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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

EUROPEAN - AFRICAN AREA

TAB

F

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(J.I.C. 83/1 - 2d Draft)

(1) 211
J.I.C. 83/M
(2) J.I.C. 83/1

May 7, 1943

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

FORECAST OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE RUSSO-GERMAN FRONT

Note by the Secretary

The attachment, which was prepared in response to a request from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, is in the form adopted by the J.I.C. at its 61st Meeting.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,
Secretary.

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JCS 15-73

By ABJ Date APR 13 1973

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FORECAST OF DEVELOPMENTS ON RUSSO-GERMAN FRONT

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To determine Russian strength as of May 1, 1943, and to forecast developments on the Russian front after that date.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

2. Weather. The past winter has been much milder than is the average Russian winter. The thaw was early this year, and the fronts should be dry enough for large scale military operations as follows:

- a. Taman Peninsula - May 1
- b. From Kharkov to the South - May 10 - 15
- c. From Moscow to Kharkov - May 20 - 25
- d. From Leningrad to Moscow - June 1 - 10
- e. From Leningrad to the North - June 10 - 15.

3. Strengths. Although the Russians probably enjoy a numerical superiority, there appears to be an approximate equality in effectiveness of ground forces on both sides. The Germans have the advantage as regards adequacy of communications and choice of battle area (by this is meant the present established front). The Germans are superior in air strength, but requirements in Western Europe and the Mediterranean will leave them inferior on the Russian front. The Germans have been making superhuman efforts to reinforce their armies, but we believe that these reinforcements will not be organized and adequately trained prior to July 15, 1943.

4. Available Reinforcements.

a. German. We believe that Germany has taken a calculated risk and is now drastically changing her system of occupational deferment, at heavy expense to her war production.

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Assuming this risk to be acceptable, we estimate that Germany will be able to replace her past casualties and provide sufficient men and equipment to form 26 additional divisions by October 1, 1943. After that time we believe that she will be able to replace only a portion of her casualties. The German Army should reach its peak, in numbers, by that date and will probably decline thereafter.

b. The Russian pool of military manpower of effective fighting age is several times the size of the German. Limitations to the effectiveness of Russian armed forces lie in organization and transport rather than in an insufficient supply of manpower.

5. Dispositions. The evacuation of the Taman Peninsula has provided a pool of 12 to 13 divisions of German troops whose further disposition along the front has not been determined. They appear to be still on the Crimean Peninsula. A movement to the south of the boundary between the Army Group, Center, and the Army Group, South, has raised the total divisions under von Kluge's command to 87, only 5 of which are defensive. The concentration of the 2nd Panzer Army north and west of Orel and the 2nd Army north of Kursk (a total of 32 divisions) suggests that it is here that action is to be expected. The Russian failures to break the northern anchors at Volkhov and Staraya Russa suggest that those points will continue to anchor the northern end of the line. The swamp land and forests in the north sector do not make for successful offensive battle terrain. But a thrust from Staraya Russa toward Yaroslav and possibly on toward Gorki would be over less difficult terrain. In the southern sector the presence of the 4th Panzer Army (8 Panzer and 9 Infantry Divs.) south of Kursk further focuses attention in the Kursk area.

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6. The Russians hold a bridgehead on the west bank of the Donets near Izyum and a salient containing Kursk. There is no good information available concerning Russian dispositions.

7. Probable Actions.

a. Germany will, in 1943, make its main effort against the Russian Armed Forces. Such intention does not necessarily imply that the initial offensive will be German. Much depends upon the strategy employed by the Russian High Command. If Russia opens an offensive, the Germans will probably await a favorable opportunity to counter-attack and exploit any success to the fullest. In this event we believe that Germany would have an excellent chance of destroying the greater part of the Russian Armed Forces. If, however, the Russians do not mass troops for offensive action and can conduct rear guard actions and retirements to draw out the German lines of communications, the Russians may again find themselves, late in the year, in a position to strike offensively and turn the tables. The Russians, in all probability, however, will not be able to knock out the German Army this year.

b. We are of the opinion that the German massed offensive, when it comes, will move from the Orel - Kursk area to seize Voronezh; then, using the Orel - Voronezh line as an anchor, turn either northeast toward Gorki or southeast toward Stalingrad. If northeast, and successful, a secondary offensive south of Lake Ilmen toward Yaroslavl may develop; if southeast, it will probably be accompanied by a southern pincer thrust originating on the Taman Peninsula and designed to trap Russian Forces in the Caucasus - Donbas areas, as well as cutting the Volga - the route of oil to Russia. The latter, if it develops, may be followed by a resumption of the northern action with the objective of annihilating the bulk of the Russian forces farther to the north.

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8. Negotiated Peace. Other controlling factors remaining as they are, a negotiated settlement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia would become a practical possibility only if the war on the Eastern front were considered by both sides to have reached a complete stalemate which could not be broken by continued fighting. In this situation the purpose of such a settlement would be strictly military -- to provide a breathing spell in which both sides could prepare for a resumption of hostilities. There seems to be small prospect that such a stalemate will develop in 1943. Reported Japanese efforts to bring about such an understanding have made no apparent progress, and Soviet successes of last winter are believed to have strengthened Russia's determination.

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COPY NO. 30

327-3
(J.C.S. 291/1)

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

May 8, 1943
Pages 28 - 54 incl.

327
(1) JCS 291
(2) JCS 291
(revised)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this date.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS by a bomber offensive and air-ground invasion of the Continent from the UNITED KINGDOM is contained in Enclosure "A".
2. It is estimated that GERMANY has 7 offensive divisions available on short notice to oppose an invasion effort. These forces could be increased in time to a grand total of 60 divisions. She also has about 1254 planes in the area (747 fighters) which could be increased to 1766 (1158 fighters) by stripping all areas except the MEDITERRANEAN and Eastern Front. In addition to a coastal defense zone varying from 5 to 15 miles in depth, she has four additional defensive belts which must be reduced or neutralized before the "West Wall" is reached.
3. The projected bomber offensive against GERMANY may be expected to so reduce her ability to wage modern war as to create favorable conditions for a reentry to the Continent unless GERMANY is able to build up timely and effective counter-measures.
4. By maximum utilization of shipping and UNITED KINGDOM port facilities for the movement of UNITED STATES Forces, and by placing increased emphasis on the conversion of British defensive divisions into offensive units, it is estimated that 36 divisions can be made available for cross-channel operations by April 1, 1944.

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5. If 6 divisions with supporting troops are moved from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM in the last quarter of 1943, there will be no increase in divisions available but the addition of battle tested troops will be an added insurance for the success of the initial assault.

6. Landing craft required for a cross-channel movement on April 1, 1944, can be provided if production is increased within limits which will not jeopardize Destroyer Escort (DE) and combatant class programs and if certain delays are accepted in the build up of UNITED STATES landing craft now allocated to the PACIFIC.

7. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the CAEN and COTENTIN PENINSULA sectors, will afford port facilities for a build up in 12 months of 2,000 men. By extending this bridgehead to include the SEINE RIVER and the ports of LE HAVRE and ROUEN, the build up in 12 months would be 4,012,000 men, or about 100 divisions. This force would be capable of major operations.

8. It should be noted that consideration of cross-channel operations in this study has been confined to the first movement and the availability of landing craft for this purpose as compared with the requirements of C.C.S. 105/2. The build up immediately thereafter and the requirements in APA's, AKA's, AP's, AK's, etc. have not been examined.

9. It is recommended that:

a. The bomber offensive be given first priority in build up and its execution be facilitated.

b. As the bomber offensive progresses, its effects should be continuously examined and integrated with other factors; the results of these examinations to be used in determining the date for cross-channel operations.

c. A balanced invasion force be built up in the UNITED KINGDOM as rapidly as possible for the purpose of an early invasion in the event of a collapse of GERMANY.

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d. Production in landing craft be increased by:

(1) Increasing the tailing on program of LST's to 12 per month for a total of 108 additional LST's.

(2) Increasing the present rate of LCI(L)'s from 16 per month to 20 per month and present program from 192 to 300.

e. Planned allocations of UNITED STATES landing craft to the PACIFIC be changed as follows (figures in parentheses represent allocations as presently planned):

<u>1943</u>		:	<u>1944</u>		
<u>3rd Quarter</u>	<u>4th Quarter</u>	:	<u>1st Quarter</u>	<u>2nd Quarter</u>	<u>3rd Qtr.</u>
LST 25 (38)	0 (22)	:	0 (0)	35 (0)	0 (0)
LCI (L) 0(34)	0 (36)	:	30 (36)	60 (24)	40 (0)

NOTE: This recommendation is subject to adjustment if incompatible with proposed operations in the Pacific and Far East.

f. With the exception of the above allocations, all UNITED STATES production (less assignments to UNITED KINGDOM) be sent to the ATLANTIC area during this period.

g. The target date of April 1, 1944 be accepted for operations from the UNITED KINGDOM. These operations to be conducted with the forces available in the UNITED KINGDOM on 1 January 1944. The target date coincides with the completion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive and is subject to revision in the light of the results obtained.

h. The area selected for the assault contain sufficient port capacities to build up the 100 division force required for major operations on the Continent.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM THE
UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944

PROBLEM

To present a study on operations from the UNITED KINGDOM including a bomber offensive, a build-up of forces in the UNITED KINGDOM for an air-ground invasion of the Continent at the earliest possible date, and a full scale offensive.

ASSUMPTIONS

10. a. The primary objective of the UNITED NATIONS is the final defeat of the WESTERN AXIS by invasion of the Continent from the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. GERMANY'S offensive against the Russian Army in 1943 will be unsuccessful, which will necessitate holding the bulk of her ground forces on the Russian front during 1944.

c. The AXIS will not invade the BRITISH ISLES, TURKEY, or the IBERIAN PENINSULA. SPAIN and PORTUGAL will remain neutral.

d. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.

e. UNITED NATIONS commitments to other theaters will remain substantially as presently planned.

f. RUSSIA and JAPAN will remain at peace.

WESTERN AXIS COURSE OF ACTION

11. The probable course of action of the WESTERN AXIS in 1943 will be:

a. To intensify the U-boat campaign.

b. To resume the offensive in RUSSIA at the earliest practicable moment, while assuming the defensive on all other fronts and retaining as long as possible the Tunisian bridgehead.

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AXIS CAPABILITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

12. The Germans now have 32 divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES, 7 of which are identified as offensive. There are a total of 1254 planes in the area, 747 of these are fighters. About 40 destroyers and 60 E-boats operate in the coastal waters. The present bases in the BAY OF BISCAY have a capacity of 127 submarines. In addition to the above forces, there are 18 divisions in strategic reserve in GERMANY proper.

13. The German defense is based on the counter-attack. Offensive divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES can reach a threatened area within 24 hours (most of these reinforcements will move by rail). Reinforcements from GERMANY could begin to arrive in 4 days and the 18 divisions now available there could be in FRANCE in three weeks. Divisions from the Russian front could begin to arrive in about 13 days. The number of planes presently in FRANCE could be increased to 1766 aircraft (1158 of these would be fighters) by stripping all areas and not touching the MEDITERRANEAN and Eastern Front. The airfields and facilities in the area are in excess of the number required for the above force. The light naval units could be increased to 100 E-boats in three days and heavier units could make their appearance shortly thereafter.

14. The coastal defenses vary in strength in both directions from the strongest point in the CALAIS area. The most heavily fortified areas are those favorable to an attack and within fighter support of the UNITED KINGDOM. The defenses of the coast proper vary in depth from 5 to 15 miles. In rear of these coastal defenses a general defensive zone 20 to 50 miles wide has been established. Beyond this belt three additional zones including the MAGINOT LINE have been organized. All of these defensive areas must be reduced or neutralized before the line of the German "West Wall" is reached if the attack is made through FRANCE.

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15. Construction of new fortifications continues at a rapid rate as well as the replacement of installation that are destroyed by our action.

16. It is estimated that in the spring of 1944, with RUSSIA still actively in the war, the Germans could, by effecting reductions on the Eastern Front, increase the Western European garrison to a grand total of 60 divisions.

UNITED NATIONS COURSES OF ACTION

17. It is deemed vital that the UNITED NATIONS now decide whether:

- a. They are to conduct further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN on the present scale, or
- b. They are to conduct major operations in the MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of re-entering the continent from this area, or
- c. They are to concentrate appropriate forces in the UNITED KINGDOM, while conducting a bomber offensive from this base, for the purpose of entering the Continent at the earliest possible time, while conducting limited operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

18. Further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN under the first two contingencies are being examined in other papers. The decisions reached for this area will determine whether or not troops should be transshipped in the theater from NORTH AFRICA to the UNITED KINGDOM. In this connection, a consideration which may assume even more importance after our HUSKY operation is the desirability of using battle-tested formations for the initial cross-Channel assault.

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19. Cross-Channel operations are dependent on the ability of the bomber offensive to so reduce the German potential to resist that a successful assault can be made. The result of the bomber offensive cannot be positively evaluated nor can the results on the Eastern Front be forecast. Therefore, it is essential that a proper balance be maintained between landing craft and combat units while the build-up for a cross-Channel invasion is being effected.

BOMBER OFFENSIVE

20. J.C.S. 277 provides for a Combined Bomber Offensive against the EUROPEAN AXIS. Implications of this plan indicate that it can be carried out while meeting commitments of U. S. Air Units to other theaters though increased shipping required may cause reduction in the rate, but not the ultimate build-up, of ground forces in the UNITED KINGDOM.

21. The ability of the bombers to destroy strategic objectives, unless effectively opposed, has been demonstrated. Judging by past experiences, it is to be expected that the projected bomber offensive against GERMANY will result in the destruction of so many of her key industries that she will no longer be able to wage modern war and favorable conditions will be created for a re-entry to the Continent. Such favorable conditions may be predicted by continuously analyzing the effects of the bomber offensive as it progresses through its various phases. When the foregoing is integrated with other factors, it should be practicable to decide well in advance on a target date for implementing the plans being prepared for cross-Channel operations.

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22. GERMANY'S problem is how best to adequately oppose our coming effort. Her experience indicates that the fighter is the most effective defense. In the Battle of Britain most of the Luftwaffe was available for use against ENGLAND due to the fact that GERMANY was still at peace with RUSSIA. GERMANY was also in possession of adequate airdromes in close proximity to the target. ENGLAND, at this time, with an inferior airforce, had concentrated on fighters, and had 1180 fighters with which to oppose the total German strength of 5,800 combat aircraft. The failure of the Luftwaffe to accomplish its purpose was such as to have demonstrated the value of the fighter to the analytical German mind.

23. If GERMANY has correctly evaluated this lesson and has correctly interpreted our intention to conduct a sustained and constantly intensified air offensive against her, her reaction may be expected to follow the British pattern. Recent indications are that this is the case. Fighter production is being increased at the expense of bomber production. Due to complications involved in major production shifts, this reflects a decision made from nine to eighteen months ago and the full implications will not become evident for some time.

24. The results of our forthcoming bombing offensive will be measured by the timeliness and effectiveness of German counter-measures. If they have failed to forecast our intentions and prove unable to duplicate the earlier British defensive measures, our bombing offensive can be depended upon to prepare the way for a cross-Channel invasion. On the contrary, there is a possibility that, with large numbers of fighters of improved types, they may be able to successfully oppose the largest scale bomber offensive we can throw against them.

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25. German success or failure will also be affected by the timeliness of our own actions. Any delay on our part will operate to her advantage, and any acceleration will increase her difficulties.

26. It appears essential that the effects of the bomber offensive be analyzed and reports thereon be submitted frequently together with a forecast for the ensuing period. These reports should be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other interested agencies (such as the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel operations).

AVAILABILITY OF GROUND FORCES

27. There is at present 1 U. S. division in the UNITED KINGDOM. This will be increased by an additional division when the shuttle of the ICELAND division is completed. Through December 31, 1944, 53 divisions will become available in the UNITED STATES for use in the UNITED KINGDOM, if commitments in other theaters are maintained at the 1943 level. Shortages in supporting and service units, which will require correction, may appear at times but there will be sufficient major units to initiate operations. In addition to the above, there will be in the MEDITERRANEAN area 2 armored, 6 infantry, and 1 airborne divisions.

SHIPPING CAPABILITIES FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM BUILDUP

28. Cargo shipping will be available to move and maintain troops up to the limit of troopship capacity.

29. Reckoning the initial movement requirements at 7 ship tons per man, monthly maintenance at 1 ship ton per man, monthly replacements at 4,000 men, and the strength for a division at 40,000 men, the following build-up can be attained in the UNITED KINGDOM. Army Air Forces are given priority over ground units (all figures are cumulative).

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	<u>In the United Kingdom</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Div.</u>
July 1, 1943	193,000	117,876	75,124	1
Oct. 1, 1943	503,000	169,918	333,082	9
Jan. 1, 1944	833,500	278,158	555,342	14
Apr. 1, 1944	1,142,500	380,864	761,636	19
July 1, 1944	1,331,000	406,424	924,576	23
Oct. 1, 1944	1,449,000	406,424	1,042,576	26
Dec. 31, 1944	1,522,500	406,424	1,116,076	28

The above will be increased 1 division by the Iceland division.

30. There will be 10 divisions (British and Canadian) available for cross-channel operations on October 1, 1943. If the target that has been set for April 1, 1944 is met in the conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive role this may be increased to 14 divisions and 2 equivalent divisions.

31. On April 1, 1944, a total of 30 divisions (U. S., British, and Canadian) can be found for cross-channel operations. This might be further increased by the conversion of still more British divisions from the defensive to the offensive type.

32. Port capacity is estimated by British Military War Transportation at 125,000 personnel and 150 BOLERO cargo ships per month if U. S. dock labor and locomotives are furnished; but only in summer, not winter months. It is further estimated that 150,000 personnel and 200 cargo ships could be handled by the UNITED KINGDOM ports working at a maximum peak load for a short period. The above estimates are based on the saturation point occurring by April 1, 1944. If operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, or if the capacity of UNITED KINGDOM ports could be increased, the above build-up can be increased to the following:

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July 1, 1944	29 Div.
Oct. 1, 1944	34 Div.
Dec. 31, 1944	37 Div.

34. A time lag of 4 weeks should be allowed between the arrival of troops in the UNITED KINGDOM and the completion of distribution of equipment to their units. It is also estimated that units should be in the UNITED KINGDOM 3 months prior to the initiation of operations to provide for the completion of the distribution of equipment, training, planning, rehearsals, and final organization.

35. If it is decided to move American divisions in the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM for the initial cross-channel invasion, this could be done in the last quarter of 1943. Such a move of up to 6 divisions with supporting troops could be accomplished by using all available troopships except the fast unescorted British troopships that can not be employed in the MEDITERRANEAN. This move would allow the same rate of personnel build-up indicated in paragraph 30, but would reduce the movement from the UNITED STATES by a like amount.

AVAILABILITY OF LANDING CRAFT

36. A study has been made of the availability of landing craft (See Appendix "A"). This shows that, provided production is increased within limits which will not jeopardize DE and combatant class programs and certain delays are accepted in the build-up of U. S. landing craft now allocated to the PACIFIC area, the requirements for ROUNDUP as set forth in C.C.S. 105/2 can be met by April 1, 1944. The implications of this decision on operations in the PACIFIC in 1943 and 1944 should be carefully evaluated. In order to afford comparison with C.C.S. 105/2, the troop and medium tanks lifts which they would provide is shown below. These figures must be reduced ~~The troop and medium tank lifts available from these tanks lifts which they would provide is shown below. These figures must be reduced~~ ~~landing craft will be as indicated below.~~ in proportion to the degree it is found necessary to substitute vehicles and freight.

	July 1, 1943	Oct. 1, 1943	Jan. 1, 1944	Apr. 1, 1944	C.C.S. 105/2
Troops	115,542	157,620	203,976	226,632	226,452
Tanks	4,515	5,250	6,405	6,925	5,700

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CAPACITIES OF PORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT

36. The initial assault and maintenance on the Continent will be over the beaches. However, to meet German reserves, ports must be captured immediately for an early build-up of our forces. The bridgehead should be established in an area affording port capacities sufficient to move to the Continent the forces that will be required for operations of major proportions.

37. The following is an estimate of the build-up that can be attained during the first 12 months after operations are initiated in any one of the following areas. These estimates are based on probable port destruction and maximum capacities being obtained after 90 days.

Build-up and maintenance in number of men.

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number of Men</u>
HOLLAND	1,465,970
BELGIUM	3,500,800
CALAIS (BELGIUM to the SOMME RIVER)	2,554,160
SOMME RIVER to the SEINE RIVER	3,846,682
CAEN (SEINE RIVER to COTENTIN PENINSULA)	334,010
COTENTIN PENINSULA	578,000
BRETON PENINSULA	955,060
BAY OF BISCAY	2,374,060

38. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the CAEN and COTENTIN PENINSULA sectors, will afford port capacities for a build-up in 12 months of 912,010 men. By extending this bridgehead to include the SEINE RIVER and the ports of LE HAVRE and ROUEN the build-up in 12 months would be 4,012,110 men. This force of approximately 100 divisions would be capable of major operations.

39. In the selection of areas for the assault, consideration should be given not only to the tactical requirements of an amphibious operation but also to the necessity of obtaining ports of the required capacity to place a force on the Continent that can defeat the German forces in NORTHWEST EUROPE.

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CONCLUSIONS

40. In arriving at the date on which a full scale invasion of the EUROPEAN CONTINENT can be launched the bomber offensive will be the determining factor.

41. The effects of the bomber offensive, if continuously examined as it progresses through its various phases, and when integrated with other factors, will determine well in advance the target date for implementing the plans now being prepared for cross-channel operations.

