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
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

You will find herewith INTELLIGENCE  
REPORT NO. 56 and I call your attention to the  
item beginning on page five entitled "Food  
Rationing".

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



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1-1-43

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT **56**

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COPY No. 1

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A summary of investigation and analysis  
conducted for certain OWI officials,  
issued for OWI and the interest of other  
members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the  
week of December 23 through December 30,  
except where otherwise specifically stated.

## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

### LIQUIDATION

Admiral Darlan's death shocked somewhat more than it saddened the American press. Commentators were less interested in the loss than in the legacy.

The very headlines announcing Darlan's death were full of promise. They forecast an end to the perplexities and dissensions created by his leadership in North Africa and heralded a fresh vitality in French collaboration with the United Nations. It was commonly assumed that General Giraud would succeed the Admiral and would secure the cooperation of General de Gaulle.

The commentators, of course, left no doubt that they disapproved of assassination as a political instrument. The Daily Oklahoman was perhaps the most explicit on this score: "Whether good or evil comes from the murder of the French admiral we do not undertake to predict. It may be that the removal of the man who has played fast and loose with the Nazi will be a real contribution to the cause of freedom... But we do know that we prefer the American system. We like it better when an unsatisfactory public official is defeated for re-election or when one who has pleased the people is returned to office. We prefer the democratic process."

Most others, although they too deplored murder in high places, were by no means blind to anticipated benefits. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch said delicately: "While regretting this violent end of a new ally, it would be unrealistic not to see that an opportunity now is open for ending the ugly dispute that had whirled about Darlan's head and threatened to bring disunity both in this country and abroad." The Birmingham Age-Herald felt that "possibly

nothing could serve as well to reunite the French."

There were some more or less perfunctory tributes to the deceased. The Indianapolis News, for example, remembered that "the position he took in North Africa saved the lives of thousands of American fighting men. And when he fell he was doing his utmost to help bring about the defeat of Hitler and Mussolini." A few analysts were fearful that civil strife might develop and French cleavages be widened. Only one or two were indecorous enough to express outright sympathy or praise for the assassin. "Darlan is dead," said Johannes Steel, "Long live France!"

There was huge satisfaction with the choice of General Giraud to succeed the Admiral. Most observers had hoped for this development in advance. When it was announced, they were unanimously optimistic about its possibilities. The Baltimore Sun, in a representative editorial, declared that "General Giraud's election as Admiral Darlan's successor brings affairs in French North Africa back into conformity with the original American plan... Now, with Darlan assassinated, the French command reverts to the man with whom our forces hoped to work in the first instance. This time, however, General Giraud will be in a more favorable position than he was when he first arrived in Algeria... The latter's elevation to the leadership in North Africa opens the way for a healing of the breach between the two French factions."

Despite such satisfaction with the new situation, there was little tendency among commentators to blame the Administration for its earlier decision to do business with Darlan. But the anxieties and misgivings created by the arrangement were sharply revealed through the relief expressed at its

(1-4-43)

sudden termination. Almost to a man, the commentators seem to feel better about the situation today — seem to feel that it has been providentially cleansed and clarified.

### FUTURE

The new year seems roseate to most of the men who interpret events for radio and the press. They have achieved, partly through the clarification of affairs in North Africa and partly through the tonic of military gains, a fresh sense of direction and of unity with our allies.

The characteristic expression of this feeling is found in the common assertion that the United Nations are at last genuinely on the march, with a full-forged offensive plan for victory. Reviewing the various sectors of the war and the parts played upon them by the allies, the Atlanta Constitution concluded: "All are doing magnificently. The initiative in this global war has passed into the hands of the United Nations ... It is teamwork. It is the cooperation of all the Allies, one and all of them, in the opening phases of the relentless attack which is going to smash Axis military and naval might into helpless pulp."

The prime source of this high confidence was the mounting power of the Russian offensive. Comparing this winter's campaign with that conducted by the Red army last year, editors were prone to point out that Hitler is now engaged on two fronts. Most of them seemed convinced that the Russian advances amount to something more than a tactical readjustment of positions and constitute a real cracking of Nazi strength.

The assurance with which commentators face the New Year manifested itself



also in renewed discussion of post-war problems. The subject no longer seems wholly academic. Vice-President Wallace's latest address received widespread attention -- most of it warmly favorable. The future, apparently, is beginning to assume shape, imminence and reality.

### RATIONING

Press and radio seem generally determined to promote the success of the point rationing system for canned, dried and frozen foods. They were in substantial agreement as to the need for such a program and as to the patriotic obligation of all citizens to cooperate in making it effective.

For the most part, the Davis-Wickard broadcast announcing the rationing plan was called "a good job." "The reasons given for the rationing," said the New York Herald Tribune, "were completely understandable." A number of commentators, however, expressed some fear that announcement of the program so far in advance of application would encourage panic buying. They exhorted their readers to self-discipline and depicted hoarding as downright treason.

Comment on the point system to be used in the rationing program was almost wholly favorable, with a number of papers devoting editorial space and emphasis to careful explanations.

### NEWS NOTE

Certain discrepancies occurred in newspaper accounts of early reactions to the announcement of point rationing. The following headlines appeared in New York City newspapers of Monday afternoon, December 28, and Tuesday

morning, December 29:

NO RUSH AT STORES TO BUY TINNED FOOD BEFORE RATIONING -- New York Times

DEALERS FEAR STAMPEDE FOR CANNED FOODS... MINOR RUSH BEGUN HERE AND  
IN CHICAGO -- New York Herald Tribune

GROCERS CHECK RUSH OF HOARDING -- New York Post

GROCERS MOVE TO BALK HOARDING -- New York Journal American

CANNED FOODS RUSH IS ON; STORES APPLY OWN RATION -- New York Daily News

Nothing is more likely to stimulate hoarding than the notion that other people are practicing it.

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### FOOD RATIONING

Recent reports of Bureau of Intelligence correspondents on public reactions to food rationing suggest that the comprehensive program just announced may encounter strong resistance. Not that people reject the principle of food rationing. They are more likely to complain about the delay in introducing a well-rounded program. Yet, at the same time that they accept the need for rationing, they are prone to blame the actual occurrence of shortages on "government bungling" -- on failure to handle the total problem of food supply with foresight and efficiency.

According to the correspondents, the American people approve of rationing as a fair and businesslike way of distributing scarce commodities. But at the same time they are inclined to feel that rationing might have been avoided -- or might be less stringent -- if the Government had faced the

over-all food situation with more competence and courage. The tardiness with which it approached the problem, they argue, has been partly responsible for the occurrence of shortages.

The reports of the Bureau's correspondents may give an exaggerated impression of the extent of public dissatisfaction with rationing. The correspondents tend to report complaints rather than to give an objective, over-all appraisal of public sentiment. A disproportionate number of them are well-to-do and unsympathetic to the Administration. But many of them are in an excellent position to observe people's reactions, and their views are indicative of prevailing sentiment among an articulate and influential segment of the public.

Rural people are inclined to ascribe impending shortages to the failure of the Government to treat the farmer more sympathetically. They expect less food to be produced in 1943 because of labor difficulties, shortages of farm machinery and the lack of price incentives to grow more of certain needed products.

Urban people think of shortages in terms of the availability of food on grocers' shelves. They blame the present difficulty in getting certain food-stuffs on the delay in introducing rationing and on advance announcement of programs once they are decided upon. One correspondent writes bitterly:

"At the moment, food rationing, or more correctly, the lack of it, has caused unusual panicky, reckless, misdirected actions on the part of merchants and consumers... Since it has become obvious to everyone that rationing only comes about after a shortage or potential shortage is in the offing and when public pressure forces it, and is not based on a solid evaluation of the total problem to be faced... the almost universal attitude is, 'Grab it, boys and girls -- you don't know what the hell they'll do next.'"

Advance announcements of rationing programs arouse anger amounting almost to rage in many parts of the country. They are denounced as open invitations to hoard. However, resentment on this score may be lessened in the case of the present program because of Elmer Davis' careful explanation of the need for disclosing the Government's plans. His explanation has received widespread favorable comment in the press.

The Bureau's correspondents believe that the job of "selling" the need for food rationing has been badly bungled. In a general way, they say, people understand the reasons for rationing well enough. Yet, at the same time, they entertain the contradictory idea that this country has plenty of every thing, and they are naturally reluctant to make any sacrifice which isn't absolutely necessary. Confusing or contradictory explanations, announcements which don't quite jibe, give them a convenient excuse for denying the need for particular programs. And, the correspondents maintain, there has been plenty of confusion. "First they say we don't have enough butter, next day they say there's plenty -- and the day after that it's frozen!"

Explanations must be complete, consistent and convincing, the correspondents urge. They must cover not only the need for rationing but the connection between saving food and beating the Axis. They must present rationing not as something imposed from above, but as an opportunity for all the people to participate in winning the people's war.

To be effective, the correspondents insist, the explanations have to be repeated many times. One man writes, "It isn't enough to say these things once. You have to hammer it in, over and over again."

### MANPOWER SHORTAGES AND ABSENTEEISM

Labor editors among the regular correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence have very definite ideas about two of the most pressing manpower problems — labor shortages and absenteeism. They believe that both problems are largely local in character, that they tend to occur in conjunction, and that they can be conquered if Government, management and labor cooperate. The diagnoses of the editors are notably similar, and probably reflect the views of many workers.

The editors all feel that with better planning the manpower shortage might have been avoided or alleviated. The continued existence of large labor reserves in some centers, such as New York City, proves, they maintain, that war orders have not been distributed wisely. Mistaken policies of draft deferment are also held to be responsible for the shortages of war workers and farm laborers now experienced in some localities.

Four other causes of the present tight manpower situation are mentioned: the hoarding of personnel by management; inadequate housing facilities; failure to utilize all available employables, especially women; and anti-union employment practices. A St. Louis editor writes bitterly about the hiring policy of some of the firms in that city, which employ non-union applicants and rural transients in preference to union members. He reports that in late November, 10,000 of the 25,000 members of the St. Louis Building Trades Council (AFL) were unemployed. Many of these men possess skills which could readily be converted to war work.

The three basic causes of absenteeism, the labor editors feel, are (1) a

lack of concern about the war; (2) adverse working conditions; and (3) unsatisfactory living conditions. The workers most prone to knock off a day now and then are those who don't appreciate the seriousness of the war or those whose spirit has been eroded by the grind at the plant and the lack of satisfactory housing and recreation.

The editors insist that many of the more irresponsible workers simply "don't understand what the war is all about." They regard their personal pleasure as more important than regular attendance at work because they don't grasp the issues and purposes of the war, or visualize the consequences of an Axis triumph. Sometimes they fail to perceive the connection between the work they are doing and victory on the fighting fronts.

The seven-day week, the editors feel, inevitably leads to extensive absenteeism. It was pointed out that some men work long enough to collect overtime for the seventh consecutive day, then take some time off. Others value an occasional day of rest so highly that they take it even when it means the loss of premium pay. An excessively long work week results in strain, irritability and reduced efficiency. Some workers resort to a day's "binge" for relief. Or, they actually get sick after a while. Ill health was mentioned with surprising frequency as an important cause of absenteeism.

The labor editors blame many of the working conditions responsible for absenteeism squarely upon management. These include not only injudicious time and overtime arrangements, but also lack of standardization of pay and working conditions, and neglect of workers' health and welfare.

Management is also blamed for permitting material shortages to occur and for occasionally hoarding manpower. Whenever work slows down for either of these reasons, the editors say the absence rate shoots up. The need to "boondoggle" lowers workers' spirit. Some workers take time off in disgust, "so as not to draw pay for polishing tools." On the other hand, when plants are operating at top speed, unqualified or harassed supervisors may exert their authority in a way which arouses workers' resentment.

The editors fully recognize the extent to which unsatisfactory living conditions also lead to absenteeism. They point out that in many boom areas valuable work hours have to be used to find a place to live. Where men can't find local quarters for their families, they are likely to take time off to visit them over the week-end and return late to work. Or, lonely and without access to wholesome forms of recreation, they may resort to drinking and sprees — then have to take time out to recover.

Special measures will be necessary, the editors feel, to reduce the high incidence of absenteeism among women war workers. Their attendance, like men's, may be expected to improve as plant and community problems are attacked and educational programs are undertaken to bring workers into closer identification with the nation's war effort. In addition, however, a number of the editors maintain that it will be necessary to allow women a certain amount of time, on a regular basis, to attend to shopping and home affairs. All agree on the importance of making provision for the day care of young children.

MANPOWER STABILIZATION IN DETROIT

660,000 DETROIT JOBS FROZEN  
— Detroit News, December 10

WMC MAY CALL ON ARMY TO ENFORCE JOB FREEZING  
— Detroit Free Press, December 11

Because of headlines like these, the manpower stabilization plan got off to a bad start in Detroit. Many workers had the impression that in some way or other the plan "froze" them in their jobs. Resentment was not strong, but the misconception intensified the normal resistance a new and complicated arrangement is likely to encounter.

A field survey in the Detroit area revealed widespread ignorance, as well as misunderstanding, about the new set-up. Few rank and file workers even knew what was meant when it was referred to as "the manpower stabilization plan" or "the manpower plan." They understood only when it was called "the freeze."

Ignorance and misconceptions about the new arrangement may do more than ruffle tempers in an area not, hitherto noted for smooth labor relations. They may actually interfere with the success of the stabilization plan. One of its purposes was to facilitate transfers which will lead to more efficient utilization of Detroit's manpower; it sets up machinery by which such transfers may be handled. But the machinery will lie idle if workers are unfamiliar with it. Foremen may exploit the prevailing misunderstanding in various ways to force men to stay on their jobs. Finally, misunderstanding may operate as a brake on transfers from non-essential to essential work. "Why," workers may reason, "should I transfer to a war plant when



I'll be frozen on my job? I'd better stay right where I am."

The UAW-CIO and organized labor in general wholeheartedly support the new plan. The plan, in fact, represents an agreement reached locally by representatives of management and labor, although erroneously depicted by Time as an order imposed by Paul McNutt from Washington. Labor's endorsement of the plan makes it likely that sooner or later an educational program will be undertaken to explain its provisions to the rank and file.

At present, however, labor appears to underestimate the size of the educational job which needs to be done. A meeting was called to explain the agreement to 1500 shop stewards and local officers of the UAW, but no clear cut instructions were given them for explaining the stabilization plan in shops and locals. As of the middle of December, the plan was not even being put on the agenda of most local meetings.

Lack of familiarity with the plan inevitably heightens workers' doubts about its practicability. Some of the men interviewed in Detroit, who were only casually acquainted with the plan, were afraid that it might be slow and cumbersome in operation.

They emphasized the need for the review machinery, in particular, to be rapid and efficient. The prevailing opinion was that the plan would fail if it were "as slow in operation as the WLB" — which some workers accuse of being on a sit-down strike.

Not only in Detroit but wherever a manpower stabilization plan is put into effect, the desirability of giving workers full information about it is apparent. Radio and the press, and their own publications and

gatherings, should all be utilized. Educational programs will probably be most effective if they are begun even before plans are formally announced.

### MISGIVINGS

A number of the Bureau's regular correspondents have reported recently that public confidence in the stated war aims of the United Nations has been somewhat beclouded by two events — the British Prime Minister's assertion that he does not intend to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire and the American military expedient of doing business with Darlan. The two subjects were mentioned spontaneously by widely scattered correspondents in response to a general Bureau request for views on post-war problems.

According to these reports, Mr. Churchill's statement was interpreted by many Americans as a resurgence of old-fashioned British imperialism. It is said to have reawakened distrust of British purposes and to have raised serious doubts as to the solution of basic economic and political problems. Idealists seem to have suffered a good deal of discouragement.

The prevailing response to the Darlan arrangement, according to the correspondents, appears to have been a loyal, though not wholly successful, effort to accept the justification of military expedience and to hope that it will turn out all right. People sympathetic to the Administration tend to express faith in its motives and to say, "There must be more here than meets the eye." But even some of these, according to the correspondents, are fearful about the consequences of any sort of compromise with principles. One letter says they are asking, "Will this war end like the last one? Why

should we fight if idealism is thrown away?" And a number of others revealed their uneasiness by expressing the hope that the deal with Darlan would not last for long.

One correspondent noted that such misgivings were voiced largely by educated persons. Another suggested that full approval of the official treatment of Darlan was expressed mainly by those whose attitude toward post-war problems is narrowly nationalistic. "Reactionaries" were encouraged by "proof that we are real politicians after all -- fighting for our own interests, not for Wilsonian ideals." Some who fear Russia took reassurance from our friendliness to Vichy: "This proves that our alliance with Russia is not so ideological as we feared, but opportunistic just as in the case of Darlan."

The Bureau's correspondents are neither sufficiently representative nor sufficiently objective to warrant generalizations about popular sentiment. Their reports may be said to indicate, nevertheless, that in the minds of a good many Americans imperialism and opportunism do not mix comfortably with idealism.

#### MILEAGE RATIONING

Public appreciation of the need for nationwide mileage rationing, particularly in the areas recently subjected to its restrictions, appears to have increased significantly since the inauguration of the program. A great many Americans, however, remain unconvinced either as to the seriousness of the rubber shortage or as to the effectiveness of gasoline rationing as a means of rubber conservation.

In November, just before nationwide mileage rationing was instituted, the Bureau of Intelligence conducted a survey in four midwestern cities -- Indianapolis, Detroit, St. Louis and Cleveland. In Indianapolis and Detroit, acceptance of the need for gas rationing was much lower than in the two other communities -- apparently as the result of an organized campaign to bring about a 90-day postponement of the rationing program. Interviewing was conducted again in these four cities during December and additional surveys were made in Oklahoma, Texas and California, as well as throughout the nation as a whole.

Awareness of the rubber shortage has increased -- especially in the two cities, Indianapolis and Detroit, where anti-rationing propaganda had created the most serious doubts as to its reality in November. In the major oil producing states there is still, apparently, a pronounced tendency to deny the existence of a rubber problem:

DO YOU THINK THERE IS A SERIOUS RUBBER SHORTAGE NOW?

