAT, Ira E.	302314	TSgt	6449	MC	
SUNDERWOOD, George C.	322614	TSgt	6439	MC	
VOICE, William C.	667077	Pfc	6441	MC	
WALLS, Daniel J.	1107723	Sgt	6500	R II	
WALTERS, Charles F.	611249	Sgt	6511	MC	
WHIDBY, Roy L.	522427	SSgt	6411	MC	
WILKES, William A., Jr.	583562	Cpl	3613	MC	
WILLIS, Titus L.	522533	SSgt	6413	MC	
WOLCZAK, Victor J.	257671	MSgt	6419	MC	
**WOMACK, Robert L.	1073365	Pfc	5200	MC	
WOODLOCK, Jack V.	317220	TSgt	6419	MC	
WOS, Robert R.	1073258	Cpl	6413	MC	
ZAMORA, Elias J.	659785	Cpl	6413	MC	
KING, Robert L.	151624	Lt		MC USN	
HEID, Joseph G., Jr.	301 52 48	HM3		USN	

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CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX I TO ANNEX A (CONT'D)
 **JACOBUCCI, Silvey A., Jr. 563 73 92 HM1 USNR
 MAC MAHON, Martin R. 245 82 92 HM3 USN
 PICUS, Irving 716 36.15 HM3 USNR

* Indicate joined during period
 ** Indicates dropped during period
 * ** Indicates joined & dropped during period
 # Indicates Killed In Action during period
 @ Indicates Killed Accidentally during period

DISTRIBUTION OF UNLISTED PERSONNEL BY MOS

1. 7 September 1950

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>OCCUPATIONAL FIELD</u>	<u>NO. ABOARD SHIP</u>	<u>NO. REAR ECHELON</u>
Headquarters	01	8	4
Camp Maintenance	13	4	6
Commissary	33	3	4
CVE Supplement	36	14	0
Electronics	66	7	0
Intelligence	70	4	0
Engineering	64	96	5
Material	30	3	2
Operations	70	4	1
Ordnance	65	35	4
Transportation	35	2	18
Medical	--	3	1
Total		183	45

2. 9 October 1950

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>OCCUPATIONAL FIELD</u>	<u>NO. ABOARD SHIP</u>	<u>NO. REAR ECHELON</u>
Headquarters	01	9	0
Camp Maintenance	13	3	0
Commissary	33	3	0
CVE Supplement	36	14	0
Electronics	66	7	0
Intelligence	70	3	0
Engineering	64	100	0
Material	30	4	0
Operations	70	3	0
Ordnance	65	36	0
Transportation	35	2	0
Medical	--	3	0
Total		187	0

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ANNEX B

(Intelligence)

The Intelligence Section of VMF-214 was given notice of the intended Incheon landing on about the 13th of September. The ship at that time, however, was proceeding to the objective area and no preparation other than the readying of material on hand could be accomplished.

The principal difficulty of this operation was the problem of maps. Close support booklets were provided for the initial landing, but they did not extend to Kimpo or Seoul and our forces soon ran off the covered area. Due to lack of prior knowledge concerning the operation, no check had been made on map coverage, therefore the most critical of the 1 to 50,000 scale maps were not available. This was the first time that the squadron had used the 1 to 50,000 map size. The pilots prefer the 1 to 250,000 scale maps for the following reasons: first, the 1 to 250,000 scale covered a larger area on each map and secondly, the 1 to 50,000 maps were of Japanese origin, not colored, contained many inaccuracies in terrain contours and altitudes, making the map difficult to read. A further difficulty with the maps arose when the Navy shifted from the polyconic projection grid system to the transverse mercator. This necessitated drawing many of the coordinates in by hand on the available maps.

One of the principle jobs of the Intelligence Officer was to interrogate the returning flights. The information thus obtained was forwarded on Aircraft Action Report forms. These forms were not considered wholly adequate and suggestions for their improvement were forwarded in the Quarterly Intelligence Report submitted on 1 September 1950.

It is recommended that:

An adequate supply of maps be given each squadron before entering a new area of operation.

ANNEX C

(Operations)

The comments and recommendations made in the Special Action Report for the period of 14 July to 6 September 1950 remain pertinent.

The tactics employed by this squadron were the same as those employed in the Pusan Perimeter defense. As the enemy was more aggressive with anti-aircraft guns and small arms fire against aircraft in this campaign, it was re-emphasized that the TAC should fly no slower than 200 knots and that the strike groups be kept clear until called on the target, and that strike groups should retire immediately after completion of mission. The Corsair has been vulnerable to anti-aircraft and small arms fire, six of our aircraft having been lost to enemy fire. Against a better equipped and more skilled enemy, losses could easily have run two or three times as high. As the oil coolers were the most vulnerable spot on the Corsair, it was made SOP to avoid, whenever possible, exposure of the underside of the aircraft to enemy fire. Pilots were instructed to fly well over the enemy positions before starting a climbing turn upon recovery of the attack, in order to avoid giving the enemy a large surface for a target.

Air to ground coordination was improved over the previous operation, however in most instances the ground units did not comply with the panel recognition display plan. Panel positions and/or colors were not changed as scheduled. In future operations ground units should adhere strictly to the panel recognition plan as published in the operation order, else the panels will become useless. There existed a definite need for better coordination between the Fire Support Control Center and the supporting aircraft, as on several occasions flights were directed, unwarned, into zones of artillery fire.

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ANNEX C (CONT'D)

The Tactical Air Direction Center and the Tactical Air Control Parties had a tendency to keep the close support strikes overtime. In one instance a strike was held one hour overtime while the relief strike was being held in an orbit awaiting assignment. Related to this was an inclination on the part of the TADC to assign a target in the last ten or fifteen minutes of the period on station. It is felt that at least a half hour is necessary to proceed from the orbit point to the controller, and to locate, and properly hit a target. To maintain carrier aircraft over a target continuously it is necessary to adhere to a strict schedule. When operating from CVE's with only one squadron aboard, it is often necessary to use aircraft returning from the first strike to make up the third strike. Any delay over the target, will cause further delay in later strikes reporting to the controllers.

From the experience gained early in the conflict, coordination between strike groups, TAC's and TACP's was greatly improved in this phase. The policy of using flights of five aircraft, with one acting as TAC proved to consume a goodly portion of the strike group's time as the TAC searched out or familiarized himself with the target. It is felt that TAC's should be separate from strike groups and be relieved on station with each TAC briefing his own relief. A TAC should be able to remain on station from two and one half to three hours in order to keep abreast with movements on the ground. A TAC separated from the strike group is free to find targets without worrying about a group circling overhead with only a short time remaining on station. It is believed that TAC's could best come from the Group's Operation Section, and composed of pilots thoroughly familiar with the entire situation.

Frequently an artillery spotting aircraft would locate some excellent targets, but without radio communication with the fighters it was extremely difficult to guide the fighters in on the proper target. In several instances the flight leader would lower flaps and reduce speed to 120 knots and fly alongside of the OY and communicate with the pilot by use of hand signals and thus be guided on to the target. One of this squadron's VHF sets was installed in a Marine OY, and operated to the satisfaction of all. It is recommended that either VHF be installed in the OY's or MHF installed in the F4U's in order to have communication with the spotting planes.

As a result of the "scrourging" ability of the squadron materiel officer, forty Air Force survival jackets were obtained. This was the first survival gear received by the squadron. The jacket contains a well planned collection of survival items.

Difficulty experienced with igniter fuzes resulted in the failure of napalm bombs to ignite upon impact. This fuze failure was so consistent that it became squadron SOP for the wingman of the pilot dropping napalm to follow closely in the attack and ignite the napalm by strafing.

Recommendations:

1. Armor plating should be installed on all vulnerable parts of the aircraft. It is to be noted that although armor plate for the oil coolers was ordered enroute to Korea in July, none has arrived to date.
2. Install VHF in artillery spot aircraft.
3. Develop a survival vest similar to that issued by the Air Force, for use by Marine aviators.

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ANNEX D

(Logistics)

For the period of the Inchon - Seoul Operation, logistical support was furnished by the USS SICILY. One aircraft with a damaged tail wheel assembly was cannibalized for spare parts. The cannibalization became necessary due to the fact that the ship had not received many of the items on the section "B" Allowance List. Five aircraft were stricken during the period, four lost to enemy action and one damaged as a result of landing accident. Replacement aircraft were not available. A shortage of lip microphones and extension cords developed. Repeated efforts to obtain a resupply of these items met with no success as the shortage existed throughout the far eastern area. A supply of clothing was received at Sasebo from Marine Aircraft Group 12, on 8 October. This replenishment of clothing was the first obtained since embarkation in June 1950, and furnished only the basic requirements for squadron personnel. Lack of adequate utility clothing and difficulty in procuring same was the main supply problem.

Recommendations:

Every carrier based squadron should have a sixty day clothing allowance and make issue as necessary to squadron personnel.

ANNEX E

(Communications and Electronics)

The Communications section of the squadron functioned in the same manner during this phase as in the preceding phase. The ship continued to handle all external communications. Communications with the parent group continued to be poor. Oftentimes the receipt of official mail was so tardy that necessary action was late.

The limited number of VHF channels available for aircraft in this operation caused a situation which was borderline between satisfactory and unsatisfactory. Two channels devoted solely to tactical air direction provided the absolute minimum for this function. The use of the emergency channel for tactical air direction and the extreme misuse of the channel for inter-plane communications, rendered the channel useless for emergency or rescue. It is believed, that had the force ashore been larger and the number of aircraft working in close support slightly greater, serious difficulties would have been encountered and rendered close air support ineffective.

The electronics functioning and maintenance in the aircraft was good during this period. The AN/ARC-1 radios were set up prior to arrival at objective area and, other than routine maintenance, presented few difficulties. A few shortages in electronics equipment did become critical. The ships supply of lip microphones, M-5A-UR (Stock No. R16-M-2471) and extension cords (GX 922 Stock No. R16-GX922-14R) became exhausted. In order to alleviate the pilot shortage of lip microphones, it became necessary for the electronics section to loan all of their available test microphones to pilots.

Recommendations:

1. From the experience gained during this period it is recommended that extension cords, GX 922, be made a part of the section R allowance.
2. A squadron in a combat zone should have six spare crystals for every frequency that the squadron may have to cover.

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ANNEX E (CONT'D)

3. As an interim measure, until newer types of communications equipment are provided, that aircraft for close air support be equipped with an additional AN/ARC-1.

ANNEX F

(Aircraft Maintenance and Repair)

The outstanding training and experience of the squadron's plane captains and maintenance crews along with the excellent cooperation of the ship's aircraft shop and maintenance personnel kept an aircraft availability of 95% for the period. The majority of aircraft problems were mainly due to the lack of spare parts and replacement aircraft. Each aircraft flew an average of 4.1 hours per day. Fifty-four maintenance checks were completed during this period, two engine changes made and a third engine was built up. Engine build-ups were difficult due to lack of an "I" frame. Troubleshooting was hampered by the breakdown of the ship's high tension lead tester and non-availability of a spark plug "Bomb Tester."

It has been recommended to the ship that an extra high tension lead tester and an R2800 engine "I" frame stand be included in the ship's section "G" allowance.

ANNEX G

(Ordnance)

No additional qualified ordnancemen joined the squadron. However, due to continuous maximum effort the personnel improved their abilities and efficiency.

Bombs - A total of one hundred and seventy-nine 500 pound and six 1000 pound bombs were dropped. They were fused with a VT or an instantaneous type nose fuze and a .025 second delay tail fuze. No loading or handling problems were experienced.

Rockets - No difficulties were encountered in the handling, loading or firing of the rockets. In some instances the MK 9 MOD 3 rocket launcher started to show wear from continued usage, and had to be replaced. Due to the limited supply, few ATARs were used.

Napalm - As there was a shortage of the MK 16 white phosphorus filled igniter, the sodium filled MK 16 igniter had to be substituted. The use of this igniter although not entirely successful, was the most appropriate igniter available. During this period the 150 gallon universal gas tank, without fin stabilizers, was used as the bomb encasement, therefore, the bomb did not have a rear clamp to hold the aft external igniter. With the fin stabilizer installed it was not possible to lower the landing flaps the full 50 degrees required for catapult take-offs.

20mm Cannon - Continued malfunctioning of the 20mm gun proved to be the biggest ordnance problem. A constant check was necessary to detect breakage of the driving spring. As a field expedient, some of the driving springs were cut into two inch segments and added to the shortened springs to give a spring of the length and tension needed to fire the first round.

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ANNEX G (CONT'D)

Twenty rear buffer plungers, and six breech block locks crystallized and fractured. Frequent breakage of the electric trigger cannon plug was also encountered.

Firing pins continued to fail on the average of one pin per 1250 rounds fired, thus requiring constant chocking. The driving rod retainer washer, driving rod spring and the rear buffer group have to be removed first each time an inspection is made of the breech block group. This entails the tearing down of the breech block group itself.

This process was standing operating procedure, until Staff Sergeant Thomas L. HENNEMANN, USMC, inaugurated a process whereby the condition of the firing pin could be checked in a much easier and faster way. This new method involved filling the plug end of a 20mm M12 ramrod with soap or wax and running it down the muzzle against the face of the breech block. If the firing pin is intact it will leave an impression in the soap or wax. If the tip of the firing pin is broken off, no impression will be made. Inspection by this method requires the breech block to be in the complete battery position. This procedure is considered a quick check that can easily be made between flights when time is at a premium.

Generally speaking the effective fire of the 20mm gun decreased in this period because of the numerous malfunctions and the inability to maintain proper replacement parts.

Recommendation:

1. It is recommended that a clamp be derived for quick attachment to the aft end of the 150 gallon universal gas tank, for the purpose of holding the external igniter.

ANNEX H

(Medical)

From the medical standpoint two problems arose during the period 7 September to 9 October 1950.

The first problem was that of maintaining medical records. This deficit was caused by the lack of sufficient medical personnel assigned to the squadron. As before, the medical section consisted of one Doctor and two Corpsmen, which was two Corpsmen short of the authorized allowance. The personnel necessarily spent long hours in their primary jobs; namely flight quarters, sick call, and night watches. As a result, the routine work of a clerical nature was not kept up to date.

The second and most serious problem was that of fatigue. Most of the pilots had been in almost constant carrier operations for over two months, oftentimes flying as much as six hours a day. The enlisted men worked until the required job was accomplished, which generally meant they spent about sixteen hours daily on the flight deck and hangar deck. It is believed that the saturation point was exceeded in many cases, yet no relief was offered. The number of minor shipboard accidents increased and the number of personnel reporting for sick call reached tremendous proportions.

The following recommendations are made in the light of the foregoing statements:

1. At least four enlisted Medical personnel be assigned Marine squadrons.
2. Squadrons should have stated periods of complete relief from combat in a rear area following approximately six weeks of continuous carrier operations.

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ANNEX "F"

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Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF VMF-323, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

- I NARRATIVE
- II ADMINISTRATION
- III OPERATIONS
- IV COMMUNICATIONS
- V ENGINEERING AND MATERIAL
- VI ORDNANCE



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I NARRATIVE

During the period 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950, VMF-323 was based aboard the U. S. S. Badoeng Strait and operated in support of the United Nations forces. During the period immediately preceding the Inchon invasion, during the assault phase, and until 3 October it furnished close air support to the United Nations forces as they captured the enemy sea port and moved inland from the invasion beaches.

The squadron was administratively attached to Marine Air Group 33 until 21 September and to Marine Air Group 12 from then until the end of this reporting period. Operationally the squadron was attached to the U. S. S. Badoeng Strait which formed a part of Task Group 96.8.

At the time of the operation the squadron had twenty-four (24) aircraft, thirty-four (34) officers and one hundred ninety-nine enlisted men attached.

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II ADMINISTRATION

When the squadron went aboard the U. S. S. BADOENG STRAIT the administrative echelon was left with the group headquarters at Itami Air Force Base. This proved entirely unsatisfactory. The forward, or ship based echelon, had no basic references, received no current directives from higher authority, and had no access to the service record books for references in disciplinary cases. The Commanding Officer was at a distinct disadvantage in trying to maintain proper administrative procedures, reports, promotions, record book markings, classification, training of personnel, and morale.

A Marine squadron is organized with the assumption that it is to be a land based unit. Aboard a carrier there is no need for functional fields 11, 13, 25, 35, 52 and 57, and a lessened need for such MOSs as material, as the ship took care of most of the suonly work. On the other hand the squadron was required to furnish plane pushers, ordnance handlers, and men for many other details incidental to carrier operations. This all resulted in on the job training coming to a standstill for many of the personnel and required them to be used outside of their specialty.

Morale throughout the operation was satisfactory despite long and arduous working hours. The squadron personnel had an intense unit "esprit de corps" but at times found it hard to accept the fact that aboard ship they were working under the different divisions of the ships' organization. The few cases of lowered morale was a direct result of this, in that some individuals felt that their duties were too much concerned with running the ship rather than the squadron.

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III OPERATIONS

The period covered by this narrative can be divided into three phases of the amphibious assault of Inchon. These phases were: the interdiction strikes prior to the approach of the invasion force, the support of the invasion and the Close Air Support furnished following the landing.

The squadron was in excellent condition, both tactically and physically, a month of combat flying in the southern sector having solidified our tactics and sharpened our marksmanship. Six pilots reported to the squadron early in September, increasing the total to the desired number for these operating conditions.

After receiving the planes aboard on 5 September the carrier headed into the Yellow Sea. The interdiction phase began the following day.

On 7 September the squadron ran interdiction strikes against pre-briefed targets in the west central part of Korea.

All strikes of the day attacked bridges and railway installations. Pilots of the first hop were congratulated personally by Rear Admiral R. W. Rubie, Task Group Commander, for their outstanding marksmanship with 1000 lb. bombs. A direct hit on a highway bridge and two "bull's eyes" on a railroad bridge were registered. Pilots of the other strikes reported excellent coverage of targets assigned. A two plane Combat Air Patrol was maintained over the Task Group during daylight hours.

The U. S. S. SICILY, with VMF-214 aboard, rejoined the Task Group at daybreak, 8 September. Combat Air Patrols were alternated between the squadrons as was customary when operating together.

Interdiction strikes were again the order of the day. The tracks at both ends of a double-track railroad tunner were blown up with 1000 lb. bombs at Hwang-ni. The tracks on a railroad bridge abutment were knocked out by a 1000 lb. bomb in the same vicinity.

A locomotive was strafed east of Pyongyang causing it to blow up and a truck load of troops were strafed at Songchon-ni causing it to overturn in a ditch and throw out all occupants.

Second Lieutenant Doyle H. Cole made the 10,000th landing on the Badoend Strait at the completion of an interdiction flight.

A strike flight hit the rail facilities at Wonsan causing extensive damage with rockets, napalm, and 20mm fire. The flight also swept the airfields at Kimpo and Suwon detecting no new activity.

Two direct 1000 lb. bomb hits on a main bridge south of Pyongyang destroyed one span of the bridge and a large truck was burned in the same area. A bridge across the river at Pyongyang was attacked by 1000 pounders with undetermined damage to the bridge. Intense accurate antiaircraft fire was encountered in the vicinity of the North Korean capital. This flight reconnoitered Chinnampo airfield and Onjin airfield and observed no activity.

Interdiction strikes and sweeps were continued on 9 September with strikes being made at Sariwon, the Ongjin area, Minohonjom, Uijongbu, and Kunchon. Extensive damage was done to railroad facilities, boxcars, tank cars, warehouses, tunnels, and buildings. Four mobile artillery pieces and a truck were knocked out by rocker and strafing attacks.

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III OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)

The strikes on 10 September were all concentrated napalm attacks on the Island of Wolmi in Inchon harbor. A total of forty-two (42) napalm tanks were dropped on the island destroying many installations and well covering a large part of the island. Shore installations adjacent to the island were strafed and intense light antiaircraft fire was encountered. The attacks were coordinated by a TAG. A special escort flight of two planes was flown over two photo planes photographing several spots in central Korea. At completion of operations the ship headed for Sasebo for replenishment.

The Balclutha spent the 11th and 12th of September replenishing at Sasebo and was back off the coast near Inchon early on the morning of the 14th which was D-Day minus one. Target CAP's were flown over the five support ships in Inchon harbor and four Naval Gunfire spotting parties were flown working with the cruisers U. S. S. Rochester, U. S. S. Toledo, H. M. S. Jamaica, and H. M. S. Kenya. CAP's were also flown over the task group.

On D-Day, 15 September, a pre-dawn launch of ten (10) planes was used as an air preparation for the landing on Wolmi-do, Green Beach. Bombing and rocket attacks were made on the island prior to the landing and strafing runs were made along the beaches just ahead of the first assault wave. Three other eight-plane strikes were made in the Inchon area knocking out troop and gun positions, buildings, and vehicles. Two Tactical Air Observation flights were flown by the squadron on D-Day as well as CAP's over the task group.

On 16 September, D-Day plus one, four strikes were sent to Lazarus Control for missions. Primarily these flights were used against areas known to contain vehicles, equipment and supplies. Heavy damage was reported by all flights as targets were numerous. The CAP hops and an observation flight of two planes completed the days operations.

At about noon of the 17th, a flight led by Captain Jack Kelley was directed to "Cedarbird 14" for the first "called strikes" of the assault. This opened the close air support phase, although other strikes during the day continued search and attack missions. A dispatch was received at 1415 to launch all available aircraft immediately. At that time five of the squadrons aircraft were out of commission. One hour later all twenty-four (24) planes were airborne in three flights of eight planes each and on their way to the target area. This was only one of the many times that the outstanding work of all personnel of the squadron became obvious.

Two CAP hops sent the day's total hours to 136.4 one of our highest.

On 18 September Close Air Support work continued between Inchon and Seoul. Other controllers began to call strikes as more Tactical Air Control Parties completed their ship to shore movement and commenced operations. Four six plane strikes and two Tactical Air Observation flights were launched throughout the day.

The remaining operating days became increasingly more devoted to Close Air Support. On 21 September all missions flown by the squadron were called strikes.

For the first time in the Korean Campaign we had satisfactory close air support grid coordinate charts. These increased the rapidity of location and identification of targets and it is recommended they be procured for use whenever possible.