42. Priority should be given to the Army Air Forces in the UNITED KINGDOM build-up.

43. The build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM should be implemented in a manner to afford extreme flexibility to the cross-channel planners; this to be obtained as far as possible by the movement of units and landing craft in proportion to effect a balanced invasion force capable of operations at any time.

44. Invasion forces in the UNITED KINGDOM can be built up at the rate indicated in the following table. UNITED STATES ground forces should be in the UNITED KINGDOM 3 months prior to the initiation of operations in order to provide for planning, training, rehearsals, and final grouping and organization.

	U. S. Divs.	British Divs.	Total	Personnel and Tank lift at one time
July 1, 1943	2	?	2+	113,868 troops 2,690 tanks
Oct. 1, 1943	10	10	20	159,840 troops 4,070 tanks
Jan. 1, 1944	15	13?	28?	203,898 troops 5,430 tanks
Apr. 1, 1944	20	16?	36?	224,244 troops 6,020 tanks

45. Careful consideration should be given to the movement of battle-tested troops from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM as an added insurance for the success of the initial assault.

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46. In the selection of areas for the assault full consideration must be given to port capacities since adequate port facilities will be required immediately to facilitate the initial build-up. Port capacities must further lend themselves to sufficient development for the provision of the required forces to defeat the AXIS in NORTHWESTERN EUROPE.

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APPENDIX "A"

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LANDING CRAFT STUDY

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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

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47. Under present production program and based on presently planned U. S. deployments, what landing craft can be made available in the UNITED KINGDOM by quarters from July 1, 1943, to December 31, 1944, and how do these meet the requirements for ROUNDUP as set forth in C.C.S. 105/2.

DISCUSSION

48. The following tables (attached) set forth the best informations available on this subject.

a. Table I - British Landing Craft from UNITED STATES Production.

b. Table II - - UNITED STATES Landing Craft available for ATLANTIC areas.

c. Table III - UNITED STATES Landing Craft available for PACIFIC areas.

d. Table IV - Best information available on British Landing Craft from British Production.

e. On the assumption that no UNITED STATES landing craft assigned to PACIFIC areas can be made available for operations in the ATLANTIC area, Table V has been made up as a composite of Tables I, II, and IV and requirements of C.C.S. 105/2 have been included for the sake of comparison. It should be emphasized that such comparison is subject to large error due to the fact that no provision has been made for training, ANAKIM, operations subsequent to HUSKY, or battle losses incurred in HUSKY. However, this table shows that such a large margin exists in case of landing craft of less than 50 feet in length and in LCT(5)'s as to indicate no problem in these classes. Also, while it is not apparent from the Table, the same is true of LCM(3)'s. This is explained as

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follows: (U. S. LCM(3)'s are not shown due to the fact that U. S. production (less assignments to U. K.) are now allocated to APA's, etc. Considerable numbers can be made available by diversion from these vessels should it be considered warranted. Also, a large additional program of LCM(3)'s is underway, which is likely to be in excess of current needs because of a change in U. S. Army requirements that is expected to come through soon.

50. From a review of the foregoing, it appears that the problem is one of providing sufficient LST's and LCI(L)'s. An examination of possible production increases in these types indicates the following:

a. LST's. From informal estimates obtained from the Navy Department, it appears feasible to increase the tailing on program to 12 per month for a total of 108 additional LST's without too great sacrifice in the DE and combatant class programs. This is subject to confirmation by the Navy Department.

b. LCI(L)'s. It also appears feasible to increase present rate from 16 per month to 20 per month and present program from 192 to 300 with same remarks as under a. above.

51. Provided all additional construction thus made available is allocated to the ATLANTIC area, the situation will be greatly improved (See Table VI). However, it is still evident from this Table that, although conditions are improved, an insufficient margin still exists in April, 1944, when battle losses, training requirements, and necessary diversions to other operations are considered. The only remaining source from which to make up deficiencies is by reductions in presently planned U. S. deployments to the PACIFIC area. This would appear essential but need not be of a permanent nature. Earlier reductions in planned PACIFIC deployments can be made up from production surpluses which will become available after the requirements for ROUNDUP have been met.

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52. Table VII represents an estimate of landing craft availability provided production is increased as outlined and temporary diversions are made from the PACIFIC to the ATLANTIC. In this Table every effort was made to account for battle losses, other demands on the British, training requirements, and normal attrition. LST's, LCI(L)'s and LCT's only were subject to careful analysis, and it was assumed for purposes of study that the increase in other types would progress at a parallel rate. Actually they may be expected to exceed the numbers shown.

53. In arriving at the figures obtained in Table VII, the following assumptions were made:

- a. Landing craft used in HUSKY will be available subject to 30 percent attrition losses (44 LST, 71 LCI(L) and 69 LCT).
- b. British commitments elsewhere will reduce the availability in the U. K. by 10 LST, 20 LCI(L) and 20 LCT.
- c. The UNITED STATES planned deployment to the PACIFIC will be altered as follows:

	<u>Oct 1 '43</u>	<u>Jan 1 '44</u>	<u>Apr 1 '44</u>	<u>Jul 1 '44</u>	<u>Oct 1 '44</u>
LST	-13	-22	0	-35	0
LCI(L)	-34	-36	-6	+36	+40

- d. Due to training requirements and normal attrition losses, final figures were subject to an arbitrary reduction of 10 percent.

54. Table VII shows that the requirements for ROUNDUP as set forth in C.C.S. 105/2 will be met by 1 April 1944 and that the following troop and medium tank lifts will be available on the dates indicated.

	<u>Jul 1 '43</u>	<u>Oct 1 '43</u>	<u>Jan 1 '44</u>	<u>Apr 1 '44</u>	<u>CCS 105/2</u>
Troops	115,542	157,620	203,976	226,632	226,452
Tanks	4,515	5,250	6,405	6,925	5,700

NOTE: A table showing characteristics of Landing Craft discussed in this paper is attached for ready reference. See Table VIII.

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TABLE I

BRITISH LANDING CRAFT
FROM U.S. PRODUCTIONS (E)

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LSD	0	1 (1)	1 (2)	2 (4)	0 (4)	3 (7)	0 (7)
LST	68	16 (84)	19(C) (103)	17(C) (120)	0 (120)	0 (120)	0 (120)
LCI(L)	150	8(F) (158)	12 (170)	12 (182)	4 (186)	0 (186)	0 (186)
LCT(5)	138	12(B) (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)
LCM(3)	477	117 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)
LCP,LCV & LCVP(A)	914	260 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)

- (A) This type only in production now.
- (B) Probable delivery. 150 originally delivered. 12 lost and expected to be replaced this quarter.
- (C) Assuming 36 additional LST's allocated to U.K. prior to 1 March, 1944. (This now under discussion.)
- (E) Discussions of deliveries beyond 1 August have not been entered into.
- (F) Figure of 22 additional LCI(L) has been discussed as a probable allocation to the British. A total of 36 LCI(L)'s are shown here as a possible allocation to the British. No discussion of these figures should be made with them.
- (G) Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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TABLE II

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U. S. LANDING CRAFT AVAILABLE FOR ATLANTIC AREAS UNDER
PRESENT PRODUCTION PROGRAM AND PLANNED DEPLOYMENT (A)

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LSD	0	0	2 (2)	0 (2)	0 (2)	0 (2)	0 (2)
LST	92	4 (96)	16 (112)	6 (118)	0 (118)	0 (118)	0 (118)
LCI(L)	102	6 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)
LCT(5)	139	9 (148)	12 (160)	12 (172)	12 (184)	0 (184)	0 (184)
LCM(3)(B)							
LCP, LCV & LCVP(B)							

- (A) Includes all landing craft in ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN areas (does not take into account sinkings or landing craft which, because of other ATLANTIC - MEDITERRANEAN demands, will not be available. Their exact location will be variable. If not in the UNITED KINGDOM, any time lag that will be required to move them there should be added. There will also be an additional time lag of about one month for training and shake-down of the limited numbers of craft added the latter part of each quarter.
- (B) None provided specifically at present time for UNITED STATES use in operations from UNITED KINGDOM. UNITED STATES production (less UNITED KINGDOM assignments) now allocated to UNITED STATES APA's, AKA's, LST's and training. Considerable numbers could be made available by diversion from these vessels, should it be considered warranted.

TABLE III

U. S. LANDING CRAFT AVAILABLE FOR PACIFIC AREAS UNDER
PRESENT PRODUCTION PROGRAM AND PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS (A)

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LSD	2	3 (3)	1 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)
LST	84	38 (122)	22 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)
LCI(L)	70	34 (104)	36 (140)	36 (176)	24 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)
LCT(5)	180	9 (189)	18 (207)	18 (225)	18 (243)	0 (243)	0 (243)
LCM(3)(B)							
LCP, LCV & LCVF(B)							

- (A) Based on what is considered necessary to support PACIFIC operations as presently envisaged for 1943. Any reduction possible will permit increases in the ATLANTIC. Does not take into account sinkings.
- (B) U. S. production assigned to APA's, etc.
- (C) Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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TABLE IV

BRITISH LANDING CRAFT FROM
U.K. PRODUCTION

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LST	6	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)
LCT (3) & (4)	183	7 (190)	7 (197)	7 (204)	7 (211)	7 (218)	7 (225)
LCP & LCG (M)	168	98 (266)	98 (364)	98 (462)	98 (560)	98 (658)	98 (656)
LCI (S)	28	15 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)
LCM (3)	100	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)
LCM (1)	215	45 (260)	45 (305)	45 (350)	45 (395)	45 (440)	45 (485)
LCS (L)	5	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)
LCA	337	233 (570)	159 (729)	120 (849)	120 (969)	120 (1089)	100 (1189)
LCS (M)	91	31 (122)	21 (143)	21 (163)	21 (184)	21 (205)	17 (222)
LCV	200	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)
LCP (M)	18	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)
LCP (S)	50	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)

Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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Table IV to Appendix "A".

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TABLE V

(SHOWS LANDING CRAFT IN ATLANTIC ONLY
AND IS A COMPOSITE OF TABLES I, II, AND IV
AS COMPARED WITH C.C.S. 105/2) *

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO						CCS 105/2
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44	
LSD	0	1 (1)	3 (4)	2 (6)	0 (6)	3 (9)	0 (9)	
LST	166	20 (186)	35 (221)	23 (244)	0 (244)	0 (244)	0 (244)	200
LCI (L)	270	24 (294)	12 (306)	12 (318)	4 (322)	0 (322)	0 (322)	300
LCT (5)	643	35 (678)	26 (704)	26 (730)	26 (756)	14 (770)	14 (784)	340
LCM (3)	577	117 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	750
LC Less than 50'	1830	569 (2399)	225 (2624)	186 (2810)	186 (2996)	186 (3182)	162 (3344)	1157

* Following assumptions:

1 LCT(3) or (4) (both British types) is the equivalent of 2 LCT(5).

3 LCI(S) (British) are the equivalent of 2 LCI (L).

Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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TABLE VI

INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF LST's AND LCI's
IN THE ATLANTIC AREA RESULTING FROM INCREASED PRODUCTION
AND ALLOCATION OF SURPLUSES THUS MADE AVAILABLE.

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					CCS 105/2	
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44		12/31/44
LSD	0	1 (1)	3 (4)	2 (6)	0 (6)	3 (9)	0 (9)	
LST	166	20 (186)	35 (221)	23 (244)	36 (280)	36 (316)	36 (352)	200
LCI (L)	270	26 (296)	24 (320)	24 (344)	36 (380)	40 (420)		300
LCT (5)	643	35 (678)	26 (704)	26 (730)	26 (756)	14 (770)	14 (784)	340
LCM (3)	577	117 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	750
LC Less than 50'	1850	569 (2399)	225 (2624)	186 (2810)	186 (2996)	186 (3182)	162 (3344)	1157

Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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TABLE VII

AVAILABILITY OF LANDING CRAFT FOR "ROUNDUP"

TYPE	7/1/43	10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	C.C.S. 105/2
LSD	0	1	4	5	
LST	101 18,786 troops and 2020 tanks	130 24,180 troops and 2600 tanks	182 33,852 troops and 3640 tanks	202 37,572 troops and 4040 tanks	200 37,200 troops and 4000 tanks
LCI(L)	161 30,912 troops or 12,075 tons	215 41,280 troops or 16,125 tons	269 51,648 troops or 20,175 tons	299 57,408 troops or 22,425 tons	300 57,600 troops or 22,500 tons
LCT (5)	499 2495 tanks	530 2650 tanks	553 2765 tanks	577 2885 tanks	340 1700 tanks
LCM(3)	375 45,000 troops or 375 tanks or 10,012 tons	525 63,000 troops or 525 tanks or 14,017 tons	675 81,000 troops or 675 tanks or 18,022 tons	750 90,000 troops or 750 tanks or 20,025 tons	750 90,000 troops or 750 tanks or 20,025 tons
LCVP, etc.	579 20,844 troops or 579 trucks or 2,022 tons	810 29,160 troops or 810 trucks or 2,835 tons	1041 37,476 troops or 1041 trucks or 3,643 tons	1157 41,652 troops or 1157 trucks or 4,049 tons	1157 41,652 troops or 1157 trucks or 4,049 tons
TOTAL LIFT	115,542 troops and 4,515 tanks	157,620 troops and 5,250 tanks	203,976 troops and 6,405 tanks	226,632 troops and 6,925 tanks	226,452 troops and 5,700 tanks

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TABLE VIII
LANDING CRAFT CHARACTERISTICS

TYPE	DESIG. LTR.	CAPACITY	DRAFT	WEIGHT (Lb.)	ARMOR	ARMAMENT	SPEED (knots)	ENDUR- ANCE (Miles)	LENGTH	BEAM	CREW
LANDING SHIP, DOCK	LSD	195 troops & 14 LCM (3) loaded (or 3 LCT(5) loaded) and 10 trucks on deck; or 1,500 long tons cargo	14'6"	5,850 long tons	Splinter	1 3"/50 8 20 mm.	16	8,000 at 15 knots	452'	72'	200
LANDING SHIP, TANK	LST	186 troops & 10 hvy (50-ton) or 20 med. (30-ton) or 39 lt (13-ton) tanks	3' fwd. 9'4" aft	1,412 long tons	Splinter	6 20 mm.	11	5,000	328'	50'	64
LAND. CRFT., TANK MK. III	LCT(3)	4 40-ton tanks; <u>or</u> 12 30-ton tanks; <u>or</u> 300 tons cargo	3' fwd. 5'8" aft	328 long tons	1/2 " and 1/4 "	2 2-pdrs	10	1,000	191'	30'	12
LAND. CRFT., TANK, MK. IV	LCT(4)	6 60-ton tanks; <u>or</u> 10 30-ton tanks	3' fwd. 4'3" aft	315 long tons	3/8 "	2 20 mm.	10	500	186'	39'	12
LAND. CRFT., TANK MK V	LCT(5)	3 heavy (50-ton); <u>or</u> 5 med.(30-ton) tanks	3' fwd. 3' 9" aft	124 long tons	Control Station 1/4 "	None	8.5	500	108'	32'	11

NOTES: SPEED is with normal load, average sea
ENDURANCE is at full speed unless otherwise noted
WEIGHT is light unless otherwise noted
LENGTH IS overall

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TABLE VIII (Cont'd)

TYPE	DESIG. LTR.	CAPACITY	DRAFT	WEIGHT (lb)	ARMOR	ARMAMENT	SPEED (knots)	ENDUR- ANCE (Miles)	LENGTH	BEAM	CREW
LAND. CRFT., GUN	LOG	Crew only	3' fwd. 5'8" aft.	328 long tons	2-1/2" & Splinter	2 4.7 Q.F. 2 20 mm.	10	2,000	192'	31'	36
LAND. CRFT., FLAK	LCF	Crew only	2'4" fwd. 6' aft	440 long tons	Control Station	8 2-pdrs 4 20 mm.	14	1,000	191'	30'	60
LAND. CRFT. INF. (LARGE)	LCI(L)	192 troops; <u>or</u> 75 tons cargo	2'6" fwd. 4'6" aft	216 long tons	1/4" sides & fwd, Con- trol Sta.	4 20 mm.	17	4,000 Ocean 500 Landing	158'	23'	23
"(SMALL)	LCI(S)	200 troops	3'6"	115 long tons			17.5		125'	21'	9
"MECHA- NIZED, MK I	LCM(I)	1 lt (16-ton) tank; <u>or</u> 2 Bren carriers; <u>or</u> 100 troops	1'6" fwd. 4' aft	45,000	1/4"		8.5	100	40'	14'	6
"MK III	LCM(3)	1 med. (30-ton); <u>or</u> 60,000 lbs. car- go; <u>or</u> 120 troops	3'6"	22 long tons	Control Station 1/4"	2 .50 Cal.	8.5	125	50'	14'	4
LAND. CRFT., SUPPORT (LARGE)	LCS(L)	Crew only	3' fwd 4' aft	56,000	1/4"	2 2 pdr. 2 .50 Cal. 2 .30 Cal. 1 Mortar	11.5	70	47'	12'	12

NOTES: SPEED is with normal load, average sea
ENDURANCE is at full speed unless otherwise noted
WEIGHT is light unless otherwise noted
LENGTH is overall

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
TABLE VIII (Cont'd)

TYPE	DESIG. LTR.	CAPACITY	DRAFT	WEIGHT (lb)	ARMOR	ARMAMENT	SPEED (knots)	ENDUR- ANCE (miles)	LENGTH	BEAM
LAND. CRAFT. SUPPORT (MEDIUM)	LCS(M)	Crew only	1'6" fwd. 4'6" aft	20,000	1/4"	2 .50 Cal. 2 .30 Cal. 1 Mortar	11.5	70	39'	10'
LAND. CRAFT ASSAULT	LCA	35 troops; or 3.5 long tons cargo	1'6" fwd. 2'6" aft	18,000	1/4"	1 Bren	11.5	70	41'	10'
" VEHICLE	LCV	36 troops; or 1 1-ton truck; or 10,000 lbs. cargo	3'	13,000			8.5	80 or 200	36'	11'
" PERSON- NEL (MEDIUM)	LCP(M)	30 troops		14,000	Engine only		8.5		36'	10'
" SMALL	LCP(S)								28'	
LAND. CRAFT., VEH.- PERS.	LCVP	36 troops; or 1 1-ton truck, or 8,100 lbs. cargo	3'2"	17,850	1/4" sides & ramp	2 .30 Cal.	8.5	100	36'	11'

NOTES: SPEED is with normal load, average sea
 ENDURANCE is at full speed unless otherwise noted
 WEIGHT is light unless otherwise noted
 LENGTH is overall

TAB

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(J.C.S. 288/1)

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(1) J.C.S. 288

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
BASES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

References: a. JCS 272
b. JCS 76th Mtg.,
Item 1.

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed study was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this date.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT
FROM BASES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

Reference: J.C.S. 272

REPORT BY JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS by operations launched from the MEDITERRANEAN is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are indicated below:

a. Invade EUROPE via the IBERIAN PENINSULA

(1) Rejected. Not suitable strategically.

b. Invade EUROPE via SOUTHERN FRANCE

(1) Retained for further examination. Suitable -- would create the "Second Front." Feasibility questionable -- would require seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA; adequate land-based air cover cannot be provided and doubtful if shipping capabilities could support an operation of this magnitude until late 1944. Acceptable only if we are prepared to face heavy losses in ships and personnel.

(2) The inherent decisive possibilities warrant retention for further examination.

c. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE

(1) Rejected. Suitable only in eliminating ITALY from the war. Not suitable as ITALY is not a vital AXIS area, would require substantial diversion of shipping to maintain Italian economy. Perhaps feasible but large forces required (estimated 40 to 50 divisions), adequate land-based air cover not available, and the shipping problem comparable to or worse than SOUTHERN FRANCE. Chances of a successful conquest of ITALY appear acceptable, but further exploitation toward FRANCE extremely doubtful.

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d. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and HUNGARY or GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA

(1) Rejected. The conclusion reached in 2 c. above is equally applicable.

e. Invade EUROPE via EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN - TURKEY, GREECE and the AEGEAN ISLANDS

(1) Rejected. Not logistically practicable (except as provided for limited operations in J.C.S. 293).

f. Reexamination of "Invade EUROPE via SOUTHERN FRANCE."

(1) Rejected. Reexamination in connection with other courses of action with a view to improving our chances of success indicate little hope of achieving such a position.

3. Conclusion

The application of the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to the various routes from the MEDITERRANEAN region for reentry to the Continent, and there to engage the AXIS armies in decisive combat, rejects them all as being unsound.

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

ENCLOSURE "A"

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT
FROM BASES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
IN 1943 - 1944

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

4. Determine the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS by operations launched from the MEDITERRANEAN.

ASSUMPTIONS

5. It is assumed that:

a. Maximum air operations from the UNITED KINGDOM against GERMANY continue, and that minimum garrison forces be maintained in the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. TURKEY

(1) Remains neutral.

(2) Becomes an active UNITED NATIONS ally.

c. SPAIN continues her neutrality.

d. ITALY

(1) Continues as an active AXIS participant.

(2) Collapses or reaches terms of unconditional surrender with the UNITED NATIONS.

e. GERMANY resumes the offensive against RUSSIA, assumes the defensive on other fronts and intensifies the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping. No final decision is reached on the EASTERN FRONT.

f. JAPAN remains on the strategic defensive and consolidates her gains.

GENERAL COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS

6. Invade EUROPE from the MEDITERRANEAN:

a. Via IBERIAN PENINSULA.

b. Via SOUTHERN FRANCE.

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- c. Via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE.
- d. Via ITALY and HUNGARY.
- e. Via ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA.
- f. Via EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN--TURKEY, GREECE, and the
AEGEAN ISLANDS.