	% answering "Yes"	
	Nov.	Dec.
National Sample		
• Old rationed area	65%	74%
New rationed area	64	67
Indianapolis and Greensburg (Ind.)	40	58
Detroit	57	71
St. Louis	50	57
Cleveland	65	68
Oklahoma, Texas, California	—	52

Similarly, there has been a decrease in the number of people who deny the necessity of nationwide rationing. Sentiment on this score has improved markedly in Indianapolis and Detroit and, indeed, throughout the whole of the country newly brought within the rationing program. Again, the most

marked hostility appears in the states where gasoline is most plentiful.

DO YOU THINK GASOLINE RATIONING THROUGHOUT THE NATION  
IS NECESSARY?

	% answering "No"	
	Nov.	Dec.
National Sample		
Old rationed area	22%	14%
New rationed area	42	26
Indianapolis and Greensburg	62	51
Detroit	58	36
St. Louis	36	37
Cleveland	23	24
Oklahoma, Texas, California	—	40

Answers to an additional question posed to all of the samples in December indicates that Government handling of mileage rationing met with considerably more criticism in the old rationed area than in the rest of the country.

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT HAS HANDLED GASOLINE RATION-  
ING VERY WELL, ONLY FAIRLY WELL OR POORLY?

	Very well	Fairly Well	No answer
		or Poorly	
National Sample			
Old rationed area	35%	57%	8%
New rationed area	54	37	9
Indianapolis and Greensburg	38	52	10
Detroit	36	56	8
St. Louis	46	43	11
Cleveland	57	31	12
Oklahoma, Texas, California	51	40	9

People who answered "fairly well" or "poorly" to this question were asked to give specific criticisms respecting management of the program. In the old rationed area, there were frequent complaints regarding the distribution and allotment of gasoline and a feeling that the East should not have been the only area to suffer; apparently this sort of resentment was largely responsible for the higher dissatisfaction in the area which had

the greatest experience with rationing.

Except where there has been a deliberate campaign against rationing, the public appears to approach it with a good deal of faith in the Government's ability to administer the program effectively. Where the program has been experienced, however, a certain amount of disillusionment seems to have set in. Perhaps the inconveniences involved proved greater than expected; possibly expressed readiness for sacrifice was more emotional than real. The relationship between rubber and gasoline is still not fully appreciated.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION  
WASHINGTON

*file*

January 11, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

You will find enclosed the weekly  
INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 57 and copy of most  
recent Bulletin.

You will, I think, be especially inter-  
ested in the item starting on page one and the  
item beginning on page four.

Sincerely yours,

*R. Keith Kane*

R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



RESTRICTED

Bureau of Intelligence  
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

M-2622

Bulletin of Intelligence Projects

Number: 2  
Date: Fortnight - January 8, 1943

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Studies completed December 24 - January 8

Subject	Description
1. Report from the Nation (Confidential)	A summary of findings of people's reactions to all phases of the war since Pearl Harbor.
2. The Public Looks at Manpower Problems. (Confidential)	A nationwide survey of public reactions to the manpower problem, covering attitudes toward labor shortages, employment of women and aliens in war production industries, government control in vital areas, and the general conception of the U. S. public as to the problems involved in effective prosecution of this phase of the war -- their satisfaction with or criticism of the present system.
3. War Information and the Changing Outlook toward Russia and England. (Confidential)	A study of changes in attitudes toward Russia and England with relation to their knowledge about the war and in terms of the changing tide of events during the past several months.
4. Public Opinion After Two Weeks of Nationwide Gasoline Rationing.	A measure of the change in attitude of people after initiation of the nationwide mileage rationing program to discover the degree of acceptance of it, with specialized interviews in critical areas where there had been considerable opposition before its institution. (Reported in Intelligence Report #56)
5. Manpower Stabilization Agreement in Detroit. (Confidential)	A survey of labor attitudes toward the new stabilization agreement established in Detroit. (Reported in Intelligence Report #56)

X-8461



6. An Experiment in Pretesting.  
(Confidential)  
A description of the techniques used in developing a set of instructions for War Ration Book No. 2 to meet the problem of obtaining maximum public understanding.
7. Summary of Division's Intelligence Materials on Food Rationing. (Confidential)  
Compilation of people's reactions to the whole problem of food rationing, their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with its present handling, their general acceptance of the plan. (Reported in Intelligence Report #56)
8. Newspaper Comment on Gasoline Rationing in Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, St. Louis (Confidential).  
Analysis of press treatment of the subject of gasoline rationing in four specific areas with a view to comparing reactions in two cities where opposition to the program was strong vs. two cities where there was general acceptance. (Reported in Intelligence Report #56.)
9. Editorial Reaction to Gasoline Rationing from October 1 to December 15. (Confidential)  
Media analysis of reactions to the whole program of gasoline rationing during this period. (Reported in Intelligence Report #55)
10. Confidence in "Washington" (Confidential)  
An analysis of the nature and extent of criticism directed at the Government's conduct of domestic affairs to determine the degree to which dissatisfaction constitutes general distrust.
11. Rumors on Manpower. (Confidential)  
A collection of recent rumors on the current manpower problem, the shortages which exist and attitudes toward its handling.
12. Participation in the War-Savings Program. (Confidential)  
A study of people's buying habits in connection with the War-Savings Program, their reasons for purchase of war bonds and stamps, the motivations behind their purchases, along with a study of the untapped potential market for promulgation of future sales.

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Studies Nearing Completion

1. A report on the shipbuilding industry, dealing with labor attitudes and the causes of absenteeism.
2. A study on public understanding of the Government's anti-inflation program.

Studies Nearing Completion (Cont'd)

3. An investigation of the degree to which the public feels surfeited with war-related radio programs.
4. A trend report on related attitudes toward the war.
5. A study designed to bring up to date previous information on public obstacles to the acceptance of the mileage rationing program.
6. Report on public reactions to the food rationing program.
7. Report on American attitudes about the United Nations.
8. Report on public reactions to the President's address to Congress.
9. Press reaction and treatment of the Vice President's recent speeches, of the President's press conference on post-war plans, of the President's address to Congress.
10. Report from field representatives on reactions in their areas to the President's speech.
11. An analysis of the efficacy of the radio allocation program, based on the monitoring of Philadelphia radio stations.

Continuing Services

1. Intelligence Report (weekly - Confidential)
2. Weekly Media Report (Restricted)
3. United Nations Intelligence Digest (weekly - Confidential)
4. United States Official Statements (weekly - For Administrative Use)
5. Summary and Analysis of Feature Motion Pictures (weekly - Restricted)
6. Newsreels and OWI Campaigns and Programs (Monthly - Restricted)

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Requests for these reports should be made in writing to Miss W. L. Shannon, Room 5427, Social Security Building, or by telephone to extension 71248 (National War Agencies). Where extra copies are not available, the master file copies may be referred to within the central offices, Bureau of Intelligence, Room 5427.

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1-8-43

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT **57**

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A summary of investigation and analysis conducted for certain OWI officials, issued for OWI and the interest of other members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the week of December 31 through January 6, except where otherwise specifically stated.

## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

### PRESCRIPTION FOR CONGRESS

Editors have become somewhat uneasy about the intentions of the new Congress they helped to elect. They want the Legislature, rather than the Executive, at the helm of the ship of state. But they do not want to see the ship wrecked again on the rocks of isolationism.

As members of the 78th Congress gathered at Washington, news pages blossomed with think-pieces predicting that a coalition of Republicans and conservative southern Democrats would wrest control of national affairs from President Roosevelt. Congressional investigations of New Deal programs and policies were forecast. Leading New Dealers, it was prophesied, would be called up on the congressional carpet.

Within limits, this sort of heckling seems entirely agreeable to the press. Many newspapers reasoned, as did the Kansas City Star, that "This new Congress is going to Washington with the opportunity and duty of re-establishing a badly disturbed balance in national government. It will have the opportunity of re-establishing popular respect for the legislative branch of that government."

The phases of Government policy which commentators most frequently prescribed for congressional action were fiscal affairs and regulation of labor. The press, during the last week, vehemently renewed its demand for modified taxation. The Ruml plan, or some variation on the pay-as-you-go theme, came in for a fresh round of applause.

Governmental expenditures and the size of the federal bureaucracy were set forth by numerous commentators as fit subjects for congressional pruning. Senator Byrd's strictures on extravagance were roundly endorsed. The press looks forward rather gleefully to a stringent congressional audit of all Government outlays.

Much editorial comment also urged a congressional crack-down on labor and a general overthrow of the Administration's "pro-labor" policy. The Cleveland Plain Dealer charged that the Administration has "held out consistently against any legislation restricting the rights of organized labor... and despite the lip service it has paid to over-all wage ceilings its agencies find excuses almost daily for authorizing wage increases."

There was some fear, however, that the new Congress might go too far along these desired lines. The Scripps-Howard papers declared: "Some members will seek not merely to correct the errors and excesses of an executive branch too long and too strongly dominant, but to deprive the President of necessary powers. Others will want not merely to correct the errors and excesses of organized labor, but to hamstring unions; to destroy price controls and risk disastrous inflation in the name of helping the farmer; to make political capital out of public dissatisfaction with flaws in the administration of essential rationing programs; to encourage public resistance to necessary sacrifices."

There was even greater fear that the Congress might not confine its opposition to the domestic domain. Warning against congressional abridgement of the reciprocal trade agreements program, the Baltimore Sun pointed out that "We shall have need for instrumentalities of this kind in the post-war world, for when hostilities cease and the work of reconstruction begins, it will be necessary to provide for the fullest possible exchange of goods and services between the nations."

Considerable apprehension was aroused by rumors that "isolationists" in the new Congress might attempt to overthrow the President's lend-lease powers, which expire in June. "Lend-lease," warned the Philadelphia Record, "is one of the major weapons counted upon to fortify the peace, as well as win the war."

The prevailing feeling among editorial commentators appears to be a desire to have the President checked — but not to have him checkmated.

### WHITE PAPER

The State Department's White Paper was received with a puzzled shaking of editorial heads. Almost all commentators agreed that it made the Pearl Harbor disaster seem more mysterious than ever. As the Christian Science Monitor put it, "The White Paper does not explain Pearl Harbor. If anything, it makes that disaster less comprehensible, especially for Americans who supposed that their leaders did not calculate on a Japanese attack so far from Japanese bases and at so strong a point as Pearl Harbor."

There was some division of opinion among the commentators over the extent to which the White Paper vindicated State Department policy. Some felt that the document proved that our diplomats had adequately warned our soldiers. Others argued, on the other hand, that it revealed only a clumsy inability to understand the plain implications of Axis behavior. Almost all were perplexed by American unpreparedness in the face of such abundant information about enemy intentions.

### PROPHECIES

Commentators were inclined to chide Admiral Halsey for tempting fate by the outright prediction of victory in 1943 which he made last week. The Baltimore Sun observed, "All sorts of people have been making all sorts of predictions ever since the war began. Now and then one is justified by the event; but the characteristic feature of prophecy in general, with regard to this war, has been its prevailing inaccuracy."

The prevailing judgment was that the American public lacks the stamina to withstand good news. As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch put it, "With many citizens, such words will inevitably have an effect just the opposite of that on the distant fighting men, eager to get back to their homes. These confused citizens will ask themselves why, if the war will be won so soon, must they deprive themselves of things they have always had - why rationing, why discomforts, why war bonds, why the Victory tax. The entire war effort can be seriously jeopardized and



the war itself prolonged if any such attitude becomes widespread."

But though they decried official optimism as a tonic for the public, the commentators were patently optimistic themselves. They listened to the recent speeches by Germany's Hitler and Japan's Tojo and found them, on the whole, very good for our side. Edwin L. James, writing in the New York Times, said of Hitler that "his bombastic declaration of Friday was entirely lacking in dignity; it is an alibi, followed by a feeble promise of eventual victory made at a time when the Russian armies were inflicting a heavy defeat on his armies in the East and while an African second front was growing in power and potentiality."

General Tojo's address was treated somewhat more cautiously. Commentators took up the General's assertion that the "real war is starting from now on." Some said this indicated that the Japanese would henceforth be on the defensive. Such interpretations were frequently accompanied, however, by cautions similar to that expressed in the Louisville Courier Journal: "The Japs will not surrender... they must be exterminated... There is little reason for the hopeful view that the end of the conflict is in sight. It has hardly begun."

Although most newspapers expected 1943 to be a year of allied offensives and seemed extremely hopeful about their outcome, they were careful to avoid predicting victory within the year's span. They conscientiously cautioned their readers against overconfidence, while themselves exuding it in almost every paragraph.

## POPULAR REACTIONS

### SIZE OF THE ARMY

The public, as a whole, is not well informed either as to the current size of the United States Army or as to the rate at which its expansion is planned during the next year. These conclusions emerge from the

interviewing of a national sample in late October and early November within a fortnight after statements by Secretary Stimson and General Marshall outlining the Army's present and projected size.

The size of the Army on October 14, as announced by Secretary Stimson, was 4,250,000. Only about one-fifth of the public was able to estimate its numbers with any accuracy. Two-fifths were unwilling to hazard even a guess.

ABOUT HOW MANY MEN DO YOU THINK THERE ARE IN OUR ARMY NOW? JUST YOUR BEST GUESS.

Less than 3,000,000	10%
3,000,000 to less than 4,000,000	19
4,000,000 to 4,250,000	13
Over 4,250,000 and less than 5,000,000	8
5,000,000 and over	17
Don't know	42

There was equal uncertainty concerning the projected size of the Army for 1943. Secretary Stimson had announced a figure of 7,500,000 to be reached by the end of the year. One-fifth of the people interviewed anticipated an Army of 10,000,000 or more. And, again, nearly two-fifths were unable to offer any estimate.

FROM WHAT YOU HAVE HEARD, ABOUT HOW LARGE AN ARMY WOULD YOU SAY WE ARE NOW PLANNING TO BUILD BY THE END OF 1943?

Less than 7,000,000	11%
7,000,000 to less than 7,500,000	13
7,500,000 to less than 8,000,000	12
8,000,000 to less than 10,000,000	8
10,000,000 and over	19
Don't know	37

### MANPOWER MOBILIZATION

The public appears to be thinking in terms of a large Army, but it is even more keenly aware of the need for maintaining a labor force adequate to America's role as the "arsenal of democracy." As previously reported in these pages, the public is more prone to favor expansion of the labor force than to favor expansion of the Army at this time.

GRANTING THAT BOTH OF THESE THINGS ARE IMPORTANT,  
WHICH ONE IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR US TO DO RIGHT  
NOW — INCREASE THE SIZE OF OUR ARMED FORCES OR  
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF WORKERS IN WAR JOBS?

Increase size of armed forces	22%
Increase number of workers	40
Both equally important	25
Don't know	13

Sentiment for expanding the labor force, even at the expense of the armed services, was particularly strong among those who were dissatisfied with the progress of production. Among people who felt that our war production program was proceeding "only fairly well" or "poorly", 47 per cent considered it more important to increase the number of war workers than to build up the Army. Only 37 per cent of those who believed production to be proceeding "very well" made a similar choice.

A Gallup Poll conducted in December indicates that about two-fifths of the public now thinks "there is a shortage of workers in war plants in this country." More than half of the public seems disposed to support drastic governmental allocation of the available manpower supply:

DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE GIVING THE GOVERNMENT THE  
RIGHT TO TELL WORKERS WHERE TO WORK AND AT WHAT  
JOBS? (Gallup Poll, December)

Favor	56%
Oppose	35
Don't know	9

About a third of the public, however, believes that the Government already has authority to undertake this sort of manpower allocation.

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE RIGHT AT THE  
PRESENT TIME TO REQUIRE A PERSON TO TAKE ANY JOB  
ANY PLACE IN THE COUNTRY? (Gallup Poll, December)

Yes	32%
No	49
Don't know	19

Considered together, these findings suggest considerable popular

receptivity to some over-all plan for the federal mobilization of manpower. Any specific national service act would, of course, encounter opposition from the groups and individuals directly affected by it.

Manpower controls would have to be accompanied by clear explanations of their effectiveness in advancing the war effort and by firm assurances to labor that the customary freedoms and collective bargaining procedures would be fully restored after the emergency.

### PRIME PROBLEM

Trial tabulations of a Gallup Poll, the results of which have not yet been released, indicate that the American public tends to approach present and future problems largely in economic terms. A national sample was asked to give free answers to the question, "Aside from winning the war, what do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" The answers, grouped under general categories in the table below, show that people were much more prone to think in terms of economic, than in terms of political, readjustments.

To solve the economic situation, to prevent inflation, to prevent another bad depression, to get the war paid for without serious effect on our currency	14%
To make a lasting peace — a permanent world peace	12
Food shortage here and abroad — problem of producing more food — stepping up agriculture	10
Preservation of our democracy, to have a more literal democracy, to maintain our present form of government during the readjustment period, to save our nation from bureaucracy, to prevent dictatorship, to avoid fascism	9
Conditions after the war, reconstruction of the world, etc.	6

The present labor problem — the manpower shortage — scarcity of farm labor — proper distribution of manpower	8%
A job for everyone after the war, to prevent future unemployment, to be sure the men in the services get jobs after the war	7
To put through social reforms — improve situation of the poor — reduce racial discrimination	4
Winning the war is the only important problem, there is no other problem	5
Other answers	17
Don't know	12

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### ENFORCEMENT OF NATIONWIDE MILEAGE RATIONING

The American public is still far from fully convinced either as to the need for nationwide mileage rationing or as to the efficacy with which the rationing program is being enforced. In the parts of the country which have had considerable experience with gasoline rationing, a fifth of the people are still unconvinced that it is necessary on a national scale. A third of the people in the newly rationed states doubt the need for such a program.

About half the population throughout the country, moreover, believe people are trying to get more gasoline than the mileage regulations allow them. Depending on their section of the country, from one-fifth to two-fifths of all persons even refused to say that people should not take advantage of a chance to get more gasoline than rationing allots them.

IF PEOPLE HAVE A CHANCE TO GET MORE GASOLINE THAN THEY'VE BEEN ALLOWED, DO YOU THINK THEY SHOULD?

	OLD RATIONED AREA	NEW RATIONED AREA			
		E.N. Central	W.N. Central	South	West
Should	18%	19%	22%	17%	33%
Should not	77	70	70	77	62
Don't know	5	11	8	6	5

That denial of the need for nationwide gasoline rationing is an important factor in influencing people to condone evasion is indicated by the fact that:

18 per cent of those who do consider nationwide gasoline rationing necessary, but

34 per cent of those who do not see the need for nationwide gas rationing... think people should take advantage of opportunities to get more gas than they have been allowed.