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III OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)

Several strikes were controlled within the city of Seoul when the resistance met-warranted air support. Many vehicles were destroyed as the enemy attempted to abandon the city. With the capture of Seoul Close Air Support continued with the advance, mostly north and east.

A record 143.0 hours flown on 30 September sent the months total to 2,507.9 hours.

On 1 and 2 October the strikes consisted of more close air support in the area north of Seoul. "Unloading" raids were invariably sent to Uijongbu and by secure, 2 October, there were no buildings remaining in the town.

On 3 October the task group departed the operating area and proceeded to Sasebo, Japan where they remained through 9 October replenishing the fuel, armament and commissary supplies of the group.

FLIGHT STATISTICS OF VMF-323 FOR PERIOD 7 SEPTEMBER TO 9 OCTOBER 1950

1. Total hours flown	2,439.8
a. Hours, Combat strikes	1,832.6
b. Hours, Combat Air Patrol	571.6
c. Hours, Non-Combat	35.6
2. Total Combat Sorties	784
a. Strikes	617
b. Combat Air Patrols	167
3. Catapult Launches	787
4. Arrested Landings	790
5. Number of Operating Days	22
a. Average No. of flights per day	35.6
b. Average flight hours per day	110.9
6. Number of pilots available	34
7. Number of aircraft aboard	24
8. Average Aircraft Availability	23.6
9. Percentage of flight hours of CAP	23.4
10. Aircraft damaged enemy fire	14
11. Number of accidents	00
12. Number of injuries	00
13. Non-Operating days for replenishment	.

September 12, 23, 24, 25,
 October 3 through 9.

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IV COMMUNICATIONS

The R. I. O. (Reporting in and out) net was used by two or more control agencies. Because of this, aircraft continually cut one another out when reporting to the centers.

The R. I. O. net was also used by outgoing flights to give their damage assessment reports. This should have been done on another net.

There were not enough TAD (Tactical Air Direction) nets. If two or more flights were working in the area on a close air support mission, either the ground controller, or the aircraft in the air were always interrupting one another's transmissions. This made the mission very difficult, because positive identification of the target must be made. While working on an assigned frequency with a forward air controller, that frequency, the Tactical Air Control Center often passed information to other flights on the already assigned frequency.

TAD nets were assigned to deep support missions. This sometimes made it impossible to furnish close air support.

The best communications for close air support was when the Forward Air Controller had a two radio setup, one forward and one rear. The planes were always under positive control by one controller while the second controller moved into position to control the mission.

Radio trouble by forward air controllers caused many hops to return without completing their mission. It is suggested a better radio be supplied the forward air controller.

A more varied frequency assignment between unrelated units would have eliminated much of the interference encountered.

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V ENGINEERING AND MATERIAL

The section "B" allowance of aircraft spares proved to be inadequate for the heavy operating done by this squadron during this period. A revised section "B" has been submitted to BuAer by the squadron, Ship and Carrier Division supply personnel with recommended changes in the amounts and types of spares for heavy combat carrier operations.

The following is a summary of engineering troubles encountered with recommendations for their corrections where appropriate.

A. Airframe

1. Tail section grease bolts. These bolts should be removed or redesigned. Bolts #47463 and #47464 are those which fail first, causing the compression strut to tear out.
2. Outer panel flap actuating rods should be strengthened. Several cases of bent flap rods have occurred. Due to high power operation with full flaps, i. e. carrier approaches.
3. Main cannon plug in wing root and outer panel wing sections. This plug is exposed to the weather and even though filled with "Dow Corning" compound, corrosion and resulting shorts have occurred. Stronger more dependable jury struts are needed.

B. Engines.

1. Push rod housing leaks caused by poor seals and improper installation.
2. Magneto contact points burning due to high power settings used in carrier landings and long periods of operation.
3. Distributor finger electrodes pitting to excess. Also caused by the high power operation. This item is not carried on the section "B" allowance list preventing change on check periods.
4. Freezing of the fuel transfer pump. Most of this has been caused by letting the pump run for long periods of time. These pumps have steel vanes, and freeze from the heat generated.

C. Hydraulic.

1. Intercooler cowl flap selector valve failure caused by use and rough landings.
2. Back pressure in gun charger. A main separate return line to the hydraulic tank would eliminate this trouble.
3. Failure of weakest part of hydraulic pressure line, and failure of unloader relief valve. This is caused by improper sealing of valve. Unloader and relief pressure valves are too close together.
4. Hydraulic failures due to the use of flat type seals. Aircraft have been received from pool and overhaul activities with old type flat seals installed.

D. Parachute

1. The new green nylon harness, is too stiff, also too hard to adjust as a quick fit harness.
2. Life-rafts, PK-2. The case is not substantial enough and the gear is not secured in the raft. One pilot who ditched lost all his gear, except the boat.

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V ENGINEERING AND MATERIAL (CONTINUED)

3. The new seat pads that come with the new nylon harness are too soft for long hops, and the unevenness of the PK-2 raft.
 4. The old type SP-1 Pad has been used, and found to be more comfortable after 3 hour hops than any of the other type pads.
- E. Radio
1. Built in birddog gear should be incorporated.
- F. Pilots viewpoint on changes needed in the F4U-4B cockpit. These changes were suggested for more efficient operation aboard carrier and in combat.
1. Wing lock actuating handle. To be taken from present position and put F6F type in center of instrument panel.
 2. Oxygen regulator. To be taken from present position and placed forward on left hand side of instrument panel.
 3. Gun Sight. To be flush with top of instrument cowl and placed behind instrument panel.
 4. Oil cooler shut off. (Service change now replacing them)
 5. Armor Plate. Armor plate kits that are called for to be transferred with aircraft complete.
 6. A non-tumbling gyrohorizon installed.
 7. Re-location of emergency and boost pump switch. Switch should be moved next to the main battery switch, battery, pump, prime, starter.
 8. An oil pressure or oil level warning light, to be placed in or near gauge.
 9. The water injection switch should be changed back to the old type or else move the water injection master switch up near the throttle quadrant.
 10. A more dependable cockpit lighting system, located in more strategic places, one light over the hydraulic pressure gauge, one over the radio console, so that the bank sector on the VHF may be seen.
 11. A vacuum pressure gauge installed. This would facilitate trouble shooting and maintenance of instruments on ground check.
 12. A vernier knob on the RPM for small changes.

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VI ORDNANCE SUPPLY

All planes in the squadron were equipped with 20mm cannon, Mk-9 rocket launchers, Mk-51 bomb racks, Mk-8 gunights, and standard cockpit installations.

1. Personnel: The average number of personnel available to work on planes, loading and maintenance, during the period was 38. During this period, because of the long hours of daylight, these people worked from before dawn until late at night to complete loading and maintenance schedules.

2. Maintenance: Shipboard ordnance facilities during this period were extremely limited and cramped. As long as guns and equipment functioned properly and only loading for succeeding hops was necessary there was usually adequate time, but when guns had to be cleaned or repaired or other equipment serviced, time was rarely available, except after flight quarters secured for the day (after dark). Facilities aboard ship for the handling and loading of 20mm ammunition, rockets, and bombs were adequate. However, facilities for repairing or servicing the above were lacking both in space and necessary accessories, such as tool bins, cleaning tables for guns, and work benches.

3. Material replenishment: During the period covered by this report there was no problem here since the ship was at sea from 7 September to 2 October and in port for resupply from 3 October to 16 October or past the terminal date covered by the report.

4. Ordnance expenditures 7 September 9 October, both dates inclusive:

<u>TYPE:</u>	<u>AMOUNT:</u>
A.P.T.....	55,300
HEI.....	55,300
Incend.....	55,300
3.5" Smoke AR.....	382
5.0" AR.....	223
5.0" HV.R.....	2,495
500# GP Bomb.....	364
Napalm (150 gal. tank).....	207

The actual number of days of operating amounted to twenty (20) with the rest spent in resupplying at Inchon and Sasobo.

5. Operation of Ordnance Equipment:

A. 20mm Canon (M-3, T-31)

1. Number of guns operated: 96
2. Total rounds fired: 165,900
3. Rds/gun, average: 1,725

During this period 218 stoppages due to normal wear and breakage of parts such as firing pins, driving spring guides, and plungers, extractor pins, and feed mechanisms,

It is felt that this is not an abnormal amount and our spares at this time were adequate. However, during this period considerable trouble was experienced with complete failure to fire on an excessive number of guns and a number of remedies were tried and it was finally determined that hydraulic pressure building up in the return lines was backing up the charging studs in the opposite wing or not allowing them to go completely forward thus cushioning the breechblock sufficiently to prevent fire. This was sub-hydraulic reservoir with the resultant elimination of the aforementioned trouble. Planes in which the check-valves were not installed continued to have the same trouble.

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VI ORDNANCE SUMMARY (CONT'D)

B. Mk-9 rocket launchers.

1. Number of launchers used: 192
2. Total number of rockets fired: 3,003
3. Rockets fired/launcher: 16

During this time ninety (90) launchers were serviced, mostly due to broakage of springs, pins, and base plates. None of these parts were available aboard ship and considerable improvising and scrounging from old or discarded launchers was necessary.

C. Mk-51 bomb racks.

1. Number of racks used: 48
2. Number of bombs dropped: 364
3. Number of napalm tanks dropped: 207

No malfunction of any kind were experienced with bomb racks.

D. Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment.

1. Mk-8 gunsight: One per plane - No malfunctions.

2. Hydraulic charging valves: Two per plane - It is felt that the fact that the hydraulic pressure can back up through the calve causes the charging studs in the opposite wing to that being charged to back up has caused the failure to fire mentioned above.

3. Gun cameras: One per plane - Still mounted in horizontal plane. The cameras were not used during the period because of the lack of facilities for developing film aboard ship.

4. Boreighting: All planes boreighted to converge at 300 yards. No trouble with boreighting going out.

6. Evaluations from handling and remaining standpoint:

A. Driving springs, firing pins and other integral parts of the gun itself have a relative short life.

B. It takes an excessive amount of time to calibrate and oil ammunition. Arrested landings tend to knock ammo out of calibration causing failure to feed on succeeding hops if not recalibrated.

C. Feeders wear out a proximatley twice as fast as the basic gun itself.

D. Much time was required to service rocket launchers and parts for this servicing was not available aboard ship.

E. Due to the damp conditions inherent with carrier operations it was found that the rocket igniters in the wings became corroded preventing good contact with the rocket plug and allowing rockets to be returned.

F. Having the ground position cut into the Mk-1 rocket selector switch as set forth in A.C-26 did not prevent salvo firing in all cases.

G. Loading 5.0" HVAR's on the flight deck with the wings folded proved to be both time consuming and difficult.

H. Since handling, loading, and arming bombs aboard ship proved to be very little different than when land-based this squadron's experience with the Mk-51 bomb racks was entirely satisfactory.

7. Recommendations:

A. That the number of Ordnance personnel of a Fighter Squadron maintaining twenty-four (24) aircraft to be combat ready should be increased to forty-five (45) when carrier-based.

B. That the cyclic rate of replenishment for 20mm cannon should be a complete set including chargers, trigger motors, and feeders every four to six months with extra feeders supplied at half this interval.

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VI ORDNANCE SUBBERRY (CONTINUED)

C. That a new type feeder be developed that will eliminate the necessity for the exact calibration of same and is not limited to three charges.

D. That subsequent models of the Mk-9 rocket launcher have the following changes incorporated:

1. A heavier shear pin to prevent rockets from tearing loose on arrested landings.

2. A heavier and more secure base plate to withstand loosening under high G pullouts and arrested landings.

3. A simpler disassemble design to enable getting at the electrical wiring for repairs.

4. That spare parts kits be issued with the launchers

E. That a master rocket switch be installed in the cockpit to prevent the inadvertent firing of rockets when the Master arming switch is turned on.

F. That the cyclic rate of replenishment for rocket launchers be: A complete set of new launchers with the ignitors every four months while in combat. Also that spare launchers be increased from seven to fourteen and rocket receptacles to eighteen.

G. That the Mk-51 bomb rack continue to be used.

H. That a standard napalm tank be developed in the shape of the present Mk-12 fuel cell but to come in two parts that will fit together in a leakproof manner. This is to facilitate storing and transportation to the forward areas.

I. That facilities be supplied aboard ship for the processing of gun camera film.

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
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ANNEX "G"

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
FOR
INCHON SEOUL KIMPO OPERATION
6 September 1950 through 9 October 1950
MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER SQUADRON 513
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWELVE



DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE ALL WEATHER FIGHTER SQUADRON 513
Marine Aircraft Group 12
1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California

JMB:gar
A9-8
Ser 01

1 JAN 1951

From: Commanding Officer, Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 12


Subj: Special Action Reports, forwarding of

Ref: (a) 1stMAW Memo No. 50-50 of 9 Nov 1950

Encl: (1) Special Action Report covering operations from 7 Sep 1950 to
9 Oct 1950

1. Reference (a) states that during periods when type a (Special Action Reports) are required by senior units involved, subordinate units will make similar reports covering identical periods and submit them to their senior units which will include them as annexes to their report.

2. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.


DAVID C. WOLFE

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INCHON AND KIMPO OPERATIONS

The Inchon-Seoul-Kimpo operation was for all practical purposes, a continuation of the Pusan Operation as far as Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 is concerned. The Pusan Operation was covered completely in a previous Special Action Report. This squadron had been working out of Itazuke Air Base from 7 August 1950 to 6 September 1950 and on 7 September 1950, continued operations as usual under the operational control of the 5th Air Force. No part of this squadron operated out of the Kimpo Air Field. Our missions widened in scope and we began to cover as far north as the 38th parallel. We were never given an official notice that Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 was participating in any operation other than the Pusan operation during our entire stay at Itazuke.

Material continued to supply the squadron from Itami Air Base (see appendix 1) and this set up was satisfactory because of lack of storage space at Itazuke. Men and material were flown to Itazuke by R4D. All line maintenance was taken care of by personnel at Itazuke and all aircraft requiring engineering work were returned to Itami for repair. All new pilots were given at least one (1) day strike to familiarize themselves with the Korean terrain. Thereafter, pilots began night missions.

Missions to be flown, briefing and interrogation was taken care of by the 49th Bomber Group. Air Attack Reports were returned to the rear echelon at Itami where they were submitted to higher commands (see appendix 6). A chronological day by day combat narrative encompassing the Inchon-Seoul-Kimpo Operation will also be found in appendix 6. Ordnance difficulties encountered and steps taken to overcome them can be found in appendix 2. The engineering report can be found in part 3. Appendix 4 covers in detail, the electronics difficulties encountered, particularly those with the APS-19 and 19A1 radar installations used in the F4U-5N aircraft. A summary of the tactics developed and employed by this squadron during this operation will be found in appendix 7 of this report. The commanding officer's comments and evaluation of this operation is compiled in appendix 8. Appendix 5 covers administration which includes the joining of the rear echelon of that department with the forward echelon on 19 November 1950.

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MATERIAL DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX 1

From 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950, this squadron operated from Itazuke Air Base giving support to the U. N. Forces in Korea. Procurement continued to be a problem of great concern as parts and supplies for operations could not be procured in local area. This was due to the lack of a Navy Supply Annex being accessible for the issuing of parts for the F4U-5 type aircraft. Critical shortages were noted in replacement parts for the engine, airframe, radar and ordnance.

Parts and supplies necessary for operations continued to be procured at Itami Air Base and flown to Itazuke Air Base by squadron aircraft in our improvised "carry all" external fuel tank. Approximately one half (1/2) of the squadron section "U" with the necessary ground handling equipment remained at Itazuke Air Base to provide for the maintenance and operation of aircraft. The remainder of the tools and ground handling equipment was retained at Itami to perform the more detailed aircraft maintenance checks.

Marine Aircraft Group 33 cooperated fully and speedily in the search for replacement parts. Transportation proved a bone of contention as the squadron was restricted to operations with a line maintenance jeep, commanding officer's jeep, weapons carrier and a cletrac. The remainder of our organic transportation was reassigned to group motor pool and there to departments and individuals not included in current allowance lists.

Fifth Air Force cooperated exceptionally well during our stay at Itazuke. Although they could furnish no parts common to our aircraft, they were able to supply transportation and heavy maintenance equipment for our usage. They further supplied cots, pads and work clothing for some of the men; either ROCs or winterized tents were available to house the officers and men.

On 16 September 1950, the rear echelon of this squadron arrived with an additional twelve (12) aircraft which were immediately pressed into combat service. Operations progressed as spare parts became available, due to the arrival of MAG-12 with their supply of section "R" and "BA" allowances which bolstered the almost depleted supply. This condition prevailed until our return to Itami, 7 October 1950, which marked the first time that the squadron had functioned as a unit since it had left the states.

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ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX 2

It was found that although in general the squadron had excellent results with its ordnance, there are a few discrepancies that should be mentioned in this report. The replacement items needed were not always available or obtainable from Air Force sources. These items included gun parts, bomb rack parts, rocket launcher parts, hand tools, and maintenance materials. Some delay was encountered in obtaining these items from Itami. No system for the procurement of these supplies was set up at Itazuke because of the limited operations being carried out there by this squadron.

The 20MM aircraft gun AN-M3 spare gun allowance was found to be not adequate nor when the spare guns did become available, did they come equipped with any of the necessary F4U-5N installation parts. It is recommended that the spare gun allowance be increased to eight guns with all necessary installation parts and that the ammunition pan allowance be increased to 50% spares. The ammunition pans were found to be mislabeled as to right or left in some cases and also numbered wrong. When the supply of MK-8 links was replenished with MK-7 links there was a noticeable increase in gun malfunctions due to link breakages and jams.

It was found that the center section pylon installation was such that the engineering crew cannot make proper engine installation inspections without removing the pylon thus delaying armament operations by making necessary, re-installation of the pylon by the ordnance crew at inopportune time. No remedy for this difficulty was found.

The extensive use of modified rockets resulted in the following observations. The quick connect splice had come apart on many pigtailed. The pigtailed broke during flight on both the modified and the new type rockets. There were instances of the receptacle not holding the plug during flight. The nose plugs on the rocket heads had been tightened so that it was necessary to use a wrench plus a hammer to release the nose plug in order to install a nose fuze. Some of the bombs were received in an unserviceable condition in that the nose plugs could not be removed. Also the locking rings were bent or the threads damaged making it impossible to remove some of the locking rings in order to install the tail fin assembly.

The only fuze difficulty encountered was the supply of MK 111-A2 fuzes supplied for the MK 26 aircraft flare. It is to be noted that O.P. 988 recommends the MK 146 flare fuze instead of the MK 111-A2 flare fuze. Duds occurred in about 40 to 50% of the flares and were attributed to the MK 111-A2 fuze.

Napalm was used extensively and to good advantage. It is recommended that low octane gas be used for napalm tanks because it was found that high octane fuel did not give the desired burning properties. It was found necessary to use a nose igniter plus a tail igniter for the proper ignition of the napalm mix. Army P-51 tanks for napalm were not adequate for the F4U-5N aircraft installation. A special designed tank later proved to be adequate for the F4U-5N installation. Transportation was inadequate in that only one vehicle was available for the ordnance department. It is recommended that the vehicle allowance be increased to two bomb handling trucks, one bomb cargo truck, one MK-3 trailer and twenty five (25) MK-2 bomb trailers.

Insufficient personnel were on hand at the beginning of this period and operations was seriously handicapped although this was somewhat eased by the use of Japanese labor to assemble munitions and to clean up the area. This personnel problem was eased considerably when the rear echelon of the squadron arrived with the remainder of the ordnance department.

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ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX 3

During the subject operation, this organization received two supposedly new Aircraft (F4U-5N) from First Marine Aircraft Wing Pool on 23 September 1950. The bureau numbers of these aircraft were 124456 and 124450. Both planes were badly corroded from salt water and not in condition for combat as the log book entries will show.

It is therefore recommended that in no case in a combat area, should an aircraft be transferred from a pool to an operating unit unless it is ready for combat.

This unit found it extremely difficult to obtain lighting units even at the well established operating base used during this operation. At this time, a VAF(N) squadron is not authorized a portable lighting unit. However, in the light of this operation, it is felt that squadrons of this type should be equipped with a minimum of three (3) lighting units. The units required are, Lighting equipment field type PAM 3 R 17 L-12945-5.

It is strongly recommended that the Dummy By-pass unit for the oil coolers be removed and the Space provisions on the forward face of the main beam in the accessory compartment and in the cockpit, be utilized and the by-pass valve be installed prior to combat operations. This organization lost one aircraft due to an oil cooler being damaged from Anti-Aircraft fire and it is felt that if the oil By-pass had been installed, the plane could have made a safe return to base. It is further recommended that the Armor plating installation - Power plant section (part No. VS-55641), be installed in the F4U-5N aircraft prior to combat. Also, that Armor plating be designed, fabricated and installed in the pilots seat.

In many instances during the subject operation when the F4U-5N had been flown through heavy rain, the Radar Dome (Part No VS 61141) had been shattered. To eliminate this, a piece of Aircraft Fabric (stock no K27-6-740) was taped on to the nose of the dome. This proved entirely successful.

During the entire operation, this organization operated its aircraft from Itazuka Air Base, Japan, while the bulk of the Squadron personnel were stationed at Itami Air Base, Japan. Due to the unusual circumstances, this department had approximately thirty (30) line maintenance men and sixteen (16) planes at Itazuka. The major repair jobs were done at Itami. This proved to be a difficult situation with respect to maintenance problems as the supplies were at Itami. It is strongly recommended that under no circumstances should a squadron be separated in such a manner in future operations.

Due to the use of compressed air as a means of emergency lowering of the landing gear and operating the cockpit canopy, it is necessary to have an R11C-1150, compressor, 0 to 3000 PSI added to the squadron TBA and that this unit be carried with the squadron on every maneuver no matter how short the maneuver may be.

It is recommended that TBA for a squadron of this type be increased to include two (2) Line Maintenance jeeps. It is further recommended that a Oletrec be added to the TBA to provide for towing and also as an additional source of compressed air.

This organization utilized the abundance of F51 external fuel tanks for carrying napalm bombs by designing a lower lug to attach the tank to the rack. This proved very successful.

CONFIDENTIAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT (Con't)

Due to the lack and reliability of radio ranges and the availability of DF Homers, the engineering department worked out a simple method of installing an ARN6 Radio Compass installation. The installation was started and completed in many of the squadron's ships during this operation and the pilots reported it a great help in navigation. The enclosed work sheet explains the steps taken to complete the installation.