GENERAL EXAMINATION OF COURSES OF ACTION

7. Invade EUROPE via IBERIAN PENINSULA

a. Suitability

Assuming that the IBERIAN PENINSULA will be defended by SPAIN and PORTUGAL and that AXIS support will be requested or accepted by SPAIN, the conquest of the Peninsula itself will require major effort to subjugate the Spanish and Portuguese forces and to hold the PYRENEES line until sea-ports and transportation facilities can be made available to our forces to support the eventual assault through the PYRENEES into FRANCE.

Initial success will not bring our forces to bear on a vital AXIS area unless the AXIS chooses to make SPAIN a battle ground of major proportions. AXIS security is not seriously threatened, and the terrain in SPAIN and through the PYRENEES into FRANCE does not favor further offensive Military operations.

Logistically, the installations are wholly inadequate for the large scale of operations ultimately envisaged. It is estimated that the route will only support 260,000 troops initially and has an ultimate monthly maintenance tonnage capacity for 1,200,000 troops.

Unless the initial action can be overwhelming, cheap in cost of neutral life and property, move rapidly into FRANCE toward a vital AXIS area, not make SPAIN a battle

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ground for a long period, and quickly establish favorable relations with the Spanish and Portuguese, this course of Military expediency will be comparable to the German invasions of HOLLAND, BELGIUM and NORWAY. Such a course would be incompatible with the announced UNITED NATIONS policy and would, therefore, be totally unacceptable to the American people.

It would cause severe repercussions in LATIN AMERICA, and the hand of the AXIS propagandists would be strengthened. The political and psychological implications of this course are distinctly unfavorable.

b. Conclusion

The course is unsuitable and is rejected. This conclusion is consistent with previous studies.

8. Invade EUROPE via SOUTHERN FRANCE

a. Suitability

The suitability of a UNITED NATIONS invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE can be accepted virtually without discussion. Success in such an invasion would place our forces on the Continent in a geographic area that, from almost every point of view (climate, terrain, and communications, as well as the political and economic circumstances of the region), favors the engagement and destruction of the AXIS forces in decisive combat. Of itself, the invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE by the UNITED NATIONS would be a serious threat to the AXIS stranglehold on the fortress of EUROPE. This invasion would force strong AXIS reaction, thereby affording an important degree of relief to RUSSIA. Such an invasion, moreover, would take full advantage of the present concentration of UNITED NATIONS Military forces in the MEDITERRANEAN region. Further, the wide choice of possible objectives in SOUTHERN EUROPE would permit exploiting threat and deception measures,

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thus facilitating the achievement of strategic surprise. Finally, the political and psychological implications of such an operation are entirely favorable; the friendly and virile French people in the battle area will assist our effort to the full extent of their capability.

Logistically, the existing facilities along the southern coast of FRANCE will support the operations.

b. Feasibility

The strategic concept of invading SOUTHERN FRANCE obviously presupposes a reasonably secure line of communications to the points of landing. This will require the seizure of both SARDINIA and CORSICA and assurance that SPAIN will remain neutral. Otherwise, our assault convoys and related shipping might suffer excessive losses from AXIS air forces operating from bases in SARDINIA, CORSICA, the Spanish mainland, and the BALEARICS.

The strategic concept envisages the initial seizure of beachheads in the area between MARSEILLES and the Spanish border by amphibious operations. These operations would be ship-to-shore from bases in the UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, and NORTH AFRICA, and possibly shore-to-shore from CORSICA and SARDINIA. Thereafter, the beachheads would be extended promptly to include the TOULON area and pressed inland sufficiently to provide a firm lodgement for use as a base for future operations. The invading forces operations would either strike westward through TOULON to the BORDEAUX region on the BAY OF BISCAY or north through the RHONE valley, or both.

The intensity of the air attack prior to the initial assaults will be determined, to an important extent, by the degree to which it is believed such air action might interfere with the achievement of strategic surprise. In any event, the large-scale use of parachute troops and air-borne troops to facilitate the initial landings is indicated.

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Effective land-based air cover for the passage of assault convoys and close air support for the initial landings will not be available. Support, therefore, could only be rendered by carrier-borne air forces.

Due to the excellent road and rail net that is available, the AXIS capabilities for immediate reaction and reinforcement in great strength are such that this operation will require striking with the maximum amphibious and aircraft carrier forces which the UNITED NATIONS are capable of providing. It is believed that this operation would require the simultaneous lifting of no less than 15 combat divisions, with at least half of them in combat loaders, which will not be available. Likewise, the build-up of forces in the seized area must be as rapid as the combined Anglo-American shipping will permit. These great demands on shipping would necessarily transcend all others and would include the temporary suspension of Lend-Lease commitments. It is estimated that a force of 2 - 2 1/4 million men could be supported ultimately through the ports of SOUTHERN FRANCE. This total could be increased if and as ports on the BAY OF BISCAY are seized.

c. Acceptability

It is by no means certain that a secure line of communications to the points of landing can be assured. More important, very heavy--probably excessive--losses in ships and human life must be anticipated due to the lack of land-based air cover for the assault convoys and adequate close air support for the initial assaults. Interdiction by AXIS submarines will present the normal hazard to the assault convoys.

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This operation is considered hazardous and difficult of accomplishment. It is probably unacceptable. The decisive possibilities inherent in the operation, however, warrant its retention for further examination.

9. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE

a. Suitability

(1) Assuming a collapse, or a successful invasion of ITALY and an unconditional surrender to the UNITED NATIONS, it becomes necessary to assess the effects on the ultimate defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS.

(2) The effects, from an economic and Military view, can be considered in four general categories:

(a) The AXIS would be deprived of certain goods and services now being supplied to the total AXIS effort by ITALY.

(b) The AXIS would be relieved of the necessity for furnishing goods and services to ITALY.

(c) The UNITED NATIONS would gain any surpluses of goods and services not required to maintain Italian economy.

(d) The UNITED NATIONS would be required to insure the supply of goods and services to support Italian economy.

(3) After careful consideration of existing studies, it is concluded:

(a) The principal disadvantages to the AXIS of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(1) The necessity of diverting about 15 German divisions to replace Italian divisions on occupational duties.

(11) The loss of the Italian fleet.

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(iii) The loss of some industrial and agricultural products which, while they contribute to German economic welfare, would not measurably effect Military capabilities.

(iv) Loss of an area from which air operations could be conducted against industrial Germany.

(b) The principal gains to GERMANY of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(i) The release of German transport equipment now required to move 12,000,000 metric tons annually to ITALY. If Italian rolling stock be seized and evacuated, this could exceed the German total 1943 building program.

(ii) Industrial resources being shipped to Italy, such as coal, iron ore, bread grains, etc.; however, these materials are not critical items to German Military effort.

(c) The principal advantages to the UNITED NATIONS of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(i) The acquisition of small quantities of critical non-ferrous metals (mercury, alumina, magnesium, zinc and copper sulphate).

(ii) Supplemental supplies of agricultural products.

(iii) The additional safety afforded to ship traffic through the MEDITERRANEAN.

(iv) Acquisition of an area from which operations can be conducted against industrial Germany.

(d) The principal disadvantages to the UNITED NATIONS of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(i) The large occupational and administrative force required, estimated on the order of 15 divisions, with supporting service force and administrative units.

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(11) The almost certain drain in shipping. It is considered most unlikely that the UNITED NATIONS would be able to obtain control of the estimated 1 1/2 million deadweight tons of Italian merchant vessels required to maintain Italian economy at a minimum level.

(4) Finally, it is concluded that, without regard to political and psychological considerations, ITALY is not a vital AXIS area and that a substantial diversion of Allied shipping would be required to maintain Italian economy.

(5) Political and Psychological

The political and psychological reactions of the collapse or unconditional surrender of ITALY are speculative, but would unquestionably be generally advantageous to the UNITED NATIONS. Such an event would certainly place SPAIN and PORTUGAL more firmly in the neutral column, probably persuade TURKEY to join the Allied cause as an active belligerent, cause definite unrest in the Balkan countries, strengthen Swedish resistance, and result in further disorder, sabotage, and subversive activities in the occupied countries.

On the other hand, the invasion of ITALY might result in a long, drawn-out, indecisive operation. It is firmly believed that in this case the political and psychological reactions in our own and other UNITED NATIONS countries are likely to result in a weakening of the will of these peoples to continue the war to the decisive defeat of GERMANY and JAPAN.

(6) It has been estimated that the capacity of the existing communication facilities from ITALY to SOUTHERN FRANCE would be sufficient to support about 500,000 men

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initially and finally, with deeper penetration into FRANCE, would be sufficient for the forces required.


(7) Conclusions as to suitability

In general, it appears that this course of action is not suitable and should be rejected. However, since it is possible that ITALY might disintegrate rapidly and that her will to fight might be vitally affected by relatively minor operations, this course of action is retained for further examination as to feasibility.

b. Feasibility

The tactical concept of invading ITALY envisages a Task Force mounted in the UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, NORTH AFRICA, and SICILY, with sufficient security of lines of communication to insure its operational success in attaining the objective--the occupation of the ITALIAN PENINSULA to establish bases for further operations via SOUTHERN FRANCE. As the sea communications are susceptible to closure by the AXIS through SPAIN, assurance of SPAIN'S continued neutrality is a condition for acceptance of the plan. Upon completion of successful HUSKY, UNITED NATIONS air power available in GIBRALTAR, NORTH AFRICA, and SICILY could furnish air requirements for security of convoys from GIBRALTAR to the east, the preliminary counter air force softening up process prior to landing operations, air operations to contain the Italian Navy, and air interdiction of enemy rail and road communications in the battle area.

Italian resistance might collapse rapidly, but probably would be heavy and sustained. Some degree of tactical surprise might be achieved. Air resistance would not be materially lessened by any element of surprise. The strategic concept envisages the establishment of a lodgement in the NAPLES area, with possibly a strong diversion in the southern part of the peninsula. It is believed that



this operation would require as great a force as the invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE; namely, the simultaneous lifting of 15 combat divisions. Lack of combat loaders would preclude implementing this operation prior to late 1944.

The build-up must be as rapid as shipping and port facilities will permit. Italian and Sicilian port facilities can handle necessary shipping for successful prosecution of the Italian operation, and shipping requirements for further operations from Italian bases to the extent of supporting 1,100,000 troops. Ultimate forces required for the conquest of ITALY are estimated to be on the order of 40 to 50 divisions, particularly if material assistance is rendered the Italians by GERMANY.

c. Acceptability

Since the points of anticipated initial assaults are at the operational limit of land-based air cover, heavy losses in ships and assault forces must be anticipated.

By the employment of large forces, it appears that the chances of initial success are reasonable.

Although heavy attrition of enemy air and ground forces might be accomplished, the complete conquest of ITALY by the UNITED NATIONS would not be a decisive blow to GERMANY. Strategically, the UNITED NATIONS would have acquired a more advanced base from which to launch further offensive operations through SOUTHERN FRANCE. Moreover, the AXIS capabilities for defense are so great that these operations might, and probably will, result in a long and indecisive campaign. Considering the Japanese menace and the temperament of our people, such an eventuality would be completely incompatible with UNITED STATES policy and, therefore, unacceptable.

d. Conclusion as to suitability, feasibility and acceptability

The disadvantages of the course of action, "Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE," far outweigh the advantages. This course of action is rejected.

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10. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and HUNGARY

11. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA

The conclusion reached in the examination of the course of action, "Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE," is equally applicable to the two courses of action listed above (paragraphs 10 and 11). They are therefore rejected.

12. Invade EUROPE via the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN - TURKEY, GREECE, and the AEGEAN ISLANDS

a. Suitability

(1) The suitability of the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Turkey, Greece, and the Aegean Islands) route of re-entry to the Continent, and thereafter pressing northward into the heart of the AXIS citadel, is a problem involving many considerations.

(2) It may be assumed that such a determination on the part of the UNITED NATIONS will bring TURKEY into the war as an ally. Initially, this analysis is based on this assumption. Obviously, the reverse assumption--that of a neutral or belligerent TURKEY--would materially affect the problem presented. This variation is discussed at a later point in this paper.

(3) Factors from a general strategic point of view:

(a) Favorable

For the AXIS, the BALKANS are a critical region. There are found commodities (oil, chromium, copper, and others of less importance) without which the AXIS could not long maintain its war effort. The BALKANS lie on the flank of AXIS lines of communication to RUSSIA. The severance of these lines by the UNITED NATIONS would be disastrous to the AXIS war effort in RUSSIA. There,

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too, are AXIS allies whose loyalty is known to be wavering. Guerrilla action in GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA would certainly accelerate, and might develop to significant proportions elsewhere in the Balkan region. It follows logically that an invasion of the BALKANS by the UNITED NATIONS would precipitate large-scale AXIS reaction. If set back initially the AXIS would probably make a determined defense at the DANUBE.

The basing of a large-scale invasion of the Continent in the MEDITERRANEAN area would take full advantage of the sizable concentration there of UNITED NATIONS Military forces. It is also evident that the clearance of EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN waters would greatly simplify and expedite the supply of war munitions to RUSSIA, by shipment through the DARDANELLES. Further, UNITED NATIONS success would ultimately permit the uniting and coordinating of the UNITED STATES - British Military effort with that of RUSSIA. However, it is important to note that this would result in a "one-front" war, rather than the "two-front" war the AXIS desires, if possible, to avoid.

(b) Unfavorable

The invasion of EUROPE via the BALKANS would represent the ultimate in the UNITED NATIONS encirclement strategy set in motion by operation TORCH. Logistically, the operation presents a bleak picture; it would be both based upon and strike into relatively barren areas. It is estimated that the existing logistical installations in the entire Balkan area, including EUROPEAN TURKEY, will only support a force of 1 - 1 1/4 million men. To exceed this total would require the

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progressive expenditure of time, effort, and materials in steadily increasing proportions. The build-up of UNITED NATIONS forces will be slow for geographic (as well as logistical) reasons, for the Balkan route to EUROPE is the longest possible, from either the UNITED STATES or the UNITED KINGDOM. The general nature of the terrain, the relative absence of decisive objectives, and the long, hard road northward into CENTRAL EUROPE would all combine to make such an invasion a time-consuming and tedious campaign. Indeed, it is probably not overstating the case to conclude that it will probably take longer to bring the full weight of the UNITED NATIONS to bear on GERMANY by an invasion through the BALKANS than it will if any other route to the Continent is selected.

(4) From an economic point of view, the considerations are largely unfavorable to the UNITED NATIONS. The PLOESTI oil fields and the BOR copper mines will either be destroyed by our air attack from bases in TURKEY, or by the enemy, prior to seizure by us. There are no other comparable economic prizes in the Balkan area. Worse, until after the first harvest period following our invasion, each area conquered will represent a serious economic liability. This is because the entire region has been so ravaged by the AXIS that the living standard is everywhere at or below the existence level, and in GREECE, at least, starvation is widespread. The full responsibility for feeding these unfortunate people would be ours, and their minimum needs would constitute an increased drain on UNITED NATIONS shipping. These demands could not be denied.

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(5) The UNITED NATIONS look forward confidently to an increasing advantage over the AXIS in air power. One important test of the suitability of any strategic plan for the defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS is the degree to which the plan permits the exploitation of this air advantage. The application of this test to the strategic concept of making the ultimate invasion of the fortress of EUROPE via the Balkans leaves much to be desired. It is true that the ground offensives will precipitate commensurate air battles, thereby permitting the desired steady attrition of AXIS air forces. Outside of PLOESTI and BOR, the Balkan region offers few remunerative targets for strategic bombing. (Current studies by the Air Staff indicate that the effective air bombardment of PLOESTI is possible from ALEPPO.) It may be argued that the strategic bombing against the German homeland could proceed undiminished from the UNITED KINGDOM. From a practical point of view, however, this is not apt to be the case. Offensive operations invariably produce persistent and increasing demands for more and more airplanes. It is feared that the ultimate potentialities of the UNITED NATIONS strategic bombing program from the UNITED KINGDOM will never materialize if the Balkans are selected as the route for our reentry to the Continent.

(6) Summary and conclusions as to suitability

Although there are important general strategic advantages that would accrue to the UNITED NATIONS from an invasion of the BALKANS, these are more than balanced by the grave strategic disadvantages inherent in such operations. Of the strategic disadvantages, the logistical limitations transcend all others. It will probably take longer to bring the full weight of the UNITED NATIONS

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to bear on GERMANY by an advance over this route than any other. Economically, the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages. Moreover, Balkan operations will not facilitate exploiting the air advantage the UNITED NATIONS confidently expect to enjoy. They will, inevitably, interfere with the strategic bombing program from the UNITED KINGDOM.

Evaluation of the foregoing considerations supports the conclusion that the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN route for the ultimate invasion of Germanic EUROPE is unsuitable. The feasibility and acceptability, therefore, of this possible course of action need not be examined.

This course of action is rejected.

Since the foregoing analysis rejects this course of action, assuming TURKEY as an ally, it is obvious that this course of action would be even more unsuitable if a neutral or belligerent TURKEY were assumed. This variation, therefore, is rejected without further discussion.

13. Reexamination of "Invade EUROPE via SOUTHERN FRANCE"

a. The only way open to us to improve our chances of success in an operation launched against SOUTHERN FRANCE is by some method to obtain land-based airfields within tactical operating range of the selected landing points.

b. There are two ways this can be done:

(1) By building additional fields in CORSICA after its capture. These fields, however, would not be within tactical range of the most desirable landing areas and the practicability of such construction is questionable.

(2) By seizure of a beachhead and suitable airfields in either SPAIN or ITALY. These limited objectives have, among others, the same inherent objection, namely, no land-based air cover. A full scale operation for the capture of SPAIN and ITALY have been previously examined and rejected.

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c. Conclusion

This course of action is finally rejected.

CONCLUSION

14. The application of the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to the various routes from the MEDITERRANEAN region for reentry to the Continent, and there to engage the AXIS armies in decisive combat, rejects them all as being unsound.

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(J.C.S. 293)

May 7, 1943

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-1944

Reference: (a) J.C.S. 272 and 272/1
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg., Item 1

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44
Reference: J.C.S. 272

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. A detailed examination of the operations that may be undertaken in the MEDITERRANEAN, subsequent to HUSKY, with the forces now available in the area is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The courses of action examined and the conclusions reached are indicated below:

a. Seizure of the DODECANESE.

(1) Retained. If TURKEY an ally, course is both suitable and feasible.

(2) Rejected. If TURKEY not an ally - not suitable; cause little or no dispersion of AXIS forces.

b. Seizure of CRETE and the DODECANESE.

(1) Rejected. Feasibility questionable, and not suitable strategically in view of limited advantages gained at the expense of operations excessively costly in time and forces.

c. Seizure of CRETE.

(1) Rejected. Lacking land-based air support from DODECANESE bases, becomes more costly and less advantageous than operations against CRETE and DODECANESE, already rejected.

d. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

(1) Retained. Limited in size - acceptable if we must "do something" between HUSKY and ROUNDUP.

e. Seizure of the Heel of ITALY.

(1) Retained. Course is both suitable and feasible, provided Military operations can be limited to Heel of ITALY. Acceptable if required to divert AXIS forces or has reasonable chance to force ITALY out of the war.

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3. Conclusions:

a. Although the timing aspect is most discouraging, operations against the Heel of ITALY are most likely to compel the dispersion of AXIS forces and to divert forces from the Russian front.

b. Operations against the DODECANESE are most likely to induce TURKEY to enter the war as an ally.

c. Being of moderate size, and, in general, the least objectionable operation strategically speaking, operations against SARDINIA and CORSICA will be the most acceptable if political pressure impels "doing something" during the period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.

d. Operations against the Heel of ITALY would best satisfy a situation whereby a limited-scale operation might force ITALY out of the war.

e. The decision as to which of the three acceptable operations (Heel of ITALY, DODECANESE, SARDINIA and CORSICA), if any, will be conducted subsequent to a 'successful HUSKY, must be delayed as long as possible. This will permit more reliable assessment of the several motives that may impel additional operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

4. Recommendations:

It is recommended that operation plans be prepared, without delay, for:

- a. The seizure of the DODECANESE,
- b. The seizure of the Heel of ITALY, and
- c. The seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

PROBLEM

5. To determine what operations the UNITED NATIONS should undertake in the MEDITERRANEAN, subsequent to HUSKY, with forces then available in the area.

ASSUMPTIONS

6. It is assumed that:

a. Maximum air operations from the UNITED KINGDOM against GERMANY will continue and that build-up continues in the United Kingdom for the defeat of GERMANY to be attained by operations initiated in 1944 from the United Kingdom.

b. TURKEY.

(1) Remains neutral.

(2) Becomes an active UNITED NATIONS ally.

c. SPAIN continues neutral.

d. ITALY.

(1) Continues as an active AXIS participant.

(2) Collapses, or reaches terms of unconditional surrender with the UNITED NATIONS.

e. GERMANY resumes the offensive against RUSSIA, assumes the defensive on other fronts and intensifies the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping. No final decision is reached on the ^{Russian} ~~Western~~ Front.

f. JAPAN remains on the strategic defensive and consolidates her gains.

DISCUSSION

7. Two ways that the forces released upon the successful conclusion of HUSKY, may be profitably employed are:


a. By transferring to the UNITED KINGDOM that part of these forces not required for permanent garrisons in the MEDITERRANEAN area with a view to concentrating appropriate forces in preparation for decisive cross-channel operations in 1944. These forces will be 11 divisions (American and British), 2 Heavy and 1 Medium Bombardment, 1 Fighter, and 5 Troop Carrier Groups (American), and 4 Bomber, 17 Fighter, and 6 other Squadrons (British).

b. By undertaking further offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area with a view to diverting the maximum AXIS forces from the Russian front in 1943.