With large sections of the population in some areas unconvinced of the necessity for mileage rationing, and with both widespread anticipation of chiseling and a strong tendency to condone it, the difficulties facing enforcement are obvious. They can be overcome only by persistent informational efforts to clarify the purposes of the program and by firm assurances that enforcement will be effective and equitable.

THE FUEL OIL PROGRAM IN OPERATION

Now that winter and a fuel oil shortage are actually upon them, Americans are adjusting to the situation with considerable ingenuity. But recent letters from social workers and other regular correspondents of the Bureau indicate that they are not denying themselves the luxury of a certain amount of grumbling, and in some parts of the country there is real anxiety about the months ahead.

Shutting off rooms and using supplementary heating — wood, gas, coal, electricity — are the most common measures for beating the fuel oil shortage. Many people are also keeping temperatures lower and install-

ing insulation or weather stripping. Other expedients include: dressing more warmly, keeping shades and curtains drawn, turning off the heat when leaving the house or going to bed, leaving windows shut at night, providing less hot water in apartment houses.

Relatively few people have heeded the admonitions of Government spokesmen to convert oil stoves and furnaces to coal. Some who have wanted to do so have been balked by shortages of labor or equipment. For low income people the cost is prohibitive. If the gravity of the situation had been better appreciated, however, some correspondents believe that more people would have found a way to change over, in spite of obstacles.

The crisis is creating some new problems. The care of old people, invalids and children, in homes which are too cold some or all of the time, is perhaps the gravest. Low income groups are resorting to "parking the kids" with neighbors in some instances. A few communities have opened public buildings to take care of families without sufficient heat.

In some places, too, there is real discomfort, and even suffering, and considerable anxiety about the future. In New England the situation is especially acute. The people in low-income groups, who depend on range oil-burning stoves for their heat, are reported to be suffering most. New Englanders generally face the rigors of deep winter with apprehension. Throughout the nation there is widespread anxiety about the danger of colds and pulmonary infections.

There is some disposition to put the responsibility for this feared wave of illness upon the Government. In general, there is a good deal of grumbling. Many people have the feeling that wise anticipatory planning could have eased the present situation. The unfinished pipe line is frequently referred to. People maintain that the present crisis is partly the result of the Government's piecemeal attack on economic problems. "If fuel oil, gasoline, price control and transportation are all parts of the same problem," one person asks, "why do we deal

with them separately?"

Any aspect of the administration of fuel oil rationing which suggests ineptness or bungling is subject to bitter attack. Failure to revise population quotas since 1940 has perhaps caused greatest anger. In Norfolk, whose population has nearly doubled since 1940, it is reported that there was a near riot about a month ago when people were first told that there was a certain deadline for securing kerosene rationing cards and then informed that there was an inadequate supply of the cards.

The "highly theoretical nature of the formula which leaves no discretion to local boards" also gives rise to some criticism. One correspondent writes:

"There is considerable confusion as to how quotas were reached. Some people report little reduction in oil, others report large reductions. Nobody seems to know why they got what they got."

There are also some complaints that rationing is not administered in such a way as to assure equality of sacrifice. A few people maintain that "the big fellows" — Government buildings and the larger hotels and apartment houses — are still extravagant in their use of fuel.

There was recognition that people's complaints about rationing arise in part as a result of their natural irritation over the discomfort it entails. The Government, the correspondents felt, should issue more material emphasizing the fact that the present situation is regrettable, but unavoidable, and stressing the relation between compliance with regulations and winning the war.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON


January 22, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

You will find enclosed the weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 59 and copy of most recent Bulletin.

The first item on page one deals with editorial opinion about political developments in North Africa. You may find that it contains material of interest to the President.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
White House  
Washington, D. C.



RESTRICTED

Bureau of Intelligence  
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

Bulletin of Intelligence Projects

Number: 3  
Date: Fortnight - January 22, 1943

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Studies completed January 9 - January 22

Subject	Description
1. Surfeit with War on the Radio. (Confidential)	Reactions of a Philadelphia cross-section on the amount of war news being broadcast to the public over the air.
2. Worker Morale in Five Shipyards. (Confidential)	A report on worker morale and related working and living conditions in 5 shipbuilding centers.
3. Public Reactions to the Draft and Selective Service. (Confidential)	Highlights from a nationwide survey of the U. S. on people's attitudes toward the administration of the draft, their understanding and confidence in the present system. (Reported in Intelligence Report #57)
4. Attitudes on American Food Situation. (Confidential)	Special memorandum on public reactions to the forthcoming food rationing program. (Reported in Intelligence Report #58)
5. Opinions of Women on Food Rationing. (Confidential)	Collection of comments by women throughout the U. S. on the proposed food rationing, its effect on their daily living, their acceptance of or dissatisfaction with it.
6. Looking Forward to a Global Peace. (Confidential)	Correspondence Panel report on people's conception of a global peace and the extent to which the U. S. should become involved in international affairs.
7. The Treasury on the Air (Restricted)	Survey of the amount of time being devoted to Treasury sponsored programs and announcements over the air.

X-9076

8. Reactions to the Joint Production Cutback Statement of the War Department, Navy Department and WPB. (Confidential) A survey in 8 production centers of workers', business leaders', and labor leaders' reactions to the joint statement on reduction in production goals.
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Studies Nearing Completion

1. Impact of the war on civilians - experimental field study to determine impact of all phases of the war on civilians.
2. Fat-saving campaign - report on women's attitudes toward and knowledge of it.
3. Alien study - change in attitudes of Italian-Americans and Italian aliens since October, and the morale and war attitudes of German-Americans and German aliens.
4. War manpower controls - reactions of Louisville war workers to these controls.
5. Anti-inflation - a measure of public understanding of the Government's economic program.
6. War related attitudes - a trend report.
7. Food rationing - public reactions to the program.
8. President's address to Congress - public reactions to President Roosevelt's speech of January 7.
9. Post-war - press reaction and treatment of Vice President Wallace's two recent speeches on post-war, of the President's press conference on the same subject, and that portion of his address to Congress devoted to this topic.
10. Radio allocation program - an analysis of the efficacy of this program, based on the monitoring of Philadelphia radio stations.

Continuing Services

1. Intelligence Report (weekly - Confidential)
  2. Weekly Media Report (Restricted)
  3. United Nations Intelligence Digest (weekly - Confidential)
  4. United States Official Statements (weekly - for Administrative Use)
  5. Summary and Analysis of Feature Motion Pictures (weekly - Restricted)
  6. Newsreels and OWI Campaigns and Programs (Monthly - Restricted)
  7. Enemy Conditions and Propaganda (weekly - Confidential)
- 

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OWI

1-22-43

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT **59**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OFFICE OF  
WAR INFORMATION  
  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

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A summary of investigation and analysis conducted for certain OWI officials, issued for OWI and the interest of other members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the week of January 14 through January 20, except where otherwise specifically stated.

## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

### FEUD

Editors are distinctly unhappy about affairs in North Africa. The whole situation there is concealed, they charge, behind a frustrating censorship which denies them essential facts.

Three events during the week brought their anxiety to a ferment -- a story by Geoffrey Parsons, Jr. in the New York Herald Tribune reporting grave differences between the United States and Britain; denials of these differences by Brendan Bracken and Harold MacMillan; and the appointment of Marcel Peyrouton as Governor General of Algeria.

Mr. Bracken's statement only partially dispelled a widespread feeling that Britain has been working at cross purposes with the United States behind the North African scenes. His pledge of cooperation was generally applauded. The prevailing judgment is that any decisions made by General Eisenhower ought to be backed to the limit by both Governments.

Some of the General's defenders suggested that he has been made the victim of factional wrangling. The Scripps-Howard papers described it in this way: "...because Eisenhower acted as a great military commander with a single eye to victory, instead of as a partisan politician -- because he refused to operate as a factional De Gaullist -- they are now out to get him. 'They' include the left wing of the De Gaullists, a British official group (though not Churchill), and an American minority which has tried to smear Secretary of State Hull for many months."

This is a judgment supported by a number of newspapers customarily hostile to the Administration's foreign policy. The Chicago Tribune observed, for example, that "North Africa has apparently become an arena in which conflicting groups, working at cross purposes, are sabotaging General Eisenhower's hope of attaining a military decision... The implication is that, while trying to fight a war, he is compelled to look over his shoulder to Washington and London to discover the political intentions of his superiors."

But some outstanding commentators of more liberal hue placed the blame for North African political difficulties squarely upon our own Department of State. "One cannot avoid the impression," said Dorothy Thompson, "that the State Department, or persons in it, have a personal feud with General De Gaulle, dating from the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair... The unrealistic policy of our State Department constitutes a menace to our war."

It was the transfer of M. Peyrouton from Argentina to the North African scene which evoked the greatest editorial ire. The Washington Post called this the "last straw" and declared, "North Africa today is in a highly explosive state. In no small measure the hopeless mismanagement by civilian American officials on the spot, notably the American Minister, Robert D. Murphy, is responsible for it. The elevation of Peyrouton to a high place in the administrative apparatus of that liberated region has all the dangerous potentialities of a lighted match in a powder barrel."

Similarly, Walter Lippmann felt that the trouble stemmed from the fact that, "When General Eisenhower was confronted with a political problem which no



one had prepared him for, his chief American adviser was the political agent, Mr. Robert Murphy, who had misjudged the situation." Mr. Lippmann ended his column with a sweeping indictment: "The time has come to cease misleading the American public by pretending that the political situation in North Africa, which is our entire responsibility, is muddled because of what has been said about it and thought about it in London. That is just an un-sportsmanlike search for a scapegoat, and altogether unworthy of a great people. The control of this situation is in Washington and nowhere else, and it is in Washington that the crucial decisions will have to be made, and the measures taken, to send to North Africa American political representation of sufficient stature and caliber to cope with the problem."

Most commentators seemed to have no objection, on principle, to diplomatic opportunism as a means for the achievement of praiseworthy ends. They have a horror of naivete and an uneasy notion that rigid adherence to principles may be naive. But, apparently, they are beginning to wonder whether American expediency in North Africa was, after all, genuinely expedient.

### STRIKE

James C. Petrillo's appearance before a Senate committee and the wild-cat strike in the anthracite coal fields, afforded opportunities, not ignored by the press, for moralistic comments on the Administration's labor policies.

Mr. Petrillo's defense of his ban on musical recordings was generally castigated as illogical. Only under an Administration which deliberately helped promote union organization, it was commonly pointed out, could such dictator-

ship by a labor official be perpetrated.

Most papers regarded the coal strike as a grave peril to eastern fuel reserves and to the war effort in general. Editorial wrath at the strikers was somewhat mitigated by the fact that one of the expressed reasons for their walk-out was the imposition of increased union dues by John L. Lewis. While not condoning the strike, some papers argued that the workers had no other avenue of protest against extortion by their own leaders.

Most commentators saw in this situation further evidence of the evils of "union dictatorship"; they agreed that it stemmed from Administration favoritism toward labor and a failure to establish union responsibility.

Nearly all editorial comment demanded strong governmental action to break the strike and applauded President Roosevelt's ultimatum to the strikers. Even newspapers relatively sympathetic to labor considered the situation intolerable. The Philadelphia Record warned the strikers of congressional reprisals against all organized labor and declared that, "Up to now, the strike has been politely called a wild-cat walk-out. From now on it rates as sabotage."

#### TAXES

Editorial pressure for a pay-as-you-go tax plan, which has been mounting steadily, achieved fresh fervor last week. Newspapers declared that the ideas of March will present a crisis for which the average taxpayer is wholly unprepared.

The problem can be met, many of them said, only by an immediate shift to some form of pay-as-you-go taxation. The Detroit Free Press observed, for example, that "Congress' most pressing taxation task is to regard March 15 as the arrival date of an emergency... This means prompt enactment of the Ruml plan or a similar device."

In most comment, the Ruml plan has been uncritically represented as a pay-as-you-go formula. Little patience has been shown toward the Treasury's suggested substitutes or to its objection that the plan fails to place tax liabilities actually on a current basis. The Ruml plan as a synonym for "pay-as-you-go" is now widely accepted as a magic device for rendering taxation convenient, if not positively agreeable.

## POPULAR REACTIONS

### RESPONSES TO RADIO TREATMENT OF THE WAR

Fears that the American public is "fed up" with radio material about the war appear to be unfounded. Most people say that they are listening to the radio more than, or as much as, they did a year ago. Relatively few feel that there is "too much" about the war on the air. These are some of the salient findings of a recent Bureau of Intelligence survey of public reactions to radio treatment of the war.

The survey was made in Philadelphia, because a monitoring study was then being conducted in that city by the Bureau to discover how much time was devoted to war-related material on the air. This study revealed that about

one-fifth of all broadcast time was given over to the war. The Bureau wished to discover, in addition, whether people felt they were hearing too much or too little about the war over the radio. A representative cross section was questioned, and a number of individuals were interviewed intensively.

Only a fourth of the people felt that they were listening to the radio less than they did a year ago. Thirty-seven per cent felt that they were listening about the same amount, and 35 per cent claimed to be listening more.

Furthermore, most of those who were listening more attributed their increased interest to the war. In contrast, most of those who were listening less were doing so, not because they were fed up with news or programs about the war, but simply because they had less time.

Direct questioning did reveal some feeling that there is too much on the air about the war:

SO FAR AS YOUR OWN PERSONAL LISTENING IS CONCERNED,  
IS THERE TOO MUCH ABOUT THE WAR, OR NOT ENOUGH ABOUT  
THE WAR, IN RADIO PROGRAMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS THESE  
DAYS?

Too much about the war	15%
About the right amount	62
Not enough	12
No opinion	11

It is to be noted, however, that almost as many said there was "not enough" on the air about the war as said that there was "too much." With these viewpoints just about balancing, and with almost two-thirds of the sample maintaining that just about the right amount of time is devoted to the war,

it appears that the public is reasonably well satisfied with present radio emphasis on the war.

While only 15 per cent of the sample felt that, in general, the radio put too much emphasis on the war, an additional 20 per cent felt that there was too much of certain types of war material. Radio serial stories, news commentators and dramatizations about the war were the types of program to which objections were most frequently raised.

Dissatisfaction with the amount of war news on the air may be expected to fluctuate with the degree of interest in the war at any particular time and with other factors. Interest may have been unusually high in December because of the North African campaign.

Some differences appeared between the people who complained that the radio put too much stress, in general, upon the war and those who raised objections only to certain programs. People in the latter group were highly interested in the war, but objected to the over-emphasis or kind of treatment given the war in some types of program. The people dissatisfied in general complained about the nerve-racking or depressing effect of war material on the radio and were irritated by the repetition of the news. They showed some tendency to want to escape the war. Their surfeit is not with war on the radio, but with war talk generally.

As these facts suggest, there was a definite relation between the opinion that there is too much about the war on the radio and people's general orientation toward the war. The people who complained about the amount of

war material on the air were prone, far more than those who did not, to be out of sympathy with the war effort and to be dissatisfied with the way it is being conducted. They were less likely to be active participants themselves in home-front war activities.

Interestingly enough, the people who held these attitudes were also more prone than those more closely identified with the war to complain that there is not enough on the radio about the war. Thus, any effort to placate some of those whose dissatisfaction is related to basic disaffection by cutting down the amount of broadcast time devoted to the war would probably only heighten the dissatisfaction of other members of the same group.

People's views about whether there is too much, too little or the right amount of emphasis on the war over the air waves does not reflect itself to any significant extent in their listening habits. The surfeited and the non-surfeited spend about the same amount of time listening to the radio.

There was some slight tendency for the surfeited group to avoid programs dealing with the war. It is clear that their dissatisfaction does not basically stem from the amount of time they spend listening to war material on the radio. If anything, those who expose themselves least to such material complain most.

Straight news broadcasts, despite the frequency of criticism by the surfeited groups, were the most popular type of program about the war. News commentators rated second in esteem. About three people in ten expressed a preference for serial stories and dramatizations of the war. A comparatively well educated group of listeners, comprising about one-fifth of the entire radio audience, were particularly attracted to speeches, forums and round table discussions.

An earlier survey conducted by the Bureau showed that most people say they like radio war programs for one of two reasons: (1) because they are informative, or (2) because they give listeners a sense of participation in the war -- of "being in on things." They like news commentators because "they help clarify the news" and "seem to have inside dope."

An effort was made to discover whether people minded having regular broadcasts interrupted for war announcements. Only five per cent objected to this practice.

A question was also asked about radio treatment of the United Nations to see if people were surfeited with the subject as a result of the six week spot campaign which had just run its course. It was found that, on the contrary, many people think that too little due has been given America's allies on the air:

IS THERE TOO MUCH, OR NOT ENOUGH, ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS (OUR ALLIES) IN THE RADIO PROGRAMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS THESE DAYS?

Too much	2%
About the right amount	51
Not enough	29
No opinion	18

The people who protested that there was too much or too little about the war on the radio also tended to make the same complaints about the movies and newspapers. But the movies were criticized somewhat more frequently than the radio for devoting too much or too little attention to the war, and the press was criticized somewhat less frequently.

### MANPOWER CONVERSION

A December poll of the American Institute of Public Opinion sheds further light on the problems involved in recruiting eight million additional workers into war industry. Only about half of the men not already in war jobs expressed a willingness to shift into war work:

WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO TAKE A JOB IN A WAR PLANT AT YOUR PRESENT RATE OF PAY? (Men only)

Yes	49%
Yes, if	6
No	40
Don't know	5

The "Yes, if" group includes those who said they would be willing to accept work in war plants "if capable of handling the job"; "if the job is in the immediate vicinity"; and "if able to stand it physically."

Yes responses might have been higher than they were if the question had not specified, "at your present rate of pay." Previous Bureau of Intelligence surveys have shown that willingness to shift into war work is definitely affected by satisfaction with present remuneration.

On the other hand, the responses are less encouraging if it is remembered that there is a big difference between willingness to take a job in a war plant and an active impulse to seek such a job. An October survey conducted by the Bureau revealed that only 15 per cent of those not employed in war industries, and only seven per cent of those not then employed at all, had actually applied for war jobs.

Economic position and age did not appear to affect the willingness of men to shift into war work. But awareness of the acute manpower shortage exerted a considerable influence -- indicating the importance of the



informational task ahead. Fifty-five per cent of those aware of the shortage were willing to shift into war work. In contrast, only 47 per cent of those who didn't know whether there was a shortage or not, were willing to make a change.