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WORK PROGRESS SHEET

INSTALLATION OF ARN-6

Date Plane out for Change _____
 Plane Bu. No. _____ Mod x No _____

(All parts removed from Metalite shelf assemblies will be plainly identified with Bu. No. and Modex No. of plane. They will be stored, if possible, in the luggage carrier of plane. To prevent loss of hard-to-get items and facilitate installation all attaching screws, bolts, washers and nuts will be secured to part removed).

FUSelage MID-SECTION BODY GROUP WORK
WORK TO BE DONE

	SHOP	BY WHOM	INSP BY	DATE
1. Remove RT-7/ANP-1 from compartment. Place mount base in luggage carrier.	Radio			
2. Remove turn & bank ind. and bracket assy. from underneath metalite shelf assy. VS-602010	Elec			
3. Remove carbon pile vot. regulator and mount base.	Elec			
4. Remove metalite shelf assy VS-55858	Metal			
5. Install fabricated shelf assy. and bracket for RT-7/ANP-1 in relocated position, at Sta. 222 to Sta. 237. (NOTE: all aircraft on which P4U-FC A/C service change 357 has been incorporated, the cowl flap controller must be relocated before the above shelf assy. can be installed).	Metal			
6. Install fabricated shelf assy. and mount MT-274-0 for R-101A/ARN-6 received over support assy. VS-60209-1. (Make sure that new shelf extends free of rudder cable).	Metal			
7. Drill four 5/16" dia. holes in metalite shelf Assy. 66220-1 and relocate turn and bank indicator and bracket mount.	Metal			
8. Cut out metal in bottom of fuselage. Spot weld assy. VS-55834 aft of Sta. 186 for AS-313-B/A ARN-6 loop antenna.	Metal			
9. Install boomer plate and mount bracket for ARN-6 loop antenna over bottom fuselage spot weld assy. VS-55834-2 Sta. 186 to Sta. 200	Metal			
10. Cut out 1 1/2" dia. hole at lower part of bulkhead 186 for cable wiring.	Metal			
11. Install AS-313 B/A ARN-6 loop antenna.	Metal			
12. Install antenna cover CW-141/ARN.	Metal			
13. Install metalite shelf assy. VS-55858.	Metal			
14. Relocate volt. reg. and mount on VS-55858 shelf.	Metal			
15. Install prefabricated guard and metal bracket assy. for volt. regulator.	Metal			
16. Relocate wiring of turn and bank indicator.	Elec			
17. Relocate wiring of volt. regulator.	Elec			
18. Cut out metal for feed through coupling unit CU-65/ARN-6 for sensitivity antenna at Sta. 242.	Metal			

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WORK PROGRESS SHEET (cont)

COCKPIT WORK

	SHOP	BY WHOM	INSP. BY	DATE
1. Remove accelerometer (Turn into material)	Elec			
2. Rework instrument panel for Volt. knob of radio compass indicator	Metal			
a. Install radio compass indicator 1D90a/ARN-6	Metal			
3. a. Drill four 1/4" dia. holes in cockpit vent grill assy. VS-59142.	Metal			
b. Install prefabricated ARN-16 control box metal bracket.	Metal			
c. Install control box mount MT-275/ARN-6.	Metal			
4. a. Drill a 1" hole aft of assy. VS-59142 for ARN-6 cable wiring.	Metal			
b. Fabricate and install 2 metal half washers for cable insulation compound for this port.	Metal			

WIRING WORK TO BE DONE

	SHOP	BY WHOM	INSP. BY	DATE
1. Route harness wire from cockpit floor hole through Sta. 186 hole.	Radio			
2. Follow harness cabling to Rec. rack.	Radio			
3. Install lead lugs in Rec. rack.	Radio			
4. Route leads to antenna loop.	Radio			
5. Install Cannon plugs in antenna loop.	Radio			
6. Route and connect leads to main junction box.	Radio			
7. Connect leads to control box.	Radio			
8. Route and connect indicator leads.	Radio			
9. Secure harness.	Radio			

Cleared for flight by Radio

Radio Chief

INSTALLATION COMPLETED

(Date)

APPROVED

(Engineering Chief)

Log Book Entry Date

By

APPROVED

(Maintenance Officer)

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ELECTRONIC DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX 4

From 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950, the section "R" became more complete than it had been previously because at about the beginning of the period, six (6) complete sets of AN/APS 19A radar equipment were delivered to this organization. After the arrival of this equipment, the repair and maintenance time on the AN/APS 19A equipment was cut by 50%.

The main components of the AN/APS-19 and 19A are;

1. Antenna
2. AN/TR100 transmitter receiver
3. Powersynchronizer
4. Indicator
5. Control Box

The majority of failures in the radar equipment were in the Transmitter Receiver units. These failures usually consisted of open filaments in the 2J55 magnetron, 4Q35 thyratron, and the 3B26 diode; also in the 2J55 magnetron low output and considerable change in frequency was experienced. The usage rate of the 1B23 crystal was extremely high and breakage of the AFC Beacon crystal has occurred in many cases. Extreme vibration due to lack of shock mountings on the transmitter receiver caused the plug J405 to come loose and strike the beacon AFC crystal holder. Prior to leaving the states, the transmitter receivers were sent to Overhaul and Repair, NAS, San Diego, California, for overhaul and modification to prevent any further damage of this nature. The Plug J405 was strapped to the chassis to prevent it coming free in operation. The beacon AFC crystal holder that had been damaged by J405 was not properly straightened and the crystal holder continued to put considerable strain on the 1B23's. Effort has been made by this shop to further straighten the crystal holder but it is difficult to straighten the holder accurately enough to eliminate all strain on the crystal.

Lack of shock mounts in the transmitter receiver probably accounts for a high percentage of the trouble in this unit. This is particularly true in the case of open filaments. Troubles resulting from lack of shock mounts were undoubtedly magnified by the extremely rough runway from which the aircraft operated from at Itazuke, Japan.

Some failure could be caused because the AN/APS-19-19A allows the pilot to turn on the equipment and activate the time delay circuits without first turning the motor alternator on. Turning the alternator on after the time-delay cycle has run, will apply high voltage to the circuits and considerable damage will be done to the tubes before the filaments can properly heat.

Troubles encountered in the antenna were mainly mechanical. During the period covered by this report only one spare antenna was available.

The Rosan stud on the tilt yoke of the antenna had a tendency to bend and if not corrected would misalign the radiation of the antenna with that indicated on the scope while in intercept or ai function. This misalignment could be overcome while in search or beacon function by use of the tilt control. The Rosan stud cannot be straightened because of its tendency to break and there were no replacements available. The only suitable solution found for this discrepancy was to readjust the nuts on the Rosan stud.

The sliding arm of the azimuth potentiometer made poor contact at some points on the potentiometer and caused the azimuth sweep to jump. This was repaired in one case by using the spare potentiometer and the discrepancies in the other cases were not repaired until more spares became available subsequent to the period covered by this report.

CONFIDENTIAL ELECTRONICS DEPARTMENT (Cont)

The key connecting the erecting mechanism to the shaft has a tendency to slip out of place. This allowed the antenna to recycle continually while in search or beacon function. This was repaired by this organization in four instances by the manufacturing of a new key. Considerable time would have been saved by replacing this unit from spare parts rather than by making a substitute key.

Troubles occurring in the ID100 Indicator of the AN/APS 19-19A radar have been unduly difficult to repair. This is due mainly to the absence of a disconnect plug for the indicator. Which necessitated the grounding of the aircraft whenever a trouble of this nature occurred in the indicator, while repairs were made. This was particularly serious during the period covered by this report because the only spare indicator was used in the shop bench set up. Shortly after commencing operations, one (1) cathode ray tube developed a cathode to grid short. In order to operate the bench set up for testing and maintaining radar, it became necessary to remove a cathode ray tube from an aircraft each time the bench set was used. This would have been particularly trying if it were not for the fact that other aircraft were grounded for lack of mechanical replacement parts. This enabled the Radar crew to remove radar components from the grounded aircraft and use them as spares.

The brilliance and focus controls on AN/APS 19 are not controlled by the pilot and a modification to move these controls from the synchronize power unit to the indicator is now in process; but field conditions make this a slow procedure. Being unable to control the brilliance has proven very unsatisfactory on the AN/APS 19 gear.

The main components of AN/APS 19 and 19A radar are not interchangeable, and the 19 gear is being replaced by 19-A.

The Synchronizer power unit SN-51/ APS-19 gave very little trouble during this period, a few tube failures comprised the majority of the trouble. One spare component proved adequate for servicing this unit.

The AN/ARR-2 proved of little or no value during the period covered by this report. The only YE-YG stations operating in the area at this time were the Navy aircraft carriers and were of no benefit to this squadron as a homing aid. These receivers were maintained by SMS-33 radio shop and maintenance was of a routine nature.

The AN/APN-1 radio altimeter was in operating condition in all planes when this squadron commenced operations on 1 August 1950. SMS-33 radio shop was prepared to perform maintenance on the altimeter but the range crystal on the TS/250 burned out and since there was no replacements for the TS/250 or for the crystal, no service was available and the AN/APN-1's became unreliable and therefore useless during the period covered by this report.

The AN/ARC-5 beam receiver proved of little or no value to this squadron during the period covered by this report. A majority of the stations in the area were of the non-directional type and the loop radio range station at Fukuoka (Itazuke), Japan proved to be unreliable. The receivers were serviced by SMS-33 radio shop and the maintenance was of a routine nature. This receiver was used by some pilots to monitor the Armed Forces Radio Service on 550 kilocycles.

All AN/AFX-2 sets were checked before leaving for the forward area. After that time, maintenance became impossible because of lack of test equipment and the delay in setting up the Group Radio-Radar Shop. Because strict IFF discipline was not required, unsatisfactory operation did not present too great a problem. Had there been enemy air activity the situation would have become critical and it is recommended that a squadron be furnished a TS-182 for line checks and maintenance or "Go or No Go" test gear (portable TX and Frequ. Meter). Interrogation Operation was not used but this department is working on that problem at the present time.

The F4U-5N mounts 2 AN/ARC-1 receivers. Service Squadron 33 radio shop was to furnish maintenance on this gear. The delay in setting up

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the group radio shop creates a problem when the squadron goes immediately into operation.

An acute shortage of crystals made the crystal changes difficult.

For optimum performance of ARC-1, which is necessary in an All Weather Squadron, a signal generator with an accurately calibrated output such as the GR 804-C or equivalent and an output meter TS-329 are required. Service Squadron, on every move was approximately one (1) week behind this squadron and their shop was always set up at such a distance that transportation was necessary. This presented a problem, and it is strongly recommended that the squadron be furnished these test items.

The R-28 relay was not used tactically.

A switch was placed in the power circuit of the ARC-1-R28 console control box to enable the pilot to monitor both VHF's at the same time. Some trouble was experienced on Close Air Support Operation when several flights were working with different ground controllers on the same frequency. However, it is expected that future equipment will incorporate more channels.

A communications problem which was also encountered was the surveying of lip microphones.

Inasmuch as such equipment is considered flight gear, pilots experienced difficulty in replacing microphones which became inoperative. Cold weather seemed to aggravate this situation. Flight issue sections were not available in forward areas. It is recommended that such equipment be made available to a squadron for issue.

Auxiliary power units are of great importance in an All Weather Squadron. This activity (Radio-Radar) had two (2) Waukasha Units and one (1) Line Jeep. This is the minimum requirements for superior performance by this department.

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ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX 5

The Administrative section had been divided into a forward and a rear echelon upon departure of Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 from the United States. For this particular phase, in order to tell the story accurately, the Administrative section will start on 6 September 1950 with its rear echelon which was aboard ship.

On the 6th of September 1950, we departed from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Oahu, T. H. On the 16th of September 1950, we arrived at Yokosuka, Japan and immediately began unloading the aircraft. On the 17th of September 1950, we departed from Yokosuka, Japan and on the 18th of September 1950, arrived at Kobe, Japan and disembarked. We then proceeded, via government transportation, to Itami Air Base. A working detail was left behind for the one night to complete the unloading of the ship. The working detail arrived at Itami Air Base the next day.

On the 19th of September we joined the Forward Echelon of the Squadron and reverted to our status as the Personnel Section. Normal working routine was commenced. New rosters of personnel, Squadron Duty Officer, Assistant Squadron Duty Officer, duty sections, rosters showing personnel at Itazuke were prepared. Rosters had to be revised continually to show where all personnel were located. Men were furnished for working parties, Group Guard and Kobe Guard in addition to regular Squadron requirements. This entailed an excessive amount of work as men were constantly changing from one duty to another. During the period 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950, VMA(N)513 participated in the Inchon-Seoul-Kimpo operation while operating out of Itazuke Air Base, Fukuoka, Japan. All office personnel remained at Itami during this operation. 108 members of the organization were at Itazuke and all administrative matters pertaining to them were taken care of at Itami. The men were paid promptly each pay day by an officer who would fly to Itazuke. Contact was maintained with Itazuke by telephone.

The main difficulties encountered were the incompleteness and erroneous condition of a great many of the Reserve personnels records and SRB's. This indicates a lack of sufficient effort on the part of the home stations, where these men were previously in squadron under the Organized Reserve Program. Some of them had been in Marine Air Detachments on Continuous Active Duty and errors were quite numerous even in these records and SRB's.

Many Reserve Personnel were joined and found to have been assigned erroneous MOS numbers. Changes were made on the rosters of Personnel, but the changes were never authorized in the individuals' SRB, consequently the Squadron could not change the MOS. Authority was given by Headquarters, Marine Corps to change the MOS's of personnel, but due to the Reserves being enroute overseas so soon, the time allowed by Headquarters elapsed in many cases before the individual could be contacted and changes be made.

The number of personnel available for assignment to the Personnel Section has been adequate. One of the main difficulties encountered, besides the lack of information in the records, has been the job of keeping up to date records on everyone while personnel are serving in two echelons.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Appendix 6

During the period between 7 September 1950 and 9 October 1950, Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 was working out of Itazuke, Kyushu. The Intelligence Section was split into two sections. That is, one intelligence clerk was stationed at Itazuke. It was his job to gather all information pertinent to the completion of intelligence reports and send it to Itami for the rest of the section to compile and send on to higher commands. Since Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 was under the operational control of the 5th Air Force, all briefing and interrogation was done by the 49th Bomber Group. The 5th Air Force also supplied a large part of the maps needed during the operation. Blood chits and strip maps were issued to all pilots before leaving Itami and this eliminated confusion upon arrival at Itazuke Air Base.

It was concluded that when a squadron works with two echelons, it is difficult for the intelligence section to be well coordinated because of the fact that information must continually be sent back and forth thus involving delays which in turn slowed down a high working efficiency within the section. It is also noted that wartime TO calls for one (1) Captain 7010 and one (1) TSgt 7011. Due to the added number of reports and other activities required of this section during war time, it is strongly recommended that the Intelligence Section be increased to one (1) Captain, one (1) TSgt, one (1) Sergeant, and one (1) Corporal. When a Squadron works in two echelons, even the above recommendation could be increased by one man. It is also recommended that all personnel in the Intelligence Section have completed a course in Air Intelligence and have some background in military correspondence, photo interpretation, map reading, interrogation and investigation. While the actual Intelligence work could be handled with a minimum of confusion, the increased size of the historical diaries and the addition of special action reports and awards and decorations, etc., make it exceedingly difficult to keep all phases up to date.

COMBAT NARRATIVE

Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 made extensive use of ground controllers during the entire Inchon Seoul Kimpo Operation. Ground control MELLOW was contacted over Korea. MELLOW in turn directed the aircraft to MOSQUITO which was a controller aircraft in the vicinity of the target. MOSQUITO directed VMF(N)-513 planes to the target by use of terrain description (over voice), making passes at the target, and dropping smoke bombs in the area to be hit. MOSQUITO planes were in contact with ground units and sometimes turned our fighters over to direct control of ground controllers. Our aircraft identified friendly troops and vehicles by use of pannels (colored). These pannels were draped conspicuously over the vehicles or on the ground near the troops to keep our aircraft from making runs on them. They also marked the front lines so that bombing and strafing runs would not endanger friendly troops on the ground. Different types of aircraft were used as air controllers. Among the most frequently used planes were the OY-4, SNJ and Navyon. Following is a day by day combat narrative of the operation.

7 September 1950

- 0225 - First Lieutenant Oliver and Master Sergeant Mayhew were on a night intruder mission in the Chinju area. Observed approximately fifteen (15) vehicles between Chinju and Kochang. Vehicles were bombed and strafed. Results unknown due to darkness.
- 0530 - Captain Pippin and First Lieutenant McLaughlin flew a night intruder mission in the Sabong-ni area. One (1) napalm tank was dropped on three (3) trucks. Trucks were moving along road but pulled off into some trees when flight attacked. No explosion occurred, and results unknown. Dropped one (1) napalm tank on a railroad tunnel. The other end was rocketed. No rolling stock, troops or activity observed.

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- 1800 - Captains Phillips and Burris flew a night intruder mission. The flight was instructed to hit artillery positions on the road three (3) miles southeast of Kigye. Attacked target with napalm and fragmentation bombs. Scored direct hits with napalm. Flight was then instructed to hit a command post on a hill at (36°-01'N/129°-12'E). Strafed and bombed the target. Results were not noted.
- 2045 - Two (2) aircraft, piloted by Captain Pippin and First Lieutenant McLaughlin, were on a night intruder mission. Section was instructed to proceed to the junction of the Nangang-Naktong Rivers to hit barges ferrying tanks and artillery. Target was attacked with fragmentation and thermite bombs. Flares were released before and after attacks. No barges or activity could be seen in the area.
- 2400 - Majors Reinburg and Hey flew a night intruder mission. Targets of opportunity were attacked. Four (4) separate convoys of (1) one or two (2) vehicles each, were attacked with thermite and fragmentation bombs. Results unknown due to weather.
- 8 September 1950
- 0220 - Two (2) aircraft flew an interdiction mission in the area north and south on the west side of the Naktong River. Captain Hazlett and First Lieutenant Oliver flew the mission. At Hynochon observed a convoy. Lost the convoy due to weather. Flight dropped fragmentation and thermite bombs in the vicinity of Kochang and returned to base, because of very unfavorable weather. Results of bombing could not be seen.
- 0610 - Captain Ray and First Lieutenant King were on a patrol of the Naktong River. Weather prevented flight from accomplishing mission as briefed. A small wood bridge was strafed and rocketed. No direct hits were observed on the bridge, but a shack near-by was set afire. Two (2) napalm tanks were dropped in the sea on safe.
- 9 September 1950
- 0215 - Major Hey and Captain Phillips flew a night intruder mission in the Chinju and Kochang area. Overcast hindered observations and did not permit attack on targets. Approximately five (5) to ten (10) miles from the Naktong River, on the highway, general purpose and fragmentation bombs were dropped. Two (2) of the bombs straddled a five (5) truck convoy. All lights went out after the bombs exploded. Trucks were stationary and approximately one (1) truck length apart. Believe convoy to have been damaged. Other aircraft was directed to Naegwan to patrol road to Kochang. Weather did not permit reconnaissance of this area. Flew a northwest heading until clear of bomb line and dropped two (2) thermite bombs in a safe area. Aircraft returned to base.
- 0530 - Two (2) aircraft flew an intruder mission in the P'ohang area. First Lieutenant T. Clark and First Lieutenant Murphy were the pilots. Under the direction of the controller, one (1) aircraft dropped napalm on a large building, which caught fire and burned. The other aircraft dropped fragmentation bombs on the north side of P'ohang near two (2) large fires. No results were observed. One (1) napalm tank was dropped near a truck, but due to passing through a cloud the aircraft overshot and missed.
- 1800 - Majors Reinburg and Hey, and Captain Phillips flew a night harassing mission in the Kunwi area. Flight rocketed, strafed, and dropped napalm on buildings. Approximately ten (10) buildings were destroyed. Proceeded to (36°-04'N/128°-24'E) and dropped another napalm tank. A direct hit was scored on a four (4) gun

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twenty millimeter (20mm) position. Dropped bombs on a troop crossing. Results not noted.

2045 - First Lieutenant T. Clark and First Lieutenant Murphy flew a night intruder mission. One (1) aircraft was directed to drop his flares to spot of artillery fire. Dropped thermitite and fragmentation bombs on a six (6) truck convoy. Results unknown due to darkness. Lights on the highway were strafed. Results unknown. Other aircraft also bombed a convoy. An object was hit that caused a large explosion, and continued to burn after leaving area.

2400 - Major Clark and First Lieutenant Murphy flew a night intruder mission in the Andong area. The flight bombed and strafed a convoy. Flares were dropped also. Results of attacks are unknown due to weather.

10 September 1950

0415 - Three (3) aircraft flew a close air support mission west of the river in the bomb line area. Captain Egan, Master Sergeant Mayhew, and Technical Sergeant Keegan flew the mission. Strafing a camouflaged object. Results of attack unknown. Dropped a general purpose bomb on the edge of town at (35°-50'N/128°-12'E). Fired rockets on the same target. Results of attack unknown. Received fifty caliber (50 cal) anti-aircraft fire from hill at (36°-05'N/128°-19'E). Made a strafing run on road north of Mae-gwan. Also dropped fragmentation bombs and a napalm tank. Controller directed attack on the road. Results were not noted.

1700 - Captain Pippin and First Lieutenant McLaughlin flew a close air support mission in the Yonsan area. Controller asked flight to hit approximately three thousand (3000) troops in five (5) small villages. Dropped napalm on, bombed and strafed the troops. Fires were started in all five (5) of the villages.

2000 - Two (2) aircraft piloted by Captain Egan and Technical Sergeant Keegan, flew a night intruder mission. One (1) aircraft was directed to patrol river on the road northwest of Chinju. Bombed two (2) vehicles. Bombs hit near vehicles and caused a fire and a large explosion on the road. Bombed and strafed lights of a convoy. No results were noted. Second aircraft proceeded to Taegu. Three (3) miles east of Kimchon, bombed a convoy. All lights were extinguished. Proceeded south, and on a road at (35°-45'N/128°-12'E), dropped general purpose and fragmentation bombs, and strafed with twenty millimeter (20mm). Bombs fell near targets and results believed to be good.