8. The decision, reiterated at CASABLANCA, that the ultimate defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS should be attained on the continent as a result of operations from the UNITED KINGDOM, remains sound. This decision should be adhered to. Contemplated operations in the EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN area should therefore be weighed with respect to their effects on the accomplishment of this objective.

9. Cross-channel operations.

a. In order to assess the value of moving to the UNITED KINGDOM forces available upon the successful conclusion of HUSKY, it is necessary to make a comparative estimate of the total forces that can be assembled in the UNITED KINGDOM by


October 1, 1943, and April 1, 1944:

(1) Moving maximum UNITED NATIONS forces from the MEDITERRANEAN and the UNITED STATES, and

(2) Moving forces only from the UNITED STATES while maintaining present UNITED NATIONS forces in continued offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

b. This comparative estimate shows that the major units in the UNITED KINGDOM for cross-channel operations on October 1, 1943, are substantially the same, whether or not a transfer is made from the MEDITERRANEAN. On April 1, 1944, by moving forces from the MEDITERRANEAN, an increase of two divisions in a total of 32 in the UNITED KINGDOM is achieved.

c. In addition to the facts developed in the above comparative estimate, the following comments on the advisability of shifting available UNITED NATIONS forces from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM subsequent to the successful completion of HUSKY, are pertinent:

(1) Even if shipped immediately after HUSKY, these forces would not arrive in the UNITED KINGDOM in time to participate in cross-channel operations in the fall of 1943, and hence would be inactive until the next favorable weather period--spring of 1944.

(2) Critical shipping would be utilized in a large scale shifting of UNITED NATIONS forces within the EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN region. By utilizing this shipping for troop movement from the UNITED STATES to the UNITED KINGDOM, an approximately equal increase, rather than shift, in UNITED NATIONS forces in the EUROPEAN -

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MEDITERRANEAN region will result. Cargo shipping for the support of the additional forces in the UNITED KINGDOM is available. Trained forces for such a movement will be available in the UNITED STATES. Considering the critical factor of time, an increase rather than a shift of forces will be the more desirable.

(3) It would sacrifice the initiative, and the potential threat to the AXIS of the concentration in the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN of some 20 American and British divisions, and approximately 5,000 aircraft.

d. It is therefore concluded that the initiation, in mid-August 1943, after a successful HUSKY, of a movement of available UNITED NATIONS forces from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM is unsound.

10. Further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

If it is decided to conduct an operation in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY, it must be with the firm understanding that the forces committed will be limited to those presently allocated to the MEDITERRANEAN area. Therefore, the objectives selected in the MEDITERRANEAN must be well within the capabilities of those forces, so as to obviate the usual demands for additional forces and such that further exploitation will not be essential.

11. General disadvantages of MEDITERRANEAN operations.

J.C.S. 288, "Invasion of the European Continent from Bases in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44," concludes that:

"The application of the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to the various routes from the MEDITERRANEAN region for re-entry to the Continent, and there

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to engage the AXIS forces in decisive combat, rejects them all as being unsound."

This conclusion is entirely consistent with the present UNITED NATIONS decision to invade the Continent by cross-channel operations based in the UNITED KINGDOM. It follows, logically, that any operation in the MEDITERRANEAN, subsequent to HUSKY, will necessarily be subject, in varying degree, to the strategic disadvantage of not contributing to the ultimate decisive objective. The degree of strategic disadvantage obviously depends upon the total, air, ground, and naval forces and equipment involved. Each limited-objective operation, hereinafter analyzed is subject to the general strategic disadvantage of being located in an indecisive region and consequently of not contributing directly to the main effort. Almost equally important is the fact that the mounting of any such limited-objective operations might precipitate a situation that would demand increasing, more and more, the forces and equipment originally committed.

12. Considerations affecting the timing of an operation subsequent to HUSKY.

The personnel casualties suffered by the combat divisions of HUSKY and destruction or damage to amphibious materiel cannot be closely estimated. However, it is reasonable to assume that the regrouping of divisions and their amphibious training for a subsequent operation, together with logistical redistribution will require a period of at least two to three months after the successful completion of HUSKY. This would mean that the operation could not be initiated earlier than mid-October or November 1943.

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13. Naval aspects of an amphibious operation in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY.

Any amphibious operation demands the employment of amphibious assault ships to the utmost strain on the UNITED NATIONS presently inadequate resources. If the limited pool of these special naval forces is used in an indecisive MEDITERRANEAN operation, other offensives of great importance in the INDIAN and PACIFIC theaters must necessarily be delayed.

In addition, an amphibious operation in the MEDITERRANEAN will withdraw fleet destroyers and other escort vessels from their paramount tasks in the Battle of the ATLANTIC, with the resultant increased loss of ships in the regular ATLANTIC convoys. Such an operation, due to the necessary time for regrouping and amphibious training of troops, cannot be mounted before late 1943. This will occur during the months favorable to convoys to NORTH RUSSIA. The cessation of these convoys for a considerable period due to withdrawal of covering forces to the MEDITERRANEAN must be weighed as a disadvantage to "doing something for RUSSIA" in the MEDITERRANEAN.

COURSES OF ACTION

14. Seizure of the DODECANESE.

a. Providing TURKEY becomes an ally or by prior agreement will enter the war at the appropriate stage of the operation, this course is entirely suitable. In view of British commitments to defend TURKEY, the forces for this defense could be found in the MIDDLE EAST with little interference from forces available after HUSKY, but would require the opening of sea communications to Western Turkish ports for the supply of our forces in ANATOLIA.

b. The advantages of this course are:

(1) Will facilitate bombing of Balkan targets from TURKEY.

(2) Might draw substantial AXIS forces from the Russian front due to the threat of invasion of the BALKANS.

(3) A heavy attrition of AXIS air forces will result from operations in the DODECANESE, the Battle of TURKEY,

[REDACTED]

and the air assaults on PLOESTI, the DANUBE, and BOR copper installations.

c. This course of action is subject to the general strategic disadvantages outlined in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, above.

d. If TURKEY remains neutral, the suitability of the course is limited to the advantages of disrupting AXIS sea traffic in the AEGEAN and providing inducement for TURKEY to become an active partner of the UNITED NATIONS. These minor strategic advantages are not commensurate with the cost and the inherent potential disadvantages to UNITED NATIONS operations in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. In this case, the course is unsuitable.

e. Even if GERMANY is convinced of the ultimate alignment of TURKEY with the UNITED NATIONS, she is unlikely to invade ANATOLIA, but may occupy THRACE, and conduct an air offensive on TURKEY. BULGARIA will most probably become an active AXIS partner in these operations. As BULGARIA and TURKEY are about equal in strength, the issue in TURKEY will be determined by the amount of German reinforcement from other areas.

f. The Amphibious operations in the DODECANESE will require 4 divisions, including 1 airborne. The amount of carrier air support required will depend upon availability of Turkish air bases. If the Turkish bases are not available the carrier air requirements will be greater than those for HUSKY and the losses in the operation probably will be prohibitively costly, and therefore not acceptable.

g. The course is acceptable only if TURKEY becomes an active ally.

15. Seizure of CRETE and the DODECANESE.

a. The discussion of the attitude of TURKEY, above, with regard to the seizure of the DODECANESE is equally applicable

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here. The additional advantages of capturing CRETE lie in closing the AEGEAN to the AXIS, removing AXIS air threat from UNITED NATIONS sea communications in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, and posing the threat of invasion of GREECE which might have the effect of forcing the AXIS to reinforce GREECE. UNITED NATIONS aid to guerrilla forces in GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA will be facilitated. The general tactical plan envisages the seizure of the DODECANESE prior to the assault on CRETE. This will provide some, but inadequate, land-based air cover for the landings on the eastern end of the Island.

b. This course of action is subject to the general strategic disadvantages outlined in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, above.

c. Assuming the determined defense of CRETE, the seizure of this island will be a more hazardous operation than HUSKY inasmuch as it will depend on carrier air support. It is estimated that six fleet carriers will be required. This is in excess of UNITED NATIONS capabilities, without crippling the strengths of these vessels in all other theaters.

d. It is estimated that a total of 12 divisions will be required: 4 for the DODECANESE and 8 for CRETE, including 2 airborne. This total exceeds by 1 division the 11 divisions that it is estimated will become available in the MEDITERRANEAN following a successful HUSKY. The shortage might be found among British defensive forces in EGYPT and the MIDDLE EAST. This operation could not be undertaken except after a lengthy period of regrouping and amphibious training, together with extensive logistical readjustment.

e. This course of action will be excessively costly in both time and forces and is therefore rejected.

16. Seizure of CRETE

The premise on which this course of action would be undertaken would undoubtedly be that TURKEY remains neutral. Otherwise the more feasible plan of capturing first the DODECANESE with aid of Turkish bases and then seizing CRETE would be used.

[REDACTED]

Lacking land-based air support from DODECANESE bases, this operation becomes more difficult than the seizure of CRETE and the DODECANESE. Being more costly and less advantageous than an operation already rejected, this course of action must also be rejected.

17. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA

a. The invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE or ITALY are beyond the capabilities of forces remaining in the MEDITERRANEAN after HUSKY, as well as being unacceptable as avenues of entry into the Continent for the ultimate defeat of GERMANY.

b. In addition to the general strategic disadvantages outlined in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, above, the favorable and unfavorable factors of this course are:

(1) Favorable

(a) Further improvement in the safety of shipping in the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

(b) Continued attrition of AXIS forces, especially air.

(c) Provide additional advanced air bases for attacks on NORTHERN ITALY and the SOUTHERN REICH.

(d) Maintain the threat of invasion toward SOUTHERN FRANCE.

(e) Satisfy political pressure to "do something" during the extended period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.

(f) Ground and air forces available.

(2) Unfavorable

(a) Due to lack of adequate land-based air cover, carrier based aircraft is required. This may result in heavy, possibly prohibitive losses in ships, aircraft, and men.

(b) There are no vital strategic targets in NORTHERN ITALY and the SOUTHERN REICH that are not within tactical range of bases already in our hands.

c. This course of action is retained for further consideration.

18. Seizure of the Heel of ITALY

a. Following HUSKY, operations against the Heel of Italy would be another blow to Italian morale. By increasing the Italian jitters, such an operation might well result in the recall of Italian garrison forces from either the BALKANS or SOUTHERN FRANCE. This would require their replacement by GERMANY. In fact, it is not entirely improbable that UNITED NATIONS success in such an operation might cause the collapse or surrender of Italian Government. The repercussions on the AXIS political and military framework, especially in SOUTHERN EUROPE, of the collapse or surrender of Italy, would be widespread. Should this happen prior to or during operations against the Heel, the strategic dispositions of the UNITED NATIONS forces would facilitate taking prompt advantage of the situation presented.

b. A large scale air battle, with the attendant attrition of AXIS air forces, would undoubtedly develop. Moreover, once air fields were secured, the effective range of our heavy bombers would be advanced some 200 miles. This would permit bombing the PLOESTI oil fields, the BOR Copper Mines, and DANUBE river traffic.

c. Control of the Heel of ITALY would further restrict the activities of the Italian fleet. Further, our position on the Heel would constitute a potential threat to the BALKANS.

d. Logistically, the mounting of this operation would require a minimum of readjustment following a successful HUSKY. The size of the operation (estimated at 9 divisions) is such that much shifting of divisions, following HUSKY, would be required. It is unlikely that a target date could be set earlier than two to three months after the completion of HUSKY.

[REDACTED]

e. If offensive operations against ITALY, once initiated, could be limited merely to the Heel, the undesirable aspects of UNITED NATIONS possible ultimate control of, and responsibility for, the whole of ITALY could be successfully avoided. It is most important to note, however, that when two opposing armies face each other on suitable terrain, decisive military action almost invariably develops. In this case, if the AXIS chooses to react offensively, the UNITED NATIONS would, perforce, have to either accept the challenge and build up our forces to continue the battle or evacuate. This might lead to a long and indecisive campaign which is contrary to the National Policy of the United States.

f. We will be unable to provide adequate land-based air cover for amphibious operations against the Heel of ITALY; and unless these operations are preceded by operations against the Toe, heavy losses must be expected. Operations against both the Heel and Toe will exceed the capabilities of UNITED NATIONS forces available in the MEDITERRANEAN region.

g. It is estimated that the Heel of ITALY can be seized with a force of 9 or 10 divisions. The soundness of this estimate will depend upon both the AXIS dispositions in ITALY subsequent to HUSKY and the extent of German reinforcement following our landings on the Heel.

h. Operations by the UNITED NATIONS against the Heel of ITALY in 1943-44 should be avoided, if possible, because if the AXIS reacts in great force we would either have to accept another DUNKIRK or take up the challenge and engage in a major campaign on the Italian Peninsula. Strategically, the latter is not desired.

i. This course of action is retained.

19. Comparison of courses of action retained, and conclusions.

a. It has been determined (J.C.S. 288) that the decisive invasion of the Continent should not be based upon operations launched from the MEDITERRANEAN. (See paragraph 11 above). This being the case, the only acceptable motives for conducting limited objective operations in the Mediterranean, subsequent to HUSKY, with forces then available in the area, would be:

- (1) To compel the dispersion of AXIS forces, and, if possible, to divert forces from the Russian front.
- (2) To induce TURKEY to enter the war as an ally.
- (3) To satisfy political pressure to "do something" during the period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.
- (4) To take advantage of a situation whereby a limited-scale operation might force ITALY out of the war.

b. The careful evaluation of the retained acceptable operations (DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, and SARDINIA and CORSICA) against the motives listed above leads to the following conclusions:

- (1) Although the timing aspect is most discouraging (See paragraph 12 above) operations against the Heel of ITALY are most likely to compel the dispersion of AXIS forces and to divert forces from the Russian front.
- (2) Operations against the DODECANESE are most likely to induce TURKEY to enter the war as an ally.
- (3) Being of moderate size and, in general, the least objectionable operation strategically speaking, operations against SARDINIA and CORSICA will be the most acceptable, if political pressure impels "doing something" during the extended period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.
- (4) Operations against the Heel of ITALY would best satisfy a situation whereby a limited-scale operation might force ITALY out of the war.

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[REDACTED]

(5) The decision as to which of the three acceptable operations (DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or SARDINIA and CORSICA), if any, will be conducted subsequent to a successful HUSKY, must be delayed as long as possible. This will permit more reliable assessment of the several motives that may impel additional operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. It is recommended that operational plans be prepared, without delay, for:

- a. The seizure of the DODECANESE
- b. The seizure of the Heel of ITALY, and
- c. The seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

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May 7, 1943

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DEFENSIVE GARRISONS REQUIRED AND FORCES
AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER TO OTHER AREAS OR
FOR LIMITED OFFENSIVES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, 1943-44.

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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DEFENSIVE GARRISONS REQUIRED AND FORCES
AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER TO OTHER AREAS OR
FOR LIMITED OFFENSIVES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, 1943-44

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An examination of the strength and composition of the major combat units: (a) required to secure lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN, (b) required to garrison occupied territory in the MEDITERRANEAN, and (c) available for transfer to other areas, or for limited offensives in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44, is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. After the successful completion of HUSKY, garrisons will be required as follows:*

a. Ground forces:

FRENCH MOROCCO**	3 U. S. and 4 French Divisions***
ALGERIA and TUNISIA	2 U. S. or British Divisions (other French forces not listed will be available for local security)
SICILY	4 U. S. or British Divisions
Total -	13 Divisions

* An estimated 16 British Divisions, of mixed character, will remain in TRIPOLITANIA and eastward including the entire MIDDLE EAST. A critical examination of the need for retention of these forces should be made with a view to transfer to other more vital areas if practicable.

** These forces required to protect lines of communication through STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

*** It is estimated that 4 well-equipped, offensive French Divisions can be made available. In addition, adequate French forces are available to provide local security in FRENCH MOROCCO and WEST AFRICA.

b. Air forces:

<u>NORTH AFRICAN LITTORAL and SICILY</u>	<u>BH</u>	<u>BM</u>	<u>BL</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>TR. CAR.</u>	<u>SPEC. PURPOSE</u>
U. S. Groups	4	3	6	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	2 3-3/4
British Squadrons	2	11	6	41	3	17

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c. Naval forces.

Until the Italian fleet is destroyed or immobilized, a naval force of suitable strength and types to cover the line of communications and contain the Italian fleet will be required.

The protection of convoys will require escort types. The strength of escort types for the protection of convoys will depend upon the availability of these types and demands in other areas.

The provision of these forces is a British responsibility.

3. If no limited operations subsequent to HUSKY are undertaken, there will be available for transfer to other areas the following:

a. Ground forces.

The equivalent of 11 U. S. or British Divisions.

<u>b. Air forces.</u>	<u>BH</u>	<u>BM</u>	<u>BL</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>TR. CAR.</u>	<u>SPEC. PURPOSE</u>
U. S. Groups	2	4 X	-	3 X	5 X	-
British Squadrons	-	-	4	8	-	-

4. Limited operations, if undertaken subsequent to HUSKY, will require the following:

a. Ground forces.

SARDINIA and CORSICA	6 divisions
DODECANESE	4 divs., incl. 1 airborne
CRETE	8 divs., incl. 1 airborne
Heel of ITALY	9 divs., incl. 1 airborne

b. Air forces.

Naval air forces excepted, these forces will be found from within the MEDITERRANEAN after HUSKY by suitable re-grouping:

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	U. S. Groups			British Squadrons		
	Bomb.	Ftr.	Other	Bomb.	Ftr.	Other
SARDINIA and CORSICA	9	9	4	15	36	8
DODECANESE	6	9	4	15	36	8
CRETE	9	9	4	15	36	8
Heel of ITALY	9	9	4	15	36	8

5. Garrisons in the event of seizure of any of the below named objectives are as follows:

a. Ground forces

SARDINIA and CORSICA	3 1/2 - 4 divisions
DODECANESE	2 divisions
CRETE	2 divisions
Heel of ITALY	estimate impracticable

b. Air forces

Air garrison will be obtained, regardless of objective seized, by regrouping and relocating forces specified in par. 2 b. above, with the addition of 2 fighter groups.

6. Operations subsequent to HUSKY will reduce the forces available for transfer (paragraph 3, above) to other areas to the totals shown below:

a. Ground forces

SARDINIA and CORSICA	5 divisions
DODECANESE	7 divisions
CRETE	3 divisions
Heel of ITALY	2 divisions

b. Air forces

Regardless of objective listed above

	<u>B(H)</u>	<u>B(M)</u>	<u>B(L)</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>TR. CAR.</u>	<u>SPEC. PURP.</u>
U. S. Groups	2	4	-	2	5	----
Br. Squadrons	-	-	4	4	-	----

c. It is most important to note that the initiation, subsequent to HUSKY, of a troop movement, regardless of size, from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM (or other theater) should only be made after careful study and evaluation of a number of partially conflicting strategic and logistical factors, not here discussed.

ENCLOSURE "A"

DEFENSIVE GARRISONS AND FORCES AVAILABLE
FOR TRANSFER TO OTHER AREAS OR FOR LIMITED OFFENSIVES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

7. Determine the strength and composition of the major combat units.
- a. Required to secure lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN.
 - b. Required to garrison occupied territory in the MEDITERRANEAN.
 - c. Available for transfer to other areas or for limited offensives in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44.

ASSUMPTIONS

8. It is assumed that:
- a. The primary objective of the UNITED NATIONS is the final defeat of the WESTERN AXIS by invasion of the Continent from the UNITED KINGDOM.
 - b. GERMANY'S offensive against the Russian Army in 1943 will be unsuccessful, which will necessitate holding the bulk of her ground forces on the Russian front during 1944.
 - c. The AXIS will not invade the BRITISH ISLES, TURKEY, or the IBERIAN PENINSULA. SPAIN and PORTUGAL will remain neutral.
 - d. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.
 - e. UNITED NATIONS commitments to other theaters will remain substantially as presently planned.
 - f. RUSSIA and JAPAN will remain at peace.
 - g. HUSKY will be executed as will possibly a subsequent limited objective operation in the MEDITERRANEAN with the forces available there.

GROUND FORCES

9. Exclusive of the French African Forces, there are approximately 36 UNITED NATIONS divisions now in or projected for the entire MEDITERRANEAN-MIDDLE EAST region. Of these, 20 first-line offensive divisions will presumably still be in MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA, and SICILY, following operation HUSKY. The remaining 16 divisions will, so far as is known, remain in TRIPOLITANIA and eastward to include the entire MIDDLE EAST.

10. Exact data as to the training, state of equipment, morale, and will to fight of the 16 divisions in TRIPOLITANIA, and to the east thereof is not at hand. The mixed character of these forces is recognized. Considering the general strategic situation and the likely 1943 AXIS intentions, however, this total of 16 divisions appears to exceed the security requirements for maintaining the strategic defensive and hence a certain number of them could be made available for use elsewhere.

11. The ever-present possibility of an AXIS strike through SPAIN at our lines of communications remains the most important single consideration with regard to the security of the UNITED NATIONS position in the MEDITERRANEAN region. Although believed to be unlikely, should the AXIS attempt such an operation, the reduction by the UNITED NATIONS of the Spanish Moroccan bridgehead, prior to the reinforcement with German forces, is mandatory. To accomplish this, not less than an American 3-division Corps should be maintained constantly in MOROCCO. Further, not less than 4 well-equipped French divisions should also be maintained in MOROCCO, for the same purpose.

12. There are adequate French Forces, exclusive of the 4 well-equipped French divisions mentioned above, to provide necessary local security in FRENCH MOROCCO and FRENCH WEST AFRICA.

[REDACTED]

13. Two divisions (American or British) should garrison ALGERIA and TUNISIA.

14. Assuming a successful HUSKY, and African security garrisons as outlined above, 4 divisions (American or British) should provide an adequate garrison for SICILY.