Sixty per cent of the men who lived in defense areas, but only 53 per cent of the remaining city dwellers, and only 33 per cent of the farmers, expressed a willingness to accept war work. Unquestionably these differences, too, were largely a product of understanding of the manpower crisis. As the Bureau's October survey showed, people in areas with many war plants are far better aware than people in other parts of the country of the existing manpower shortage.

As is natural, there was a close relationship between willingness to shift into war work and approval of compulsory manpower mobilization. Fifty-eight per cent of those who favored giving the Government the right to tell workers where to work and at what jobs were willing to accept war work themselves at their present rate of pay. Only 36 per cent of those who opposed compulsory mobilization were similarly willing to shift into war work.

#### BAN ON "PLEASURE" DRIVING

Up and down the eastern seaboard, motorists seem to be taking the ban on pleasure driving with reasonable good cheer. Reports from BOI field observers and from OWI's regional information offices agree that, in the states hit by the new restriction, there is general acceptance and cooperation.

Indeed the stringency of the OPA ruling on gasoline seems to have convinced people in a number of localities that the gasoline shortage is real and serious. There have been some protests and a number of inquiries, of course. But complaints are less frequent than they were before the ban, and a healthy feeling has developed that now everybody is being treated alike, at least in the eastern states.

The inquiries centered, for the most part, around definition of the term "pleasure". There has been some concern over differing interpretations of this word by individual OPA offices, and some localized criticism of special gas allowances.

Regional information officers and BOI field men agreed that acceptance and cooperation were high, even in the Boston area, where the Massachusetts Public Works Commissioner, whose department faces heavy losses in gasoline taxes, complained that New England had been singled out for gasoline restrictions. He described the motorist as "the prize sap of the century" for paying automobile registration fees under the illusion that he would be allowed to drive his car. In Philadelphia, a city with important suburban communities, reaction to the prohibition was reported to be "remarkably good."

The greatest irritation developed along the fringes of the restricted areas. Field men say that the inclusion of Pittsburgh in the eastern gas rationing area evoked considerable bitterness there. The check on motorists while driving was vehemently resented. The OPA office in this city had 900 phone calls on this subject in one day.

The situation in the Middle West was aggravated by some organized opposition, especially by the Chicago Tribune, to the rationing program. In Milwaukee, where OPA officials themselves were charged with failure to cooperate, there has been some tendency to disregard OPA rules. The theft of 6,500 gasoline ration books in Chicago has led to fear of a large gas bootlegging ring in that city.

People in the Southwest, where gasoline rationing remains a serious problem, have been hearing a number of rumors as a result of the eastern ban on pleasure driving. There is now some fear that coupon values in the Southwest will be cut to salve the feeling of those in the eastern shortage area.

A traffic survey conducted by the North Carolina Highway Department showed that the volume of traffic in that state during December 1942 was 49 per cent lower than during December 1941. On rural highways, there was a decrease of 67 per cent in traffic. But public conveyances are said to be seriously overtaxed, while private cars still on the road drive without full loads.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION


WASHINGTON

January 29, 1943

My dear Miss Tully:

Enclosed is a copy of INTELLIGENCE REPORT  
NO. 60. An item titled "The President's Audience"  
beginning on page five discusses popular reactions  
to the President's message to Congress on the  
State of the Union and to some of the ideas  
advanced in that address.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



PSF  
OWI

1-29-43

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT **60**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains information relating to the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, as amended, U. S. Code 50, Sections 31 and 32. Its transmission or communication in any manner to any unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

OFFICE OF  
WAR INFORMATION  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

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A summary of investigation and analysis conducted for certain OWI officials, issued for OWI and the interest of other members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the week of January 21 through January 27, except where otherwise specifically stated.

## EDITORIAL ATTITUDES

[ 62-43-041 ]

### EXULTATION

The dominant tone of the American press throughout the week has been one of triumph. Nazi reverses in Russia, Rommel's continued retreat in Africa and signs of weakened German and Japanese air potency combined to bolster the editorial sense that we now have the enemy on the run. Finally, the dramatic Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Casablanca imparted a fresh feeling of purpose and direction to the United Nations war effort.

All appraisals of the Anglo-American conference concluded that important war plans had been worked out in detail by the military and naval chiefs. The rapprochement between Generals Giraud and De Gaulle was welcomed, of course — although with considerable skepticism as to its reality and depth. Commentators confessed disappointment that neither Stalin nor Chiang Kai-Shek attended the conclave; some had hoped for the announcement of a full-fledged United Nations high command. But they agreed that the close collaboration between British and American leaders was greatly heartening and would lead to new offensive action in southern and western Europe. Insistence on unconditional Axis surrender was enthusiastically applauded. The President was widely praised for his boldness and courage in making the trip.

German acknowledgement of losses on the eastern front has swept away most of the American doubts concerning the significance of the Russian offensive. With the lifting of the siege of Leningrad, the Nazi withdrawal from Voronezh



and the entrapment of German forces in Stalingrad, American commentators have begun to see visions of a real Hitler debacle. The Cincinnati Times Star, in a representative comment, observed that, "Lately things have been happening in Russia that make it seem not at all unlikely that the Germans are facing one of the greatest disasters of military history."

Only a few analysts continued to warn against overestimating the importance of Russian gains. They reminded readers that the German armies have not yet been thrust back to last year's winter line. Some suggested that Nazi admissions of defeat on the eastern front might be a psychological stratagem of Dr. Goebbels to promote American complacency.

The press was particularly warm in its tributes to the heroism of the Russian people. In a number of comments, the sufferings endured by the besieged citizens of Leningrad were compared with the trivial inconveniences to be accepted here in America. There seemed genuine friendliness and sympathy in the editorial admiration for Russian endurance and courage. The Des Moines Register, for example, said: "Let us remember that the magnificent performance of the Russian army has been matched, right straight through, by hardships and sacrifice and courage on the part of Russia's civilian population such as we can hardly imagine."

The extrusion of Rommel's battered army from Libya occasioned a host of sardonic comments on the end of Mussolini's dream of empire. "From the jungles of deepest Ethiopia to the shores of Tripoli," remarked the Cleveland Plain Dealer, "the new Roman empire of Benito Mussolini lies in ruins. The smoke that rises above the charred coals of the last Fascist stronghold on the Mediterranean... marks the end of an era."

A number of editorials gave warning, however, that the consolidation of the Afrika Korps with the Axis troops in Tunisia would constitute a formidable problem for the allied forces in North Africa.

The bombing of Berlin gave the American press as much delight as an important military victory. Most of the commentators who appraised it felt certain that this RAF achievement must have dealt a seriously damaging blow to German morale. The prevailing judgment was expressed by the Indianapolis Star: "The heavy bombardments of Berlin by the RAF were so timed that they added greatly to the worries of Doc Goebbels... The devastating blows already dealt numerous German cities weakened confidence in the Nazi leadership and the raids on Berlin on two successive nights must have given the Aryans a decided jolt."

The German reprisal raids on London were commonly regarded as insignificant — additional proof of the RAF's great superiority over the Luftwaffe. And in the South Pacific, enemy air weakness was discerned in the diminished scale of Japanese attacks and the high ratio of Japanese to American losses. It is now assumed that we have an edge over the Japanese quantitatively, as well as qualitatively.

#### THREAT

The one circumstance which jarred all this ebullience was a dawning recognition of the seriousness of German U-boat activities in the Atlantic. The threat to our supply line was generally characterized as the worst peril in the path of United Nations strategy.

Much of the comment criticized the Government's information policy about submarine activities, first, for failure to admit the extent of the damage they had done and, second, for allegedly burying stories of our losses beneath good news. The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot declared, for example: "American officialdom... appears curiously loath to let the facts of submarine sinkings come out as news when it is fresh and, therefore, vivid... Whatever the other purposes of the American publicity policy, the net effect has been to belittle the toll the submarines are taking."

There was praise, however, for the candor of the statements made by Elmer Davis and Sir Percy Noble. A good deal of speculation suggested that the latter would be put in supreme charge of a rejuvenated Anglo-American anti-submarine campaign. And while the press exhibited some degree of real alarm over the situation, most newspapers agreed that this Hitler threat could be overcome.

#### FOOD

The farm problem continued as a major topic of editorial concern during the week, as the newspapers commented approvingly on ex-President Herbert Hoover's proposals for increased food production. They expressed anxiety about shortages of farm labor and machinery, urging that agriculture be recognized as one of the essential war industries. Dissatisfaction with Selective Service policies respecting exemption of farm workers continued to be widespread.

There was some approval of Mr. Hoover's suggestion that farm boys in the Army be furloughed back to the farms in order to get in next year's crops.

And a good many newspapers began to campaign vigorously for the planting of victory gardens. The bulk of the press was vehemently opposed, however, to permitting price rises as a means of promoting farm production.

#### OPTIMISM IN THE NEWS

The high level of optimism previously reported in newspaper headline treatment of war news has been even more strikingly apparent during the past week. A survey of 20 metropolitan newspapers, January 19 - 25, reveals that all of them singled out good news exclusively for their headlines about Russia. The news stories from Libya, New Guinea and the Solomons were headlined with just about equal cheeriness. The only important battle sector in which gains for the enemy were acknowledged was Tunisia.

The following table shows the ratio between good and bad news in the headlines of the 20 metropolitan dailies examined:

<u>Story</u>	<u>"Good News"</u>	<u>"Bad News"</u>	<u>Neutral</u>
Russia	99%	0%	1%
Libya	97	1	2
Tunisia	53	37	10
New Guinea	100	0	0
Solomons	73	0	27
European Bombings	60	30	10
Other Actions	65	25	10

## POPULAR REACTIONS

#### THE PRESIDENT'S AUDIENCE

Some knowledge of the President's Message on the State of the Union reached about two-thirds of the American people. Four in ten of a national sample, interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence immediately after the President's

message was broadcast, said that they heard it over the radio, although only half of these people claimed to have listened to the speech in its entirety. An additional three in ten said that they had read the speech or had heard talk about it.

The Message was displeasing to only a very small minority of the public. When asked if there was anything particular about it they did not like, only seven per cent of the sample responded affirmatively. These few objections referred, in the main, to post-war plans or to the cost of the war, as outlined later in the President's budget message.

To the majority who liked the speech, its tone of optimism and encouragement seemed most impressive. When asked to mention what things in the speech they liked best, a fourth of the sample spoke of the heartening facts Mr. Roosevelt gave about the progress of the war and the production program and of the hope he held out for victory in the next year or two.

A considerable portion of the public, about 12 per cent, said that they liked the speech best for its discussion of peace plans and post-war problems. In about equal numbers, they applauded the President's references to measures for insuring permanent peace and to a domestic program of social security. Other expressions of praise for the speech alluded to its attitude of cooperation with Congress and its emphasis on national unity.

A decided majority of the American people is now hopeful that we will win the peace, as well as the war. President Roosevelt's words may have lent some encouragement to this view. The Bureau posed the following question

to the national sample interviewed immediately after the President's Message:

DO YOU THINK THE CHANCES FOR MAKING A LASTING PEACE  
AFTER THIS WAR WILL BE ANY BETTER THAN THEY WERE AFTER  
THE LAST WAR?

Yes	62%
No	24
Don't know	14

Rather interesting differences were evident in this connection between those who had listened to Mr. Roosevelt and those who had neither heard nor read his address.

68 per cent of the people who had heard the President's speech, but only

56 per cent of those who had neither heard nor read it... believed that the chances for a lasting peace will be better after this war than they were after the last war.

The difference may not, of course, be attributable to the impact of the President's ideas. People sympathetic to the President and to his program of international collaboration may have tended to listen to his address in greater numbers than those less friendly.

Interviewing indicated that the overwhelming approval expressed last fall for continued Lend-Lease shipments to our allies has now grown to even greater proportions:

SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO SEND SUPPLIES TO OUR ALLIES EVEN  
IF IT MEANS WE WILL HAVE SOME SHORTAGES HERE AT HOME?

	<u>October</u>	<u>January</u>
Send supplies	88%	94%
Do not send supplies	7	4
Don't know	5	2

Popular approval of American participation in some sort of post-war association of nations has also developed:

IN GENERAL, DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE IDEA OF THE UNITED STATES JOINING AN ORGANIZATION OF NATIONS AFTER THE WAR?

	<u>November</u>	<u>January</u>
Approve	62%	72%
Disapprove	23	12
Don't know	15	16

Eighty-five per cent of those approving in January were in favor of having other countries besides the United Nations as members of the organization. Sixty-one per cent of these people were in favor of granting membership to the Axis countries.

The President's Message was delivered in an atmosphere predominantly sympathetic to the consideration of peace plans at the present time,

DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO BEGIN RIGHT NOW DECIDING WHAT THE PEACE TERMS AFTER THIS WAR SHOULD BE, OR DO YOU THINK THE PEACE PLANS OUGHT TO WAIT UNTIL LATER?

Make plans now	55%
Wait	37
Don't know	8

The objection most frequently advanced against the formulation of peace plans now was that the nature of the post-war settlement cannot be determined until the final outcome of the conflict is known. A sizeable group objected simply on the ground that winning the war should be considered our first and

most important job; their feeling, apparently, is that planning for the future may distract attention from the immediate objective.

Conversely, those who favored planning at the present time were prone to argue that the job requires much time and should, therefore, be undertaken as soon as possible. Some asserted that planning now is needed in order to have a clear statement of our war aims. Others suggested that we can think more clearly now than we will be able to at the end of the war and that we need a definite program to avoid the mistakes that followed the last war.

#### THE VICE PRESIDENT'S AUDIENCE

About a third of the American people said that they had some knowledge of Vice President Wallace's address of December 28; 15 per cent said they had listened to it over the air. Among those who had heard the speech, read it or talked about it, one-sixth voiced objections to Mr. Wallace's ideas -- for the most part on the grounds that they were too vague, too radical or too impractical.

In the interviewing conducted in January, the Bureau sought public opinion in respect to several proposals suggested by the Vice President in the course of his address. Three-fourths of the American people registered agreement with him that we must physically disarm our enemies when we have won the war. Only half the country, however, went along with the Vice President's thesis that the aggressor nations must be psychologically disarmed as well.

SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT IN ORDER TO CHANGE PEOPLE'S WAY OF THINKING IN THE ENEMY COUNTRIES WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE CHARGE OF THEIR EDUCATION. DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO DO THIS?



Yes	49%
No	36
Don't know	15

The objections to such an undertaking were chiefly on the ground that it would be an unwarranted and undemocratic violation of human rights. These people, apparently, felt on principle that the United States should not interfere in the internal affairs of any other country. A smaller group argued that this sort of psychological disarmament was impractical. They felt that a system of education cannot be imposed by outsiders and that the surveillance involved would prove too formidable.

With the thesis advanced by both the President and the Vice President that economic opportunity should be assured to all after the war, there was virtually unanimous agreement among all the people interviewed. There was, moreover, extremely widespread confidence that such a program could be made effective and a prevailing belief that efforts in this direction should be commenced at once.

DO YOU THINK THAT ONE OF OUR AIMS SHOULD BE TO SEE THAT EVERYONE IN THIS COUNTRY HAS A CHANCE TO GET A JOB AFTER THE WAR?

Yes	99%
No	1

(Asked of those who answered "Yes")

(a) DO YOU THINK THAT THIS CAN ACTUALLY BE DONE?

Yes	68%
No	18
Don't know	13

(b) DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD START TO MAKE PLANS FOR THIS RIGHT NOW, OR DO YOU THINK THIS OUGHT TO WAIT TILL LATER?

Make plans now	72%
Wait till later	23
Don't know	4

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### THE RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN

Mr. McNutt has estimated that 4,000,000 women will have to be added to the labor force within the next 12 months. Because most women in the employable age group are married, and because most single women are already employed, housewives constitute by far the most important source of additional workers. These facts indicate the significance of the views of husbands and of women themselves about women accepting wartime work.

A December poll of the American Institute of Public Opinion indicates that three men in ten are unqualifiedly willing to have their wives accept full-time jobs running machines in war plants:

#### WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO HAVE YOUR WIFE TAKE A FULL-TIME JOB RUNNING A MACHINE IN A WAR PLANT?

Yes	30%
Yes, if	11
No	54
Don't know	5

The "Yes, if" group includes those who said: "if the children could get proper care"; "if my wife could stand it physically"; "if she is capable of handling the job"; and "if she didn't have to leave the family."

Economic status and awareness of the manpower crisis significantly influenced views on this question. Thirty-five per cent of the men in the low income groups, but only 25 per cent of those better situated, were willing

to have their wives take jobs in war plants. Thirty-four per cent of those who felt that the crisis justified compulsory governmental mobilization of manpower, but only 23 per cent of those opposed to such a plan, expressed a willingness to have their wives go to work.

Four out of ten of the women in the sample were willing to take full-time war jobs. An equal number were unwilling. Seventeen per cent said they would accept jobs "if children could get proper care"; "if able to stand it physically"; "if capable of handling the job"; "if I didn't have to leave my family."

Economic status did not appear to affect women's willingness to go to work. But awareness of the manpower crisis did exert considerable influence. Forty-four per cent of the women who favored compulsory mobilization, as compared with 33 per cent of those opposed, were willing to take war jobs. Younger women, as might be expected, were far more interested in wartime employment than older ones.

It is to be noted that the American Institute questions specified "a full-time job running a machine in a war plant." Thus the replies may understate the willingness of men to have their wives take work of some kind and the willingness of women to enter the labor force. An investigation made early last year indicated that almost 3,000,000 women were willing to take half-time jobs. And a large number of the women entering the labor force on a full-time basis are taking clerical, sales and service jobs, thus releasing men for the often more arduous work in war plants.

The Institute questions did not distinguish between women with children

and childless women. Interviewing conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence in late October and early November indicates that the public distinguishes sharply between the two groups. Seventy-one per cent of the sample recognized the need for married women without children in war industry. But only 14 per cent believed that there was any need for mothers to go to work at that time.

On the part of the women themselves, there was a notable difference in willingness to accept employment between those who had children and those who did not:

42 per cent of the childless women in the sample  
20 to 34 years of age, but only

16 per cent of the mothers in this age span...  
were willing to take war jobs.