2300 - Major Clark and First Lieutenant Murphy flew a night intruder mission at (35°-45'N/128°-17'E). Observed ten (10) to fifteen (15) lights on the highway. The lights were bombed and strafed. Started fires in unidentified vehicles. At Kimchon, on the Taejon junction of the highway, observed approximately one hundred (100) vehicles. All had lights turned on and were about fifty (50) yards apart. Dropped bombs and started two (2) fires. The convoy was then strafed. This caused a large explosion. Two (2) fragmentation bombs were dropped with undetermined results. Strafing three (3) unidentified vehicles. One (1) vehicle was set afire.

11 September 1950

0115 - Captain Ray and First Lieutenant King were on a close air support mission in the Kumchon area. Observed about one hundred (100) vehicles going in and out of Kumchon. The vehicles were strafed and hit with bombs. Results of the attack unknown.

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- 0520 - A close air support mission was flown by Major Clark and First Lieutenant Berck. The target assigned was a troop concentration at (35°-59'N/128°-32'E). Section strafed, bombed, and rocketed the troops. Controller stated that load was dropped on target.
- 1705 - Three (3) aircraft were on a close air support mission which was located at (36°-02'N/128°-30'E). The pilots were Captain Ray, First Lieutenant King and Master Sergeant Mayhew. Artillery positions were hit with napalm, fragmentation bombs, and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. One (1) position was completely wiped out and two (2) others probably destroyed.
- 1945 - Major Clark and First Lieutenant Berck flew a night intruder mission. Assigned target was very close to friendly troops. Flight could not contact controller, and was afraid to hit area without the controller's assurance that the right targets were being attacked. By this time the flight was very low on fuel. Aircraft proceeded to Sinpena-dong and dropped flares and bombs. No results of attack noted.
- 2130 - Two (2) aircraft, piloted by Captain Egan and Technical Sergeant Keegan, were on a night intruder mission in the Tabu-dong area. At (36°-03'N/128°-32'E), bombs and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition were expended on the target. Bombing results were excellent. All bombs hit the target area.
- 2335 - First Lieutenants T. Clark and Murphy flew a close air support mission in the Tabu-dong area. Controller instructed flight to hit an artillery dump at (36°-03'N/128°-30'E). Bombed and strafed the dump. Results of attack not observed due to darkness. Other aircraft could not contact controller so proceeded to Kumchon and dropped bombs, and strafed with twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. Results of bombing run not noted.
- 12 September 1950
- 0145 - Captains Denham and Polen, and Second Lieutenant Holdridge flew a night intruder mission in the area of Sangju. A direct hit was scored with a rocket. Two (2) more trucks were rocketed. Results were near misses. A napalm tank, dropped at Lungyong, started a large fire. A truck was set on fire by strafing. Another truck was hit with a napalm tank and set afire. Lights on the road were strafed and rocketed. Strafed three (3) more trucks. One (1) exploded and the other two (2) were severely damaged.
- 1645 - First Lieutenants T. Clark and King flew a close air support mission in the Pugong-ni area. A small village two (2) miles southeast of Pugong-ni was the target. The flight dropped two (2) napalm tanks and eight (8) fragmentation bombs on the target. The town was burned to the ground.
- 1925 - Captain Polen and Second Lieutenant Holdridge were on a night intruder mission heading for Taegu. Flight had difficulty letting down because of weather. At Kochang one (1) aircraft strafed two (2) moving lights. Hits were scored all around the trucks but no visible results of damage inflicted. Observed more lights near Sanchong. Strafed and dropped a flare. Trucks were not to be seen. Flight dropped bombs, which caused a fire in the area. Strafed a small convoy but results unknown due to darkness.

13 September 1950

- 0030 - Two (2) aircraft were on a night intruder mission. Major Clark and First Lieutenant Berck flew the mission. The flight encountered bad weather, coverage being about 9/10. Section dropped bombs and flares at (35°-50'N/128°-40'E). Results unknown due to darkness and bad weather.

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0120 - Captain Egan and Technical Sergeant Keegan flew a night intruder mission in the Chinju area. At (35°-30'N/127°-50'E) a convoy of six (6) or seven (7) trucks was bombed. A strafing run caused a fire in the convoy. The object burning could not be identified. Second aircraft proceeded to go to (36°-18'N/127°-57'E) and bombed a convoy of five (5) trucks. No results noted, but bombs fell near convoy and lights extinguished. Weather did not permit aircraft to let down for strafing run.

NOTE: No sorties flown from 0120 the 13th of September 1950 to 1640 the 14th of September 1950, due to intense weather.

14 September 1950

1640 - Captain Egan, Master Sergeant Mayhew and Technical Sergeant Keegan flew a close air support mission in the Yongsan area. Three (3) artillery positions, at (35°-22'N/128°-32'E), were bombed with napalm, rocketed, and strafed. The positions were completely wiped out. Controller directed flight to attack town of Changnyong where approximately two thousand (2000) troops were stationed. The town was strafed and rocketed, and left aflame.

2045 - Captain Denham and Technical Sergeant Sallade flew a night intruder mission. One (1) aircraft bombed, with the aid of flares, two (2) vehicles going north on road in Kumaw-ni. Two (2) large fires, and one (1) small one were observed after the attack. Second aircraft proceeded to the Chinju area. Dropped flares and one (1) bomb on vehicles moving into Chinju. Dropped another bomb on three (3) vehicles in Singdong-ni. Results of the bombing runs are unknown. Strafed and bombed seven (7) to eight (8) vehicles moving from the south in Chinju. Two (2) small fires resulted.

2300 - Two (2) aircraft flew an assigned mission in the Yongsong-ni area. Captain Polen and Second Lieutenant Holdridge were the pilots. The section bombed and strafed a convoy. Results of attack unknown due to the intense weather.

15 September 1950

0150 - Two (2) aircraft, piloted by Major Clark and First Lieutenant Berck, took off on a night intruder mission in the Namwon area. One (1) flare was dropped, but vehicles disappeared. Flight proceeded to the town of Kurye and bombs and flares, which started several fires.

0600 - Major Boeg, and First Lieutenants Bryant and Corboy, flew a close air support mission. Flight was directed to a point fifteen (15) miles north of P'ohang. An LST was attempting an amphibious landing and was being subjected to heavy mortar fire. Flight reached the area and was directed by a destroyer to hit various positions. The enemy was dug in and delivering defiladed fire on troops attempting the landing. Flight dropped napalm, bombed, and strafed in the area. Controller was very pleased with the results.

1650 - A close air support mission was flown by two (2) aircraft in the area at (35°-40'N/128°-29'E). Flight was directed to hit a large warehouse. Direct hits were scored with fragmentation bombs. An orchard, one hundred (100) yards northeast of the warehouse, was bombed and strafed. Troops were in the area and good results were obtained. Napalm was dropped on an anti-aircraft position. The position was destroyed. Troops on a nearby ridge were bombed. Results of all attacks were good. The pilots on this mission were Major Clark and First Lieutenant Berck.

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2015 - Captain Denham and Technical Sergeant Sallade flew a night intruder mission in the Kurye area, and observed three (3) vehicles moving east on the highway about three (3) miles from Kurye. Dropped a flare, and then bombed the vehicles. Results of the attack were unknown. A village at (35°-12'N/127°-28'E) was attacked with bombs and napalm. One (1) fire was observed coming from the village after the attack.

NOTE: No missions were flown from 2015 the 15th of September 1950 to 1645 the 17th of September 1950.

17 September 1950

1645 - Captain Denham and Technical Sergeant Sallade flew a close air support mission. Flight patrolled road from Kunchon to Waegwan. Bombing and strafing runs were made on an enemy tank going east on the road. The tank was destroyed by the attack.

1945 - Captains Peebles and Williams took off on a night intruder mission. Could not get down because of weather conditions, so flight left the area and returned to the base.

18 September 1950

0630 - Four (4) aircraft were on a close support mission at (35°-16'N/128°-20'E). Targets were concentrations of troops, artillery and mortars in the village, and ridges around the village. Flight made bombing and strafing runs on the targets. All bombs hit in the target area and fires were observed coming from the village after the attack. Major Boag, Captain Fulton and First Lieutenants Bryant and Corboy were the pilots.

1700 - Four (4) aircraft flew a close air support mission. Two (2) planes were directed to hit five (5) villages in the vicinity of Huchon-ni. The villages were set afire with napalm and bombs. The other aircraft were instructed to hit four (4) villages at (35°-39'N/128°-32'E). Napalm and bombs started fires in all four (4) of the villages. The flight then attacked a machine gun and mortar positions on a hill at (35°-40'N/128°-22'E) with fragmentation bombs, as directed by the controller. Results of attack unknown. The pilots on this mission were Majors Boag and Brushert, and First Lieutenants Haddock and Bryant.

1840 - A night intruder mission was flown by Captain Fulton and Technical Sergeant Pennell. Observed many vehicles moving north on road from Chinju to Kochang. On the first pass lights on vehicles went out. Flight bombed road three (3) miles north of Sanchong where many vehicles were moving. Results were undetermined.

19 September 1950

0545 - Major Hey, Captains Burris and Hazlett, and First Lieutenant Oliver flew a close air support mission at (35°-59'N/128°-24'E). Targets assigned were troop concentrations and artillery positions on ridge west of Naktong-gang River, four (4) miles south of Waegwan. Flight bombed, rocketed, and strafed the target. Artillery position was destroyed and an unknown number of enemy troops were killed.

0845 - Captains Peebles and Williams flew a close air support mission. Controller instructed flight to attack large buildings in Pohang. Attacked with general purpose and fragmentation bombs. One direct hit was scored, two (2) fires were started and one (1) building was burned to the ground. Another building was strafed. It exploded.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION (Cont)

- 0845 - Captain Phillips and First Lieutenant Corboy flew an armed reconnaissance mission. Flight was instructed to seek targets of opportunity. In the vicinity of Simchon-ni an armored car was attacked with bombs and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. Bombs bracketed the vehicle and many hits were scored by strafing. Armored car was destroyed. About one hundred and fifty (150) yards north of the armored car a truck mounting a forty millimeter (40mm) gun was hit with a five hundred (500) pound general purpose bomb. A direct hit was scored.
- 0845 - Major Reinburg flew a close air support mission. Targets of opportunity were attacked in the Kumsan area. A jeep on the road one (1) mile east of town was strafed and damaged. Proceeded to Osuri and strafed a bus in town. Dropped bombs through the overcast on the roads. Results unknown because of weather.
- 1430 - Two (2) aircraft flew a close air support mission. The pilots were Major Brushert and First Lieutenant Hadcock. Artillery positions and troop concentrations about seven (7) miles due east of Waegwan were hit. Flight attacked target with napalm and bombs. All bombs were dropped in the area. A large puff of white smoke rose to an altitude of one thousand (1000) feet.
- 1430 - Captain Fulton and Technical Sergeant Pennell flew a close air support mission at (35°-06'N/128°-25'E). Target was artillery pieces, trucks and troops on the road approximately one (1) mile south of Indong. The target was attacked with napalm, bombs, and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. Two (2) artillery pieces and two (2) trucks were destroyed, and approximately one hundred (100) enemy troops were killed.
- 1615 - Major Hey, Captain Burris, and First Lieutenants Corboy and Oliver flew a close air support mission. Flight was directed to attack a village at (35°-52'N/128°-23'E), with two (2) napalm tanks. Village contained a mortar position. After the run the whole area was afire. Section bombed ridge north of villages which contained enemy troops. Bombs were dropped. Results unknown, but bombs landed in the area and the controller was well pleased. Flight strafed a possible command post on a ridge, results unknown. Three (3) artillery positions in the vicinity of Tongam-dong was attacked with napalm, bombs and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. Controller was pleased with the results and stated the three (3) positions were silenced.
- 20 September 1950
- 0500 - Four (4) aircraft were on a close air support mission. Captains Fulton and Hey, First Lieutenant Corboy, and Technical Sergeant Pennell, were the pilots. At (35°-16'N/128°-20'E), dropped napalm and bombs, and fired rockets. Started fires all over town. Could not determine damage, due to smoke. Proceeded to two (2) miles northeast of town and strafed a ridge for enemy troop positions. No observations of casualties inflicted.
- 0715 - Major Cochran and Captain Peables flew a close air support mission in the Sinban-ni area. One (1) five hundred pound general purpose bomb was dropped on a large truck. A direct hit was scored and the vehicle destroyed. A village was attacked with napalm. Controller stated enemy supplies in the town were destroyed. Near Chuchon-ni caught thirty (30) to forty (40) enemy troops on a road. Believed at least fifteen (15) were killed by strafing because they were very close together. Strafing a horse drawn cart which blew up. Strafing three (3) trucks and caused heavy damage. At Changou fired rockets at a T-34 tank. All rockets were near misses. Two (2) miles west of Changou strafed another T-34 tank. Tank remained immobile after attack. Dropped bombs on, and strafed enemy troops hiding in the brush. Bombs hit outside of the area so flight expended remaining ammunition in the area.

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- 0720 - Captains Williams and Berg flew a close air support mission. At (35°-00'N/128°-23'E) enemy positions were bombed and rocketed. Positions were also strafed. Area was thoroughly hit, but no estimation of damage inflicted on the enemy.
- 0940 - Major Brushert, Captain Hazlett, and First Lieutenants Hadcock, and Oliver flew a close air support mission. A ridge three (3) miles southwest from Naegwan was strafed, and bombed with napalm. No results were observed. Controller then directed flight to a village at (35°-57'N/128°-21'E) to strafe and rocket troops in houses. Fired twenty-four (24) rockets into the village, and started two (2) fires. Flight then strafed a large camouflaged vehicle, probably a tank. Tank probably damaged.
- 1200 - A close support mission was flown by Major Hey and Captain Phillips. Flight directed to Kunchon to destroy the remaining portion of the town. Dropped a napalm tank but it did not explode. Fired rockets into buildings, but they did not burn. Flight then strafed the napalm tank in hopes of having it explode. This was unsuccessful.
- 1630 - Three (3) aircraft were assigned a close air support mission. The pilots were Major Cochran, and Captains Williams and Peebles. Flight was directed to hit troop concentrations at (35°-58'N/128°-57'E). Dropped napalm on the crest of a hill and dropped bombs on the slope of the hill. Flight then strafed the area. Controller stated that about thirty (30) or forty (40) enemy troops had been killed.
- 1720 - Captains Berg and Fulton, and Technical Sergeant Pennell flew a close air support mission. Flight was directed to hit targets at (35°-59'N/129°-17'E). Controller stated ridge held machine gun positions and troop concentrations. Planes attacked with rockets, bombs, napalm, and dropped four (4) flares. Area was also strafed. Results of attack very good according to the controller.
- 21 September 1950
- 0600 - Seven (7) aircraft flew a close support mission at (35°-13'N/128°-16'E). The flight attacked enemy troops and artillery positions. All bombs, rockets and twenty millimeter (20mm) hit in the target area. Controller stated, "job well done". The pilots participating in the flight were Major Brushert, Captain Fulton, Captain Ray, Captain Phillips, First Lieutenant Hadcock, First Lieutenant King and Technical Sergeant Pennell.
- 0715 - Captain Pippin and First Lieutenant Jernigan flew a close support mission. The village of Chach'on-dong was the assigned target. Enemy troops were in the town. The village was destroyed by fire and a large building on the outskirts was damaged by rocket fire. Enemy troop casualties were unknown.
- 0715 - Captain Williams and Captain Peebles were on a close support mission. Two (2) self-propelled artillery pieces at (36°-03'N/128°-20'E) were attacked. The guns appeared to be approximately one hundred and fifty-five millimeter (155mm). The two pieces were destroyed by napalm tanks and rockets. Flight observed many troops running on the road near Poksong-dong. Approximately thirty (30) of the enemy were killed by strafing. In the hills at (36°-03'N/128°-17'E) observed what appeared to be an artillery position, with supplies in the area. Strafing runs were made on the target. Many small fires were started.
- 1100 - Four (4) aircraft were on a close support mission in the Songju area. A road block two (2) miles east of Songju was destroyed.

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Controller stated load hit where he wanted it and that friendly troops were moving into the area. The other section was instructed to hit artillery positions in the vicinity of Kumchon. Many hits in the target area were observed. Flight then attacked three (3) freight cars and two (2) warehouses. Direct rocket hits were scored on the cars and warehouses. Captains Hazlett and Fornozini and First Lieutenants McLaughlin and Oliver made the flight.

- 1300 - Major Mey and First Lieutenant Madcock flew a close support mission. Targets were possible artillery positions in the Hung-hae area. The position was attacked with rockets, bombs and twenty millimeter (20mm) fire. Fires were started and still burning when flight left the area. Results were termed as excellent.
- 1310 - A close support mission was flown by Major Cochran and Captain Berg. Buildings in the town of Ussong were the target. Two (2) large fires were started. Four (4) large buildings were possibly destroyed.
- 1640 - Captains Phillips and Ray and First Lieutenant King flew a night search mission in the Sunchon Namwon area. Two (2) large fires were started in the town of Namwon. The controller termed results as excellent.
- 1815 - Captain Pippin and First Lieutenant Jernigan were on a close support mission. Could not contact controller in the target area. Flight proceeded to night intruder area, but no targets of opportunity could be found. Flight then returned to base.
- 1830 - Captain Williams and Captain Peebles flew a night intruder mission. At Unbong aircraft dropped a napalm tank on a truck. Results were not noted. The town of Unbong was then attacked with undetermined results. Vehicles were bombed, but due to the intense darkness, damage to the enemy vehicles was not known.
- 2300 - Two (2) planes flew a night intruder mission in the Chinju area. The aircraft were piloted by Major Mey and First Lieutenant Oliver. Flight observed approximately twenty-five (25) enemy vehicles, but lights were extinguished as the aircraft approached. A railroad intersection was hit by five hundred (500) pound bombs.
- 22 September 1950
- 0200 - Captain Ray and First Lieutenant King flew a night intruder mission in the Uisong area. Many enemy vehicles were observed. An attack was made on the convoy destroying eight (8) of the trucks. Strafing attacks were made at Andong and Kangho-dong. Many fires were started.
- 0320 - Captain Berg flew a night intruder mission in the Chinju Kumohom area. No activity was observed. Proceeded to Taejon and strafed four (4) vehicles. Damage inflicted unknown. Strafing what seemed to be a locomotive, results unknown. Salvoed bombs on road intersection at (36°-10'N/127°-51'E) and returned to base because aircraft developed an oil leak.
- 0446 - Major Cochran flew a night intruder mission in the vicinity of Andong. He observed six (6) vehicles in a village and scored a direct hit with five hundred (500) pound bombs. Two (2) miles further along the road a vehicle was found in a deep cut. The truck was strafed with twenty millimeter (20mm) cannon fire.
- 0510 - Two (2) aircraft were on an armed reconnaissance mission. The planes were flown by Captain Fornozini and Captain Peebles. No vehicles were seen. One (1) locomotive was strafed with twenty

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION (Cont'd)

- millimeter (20mm). Rockets were fired at the engine as it entered a tunnel. One (1) direct hit was observed. The locomotive was losing steam as it entered the tunnel. Both the entrance and the exit of the railroad tunnel were bombed out. Marshalling yards were attacked. Two (2) freight cars were destroyed and four (4) were damaged.
- 0555 - Captain Williams and Captain Boswell flew a close support mission. The target was an estimated battalion of enemy troops entrenched on a hill located at (35°-34'N/128°-17'E). It was reported that reserves were coming in from the west. A flight of P-51's were working the hill before flight reached the area. The section hit the hill with napalm tanks and twenty millimeter (20mm) fire. Controller estimated at least twenty (20) of the enemy troops were killed. Aircraft were directed to hit troops on a road at (35°-30'N/128°-11'E). The enemy troops were strafed and approximately fifteen (15) were killed. Six (6) haystacks were strafed and hit with rockets. Two (2) caught fire. A tank was hit with rockets but the tank probably had been hit at an earlier date. Next an enemy jeep was attacked and left smoking.
- 0730 - Captain McBarron and First Lieutenants T. Clark, McLaughlin and Murphy flew a close support mission. Flight was directed by controller to bomb a ridge at (35°-05'N/128°-32'E). Four (4) napalm tanks were dropped on the target area. No estimate of damage because the whole area was burned out. Controller had flight rocket the ridge on the southeast side. Estimate of damage was not available because the area was heavily wooded. Flight was directed to strafe positions just forward of friendly troops. Casualties were impossible to estimate because of foliage. Aircraft then attacked a machine gun position in the vicinity. Friendly troops were taking the position as the planes left the area.
- 1005 - Two (2) aircraft flew a close support mission in the Kunwi area. Flight was directed to hit a ridge at (36°-11'N/128°-34'E). Capt. in Pippin and First Lieutenant Jernigan participated in the flight. The enemy position was bombed and strafed. Controller called and said to break off the attack as the flight was strafing our own troops. Ground controller called and said the aircraft were not strafing our men, and that this was the third (3rd) time in three (3) days that he had been called and told that aircraft were strafing in friendly areas. It is assumed the enemy had use of a radio and were cutting in on the controller.
- 1400 - Four (4) planes were on a close support mission at (36°-16'N/128°-54'E). Capt. in Fernonzi, Captain Phillips, First Lieutenant King and First Lieutenant Oliver flew the mission. The flight searched road up to Kusan-Dong for troops. Three (3) villages were hit and an undetermined number of houses burned to the ground. Controller estimated thirty-five (35) of the enemy troops were killed out of an estimated three hundred (300).
- 1610 - Captain Boswell, Captain McBarron, First Lieutenant T. Clark and First Lieutenant Murphy flew a close support mission. Five (5) artillery pieces at (36°-09'N/128°-06'E) were the target. Three (3) of the pieces were destroyed and two (2) severely damaged by bombing, rocketing and strafing runs.
- 1725 - Captain May and First Lieutenant Hedcock flew a special mission. A tank repair factory about two and one half (2½) miles from Kun-chon was the target. The building was destroyed by bombing and strafing runs.
- 2020 - Major Cochran and Captain Berg flew a night intruder mission in

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION (Con't)

the Chonju, Namwon and Hadong area. A bridge at (35°-10'N/127°-27'E) was bombed. Near misses were scored. Flight then strafed the area and caused several fires.