15. The above security requirements total 9 (British or American) divisions. A total of 20 will be available. Therefore, disregarding the damage to be expected in operation HUSKY upon its successful conclusion, there will be a total of 11 divisions available either for transfer to another theater or for further offensive use in the MEDITERRANEAN. Due to the severity of the action to be expected in HUSKY and the time required to rehabilitate, re-equip, shift, and train units in preparation for further offensive operations, it is doubtful if more than 5 or 6 divisions could be made available for at least 2 months after a completed HUSKY.

16. The garrison requirements for SICILY and NORTHWEST AFRICA should not be affected materially by UNITED NATIONS operations against any one, or any combination, of the places listed below. Neither the relationship between these places themselves, nor between them and the areas controlled after a successful HUSKY, is such that the garrison requirements will vary materially, regardless of which place is seized. Further, the assumption that the security of our MEDITERRANEAN position will still be subject to the threat of an AXIS blow through SPAIN, requires that the garrison forces indicated for SICILY and NORTHWEST AFRICA be maintained, regardless of what additional territory is seized after HUSKY.

17. J.C.S. 293, "Limited Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44," concludes that, depending on existing circumstances, one of three acceptable operations (DODECANESE, HEEL OF ITALY, SARDINIA and CORSICA) may be conducted, following a successful HUSKY. The forces required for the operations, as well as the security garrisons, are:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Forces Required*</u>	<u>Security Garrison*</u>
SARDINIA and CORSICA	6 divisions	2 divisions (SARDINIA) 1 1/2 - 2 divs. (CORSICA)
CRETE	8 divisions, including 1 airborne	2 divisions
DODECANESE	4 divisions, including 1 airborne	2 divisions
HEEL OF ITALY	9 divisions, including 1 airborne	(See **, below)

*Does not include supporting combat troops.

**It is not believed that a firm recommendation can be made. The scope of this operation will depend on AXIS (especially German) reaction. Maximum enemy reaction would result either in our evacuation or in a major operation of increasing magnitude, whereas minimum enemy reaction, or the collapse of ITALY, would present an entirely different picture.

18. If, as the result of any one of several possible reasons (uprisings inspired by subversive activity, air attack, operation HUSKY, or any subsequent offensive operation against ITALY) the government of ITALY should collapse or surrender, the strategic dispositions of the UNITED NATIONS forces would be adequate for the situation presented.

AIR FORCES

19. It is estimated that the air garrison requirements for the NORTH AFRICAN LITTORAL and SICILY will be:

	<u>U. S. Groups</u>	<u>British Squadrons</u>
Heavy bomber	4	2
Medium bomber	3	11
Light bomber	6	6
Fighter	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	41
Troop carrier	2	3
Special purpose	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	17

20. It is estimated that these forces, fighters excepted,* by regrouping will furnish the air garrison requirements for any limited objective area seized in the MEDITERRANEAN.

21. If no limited operations subsequent to HUSKY are undertaken, there will be available for transfer to other areas the following:

	<u>U. S. Groups</u>	<u>British Squadrons</u>
Heavy bomber	2	-
Medium bomber	4	-
Light bomber	-	4
Fighter	3	8
Troop carrier	5	-
Special purpose	-	-

22. Limited operations subsequent to HUSKY will require the following air forces:

	<u>U. S. Groups</u>			<u>British Squadrons</u>		
	Bomber	Fighter	Other	Bomber	Fighter	Other
SARDINIA and CORSIKA	9	9	4	15	36	8
DODECANESE	6	9	4	15	36	8
CRETE	9	9	4	15	36	8
Heel of ITALY	9	9	4	15	36	8

*Two additional fighter groups will be required to augment any limited objective area garrison, and may be obtained by reducing transfers by 1 Fighter Group (U. S.) and 4 Fighter Squadrons (British).

NAVAL FORCES

23. The determination of the proper strength and composition of major naval forces required to secure the lines of communication in the MEDITERRANEAN can only be made by constant review of the existing naval situation. The policy of assignment of naval forces to this and other areas should be guided by a recognition of the need for strict economy consistent with calculated risks. Such a policy may make available ships sorely needed for the conduct of offensive operations in other areas and for the protection of our vital shipping.

24. If the Italian Fleet is in an operating status, it always will be necessary to maintain a cover force of sufficient strength to provide adequate security for the protection of shipping and maintaining UNITED NATIONS lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN. This force can be provided, but obviously its use elsewhere will be precluded.

25. In C.C.S. 160 (Minimum Escort Requirements to Maintain the Sea Communications of the UNITED NATIONS), prepared at the Casablanca Conferences, it was stated in the discussion in connection with "Re-opening the MEDITERRANEAN," that "The shipping running to the MIDDLE EAST has already been reduced considerably. It is proposed, when the MEDITERRANEAN route is re-opened, to run a convoy of thirty cargo ships every ten days to supply and replenish the MIDDLE EAST and INDIA. The escort commitments involved can be met by the forces available locally supplemented by small savings which will be available from the reduced scale of escort required on the FREETOWN route when the MEDITERRANEAN is opened to cargo ships." However, it is noted that recent oil convoys into the MEDITERRANEAN have required escort by U. S. Fleet destroyers which was not contemplated. It is recognized that the requirements for escort vessels can not be met until late 1943, and that the demands must be met where the greatest need exists.

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(J.C.S. 295/1)

15 May 1943

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SIZE OF FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IF MAIN EFFORT
IS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Reference: (a) J.C.S. 79th Mtg., Item 12.

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan is a revision by the Joint War Plans Committee of J.C.S. 295, containing a reevaluation of the naval, ground, and air strengths required, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference (a)

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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By RMP, NLR, Date

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SIZE OF FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
IF MAIN EFFORT IS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. An examination to determine the size of air, ground, and naval forces that should be maintained in the UNITED KINGDOM in the event it is decided to accomplish the ultimate defeat of the AXIS on the Continent of EUROPE by making the main effort in the MEDITERRANEAN, is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. As long as GERMANY is occupied on the Eastern Front, she does not have the capability of invading the BRITISH ISLES. Due to the intensity of preparations, it is estimated that a warning of 2 to 6 months can be expected of an attempted German invasion. The air offensive and the presence of so large an Air Force in the BRITISH ISLES will be added insurance against an AXIS invasion.

3. Under the above conditions the forces indicated below should be maintained in the UNITED KINGDOM to provide for its security and to conduct an air offensive:

a. Ground forces

Twenty UNITED NATIONS divisions plus the equivalent of four divisions and the Home Guard. This should be subsequently reviewed in the light of changes in the situation affecting the vulnerability of the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. Air forces

	B(H)	B(M)	F	TB	T/C	Others
U. S. Groups	51	9	10		2	4
R.A.F. Squadrons	39	15	57	6		36

No reduction in the Coastal Command is considered advisable.

c. Naval forces

BB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	OCL	DD	ODD
4	2	7	5	8	3	92	69

Plus numerous ships of the smaller classes.

[REDACTED]

4. It is estimated that the following forces could be released from the UNITED KINGDOM for service elsewhere.

a. Ground forces

11 UNITED NATIONS divisions.

b. Air forces

	B(L)	F	FB	T/C	Obs
U. S. Groups	13	15	0	5-1/2	2
R.A.F. Squadrons	8	37	2	0	0

c. Naval forces

Three OBB might be made available for use elsewhere if one additional BB is maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC. The diversion of certain vessels from the NORTH ATLANTIC to support specific operations for a limited period is a calculated risk which can be taken, and has been taken in the past.

ENCLOSURE "A"

SIZE OF FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
IF MAIN EFFORT IS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

ASSUMPTIONS

1. It is assumed that:

a. The security of the BRITISH ISLES will be maintained as a main charge upon the resources of both the UNITED KINGDOM and the UNITED STATES.

b. Maximum air operations from the UNITED KINGDOM against GERMANY will continue and minimum garrison forces will be maintained in the BRITISH ISLES.

c. TURKEY will remain neutral or become an active UNITED NATIONS ally. SPAIN and PORTUGAL will remain neutral.

d. GERMANY will resume the offensive against RUSSIA while assuming the defensive on other fronts and intensifying the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping.

e. GERMANY'S offensive against the Russian Army will be unsuccessful, which will necessitate holding the bulk of her ground forces on the Russian Front during 1944.

f. The AXIS will not invade TURKEY or the IBERIAN PENINSULA.

g. RUSSIA and JAPAN will remain at peace.

AXIS CAPABILITIES FOR AN INVASION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

2. As long as GERMANY is occupied on the Eastern Front, she does not have the capability of invading the BRITISH ISLES. There are approximately 400 Siebel Ferries, 100 E-boats, and some barges along the western coast of EUROPE and in the BALTIC that could be used for invasion purposes. However, the lift of these craft is so small that they cannot be considered as advance preparations of any magnitude. Also, due to the intensity of preparations, it is estimated that a warning of 2 to 6 months can be expected of an attempted German invasion of the UNITED KINGDOM.

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3. The AXIS can continue air attacks on the present scale, and carry on blockade efforts with submarines and mines. Small scale surface raids are a capability but are considered unlikely. The blockade efforts will probably not obtain results beyond the present scale and will undoubtedly be subject to reductions in the future.

BOMBER OFFENSIVE

4. The conclusions reached in J.C.S. 291/1 are adhered to. These are that the bomber offensive against GERMANY will result in a destruction of so many of her key industries that she will no longer be able to wage war, and favorable conditions will be created for a re-entry to the Continent, unless GERMANY is able to build up timely and effective counter-measures.

5. In any event, it is believed that the bomber offensive will, at the least, be effective enough to definitely preclude a large scale GERMAN invasion effort. Also the presence of so large an air force in the BRITISH ISLES will constitute an unacceptable threat to such an operation.

6. The bomber offensive will therefore have the corollary effect of adding further insurance against an AXIS invasion of the BRITISH ISLES.

UNITED KINGDOM REQUIREMENTS AND PROSPECTIVE FORCES AVAILABLE

7. Air.

a. The present and projected deployment of U.S.A.A.F. units in the UNITED KINGDOM is:

<u>Now in theater or enroute</u>		<u>In theater 1 April 1944</u>
12	Heavy Bomber Groups	51
2	Medium Bomber Groups	9
0	Light and Dive Bomber Groups	13
3	Fighter Groups	25
$\frac{1}{2}$	Photo Reconnaissance Groups	2
1	Observation Groups	4
$\frac{1}{2}$	Troop Carrier Groups	8 $\frac{1}{2}$

NOTE: The U.S.A.A.F. units, including the necessary service troops and the final build-up, will total approximately 406,000 men.

b. It is estimated that the U.S.A.A.F. units required for the bomber offensive are:

- 51 - Heavy Bomber Groups
- 9 - Medium Bomber Groups
- 10 - Fighter Groups
- 2 - Photo Reconnaissance Groups
- 2 - Troop Carrier Groups

These figures indicate that a reduction can be effected in the projected build-up for the UNITED KINGDOM.

c. Units listed below represent total R.A.F. air strength now in the BRITISH ISLES. These figures should show slight increases by 1 April 1944 from both production and the decreased attrition that will result from the gradual weakening of the Luftwaffe:

- 39 - Heavy Bomber Squadrons
- 15 - Medium Bomber Squadrons
- 8 - Light Bomber Squadrons
- 6 - Torpedo Bomber Squadrons
- 16 - General Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 9 - Flying Boat Squadrons
- 94 - Fighter and Night Fighter Squadrons
- 6 - Photo Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 5 - Observation and Liaison Squadrons
- 2 - Fighter Bomber Squadrons

d. The following is an estimate of the R.A.F. units required both for the bomber offensive and defense of the UNITED KINGDOM beyond that afforded by the bomber offensive.

<u>Squadrons</u>	<u>Bomber offensive requirements</u>	<u>Defense requirements</u>	<u>Total</u>
Heavy Bomber	39	0	39
Medium Bomber	15	0	15
Torpedo Bomber	0	6	6
General Reconnaissance	0	16	16
Flying Boat	0	9	9
Fighter and Night Fighter	25	32	57
Photo Reconnaissance	6	0	6
Observation and Liaison	0	5	5

No reduction in the Coastal Command strength is indicated.

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8. Ground.

a. The strength of UNITED NATIONS ground forces in the UNITED KINGDOM is:

British	1,373,406
Indian	2,191
Dominion	184,562
Allied (excluding U.S.)	33,232
United States	<u>61,766</u>
Total	1,655,157

b. Exclusive of U.S. forces, this strength includes 29 divisions of all types and in various stages of conversion from defensive to offensive roles. The U.S. strength includes 1 division, which number will be increased to 2 divisions in the near future by the shuttle of the ICELAND division to the UNITED KINGDOM.

c. Ten British and Canadian divisions will definitely be ready for offensive operations by 1 October 1943. Further change over to the offensive type of divisions is continuing with the result that more units will become available after 1 October 1943. In addition, the two U.S. divisions are equipped and trained for the offensive.

d. The Home Guard which is not included in the above, has a strength of 1,792,912 officers and men. This organization has a generally high morale and would undoubtedly be a vital factor in repelling an attempted AXIS invasion.

e. It is estimated that the British and Canadian forces in the UNITED KINGDOM could be reduced by the total number of offensive units that will be fit for duty with the British Expeditionary Forces by 1 October 1943 plus the required supporting and service troops. This will leave 19 other divisions of various categories and state of equipment and training, the equivalent of 4 additional divisions, and miscellaneous forces

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including the Home Guard, in the UNITED KINGDOM. The strength of the ground forces should continue to be reviewed in the light of the changing situation with a view to additional reduction in the Home Forces as more offensive units become available.

f. Due to the difficulties GERMANY encounters in obtaining confirmed information concerning U. S. forces in the UNITED KINGDOM, it is believed that limited forces, if active and frequently moved, would assist in creating doubt as to our intentions. It is considered that one U. S. division with appropriate service forces and a limited number of landing craft would be sufficient for deception purposes. Therefore, one U. S. division and all excess supporting and service forces should be moved from the UNITED KINGDOM.

g. These reductions would make available for use in areas other than the UNITED KINGDOM 10 British and Canadian divisions with adequate supporting and service units and one U. S. division with all excess U. S. service forces. Further British formations should become available for use overseas as the situation develops.

9. Naval.

a. The main units of the German Fleet in serviceable condition are: 2 battleships (TIRPITZ, 45,000 tons, 8-15", 30 knots, and SCHARNHORST, 32,000 tons, 9-11", 29 knots); 2 pocket battleships (SCHEER and LUTZOW, 10,000 tons, 6-11", 27 knots); 2 CA (HIPPER and EUGEN, 15,700 tons, 8-8", 32 knots); 4 CL (3 of 6,000 tons, 9-5.9", 32 knots, and one of 5,400 tons, 8-5.9", 29 knots); 1 CV (25,000 tons, 33 knots, 55(?) planes) and 30 destroyers, 54 torpedo boats and 452(?) submarines.

b. The British naval forces now maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC are not based on the possibility of invasion, but are influenced by the necessity of containing the German Fleet. As of 7 May 1942, exclusive of ships out of service due to damage

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or overhaul, Royal Navy units and Allied Naval units under British operational control in the NORTH ATLANTIC, are as follows:

TABLE I.

BB	OBB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	OCL	DD	ODD
3	3	2	7	5	8	3	92	69

c. Assuming that GERMANY can choose a sortie date and have the majority of her units operationally available on this date, the Royal Navy should have deployed in the NORTH ATLANTIC a superior force. The minimum force required to be available for assembly as a striking force against the German Fleet should it sortie, is estimated below:

TABLE II.

BB	CV	CA	CL	DD
4	1	4	4	27

d. Data is not available on which to estimate the requirements for patrol, convoy, and escort, etc., in the NORTH ATLANTIC, but it appears that if the number of ships operationally available shown in Table I, is maintained, it will be sufficient for all requirements. New construction and repaired ships becoming available in excess of these numbers should be available for use in other areas. It appears that three OBB might be made available for use elsewhere if one additional BB is maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC. The diversion of certain vessels from the NORTH ATLANTIC to support specific operations for a limited period is a calculated risk which can be taken and has been taken in the past.

CONCLUSIONS

10. The following forces present in or projected for the UNITED KINGDOM are available for diversion elsewhere:

a. Air.

(1) R.A.F.

8 - Light Bomber Squadrons
 37 - Fighter Squadrons
 2 - Fighter Bomber Squadrons

(2) U.S.A.A.F.

13 - Light and Dive Bomber Groups
 15 - Fighter Groups
 2 - Observation Groups
 6-1/2 - Troop Carrier Groups.

b. Ground.

10 - British and Canadian offensive divisions with appropriate supporting and service forces
 1 - U. S. division
 Excess supporting and service troops.

SECRET

c. Naval.

Three OBB if one additional BB is maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC. Also, certain vessels may be diverted for short periods.

11. If the forces listed in paragraph 10 are transferred elsewhere, there will remain in the UNITED KINGDOM for the bomber offensive, the defense of the BRITISH ISLES, and the various fleet tasks (containing the German naval forces, and patrol, escort, and convoy duties), the following:

a. Air.

(1) R.A.F.

- 39 - Heavy Bomber Squadrons
- 15 - Medium Bomber Squadrons
- 6 - Torpedo Bomber Squadrons
- 16 - General Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 9 - Flying Boat Squadrons
- 57 - Fighter and Night Fighter Squadrons
- 6 - Photo Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 5 - Observation Squadrons.

(2) U.S.A.A.F. (deployment to 1 April 1944)

- 51 - Heavy Bomber Groups
- 9 - Medium Bomber Groups
- 10 - Fighter Groups
- 2 - Photo Reconnaissance Groups
- 2 - Observation Groups
- 2 - Troop Carrier Groups

The U.S.A.A.F. units to include the necessary service troops.

b. Ground.

- 19 - Allied divisions of all categories, except U. S. The equivalent of 4 additional divisions.
- Remainder of supporting and service forces
- Miscellaneous forces including the Home Guard
- 1 - U. S. division with necessary service forces.

NOTE: The British ground forces should be subsequently reviewed with a view to additional reductions in the Home Forces.

S E C R E T

c. Naval.

BB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	OCL	DD	ODD
4	2	7	5	8	3	92	69

Plus numerous ships of the smaller classes.

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COPY NO. 47

C.I.C. 16/1 (4th Draft)

April 8, 1943

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943

Note by the Secretaries

At their 72d meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 151/2, a paper prepared by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff proposing certain revisions to the text of C.I.C. 16/1 (2d Draft), and directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit comments on C.C.S. 151/2, with particular reference to the revisions therein proposed. That paper was distributed to the Combined Intelligence Committee as Enclosure "A" of C.I.C. 16/3/D.

In view of the changing situation, the Committee felt it advisable not only to consider the proposed revisions but to reconsider C.I.C. 16/1 (2d Draft) as well. Attached hereto is a new edition of C.I.C. 16/1 (2d Draft), revised in the light of the changing situation and of the revisions proposed in C.C.S. 151/2. Certain divergent views have been left in parallel columns.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,
P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE

GERMAN STRATEGIC AIM

1. Germany's basic policy is to achieve world domination. In pursuing this policy she has encountered obstacles which compel her to conform her strategy to various limitations of short term necessity.

2. Within limits, the initiative lies in major part with the United Nations. Whilst this situation holds, the pattern of German strategy must be influenced by the choices made and operations launched by the United Nations.

3. In order to eliminate the greatest present threat to her, Germany must make the Russian front her chief preoccupation for the time being. Her task elsewhere will be to delay by every means available the build-up of the striking power of the other United Nations and simultaneously to exploit the industrial and agricultural potential of the conquered regions in order to strengthen her own position.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

4. Relationship to Japan. Regardless of the alliance between Japan and Germany, neither will adopt any line of action which it does not consider likely to further its own basic policy and strategic aims.

5. Strategic Position. The German position may be considered as a huge strategic triangle running from the North Cape to the Pyrenees, thence to the Caucasus, and back to the starting point. Germany has the advantage of fighting on interior lines and possesses good internal communications.

6. Limitations upon striking power. Due largely to inescapable commitments, logistic difficulties, the present critical shortage of oil, and to limitations of air and man power, Germany cannot conduct another major land offensive unless she can substantially neutralize the striking power of the Russian armies. Her lack of naval power and deficiency in air power limit her ability to conduct and support amphibious operations.

7. Time. Strategically time is not on the side of the Axis so long as offensive action is vigorously pressed against them.

8. Economics. Germany's war potential cannot be substantially increased if the present rate of military activity continues. Exploitation of the industrial and agricultural potentials of the conquered regions can only be partially achieved during 1943.

9. Morale. It is improbable that German military and civilian morale will crack in 1943, but its present state renders it vulnerable to the results of the 1943 campaign.

10. Prestige. The problem of impaired German prestige among Axis partners and satellites and in occupied countries will influence the German plans for 1943.

11. Personal Factor. Hitler himself has hitherto made all major decisions, often overruling sound advice; but there are some indications that the influence of the senior military leaders is increasing, which may result in an improvement in German strategy.

12. Negotiated Peace. A negotiated peace between Germany on the one hand and England and the United States on the other is ruled out. A negotiated peace between Soviet Russia and Germany cannot be regarded as an impossibility. Japan is reported to be

seeking to bring about just such a negotiated peace. It is thought, however, that the recent striking successes of the Soviet Armies in Russia have diminished to a considerable extent the likelihood of Germany and Russia reaching an understanding.

13. Military Situation as of March 24, 1943. There is good reason to believe that the strength and speed of the Russian assaults surprised and worried the German High Command. The recent German counter-attacks in the extreme South and their counter-offensive culminating in the capture of Kharkov and Byelgorod have averted the danger of disaster to the German Armies in the Donetz Bend and have largely succeeded in making it possible for them to hold the Russians as far East as their winter line of 1941-42. The evacuation of the Taman Peninsula continues.