Similarly,

33 per cent of the childless women 35 to 54 years  
of age, but only

19 per cent of the mothers... were willing to  
take jobs.

The necessity for taking care of their children was, of course, the greatest obstacle to the employment of mothers. It is clear that if women with family responsibilities are to be recruited into the labor force in large numbers, adequate provision must be made for the day-care of young children. The importance of such provisions is underscored by the fact that mothers constitute a very large percentage of the women not now working.

Men workers in non-war jobs were reluctant to concede that even women without children were needed in war industry. Forty-nine per cent of those men, as compared with 20 per cent of the total sample, expressed the opinion that women were not needed.

A disproportionate number of these men opposed to women in industry were semi-skilled or unskilled workers. It may be surmised that many of them may have tried without success to land jobs in war plants. Or, even if they have not, they may have regarded the wide-scale employment of women as a threat to their prestige and security.

Thus an essential phase of the task of speeding the recruitment of women centers in industry itself. There is need for further informational material directed to workers on the necessity for recruiting women into the labor force if 1943 production goals are to be met. Measures are also indicated to appease the possible resentment of male workers who are left out of war industries in lower-paying jobs and to prevent friction where men begin working with women for the first time.

#### RUMORS

Previous Bureau of Intelligence reports have emphasized the basic impulses — such as hatred, anxiety, curiosity, wishful thinking — which account for the rise and spread of rumor. The subjects with which rumors deal also furnish valuable clues to the type of information needed to keep distorted versions of events from gaining currency.

The American Institute of Public Opinion recently made available to the

Bureau the rumors gathered by its field reporters in a December rumor survey. Though by no means a perfect scientific sample, the collection probably gives a fairly accurate impression of the rumors which were current.

In all, 457 rumors were gathered. These were analyzed and classified by the Bureau. The list below indicates their distribution by subject matter:

Rationing, conservation and salvage	116
War bonds, taxation, inflation	18
Price control	2
Special economic problems	3
Military matters	87
Duration of the war	40
Post-war problems	6
United Nations	12
Neutral nations	1
Lend-Lease	1
The enemy	14
U. S. Government and administrative personalities	56
Information policy	8
Minority groups	50
Civilian responsibilities	2
Welfare and health	2
Manpower	19
Production	11
Transportation	9

The rumors about rationing far outnumbered all others. Most of them reflected resistance to rationing. A large number indicated or implied that there was no real shortage in one or another of the commodities being rationed. Many went on to charge that rationing was being imposed on

people out of malice or a desire to arouse the public to the seriousness of the war.

Rumors about military matters, the second largest group, were of two chief types. One group gave the "inside dope" about where the United Nations would strike next. The other centered around misadministration within the Army. The waste of food was one favorite subject.

Rumors about the Government and administrative personalities were almost all hostile in character. Anti-Roosevelt stories and accusations of Government bungling predominated.

Minority group rumors also reflected strong hatreds. Negroes, Jews and Japanese interned in WRA camps were the targets of all the minority group rumors gathered in this particular survey.

Most of the rumors about the length of the war were clearly wishful in character. An overwhelming majority prophesied an early end of the conflict. In contrast, a few dealt with obstacles to peace and revealed a fear that the war would drag on indefinitely.

These rumors furnish at least rough clues to the areas about which additional information is needed. Of course, information cannot put a complete stop to rumors. War increases normal tensions and creates new ones. It focuses people's attention on some problems about which it is not easy to furnish simple and reassuring explanations. And it is not always possible to release all the information which might clarify a particular situation and relieve people's anxiety. But, if not a guaranteed

remedy, information -- clear, complete, authentic news -- is the best antidote yet discovered for the poison of rumors.

#### UNCERTAINTY

Field observers of the Bureau have reported a good deal of confusion regarding the payment of federal income taxes. Sentiment for the institution of a pay-as-you-go system is said to be extremely widespread. And uncertainty as to whether such a system will be substituted for the present method of income tax collection has created a considerable measure of bewilderment, especially in the Midwest.

Expectation of a pay-as-you-go plan, according to the field men in one or two areas, has provided some people with a pretext for failing to make any provision for the income tax payments due next March. In some cases, people take the attitude that taxes should not be paid until the last minute, and that in no case should more than a quarter be paid, whether the funds are available or not. The thought is that normal collection of taxes may be abandoned in favor of collection at source during the course of the year.

Reports indicate special confusion in Iowa. In that state a rumor has gained currency to the effect that "internal revenue employees say a man is a fool to pay his taxes." It is also reported that men in the armed services are being advised to ask deferment of their taxes on the belief that Congress will exempt soldiers and sailors from taxation. Working wives of men in the service are inquiring whether this means that they should file a joint return and defer their entire tax liability.



Workers who have had new income during the last year are said to be especially confused. Reports indicate that they have made no provision for the tax due on March 15 and that they will be unable to pay it.

Early congressional clarification of the tax program would be highly desirable. An informational campaign seems needed to make it clear that the income levy under any system adopted by Congress will be steep and stiff.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON


February 8, 1945

My dear Miss Tully:

The latest issue of the weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT, NO. 01, and the current Bulletin of Intelligence Projects are sent to you herewith.

The President may find particular interest in two items dealing with editorial and popular reactions to the Casablanca conference. These are to be found on pages one and five of the report.

Sincerely yours,



H. Keith Aane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



Number: 4

RESTRICTED

Date: Fortnight - February 5, 1943

## BULLETIN OF INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS

Bureau of Intelligence, Office of War Information

Studies completed January 23 - February 5

Subject	Description
1. Public Preparedness for Point Rationing (Confidential)	A measure of public reactions to government plans for point rationing, their approval or disapproval of advance notice of the rationing of specific commodities, and their knowledge of how extensive this program will be. (Reported in Intelligence Report #61).
2. Employment Stabilization Plan for the Louisville Area. (Confidential)	Preliminary summary of attitudes of workers in non-war and war industries to the War Manpower Commission's labor control plan.
3. News Treatment of Manpower Controls. (Restricted)	Editorial comment in Louisville papers on the manpower controls.
4. American Opinion and Post-War Problems. (Confidential)	Summary of U. S. opinion toward post-war problems and people's expectations as to some form of a post-war international order.
5. Farm Labor Situation. (Confidential)	Summary memorandum outlining present farm labor shortages and how they can be met.
6. Comment on the Enemy. (Restricted)	A survey of media discussion on the strength of the enemy, its immorality and specific identity.
7. American Attitudes toward the Beveridge Plan. (Confidential)	Reported in Intelligence Report #61.
8. Summary of editorial opinion towards Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Casablanca.	Reported in Intelligence Report #61.
9. Your War and Your Wages. (Confidential)	Reactions of labor and white collar employees to the effectiveness of OWI pamphlet on wages.

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Studies Nearing Completion

1. Fat-saving campaign - report on women's attitudes toward and knowledge of it.
2. Anti-inflation - a measure of public understanding of the Government's economic program.
3. War related attitudes - a trend report.
4. President's address to Congress - public reactions to President Roosevelt's speech of January 7.
5. Anti-inflation primer - a measure of the effectiveness of OWI's booklet on economic policies.
6. Post-War - reactions of farmers, businessmen and labor to post-war problems and their expectations.

Continuing Services

1. Intelligence Report (weekly - Confidential)
  2. Weekly Media Report (Restricted)
  3. United Nations Intelligence Digest (weekly - Confidential)
  4. United States Official Statements (weekly - for Administrative Use)
  5. Summary and Analysis of Feature Motion Pictures (weekly - Restricted)
  6. Newsreels and OWI Campaigns and Programs (Monthly - Restricted)
- 

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PSF  
OWI

2-5-43

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT **61**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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INTELLIGENCE

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### PRESS AND RADIO COMMENT

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The prevailing enthusiasm over the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting was somewhat tempered by regrets that Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek failed to attend and by doubts regarding the reality of the Giraud-De Gaulle reconciliation. A number of commentators remained critical of political arrangements in North Africa.

#### PRIORITIES

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A majority of newspapers defended William Jeffers in speaking out against "Army and Navy loafers" — but tended to argue that civilian demands for synthetic rubber must yield to military and naval needs.

#### NAZI ANNIVERSARY

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Despite warnings that Nazi admissions of defeat might be hokum, the press celebrated Hitler's tenth anniversary gleefully. The RAF raids on Berlin and the Russian recapture of Stalingrad occasioned high optimism.

### POPULAR REACTIONS

#### CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

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Bureau correspondents report that announcement of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting proved a "let-down" for people whose hopes had been raised extravagantly by the advance build-up.

#### BEVERIDGE REPORT

Page 6

Although knowledge of it is not yet widespread, the Beveridge social security plan has evoked keen enthusiasm among most people who know of it. According to the Bureau's labor and social worker correspondents, there's a prevailing belief that it can be, and ought to be, adapted for American use.

FOOD RATIONING

Page 8

Only half the women in the U. S. think they understand how point rationing works. But they're overwhelmingly in favor of a comprehensive food rationing program and have little fear of dangerous food shortages. Sugar and coffee restrictions have not pinched very hard. Poor and uneducated people show the most anxiety about the food future and are in special need of information about it.

DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

INFLATION

Page 13

Optimism about the war and a lowered sense of urgency have given impetus to economic forces working toward inflation. Government and popular resistance to pressure groups has weakened. Labor and farm demands, if unchecked, will produce an inflationary spiral. Labor, in particular, because of increasing discontent among the rank and file, needs information about the dangers of inflation and the imperative need for accepting, temporarily, a lowered standard of living.

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Cancellation of the railroad discrimination hearings scheduled by the FEPC, resignation of committee members and of Judge Hastie from the War Department have inflamed Negro resentment.

A summary of investigation and analysis conducted for certain OWI officials, issued for OWI and the interest of other members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the week of January 28 through February 3, except where otherwise specifically stated.

2-5-43

## PRESS AND RADIO COMMENT

### CASABLANCA AFTERMATH

[ 2-5-43 GHI ]

Enthusiastic approval of the Casablanca conference continued to fill editorial pages and radio broadcasts throughout the week. There was general agreement that the meeting gave dramatic assurance of Anglo-American unity and laid the groundwork for decisive military action on the fighting fronts.

The "unconditional surrender" agreement was applauded as serving notice, both to the Axis and to our Russian and Chinese allies, that negotiated peace proposals would be given no ear in London or Washington.

With the first excitement past, however, commentators began to voice dissatisfaction with one or more of the subsidiary aspects of the conference. Most of them were at pains to explain the absence of the Russian and Chinese leaders on the ground that their countries are not engaged in war against the Axis as a whole. But it was plain that they would have preferred a full United Nations council. There was a good deal of agreement with the comment in the Boise Statesman: "We'd reel a lot better in regard to that African rendezvous if Stalin and the Gissimo had been there. If the presence of two leaders can do much to lacerate Hitler's nerves and hearten the waiting peoples of Europe, the presence of the four would have been even more potent." Allied to this sentiment was a smaller volume of regret that a unified supreme war council had not materialized from the meeting.

Unraveling of the French political tangle was emphasized as second in importance only to military matters. A majority of commentators felt that substantial progress had been achieved in this connection. But a considerable



minority expressed deep disappointment that no more definite solution had been reached. The Cleveland Plain Dealer remarked, for example: "We do not like the conclusions. They forecast a continuation of trouble in that area and a further diminution of allied prestige among the struggling populations of occupied Europe."

The prevailing tendency was to hope that the rapprochement between Generals Giraud and De Gaulle would prove genuine and provide a basis for effective collaboration. And a number of newspapers deplored criticism of North African political arrangements in general. Typical of this point of view was an editorial in the Kansas City Star: "The difficulties confronting the American and British Governments are not eased by the intervention of various groups in the United States and England who are trying to exercise long distance control of the situation without regard to the views of the responsible officials on the ground."

The criticism continued, nevertheless, in considerable volume -- centering, in large part, around the appointment of Marcel Peyrouton as Governor General of Algeria. Secretary Hull's upbraiding of his critics merely made them more vehement. Few newspapers sympathized with the Secretary's impatience. The Lynchburg News remarked, for example, that "When... Secretary Hull insists that critics should hold their tongues until they know all the facts, he invites the retort that the Government should make known the facts." A small number of editorials called for a reconstitution of the State Department.

Despite Mr. Hull's admonition, much of the newspaper discussion and most of the radio comment about North Africa and the Casablanca conference were

concerned with political problems.

### PRIORITIES

Rubber Administrator Jeffers' blast at "Army and Navy loafers" occasioned a fresh flood of comment about the synthetic rubber program and the priority problems which it entails. The bulk of the comment, both in newspapers and on the air, was more concerned with the personalities involved and the reported conflicts between them than with actual production problems.

Most of the newspaper discussion appeared in conservative and anti-Administration papers in the South and Midwest. These sources tended to see the issue as a matter of the public's right to information, viewing Elmer Davis' rebuke to Mr. Jeffers in an unfavorable light. The Butte Standard expressed a common feeling: "Although Jeffers' speech was not according to rule, it is likely to have a very wholesome effect and it will be pretty generally applauded by the American people who are beginning to suspect that the experts, the bureaucrats, the amateur expeditors, are gumming up the works on the production lines... The controversy has been dragged out of the closet... It can't be hush-hushed."

Some commentators expressed sympathy for OWI and criticized the Rubber Chief's attitude. Mark Sullivan accused him of having raised a tempest in a teapot. H. V. Kaltenborn called the conflict an "honest difference of opinion," but declared that Mr. Jeffers had been "indiscreet." Some commentators hinted that Mr. Jeffers might have political ambitions.

The dominant feeling as to the merits of the issue was that military and

naval needs must take precedence over civilian desires for synthetic rubber.

#### NAZI ANNIVERSARY

The gloom which emanated from Berlin during the week aroused some suspicion among American analysts -- particularly among radio commentators. William Shirer and Samuel Crafton, for example, suggested the possibility that the Germans were magnifying Russian strength in an effort to persuade us to relax our Lend-Lease aid to Russia.

Raymond Gram Swing advanced the thesis that German pessimism might be a deliberate preparation for the launching of a peace offensive. He said: "... the Nazis can take only two lines as the war progresses: they either can hope for a compromise peace, or they will throw themselves into destruction with a frenzy surpassing anything they have shown, even using gas and bacteria, to bring down European civilization in a crash around them since they are doomed."

Despite such cautions, however, most editorial comment about Germany continued to be staunchly optimistic in tone. The tenth anniversary of Nazism occasioned sardonic observations that the Nazi sun is setting in the East. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, for example, noted that, "In past years, this anniversary has been a day for uninhibited boasting and confident promises... There was none of this cocksureness in the ceremonies yesterday. The emphasis was all on grim warnings that loss of the war would mean the destruction of Germany, and on savage threats against slackers and saboteurs."

The RAF raids on the Berlin anniversary celebrants caused great rejoicing.

And the Red Army's final deliverance of Stalingrad was hailed as a crushing blow to Hitler's prestige. In a great many comments, the Nazis were represented as desperate, with the U-boat campaign remaining as the last trump in their hand.

## POPULAR REACTIONS

### CASABLANCA CONFERENCE

The advance announcement that great news was to be expected on Tuesday evening, January 26, aroused rather extravagant expectations. The Bureau's field representatives in almost all parts of the country report that people experienced some sense of disappointment in their reaction to the actual news of the Roosevelt - Churchill meeting.

There is no suggestion in the field reports that the public generally failed to applaud the President's trip or to recognize that it achieved significant results. A good many people, however, gauged the accomplishments in relation to their own unfounded hopes. Some disappointment was expressed, for example, over the Anglo-American nature of the meeting; hope had developed that a supreme United Nations war council would be created. According to the field reporters, regret was widespread over the absence of Premier Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

A few wishful thinkers in the country had gone so far as to suppose that the big news to be announced that Tuesday evening would be nothing less than the end of the war -- an Axis capitulation. Others anticipated the announcement of an important military victory. To such people, the facts inevitably

constituted something of a "let down."

The news of the rapprochement between Generals Giraud and De Gaulle also occasioned some expressions of disappointment. People said they had hoped for a more far-reaching and sensational solution of French political difficulties.

How extensive this sense of "let down" was cannot be measured from the reports of the field men. It seems significant, nevertheless, that among representatives reporting from 11 areas, all but one took note of a gap between popular anticipation and reality. The consensus of opinion among them was that the build-up for the news had been somewhat excessive and had detracted from, rather than added to, public appreciation of the Casablanca meeting.

#### BEVERIDGE REPORT

Knowledge of Britain's Beveridge report does not appear to be very widespread in the United States. Social workers and labor editors report, however, that there is a high measure of enthusiasm for the purposes of this social security program, wherever it is known among their contacts.

These correspondents were asked recently by the Bureau of Intelligence to comment on reactions of people in their communities to the Beveridge plan. Among members of both panels, there was agreement also that, wherever the plan is known, there is a pronounced feeling that something of the sort should be adopted in this country.

The correspondents indicate that, most of all, people in their communities want jobs after the war. Next to assurance of employment, they desire protection through periods of idleness or illness "from cradle to grave."

The plan appears to crystallize, in many respects, one of the dominant aspirations which great numbers of people hope that the war will realize.

It is generally recognized that the British plan would not in all respects fit the needs of this country -- its stipulated allowances, for example, are too low. But, according to the correspondents, it invites review of our own social security program, which they say should provide a better retirement system for teachers, broader coverage for unemployment, illness and accidents, larger grants to dependent children, better guardianship regulations. And they are convinced that it should be extended to include farmers, domestic employees, professional workers, small businessmen and other white collar groups. The difficulties of financing and administering such an extended social security plan are mentioned by the correspondents, but are not considered insurmountable.

The most common argument advanced against such a plan in the correspondents' reports is that "livings must be earned by sweat, and lots of folks won't sweat unless they have to." But the consensus of opinion among those writing to the Bureau on this subject was that social workers, teachers, nurses, liberals and labor are, on the whole, enthusiastic for a program of this sort. "Organized workers," said one correspondent, "are as nearly unanimous for the program as they are on any question."

Opposition is expected from those hostile to any extension of Government controls and from those members of the medical and dental professions who abhor the idea of socialized medicine. Indeed, surprise was expressed that so far private insurance companies had not been more vocal in their protest.

According to the correspondents, a good many people of conservative background, who might be expected to oppose such a plan, tended to regard it as a wise concession to avert a more serious disruption of our economic system.