2310 - Captain Fornozini and First Lieutenant McLaughlin were assigned a night intruder mission. Captain Fornozini became airborne at 2309. Lieutenant McLaughlin's aircraft swerved on takeoff and after one hundred (100) yards of roll went through two (2) ditches. The belly tank caught fire. The plane was destroyed and the pilots death attributed to burns. There were no explosions from the armament. Pilot was dead upon arrival of crash crew. The body was about ten (10) feet aft of the tail section of the aircraft. Plane was intact. First aircraft circled the field and landed after the field was reopened.

23 September 1950

0630 - A flight of four (4) aircraft was directed to attack eight (8) villages that contained enemy supplies. The towns were located about seven (7) miles north of Kumchon. Captains Corman, Egan, Ray and First Lieutenant Childers participated in the strike. Flight attacked with bombs, rockets napalm tanks and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. Fires were observed coming from the village after the attacks. Black smoke was coming from one (1) of the villages in the target area.

0715 - Two (2) planes were on a close support mission in the vicinity of (35°-08'N/128°-16'E). Controller directed Major Cochran and First Lieutenant Thayer to attack one (1) man leading an oxcart that was loaded with packages. Target was destroyed with twenty millimeter (20mm) fire. Flight then attacked a tunnel which contained about thirty (30) enemy troops. Tunnel was hit with napalm tanks. The tanks went well inside the opening before exploding. Excellent results were reported.

0900 - First Lieutenants T. Clark and Jernigan flew a close support mission. Controller directed them to attack trucks in the Hamchang area. Section could not locate vehicles. A field piece and a village southwest of Sangju were attacked. The field piece was bombed and destroyed. A village in the area was strafed and approximately sixty (60) of the enemy troops killed.

1110 - An armed reconnaissance mission was flown by Captain Berg and Captain Pippin. At (36°-31'N/127°-43'E) a truck was damaged by strafing. A large building was strafed. There were many vehicles in the area because of the numerous tracks around the structure, but none were to be seen. Two (2) warehouses in the town of Namwon were damaged by bombing and strafing.

1230 - Two (2) aircraft flown by Captain Boswell and First Lieutenant Murphy flew a close support mission in the Chinju area. Controller directed flight to strafe two villages on the west side of Chinju. Both of the villages were strafed and bombed and were afire when the flight left the area.

1605 - Captain Egan and Captain Corman flew a close support mission in the Kunwi area. Troops and vehicles were attacked. Damage to vehicles unknown but three hundred (300) enemy troops were killed or wounded and two (2) bridges were damaged in the attacks.

1815 - Captain McBarron and Captain Ray flew a night intruder mission in the area of (35°-49'N/127°-10'E). Flight reconnoitered the area. Observations negative. Dropped armament in the area but results unknown due to darkness.

2300 - A night intruder mission was flown by Captain Berg and First Lieutenant T. Clark in the Taejon area. One (1) plane attacked

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what appeared to be a locomotive, setting it afire. On the runs the pilot received return fire. The other pilot attacked several vehicles causing a large fire.

24 September 1950

- 0110 - Two (2) planes flew a night intruder mission in the Sunchon area. The aircraft were piloted by Captain Egan and First Lieutenant Murphy. Four (4) trucks were attacked with bombs and twenty millimeter (20mm) fire. Results unknown due to darkness.
- 0305 - Captains Boswell and Gorman flew a night intruder mission in the area of (36°-37'N/127°-38'E). Runs were made on a road bed but no activity was noted.
- 0540 - Major Cochran, Major Folsom, Captain Fornozini and First Lieutenant Thayer flew a close support mission. Flight was directed to bomb a bridge at (36°-24'N/129°-22'E). The target was a concrete structure. The bridge received many direct bomb hits; but pilots believed with a few repairs, one way traffic could possibly pass over the structure.
- 0700 - Captains McBarron and Pendrey flew a close support mission in the Sunchon area. Two (2) villages were hit with napalm tanks and set afire. Troops were strafed with twenty millimeter (20mm). An estimated thirty-five of the enemy were killed.
- 1045 - An armed reconnaissance mission was flown by First Lieutenants Jernigan and Miller. Flight was directed to go seven (7) miles northeast of P'yongch'ang to hit eight (8) tanks camouflaged in a farm house. Section could not locate target so dropped armament on a large building. Another building was damaged with rockets and fragmentation bombs.
- 1130 - First Lieutenant T. Clark and First Lieutenant Jennings flew a close support mission. Controller had approximately twenty (20) trucks at (36°-15'N/129°-15'E). Attacks destroyed one (1) artillery piece, four (4) ox carts, two (2) trucks and killed at least fifteen (15) enemy troops.
- 1610 - Major Folsom, Captains Boswell, Pendrey and First Lieutenant Murphy flew a close support mission in the Chinju area. Target was a tunnel one-half (1/2) miles south of Chinju. Controller stated that the tunnel had troops and vehicles in it. It is estimated that at least seventy-five enemy troops were killed by the rocket, napalm, twenty millimeter and fragmentation bomb attacks on both the entrance and exit of the tunnel.
- 1820 - Captains Gorman and Egan flew a night intruder mission. Controller directed flight to work west of Chinju. The flight made eleven (11) strafing runs on roads out of Chinju. Darkness precluded estimations of damage in the area.
- 2125 - A night intruder mission was flown by Captain McBarron and First Lieutenant Thayer. Controller directed flight to reconnoiter north and south of Namwon. Dropped a general purpose bomb on an unidentified object. Results unknown due to darkness.
- 2245 - Two (2) aircraft flew a night intruder mission. The planes were piloted by Captain Fornozini and First Lieutenant Jernigan. Patrolled in the Chinju and Namwon area. No activity was observed. Bomb load was salvaged in the Namwon vicinity. Results unknown due to darkness.

25 September 1950

- 0145 - Captain Berg and First Lieutenant T. Clark flew a night intruder

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- mission. Could not contact controller so flight proceeded to Namwon and dropped bomb load. Results of the bombing run unknown due to darkness.
- 0320 - Captain Berg, and Second Lieutenant Holdridge flew a night intruder mission. Had difficulty contacting controller. Flight was running low on fuel and no activity was observed, so section returned to base.
- 0545 - Captain Boswell, First Lieutenants Berck, Childers and Miller flew a close support mission. After much difficulty the town of Hamchang was the target designated by the controller. Approximately one and one-half (1½) blocks of the town were left burning after the attack. Ten (10) camouflaged vehicles outside of town were hit with rockets. Many small fires were started. The results of the attack were as follows: thirty to thirty-five buildings destroyed and ten (10) buildings damaged.
- 0655 - Captain Corman flew a close support mission. Controller directed pilot to hit troops in the Yongdok vicinity. Strafed troops with twenty millimeter, rocketed and bombed the positions. Estimate at least ten of the enemy were killed by the runs.
- 0935 - Captain McBarron and First Lieutenant Groff flew a close support mission. Controller directed flight to Yongdok. Attacked troops in an orchard with bombs, rockets and twenty millimeter fire. Controller estimated that at least one hundred enemy troops were killed and one (1) truck destroyed.
- 1135 - Captain Egan and First Lieutenant Jennings were on a close support mission. Controller sent flight to Andong. Controller misdirected the use of a napalm tank. A bus was destroyed with the tank. An enemy T-34 tank was destroyed by bombing and strafing runs. Flight attacked an enemy troop column. Estimate at least one hundred (100) were killed in the attack.
- 1450 - Captain Pendrey and First Lieutenant Miller flew a close support mission. Could not contact controller so the flight proceeded to (37°-10'N/129°-00'E) and attacked one (1) truck with two (2) napalm tanks. Results not noted. Strafing runs on enemy cycle troops accounted for at least eight (8) of the enemy.
- 1600 - Two (2) planes flew a close support mission in the Chinju area. The aircraft were piloted by First Lieutenant Berck and Second Lieutenant Holdridge. Four (4) trucks were attacked with rockets and twenty millimeter fire. All the vehicles were left burning. Ten ox carts were strafed, five were observed to have been severely damaged. Fired a rocket at one truck, results unknown.
- 1755 - Two (2) aircraft flew a night intruder mission. The planes were piloted by Captain Boswell and First Lieutenant Childers. The section patrolled railroad north from Namwon. No movement was observed. Bombed the town of Pusan. The bombing attack started many fires. Chuktong-ni was hit but results unknown.
- 2020 - Major Folsom and Captain Berg flew a night intruder mission. They patrolled in the Sunchon, Namwon and Pusong area. No activity was noted. Used four (4) flares with no results. Checked out with controller and returned to base.
- 2227 - A night intruder mission was flown by Captain Corman and Captain Polen. They dropped bombs on a road intersection near Sunhung. Patrolled road at (36°-57'N/128°-45'E) and dropped bombs, results unknown due to darkness.

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26 September 1950

- 0115 - Two (2) aircraft were on a night intruder mission. Captain McBarron and First Lieutenant Berck patrolled the Kunsan, Chunju and Namwon area. Contacted controller and left area for the base.
- 0340 - Captain Egan and First Lieutenant Miller flew a night intruder mission. Planes proceeded to (35°-37'N/127°-10'E) and observed vehicles moving in and out of town. Flight dropped bombs on the vehicles. Two (2) direct hits were scored. Two trucks were destroyed and another object was hit and burned for approximately fifteen minutes. Accurate evaluation of damage inflicted unknown due to weather and darkness.
- 0610 - Four (4) aircraft flown by Major Folsom, Captain Pendrey, First Lieutenant Groff and First Lieutenant Jennings, flew a close support mission. Controller directed flight to attack a field piece which was camouflaged in a horse drawn cart. The target was located near the town of Uiryong. Flight destroyed the field piece with rockets, bombs, napalm tanks and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. Enemy troops with the piece were strafed and the results reported as excellent.
- 0730 - Major Clark and First Lieutenant V. C. Clark flew a close support mission. Controller directed flight to village at (35°-22'N/128°-06'E) to bomb a long warehouse. The warehouse was severely damaged by the runs. A village nearby was hit with rockets. Four (4) fires were started by the attack.
- 0930 - First Lieutenant Beyos and First Lieutenant Bryant flew a close support mission. Controller directed flight to hit about three hundred (300) enemy troops ten (10) miles northwest of Chinju. Section attacked with bombs, napalm tanks and twenty millimeter (20mm) ammunition. Controller estimated fifty (50) of the enemy troops were killed in the attacks.
- 1055 - Two (2) aircraft flown by Captain Polen and Second Lieutenant Holdridge were directed by the controller to hit enemy troops at (35°-20'N/127°-59'E). All bombs and ammunition hit directly in the target area. The target area was burning when the flight left the vicinity.
- 1555 - Major Folsom, Captain Pendrey, First Lieutenant Childers and First Lieutenant Thayer flew a close support mission in the Uiryong area. One (1) gun position was destroyed and three (3) were knocked out, by bombing, strafing and rocketing runs.
- 1900 - Major Clark and Captain Pippin flew a night intruder mission. They attacked a truck three (3) miles southwest of Chunju. The truck was destroyed by bombing and strafing runs. A second vehicle was caught on the road and destroyed by strafing runs. No other activity was noted.
- 2030 - Two (2) aircraft flown by Captain Polen and Second Lieutenant Holdridge flew a night intruder mission in the vicinity of Namwon. They attacked enemy vehicles along the road. Many hits by strafing were observed but actual damage was not ascertained.
- 2320 - First Lieutenant Bryant and First Lieutenant Thayer flew a night intruder strike. Patrolled in the Namwon area. One and one-half miles south of the town the flight observed one (1) vehicle on a bridge. Dropped bombs but they were all near misses.

27 September 1950

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0100 - Two (2) planes flew a night intruder mission. Proceeded to Samnye-ri. Captain Berg and First Lieutenant Berck were the pilots flying the strike. A warehouse was heavily damaged with bombs and five (5) trucks in the vicinity were damaged with twenty millimeter (20mm) fire. Captain Berg's aircraft ran out of gasoline on the return trip. The Captain bailed out over southern Japan. He directed the aircraft seaward and jumped. The plane was lost at sea and the pilot returned to Itazuke by vehicle. The location of the bail out was at (34°-20'N/130°-57'E).

No more missions were flown until 1030 Item time on the 28th of September.

28 September 1950

1030 - Four (4) aircraft flown by Captain Pelen, First Lieutenants J. C. Clark, Miller and Jernigan flew a close support mission in the Pungang-ni area. Twenty (20) trucks were sighted in a court yard. The vehicles were bombed. Results five (5) of the trucks were destroyed and others damaged. On the road south of the town a T-70 was attacked with rockets. Three direct hits were scored on the tank. Strafed trucks that were with the tank and left twelve (12) burning. Destroyed three (3) more vehicles with rockets. Damaged at least ten (10) more trucks by strafing with twenty millimeter (20mm).

1200 - Major Boag, First Lieutenant Boyes and Technical Sergeants Keegan and Sallade flew a close support mission. Three (3) T-34 tanks at (37°-00'N/127°-05'E) were the target. The tanks were attacked with bombs, rockets, napalm tanks and twenty millimeter (20mm) fire. One (1) tank was severely damaged and the results of the attack on the other tank unknown.

1500 - Four (4) aircraft flew a close support mission piloted by Captain Fulton, First Lieutenants Groff, Berck and Second Lieutenant Williams. Controller instructed flight to hit the northwest side of Taejon. Attacked the target with bombs, napalm tanks, rockets and twenty millimeter (20mm) fire. Started two very large fires in the target area.

1555 - First Lieutenant Bryant and Second Lieutenant Holbridge flew a close support mission. Controller directed flight to Chonan Creek to hit two (2) tanks in the creek bed. The tanks were destroyed by bombing, rocket and strafing runs.

1915 - A reconnaissance patrol was flown by Major Key and Technical Sergeant Pennell. No action was encountered during the flight.

2200 - Captain Denham and First Lieutenant Miller flew an armed reconnaissance mission in the Kuchon, Taeru, Taejon and Chonju area. No attacks were made.

29 September 1950

0150 - Major Clark and First Lieutenant Berck flew a night intruder mission. Patrolled from Chonju to Kunsan. No activity noted, so flight returned to base.

0630 - Major Boag and Captain Fulton flew an armed reconnaissance mission. Controller had no targets. Flight left area and returned to base.

0710 - Four (4) planes piloted by Major Clark, Captain Denham, First Lieutenant J. C. Clark and Second Lieutenant Williams flew a close support mission. Checked in with the controller. No targets were assigned. Checked out and returned to base.

1230 - Major Boag, Captain Fulton, First Lieutenant Boyes and Lester

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INTELLIGENCE SECTION (Con't)

1415 - Major Reinburg and Captain Phillips were to fly a close support mission. One (1) aircraft aborted, the second plane flew to (33°-54'N/130°-07'E) and dropped armament on safe and returned to base.

2 October 1950

1445 - Four (4) aircraft were to fly a special mission. The aircraft, flown by Major Cochran, Captain Peoples, First Lieutenant Haddock, and First Lieutenant Murphy. One (1) aircraft aborted on takeoff. Other planes contacted controller. No targets assigned so pilots returned to base.

2125 - Captain Hazlett and Captain Williams were directed to proceed to controller at 2125. Patrolled area, but could not observe any activity. Dropped flares, and bombed and strafed area as pre-briefed. Many fires were started. One (1) was burning especially bright.

2145 - Two (2) aircraft flew air support for one (1) C-47. The flight took place just off the coast of Fukuoka, Japan. Controller then released flight to return to base. The pilots were Captain Phillips and First Lieutenant Oliver.

3 October 1950

0830 - Captain Fernonzini and First Lieutenant Murphy, took off on a combat air patrol mission. Mission was flown from Yonchon to Changsong-ri. No activity was observed, so flight returned to base.

0950 - Three (3) aircraft took off on a close air support mission north of Seoul. The pilots were Captain Egan, First Lieutenant Jernigan and First Lieutenant Haddock. Two (2) tanks were the target. They were located at Uijonbu, and traveling north. Flight obtained permission to hit the tanks. By that time tanks were off of the road. One (1) hid in the trees and was rocketed. The other continued north and was lost. Flight fired rockets at the tank hidden in the trees. Personnel abandoned the tank. Surrounding buildings caught fire as a result of the attack.

4 October 1950

No missions were flown due to lack of targets.

5 October 1950

1430 - Four (4) aircraft piloted by Major Brushert, Captain Boswell, Captain Kay and First Lieutenant T. Clark, took off on a close support mission, in the Tongchon area. Bombed what appeared to be three (3) small armored railroad cars. Many hits were observed. Bombed a camouflaged object on a railroad siding. Two (2) hits were observed.

6 October 1950

1140 - Four (4) aircraft took off on a close air support mission in the Wonsan and Tongwon area. Troops in the vicinity were friendly. Captain Corman, Captain Egan, First Lieutenant Jernigan and First Lieutenant participated in the flight.

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OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

APPENDIX 7

For the period covered by this report, Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513, in conjunction with the Air Force's 69th Night Fighter Squadron was assigned the mission of providing base air defense for the Itazuke Air Force Base, under the operational control of the United States Fifth Air Force. In addition, Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 was assigned the mission of providing around the clock, Close Air Support, Armed Reconnaissance, Night Intruder and Night Heckler missions in support of the United Nations Forces fighting in Korea.

During this period the squadron continued to work from Itazuke Air Base with the addition of the rear echelon pilots and planes. Ten days after the beginning of this phase the squadron was fully up to strength and day missions were added to the capabilities of the squadron and much more day work was undertaken.

On the night of 22 September 1950, the squadron suffered its first casualty when 1stLt. J. P. MC LAUGHLIN crashed during a take-off run.

The majority of missions were flown in Close Air Support of the troops advancing from the Southeastern perimeter. The first part of October found the missions proceeding North of the 38° parallel. This distance required two extra fuel drop tanks and the 5.5 hour flight is considered to be excessive for night missions. Also the squadron flew night CAP, for the first time, in the Itazuke area.

The squadron returned to Itami on October and did not fly further missions. The balance of this period was devoted to training with emphasis being placed on GCA and AIA work.

There were no operations against the enemy carried out from Itami Air Base. During the period covered by this report, Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 513 flew 170 night sorties for a total of 572.7 night flying hours. During this same period, 190 day sorties were flown for a total of 668.9 day hours. The total sorties for the period was 360 with a total of 1241.6 hours flown. The above sorties and hours were flown with an average availability of twenty (20) planes and twenty (20) pilots. At the end of the period the squadron had twenty four (24) planes and forty one (41) pilots assigned.

A typical sortie was as follows: Two planes would take off from Itazuke at 2400 after being briefed by the intelligence officers of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group of the 5th Air Force. After the planes were in the air and heading for Korea, the flight leader would give Moonshine (Fukuoka Control) a call, reporting to him the call sign, the number of planes in the flight, the type of planes in the flight and the expected time of return. The flight would then proceed to Korea and give Mellow Control (Pusan) a call when approximately forty (40) miles out giving the same information that was passed to Moonshine with the additional information as to bomb load, whether or not it was a pre-briefed mission and requesting a mission number. The flight then would proceed to its assigned target area where it would remain on station for approximately two (2) hours at the end of which they would return to Mellow Control and check out giving him the call sign of the aircraft, the mission number and the assessment of damage inflicted along with any other intelligence observations that the pilot felt warranted a contact report. The flight would then set course for Itazuke giving Moonshine Homer a call if any assistance was needed to ring the base.

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OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT (Cont'd)

Upon landing, the entire flight would be debriefed by the 49th Fighter bomber Group. Interrogation forms would be made out and the original sent to Itami to the Intelligence Section of the squadron for compilation of the reports required.

In addition to one, 150 gallon external fuel tank the average flight carried one 500 pound general purpose bomb, two 265 pound fragmentation bombs, two MK-6 flares, plus a full load of 20MM ammunition. On dusk and dawn hops; the flares and fragmentation bombs were replaced with 5" rockets and the 500 pound general purpose bomb with a 150 gallon napalm tank.

Night missions were assigned with two planes to a sector for periods up to 4 hours, with a time overlap of approximately one hour. The two planes remained together on target although a distance and altitude separation was maintained. Radio contact was continuous as necessary on the squadron common frequency. Attack altitudes varied with the visibility, terrain and moonlight available. Flare usage tactics sent one plane high, (approximately 5000 - 6000 ft., above the ground) while the second plane stayed at attack altitude and slightly behind the flare drop plane. As the flare lit the target, the second plane was in an immediate attack position and the drop plane could then circle into position for a succeeding attack. This system proved very effective except that approximately 30% flare duds were encountered. Flares used were the MK 26, Mod. C, and the MK 6.

All checks, 30, 60, 90 and 120 hours were returned to Itami as no space was available at Itazuke Air Base. Routine maintenance was handled at Itazuke. This system gave very satisfactory availability as only 8 to 10 planes were kept at Itazuke. After the rear echelon planes arrived late in August, this total was raised to 16 to 18 planes at Itazuke, but the time interval was not sufficient to comment on the advisability of working a 24 plane squadron in this manner.

As space was not available to quarter pilots at Itazuke Air Base, we rotated two pilots each day maintaining 20 pilots at the forward base. Incoming pilots started on the flight schedule with the dawn hop and each night moved back one hop until after flying the dusk hop they returned to Itami for a period of approximately 5 days. This system proved very satisfactory as the flights were long and the quarters crowded. The 5 days rest was considered an important link to pilot effectiveness and moral.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENTS

APPENDIX B

Day tactics were carried out as prescribed by current Close Air Support doctrine. Minor variances were used upon occasion due to terrain, extreme weather conditions and the lack of aerial opposition. Maps were entirely inadequate throughout the battle zone during the entire period. They were inaccurate in that key terrain features were not shown, altitudes were sometimes as much as two or three thousand feet in error, major ridge lines were 30° off in azimuth, and in that a standard map and grid coordinate system was not available for use. This made it extremely difficult and dangerous for air to give effective Close Air Support. Close coordination is needed between Air and Ground Intelligence Sections in a fast moving situation such as this operation has been. Quite often intelligence was unable to accurately tell the pilots where the front line was. This made it necessary to jettison armament in the ocean instead of taking a chance on hitting friendly troops. This was particularly true at night and many targets had to be left alone because it was impossible to tell if they were in friendly territory.