Desperate efforts by the Germans are making good, to some degree, the decline in manpower in the Army; and to this extent the German position has for the moment improved, though the quality of recruits is probably lower than normal.

However, Germany did suffer a series of major defeats in Russia and has lost the equivalent of more than 40 divisions*, 20 of them destroyed at Stalingrad. The net German loss on this front, taking into account some 17 divisions moved from France to Russia since November, is approximately 23 divisions.

In her retreat Germany's losses of heavy equipment have been serious, particularly with respect to aircraft and motor transport. These losses and the decline in industrial output, due mainly to the extensive comb-out of manpower from industry, which is being replaced by less efficient foreign labor, women, youths or prisoners of war, and the effect of

* Includes Satellites which are counted as two Satellite Divisions for one German.

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air bombing present a calculated risk of reduced output of war materials which Germany appears to be assuming in the light of the results she hopes to accomplish this year.

Even when Germany has evacuated the Taman Peninsula, she will still have to hold a line not less than 1,400 miles in length. But with regard to the approximate number of divisions required and available to hold this front, combined agreement has not yet been reached.

The number of German divisions in France and the Low Countries has been reduced to the very low level of 33, of which only 9 are offensive. During the past two months ending 18 March, twelve offensive divisions (four of them Panzer and eight Infantry) have left France, and the only replacements have been two SS (Panzer or Motorized) divisions (both still in the course of formation), two offensive infantry divisions, and four to five reserve defensive divisions. There are clear indications that the German divisions arriving in Russia from France have, in some cases, gone straight into action and have been allowed no period either for acclimatization or training.

It is unlikely that during 1943 there will be such a change in the course of events in Russia as would enable the Germans to withdraw divisions from there sufficient both to meet their existing commitments and at the same time to mount any major offensive operations elsewhere.

In the Mediterranean area Germany was strategically surprised by the Allied landing in North Africa. She has sustained reverses and is meeting with difficulties in finding the necessary means to counter this situation and its possible repercussions in Italy and the Balkans.

1943 is probably the last year in which Germany can attempt to destroy the Russian forces with a feeling of comparative safety from attack in the west. She cannot safely turn her

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back on Russia until she is secure on that front. However, if Germany feels that there is little prospect of her obtaining decisive results against Russia in 1943, she will have to consider seriously the following alternatives:

- (a) To adopt an active defensive in Russia turning, if possible, to offensive operations elsewhere; or
- (b) To assume the strategic defensive on all fronts.

In particular Germany may feel that a year of defensive attrition warfare against Russia, coupled with offensive operations aimed at eliminating the growing threat to her in the Mediterranean area, will leave her in a relatively stronger position to continue the war in 1944.

The Germans realize that the ocean shipping situation of the United Nations is now unsatisfactory. Though they may hope that their own offensive measures will more than override increasing United Nations' shipbuilding and anti-submarine measures, they also realize that, from a purely shipping standpoint, the present probably offers a more favorable opportunity than will ever again exist for Germany to take offensive action against United Nations' forces.

COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO GERMANY

14. The following are the major courses of military action open to Germany in 1943 (not necessarily arranged in order of probability):

Course A: To intensify the war of attrition against shipping.

Course B: To resume the offensive in Russia.

Course C: To adopt an active defense against Russia, exploiting any success to the fullest extent.

Course D: To maintain a bridgehead in North Africa.

Course E: To withdraw to and defend the Mediterranean island line.

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Course F: To occupy the Iberian Peninsula.

Course G: To take the offensive against Allied Forces in North Africa, either directly across the Mediterranean, or through the Iberian Peninsula, or both.

Course H: To attack the Middle East.

Course I: To make an all-out attack against Great Britain.

Course J: To assume the strategic defensive on all fronts.

DISCUSSION OF EACH COURSE

15. The major pros and cons of each indicated course of action are discussed below. For courses of action retained, see paragraph 16.

Course A: To intensify the war of attrition against shipping.

(1) Conclusion: This course of action will be undertaken no matter what other courses are adopted.

Course B: To resume the offensive in Russia.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. If successful, the only remaining great military power on the continent of Europe would be destroyed and Axis Europe would be free from the danger which threatens it from the east.

b. If successful, it would in time insure a large degree of economic relief.

c. Many German leaders, as well as the German people, regard Russia as the major long-range threat.

d. Hitler's personal commitment to the annihilation of Russian power would be vindicated.

e. 1943 is probably the last year in which Germany can attempt to destroy the Russian

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forces with a feeling of comparative safety from attack in the west.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would tie up the major part of German offensive forces as well as transport in eastern Europe and thus preclude any major German action elsewhere at a time when the United Nations are still seriously handicapped by the shipping situation. It would even jeopardize the defense of Germany in case of a strong Allied attack in western or southern Europe.

b. It would require an all-out military effort with the result that the economic effort would be further strained.

c. If unsuccessful, it would sow the seeds of a moral collapse -- if not in Germany, at least in the countries of some of its allies.

d. A major offensive has been tried twice before, and under more favorable conditions has failed. The heavy losses sustained by both German and satellite formations will handicap such an offensive in 1943.

e. It would commit Germany to active aerial combat which, with her present deficiency and over-all commitments, she can ill afford to face.

f. Germany's present critical oil situation may seriously prejudice the success of extensive operations in Russia.

(3) Conclusion: Germany's war machine is strained to such an extent that she can hardly hope to be able to destroy Russia's military power by a deliberate major offensive after her failure, under better conditions in previous years. She may be

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expected to seize every opportunity of exploiting fully any favorable situation which may arise.

Course C: To adopt an active defense against Russia, exploiting any successes to the fullest extent.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. In view of the improved fighting power and considerable strength of the Russian Army, it is essential to carry out a policy of heavy attrition against it. To achieve this policy an active defense is the only course which could reasonably be adopted against Russia short of offensive action.

b. Although it would give Germany valuable time in which to build up her armament production and reequip and rest her forces, the same argument applies to Russia. However, it will result in greater economy of force for Germany because she will have better communications and will be able to concentrate her forces both to meet threatened attacks and to take advantage of Russian weak spots. This will give Germany a chance to prepare herself for an effective offensive in 1944.

c. It is essential, in order to avoid further losses of men, equipment and valuable Ukraine territory by further withdrawals, that the line should be stabilized as far east as possible. For this an active defense is essential, although it will not permit the release of any major units for commitments and operations elsewhere.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would still not be possible for the Germans to release major units for employment elsewhere unless they were prepared to fall back to a line further west than one based on the River Dneiper - the Pripet Marshes - Lake Peipus. But withdrawal to such a line would expose the Rumanian oil fields to air attack and result in the loss of some of the Ukraine. It would also endanger the German hold on the Balkans and might result in defection on the part of some of their satellite allies. The result, therefore, of any such withdrawal might well be to increase Germany's defense commitments in other parts of Europe and to this extent nullify the gain.

b. It would still commit Germany to active aerial combat which, with her present deficiency and over-all commitments, she can ill afford to face.

c. A defensive attitude, even if it is intended to be an active one, would not be appreciated by the German people and would, therefore, not lead to the bolstering up of their spirits which their defeats in Russia have brought to a low level.

d. Unless the Russians undertake and maintain the offensive, the adoption by Germany of an active defense would eliminate the possibility of a destruction of the Russian armed forces in 1943.

(3) Conclusion: This course may be chosen by Germany and is therefore retained for further consideration.

Course D: To maintain a bridgehead in North Africa.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. It contains United Nations' armies in North Africa and thus delays any major offensive action by the United Nations against the Continent. It also diverts some United Nations' air power from targets on the Continent.

b. It might commit the United Nations' western power to an indecisive campaign and facilitate Axis operations against Russia for another year.

c. It is important toward maintaining the Italian will to continue participation in the war.

d. It results in an economy of Axis forces in that more would be required should a withdrawal be made to the "Island Line." Such a withdrawal would necessitate additional German forces in Italy and the Balkans as well as occupation of the islands.

e. It greatly increases the strain on United Nations' shipping, exposes it to loss, and practically denies its operations through the Sicilian straits.

f. The short lines of land communications and, in their advanced positions, the terrain favor an Axis defense of their present bridgehead.

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g. It facilitates the continuance by the Axis of subversive activities among the native peoples of North Africa.

h. It tends to maintain Franco's attachment to the Axis.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. There is inevitably heavy attrition due to the insecure line of water communication across the Mediterranean to Tunis.

b. The United Nations have the capability to build up and maintain superior air forces in this area. Maintaining this bridgehead and the air forces necessary for that purpose entails a heavy drain on Axis air strength which they can ill afford.

c. A clear-cut military defeat in this area would have serious political and psychological repercussions, particularly in Italy.

(3) Conclusion: Since Germany's commitment in North Africa pays a high dividend in the delay and embarrassment which it causes the United Nations, and is an important factor in maintaining the will to fight among the Italians, Germany is likely to continue to maintain the bridgehead until she is defeated there, although this will not constitute the major portion of German military activity in 1943.

Course E: To withdraw to and defend the Mediterranean Island Line.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. The islands (Crete, Sicily, Sardinia) are suitable for effective defense, as they can only be taken by amphibious operations.

b. It would still be possible to hamper any offensive action by the United Nations against southern Europe.

c. It would permit Germany to use the bulk of her forces against Russia.

d. It would still be possible to interfere seriously with United Nations' shipping through the Mediterranean.

e. It would avoid the costly attrition and danger of a defeat inherent in operations in and against North Africa.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would entail the diversion of German forces from other fronts to garrison the islands, Italy, and the Balkans.

b. It would entail loss of prestige and consequent damage to the Axis, and especially Italian, morale.

c. It would result in an improvement in the shipping situation of the United Nations to the extent that it permitted passage of United Nations' shipping through the Mediterranean.

d. It would practically eliminate the hope of future major operations toward the Middle East or Northwestern Africa.

(3) Conclusion: As a defensive measure this course logically comes next to that of maintaining the Tunisian bridgehead, since it would still give some protection to the base of the German strategic triangle and might prevent an early collapse of Italian morale.

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Course F: To occupy the Iberian Peninsula.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. Occupation of the Iberian Peninsula could deny to the Allies free passage through the Straits of Gibraltar and would secure to the Axis airfields and naval bases, particularly for submarines operating in the Atlantic.

Operations from these bases would greatly assist Axis capability to interfere with Allied shipping in the Atlantic and impede air communications.

b. It would seriously hamper Allied operations in, and extending from, North Africa.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would open another active front and necessitate the diversion of Axis forces from other areas, especially Russia.

b. It would greatly increase the dispersion of Axis forces and result in very important logistic problems.

c. The supply line through Spain would be very limited in view of the transport situation there.

d. Under the best of circumstances it would saddle Germany with another economic liability.

e. It might be countered by a United Nations' landing in the Iberian Peninsula and would almost certainly lead to the seizure of the Atlantic islands. This latter would not only give the United Nations an advantage in the protection of their shipping, but would enable them better to combat the U-boat campaign.

f. The attitude of the people of Spain is such that Franco would find it difficult to insure even passive cooperation with the plan.

g. It would eliminate an important point of Axis contact with the outside world (Lisbon).

h. If Spain resisted or suffered in consequence, it would antagonize elements in Latin America which are now lukewarm to the United Nations' cause.

(3) Conclusion: Were Germany in a position to make available the necessary forces to insure the success of this course in all eventualities which may arise in the Iberian Peninsula, it would provide the best means of countering the Allied invasion of North Africa. Whilst Russia remains her chief preoccupation, Germany cannot make these forces available. This course is therefore not probable in 1943.

Course G: To take the offensive against Allied Forces in North Africa, either directly across the Mediterranean, or through the Iberian Peninsula, or both.

- (i) Directly across the Mediterranean;
- (ii) Through the Iberian Peninsula (extension of Course "F") and into Spanish Morocco.

It is assumed in both cases (a) that the maintenance of the Tunisian bridgehead is a necessary part of this Course, and (b), that attempts will be made at harassing Allied communications by means of raids based on Sardinia.

Course (i) is ruled out since the Axis would be unable to establish naval superiority and is unlikely to be able to provide the air superiority and sufficient

shipping successfully to launch a large amphibious operation of this nature. Much less would they be able to maintain and supply the force necessary for such an operation.

Course (11)

NOTE: Such an offensive as is here visualized must be made in the form of a pincers movement, and one claw of the pincers must move from the Iberian Peninsula after its complete occupation; even if the crossing to North Africa did not succeed, the Axis would then at least gain the advantages mentioned in Course F. The other arm would take the form of at least maintaining the Tunisian bridgehead assisted, to some degree, by raids from Sardinia aimed at Allied communications between Tunisia and Algeria.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. The Mediterranean front offers the only opportunity of any promise of obtaining important results and a desperately needed victory with relatively small ground forces compared with those employed in Russia.

b. If made in sufficient force, and successful, it would remove the Allied threat against Southern Europe and the consequent necessity of providing strong defensive forces along the north coast of the Mediterranean and the Island chain.

c. If successful, it would render the passage of the Straits practically impossible to the Allies.

d. Complete success in North Africa would have a profound psychological effect not only in Germany and in Italy, but in the satellite

and conquered countries. At the same time it would discourage Russia and would weaken Turkish resistance to the Axis.

e. Access to the food and other resources in North Africa (and perhaps West Africa) would ultimately be regained.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. This course could not achieve the desired results unless the Tunisian bridgehead is still held in force.

b. The Allies would have ample warning of the intention to carry out this course, and therefore a combined operation across the Straits would be exceedingly hazardous in view of the forces, especially air, which the Allies would oppose to it.

c. The concentration of the requisite shipping and assault craft would be extremely difficult.

d. To be entirely successful it would require large forces beyond those required for Course F. For some months to come at least, these forces cannot be spared.

e. It would create a still greater dispersion of forces and greatly increase the logistic difficulties of the Axis.

f. The Allies would still retain the supply route from the East to Tripoli and Malta.

(3) Conclusion: This course depends upon the maintenance of the Tunisian bridgehead (Course D) and a successful occupation of the Iberian Peninsula

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(Course F). If the Tunisian bridgehead collapses, the whole course is ruled out. An occupation of the Iberian Peninsula has already been judged not probable in 1943 so long as Russia remains Germany's chief preoccupation.

Course H: To attack the Middle East.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. It would deny important economic resources, particularly oil, to the United Nations, make them eventually available to the Axis, and might eventually deny the Indian Ocean to the United Nations.

b. It would open the way toward a junction with Japan and access to the enormous raw material resources of southeastern Asia.

c. It would complicate the United Nations' shipping problem.

d. It would create grave political problems for the United Nations in the northern interior of Africa, in parts of the Middle East still held by them, and in parts of India.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. Land approaches to the Middle East are unfavorable to the rapid build-up of striking forces. If an attack were launched by sea, it would require a superiority of naval and air forces which the Axis cannot provide.

b. There would be hostile forces on both flanks.

c. If launched through Turkey, it would align another power against the Axis.

d. Before any junction with Japan could be effected, the German lines of communication would be very dangerously extended.

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e. It would open another active front and necessitate the diversion of Axis forces from Russia.

(3) Conclusion: Germany's preoccupation in Russia, the difficulties of land approaches, and her inability to provide sufficient naval and air forces to gain the superiority necessary were the operation to be amphibious, together with the probable addition of Turkish forces to those of the United Nations, make it impracticable for her to undertake such an operation during 1943.

Course I: To make an all-out attack against Great Britain

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. It would weaken or eliminate a major enemy and the most important nearby bases of hostile air and naval power.

b. It would greatly bolster Axis morale and discourage the conquered peoples.

c. It would provide a possible means of stimulating, in certain elements in the United States and the British Dominions, a desire to make a compromised peace.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would be an unsound military operation, inasmuch as Germany does not and with its available forces cannot have control of the Channel and the air over England.

b. It would open another active front and necessitate the diversion of Axis forces from Russia.

c. Its failure would constitute a disastrous reverse for the Axis.

(3) Conclusion: It is considered that Germany has not the resources to make practicable an all-out attack on Great Britain in 1943.

Course J: To assume a strategic defensive on all fronts.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. The Axis could devote more of its military effort to the preparation of defenses and the production of armaments, including submarines and aircraft, with the aim of making the Strategic Triangle impregnable as swiftly as possible.

b. Manpower, productive capacity, and transport would be relieved for the economic and political consolidation of Europe as far as Allied action permits.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would mean the abandonment of the German basic policy (see paragraph 1), and would permit the Allies definitely to seize the initiative.

b. The war with Soviet Russia, even if a passive defensive were adopted, would still consume a large portion of the German Army and Air Force and ultimately reduce to a dangerous extent German defensive capabilities in other theaters.

c. It would commit the war to a phase of aerial combat in which the Axis cannot hope to match the United Nations.

d. It would commit the Axis to a competition in production in which it cannot hope to match the United Nations.

e. It would permit a more complete build-up of the military power of the United Nations.

f. It would be an admission to the people of the Axis and occupied countries that a decisive military victory for the Axis is impossible in 1943.

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(3) Conclusion: This course would do much to enable Germany to consolidate her gains, reorganize her army and relieve her economic situation, but is unlikely because it could succeed only in the event the United Nations failed fully to exploit the initiative. It is, however, retained for further consideration.

COURSES OF ACTION RETAINED

16. Whatever course of action Germany decides or is forced to take in Russia, this front perforce will absorb the larger portion of her army and air force for months to come. After consideration of the foregoing courses of German action in 1943, we consider that her possible courses are as follows:

(a) To intensify the war of attrition against United Nations' shipping, and at the same time:

U. S. version

(1) To continue to employ the great bulk of her forces against Russia with the strategic aim of destroying Russian military power and, at the same time, either:

a. Maintain the Tunisian bridgehead in order to defend Italy and the Islands, remaining elsewhere strictly on the defensive with the main line of resistance along the shores of the "Fortress of Europe," or

British version

(1) To adopt an active defense in Russia; so far as possible by limited offensive actions in Russia to improve her own position and, should she unexpectedly attain successes leading to a weakening of Russian military strength, to make a final effort to destroy the Russian Armed Forces, and, at the same time:

a. Maintain the Tunisian bridgehead in order to defend Italy and the Islands, remaining elsewhere strictly on the defensive with the main line of resistance along the shores of the "Fortress of Europe," or

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- b. If driven from Tunisia, defend the "Island Line," remaining elsewhere on the defensive as above; or
- (2) To assume the defensive in Russia and occupy the Iberian Peninsula, whilst holding and possibly trying to expand the Tunisian bridgehead, remaining strictly on the defensive elsewhere; or
- (3) To assume the defensive in Russia and take the offensive against Allied Forces in North Africa through the Iberian Peninsula, whilst holding and trying to expand the Tunisian bridgehead, remaining strictly on the defensive elsewhere; or
- (4) To assume the strategic defensive on all fronts.

- b. If driven from Tunisia, defend the "Island Line," remaining elsewhere on the defensive as above;
- (2) To maintain the strategic defensive on all fronts.

SPECIAL NOTE:

Unless Russia unexpectedly collapses, an attempted occupation of the Iberian Peninsula in 1943 would involve an increase in Germany's total commitments, and a depletion of her forces in other theaters, to an extent which would not be acceptable to her. An attempt, subsequently, to launch an offensive against Allied forces in North Africa is considered even more remote. On the contrary, evidence tends to show that, so far from contemplating operations in the Iberian Peninsula this year, the Germans are apprehensive of the Allies' intentions in that quarter.

PROBABLE GERMAN INTENTIONS AS OF APRIL 5, 1943

17. To intensify the war of attrition against United Nations' shipping and to seek to destroy the Russian Armed Forces, assuming the defensive on all other fronts and retaining, as long as possible, the Tunisian bridgehead.
17. To intensify the war of attrition against United Nations' shipping; to adopt an active defensive strategy in Russia; so far as possible, by limited offensive actions in Russia, to improve her own position and, should she unexpectedly attain

U. S. [REDACTED]
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success leading to a weakening of Russian military strength, to make a final effort to destroy the Russian Armed Forces; on all other fronts to assume the defensive and to retain the Tunisian bridgehead as long as possible.

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(1) J.C.S. 287

Pages 5-9, incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

References: (a) J.C.S. 272
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg., Item 1

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
this date.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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By WBJ Date APR 13 1973

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STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

1. A brief discussion of the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN is contained in Enclosure "A".
2. The plan is based upon the following general tasks:
 - a. Until GERMANY is defeated, to maintain pressure on Japan; to retain the initiative; and to attain a position of readiness for the full-scale offensive against JAPAN by the UNITED NATIONS as soon as GERMANY is defeated.
 - b. As soon as GERMANY is defeated, to apply the full-scale offensive contemplated.
3. The indeterminate period during which task a. is effective, prevents dividing the plan into definitely coordinated phases. With this reservation in regard to timing and coordination, the plan is expressed as follows:

PHASE I

- a. CONTINUE AND AUGMENT EXISTING UNDERTAKINGS IN AND FROM CHINA.

Chinese Forces assisted by U.S. Forces.

- b. RECAPTURE BURMA.

British Forces assisted by U.S. and Chinese Forces.

- c. OPEN A LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO THE CELEBES SEA.

United States Forces.

PHASE II

- a. OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES.

British Forces.

- b. RECAPTURE THE PHILIPPINES.

United States Forces.

- c. PREPARE TO CAPTURE HONG KONG.

Chinese Forces.

PHASE III

- a. CONTINUE OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES.

British Forces.

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- b. SECURE CONTROL OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND ASSIST IN THE CAPTURE OF HONG KONG.

United States Forces.

- c. CAPTURE HONG KONG.

Chinese Forces.

PHASE IV

ESTABLISH AIR BASES IN JAPANESE OCCUPIED CHINA FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH AN OVERWHELMING BOMBING OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN.