These correspondents were, of course, disposed to be sympathetic to the Reveridge plan. Business magazines examined by the Bureau were prone to stress the difficulties and complexities of adapting it to the United States. They were uniform in forecasting insurance company opposition.

#### FOOD RATIONING

Interviewing conducted with a small national sample of women in January indicates that about half of them do not now understand how the new food rationing system will operate:

DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU UNDERSTAND PRETTY WELL HOW THIS  
NEW FOOD RATIONING PROGRAM IS GOING TO WORK?

Yes	52%
No	48

As might be expected, the point system was the phase of the new program which was least understood.

The women displayed little anxiety about comprehensive food rationing. Eight in ten were confident Americans would still get enough to eat:

WHEN MEAT AND CANNED FOODS ARE RATIONED, DO YOU THINK  
YOU AND YOUR FAMILY WILL STILL BE ABLE TO GET ALL YOU  
NEED TO STAY HEALTHY?

Yes	81%
No	7
Don't know	12

Other attitudes do much to explain this confidence. As reported in Intelligence Report #58, the American people overwhelmingly accept the need for comprehensive food rationing. They regard it as a means of assuring equitable distribution of scarce goods. Both that survey and the present one showed, furthermore, that an overwhelming majority approve of shipping food to our allies, even if it means further restrictions here.

The current survey revealed that food rationing has not yet entailed much hardship for most people. Only 39 per cent said that they get less coffee than they need, and only 25 per cent said that they get too little sugar:

DO YOUR RATION BOOKS ALLOW YOU MORE SUGAR (COFFEE) THAN YOU NEED FOR YOUR FAMILY, OR ABOUT THE RIGHT AMOUNT, OR LESS THAN YOU NEED?

	<u>Sugar</u>	<u>Coffee</u>
More	16%	13%
About the right amount	58	47
Less	25	39
Don't know	1	1

More than a third of the women interviewed said that they were buying as much coffee and sugar as they did before rationing, a few said they were buying even more. Fourteen per cent were not buying all the coffee and sugar their ration books entitled them to.

There was a widespread feeling that the country could still tighten up a good bit on its utilization of food -- that much food is still being wasted:



DO YOU FEEL THAT VERY MUCH FOOD IS BEING WASTED IN  
THIS COUNTRY?

Yes	44%
No	38
Don't know	18

Interestingly, however, despite the numerous rumors about wastage of food at army camps, only seven per cent felt that that was where most of the waste is occurring. And when the remaining women were asked specifically, "Do you feel that food is being wasted unnecessarily in Army camps?", only 12 per cent said "Yes."

The feeling that America's food position is relatively comfortable may also contribute to the good spirit with which food rationing is accepted. Forty-three per cent of the women acknowledged that they did not know what effect food rationing in England had had on the health of the people. But an overwhelming majority of those with an opinion about the matter felt certain that our diet is healthier than the English diet, and would continue to be so even after the new rationing program goes into effect.

The most serious long-term threat to the success of food rationing appears to be the fear that ultimately there won't be enough food to go around. Newspaper concern over the farm labor shortage and food production problems has been acute and may have stimulated popular anxiety about the adequacy of food supplies. About a fourth of the people in this and the preceding sample believed that the food situation would ultimately become so serious

that some people wouldn't have enough to eat.

This anxiety definitely colors people's attitudes toward food rationing. Unlike the recognition that food supplies are scarce, which inclines people to accept rationing as a means of distributing available supplies equitably, the panicky fear that there won't be enough food to go around may lead people to hoard and to oppose rationing.

Approval of food rationing is now high among the entire population. But only eight in ten of those who were anxious approved of present rationing plans, as compared with nine in ten of those who were not. Similarly, those who were anxious were somewhat less inclined to favor sending food to our allies and to North Africa than was the rest of the population.

If resistance to food rationing develops, it will probably come largely from those who display greatest anxiety. Those who fall in this category, in the earlier sample, were therefore carefully analyzed. It was found that the apprehensive group is disproportionately composed of the economically insecure. Anxiety was also closely related to low identification with the war effort. Those highly identified with the national cause may be at once more willing to endure necessary sacrifices than are the apathetic, and more confident that the Government will be successful in preventing extreme shortages.

The association between anxiety and lack of schooling was particularly marked. Anxiety increased progressively as one went down the educational scale. Only 16 per cent of the college graduates in the sample, but 42 per cent of those who had not completed grammar school, revealed anxiety about

the future food supply. The more education people had, the more prone they were to appreciate the efficacy of such a mechanism as rationing.

On each educational level Negroes displayed more anxiety than whites, and a large majority of the uneducated Negroes in the sample fell in the anxiety group. Having experienced discrimination, many Negroes may fear that they are certain to be on the short end of things if the food situation becomes more acute.

Despite the equalitarian aspects of rationing, more anxiety was displayed by economically insecure people with little education than by better-to-do people of comparable educational status. In part, this may be explained by the fact that anxiety was associated with the belief that dealers will play favorites. The poor, like Negroes, may fear that this partiality will operate to their disadvantage. People with few dollars in their jeans may also fear that they will be in a poor bargaining position for obtaining those foods not yet being rationed.

The problems of reaching the poor, the uneducated and Negroes -- the very groups who most need reassurance about the food situation -- will not be an easy one. Questioning reveals, for example, that they listened to the Wickard and Davis radio speeches outlining the new food program in significantly smaller numbers than did more favorably situated groups. Other types of informational approaches will have to be employed in reaching and influencing them.

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### INFLATION

Signs are multiplying that the anti-inflation program faces its most severe test since its inception. Farm organizations are renewing their pressure for an upward revision of the farm price structure. Organized labor is displaying impatience with the Little Steel formula. It has now been attacked, not only by John L. Lewis, but also by more temperate labor leaders such as Philip Murray and R. J. Thomas. The United Mine Workers and the Railway brotherhoods have demanded that the formula be revised. The CIO is expected to come out for revision in the very near future.

The AFL has issued a lukewarm defense of the formula, but some AFL officials are declared to have opposed it privately. And one of the AFL's major affiliates, the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, engaged in a two-day strike last week during which it announced its intention to smash the 15 per cent limitation on wage increases.

These demands have arisen at a time when the Government itself has appeared to be wavering in its determination to enforce its anti-inflation program. The interpretation put on Prentiss Brown's statement about the inevitability of a six per cent annual price rise confirmed the fears of many that his appointment meant some relaxation in the Government's efforts to control prices. The Department of Agriculture has introduced price incentives to spur production of a number of important crops. In spite of the 15 per cent formula, a WLB panel has recommended a further wage increase for 150,000 meat packing workers, whose wages advanced from 17 to 18 per cent between January 1, 1941 and May, 1942.

The present assault upon the price control program is unquestionably attributable, at least in part, to the wave of optimism which swept over the country following the American landings in North Africa. Bureau surveys show that between summer and late November the number of people who felt the United States was certain to win a complete victory increased from 58 per cent to 73 per cent. In the same period, the belief that the war would be over in two years or less gained ground even more rapidly. Because of sweeping Russian successes and the retreat of Rommel into Tunisia, it may be surmised that optimism has grown still further since November.

A decreased sense of urgency about the war has been one of the fruits of the feeling that we are sure to win it anyway. Many people have lost some of the December 7 feeling that the war is a life-and-death affair, demanding an all-out effort on the part of everyone. At least unconsciously, some people have begun to ask why sacrifices are necessary.

It is to be emphasized that this feeling has not been confined to any one or two groups. Many other pleas for special treatment have been voiced besides those detailed here, and each group has been emboldened by a belief that the general public would not strenuously oppose its demands. Overconfidence may have weakened the will of the American people to resist the demands of special groups at the very time those demands are being advanced with increasing pressure.

Many of the explosive economic forces working toward inflation have been gathering strength for months. The recent wave of optimism has simply given them a better opportunity of asserting themselves. Large commercial farmers

want a revision of the price structure basically because the greatest bottleneck they face in increasing production is a shortage of cheap labor. Higher prices for farm products will allow them to compete with industry for labor without curtailment of present profits.

Workers demand more money primarily because the rise in the cost of living has already outstripped the 15 per cent wage increase, the Little Steel formula permits them. Government and National Industrial Conference Board figures indicate that prices have risen about 20 per cent, and R. J. Thomas, among others, argues that these figures are unrealistic because they do not take into account "black markets," precipitate price increases in war centers and the "hidden inflation" of inferior goods.

For many reasons, workers are impatient with the argument that further wage increases will only raise prices higher still, until the country is in the vortex of a disastrous inflationary spiral. For one thing, like most of their fellow Americans, they are unaware of the interrelationship of the various parts of the anti-inflation program. They simply don't recognize the danger of their present demands.

Previous Bureau of Intelligence studies have shown, too, that workers attach undue importance to production. The sharp rise in output in recent months may have reenforced the effect of military successes.

Whether or not these explanations are adequate, most observers are agreed that dissatisfaction, apathy and cynicism are on the increase among workers. Many Labor papers have harped on the continued retreat of the New Deal, the "abandonment," even the "betrayal," of workers by the Administration.

There is a growing belief that more sacrifices have been asked of labor than of any other group. Wage demands are clearly a part of the whole problem of labor morale. They are closely related to absenteeism, wildcat strikes, the tendency to chafe about the concessions labor has already made. Informational measures directed to workers may have reduced, but have clearly not eliminated, unwholesome attitudes.

An intensified informational campaign, employing some new approaches, seems imperative if the present pressure of workers for higher wages is to be reduced. Workers have to be shown in ABC terms that inflation is not an abstract concept, but a real and imminent peril to them and to the nation at large. They have to be shown how their demands inevitably lead toward inflation, and how inflation threatens both the war effort and a stable economy in the post-war years. Most important of all, they have to be convinced that the war can't be won on a basis of living-as-usual, that they, and everyone else, have to reconcile themselves to sacrifices and a lower standard of living for the duration.

Such a campaign will be ineffectual, however, if it gives workers the impression that they have been singled out for special attention or if the fundamental conditions responsible for their dissatisfaction are neglected. In individual plants and in the nation at large, steps must be taken and an informational approach adopted which will strengthen workers' identification with the national cause. And these efforts must be part of a still broader program to give the nation as a whole a renewed sense of urgency about the war, and to foster the realization that it can still be lost by a let-down or a resurgence of selfishness.

NEGROES

Comments by Negro spokesmen and newspapers characterize the indefinite postponement of the railroad discrimination hearings as the greatest shock to Negro morale of any event in recent months. President Roosevelt's request that Mr. McNutt set up more effective machinery for protecting the rights of Negroes, with its implied promise that the railroad case will be heard once this is done, may undo the damage.

Nearly every national Negro organization and numerous local groups protested the deferment of the railroad hearings. They were joined by associations concerned with improving racial relations and by numerous labor, liberal and church organizations. Two delegations composed of representatives of these organizations came to Washington to register their protests. The decision was widely interpreted among Negroes as an indication that the Administration had abandoned its fight to win equality of opportunity for them in war employment. Press comment reflected a deep sense of outrage. The bitter statements of prominent Negroes were copiously quoted.

The resignation of William H. Hastie, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, augmented the damage caused by the deferment. His charges about the adamant refusal of the Army to integrate Negroes in the Air Forces was given widespread attention in the Negro press. Field men of the Bureau of Intelligence report rising tension and rancor among the Negro rank and file.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON


February 12, 1943.

Dear Miss Tully:

Attached is the current issue of the weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT, No. 62.

One item may seem to you to be particularly worth calling to the President's attention, is editorial and public attitudes about Lend-Lease program and summarized under the heading: "Lend Lease", starting on Page 12.

Very truly yours,

  
R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully,  
Secretary,  
The President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

ATTACHMENT.



PST  
OWI

2-12-43

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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## CONTENTS

### PRESS AND RADIO COMMENT OF THE WEEK

#### HOME PROBLEMS

Page 1

Manpower shortages and inflation threats were major topics of editorial concern. Most commentators opposed enlistment of 11 million men into the armed forces — largely because of farm labor needs. Union pressure for revision of the Little Steel formula to permit wage increases was condemned by press and radio alike.

#### MILITARY PROBLEMS

Page 3

Optimism ran high over the Japanese abandonment of Guadalcanal and continued Russian gains — although a few commentators expressed fear of a communist dominated Europe.

### POPULAR REACTIONS

#### INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS AND INERTIA

Page 5

Interviewing reveals that most women know about the campaign to collect fats and greases, yet many do little about it. The situation suggests that information efforts to promote civilian participation in the war effort must create a sense of urgency.

#### SHOE RATIONING

Page 6

OWI Regional Offices in all parts of the country report apparent public satisfaction that the new rationing order was imposed without advance notice.

### DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

#### FARM LABOR

Page 8

Farmers complain bitterly that the Administration has neglected their labor problem. The situation is acute — but misconceptions about it are prevalent. The Government's farm program needs clarification.

LEND-LEASE

Page 12

Both press and public overwhelmingly endorse the Lend-Lease program. While some editorial commentators support a congressional inquiry into Lend-Lease activities, few want these curtailed or abandoned.

HIDDEN INFLATION

Page 16

Correspondents report that the public appears to be aware of, but not very exercised about, increased living costs in the form of lowered quality of consumer goods. They believe that this form of deterioration is widely recognized, but generally accepted as an inevitable annoyance.

IRRITANT

Page 18

Labor editors complain that anti-inflation speeches by Eddie Rickenbacker and other service men antagonize workers and promote a dangerous cleavage.

A summary of investigation and analysis conducted for certain OWI officials, issued for OWI and the interest of other members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the week of February 4 through February 10, except where otherwise specifically stated.

## PRESS & RADIO COMMENT OF THE WEEK

### HOME PROBLEMS

Domestic affairs loomed large in editorial discussions of the week. Commentators were freshly concerned over manpower shortages and inflation threats. In regard to both of these problems, there was an insistent demand for strong governmental action.

Much of the comment respecting manpower centered around the projected size of the Army. With varying degrees of vehemence, the editorial pages and radio broadcasts assailed the wisdom of enlisting 11,000,000 men in the armed forces. Very few actively supported such an expansion, although a larger number acknowledged that the matter is a technical one which only military and naval experts are qualified to determine.

Uneasiness about farm production was the chief basis of objection to the large-Army program. Discussion of this phase of the problem was stimulated during the week by the testimony of ex-President Hoover and by the introduction of a bill to furlough soldiers for farm work. Another major objection was that the shipping bottleneck would prevent transportation overseas of a huge Army and that those men remaining in the United States could better serve in industry or on farms than in Army camps. In addition, some expressed a fear that the removal of so many men from productive enterprise would seriously dislocate our economy and undermine our capacity for post-war reconstruction.

The concept of America as the arsenal, rather than as the fighting champion, of democracy had a large measure of explicit or implied support. The most common arguments against large-scale expansion of the armed forces were summed up by the Cincinnati Times Star:

"It should be emphasized that our task in this war is not quite the same as Russia's. If we were defending our own shores and borders against invasion, we might easily need an armed force of 20,000,000 men. But our job is to supply war material, food, clothing, medicines and, above all, transportation, in addition to fighting men. Not even the United States can expect to do all these things and at the same time put an army in the field bigger than Germany's."

On the air, H. V. Kaltenborn declared that, "there is heavy public opinion pressure against putting 11 million men into uniforms by the end of this year." Optimism about the outcome of the war may have played a part in the general editorial opposition to expansion of the fighting services. Although none of them said so, there was apparently a feeling among commentators that a huge Army no longer seemed vitally necessary.

Union pressure for revision of the Little Steel formula to permit wage increases was viewed by all newspaper and radio commentators who discussed the subject as an ominous threat to the economic stabilization program. Most of the comments warned that revision of the formula would strengthen pressure by farm leaders for higher prices and thus lead to a ruinous inflationary spiral. Liberal commentators warned labor that its demands would provoke retributive restrictions from an outraged Congress and general public.

Prior to the Byrnes' broadcast, several newspapers blamed the Administration

for weakness in its handling of labor and farm demands. A Scripps-Howard editorial, for example, said that John L. Lewis "might still be stopped if the Administration would really fight its alleged war on inflation. But there isn't much time left for that, and it would require much more courage than this Administration has ever shown in its dealings with labor leaders and farm leaders."

#### MILITARY PROBLEMS

There was a good deal of uneasiness about the reported naval battle around the Solomons. Editorial misgivings expressed themselves in pronounced irritation over the Navy's information policy -- especially over the confusion caused by differences between the Navy's communique and a statement made by Secretary Knox.

Commentators were especially incensed by the fact that news of the battle came first from enemy sources. The Philadelphia Record urged the Navy "to remember that Americans like to get correct news from Washington, instead of incorrect news from Tokyo. The admission that a battle has started doesn't give away any military secrets." A broadcast by Cecil Brown charged that "The Navy appears to prefer to give out information at a time not entirely when security is involved, but when the Navy can put losses beside our gains. That would indicate the Navy isn't yet sure that the American people can take it."

Respecting the reported battle itself, the consensus was that behind the veil of censorship an important engagement was in progress, or at least impending.

Jubilance over German reverses on the eastern front was tempered last week

in some quarters by a fear that Russian successes might lead to communist domination of Europe. Some commentators, who did not themselves express any such fears, considered it necessary to warn specifically against them.

The Patterson-McCormick newspapers were, of course, among those which expressed anxiety about Russian strength. The New York Daily News and Washington Times Herald called it "a cinch bet that the much-discussed post-war policing of Germany will be done by the Russians... Stalin will accomplish what Hitler tried to do -- dominate all Europe."

Radio commentator Gabriel Heatter, on the other hand, identified fear of Russia with Nazi propaganda. He declared that, "If we let Hitler frighten us now into a negotiated peace by reviving his Russian bogies, it will be a tragedy for us all."

The bulk of the comment on the fighting in Russia, however, was concerned wholly with its military consequences and was unqualifiedly optimistic. Newspaper and radio comments alike expressed a considerable measure of assurance that the Red Army will push the Germans out of the Caucasus, retake Rostov and Kharkov and perhaps finally crack Hitler's military machine. The prevailing good cheer was heightened, of course, by the Japanese abandonment of Guadalcanal.