It is imperative that positive target identification be made in both day and night attacks. In order to facilitate this, all new pilots in the area were given one and if possible two daylight flights with an experienced pilot over the terrain to be worked before they were permitted to work the area at night. This enable them to familiarize themselves with the general terrain features making target identification at night easier and more positive.

Night missions were generally night intruder, and night heckler. It is felt that these type missions were highly effective by working in the two plane team utilizing flares as explained in the Operations Section of this report.

It is mandatory that some navigational aid be present at some geographical spot in the battle zone. This is needed so that the target can be located in conditions of reduced visibility and/or overcast. This was not available for this operation and as a result sorties had to be cancelled because of weather that could have been flown with such a navigational aid.

Some Close Air Support missions were flown in coordination with the ground troops by the use of Forward Air Controllers coordinating the fire of mortar and artillery using white phosphorus and smoke shells for target identification. This can be effectively done if good communication, Air to Ground, Ground to Air, is maintained. The radio jeep proved partially ineffective in that it only had a range of approximately ten miles due to the line of sight limitation. It is felt that some radio must be carried with the Forward Air Controller that will permit the equipment to be in defilade and still be able to contact the aircraft.

Pilots should be trained in type aircraft in the United States being thoroughly indoctrinated in all forms of all weather mission tactics. It is felt that all pilots should be more familiar with the basic ground tactics and problems. There should be constant ground and air intertype tactics both day and night to train and to maintain the standards of Marine Close Air Support.

The consensus of opinion of the pilots in this squadron, is that the F4U-5N is most unsatisfactory for night operation, and for its primary mission as an all weather fighter, ranges from unsatisfactory to fair. Visibility is restricted to such an extent at a 3 point altitude, that any night take off or landing is hazardous. Visibility in flight is very limited due to the length of the nose and the glow from the engine. Location of the Radar control panel, makes night use of the radar, with heavy clothing on the pilot, a hit or miss proposition.

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Rockets were not considered a satisfactory night weapon and their use was discontinued in favor of the 265 pound Fragmentation bomb. The rockets were discontinued in the daytime because of the malfunctions due to their age, temperature, and lack of facilities for handling both rockets and fuzes. Considerable malfunction of the guns was encountered when the supply of MK 8 twenty millimeter gun links was depleted and they were replaced with the MK 7 link. It is recommended that all MK 7 links be destroyed and sufficient MK 8 links be made available in the supply system. Considerable number of duds among the flares was encountered. This squadron used the Army M-26 and the Navy MK 6 flare with the 111A2 fuze. The recommended fuze (MK 146) was not available to this unit.

In summing up, it is felt that this squadron carried out its assigned mission in a very creditable manner, giving considerable aid to the ground forces of the United Nations even though adverse conditions prevailed. It has been a distinct asset at night, harassing the enemy, and deterring him from use of artillery and auto weapon fire, which is readily visible from the air. In addition, the verified damage attributed to this organization was considerable in both day and night operation.

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ANNEX "H"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

LOGISTICS REPORT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

On 1 August 1950, the Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 12, alerted his command for overseas assignment. The Executive Staff, Special Staff, and squadron commanders were directed to be prepared for embarkation on ten hours notice by 1 September 1950.

In accordance with 1st Marine Air Wing Ad Plan #1-50, preparation began immediately. Section "M" was drawn from BuAer Pool, NAS, Mira Mar, California. Class IV Marine Corps Winter Equipment was assembled from Camp Pendleton, Barstow and San Francisco, California. The S-4 Section of MAG-12 was placed on a 24 hour operating basis. BuAer Allowance Sections "B", "H", "K", "R" and "W" were procured, packed, weighed, and volume determined.

On 10 August 1950, the squadron property of Marine Fighting Squadrons VMF-312 and VMF(N)-513, some section "B" and some section "M" which was to augment and replenish MAG-33 equipment was ordered loaded aboard the U.S.S. OGLETHORPE. On this date VMF-212 was transferred from MAG-15, located at Cherry Point, North Carolina, to MAG-12 at El Toro, California. This necessitated the repacking of all section "B" for F4U-5 aircraft, Table of Basic Allowances for VMF-212, and the filling of shortages. Staging was performed from El Toro, California to Pier 6, U.S. Naval Base, Terminal Island, California. On-loading was executed by civilian stevedores under the supervision of the MAG-12 Transport Quartermaster. On-loading was completed 15 August 1950.

During the period 1 August 1950, concurrent with other activities, all aircraft of VMF(N)-513 (Rear Echelon) and VMF-312 were inducted into Overhaul & Repair, San Diego, California, to be brought up to configuration. This work was performed in what is considered record time. On 24 August 1950, planes and personnel of VMF-312 and VMF(N)-513 (Rear Echelon) embarked aboard the U.S.S. SITKOH BAY for Kobe, Honshu, Japan, via Yokosuka Naval Base, Honshu, Japan. On 26 August 1950, planes and personnel of VMF-212 and VMF(N)-542 embarked aboard the U.S.S. CAPE ESPERANCE for Kobe, Honshu, Japan via Yokosuka Naval Base. These embarkations were conducted from the NAS, NORTH ISLAND, San Diego, California.

As directed by 1st Marine Air Wing Ad Plan #2-50, Hedron 1st MAW, Hedron MAG-12, Soron MAG-12, some VMF(N)-513 material, VMF(N)-542, MAG-12 S. O. Stores and MAG-12 section "M" were loaded aboard the U.S.N.S. GENERAL C. G. MORTON and the S.S. FURMAN VICTORY at Pier 6, Long Beach, California, on 28 October 1950. Approximately 310,000 cubic feet was loaded aboard the S.S. FURMAN VICTORY; 90,000 cubic feet and 1000 personnel aboard the U.S.N.S. GENERAL C. G. MORTON. During this operation, staging and on-loading progressed simultaneously. The operation was extremely smooth. The vessels were loaded and sailed 1 September 1950 for Kobe, Honshu, Japan.

The U.S.N.S. GENERAL C. G. MORTON and the S.S. FURMAN VICTORY arrived in Kobe on 14 September 1950. Off-loading operations were completed 18 September 1950. Only essential equipment was transported to Itami Air Force Base. The majority of the equipment was warehoused on pier 6.

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The U.S.S. SITKOH BAY arrived at Kobo, Honshu, Japan, 17 September 1950 and the U.S.S. CAPE ESPERANCE 14 September 1950. The aircraft had been previously off-loaded at Yokosuka Naval Base, hauled to Kisarazu Air Base and flown to Itami Air Force Base. The ships off-loaded personnel and equipment on Pier 4, Kobo, Japan. The off-loading of each ship was completed in less than twenty four hours and the equipment was warehoused or lifted by truck to Itami Air Force Base.

On 24 September 1950, verbal information was received that MAG-12 was to be committed to an operation in North Korea; the objective being Wonsan. On 26 September 1950, G-4, 1st Marine Air Wing; G-4 (Forward Echelon), 1st Marine Air Wing; and S-4, MAG-12 participated in a conference at Kimpo Air Base, Korea. The following assumptions were made:

1. MAG-12 would be lifted by LST from Kobo, Honshu, Japan, to Wonsan, North Korea.
2. Landing would be on D plus 2.
3. Flight operations would begin on D plus 3.
4. MAG-12 would consist of Hedron, Soron, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-513.
5. The ground echelon of VMF-312 would be sea lifted from Inchon, Korea.
6. VMF(N)-542 would possibly be airlifted from Kimpo Air Base, Korea to Wonsan, Korea, to join MAG-12 at a later date.

The Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing, directed MAG-12 to carry rations for three days and necessary aviation equipment. MAG-12 was informed that a fifteen day operation could be expected and was further instructed to be prepared to support an 800 man camp. Two Seajap LSTs, Q002 and Q008, were designated to carry MAG-12 from Kobo, Japan, to Wonsan, North Korea. The maximum lift allowed was 1600 measured tons including vehicles.

As preparations continued, it became apparent that Wonsan Air Field would be in friendly hands long before "D" day. Consequently, the S-4 Section, MAG-12, organized minimum transportation, ordnance, camp and billeting equipment. This equipment would be airlifted while the primary equipment was enroute by sea should "D" day be advanced.

With such a scaled down operation, the Commanding Officer, MAG-12, directed the attached squadrons to include only the designated air lift items and undertook to establish as a MAG-12 function the supply of the whole camp area. Consequently, tentage, stoves, cots, galley equipment and other essential items were packed and air lifted by MAG-12 utilizing the assistance of MAG-12 department heads. Class IV Marine Corps Winter Clothing was issued to the officers and men. Individual equipment to be carried was designated by the M.G. The men were issued mountain type sleeping bags in lieu of bedding rolls. This was a departure from the usual routine. The mountain type sleeping bag in conjunction with a cot had proved most effective in the Inchon, Korea operation. They also created less of a bulk problem to the individual and the supply section.

CONFIDENTIALRECOMMENDATIONS

1. Shipping should be assigned directly to Marine Aviation units rather than have the aviation units dependent on the "leavings" of the Marine Division.
2. Shipping should be assigned in accordance with needs rather than having the allowable materiel assigned in accordance with shipping.
3. Operational orders and additional plans should be written and classified low enough to allow dissemination to Marine Air Group Executive Staffs.
4. Engineering personnel (Functional Field 1300) should be included on a MAG level in the aviation tactical organization of a MAG going into a forward area in the field.
5. A maximum number of officer personnel should be made cognizant of logistics problems. This could be accomplished by rotation of duty and the use of service schools.

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ANNEX "I"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
Fleet Marine Force, c/o WFO, San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF THE MEDICAL SECTION, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

From 7 September 1950 through 15 September 1950 Marine Aircraft Group 12 medical personnel were aboard the USNS GENERAL C.G. MORTON enroute from Long Beach, California to Kobe, Honshu, Japan. Headquarters Squadron medical personnel consisted of 1 medical officer and 5 hospital corpsmen. Service Squadron medical personnel consisted of 2 dental officers, 3 dental technicians, and 12 hospital corpsmen.

Medical indoctrination lectures regarding venereal diseases and their control, personal hygiene, sanitation, and accident prevention were given aboard ship. The few Marine Aircraft Group 12 personnel who were not "up to date" with the designated immunizations were inoculated aboard ship during this period. The USNS GENERAL C.G. MORTON docked at Kobe, Honshu, Japan, 15 September 1950. On 16 September 1950 personnel debarked for Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan.

Upon arrival at Itami Air Force Base, Marine Aircraft Group 12 medical personnel staffed the dispensary. Marine Aircraft Group 33 medical officers and corpsmen (excepting rear echelon) had departed for Korea with their medical supplies a few days earlier. Consequently, enough Marine Aircraft Group 12 field units to run a dispensary were broken out and made operational.

Chief points of attention by the medical personnel at Itami during this period were venereal disease and its control, the medical supervision of the various messes and individuals working therein, food, water, and living quarters sanitation, the setting up of a workable and adequate sick call, ward, X-ray, laboratory, and pharmacy facilities. It is felt that these points were successfully handled.

VMF-214, with 1 medical officer and 3 hospital corpsmen attached, and VMT-323, with 1 medical officer and 4 hospital corpsmen attached, although a part of Marine Aircraft Group 12, were operational aboard carriers during this period.

VMF(N)-513 attached to Marine Aircraft Group 12 during this period was operational at Itazuke Air Field, Honshu, Japan. There was no medical officer attached to this squadron during this period.

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ANNEX "J"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

From 7 September 1950 through 14 September 1950, communications personnel, Marine Aircraft Group 12, were enroute from Long Beach, California, to Kobe, Honshu, Japan, aboard the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON. The Communications Department consisted of three (3) officers (MOS 7302, 6610, 6601) and 27 enlisted men with the following MOS numbers:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>MOS</u>
1	2500
5	2511
3	2541
1	2543
2	2533
1	2600
1	2611
1	2639
2	2636
1	6419
2	6613
1	6611
2	6400
1	6500
1	6619
2	6700

Upon arrival at Kobe, Honshu, Japan, all personnel were transported to Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan. Five men (teletype operators, message center men, radio operators) and one officer were assigned to 1st Marine Air Wing Communications. They assisted the personnel of that office and became familiar with procedures and routines necessary to proper functioning of a message center. It was anticipated that Marine Aircraft Group 12 would possibly operate independently in the future and therefore be required to set up and operate its own message center. In accordance with standard operating procedures, MAG communications, when based with the Marine Air Wing, is furnished dispatch service which requires that MAG communications route and deliver dispatches. Under this arrangement, little opportunity is afforded MAG personnel for such jobs as teletype operation, radio operation of point to point circuits, supervisory message center work, cryptographic work, and use of RPs publications.

In view of the above, it was necessary to use personnel, who did not have the proper MOS and who were only partially "checked out" in the handling of dispatches, to operate the MAG message routing center. This routing center was put into operation shortly after arrival at Itami Air Force Base.

Operation of a ground to air circuit was accomplished with an AN/ARC-1 Radio Jeep, at an outlying field, for the direction of aircraft over the impact area. Radio direction finding equipment, SCR 575, was put into operation for the training of personnel. Personnel familiar with the operation of this gear were few. A radio and telephone repair shop was set up for rechecking the MAG signal equipment for damage which occurred in transit, on-loading, and off-loading operations. Two jeeps were mounted with portable radio equipment, MAG, for use by the guard detachment. A signal materiel section was established to replenish lost and deficient stock.

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The following difficulties were encountered:

1. Loading, stowage, and maintaining guard on the RPS publications library (contained in the Remington Rand File Safe because stowage space was unadaptable to requirements) aboard ship was difficult.
2. The signal gear, which was not easily transported, was left in the warehouses on the Kobe docks. It was not possible to check this equipment due to the lack of facilities at the docks.
3. Crystals for frequency assignments were not available for immediate use because they were not held in stock.
4. Seven boxes of signal equipment, at Kobe docks or in transit to Itami AFB, were lost.
5. Signal materiel was slow in arriving after having been ordered.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Safes for transportation of classified materiel should be adapted to ease in handling, and designed with protectors on dials, handles, and latches. Field safes are not considered adequate stowage for crypto materiel.
2. Information concerning overseas radio frequencies should be made available before departure from the United States.
3. The TO for a communications section should include signal materiel personnel in that the materiel section for MAG Headquarters is considered inadequate to accomplish the job required by the present Allowance Tables. It is recommended that these personnel be placed under the command of the Communications Officer.
4. Signal equipment should be given secondary, if not primary, priority when off-loading at the destination.
5. M.O.S. numbers, as authorized by the current Tables of Organization, should be supplied the communications section.
6. Training of communications personnel should be carried on by the Marine Air Wing with the assistance of MAG Communications personnel.

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ANNEX "K"

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The Special Action Report of the Buildings and
Grounds Department is currently being compiled
and will be forwarded at a later date.

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ANNEX "L"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF THE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

On the 7th of September the engineering section of S1S-12 was aboard the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON, which departed from the United States on 1 September. The ship docked at Kobo, Honshu, Japan on 15 September. On the morning of the 16th the personnel disembarked and proceeded to Itami Air Force Base via government rail transportation.

The tools and equipment were unloaded and stored in a warehouse at the docks with instructions to bring only the light gear to the air base in order to help support the squadrons then staging through Itami Air Base for the forward area.

S1S-12 was required to furnish large details from the engineering section for housekeeping functions and guard duty. Loss of maintenance personnel to those details, coupled with the fact that only a minimum of equipment was permitted to be set up, resulting in an amount and class of maintenance far below the capabilities of this squadron.

On the 24th of September the wing aircraft pool was assigned to Service Squadron 12, for maintenance under the operational control of the S-3 section of Marine Aircraft Group 12. Although some personnel were furnished by Headquarters Squadron 12, additional personnel were required in order to meet the flight schedule. The additional personnel were drawn from the maintenance section, further restricting aircraft maintenance work.

The squadron was alerted on the 7th of October to send an echelon of the engineering section to the forward area, this detail consisted of one officer, Major A. I. Haas, and sixty-one (61) onlisted men. On the 9th of October the engineering section was divided into two (2) echelons with the forward echelon awaiting transportation and the rear echelon reorganizing to operate at Itami Air Base.

The following recommendations are based on the operations of the engineering section for the period covered by this report:

1. The personnel assigned to the engineering section by the Table of Organization appear to be adequate with possibly some small change to meet the local situation. However, the present policy of using the engineering section as a man power pool, resulting in constant fluctuation of personnel, tends to disorganize the section and to eliminate any opportunity for on the job training.

It is recommended that the Table of Organization be revised to provide the squadron with additional personnel for housekeeping, guard duty, and labor pool. The additional personnel would enable the squadron to maintain a larger number of aircraft and insure a much higher quality of workmanship. As replacements in the shops are required they should be drawn from the housekeeping pool. This method would provide a stabilized shop personnel and would result in a high quality of on the job training.

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2. Since the service squadron is designed to operate, using all of the equipment listed in the Table of Equipment, it appears to be a waste of technical skill and equipment to try and operate with a large portion of the equipment boxed up. It is recommended that a service squadron be set up completely as one unit, and not divided into two (2) echelons. A well organized section that has saved its boxes can completely pack in 24 hours.

3. It is not recommended that an operating line be a part of the engineering section. The demands of the operations section to keep a few aircraft in commission will push the primary mission of the service squadron, that of major aircraft repair, into the background.

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ANNEX "M"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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From 7 September 1950 to 9 October 1950, the Ordnance Section, Marine Aircraft Group 12 consisted of 1 officer (MOS 6510) and thirty-nine enlisted personnel. The mission of this section was to supply ordnance material, belt machine gun ammunition, and assemble bomb and rocket type ordnance to deliver to the squadrons attached to MAG-12.

During the period 7 September 1950 through 15 September 1950, the ordnance personnel and equipment was enroute from Long Beach, California to Kobe, Honshu, Japan, aboard the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON. Debarkation and offloading began 16 September 1950. On 22 September 1950, the Ordnance Section, MAG-12 had sufficient gear and personnel at Itami AFB, Honshu Japan, to begin operation.

A special ordnance detail of eight enlisted personnel with a non-commissioned officer in charge was organized. This detail degreased, serviced, and maintained the armament of the aircraft attached to Headquarters Squadron, MAG-12; also those aircraft in the replacement pool attached to the 1st Marine Air Wing.

A detail of two enlisted personnel was assigned the task of putting a skeet range in operation. With the assistance of Japanese labor the skeet range was completed and in operation on 1 October 1950. It was noted that few pilots took advantage of this facility.

The remaining ordnance personnel, twenty-nine enlisted men, belted ammunition ordered by the 1st Marine Air Wing. Of this ammunition the 20mm was shipped by air-lift to Itazuke AFB, Kyushu, Japan, in support of the forward echelon of VMF(N)-513 stationed at that base.

Ordnance material and equipment was shipped by air-lift to MAG-33 at Kimpo AFB, Korea. In this support was a temporary arrangement pending offloading of MAG-33 Ordnance Section at that base.

In accordance with formulated plans, ordnance material and equipment was prepared for shipment to Wonsan Air Field Korea. This material and equipment was to support two operating squadrons of MAG-12. Preparations were completed 9 October 1950, and a list of the estimated logistics necessary to carry out the operation was given the S-4 Section MAG-12.

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ANEX "N"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF THE TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

From 7 September 1950 through 14 September 1950, the transportation Department of Marine Aircraft Group 12 was enroute from Long Beach, California, to Kobe, Honshu, Japan, aboard the S.S. FURMAN VICTORY. Off-loading began immediately, transportation personnel worked in shifts twenty-four hours a day until off-loading was completed. At the beginning of operations drivers operated their vehicles from ten to thirty-five hours without relief. The off-loading progressed slowly because the ship's rigging was not able to handle the heavy lifts which had been dock loaded by a heavy duty lift crane in Long Beach, California. One heavy lift crane was all that could be utilized to unload the ship at Kobe, Japan. This one had to be shifted from one hold to another.

On 15 September 1950, transportation began from Kobe dock to Itami Air Force Base. There were no guides available to be sent with the trucks or road signs along the route to enable the drivers to find their way from Kobe to Itami AFB. These factors contributed to the difficulties experienced in the initial phases of the moving operation. The personnel, with the exception of four non-commissioned officers had never handled combat type vehicles.

In order to provide the maximum flow of materiel and equipment from Kobe dock to Itami AFB, men were drawn from Headquarters Squadron, Service Maintenance Squadron, tactical squadrons of Marine Aircraft Group 12, and the 1st Marine Air Wing to bring the total number of transportation personnel to three officers and eighty-seven enlisted men.

This moving operation was begun with equipment that had not been dehydrated other than an oil change.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All combat vehicles should be equipped with fixed lifting lugs.
2. Aircraft refuelers should have a tank capacity of 2000 gallons minimum. The capacity of the tank on the present refueler is inadequate.
3. Marine Aircraft Group Transportation should be commanded by an officer who has a transportation M.O.S. It should be organized as a Motor Transport Company with equipment and personnel independent of individual squadron or group personnel and equipment.

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ANNEX "O"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

The Provost Marshal's duties during the period covered in this report consisted of providing adequate guard and investigative facilities in matters of group concern.

From 7 September 1950, the Provost Marshal and Guard Detachment of MAG-12 was enroute from Pier 6, Terminal Island, Long Beach, California, to Kobe, Honshu, Japan, aboard the U.S.N.S. GENERAL C. G. MORTON. The Captain submitted a list of posts necessary to enforce ship's regulations. Additional posts were set up for such security as the Commander of Troops, U.S.N.S. GENERAL C. G. MORTON, considered necessary.

From 14 September to 18 September 1950, the duties of the Provost Marshall at Itami AFB, Honshu, Japan, were carried on by the Provost Marshal, Marine Aircraft Group 33. On 18 September 1950, the Provost Marshal, Marine Aircraft Group 12, assumed the responsibility for the security of Itami Air Force Base and for the activities of Marines on liberty in the surrounding area.

The personnel attached to the Provost Marshal's office consisted of a port and starboard watch of the Guard (90 men), a Shore Patrol Detail (15 men), and an administrative staff. In addition to these units the Provost Marshal maintained the base brig with a complement of twelve men. The personnel composing these various units were drawn from the attached squadrons; the majority being acquired from Service Maintenance Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group 12.