Chinese Forces, assisted by British and U. S. Forces.

PHASE V

CONDUCT AN OVERWHELMING AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN.

U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

PHASE VI

INVADE JAPAN.

U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

4. Objective of the plan.

The UNITED NATIONS war objective is the unconditional surrender of the AXIS Powers. The accomplishment of this objective may require the invasion of JAPAN.

5. Most probable Japanese courses of action.

JAPAN'S most probable courses of action are to direct her major effort toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating CHINA from the war.

6. The invasion of JAPAN.

Since the invasion of JAPAN is a vast undertaking, it should not be attempted until Japanese power and will to resist have been so reduced that favorable conditions for invasion obtain. Under these conditions the invasion of JAPAN is considered feasible.

It is probable that the reduction of JAPAN'S power and will to resist may only be accomplished by a sustained, systematic, and large-scale air offensive against JAPAN itself.

7. An air offensive against JAPAN.

An air offensive on the required scale can only be conducted from bases in CHINA. The capacity of the Burma Road, supplemented by the air route from INDIA is inadequate. The seizure of a port in CHINA to augment the supply through BURMA is essential.

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8. The seizure of a port in CHINA.

HONG KONG is the most suitable port which may be seized initially. Its seizure requires an offensive from the interior of CHINA by forces supported through BURMA, and, probably, by supplementary amphibious operations. Control of the SOUTH CHINA SEA by the UNITED NATIONS will be necessary to prevent JAPAN from successfully opposing these measures.

9. A line of communications to HONG KONG.

The most feasible sea route from the UNITED STATES to HONG KONG is through the CELEBES and SULU SEAS; that from the UNITED KINGDOM is through the STRAIT OF MALACCA. The establishment of these routes will require the neutralization of Japanese bases in the northern EAST INDIES, the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA, and on the Asiatic mainland south of HONG KONG. Control of these areas will prevent JAPAN from supporting her forces in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and will deny her the economic advantages she receives from that area. Operations to open a line of communications to HONG KONG and to control the SOUTH CHINA SEA are considered feasible.

10. A line of communications from HAWAII to the CELEBES SEA.

This line of communications to the CELEBES SEA will be established by advancing in the CENTRAL and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areas with a view to shortening the sea route, providing for its security, and denying to the enemy bases and means by which he may interfere with the line of communications.

11. A line of communications through the STRAIT OF MALACCA.

Although the supply of forces in CHINA will come mainly from the UNITED STATES, operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA, after the reconquest of BURMA, are a vital part of the plan. The enemy must be continuously compelled to disperse his forces.

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throughout the PACIFIC and ASIATIC areas thus exposing them to attrition on an additional front in SOUTHEASTERN ASIA. This area is one of British strategic responsibility, and is a suitable and feasible undertaking for British Commonwealth Forces.

12. Control of the Seas.

Since control of the seas in the WESTERN PACIFIC by the UNITED NATIONS may force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN before invasion and even before JAPAN is subjected to an intensive air offensive, every means to gain this control will be undertaken by the UNITED STATES. The establishment of the line of communications to the CELEBES SEA will be used as the vehicle to gain this end. The selection of intermediate objectives which will compel the enemy to expose his naval forces will be the greatest single factor in determining the enemy positions to be seized.

Attrition of enemy shipping, air, and naval resources will be a continuing objective. Raids on Japanese lines of communication, and carrier-based air raids on Japanese positions extending to JAPAN itself, will be implemented as our naval strength increases.

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March 5, 1943

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(1) J.I.C. 80/M
(2) J.I.C. 80/1

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

JAPANESE STRATEGY, 1943

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure is in the form adopted by the Committee at its 54th Meeting. It was prepared in response to a request from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,
Secretary.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-73

By RT Date MAY 23 1973

ENCLOSURE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. As of 1 March, 1943, the probable Japanese intention for the current year is:

(a) To remain on the strategic defensive and conduct operations to maintain the island barrier while, by limited objective operations, forestalling United Nations' attempts to penetrate Japan's strategic barrier;

(b) To carry out attritional tactics against United Nations' forces, bases and outposts;

(c) To attempt to sever the supply line to and consolidate her position in China in order to deny bases for an attack against Japan Proper.

2. The existing military situation in the Pacific and Asiatic theaters indicates that Japan will endeavor, for the time being, to improve her relations with Russia, and will exert military, economic, and political pressure to bring about a cessation of hostilities with China. Events in the Southwest Theater during the past few months strengthen the belief that Japan intends to consolidate and develop her defenses in this area as well as the rest of her strategic barriers. Meanwhile, Japan is feverishly attempting to expand transportation and industrial capacities in order to exploit the raw materials of the occupied areas and thus achieve an economy self-sufficient for continued hostilities over an indefinite period. To accomplish this purpose, Japan apparently intends to remain on the strategic defensive, thus conserving manpower and military strength for future operations.

3. Considering the possible courses of action in 1943 in the light of the existing situation in the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters, it is believed that they may be arranged in the following order of likelihood:

[REDACTED]

(a) To remain on the strategic defensive, carrying out limited offensives and operations designed to cripple United Nations' striking power when opportunities permit, particularly against the islands along the lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific and, at the same time, to improve present positions by limited offensive operations in one or more of the following areas in the order named:

- (1) New Guinea.
- (2) The Solomon Islands.
- (3) Southwest China (Yunnan Province)*.
- (4) Other areas in China.*
- (5) Northern Burma-Assam.
- (6) The Aleutian Islands.

(b) To undertake major offensive operations in the order named against:

- (1) The Southern Solomons, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa groups.
- (2) Northern Australia.
- (3) India and/or Ceylon.
- (4) China.*
- (5) Siberia.
- (6) Midway-Hawaii.

ARGUMENT

4. Japan's basic aim is to achieve complete control of the Far East. This includes Asiatic Russia (East of Lake Baikal), Manchuria, China, Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, the East Indies, the Philippine Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and all islands in the Melanesian, Micronesian, and Polynesian groups (including Hawaii). Ultimately Japan hopes to achieve domination

* In the event of a substantially increased tempo of military operations in China on the part of the United Nations this would be given a higher degree of probability.

[REDACTED]

of a wider area, including India. In carrying out this basic aim it is only recently that she has encountered such serious military opposition, as to force her to conform her strategy to various limitations of short term necessity.

5. At present the initiative basically lies with the United Nations, except in China, but commitments in the European theater prevent full exploitation of this situation. The pattern of Japanese strategy will be determined in large part by that of the United Nations.

6. The greatest present threat to Japan is in the Melanesian area, which will probably be her chief preoccupation during 1943. The Treaty of Amity with Russia, Russian commitments in Europe, and the pressure of large Japanese forces in Manchuria are believed sufficient to insure, for the time being, the strategic security of Japan from that flank. Her task elsewhere will be to exploit, consolidate, and strengthen the defenses of the present occupied areas in order to sustain prolonged hostilities. Japan will, in addition, support her strategic defense by limited offensives and operations designed to cripple the United Nations' striking power.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

7. Relationship to the Axis.

Regardless of the alliance between Japan and Germany, neither will adopt any line of action which it does not consider likely to further its own basic aims and strategic policies. German attempts to induce Japan to attack Russia, as well as reported Japanese attempts to bring about a Russo-German peace, have so far been unsuccessful.

8. Strategic Position.

From no point of land outside of the strategic barrier (Kiska-Karefuto-Manchuria-Occupied China-Burma-Malaya-East Indies-Melanesia-Mandates) can effective bombing attacks be launched

[REDACTED]

against Japan Proper except from Eastern Siberia and limited areas in China. Terrain and supply conditions in Burma and supply problems in China favor Japanese as against United Nations' ground forces. With the Japanese Navy in virtual control of the Western Pacific north of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, submarine and air attacks against Japanese lines of communications, and possibly naval raids are probably the only effective United Nations operations feasible in that area until a shift of the balance of naval power occurs.

9. Limitations Upon Striking Power.

Japan will not be limited by a lack of ground forces in any strategic operations she is likely to undertake. But air and shipping limitations will prevent her from simultaneously embarking on operations against Russia, India, and Australia or even against any two of them. Japan's naval strength, while probably sufficient for her present commitments, must be carefully husbanded, and all-out naval engagements by her main fleet (or large task forces of it) within range of United Nations' land-based bombers will have to be avoided if sufficient strength for successful defense of Japan Proper is to be retained. Japan's extended lines of communication entail a large commitment of and a serious drain upon naval strength, particularly escort vessels for the protection of her shipping. These factors are believed to limit the possibility of major offensive operations to only one area.

10. Time.

The full exploitation of territories now occupied by Japan would in time enable her to develop a self-sufficient war economy. Strengthening the defense of these areas is making their recapture by the United Nations increasingly difficult in proportion to the delay involved.

11. Economics.

Japan is attempting to expand transportation and processing facilities to take advantage of a greatly strengthened raw materials position. Under the most favorable conditions her over-all war production might be increased 10% to 15% by the end of 1943. Shipping and processing are, however, vulnerable to hostile action. Japan at present is concentrating industrial development in Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, and Formosa and building up in these areas stockpiles of materials obtained from the areas conquered in 1942. This would indicate Japanese preparation of a strong secondary defense area in the event of a German defeat in Europe and a consequent concentration of the United Nations in the Pacific. If Germany's position deteriorates further in 1943, Japan can be expected to place still greater economic emphasis on the northern areas.

12. Morale.

Japanese military and civilian morale is high and Japanese psychological characteristics are such that no break in morale can be expected before Japan's complete and irretrievable defeat in battle.

13. Prestige.

Japanese prestige among the natives of the occupied territories is maintained by military rule. The very clannishness which unites and strengthens the Japanese prevents them from winning the loyalty of the conquered (the Japanese say, "liberated") peoples. Actual Japanese occupation is generally followed by the disillusionment of the natives although these people are mostly passive folk from whom no violent or organized resistance to Japanese rule is to be expected. Future military reverses would lower Japan's prestige among these peoples and would make necessary larger garrisons for policing purposes.


14. Personal Factors.

The institution of the Emperor in Japan symbolizes that mystic sense of divinity and special unity which has characterized the Japanese race. The loyalty of the Japanese people is to the institution of their God-Emperor, however, rather than to any individual Emperor. Therefore if Hirohito should disappear, the loyalty of the people would be transferred without abatement to his imperial successor.

The actual power in Japan is in the hands of the militarists. The recent changes have so concentrated administrative authority in the hands of one man (Tojo) that the succession to his post might be open to dispute within the military cliques. While the fall of Tojo or even a reshuffling of the cabinet might entail a modification of the immediate strategic plans, such change would not alter Japan's determination vigorously to prosecute the war.

15. Negotiated Peace.

A negotiated peace between Japan and the United Nations is highly improbable due to the wide discrepancy between the terms that might be acceptable to the two groups. A discontinuance of China's active belligerency cannot be regarded as an impossibility, but increased support of China by the other United Nations would minimize that possibility.

16. The Military Situation as of 1 March, 1943.

Japan nearly succeeded in perfecting her strategic barrier before the United Nations stopped her progress. Except for combat pilots, her personnel losses have not been important. Her losses in aircraft, and naval and merchant shipping have been heavy. She has sufficient troops in most areas to meet local needs. Reserves of ground forces are strategically located and are adequate in numbers and training. There is sufficient shipping to move these reserves to points where they may be needed but only at the expense of her present economic program. The reverses suffered by the Japanese at Midway, in Papua and Guadalcanal, while they do not constitute a major

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defeat, must certainly indicate to Japanese leaders that the days of easy victory are over, and the increasing strength of the United Nations must be the cause of serious concern.

17. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO JAPAN

As long as the situation in Europe undergoes no basic change, the following are the major courses of action open to Japan for 1943:

- (a) Remain on the strategic defensive.
- (b) Intensify efforts to secure peace in China.
- (c) Adopt measures of attrition.
 - (1) Raids or attacks on military, naval, and air bases, particularly in the islands along the lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific.
 - (2) Attacks on shipping.
 - (3) Attacks on naval forces.
 - (4) Sea-borne raids on coastal points (India, Australia, and North America).
- (d) Improve present positions by limited offensive operations.
 - (1) In New Guinea.
 - (2) In the Solomons.
 - (3) In Southwest China (Yunnan Province).*
 - (4) In other areas in China.*
 - (5) In Northern Burma-Assam.
 - (6) In the Aleutians.
- (e) Undertake major offensive operations.
 - (1) Against the Southern Solomons, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa groups.
 - (2) Against Northern Australia.
 - (3) Against India and/or Ceylon.
 - (4) Against China.*
 - (5) Against Siberia.
 - (6) Against Midway-Hawaii.

* In the event of a substantially increased tempo of military operations in China on the part of the United Nations this would be given a higher degree of probability.

18. Discussion of each Course of Action.

The pros and cons of each course of action indicated in paragraph 17 are discussed below:

(a) Remain on the strategic defensive.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. If not seriously hampered by enemy action, Japan could strengthen her defenses and develop her war industries to such an extent that except for the threat from Eastern Siberia her defensive position could then be reduced only by long and extremely costly operations.

b. Because of her strong position in the Western Pacific, Japan can remain on the strategic defensive with a minimum expenditure of manpower and risk of materiel.

c. The insular portion of Japan's strategic barrier is suitable for effective defense, as it can only be breached by large scale amphibious operations.

d. It would avoid irreplaceable air and naval losses and other dangers inherent in large scale offensive operations.

e. It would avoid further extension of the present long lines of communication which would place an additional burden on an already tight shipping situation.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. A defensive strategy does not conform to Japanese military doctrine.

b. Japan would be unable to choose the theater of action.

c. The United Nations with their vastly superior industrial resources will be able to outstrip Japan in production.

d. The United Nations may acquire bases from which they can bring their superior forces and resources to bear more effectively upon Japanese lines of communication and vital centers.

(b) Intensify efforts to secure peace in China.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

If successful:

a. The military effect would be important. Japan could withdraw some portion of the soldiers now stationed in China. The use of air bases would be denied to the United Nations. Japan's hold over Burma would be strengthened.

b. It would have a profound psychological effect, encouraging the Japanese populace, discouraging the United Nations, and greatly aiding Japanese psychological warfare in India and in occupied areas.

c. Japan's economic exploitation of China would be greatly facilitated. Japan might secure adequate supplies of certain strategic materials, e.g., tungsten and antimony.

d. It would facilitate efforts to achieve closer and better relations with the Soviet Union.

(2) Reasons against adopting (in the sense that Japan would be unwilling to grant favorable terms to the Central Government for the following reasons):

a. Fighting in China gives Japanese troops a valuable training ground.

b. In any event Japan would be forced to keep a large number of troops in China to insure order and suppress guerilla warfare.

c. Japan already controls those parts of China most suited to economic exploitation. Most of unoccupied China is only of minor economic importance.

d. Japan has tried unsuccessfully to bring about a separate peace and may have been discouraged from further attempts.

(c) Adopt measures of attrition.

No discussion deemed necessary. See paragraph

17 (c).

(d) Improve present positions by limited offensive operations.

(1) In New Guinea.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. The capture of Papua and control of all New Guinea would give the Japanese an additional base from which to launch raids or attacks on North Australia and would deprive our land forces and land-based air units of their most effective base of operations against Rabaul and other areas in New Britain of strategic importance to the Japanese.

2. The control of all New Guinea would enable the Japanese to strike effectively at Allied operations in the Banda and Arafura Sea areas.

3. The capture of Papua would regain for the Japanese some of the prestige lost by reverses suffered there in recent weeks.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Japanese losses in the Southwest Pacific have been high.

2. Further attempts would probably be very expensive to their ground, naval and air forces so long as the United Nations retain air superiority in that area.

3. Health conditions are poor with the result that the number of noneffectives becomes large soon after the arrival of troops in the area.

(2) In the Solomons.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Capture and occupation of the Solomons would remove a dangerous threat to other Japanese bases in this area.

2. It would put Japan in a better position to move against the islands in the South Pacific along the United Nations' lines of communication.

3. As long as the United Nations remain in possession of bases in the Solomons they constitute a threat to the Japanese position not only in the Solomons but in the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea.

4. In addition to these important strategic considerations, the recapture of the South Solomons would tend to revive among the Japanese the myth of the invincibility of their military forces and restore lost prestige.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. The campaign in the Solomons has been particularly expensive to Japan in both men and materiel.

2. Since the United Nations have consolidated their position and have air superiority, any further operations to regain control of the Southern Solomons would probably involve even greater losses.

(3) In Southwest China (Yunnan Province).

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. It would deprive China of Kunming, its second most important war production center.

2. A Japanese occupation of Kunming would cut the present air supply route from India to China.

3. It would seriously handicap the operations of the American Air Task Force in China.

4. It would strike a serious blow at Chinese morale and might result in a collapse of Chinese resistance.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Japanese forces at present in Burma cannot afford to divert any large force for this operation.

2. Except for a Japanese division now in Thailand, any additional troops would have to come from French Indo-China or beyond.

3. It would require a diversion of air strength from other areas.

4. All routes leading to Kunming are mountainous and the area is infested with malaria.

5. Supply problems would become progressively more serious.

6. Chinese forces in the area have been reinforced.

(4) In other areas in China.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. To remove the possibility of the United Nations using certain air and naval bases in China as a base for attacks on Japan Proper, occupied areas, and lines of communication.

2. To occupy strategic and economic centers vital to the Chinese war effort.

3. To obtain certain additional strategic bases (particularly air).

4. It would strike a serious blow at Chinese morale and might result in a collapse of Chinese resistance.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would lengthen Japanese lines of communication.

2. It would require additional ground and air forces.

(5) Northern Burma-Assam.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Occupation of this area would increase the isolation of China by cutting the air route.

2. The further isolation of China might demoralize the Chinese to the point where they would cease to resist. The Japanese would be in a far better position to deny to the United Nations the possible future use of China as a base for operations against Japan.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would be a long and costly campaign over difficult terrain.

2. It would extend Japan's already extremely long lines of communication.

(6) In the Aleutians.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Japanese attacks on our forward bases in the Aleutians would hamper American attacks on Japanese bases in the western Aleutians.

2. More extensive operations might deny to the United Nations the use of waters north of the Aleutians and would restrict the use of the Arctic Sea route to Russia.

3. It would provide bases for the Japanese control of northern Pacific waters, for raids or attacks on the mainland of Alaska, and would increase security for the Japanese fishing fleets operating in northern waters.

4. It would impede a possible future junction of American and Russian forces in the North Pacific and would hamper attacks on Japan Proper via the Aleutians.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. A Japanese attack on our western bases would necessitate using at least a division supported by air and naval forces.

2. This would necessitate initially 150,000 tons of shipping and thereafter 37,000 tons monthly for maintenance.

3. This long line of communication would be vulnerable to our submarine, air and surface attacks.

4. Frequent rains, high winds, and fogs among the Aleutian Islands seriously interfere with air operations in summer and winter.

5. There are no local supplies or resources in the area other than fish.

6. Persistent attack from American forces can be expected.

7. Because of our occupation of some of these islands, surprise could not be completely effected.

8. The important objectives are far apart.

(e) Undertake major offensive operations.

(1) Against the Southern Solomons, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa groups.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. The present line of communications between the United States and Australia and the Southwest Pacific would be severed. Even a partial success in securing some of these islands would increase logistic difficulties of the United Nations (particularly on the air ferry route).

2. Capture of New Caledonia would improve Japan's position regarding nickel and would deny a source of nickel to the United Nations.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would place a much greater strain on Japan's already extended lines of communication.

2. It would necessitate further dispersion of her troops and further expenditure of shipping and equipment which would be very difficult to replace.

3. The capture of some of these islands would be almost prohibitive in cost.

4. Action in force in this direction would weaken the naval defenses of Japan Proper.

(2) Against Northern Australia.

a. Reasons for adopting:

Possession of Northern Australia would help consolidate the Japanese position in the Southwest Pacific and, by forcing the United Nations to defend Southeast Australia, would divert United Nations' strength from possible offensive operations against the southern island barrier.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would require large forces and probably entail heavy loss to invade Northern Australia in the face of land-based aircraft and ground opposition. It is highly improbable that Japan can spare the necessary aircraft and shipping.

2. There are no economic advantages to be gained by invading Northern Australia. Over a thousand miles of difficult terrain lie between Northern Australia and the industrial and agricultural centers of population of the Southeast.

(3) Against India and/or Ceylon.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. This operation would give Japan a powerful outpost on her western flank and deny the Bay of Bengal to the shipping of the United Nations.

2. It would provide Japan with a base for the interception of hostile shipping along the west coast of India and in the Indian Ocean.

3. It would give Japan control of the Calcutta area, the vital industrial center of India, with a steel production equal to one-fifth of Japan's total steel capacity.

4. It would damage Chinese morale and cut the air supply route to China with the possible result of forcing China into a cessation of hostilities.

5. The unstable Indian political situation facilitates this course.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Operations against India would meet determined resistance from the air and ground forces of the United Nations.

2. All routes from Burma into India are difficult and would limit the size of the land force that could be concentrated promptly for effective operations.

3. It is probable that at least 8 to 10 divisions would be necessary for a successful attack on India.

4. Operations against Ceylon would be extremely hazardous so long as Allied naval and air strength in the area remains formidable.

5. An attack on India or Ceylon would further lengthen Japanese lines of communication and require large air, naval, and shipping commitments which Japan is believed unable to make at this time.

(4) Against China.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. A successful general offensive against China would eliminate the Chinese as an organized factor in the present war.

2. It would remove the possibility of the United Nations using Chinese territory as a base for effective attacks on Japan.

3. It would eventually release some Japanese troops for use in other areas.

4. It would have a profound psychological effect in Japan and among all Asiatic peoples and would have an adverse effect upon the morale and prestige of the United Nations.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Terrain and lack of routes of communication in China make military operations difficult.