PRESS AND RADIO COMMENT OF THE WEEK reports the main currents of editorial opinion because they indicate the ways in which events are being interpreted to the American public. Based on leading metropolitan dailies and major network commentators, it constitutes a qualitative, not a quantitative, evaluation of current editorial influences.



## POPULAR REACTIONS

### INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS AND INERTIA

Civilian participation in the war effort may require a stimulus beyond simple information. The public is subject to an inertia out of which it can be stirred only by prodding its sense of urgency about the war. This inertia seems to be illustrated by the response of American women to the current campaign for conservation of kitchen fats and greases.

The campaign appears to be one of the most successfully publicized of all programs calling for civilian effort. Among a national sample of women interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence late in January, 92 per cent said they had heard that people were being asked to turn in their waste kitchen fats. Eighty-six per cent said they were convinced that there is a real need for the conservation of fats. And most of these women knew, in general, the use to be made of the fats they saved.

But with all this awareness, actual participation in the program proved disappointingly small. Less than a third of the women interviewed had actually turned in any fats or greases by the latter part of January.

31 per cent had turned in fats or drippings.  
28 per cent were saving fats, but had not yet  
turned any in.  
33 per cent were not saving fats.  
8 per cent had not heard of the campaign.

The 28 per cent who were saving fats but had not yet turned any in may have included women who utilize waste fats for home consumption, as well as some who, at the time of the interviewing, had not accumulated a sufficient

amount to turn in. Food shortages, particularly the scarcity of butter, may have promoted a more economical use of materials which were once regarded as waste.

Participation in the fat-saving program was highest among upper educational and economic groups and was markedly greater in cities and towns than in rural areas. Women who did their own marketing and cooking were more cooperative than others.

Few women had experienced any difficulty in turning in the fats they had collected. Seven out of ten knew that the fats and greases should be taken to their butchers and that they should be saved in tin cans. Less than half, however, were aware that they needed to collect a pound before turning it in to the collection station. A majority knew that they could be paid, but less than a fourth felt that they should be paid for fats turned in.

These findings suggest an inference which may be applicable to all drives designed to promote civilian participation. They indicate that the problem here is not one of resistance to the proposed activity, but merely one of apathy or inertia. There is a need, apparently, for supplementing direct informational campaigns with measures to bolster the civilian sense of urgency. When people are asked to contribute to a war program they need to be reminded that the war is not yet won and that their full participation is still needed to win it.

#### SHOE RATIONING

Regional Officers of the OWI Field Division are substantially in agreement

that the shoe rationing order was generally accepted as reasonable, practical and effective. The prevailing judgment was that the public, on the whole, was thoroughly pleased that the new regulation had been imposed without any advance warning.

Regional Offices and ration boards were, of course, flooded with inquiries immediately after the order had been issued. Few of the calls, however, took the form of protest. For the most part, people seemed delighted that no one had time to stock up on shoes prior to the general restriction.

Some of the field men, particularly in the South and Southwest, reported that the new rationing order had provoked a good many rumors that clothing would also soon be placed under ration restrictions. In Dallas, New Orleans and Atlanta, a noticeable increase in clothing purchases was reported.

The only complaints about the handling of the new rationing measure came from a few Regional Officers who felt that inadequate advance notice had been given to them and to local OPA officials.

The public generally seemed to feel that the shoe regulation was not too harsh and would enable most adults to get by without serious inconvenience. But complaint was heard that three pairs of shoes yearly would not be enough for growing children, who outgrow, if they do not wear out, their shoes much faster than adults.

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### FARM LABOR

Reports from correspondents and field representatives of the Bureau of Intelligence indicate that farmers remain bitter about the Government's handling of their labor problem and feel that no adequate solution has yet been found for it.

Hard pressed themselves, farmers resent the prosperity and comparatively short hours of industrial workers. Some of this resentment spills over against an Administration which they regard as labor's champion. The Administration is blamed, too, for failure to adopt a firm and comprehensive manpower policy which would give adequate consideration to the needs of farmers. From a small town in Wisconsin, one correspondent of the Bureau writes:

"Dairying is an essential of essentials, yet the mills are going into the farm lands for labor to replace men called up."

It is generally agreed among the Bureau's correspondents that the situation has been eased by recent Selective Service rulings and by the "freezing" of labor on dairy, livestock and poultry farms. But it is felt that these moves were too long delayed. Furthermore, the community pressure which is always so pronounced in rural areas is said to be cancelling the value of the new draft regulations to some extent. Another correspondent reports:

"Local draft boards, I hear, are still taking farm workers despite the new regulations concerning workers on essential farms. The difficulty seems to be that the local boards, having drafted sons and

employees of some of the neighbors, now feel they cannot treat those of others differently. In many cases the young man does not care to appeal but is anxious to get into the service... Farm boys feel that they will be under some stigma if they do not get into the armed forces."

The consequences of the tight farm labor situation, which is made worse by the scarcity of farm machinery, are painted darkly by the Bureau's correspondents. Many of them report the same sort of incident which has been given so much attention in the press: heavy sale of dairy cows for slaughter; the sale of farmsteads because of the difficulty of getting farm hands to replace drafted sons. A note of warning is evident in many of the letters: if farmers aren't given the manpower and machinery they need to meet production goals, the correspondents suggest, they will lower their sights to what they know they can take care of.

There is some recognition, however, that not all the heralded sales of farms can be blamed on the labor shortage:

"I cannot be made to believe that lack of farm labor is the sole reason for liquidating farms -- as much as anything it is the chance of a farmer to move to town and work in industry, a chance he has never had before. He quits farming for that reason, and for the reason that he can sell anything he has for more than he probably will ever get again. He's no farmer at heart."

Some of the correspondents also take cognizance of the fact that the high price of livestock has something to do with the heavy sale of dairy cows for slaughter. And one or two correspondents stress the determination of farmers to surmount the problems which confront them:

"Despite the statements to the contrary by some farm leaders, farmers in general are in a very good state of mind. Financially they have had a good year... Their spirit toward the war is splendid, and no matter how much grouching you

hear, the fact is that the farmers are grimly determined to meet their goals this year if it is humanly possible to do it, and will put in whatever amount of work that calls for."

On the whole, however, the Bureau's correspondents paint an exceedingly dark picture of the farm labor situation and its probable consequences on farm morale and on production. A nationwide farm labor survey conducted last autumn by the Department of Agriculture suggests that they, like the media, may have exaggerated the gravity of the labor crisis.

The survey indicates that, while the situation is unprecedentedly tight, so tight that many individual operators may be caught short of help, in general there are sources of replacement for the additional workers which will be needed. The real problem comes in the fact that qualitatively these replacements leave much to be desired. Many adjustments are evidently needed, in employment and operating practices, to enable farmers to make the most of a limited and less competent labor supply.

Between September 1941 and September 1942, the Department of Agriculture estimates 1,600,000 farm workers and operators left agriculture, about 900,000 to take jobs in industry, about 700,000 to enter the armed forces. This loss was replaced, but many of the replacements were older men, women, youths of school age and children. In September 1942, there were 500,000 fewer men 18 to 44 years of age on farms than there had been a year earlier. Despite this shift in the composition of the work force, it will be remembered that American farmers were able to increase production by 13 per cent in 1942.

Not all farms were able to make full replacement of the workers who left. In general, the large commercial farms replaced workers most readily. They were in a better position to bargain for the available labor and many operators of family size farms elected to maintain production with a reduced number of workers by working more hours per week.

The situation will, of course, be tighter and more difficult in 1943. Most of the slack which existed when the war began has already been taken up. Many of the best sources of reserve labor supply have already been dipped into.

The Department of Agriculture survey indicated that farmers anticipated a net loss of some 800,000 workers between September 1942 and September 1943. And they expected the smaller labor force to contain a higher proportion of older men, women and children.

Despite this, two-thirds of the farmers in the sample believed that they could maintain production:

IN VIEW OF THE PROSPECTIVE LABOR SITUATION FOR NEXT YEAR,  
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS FARM CAN HANDLE AS LARGE AN ACREAGE OF  
CROPS AND AS MANY HEAD OF LIVESTOCK AS IN 1942?

Yes	67%
No	33

These figures are less cheerful than they at first appear. It was the smaller farmers who were most optimistic about maintaining production. Over half of the farmers cultivating units of 500 acres or more said that they would have to reduce operations. These large commercial farmers produce a very large proportion of all the food and fiber which is marketed.

However, Agriculture's survey was made before the revision of Selective Service policies and the freezing of certain types of farm labor. These measures have afforded farmers a certain measure of relief, and James F. Byrne's disclosure that the Army is considering plans to furlough men to help with the harvest indicates that more relief may be forthcoming.

There is no denying the reality of the farm labor shortage. But there are indications that its seriousness has been exploited by organizations representing the large commercial farmers. There are manifest advantages to these farmers in a solution of the crisis based upon higher prices as well as an effort to ease the labor shortage.

Much has been made of isolated instances. Broad generalizations have been based on purely local situations. Despite all the emphasis on the sale of farms, for example, the Department of Agriculture survey indicated that few farms have been taken out of production. To reassure the public, information is needed which will present the whole situation in perspective and clarify the steps the Government is taking to meet it.

At the same time intensified informational and educational measures are necessary to show farm people that the Government understands their problems. The major emphasis of the campaign can be on the constructive measures the Department of Agriculture has already proposed for meeting the crisis, such as adjustments of farming practices to reduce or spread out peak labor requirements; changes in employment practices; pooling the available labor supply within communities; the cooperative use of labor-saving machinery; and the fullest possible utilization of types of labor not hitherto relied upon extensively. Fortunately, agencies already exist for bringing information to farm people about such measures in terms of their local requirements.

2-12

LEND-LEASE

Reports from various divisions of the Bureau of Intelligence indicate that Lend-Lease is now among the least controversial of all war measures. It is



overwhelmingly accepted by both press and public as, in Dean Acheson's words, "the corner-stone of our wartime relations with friendly powers."

Questioning of national samples in October and again in January shows that support for Lend-Lease already high in the autumn, increased still further by the turn of the year:

SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO SEND SUPPLIES TO OUR ALLIES EVEN  
IF IT MEANS WE WILL HAVE SOME SHORTAGES HERE AT HOME?

	<u>October</u>	<u>January</u>
Yes	88%	94%
No	7	4
Don't know	5	2

The increase is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that in October Lend-Lease was already accepted by all but 12 per cent of those interviewed. It is to be noted, too, that the question directed attention to the possible cost of Lend-Lease in terms of shortages here in the United States.

The January sample also overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of continuing to help other nations in the period immediately after the war. Of course, sentiment on this issue may shift when victory has been won.

IF IT MEANS THAT WE HAVE TO CONTINUE RATIONING AND OTHER  
SACRIFICES AFTER THE WAR, DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO HELP  
FEED AND REBUILD OTHER COUNTRIES?

Yes	78%
No	17
Don't know	5

Reports from field representatives and correspondents of the Bureau also suggest that the Lend-Lease program is well accepted by the American people. Complaints of any sort about it are relatively rare.

A recent Gallup poll confirms these findings of the Bureau. Perhaps because the Gallup question identified the Lend-Lease program by name, instead of describing it, one-fourth of the people in the sample said that they were unfamiliar with it. But a decisive majority of those who were acquainted with the program approved of it:

DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE CONTINUING THE LEASE-LEND PROGRAM?

Favor	82%
Oppose	9
Undecided	9

This approval is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that most of these people did not think that the United States would ever be repaid, in terms of money or goods, for its Lend-Lease aid:

DO YOU THINK THE NATIONS NOW GETTING LEASE-LEND MATERIALS FROM US WILL REPAY US FOR THESE MATERIALS EITHER IN MONEY OR IN GOODS, OR WILL NOT REPAY US AT ALL?

Will repay	29%
Will not	58
No opinion	13

Of course, enthusiasm for Lend-Lease may wane once Americans feel the full burden of wartime taxes and privations. There is perhaps some danger in the fact that 72 per cent of those familiar with Lend-Lease in the Gallup sample believed that America should be repaid for its Lend-Lease aid. Some of these people, however, may have had in mind the sort of repayment America is already receiving in the form of reciprocal aid. Others may have been thinking of post war territorial and trade concessions.

Newspaper and radio comment on Lend-Lease has in general mirrored the favorable viewpoint of the public. From June 1942 until this January, opposition

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to Lend-Lease was almost exclusively confined to consistently isolationist papers. At the turn of the year, however, the proposal that Congress investigate Lend-Lease won mild support in the press.

Most of these papers favoring an investigation adopted an inquiring, rather than a critical, attitude. Many of them warned against abuse of the probe by Congressional opponents of the Administration. By and large, only isolationist papers voiced outright opposition to Lend-Lease. The rest of those supporting the investigation simply argued that Congress, "under its constitutional responsibilities", should investigate any program it desired.

This temperate flurry of skepticism quickly subsided. The Stettinius year-end report on Lend-Lease won almost unanimous approval from the fourth of the papers in the Bureau's sample which commented upon it. Only the Chicago Tribune and The Washington Times Herald dissented. A number of papers applauded the decision of the Republicans in Congress not to oppose the renewal of the Act.

In the last two weeks there has been another burst of criticism of Lend-Lease from a small minority of editors, radio commentators and trade publications. The critics have asked whether the United States has not been prodigal with Lend-Lease supplies at the expense of the American people's standard of living. Fulton Lewis Jr. argued that the public should be informed where all supplies except war materials are sent, so that the American people will know "who is getting that meat that we are giving up and how much they're getting." The isolationist press has kept up, or intensified, its sniping at the whole philosophy of The Lend-Lease program.

Most newspapers and commentators, however, have continued to give Lend-Lease warm support. The prevailing viewpoint has been that the benefits of shipping military equipment, food and other supplies to our allies far outweigh any sacrifices they may make necessary at home. There have been numerous expressions of regret that we have not been able to send greater quantities of material to Russia and China.

From the beginning of the discussion of the program, Lend-Lease has been credited with keeping war away from own shores and making offensive warfare possible. Recently some commentators have endorsed the statement of Government officials that Lend-Lease has been of significant help to the Russians in their present offensive. Sydney Moseley and one or two others have attributed Turkey's defiance of the Axis in part to the Lend-Lease aid she has received and been promised.

The reciprocal nature of Lend-Lease has received increasing attention. News columns, editorials and radio commentators have emphasized the fact that America is receiving immediate tangible returns from her allies for the aid she is giving them. Still more emphasis on this idea is perhaps needed to eradicate the lingering notion that Lend-Lease is a kind of glorified hand-out. In addition, more stress may be desirable on the post-war benefits of Lend-Lease. There has been relatively little comment thus far on Lend-Lease as a long-term good will asset, and on the possibility of setting up some machinery as imaginative as Lend-Lease to stimulate post-war trade.

#### HIDDEN INFLATION

Rising prices are not the only avenue to inflation; the cost of living can

be boosted, also, by lowering the quality of the goods that people buy.

Labor editors and social workers who are regular correspondents of the Bureau of Intelligence were asked to report the extent to which people in their communities feel that this sort of hidden inflation is occurring. The consensus among them was that awareness of lowered quality of consumer goods has become fairly widespread, but that the condition is not a major public grievance. For the most part, the deterioration of quality which has taken place seems to be accepted by the public as an inevitable consequence of the war.

A few, however, view the situation angrily as evidence of the ineffectiveness of price control and the ineptitude of OPA. "People are losing faith in price control," reports one correspondent. "The consumer knows only that, despite price control, he is paying more for the necessities of life and other goods he is purchasing."

The reduction of quality in consumer goods is recognized by people in a variety of forms. They complain that packages are smaller, that there are fewer pieces in cans, that wearing apparel is skimpier and sleazier. Some people assert that manufacturers have substituted poorer lines for goods which previously used restricted materials. Relabeling of some brands to permit the evasion of ceiling prices is also charged occasionally.

Clothing and food, especially meat, head the list of items in which deterioration in quality has been noticed. Women's dresses, nightgowns, slips, etc., are reported to be inferior in quality of material, skimpy in cut and of poorer workmanship.

Shoes, according to the correspondents, were among the first articles of

apparel to reveal inferior materials and workmanship. One social worker, indeed, commented that "Shoe merchants appear to make a point of stimulating overbuying by reports to the public that shoes, in the future, will be definitely inferior in quality, but will be priced considerably higher than the present product, which they admit is already inferior."

A number of the correspondents report complaints that foodstuffs are not as high in quality as formerly, that prices on various cuts of meat are juggled to evade price control. Eggs, people charge, are smaller and less fresh than they used to be; butter is of a poorer grade; cream gets thinner all the time; coffee secured with the first ration coupon had less freshness and flavor.

In large part, people attribute this deterioration to wartime shortages — particularly to the fact that vast supplies of food and other goods must be sent to the armed forces. Buyers are less indulgent, however, when the poor quality seems unnecessary and when they suspect the merchant of profiteering at the expense of his retail customer. A few people suspect devious favoritism on the part of dealers, feeling that the best grades and better brands of goods are not made available to all alike. The prevailing judgment among the correspondents, nevertheless, was that, for the most part, complaints on this score amounted to plain "American grouching," without much real bitterness behind it.

#### IRRITANT

Labor editors, members of one of the Bureau's regular correspondence panels report an angry sense of resentment among workers over the criticism of organized labor made recently by Eddie Richenbacker and a few other service men. Their comments on this subject were extremely heated and entirely spontaneous; the

Bureau did not suggest the topic.

The prevailing judgment among the labor editors is that criticism of this sort does nothing to promote worker enthusiasm, but, on the contrary, antagonizes workers and widens the cleavage between them and the general public. As one correspondent put it in a representative comment, "The guys who are doing their duty in the mills feel it like a physical push in the face" when men in uniform "go off half cocked."

These correspondents are not unaware of organized labor's shortcomings. They deplore the occasional strikes in war industries. But they feel that labor, as a whole, is trying to cooperate in the war effort and that it should not be stigmatized by the unfortunate actions of a tiny minority. The normal patriotic working man, they assert, is outraged and embittered by indiscriminate aspersions upon labor in general.

Some of the correspondents express a fear that gibes at labor by men in uniform may produce a dangerous antagonism when the war is over. There are dark suggestions about what may happen "when these boys return to civilian life with sniping on both sides resulting in some rather bloody affairs." A few suggest that the Government should make some effort to keep service men from fomenting inter-class hostility.