The Guard activities adhered closely to the procedures set forth in Chapter eleven, Landing Force Manual. The Shore Patrol Detail executed normal shore patrol functions as recommended in Chapter six, Naval Justice. The administrative section handled clerical work, property problems, the armory and investigations.

Problems encountered were due mainly to the inexperience of the personnel assigned to particular duties. Without exception, the men were specialists in some technical field of aviation and were, at first, poorly qualified for routine guard, shore patrol, or brig duties. Two weeks of intensified "on the job" training rectified this inexperience sufficiently so that the Provost Marshal's Office functioned in a satisfactory manner.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Personnel of a Marine Aircraft Group Guard or Shore Patrol Detail should have appropriate M.O.S. numbers. This would eliminate problems to a large extent arising from inexperience and the necessity of rotating personnel. The ability to adequately guard, patrol, or investigate cannot be presumed to be inherent in men.

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ANNEX "P"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIALREPORT OF THE RADIO AND ELECTRONICS DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

For the period from 7 September through 15 September this department was aboard the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON for transportation to Japan. For the period covered by this report the electronics department consisted of two officers (one MOS 7302, one MOS 6610) and twenty-nine enlisted with the following MOS numbers:

<u>No. of Personnel</u>	<u>MOS</u>
6 -----	6619
7 -----	6613
7 -----	6611
9 -----	6600

Upon arrival in Japan on 15 September and on completion of the offloading of equipment at Kobe, Japan this department set up an electronics repair shop at Itami Air Base to provide electronic maintenance for all aircraft at that station.

During the period covered by this report the following difficulties were encountered:

- (a) The department was asked to set aircraft radios on frequencies for which crystals were not carried in stock or were not immediately available.
- (b) In the support of transport type aircraft certain replacement parts were not available since these items were not in the Section "R" carried by the Supply department, Marine Aircraft Group 12.
- (c) A number of electronics personnel were assigned to the station guard company and other semi-permanent details outside of the electronics field for periods of time in excess of one month.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In order to rectify the A/N-ARC-1 crystal shortage it is suggested that some effort be made to determine the radio frequencies to be used in the theater of operations and published in the operations plan in order that proper crystals can be procured before the operation begins.
2. It is suggested that a complete Section "R" for electronics equipment carried in utility or transport type aircraft be carried by the Wing or Group Supply and made available to the activity responsible for their maintenance.
3. The assignment of electronic maintenance personnel to semi-permanent details did not leave the department short handed, but these assignments were outside their MOS for too long a period to keep the men proficient in their specialized fields. It is recommended that trained personnel not be assigned to permanent details and when assigned outside their MOS that they be rotated and allowed to return to their regular duties.

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ANNEX "Q"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Air Wing
 Fleet Marine Force, c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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REPORT OF THE MESS DEPARTMENT, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12

On 7 September 1950 this department consisted of one officer (MOS No. 7302), ten cooks (four with MOS No. 3311) and 3 bakers (one with MOS No. 3319, two with MOS No. 3311). From 7 September 1950 to 16 September 1950 these enlisted personnel were augmenting the USNS GENERAL O.G. MORTON'S Mess personnel to mess approximately 600 Marines. Officers were served in the Officers' Mess.

On 16 September 1950 Marine Aircraft Group 12 was given the responsibility of messing all Marines, permanent and transient, at Itami Air Force Base, Honshu, Japan. On this date Marine Aircraft Group 33 was relieved, their equipment and buildings being utilized by Marine Aircraft Group 12. There were four individual mess halls; one for officers, one for Staff WCOs and two for the General Mess. Also there was an Issue Commissary and a butcher shop.

Equipment consisted of Field Ranges, steam kettles, trays, silverware, and cups in each mess hall. Fresh stores were placed in two or more 150 cu foot reefers on the outside of each mess hall.

Cafeteria style was used in each messhall except the officers' mess. The Officers' Mess was issued silverware and dishes by SMS-12 Material and Family style in the Officers' Mess went into effect on 1 October 1950.

The average head count from 16 September through 9 October 1950 was 1274 per meal.

Rations were drawn directly from Army Quartermasters. The type ration was the "X" ration and was drawn as follows: Ice from Kobe, dry stores from Kanoko Barracks, Bread and Fresh stores from Osaka. Officers were required to pay \$.40 per meal for this ration.

Approximately 150 Japanese indigenous personnel were required by the mess department for efficient operation. 35 were assigned to each mess hall as cooks, kitchen police, and waitresses. During the day light hours from 0400 to 2000 the mess halls were under the supervision of a Marine mess sergeant and two Marine mess cooks. From 2000 to 0400 the mess halls were supervised by a Marine mess cook. No Marine messmen were required by the mess department at Itami Air Force Base.

No bakery was set up at this time.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that butchers be assigned to service squadrons when the "X" ration or "A" ration is the ration being issued.
2. The present type of can opener provided in the field is unsatisfactory and there should be provided a suitable type for each field range preferably of the hotel type.
3. The allowance of spare parts for field range fire units should be increased, particularly fuel lines and generators.

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ANNEX "R"

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 HEADQUARTERS, AIRCRAFT, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC AND
 1st MARINE AIR WING, U. S. MARINE CORPS AIR STATION
 EL TORO (SANTA ANA), CALIFORNIA

6 July 1950

RESTRICTED

AIRFMFPAC AND 1stMAW)
 : Standing Operating Procedure for Embark-
 GENERAL ORDER NO. 69) ation and Ship Loading

Ref: (a) AM-11, "Embarkation and Ship Loading"

Encl: (1) Duties of Embarkation Officers
 (2) Loading Plans, preparation of
 (3) Embarkation of Motor Vehicles

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this Standing Operating Procedure is to make a standard within this command for the loading and movement of units and supplies by sea, air and land; to set forth the duties and responsibilities of all personnel concerned with loading, embarkation and debarkation in order to promote the required teamwork among all echelons of command; and to set forth, under one cover, the pertinent instructions for all methods of movement.

2. GENERAL

a. The organization, duties and responsibilities are herein set forth for an amphibious operation. More specific instructions for air and rail movement will be found in Appendix I and Appendix II.

b. In an amphibious operation, supplies and equipment must be loaded in order to support the tactical situation most likely to be encountered. This requires detailed planning before commencing to load, and exact execution of those plans thereafter.

c. (1) Three staff sections are concerned with the compilation of the embarkation plan and general supervision of the loading.

(i) The "1" section supervises the preparation of plans for personnel.

(ii) The "3" section determines the units required to execute the tactical plan and assigns their debarkation priorities.

(iii) The "4" section supervises the preparation of plans for assembling, loading and stowing of cargo, and the movement of troops, supplies and equipment.

(2) It is necessary that all officers concerned with the execution of the embarkation plan maintain close liaison with the above staff sections during the embarkation period.

d. Satisfactory loading depends upon careful planning by both embarking troops unit and the ship, and is based on complete, accurate, and current information as to the capacity of the ship, the cargo handling facilities, the troop facilities and the capabilities of the ship and upon the priority, cube, square and weight of the cargo to be loaded.

e. Advance information on ships characteristics, and forms for embarkation tables will be furnished the Wing Embarkation Officer. Such advance information will be verified by the Embarkation Team Embarkation Officer (TQM) concerned upon arrival of the ships in the loading area.

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f. Transportation for troops, supplies and equipment in movement to the loading area will be furnished by MC/S on call to the Wing Motor Transport Officer.

g. Embarkation entails the combined efforts of all elements within the Wing, and will be carried to completion without delay, once started.

3. ORGANIZATION FOR EMBARKATION

a. Embarkation Group -- the basic organization which is a temporary administrative formation of troops embarked in the several vessels of a transport division or similar naval organization. The Air Group forms the basis for the principal embarkation Groups of the Marine Aircraft Wing. In addition to the Air Group, an Embarkation Group includes those additional units, supplies and equipment which tactical or logistical considerations require to be embarked in the same transport division with the Marine Air Group.

b. Embarkation Team -- that part of an Embarkation Group which is embarked in a single vessel. It is commanded by the senior landing force officer embarked, or by such other landing force officer as may be designated. (Designation: Commanding Officer of Troops).

4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMBARKATION

a. Wing

(1) The Embarkation Order will be promulgated by the Wing to cover the Organization for Embarkation Points and Assembly Areas, Control, and Movement and Embarkation of Personnel.

(2) G-4 has over-all responsibility for loading of all ships, movement of Wing equipment and supplies, and the transportation of troops to the point of embarkation.

(3) Logistical decisions regarding type of loading, troops to be embarked, equipment and supplies to be embarked, and priorities for unloading are promulgated in Wing Operation and Administrative Orders.

b. Embarkation Groups

(1) Responsible for the movement of all organic equipment to the point of embarkation.

(2) Furnish supplementary working details when called for by the Wing Embarkation Officer. All working details furnished will be from tactical units insofar as practicable.

(3) Furnish Military Police in order to maintain proper security of embarkation area and to control traffic enroute to POE.

(4) Preparation of an Embarkation Plan for the Embarkation Group.

c. Embarkation Teams

(1) Preparation of detailed loading plans.

(2) Execution of loading plans.

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5. LOADING PLANS

a. Aviation units will be loaded as prescribed by Wing order, usually organizational or convoy loading.

b. Loading plans are of value only in their contribution to the progressive support of the tactical situation. To this end, the instructions for Embarkation Officers (TQM) and the instructions for the preparation and use of embarkation forms will be strictly followed.

c. The sequence of submission of forms for the preparation of loading plans is as follows:

(1) Forms prepared by Units or parts thereof:

Unit Personnel and Tonnage Table
Unit Vehicle Summary and Priority Table
Unit Cargo and Loading Analysis

(2) Forms prepared by Embarkation teams, which forms constitute the loading plan:

Consolidated Embarkation and Tonnage Table
Consolidated Personnel and Tonnage Table
Consolidated Vehicle Summary and Priority Table
Consolidated Cargo and Loading Analysis
Stowage Diagrams
Profile Loading Diagram
Consolidated Vehicle Table

(3) Forms prepared by Embarkation Groups and submitted to higher echelons:

Landing Force Embarkation and Tonnage Table
Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies

6. DUTIES OF PERSONNEL

a. Commanding Officer of Marine Air Group which is designated as Embarkation Group will designate the Embarkation Group Commander.

b. Embarkation Group Commander:

- (1) Designate Commanding Officer of Troops for each Embarkation Team.
- (2) Designate Embarkation Group Embarkation Officer (TQM).
- (3) Designate two (2) officers and two (2) NCOs to assist Embarkation Officer.
- (4) Designate the following Embarkation Group Officers:

Military Police Officer
Police and Billeting Officer
Mess Officer
Communications Officer
Medical Officer
Supply Officer
Motor Transport Officer
Ordnance Officer

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6. DUTIES OF PERSONNEL (Cont'd)

(5) Maintain necessary liaison with the Commander, Transport Division in which embarked.

(6) Maintain the supervision and coordination necessary for the embarking of the Embarkation Teams of his Group.

c. Commanding Officer of Troops:

(1) Designate Embarkation Team Embarkation Officer (TQM).

(2) Designate two (2) officers and two (2) NCOs as assistants to the Embarkation Officer.

(3) Designate Police and Billeting Officer and assign one (1) NCO assistant from each embarking element for billeting detail.

(4) Designate Mess Officer.

(5) Designate Motor Transport Officer.

(6) Prior to embarkation, complete arrangements for the following, using Ship's Bill as a guide:

(i) Establishment of Ship's guard and orderly for Ship's

Captain

(ii) Plans for troop participation in General Drills, Military training, and recreation enroute.

(iii) Instructions for personnel regarding Ship's regulations.

(iv) Formation of advance detail

d. Advance Detail:

(1) The following will be prepared to report to each ship 48 hours in advance of loading:

Billeting Officer and assistants
Mess Officer and detail of cooks and messmen
Ship's guard as required
Ship's platoon as required

e. Beach Party: a working detail designated to move the Embarkation Team supplies and equipment to the POE staging areas and thence shipside for loading aboard.

f. Police and Billeting Officer:

(1) Prepare billeting and policing plan in coordination with ship's Embarkation Officer (TQM).

(2) Prior to embarkation of troops, deliver copy of Ship's bill to C.O. of Troops for dissemination of pertinent information to personnel concerned.

(3) Instruct and post guides to insure orderly embarking.

g. Mess Officer:

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g. Mess Officer (Cont'd):

- (1) Prepare messing plan in coordination with ship's Embarkation Officer (TQM).
- (2) Arrange for advance detail of cooks and messmen required during loading operation.
- (3) Detail cooks, messmen, bakers, and butchers required during voyage.

h. Embarkation Group Military Police Officer:

- (1) Maintain security of group supplies and equipment at home station, enroute, and at POE. Control traffic enroute to POE.

i. Embarkation Group Communications Officer:

- (1) Establish and maintain signal communication system between home station and POE area.

j. Embarkation Group Medical Officer:

- (1) Compile detailed itemized list, with cube and tonnage of all group medical supplies and equipment to be loaded on each ship and submit to Embarkation Group Embarkation Officer (TQM) for distribution.
- (2) Establish First Aid stations at POE staging and loading areas.

k. Embarkation Group Supply Officer:

- (1) Compile itemized lists, with cube and tonnage data, of Embarkation Group supplies and equipment to be loaded on each ship and submit to Embarkation Officer (TQM) for distribution.

l. Embarkation Group Motor Transport Officer:

- (1) Establish a central control dispatcher's office at the pool and a branch office at the POE, maintained on a 24 hour basis during the embarkation period.
- (2) Procure necessary vehicles to augment organic transportation in the movement of troops, supplies and equipment to the POE.
- (3) Maintain facilities at the POE to insure that vehicles are embarked in accordance with enclosure (3).

m. Embarkation Group Ordnance Officer:

- (1) Compile itemized detailed list, with cube and tonnage data, of all ammunition to be loaded on each ship and submit to Embarkation Officer (TQM) for distribution.
- (2) Coordinate, with the Embarkation Officer (TQM) safeguard measures for the proper handling, loading and stowage of all ammunition and pyrotechnics.

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DUTIES OF EMBARKATION OFFICERS

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1. Wing Embarkation Officer:
 - a. Heads the Embarkation Section as special staff officer to the Wing Commander.
 - b. Makes recommendations for employment of assigned shipping, coordinates and supervises all loading activities within the Wing.
 - c. Conducts training of Troop Embarkation Officers (TOM) within the Wing. This will be accomplished by TTU, Coronado.
 - d. Maintains current tonnage tables of Wing equipment and supplies and maintains a complete file of ship's Characteristics pamphlets.
 - e. Advises Embarkation Officers of subordinate units in the preparation of loading plans for all vessels assigned to the Wing.
 - f. Arranges with appropriate authorities for dock and embarkation areas, loading facilities, and berthing allocation of ships in order to effect the embarkation plan.
 - g. Establishes and operates a Control Office at Port of Embarkation.
 - h. Assigns space to embarkation groups for spotting of equipment and supplies, and in conjunction with appropriate supply agencies, arranges for delivery of supplies and equipment to Port of Embarkation.
 - i. Maintains close liaison with G-4 and reports progress of loading.
 - j. Prepares the Landing Force Embarkation and Tonnage Table, Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, etc.
 - k. Performs liaison between 1st MAF and Camp Pendleton, FMFPac, ComPhibPac and their subordinate units as the situation demands.
 1. Arranges for adequate loading devices at the beach or dock and at MCAS cargo assembly areas.
 2. Arranges for adequate motor transport to lift units between MCAS and embarkation points, establishing the requirements to be coordinated by the Wing and Station Motor Transport Officers.
 3. Arrange for illumination at embarkation points during hours of darkness.
 4. Provide chocking materials and dunnage in the embarkation areas as required. Contact engineer supply division of Marine Corps Depot for dunnage; camp maintenance for pre-cut shocks, specifying size and angle of cut.

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2. Embarkation Group Embarkation Officer:
 - a. Checks all embarkation forms submitted for accuracy. Consolidates and completes remaining forms.
 - b. Prepares the Embarkation point, cargo assembly areas, vehicle staging areas pertinent to their organizations.
 - c. Acts as direct representative of the embarkation group commander in all matters pertaining to loading.
 - d. Inspects ships to be loaded upon arrival in embarkation area.
 - e. Maintains close liaison with the Wing Embarkation Officer and reports progress of loading.
 - f. Familiarizes himself with the tactical plan and under direction of the embarkation group commander, prepares priority debarkation lists.
 - g. Requests, 24 hours prior to time of need, adequate loading devices at the beach and MCAS cargo assembly area.
 - h. Requests, 24 hours prior to time of need, motor transport required to lift cargo and working parties to embarkation point.
 - i. Requests, 24 hours prior to time of need, lighting equipment required at MCAS cargo assembly areas and at embarkation point.
 - j. Requests, one week prior to time of need, chocking materials and dunnage required.
3. Embarkation Team Embarkation Officer:
 - a. Prepares detailed loading plans for the ships to which the units are assigned.
 - b. Perform liaison between embarkation team and assigned ship, such liaison to commence two weeks prior to outloading.
 - c. Prior to embarkation of troops, secures approval of ship's commanding officer on tentative stowage plans.
 - d. In conjunction with ship's Embarkation Officer (TQM) prepares final loading plan.
 - e. Arranges for working details by time, number, and place, from units to embark in assigned ship.
 - f. Assist Group Embarkation Officer in preparation of the embarkation point, cargo assembly areas, and vehicles staging areas pertinent to his team.
 - g. Assist Group Embarkation Officer in scheduling movement of team supplies and equipment to the embarkation point.
 - h. Arrange for team supplies and equipment to be placed in the embarkation area in accordance with plans for stowing cargo on the beach or dock.
 - i. Requests, through Group Embarkation Officer, seven days prior to time of need, chocking materials and dunnage.

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3. Embarkation Team Embarkation Officer; (Cont'd):

j. Coordinates and supervises the execution of the Embarkation Team loading plan.

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LOADING PLANS

PREPARATION OF DETAILED LOADING PLANS

a. Tentative detailed loading plans are prepared by the Troop Embarkation Officer (TOM) as directed by the Commanding Officer of troops. These tentative plans are submitted to the Commanding Officer of the ship for approval. When approved, these plans constitute the final loading plans and govern the loading of the ship. Changes in the final loading plans will be made only with the approval of the Commanding Officer of the ship and the Commanding Officer of the Troops concerned.

b. The complete loading plan will consist of seven (7) standard forms for transport type ships and six (6) forms for landing ships. The forms will be assembled in the following order:

(1) Consolidated Embarkation and Tonnage Table (Form 1): A summary of personnel and cargo by organization to be embarked in the vessel.

(2) Consolidated Unit Personnel and Tonnage Table (Form 2): The UP&T Table is a form prepared by each unit or detachment to be embarked aboard the vessel and submitted to the Commanding Officer of troops. The Consolidated UP&T Table is a recapitulation of the unit tables, and constitutes the basis of the loading plan.

(3) Consolidated Vehicle Summary and Priority Table (Form 3): This form is prepared by each unit or detachment embarking vehicles aboard the vessel and submitted to the Commanding Officer of troops. It lists the vehicles to be embarked in the desired order of debarkation priority, and is an integration of the tables submitted by unit or detachment commanders, including such changes in priority as may be directed by the Commanding Officer of troops.

(4) Consolidated Cargo and Loading Analysis (Form 4): This form is prepared by each unit or detachment and submitted to the Commanding Officer of Troops. It provides a more detailed breakdown of the cargo summarized on the UP&T Table.

(5) The Stowage Diagram (Form 5): This is a scale plan drawing of each hatch level to be used for stowing cargo aboard the vessel.

(6) The Profile Loading Diagram (Form 6): This is a distorted profile of the vessel showing hatch levels occupied by troop cargo. Cargo is listed by type and weight. (Not required for landing ships).

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1. PREPARATION OF DETAILED LOADING PLANS (Cont'd)

(7) Consolidated Vehicle Table (Form 7): A Recapitulation, by types and organizations, of all vehicles shown in the Consolidated VS&P Table.

c. Wings and Embarkation Groups will prepare and submit the following forms to higher echelons:

(1) Landing Force Embarkation and Tonnage Table (Form 8): This form presents a summary and analysis of embarkation data for the Wing or Embarkation Group.

(2) Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies (Form 9): This form presents a detailed analysis of total supplies and equipment, in short tons, together with a breakdown of vehicles by type and number embarked in each vessel of the convoy lifting the Wing or Embarkation group.

Page (1) to Enclosure (2) to AirFMFPac and 1stMAW General Order No. 69

2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF LOADING FORMS

a. The Consolidated Embarkation and Tonnage Table (Form 1) is a list of all units embarked in a ship, showing the total personnel, total cubic feet, total square feet, and short tons of cargo for each unit and for bulk general cargo (Group supplies). It is totalled to give the consolidated view of the embarkation and loading data for each ship. It is prepared by the Team Embarkation Officer (TQM) from data obtained from each of the unit's UP&T Tables.

b. Unit Personnel and Tonnage Table (Form 2) is prepared by each unit and detachment (including Special Services, Ordnance, Group Supply, etc.) which is to be embarked aboard a vessel; it is submitted to the Commanding Officer of troops. This form constitutes the basis for the entire loading plan. Since this basic form must be accurate in every detail, it will be necessary for the Commanding Officer of troops concerned to supervise its preparation and to check carefully each item entered thereon. The weights and measurements to be entered are the actual weight and dimensions of the vehicle or other items of equipment as they are packed to go aboard the ship. Weights and measurements obtained from statistical publications should be used only in original planning phases; weights and measurements of items of equipment and supplies ready to go aboard a ship must be ACTUAL.

(1) The UP&T Table, for purposes of clarity is divided into two sections; the upper portion (lines 1 through 11), and the lower portion (lines 12 through 29). The upper portion is used for assembling information covering the allowances (T/A, TB., T/E and Navy Allowance Lists) and the special organic equipment of the unit to be embarked. Data contained in those lines is assembled by the units concerned and submitted to the Troop Embarkation Officer designated ship. The lower portion is used to assemble information pertaining to supplies common to the Air Group or the forces of the Wing or higher echelon as a whole. Data contained in those lines is assembled by the Air Group or higher echelon logistics officer and incorporated by the Troop Embarkation Officer (TQM) in the Consolidated UP&T Table for the organization to embark on the designated ship.