2. It would require an increase in the number of Japanese troops initially used in China.

3. The lines of communication would be greatly lengthened.

4. Even if Japan were successful in conquering the remaining areas in China, a period of chaos or confusion would result and the immediate economic and industrial gains would be small.

5. Limited offensive operations resulting in a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan might accomplish virtually the same results.

(5) Against Siberia.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Seizure of a most favorable opportunity for military action against an arch enemy. Russia would be hard pressed to fight on two widely separated fronts and reinforcements to Siberia are virtually precluded under present circumstances.

2. It would eliminate the possibility of United States-Russian military and naval collaboration and encirclement of Japan in the North Pacific.

3. Japan enjoys on land a superiority in strategic position, manpower, supply lines, and most types of military equipment. Naval superiority is overwhelming although air strength is limited.

4. It would remove the weakest spot in Japan's strategic barrier. Russian and possible United Nations air, naval and submarine bases in this area constitute the greatest potential danger to Japan's inner zone.

5. It would be of great assistance to the Germans.

6. It would impede the flow of Lend-Lease goods from the United States to Russia by the Alaska-Siberia air route.

7. It would afford Japan additional bases for operations against Alaska.

8. Japan would gain oil and additional security for her northern fisheries, and some lumber, coal, lead, zinc and gold.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Disinclination of Japan to embark upon a new major offensive in view of existing commitments elsewhere.

2. It would expose most of the essential and highly concentrated centers of Japan to the danger of attack by Russian and Allied bombers.

3. It would expose Japanese naval units and some of Japan's most essential shipping lanes to attack by Russian submarines, other naval vessels, and aircraft.

4. Russia's preoccupation in Europe practically assures Japan of immunity from attack by Russia.

5. Japan is confident that for the time being Russia will not grant to the U.S.A. use of her air or naval bases and that they are therefore neutralized.

6. Climatic conditions and geographic factors handicap operations during substantial periods of the year.

7. Respect for Russian strength in the Siberian area, learned at Nomonhan and Changkufong.

(6) Against Midway-Hawaii.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. The occupation of Midway and Hawaii would eliminate the United Nations' key base in the Pacific and extend Japan's strategic barrier east to a point from which it would be practically impossible to launch an attack on Japan Proper across the Pacific.

2. The occupation of Hawaii would give Japan a base for operations aiming to control the eastern as well as the western Pacific.

3. The occupation of Hawaii would destroy the present air ferry routes to the South Pacific.

4. The occupation of Hawaii would cut the present surface supply lines to the South Pacific.

5. American offensive and defensive operations in all parts of the Pacific would be seriously crippled.

6. Japanese naval and air operations against Alaska, the Continental United States, and the Panama Canal would be greatly facilitated.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Japan has the necessary troops available for an attack on Midway and the Hawaiian Islands, but she could provide the necessary shipping only by a great temporary restriction of her economic effort and at a considerable risk to her entire war economy.

2. Her preoccupation in the Southwest Pacific would preclude any such widespread dispersion of her forces while she is engaged in a major effort elsewhere.

3. Since the nearest Japanese-occupied island is beyond the operating radius of Japanese land-based aircraft, any air operations against Hawaii would have to be made with ship-borne planes.

4. Inasmuch as a successful surprise attack on Hawaii is not believed to be feasible at the present time, the risks involved in attacking such a strongly held base would be very great.

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(J.C.S. 297)

May 10, 1943

Pages 1 - 13 incl.

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN BURMA 1943-1944

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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By N&P Date APR 13 1973

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COPY NO. 42

OPERATIONS IN BURMA IN 1943-44

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. A detailed study to determine the prospects of successfully completing ANAKIM (as based on the NEW DELHI decisions) in the next dry season, is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The conclusions reached in connection with the successful completion of ANAKIM are:

- a. That if the NEW DELHI tactical concept is adhered to, there is no reasonable chance of success.
- b. That with tactical modification of the NEW DELHI plan, there is a reasonable chance of success.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS IN BURMA IN 1943 - 1944

3. Problem

To determine the prospects of successfully completing ANAKIM (as based on the NEW DELHI decisions) in the next dry season.

4. Objectives of Operation in Burma

a. In order to sustain CHINA and insure its retention as a base for the full-scale offensive against JAPAN, effective and timely steps must be taken, not later than the next dry season, to improve the flow of supplies to CHINA by way of BURMA. BURMA occupies a strategically important position as an outpost or anchor to JAPAN'S defense line running through N.E.I., NEW GUINEA, and the MARSHALLS. JAPAN should not be permitted to consolidate and develop this naturally defensible flank position.

b. The minimum objectives of operations in BURMA should be to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative in the theater, and maintain and improve the flow of supplies to CHINA. The conquest of BURMA would fully accomplish these objectives, but the requirements therefor might tax the presently available resources of the UNITED NATIONS to an unacceptable degree. In that case, it will be most important that sufficient resources be allocated to insure the accomplishment of more limited objectives which are in keeping with the urgency of the situation in this particular theater. Various actions short of conquering BURMA would secure these objectives in part or in varying degrees of completeness. The minimum acceptable degree of completeness is defined as follows:

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(1) Maintain pressure on the enemy and retain the initiative in the theater to a degree that interferes with JAPAN'S lines of supply and denies her freedom of action.

(2) Obtain a position that will permit rapid development of an all-weather route into CHINA.

5. Present status of ANAKIM

The failure to attain all of the objectives set for accomplishment before the monsoon of 1943 presages a low order of effectiveness in the ground operations of ANAKIM. The offensive against AKYAB was a failure, which was costly in prestige, morale, and troops. Operations from IMPHAL were disappointing, and control of the CHIN HILLS not accomplished. Little information is available regarding submarine action against shipping to RANGOON. One U. S. submarine was diverted to this area in accordance with ANAKIM. The air offensive was successful.

6. General considerations

a. The pertinent factors for consideration in arriving at a decision in regard to operations in BURMA in 1943-44 are:

(1) The Chinese are reluctant to participate unless assured that operations in this theater will be conducted on a scale which, as the Generalissimo said, would be "adequate to drive the Japanese out of BURMA."

(2) The UNITED NATIONS are faced by the practical necessity of opening land supply routes to CHINA. Only by such action is it considered possible for CHINA to continue in the war.

(3) From a practical standpoint, it appears that nothing short of a completely successful ANAKIM will meet our requirements. The road under construction from LEDO south to MYITKYINA, when completed, will have an estimated capacity of only 30,000 long tons per month. The Chinese divisions in this area (about 30,000 men) will require about 20,000

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tons per month to support them. This will leave at best about 10,000 tons per month for CHINA, much of which will be required to support Chinese forces in YUNNAN. The Chinese representatives at the CALCUTTA conferences (C.C.S. Memo #45) pointed out that "10,000 tons a month was only a very small percentage of their requirements." The air route to CHINA at this time has a capacity of about 2,000 tons per month with a target of 4,000 tons per month in the near future. The ultimate objective is 10,000 tons per month.

(4) If it becomes necessary to consider any modification of ANAKIM, its objectives and prospects of success should be weighed carefully to insure the attainment of our primary purpose: maintaining CHINA in the war.

7. Objectives before the monsoon in 1943

a. Navy. Submarine attacks on Japanese sea lanes to RANGOON.

b. Army.

(1) From YUNNAN - limited offensive operations to gain positions for offensive after the monsoon.

(2) From LEDO - limited offensive to cover road construction to be pushed as far as possible toward MOGAUNG.

(3) From IMPHAL area - advance to CHINDWIN between SITTANG and KALEWA, followed by raids east of the CHINDWIN to establish bridgeheads.

(4) Control of the CHIN HILLS.

(5) On ARAKAN Coast - capture AKYAB and RAMREE ISLAND.

c. Air. Continue employment according to present directive, i.e., attacks on enemy communications, shipping, port installations, and airfields.

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8. Outline plan for capture of BURMA next season. (1 November 1943, to 15 May 1944).

a. Phase I - November 1943.

Advance by ten Chinese divisions from western YUNNAN towards MYITKYINA, BHAMO, LASHIO, and eventually MANDALAY area. Chinese divisions are said to be ten thousand strong.

Advance by Chinese troops trained at RAMGARH from LEDO on MYITKYINA.

Advance by British Forces (three divisions) from ASSAM on PAKOKKU and MANDALAY area.

b. Phase II - December 1943.

Simultaneous seaborne assaults:

On KYUKPYU, GWA, and SANDOWAY with the object of capturing airfields.

On TAUNGUP, in order to capture airfields and advance on PROME and RANGOON road, with a force of about one division, with the object of containing enemy forces and cutting communications between RANGOON and the north.

On ARAKAN coast opposite BASSEIN, with the object of capturing BASSEIN and its airfields, advancing in the direction of HENZADA and RANGOON, and containing enemy forces.

Continuation of British and Chinese advance in upper BURMA.

c. Phase III - January 1944.

(1) Direct seaborne and airborne assault on RANGOON, while operations in Phase I and II continue.

(2) A proposed variation in the above concept envisages shifting some of the forces from the RANGOON assault to an advance from the BASSEIN lodgement. Though difficult, this plan is the only one that holds out any prospect of taking BURMA in one season. The fact that it is a bold and hazardous operation may help to achieve surprise. If the RANGOON assault is unsuccessful, the BASSEIN bridgehead could still be developed as the main line of advance on RANGOON.

9. Comments on ANAKIM plan

a. Following a careful study of the ANAKIM Plan, it is concluded that Phase III, the frontal attack on RANGOON, is not feasible or acceptable and should be rejected.

b. By a change in the tactical concept and without any troops in addition to those set up by the NEW DELHI decisions, it is believed that the reduction of RANGOON can be effected by an assault in force from BASSEIN via HENZADA, taking RANGOON in reverse. The troops intended for Phase III in the ANAKIM Plan can be used to augment the forces assigned to the BASSEIN area in Phase II.

c. An assault in force on RANGOON from BASSEIN would probably be successful because:

(1) It would tend to split the Japanese forces.

(2) It would be based on the second largest port in BURMA.

(3) It could be supplied by way of the BASSEIN river.

(4) It would be taking RANGOON in reverse.

(5) It could be easily supported by aircraft from landing fields on the ARAKAN coast.

(6) It would threaten Japanese supply lines to north BURMA.

(7) It would be over ground not easily defended.

d. It is believed that if the deficiencies in forces and equipment as indicated later in this study are made up, BURMA may be recaptured in the dry season of 1943-44, provided there is the necessary determination. The BASSEIN - RANGOON concept will offer an acceptable chance of success.

10. Possibilities of Meeting Requirements

a. Naval support for ANAKIM

(1) The British estimates of naval requirements (covering force and escort force), and that part which they now estimate can be assigned to the operation, are as listed below:

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	<u>Covering Force</u>	<u>Escort Force</u>	<u>British Estimate They can Assign</u>	<u>Balance Required for ANAKIM</u>
BB	5	-	2	1
OBB	-	-	2	-
CV	3	-	2	-
ACV	-	10	6	5
CA	4	-	2	2
CL	-	10	7 M & 6 Light	-
CL(AA)	-	5	-	5
DD	27	50	27	50
DE	-	50	3	47
AMS-DMS	-	25	33	-
SS	-	-	13	-

(2) The Japanese could bring superior naval strength against this force. However, since naval operations in the PACIFIC may be expected to contain the Japanese fleet and thus preclude interference with naval operations in the INDIAN OCEAN, the requirements in naval forces indicated above are considered excessive.

b. Shipping.

(1) In the preliminary discussions regarding ANAKIM, the UNITED STATES was requested to allocate shipping as follows:

(a) 25 sailings April, May, and June.

(b) 19 sailings July and August, or a total of 113 sailings.

(2) The U. S. shipping allocated and now planned, however, is as follows:

(a) 20 sailings April, May, and June.

(b) 15 sailings July and August, or a total of 90 sailings.

(3) The deficiency, based on C-2 cargo vessel capacity of 6,500 long tons of military stores, is as follows:

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Requested - 733,500 long tons

Allocated - 584,000 long tons

Deficiency - 149,500 long tons

(4) This deficiency should not affect the operation, provided proper selection of the required supplies is made. The deficiency can be made up during the third quarter.

(5) No data are available as to British shipping for ANAKIM.

c. Assault shipping and landing craft.

(1) Definite requirements of assault shipping and landing craft for ANAKIM have not been set up. However, based on the estimates in C.C.S. 164/1 of 21 January, 1943, it appears practicable to provide from other theaters any deficiencies in landing craft. Before deciding to divert landing craft from other theaters to ANAKIM, consideration must be given to the effect of such diversion on projected operations in those theaters.

(2) Tables showing landing craft requirements and deficiencies are contained in Appendix "A".

d. Ground and service forces.

(1) Army units which INDIA cannot provide

From the troops available in INDIA, there will be a shortage of three assault brigades and one parachute brigade for the RANGOON operation, and two divisions for the reserve in INDIA. It is also possible that there may be an additional shortage of two assault brigades, one of which INDIA may be able to supply, the other, however, can come only from the 70th British Division which is to be used in the BASSEIN operation.

(2) Army shortages in equipment

(a) As of February, 1943, only enough specialized equipment for four of the six assault brigades required had been ordered.

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(b) It is not considered feasible to deliver direct to captured ports and bases the necessary equipment for base construction, reconstruction of ports, and maintenance of forces. This equipment must be shipped via INDIA.

(c) Transportation equipment must be shipped early and even now cannot all be assembled within the time available.

(d) There is a shortage of small drums (2 - 4 gallon) for gasoline. If the operations are to be successful, it will be necessary to ship a drum manufacturing plant from the UNITED STATES by July, 1943.

(e) Among the administrative units, there is a shortage of equipment for a considerable number of engineer battalions, general hospital units, military police companies, etc. All of this must be shipped to INDIA. In addition, for anti-malarial control, seventy-five anti-malarial units must be ready. It is estimated that much of the anti-malaria equipment will arrive from the UNITED KINGDOM, but not before November, 1943.

(3) Army forces and their necessary equipment to be provided from outside INDIA present great difficulties, but these difficulties can possibly be overcome.

e. Air forces

(1) U. S. Army Air Force requirements, other than troop carrier, will be met by the diversion of one heavy and one medium bomber group from NORTH AFRICA at the conclusion of HUSKY. At the expense of future operations in the European-African area, 5 troop carrier groups could be provided to satisfy ANAKIM requirements in transport aircraft.

(2) Information is not available as to whether the British can meet their deficiency in about 90 heavy bombers and 120 fighters.

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11. Enemy capabilities for the defense of BURMA during the period November 1943 to April 1944.

a. Naval forces

(1) It will be possible for the Japanese to bring naval forces to bear as soon as the nature and scope of the BURMA operation is disclosed. The Japanese may decide:

(a) To send their fleet into the BAY OF BENGAL leaving a covering force in the PACIFIC, or

(b) To retain their fleet in the PACIFIC and send a striking force into the BAY OF BENGAL.

(2) In view of the threat offered by our PACIFIC Fleet, and the fact that the Japanese naval force in the BAY OF BENGAL area would be operating under the protection of shore-based aircraft, it is considered highly probable that they will retain their major naval forces in the PACIFIC and send a striking force into the INDIAN OCEAN area.

b. Ground and air forces

(1) The Japanese forces occupying BURMA total 4 infantry divisions, 1 armored regiment, and approximately 132 fighters, 132 bombers, and 36 observation type planes. The 33rd Division, with its headquarters at MANDALAY, controls the CHINDWIN RIVER valley. The 56th Division, with its headquarters at LASHIO, is disposed along the BURMA-CHINA border. The 55th Division, with its headquarters at AKYAB, is now in contact with British forces in the vicinity of MAUNGDAW and BUTHIDAUNG. The 18th Division, with its headquarters at MANDALAY, is deployed as follows:

1 combat team, vicinity of KENGTUNG

1 combat team, MANDALAY

1 combat team, MYITKYINA

The general reserve for the Jap Forces in BURMA is located in vicinity of RANGOON. Estimated strength, one-half division plus one tank regiment.

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(2) The Japanese capability of reinforcing this area is considerable because of the existing lines of communication across INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, and the MALAY PENINSULA, and the sea route through the STRAITS OF MALACCA to RANGOON.

(3) For Japanese ground force reinforcement there will be available 3 weak THAI divisions in the KENGTUNG area of BURMA, 1 division in INDO-CHINA, and 2 divisions in MALAYA. There have also been reliable reports of the formation of a BURMA Independence Army, allegedly numbering 40-50,000. The diversion to BURMA of Japanese forces from MANCHURIA, CHINA, or the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC would depend upon the situation existing at the time. Japanese reinforcements would probably be limited to increasing their forces in BURMA to a total of 9 divisions.

(4) Through the construction of a system of airdromes and airfields the Japanese are capable of rapidly concentrating air forces from other areas to support their troops in BURMA. However, the availability of air units is dependent upon the situation existing in the other areas at the time. They are capable of increasing the number of operational aircraft in BURMA from 300 to 650 within a period of 45 days.

12. Conclusions.

Assuming Operation ANAKIM is attempted by the methods and on the scale envisaged in the NEW DELHI decisions reached in February, 1943, it is concluded that:

a. U. S. commitments for mounting the operation can be met with the exception of 150,000 tons of shipping. This shortage can be met one month later than the required date.

b. A large part of the British personnel and logistic requirements must be provided from outside of INDIA. The difficulty of meeting these requirements can be overcome only by early and decisive action.

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c. The proposed direct assault on RANGOON, which envisages the attack force proceeding up the RANGOON RIVER with landings at or near the city, has no reasonable chance of success.

d. Should the attack on RANGOON from the South fail there would be insufficient troops in the BASSEIN area to reduce RANGOON and the time factor remaining would not be sufficient to effect the capture in one campaign season.

e. By changing the tactical concept, and without additional troops, the execution of an assault from BASSEIN via HENZADA - PROME to take RANGOON in reverse, has a reasonable chance of success.

f. Results of the pre-monsoon operations of 1942-43 presages a low order of effectiveness in ANAKIM Operations. Therefore, it is necessary that there be a marked improvement in leadership, calibre of troops, and that the major proportion of the amphibious troops be British.

g. If the difficulties enumerated above can be overcome, and tactical modification of the RANGOON assault to an advance from BASSEIN is made, ANAKIM, including the capture of RANGOON has a reasonable chance of success during the next dry season.

13. Recommendations.

In order to increase the chances of success, it is recommended:

a. That additional air forces be made available.

b. That sufficient combat personnel be diverted from British spheres of responsibility to offset present deficiencies. The reserve deficiency need not arrive in INDIA until 1 November, 1943.

c. That carefully prepared cover plans be made and cover operations include demonstrations in force in the PACIFIC.

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APPENDIX "A"

LANDING CRAFT

I. Requirements for ANAKIM based on CCS 164/1 of 21 January 1943

<u>Required</u>	<u>To be made Available by British</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>
1 HQS	1	0
9 LSI (L)	9	0
40 LST (2)	10	30
5 LSD	0	5
10 LCT(5)	0	10
120 LCM	100	20
40 LCP	40	0
100 LCA	100	0
16 LCS	10	6
20 Personnel ships	}	
60 MT ships		

II. Landing craft requirements based on ANAKIM plan (U.S.B. 23).

<u>Required</u>	<u>Available in India</u>	<u>Deficiency</u>	<u>Provided by British</u>	<u>Provided from other theaters</u>
336 LCA	180	156	100	56
36 LCS	20	16	10	6
320 LCM	120	200	100	100
190 LCP	101	89	40	49
18 LCT	0	18	-	18
25 LCI	10	15	-	15
18 MT Ships	30	0	-	-
27 LSD or G	5	22	-	2
15 River Steamers	0	15	?	?
0 LST				

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April 13, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

STATUS OF "ANAKIM"

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. In C.C.S. 155/1, dated January 19, 1943, Subject - Conduct of the War in 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed in Paragraph 6 as follows:-

"6. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST:

"(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

"(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

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"(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for:-

(1) The recapture of Burma (ANAKIM) beginning in 1943.

(2) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to ANAKIM."

2. In the 65th Meeting, the Committee:-

"(a) Took note of C.C.S. 164, as amended, and agreed:-

(1) To approve November 15, 1943, as the provisional date for the ANAKIM assault.

(2) To approve the provisional schedule of forces laid out in Paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 164, recognizing that the actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft, and shipping must depend on the situation in the late summer of 1943.

(3) To confirm in July 1943 the decision to undertake or to postpone Operation ANAKIM."

3. It is becoming increasingly apparent to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff that, if we are, in fact, to "attain (or maintain) a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against JAPAN by the United Nations as soon as GERMANY is defeated," it is imperative that effective steps must be taken during the next dry season to improve the flow of supplies into CHINA.

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4. Progress of the RAVENOUS operation has proved disappointing. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff feel that vigorous steps must be taken to get on with the preparations for ANAKIM. They request, therefore, that the British Chiefs of Staff cause a report to be made of the present status of operations, plans for ANAKIM, and preparation for ANAKIM.

5. It is further requested that a report be furnished the Combined Chiefs of Staff once each month until a final decision on the timing of ANAKIM is made in July, 1943.

6. In connection with the above, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff have already taken the initiative to provide shipping for the necessary ANAKIM build-up. The Air Transport Service to CHINA is being augmented, and it is planned to continue the augmentation of combat aircraft as indicated in C.C.S. 198. Further, two U. S. submarines have been temporarily diverted from more favorable operating areas to operate against the communications of the STRAITS OF MALACCA and RANGOON.

7. The Air Transport Service to CHINA, augmented as indicated above, requires support by operations to the southward in order that Japanese interference can be prevented. The follow-up of RAVENOUS by ANAKIM is important to this service.