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OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

February 25, 1943


*Tully*

My dear Miss Tully:

Enclosed is the current INTELLIGENCE  
REPORT, No. 64.

Two items included in it may seem to  
you to be of special interest to the President.  
On page four under the heading, "Fear of 'Bureaucracy'",  
there are presented some findings which indicate popu-  
lar misgivings about the extension of Government controls  
of business after the war. On page nine under the  
heading, "Understanding of Inflation", there is a  
summary of a detailed survey made by the Bureau on a  
relationship between approval and understanding of  
anti-inflation controls.

Sincerely yours,



R. Keith Kane  
Chief, Bureau of Intelligence

Miss Grace Tully  
Secretary  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.





PSF  
OWI

2-26-43

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT **64**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OFFICE OF  
WAR INFORMATION  
BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE

COPY No. 1

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CHINA Page 2

Madame Chiang Kai-Shek won the affection and admiration of press and radio. Increased aid for China was widely urged.

REVOLT Page 3

Commentators continued to encourage congressional "independence," but disclosed some fear that it might get out of hand. On some issues, they supported Congress; on others, the executive.

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A growing minority of the public is fearful of the Government's economic controls. People anticipate, in far greater numbers than they endorse, the extension of Government controls over business after the war.

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In general, radio has been alert and cooperative in its handling of Government information campaigns. The distribution of emphasis among the numerous Government programs has been fairly well balanced, save that the subject of the United Nations has been comparatively neglected.

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### UNDERSTANDING OF INFLATION

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The Government's economic program is not widely understood, even among those who endorse it. The public is not yet prepared for the general reduction of living standards which anti-inflation measures must entail if they are to operate effectively.

### BEDROCK LIVING STANDARDS

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A study by the Office of Civilian Supply reveals the levels to which production of consumer goods may be cut. Release of this study may give the public a healthy shock. But it may also promote panic buying. It should be accompanied by an information campaign to promote cooperation with rationing programs.

A summary of investigation and analysis conducted for certain OWI officials, issued for OWI and the interest of other members of the Government.

The period covered by this report is the week of February 18 through February 23, except where otherwise specifically stated.

## PRESS & RADIO COMMENT OF THE WEEK

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### SETBACK

Neither press nor radio minimized the bad news from North Africa. Comments frankly called it a defeat. In general, however, they followed the line suggested by Secretary Stimson that we should neither exaggerate nor underestimate the losses we had suffered.

The most common explanations of the setback were that the Germans were superior in numbers and equipment or that the American troops were lacking in battle experience. There were few direct charges of faulty strategy on the part of the American military command in North Africa.

There were complaints, however, that American tanks and planes have been proved inferior to those of the Germans. Fletcher Pratt declared that, "The people in charge of design and production of American fighter planes simply have been left well behind by both the British and the Germans." Cal Tinney, on the air, argued that, "Superior equipment, more than the relative experience of the opposing armies, is what got Uncle Sam's head skinned up in Tunisia this week."

The approach of the British Eighth Army was hailed by commentators with rather refreshing humility. It was widely assumed that these seasoned desert fighters, under the experienced command of General Montgomery, would turn the tide. On the whole, there was little loss of confidence in the eventual outcome of the battle for Tunisia.

Some commentators were fearful, however, about the effect of our setback on neutrals -- Spain and Portugal in particular. Drew Pearson observed

that the Spanish fascists "have a well equipped, German-trained army in Spanish Morocco, where they could attack us from behind."

Comment on the handling of the news from the front was light, both in the newspapers and on the air; but what there was of it applauded the prompt release of the news and its freedom from sugar-coating. On the plus side of the ledger, it was felt that the realities of war were now being brought home to the American people and would prod them into all-out effort.

CHINA [2-26-43 -OWJ]

Madame Chiang Kai-Shek completely captivated the gentlemen of the press and of the radio. She was all but apotheosized. It was generally agreed that she made a powerful impression in her appearance before Congress.

A considerable number of newspapers, although by no means a majority, played up her speech as a plea for increased emphasis on the Pacific war. The isolationist press took Madame Chiang's remarks as support for their position that Japan should be regarded as our prime enemy.

Comment, in general, concurred in the desirability of providing additional supplies for China, but avoided commitment as to the relative importance of the European and Asiatic fronts. Sympathy for China and affection for Madame Chiang keyed almost all discussion of the subject.

REVOLT

Editors found themselves this week somewhat unhappily reaping the whirlwind of the congressional independence they had helped to sow. They continued

ferverently in favor of legislative checks on the Executive, but were uneasy that these might add up to a dangerous checkmate.

Support of Congress varied in accordance with specific issues. In regard to the \$25,000 salary ceiling, newspaper editorials were almost unanimous in vehement condemnation of the President. The prevailing judgment was that Congress should and would revoke the executive limitation. Radio comment on this question was consistently noncommittal.

The liquidation of the National Resources Planning Board evoked a mixed reaction during the week; but senatorial resolutions looking to post-war planning by Congress itself were received favorably by most of those commenting. The Detroit Free Press, for example, said that, "Certain executive agencies... are already working out plans of their own. Congress... should not leave this field entirely to the Administration."

On the other hand, the Kilday Bill to give draft deferment to men with children was viewed with real alarm by both press and radio commentators. They were equally critical of the McKellar Bill providing for senatorial review of appointments to executive agencies. The dominant view appears to be that the Legislature should restrain the Executive, but that it should not attempt to manage the war from the floor of Congress.

PRESS AND RADIO COMMENT OF THE WEEK reports the main currents of editorial opinion because they indicate the ways in which events are being interpreted to the American public. Based on leading metropolitan dailies and major network commentators, it constitutes a qualitative, not a quantitative, evaluation of current editorial influence.

## POPULAR REACTIONS

### FEAR OF "BUREAUCRACY"

The bulk of the American public accepts Government control of the country's economic life as inevitable in wartime. Some feel, indeed, that the Government has not applied its regulatory powers with sufficient scope and severity. But another minority fears that Government control is incompatible with free enterprise and individual initiative.

Last fall's congressional elections gave Administration opponents an opportunity to play upon this fear. The bugbear of "regimentation" was revived. The Government was described as "a vast, sprawling bureaucracy," sometimes as "totalitarian." Planning for the future was stigmatized as somehow inimical to democratic freedom.

A question asked by the Bureau of Intelligence in identical terms before and after the elections reveals that the minority fearful of governmental control has grown:

AT THE PRESENT TIME, DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT HAS  
TOO MUCH CONTROL OR NOT ENOUGH CONTROL OVER OUR WAY OF  
DOING BUSINESS IN THIS COUNTRY?

	<u>September</u>	<u>December</u>
Too much	19%	27%
About right	34	36
Not enough	33	25
Don't know	14	12

In the latter part of January, the Bureau asked two other questions regarding Government control over business in the future. The first of these had been asked previously in December and discloses an increased anticipation

that governmental controls will be extended when the war is over:

RIGHT AFTER THE WAR, DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE MORE CONTROL OR LESS CONTROL OVER OUR WAY OF DOING BUSINESS THAN IT HAS NOW?

	<u>December</u>	<u>January</u>
More	52%	62%
Same	11	16
Less	22	16
Don't know	15	6

While a sizeable majority of the public expected the Government to exercise increased control after the war, it is noteworthy that only half as many people desired this development. The wish here is quite apparently not father to the thought:

DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE MORE CONTROL OR LESS CONTROL OVER OUR WAY OF DOING BUSINESS THAN IT HAS NOW? (January)

More	32%
Same	16
Less	41
Don't know	11

In general, better educated people were more prone to anticipate increased Government control in the future than were those of inferior educational background. Conversely, however, the people with less education were somewhat more prone to express approval of such a development.

These educational differences were largely a matter of economic status. People in the lower income brackets, who tend also to be people with inferior schooling, were more disposed than those better off economically to approve of increased Government control over business after the war. People



in the upper income brackets were, however, more disposed to anticipate (and evidently to fear) that Government controls would be extended.

This fear of governmental activities in the future may prove a serious block to the achievement of stable international economic arrangements. For the complexity of post-war economic problems is likely to require a greater measure of Government intervention than in the past. People need assurance that the Government is merely an effective instrumentality for executing their collective will.

#### RADIO TREATMENT OF OWI CAMPAIGNS

Less than five hours after shoe rationing was announced the Charlie McCarthy show went on the air with a good-natured wisecrack about the program. Just as his companions prepared to throw out an obnoxious English peer, Charlie exclaimed: "Wait! First get his shoes." This sort of topical allusion has been characteristic of radio treatment of the war.

In general, a Bureau of Intelligence study indicates, radio has been alert and cooperative in its handling of Government information campaigns. The study covered the week of February 2-8. A representative selection of all network broadcasts carried by Washington, D.C., stations was monitored.

Of the 158 broadcasts which were analyzed, 102 carried OWI campaign messages. An additional 28 contained jokes or other references designed to further Government campaigns. On about one-third of the broadcasts carrying messages, the star of the show made the announcement in person. About one-fourth of the messages were tied up with commercials.

The distribution of emphasis was fairly well balanced. Food production, rationing, conservation, the war bond campaign and production and manpower problems all received a generous amount of attention.

The subject of the United Nations, however, was notably neglected. Although it received a fair amount of time, this was largely because Cal Tinney devoted a large part of one broadcast to discussing America's relationship with Russia. Among all the remaining programs, there were only three other references to the United Nations, all of them quite casual. This can hardly be explained on the ground that people are "fed up" with the subject. As previously reported (see Intelligence Report #59), a public opinion survey made in Philadelphia, right after a six week spot campaign on the United Nations had run its course, disclosed very little feeling that the subject was being overemphasized. Twenty-nine per cent of those interviewed felt that too little due had been given America's allies on the air.

The scheduling of Government messages was highly judicious. About half of the messages were carried after 6 p.m., when the largest audiences are available. Most of the rest were scheduled during the daytime for clearly discernible reasons. Thus, nine agricultural messages were broadcast on the popular "National Farm and Home Hour" and "Country Journal" programs. The Treasury's "Release Pennies" broadcasts, being aimed at children, were put on the air just before suppertime. Many messages addressed primarily to women naturally received most stress during the day.

Most of the campaign messages were carried as straight announcements. Excluding from consideration the "National Farm and Home Hour," only about

one-fifth of the messages were integrated into radio programs. In the necessarily subjective judgment of the monitors, however, the integrated references were considerably more effective than the straight announcements. They ranged from jokes and short ditties to dramatizations built entirely around war problems.

It is, of course, difficult to generalize about a large and varied group of radio broadcasts. But it was the opinion of the monitors that the broadcasts dealt with in this study were valuable primarily because they helped set the tone for public reactions to Government programs. In particular, they attempted to popularize an attitude of good-humored acceptance of war-time stringencies and sacrifices.

Perhaps the most notable shortcoming of the broadcasts was their failure to explain the reasons for those sacrifices persuasively. The problems OWI has the responsibility of explaining to the public were reflected and referred to in these broadcasts, but they were seldom examined in complete and convincing detail.

## DEVELOPING SITUATIONS

### UNDERSTANDING OF INFLATION

The American people are keenly aware of the chief portent of inflation -- an increased cost of living. But they do not appear to be aware of inflation as a real, imminent and terrible danger. The term "inflation" has never been given shape, substance or vitality; it has remained an abstract concept.

An overwhelming majority of Americans want the Government to control the cost of living and, for the most part, have confidence that it can do so. They do not clearly understand, however, that this control can be exercised effectively only through their own cooperation and self-denial. They tend, indeed, to look upon the Government's efforts at price control as a means of maintaining their accustomed peacetime standards of living in the midst of a war.

In large measure, as a matter of fact, peacetime living standards have actually been maintained thus far in the war. Between 1940 and 1942, the national income jumped by about 50 per cent. The increase was, of course, unevenly distributed. Living standards of some families whose chief wage earners entered the armed forces were curtailed; so were those of some white collar business and professional workers with fixed or diminished earnings. But about a third of the American people admitted last fall, when they were interviewed by the Bureau of Intelligence, that they and their families had more money coming in than before the war. Only one-quarter said they had less money coming in.

The Bureau interviewed an unusually large national sample -- some 7,000 individuals -- asking questions designed to find out what they were doing with this increased income, how they felt about the seven points in the President's anti-inflation program and how well they understood the importance of each of the seven points in regulating living costs.

Forty per cent of the people who said that they had more money coming in since the war started admitted that they were spending all of it. Twenty-nine per cent of them acknowledged that they were spending part of the extra money.

They used the term "spending" with different meanings. To some, it meant paying old debts or buying war bonds -- items which cannot be considered inflationary. To others, however, the extra income meant an opportunity to expand living standards which had previously been at a very low level. And to many, if not to most of those questioned, the extra income provided a means for maintaining their accustomed living standards in the face of increased living costs.

This was particularly true among the occupational groups which enjoyed the largest increase of income -- manual labor and farm owners; workers constituted the group most conscious of increased spending to meet increased living costs, while the farm owners interviewed were the group most conscious of extra spending even beyond the maintenance of their past living standards. These groups, because their lower pre-war living standards expand almost inevitably into a demand for more of the necessities, represent a major inflationary hazard.

Most of the public favored Government limitation of wages and salaries, business profits and farm prices. It was evident that they put a variety of interpretations on the term "limitation." Few wanted wages and salaries frozen at current levels; they preferred some flexible regulation which would permit adjustments in accordance with need. Four persons in ten said flatly that they wanted their own incomes to go higher.

People whose incomes had increased since the beginning of the war were naturally more willing to have their incomes frozen at existing levels than those not sharing in the war prosperity. But the groups with normally smaller and less regular incomes (manual workers and farmers) were less apt than others to endorse a freezing of their own incomes. The order of willingness for personal sacrifice was, in general, in inverse relation to the amount of sacrifice entailed.

It seems significant, however, that approval of the principle of income limitation was closely related to personal willingness to accept an income freeze. Moreover, those who advocated control of other types of income were more willing than their opposites to accept control of their own type of income. This suggests that the rank and file of the major occupational groups are less greedy for special advantages than their organized lobbies and leaders. They are ready, perhaps, to respond to leadership which will appeal to their national, as distinct from their group, identification.

There was somewhat less widespread approval of other measures for the indirect control of inflation. Six people in ten approved Government restraints on installment buying. About four in ten believed that higher

taxes should be imposed. Five in ten expressed support of a compulsory war bond purchase program, although few were willing to have the Government tell them how many bonds or stamps they must buy each month. Seven in ten favored immediate rationing of all materials in which shortages might develop.

There was a great deal of confusion and ignorance about the ways in which these anti-inflation measures would operate. In connection with each of them, the Bureau asked the people interviewed, "... will this affect prices in general, or won't it make any difference to prices?" Only about half the public recognized the influence of direct limitation of wages, profits and farm prices upon the over-all price structure or were aware that restrictions on installment buying would affect prices. The value of rationing, higher taxation and compulsory bond buying as anti-inflationary devices was appreciated by only about a quarter of the people.

Even among those who were aware that these seven anti-inflation measures would affect prices, there were widespread misconceptions about the ways in which they would work. Some people realized that they would siphon off excess purchasing power. Others, counting wages and profits as costs of production, simply calculated that limiting these would limit prices charged for consumer goods. Still others seemed to favor them simply as a means of preventing profiteering.

Rationing was interpreted, for the most part, as a means of distributing scarce goods equitably, rather than as a check on inflation. In fact, about four people in ten expected that they would be able to live as well


as they did before the war if more things were rationed. They seemed wholly unprepared for the reduction of living standards which must accompany rationing if it is to be effective as an anti-inflationary measure.

In general, there was greater acceptance of each of the anti-inflationary controls among people who understood its operation in an anti-inflationary context. What is more important, however, is the fact that genuine support for these measures, once their pinch begins to be felt, can come only through such an understanding. For people cannot be expected to practice the self-denial which cooperation with the economic program must entail until they learn to appreciate the direct relation of this cooperation to their own well-being.

Understanding is lowest, naturally, among those with least education. It follows, therefore, that it is lowest among those who are the chief sources of inflation -- manual workers and farmers. Information needs to be directed specifically to these groups. The following chart presents a graphic illustration of the information problem which must be met. It shows the cumulative segments of the American public included in successive stages of attitude-understanding for each anti-inflation measure. Only that group at the top of each bar (the people who both approve and understand the measure) can be depended upon to give real support to the Government's economic program. It will be observed that the area at the bottom of the bar representing "disapproval" enlarges as the area of "understanding" diminishes.



## APPROVAL AND UNDERSTANDING OF ANTI-INFLATION MEASURES



The primary task of an information program in this sphere must be to convey to the public an urgent sense of what inflation would mean to their living standards and their entire economic life. Once this is understood, the Government must persuade the American people that inflation can be prevented -- but not by stopgaps applied to isolated facets of the problem. People need to understand that the component parts of the anti-inflation program are vitally interrelated and that they can be made effective only by a general reduction of living standards for the duration of the war. This reduction

it can be made clear, need not affect national health or any of the essentials of living; but it will inevitably involve a curtailment of luxury goods and services, of some of the perquisites and pleasures of American life. It will mean simpler, plainer living. So long as people regard the anti-inflation program as a comfortable avenue to living-as-usual, they will fail to understand and to support it.

#### BEDROCK LIVING STANDARDS

A factual appraisal in specific terms of what the war may do to American living habits is now available to the public for the first time through the study of bedrock civilian requirements prepared by WPB's Office of Civilian Supply. Adjustment to the production levels set in this study would entail a real lowering of living standards for the entire nation, with the exception of the lowest income groups.

Publication of this preliminary report may give a healthy shock to Americans who still suppose that the war can be waged comfortably. But it may also give rise to panic buying of many kinds of goods. It is possible that the public will assume that the report presages wholesale rationing.

The inauguration of point rationing did not receive a very favorable press. Headlines and editorial comment played up the complexity of the plan, its unexpected severity and the difficulties it posed for grocers and consumers alike. And, in many cases, they stressed the fact that hoarders would profit. Headlines of this sort were not uncommon: FOOD HOARDER GETS UNFAIR BREAK UNDER POINT RATIONING SYSTEM (Cleveland Press).

An information program seems needed to give the public a clear understanding of two facts: (1) that any cuts which may actually be prescribed by WPB for civilian production are genuinely necessary; (2) that hoarding, black market buying or any other attempt to evade cooperation with rationing programs are a form of sabotage.