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2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF LOADING FORMS (CONT'D)

Line 8: Special Equipment: all equipment and supplies specifically authorized for an operation which are not covered by T/A, TBA, T/E, and Navy Allowance Lists. Includes special materials required to construct semi-permanent installations.

Line 9: Aviation Material: all aviation general cargo, such as spare engines, and structural parts, special aircraft tools, and other aeronautical equipment and supplies. This line is the total of the weights and cubes shown on Line 9 Supplementary UP&T Table for each of the Section Allowance List supplies and equipment.

Line 10: Vehicles: all uncrated vehicles and track-laying equipment and trailers. This line is supported by the specific measurements of all vehicles, and also the weight and cube of cargo in the vehicles.

Line 11: Total Unit General Cargo: Total cube and weight of lines 5 through 10.

Line 12: Ammunition (Small Arms): all small arms ammunition (.50 caliber, or less).

Line 13: High Explosives: all high explosives such as bombs, rockets, artillery and mortar ammo, powder and propelling charges, and dynamite.

Line 14: Pyrotechnics and Fuzes: all sensitive high explosives such as pyrotechnics, fuzed, blasting caps, etc. which require special stowage.

Line 15: Total Ammunition: total cube and weight of lines 12, 13, and 14.

Line 16: Gasoline: all gasoline, aviation and motor in cans or drums.

Line 17: Other Petroleum Products: all other petroleum products such as diesel fuel, lubricating oils (aviation and motor) and greases, in cans or drums.

Line 18: Water: all water in cans and drums only.

Line 19: Other Liquids: all other liquids such as acids, paint, alcohol, chemical warfare liquids and flame thrower fuel. Dry Napalm will also be shown here.

Line 20: Rations: all types of rations, including initial issue to troops prior to debarkation, hospital rations, etc.

Line 21: PX Supplies: all Post Exchange Supplies.

Line 22: Signal: all signal maintenance and replenishment supplies and equipment. Such items include telephones, radios, spare parts and batteries.

Line 23: Engineer: all engineer maintenance and replenishment supplies and equipment.

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2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF LOADING FORMS (Cont'd)

(2) The column to the extreme left of the UP&T Table divides all cargo into stowage classifications as follows:

- a) Troop Space Cargo: cargo for stowage in troop spaces or other space permitting access during voyage.
- b) Unit General Cargo: hold-stowed cargo organic to individual units.
- c) Bulk General Cargo: hold-stowed cargo common to the embarkation team as a whole; this cargo is divided into Ammo and other Supplies.
- d) Note: This does not attempt to show stowage such as D-1 issue.

(3) The cube and weight of cargo is listed under two divisions: Standard Cargo and Specially Prepared Cargo. Specially prepared cargo is that which is palletized or packed so that the weight is 800 pounds or more, and the cube is more than 100 feet.

(4) UP&T Table line analysis:

Line 1: Baggage: Baggage including seabags, foot lockers, and bedding rolls carried as troop space cargo, and not requiring hold-stowage. (Hold-stowed baggage such as foot lockers not carried aboard by personnel allowed them should be shown on line 5.) Considered to average 3.5 Cubic foot and 80 pounds per individual.

Line 2: Office Equipment: All office equipment and supplies necessary for administrative purposes during the voyage, such as field desks and typewriter chests. Crated office supplies and equipment to be hold stowed are entered on line 5. (Air-lift will have no line 2 equipment and supplies).

Line 3: Initial Combat Equipment: None for aviation units.

Line 4: Total Troop Space Cargo: Total cube and weight of lines 1, 2, and 3.

Line 5: Organizational Equipment: All organizational equipment authorized by T/A, TBA, T/E and Navy Allowance Lists and not entered separately elsewhere on the UP&T Table (lines 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10). Tool chests, organizational maintenance equipment and supplies, cleaning and preserving materials, and organizational combat equipment will be listed on this line.

Line 6: Mess Equipment: all equipment necessary to operate a galley and mess in the field. Ranges, galley equipment and screening constitute mess equipment. (Rations and cooking fuels are shown elsewhere).

Line 7: Camp Equipment: All equipment and construction materials excluding mess equipment, required to establish a temporary camp in the field. Includes tonnage with poles and pins, portable heads, showers, and other supplies for use in temporary camp construction.

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2. INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF LOADING FORMS (CONT'D)

Line 24: Ordnance: all ordnance maintenance supplies and equipment.

Line 25: Motor Parts: all maintenance spare parts for motor transport and other major equipment; special maintenance equipment not shown elsewhere.

Line 26: Medical: all medical supplies and equipment such as splints, bandages, stretchers, portable operating tables, not listed elsewhere. Squadron medical gear is organizational and shown on line 5; liquid chemicals require special stowage and are shown on line 19.

Line 27: Chemicals: all dry chemicals; chemical warfare maintenance supplies and equipment.

Line 28: QM Supplies (General): all quartermaster maintenance supplies and equipment.

Line 29: Total Other Cargo: total cube and weight of lines 15 through 28.

Line 30: Total Cargo: total cube and weight of lines 4, 11, 15 and 29.

Line 31: Total Short Tons: includes short tons of specially prepared cargo and standard cargo.

GRAND TOTAL: Includes the square feet of vehicles (line 10), grand total cubic feet, weight in pounds, weight in short tons (2000 pounds), and measurement tons (40 cubic feet) of standard and specially prepared cargo.

c. Vehicle Summary and Priority Table (Form 3) is a complete description with length, width, height, square feet, cubic feet and weight shown for each vehicle. Cargo loaded in vehicles is also shown by type, number of containers, cube and weight. Both the net weight (without load) and the gross weight (loaded) of vehicles is shown on this table. Heavy lifts are listed after vehicles, showing length, width, height and weight of each lift. When consolidated, this form will list the vehicles in order of debarking priority as established by the commanding officer of troops, who may also change the load of vehicles, as submitted by unit or detachment commanders. The troop Embarkation Officer will fill in the "where stowed" column on this form.

d. Cargo and Loading Analysis (Form 4): This form provides a breakdown of all cargo except vehicles, listed by cubic feet and weight on the UP&T Table and is comparable to a voucher in support of these figures. The C&L form is designed to offer detailed information on cargo by types, and is of most value for supplies such as rations, fuels, and ammunition in containers on which are listed gallons, rounds, etc. UP&T Table lines 12 through 14, and 16 through 28 will be developed in detail on the C&L form; lines 1 through 3 and 5 through 9 will be entered on the C&L form, and may be entered by the number of containers and need not show in detail the container contents. Line 10 of the UP&T Table will not be listed on the C&L form. However, cargo loaded in vehicles will be shown separately from other cargo of the same UP&T Table line number.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF LOADING FORMS (CONT'D)

c. Stowage Diagram: This is prepared by the troop Embarkation Officer to show the stowage of the gear within the various holds of the ship. Each hatch level used to stow troop gear is drawn to scale of 1/8 inch equals 1 foot. Vehicles are drawn in by use of templates made to scale, and show priority number. All cargo is stowed to scale on these diagrams. The priority number, description, organization to which the vehicle belongs, cubic feet, gross weight are shown on the lower portion (or reverse side) of each diagram. General cargo is shown in the same manner, including the number of lifts.

EMBARKATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES

1. The term "motor vehicles" or "vehicles" will be interpreted to include DUKW's, weasels, trailers, and tractors, both diesel and gasoline types.

2. PREPARATION:

a. Unit motor transport Officers will be responsible for servicing and for condition of all vehicles prior to loading.

b. Each motor vehicle will be equipped with the following for non-tactical moves prior to departure for POE:

(1) Fire extinguisher.

(2) Tire chains, not to be installed unless directed.

(3) Wheel blocks for checking vehicles aboard ships.

(4) Fold winshields down and crate in place. Blue prints are available at Wing Motor Transportation Office.

c. In addition to the items specified in b. above, the following will be carried on each vehicle for tactical moves:

(1) Ten (10) gallons of motor fuel in expeditionary cans. (5 gallons, for $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks and weasels).

(2) One expeditionary can of fresh water.

(3) Tools, (shovel, axe, etc).

d. Each motor vehicle to be loaded aboard on APA or AKA will be prepared for loading as follows:

(1) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 4 X 4 trucks-fold bows and secure.

(2) $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6 X 6 and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6 X 6 trucks:

(a) Remove bows and strap around top of cargo bed;

(b) Remove top and stow on bottom of cargo bed.

e. Upon determination by Unit Commanders as to what vehicles will be waterproofed, Wing Motor Transport Officer will supervise and coordinate waterproofing operations.

3. LOADING:

a. Embarkation Group Motor Transport Officers will provide facilities at the dock for last minute servicing and checking of all vehicles. Such assistance as is required will be rendered by the Wing Motor Transport Officer.

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 HEADQUARTERS, AIRCRAFT, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC AND
 1st MARINE AIR WING, U.S. MARINE CORPS AIR STATION
 EL TORO, (SANTA ANA), CALIFORNIA

25 August 1950

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EMBARKATION ORDER)

NUMBER..... 4 50)

- Ref: (a) AirFMFPac and 1stMAW General Order No. 69, "SOP for Embarkation and Ship Loading"
 (b) AirFMFPac Administration Plan No. 1-50 (conf)
 (c) CG, AirFMFPac conf ltr serial 0173 of 23 Aug 50

1. ORGANIZATION FOR EMBARKATION

- (a) The Embarkation Group consists of the following units:

Hedron, 1stMAW (Less flight echelon)
 Hedron, MAG-12 (Less flight echelon)
 Seron, MAG-12
 VMF 212 (ground det.)
 VMF(N) 542 (ground det.)

- (b) Embarkation Group Commander Lt. Colonel Donald K. YOST.

- (c) Troop lists will be published by the Embarkation Group:

- (d) Ships assigned to the Embarkation Group:

(i) FURMAN VICTORY

- (a) Berthed at Pier 6, Long Beach Naval Station (Terminal Island)
 (b) Embark maximum number of vehicles; Supply Officers stores; organizational equipment of Seron 12; drummed fuels will be loaded by NSD, Long Beach; personnel not to exceed 2 Officers and 15 men.
 (c) Commence loading drummed fuels 25 August
 (d) Load drummed fuels and vehicles 28 August
 (e) Commence staging cargo and vehicles 27 August
 (f) Commence loading cargo and vehicles 28 August
 (g) Continue loading 29, 30, 31 August, and 1 September
 (h) Complete loading vehicles and cargo and embark personnel prior to sailing time on 2 September.

(ii) USNS GENERAL C.G. WORTON (AP-138)

- (a) Berthed at Pier 6, Long Beach Naval Station
 (b) Load "Baker" rations from NSD San Diego on 28 August
 (c) Load organizational equipment of Hedron 1stMAW, Hedron MAG-12, VMF 212 and VMF(N) 542; load small arms ammo.
 (d) Commence staging 28 August and commence loading when practicable.
 (e) Continue loading 29 August - 31 August.
 (f) Complete loading and embark all personnel prior to 2400 31 August.

- (e) Advance Parties (See SOP).

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EMBARKATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES (CONT'D)

b. Before loading, the following will be effected:

(1) Each vehicle will be chalk-marked on the hood, and each side indicating the hold in which it is to be stowed, deck level, ship's number, and debarkation priority number.

(2) Loaded vehicles will be inspected to insure that no loads extend above the vehicles side-boards.

(3) Fuel cans will not be carried outside of vehicles in such a manner that they may be smashed in case the vehicles swing against the ship.

4. The Commanding Officers of Troops on each ship will assign one Officer to act as motor transport officer on that ship. This officer will supervise the following:

a. Parking of vehicles, placing wheelchocks, and securing of cables or chains.

b. Grounding motor vehicle frames to ship.

c. Disconnecting battery. Positive cable will be taped and tied away from terminal.

d. Emergency brakes will be set, and the gear shift lever set in "reverse position".

e. Secure motor vehicle's keys to instrument panel with cord.

f. Preparation of a list to be submitted to the CO of troops showing the number of vehicles, by type and/or Marine Corps or Navy numbers and indicating thereon that the provisions of this paragraph have been carried out.

g. Daily inspection of all vehicles, or inspections in accordance with the ship's cargo inspection routine.

h. Daily hydrometer readings of vehicle batteries. Make arrangements to have batteries recharged where necessary.



i. Take corrective action where applicable, such as pumping up tires, etc.

j. No gasoline will be carried in the fuel dispensing tanks of refueler trucks.

k. Vehicles will be cabled or chained down by the axles and not by the bumpers or any part of the chassis.

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J. L. Linn
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SITUATION OVERLAY
 152200 SEPT 50
 MAP KOREA 1:50000 AMS L751

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2. Main Body:

(a) USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON

SMS-12	17 Officers	450 Enlisted
HqSq-12	22 Officers	105 Enlisted
HqSq-1stMAW	18 Officers	115 Enlisted
VTF(N)-542	4 Officers	19 Enlisted
VMT-212	1 Officer	6 Enlisted

(b) FURMAN VICTORY:

2 Officers	12 Enlisted
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(c) Supplies and equipment not loaded aboard the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON will be loaded aboard the FURMAN VICTORY.

3. Uniform:

- (a) Officers - Summer Service w/out Jacket
- (b) Enlisted - Utility w/Jacket tucked in trousers
- (c) Uniform Clothing to be carried is as provided in Group Memorandum 65-50

4. Equipment:

- (a) Officers - Appropriate Arms
- (b) Enlisted - Field Marching Pack, Helmet, Blanket Roll w/green side of camouflage cover out. Appropriate Arms

5. Baggage:

(a) Hold Baggage:

- Field Officers - three (3) Field Trunks
- CO Grade Officers - One (1) Field Trunk
- 1st Pay Grade - One (1) Field Trunk and One (1) Sea Bag
- Other Enlisted - One (1) Sea Bag
- (b) In addition to the above, for use while on board ship, Officers and Enlisted may carry hand luggage not to exceed 55 pounds

6. Assembly Area:

- (a) Personnel will assemble on both sides of the station theatre in the parking areas at 0900 on 1 September 1950. Personnel will form in accordance with attached diagram.
- (b) Personnel will clear barracks by 0700 on 1 September 1950, in order that the Building and Grounds Officer can prepare the barracks for release to the Commanding Officer, MCAS, El Toro.

7. Embarkation:

- (a) Personnel will leave busses on order and reform by Squadrons on the pier. Company Commanders will report when formed and ready to embark.
- (b) The following sequence of embarkation will be ordered:
 - (1) Personnel below the staff NCO grades will form in single file alphabetically by rank by squadrons.
 - (2) Staff NCO's will be formed in separate platoons alphabetically by rank by Squadrons, and will embark last.
 - (3) Officers will embark via the forward gangway by 1100 on 1 September 1950.
 - (4) After personnel reach their compartment they will remain in the compartment until after the troop embarkation has been completed.
 - (5) Two Squadron Officers and Squadron Sgt Major's will be at the foot of the gangway to check off their personnel, and assign compartment numbers.

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- (6) Squadron Billeting Officers will board the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON prior to 2400 31 August 1950.
- (7) Office Equipment retained by Squadron's for use on board ship will be transported to Pier #6 Thursday 31 August 1950. MAG-12 Adjutant will arrange transportation and will notify the various offices when to have their equipment ready to be picked up.
- (8) Squadron Commanding Officers will submit a final muster no later than 30 minutes after the embarkation has been completed, with 5 corrected copies of their embarkation roster.

D. K. YOST

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 HEADQUARTERS, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 12
 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF, Marine Corps Air Station
 El Toro (Santa Ana), California

WJK:ws1
 KV12-10
 Ser 1416
 29 Aug 1950

From: Embarkation Group Commander
 To: Commanding Officer, Marine Service Squadron 12
 Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron 12
 Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron 1st MAW
 Officer in Charge, Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 542
 Officer in Charge, Marine Fighter Squadron 212

Subj: Embarkation Instructions

Ref: (a) AirFMFPac & 1st MAW GO #69
 (b) AirFMFPac & 1st MAW Embarkation Order #4-50

1. Organization for Embarkation:

(a) Composition of Embarkation team:

Embarkation Group Commander - LtCol D. K. YOST
 Commanding Officer of Troops - LtCol B. PROSSER
 Embarkation Group TOM - LtCol D. C. WOLFE
 Military Police Officer - 1stLt R. W. FRASER
 Troop Executive Officer - CAPT A. B. LEMLEIN
 Police and Mess Officer - 1stLt SAVAGE
 Communications Officer - Capt W. E. BROWN
 Medical Officer - Commander FRUIN
 Supply Officer - Capt T. STEPANUK
 Motor Transport Officer - CWO LEE
 Ordnance Officer - Capt MAC CRONE

(b) The duties of the above officers are as outlined in AirFMFPac and 1st MAW GO # 69. They will maintain necessary liaison with the Embarkation Group Commander.

(c) Prior to embarkation, the Commanding Officer of Troops, will complete arrangements for the following, using Ship's Bill as guide:

- (1) Establish a Ship's Guard and orderly for Ship's Captain.
- (2) Arrange for Troop participation in General Drills, Military Training and Recreation enroute.
- (3) Instruct personnel regarding ship's Regulations

(d) Advance detail:

Officer in Charge - Capt E. P. CAREY

Composition of Advance Detail:

SMS-12	1 Officer	51 Enlisted
HqSq-12	2 Officers	15 Enlisted
HqSq-1st MAW	1 Officer	15 Enlisted

Function of Advance Detail:

- (1) Prepare billeting and policing plan
- (2) Deliver a copy of Ship's Bill to Commanding Officer of Troops
- (3) Instruct and post guides to insure orderly embarking
- (4) Prepare Mess Plan
- (5) Provide work detail for loading supplies and equipment
- (6) Prepare office space for Embarkation Group Commander, Commanding Officer of Troops, Group Staff, and Commanding Officers of HqSq-12, and HqSq-1st MAW.

Movement of Advance Detail:

The Advance Detail will be transported from the Marine Aircraft Group 12 Area to the point of Embarkation commencing at 1330 29 August 1950. Transportation will be furnished by Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro.

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
 HEADQUARTERS, AIRCRAFT, FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC AND
 1st MARINE AIR WING, U. S. MARINE CORPS AIR STATION
 EL TORO (SANTA ANA) CALIFORNIA

P16-3(2) /G-1/DBL
 Serial: 7453-50

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30 August 1950

From: Commanding General
 To: Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. YOST 0543/7302 USMC/NA
 Subj: Movement orders
 Ref: (R) AirFMPac and 1stMAW EmbOrd 4-50 of 25 Aug 1950
 Encl: (1) Roster of personnel

1. On or about 1 September 1950, and in accordance with an embarkation schedule issued by separate instructions, you and the personnel listed on enclosure (1) will embark on board the USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON (AP-138) for surface transportation to such point beyond the seas as the 1st Marine Air Wing may be and report to the Commanding General, for duty.

	MARINE CORPS	NAVY
HEDRON-12	16 Off 98 Enl	2 Off 5 Enl
SERVRON-12	15 Off 433 Enl	2 Off 15 Enl
HEDRON-1	16 Off 111 Enl	
VMP-212 (ground det) and		
VMT(N)-542 (ground det)	5 Off 25 Enl	

2. These orders constitute permanent change of station orders for yourself and the personnel listed on enclosure (1) and your dependents will not be permitted to accompany you to your new duty station. Transportation within the continental United States is authorized for your dependents who are entitled to such transportation in accordance with SecNav ltr (NavyDeptBul 44-609) of 23 December 1943 and SecNav ltr (NavyDeptBul 46-2045) of 30 October 1946. You and the personnel listed on enclosure (1) have been issued Certificates in Lieu of Orders.

3. Cost of the travel is chargeable to appropriation 1711105, Allotment Number 10105, for Marine Corps personnel and to appropriation 1711453.18, MPN, 1951, object class 029, expenditure account 74150 (Officers) 74160 (Enlisted) for Navy personnel.

FIELD HARRIS

Copy to:
 CG 1stMAW FwdEch
 Port Director NavSta Long Beach (30)
 USNS GENERAL C. G. MORTON (20)

1st Endorsement

1. Received these orders at _____ (place)
 _____ (time) _____ (date)

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2. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO BE EMBARKED

- (a) Embark the supplies and equipment in accordance with reference (b) as modified by reference (c).
- (b) Supplies to be palletized normally and marked in accordance with LFD, Appendix 1. See SOP for preparation of motor vehicles.
- (c) Supplies will be moved from El Toro to the staging area in vehicles furnished by MCAS, El Toro.

3. EMBARKATION POINTS AND CARGO ASSEMBLY AREAS

- (a) Units will assemble cargo in the squadron areas.
- (b) Staging areas for cargo and vehicles will be adjacent to Pier 6, and will be marked out by the Embarkation Group TWM.
- (c) NSB, Long Beach will furnish fork lifts, cranes and operators. Complete stevedoring service will handle the cargo from the pier to the ship.

4. CONTROL

- (a) The Embarkation Group TQM will establish a control office in the pier office at pier 6; MAG-12 S-4 office will maintain control at El Toro.
- (b) Security will be established by the Embarkation Group in accordance with SOP.
- (c) Communications will be established by a voice radio from an area near the pier to MAG-12; long distance phones will be available.

5. MOVEMENT AND EMBARKATION OF PERSONNEL

- (a) The Embarkation Group will arrange with MCAS El Toro for the bus transportation of troops to the pier.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

- (a) Responsibilities and duties for embarkation are set forth in SOP.
- (b) Uniform for embarkation: (and EQUIPMENT)
 - (1) Officers: Uniform prescribed by the Embarkation Commander. Equipment includes: Field Marching Packs, Normal Arms, and Helmet.
 - (2) Enlisted: Uniform prescribed by Embarkation Commander. Equipment includes: Field Marching Packs, Normal Arms, and Helmet.
 - (3) Gas masks will accompany troops, but will be retained in possession of the Squadron Material Officer.
- (c) Clothing and baggage allowances: As listed in volume II T/A (War Allowances) and reference (b).

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(d) AirFMFPac G-4 will assist in coordinating the loading and supply problems.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HARRIS

C. T. BAILEY
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: List III, Case "A" and IV.

~~O-P-F-I-C-I-A-L~~

L. H. BUSS
1stLt., USMC
Adjutant

~~RESTRICTED~~