

● PSF

Navy: Daniel J. Callaghan

*May file*

*P5F  
Callaghan  
Navy*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brief Comments on Fleet Problem XX

1. MOTIVES

- (a) Surface scouting; search and attack of convoy and escort.
- (b) Escorting convoy.
- (c) Coordinating measures by the aircraft and destroyers for antisubmarine offense.
- (d) Attacking mobile patrol plane bases, tenders, etc.
- (e) Scouting by patrol planes and attack.
- (f) Defense of patrol plane bases and tenders by dispersion of bases into several localities.
- (g) Information by submarines; submarine attack against surface vessels.
- (h) Defense of surface ships from submarine and patrol plane attack by the various methods.
- (i) Establishment of a force in a base in connection with the control of a given area.
- (j) General training of the personnel; general test of the material; trials of conditions of readiness; trial of various forms of evasion tactics and attack methods against attacking aircraft and submarines, and the employment of combatant forces in contact, approach, deployment and battle.

2. The following comments by the Commander-in-Chief are quoted from the official report of Fleet Problem XX:

"In considering the cruiser raid against the convoy, it should be borne in mind that there were two controlling reasons for its ineffectiveness: First, that the escort was much heavier than might normally be used on such an occasion, particularly in view of the need, as indicated in the orders of the WHITE Navy Department, for the WHITE Main Body to proceed to forestall any attempt of BLACK to establish a base in the Puerto Rico-Culebra area; and second, because certain light cruisers, which had only recently

joined the Fleet, failed to realize fully their duties of cooperation with the heavy cruisers and failed to destroy the UTAH, and possibly aircraft carriers, when such destruction might have been accomplished.

"The operations of Fleet Problem Twenty were such as to accentuate greatly the importance of aircraft and submarines, and may have created a false impression of their importance as compared with that of battleships and cruisers. The conditions of any brief fleet problem are necessarily such as to favor abnormal activity by aircraft and submarines. Operations extending over a longer period would inevitably cause a fuller appreciation of the real value of the cruiser and the battleship.

"The same abnormal activity by aircraft and submarines may occur in the early stages of any campaign, but in such cases, as time passes, the decrease in effectiveness of aircraft and submarine units due to actual losses, to deterioration of material, and to exhaustion of personnel will make both of these arms relatively less effective and will force a temporary reduction in the scope of their activities.

"Due to the large water area covered by the problem it was impossible to have much offensive destroyer action; however, WHITE did use his destroyers for the purpose of attacking San Juan and on at least one occasion obtained results far in excess of his losses.

"The difficulty in using patrol planes based on mobile tenders has again been demonstrated and it appears more and more obvious that base facilities will have to be provided wherever patrol planes are to be used in large numbers, and that a natural accompaniment of such bases must be an adequate antiaircraft defense."

3. The following is quoted from the remarks of the Commander-in-Chief at the critique of Fleet Problem XX:

(a) OPERATIONS OF PATROL PLANES

For purposes of safety, the Commander-in-Chief imposed restrictions on the operations of patrol planes which hampered their operations to a certain degree. They were very effective in scouting and their information reports were very good, and it might be said that Commander BLACK had accurate information of what was taking place within the 500 mile radius of his bases. It is noted that the patrol planes made several attacks on formations in groups of twos and threes. It is the considered opinion that such attacks are ineffective and might be considered as the fritting away of one's patrol planes without compensating results. Bombing attacks on

base of operations in or near the eastern extremity of South

well armed dispositions of vessels should not be made in smaller concentrations than a full squadron, and even then the losses may be found to be heavy in comparison with the damage inflicted. Patrol planes are considered primarily scouts and above all things their scouting should be carried out in such a way as to prevent the enemy from knowing that there are scouts present.

The BLACK patrol planes were practically concentrated in two bases together with all their tenders and auxiliaries. This was a most vulnerable arrangement and I consider it to have been an error. It would have been far better to have had many widely scattered smaller bases capable of tending one or two squadrons, thus making the air search for these bases, and the attack, more difficult, and at the same time reducing the losses.

(b) SUBMARINES

The Submarine Force left port on 11 February and were sixteen days at sea during the problem. They were necessarily submerged all day and could only surface at night. Their operating conditions may be described as being arduous, particularly those in the S-boats. All submarines went through the Problem without breakdown; they performed their missions so far as could be observed with uniform efficiency. They more nearly operated under war conditions during the Problem than any other force and acquitted themselves in a most admirable manner.

(c) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

The aircraft carriers were handled most efficiently and the improvements noted in the operations of Carrier Division Two were notable. Great skill is required in handling carriers to prevent the separation of carriers from their own Fleet and from their planes. Much has been accomplished during Fleet Problem Twenty towards the solution of many difficulties experienced in the past.

(d) THE BATTLE

Many features were observed by the Commander-in-Chief which impressed him unfavorably, namely: Excessive distance used in the battle line and light forces; the slowing of the Fleet in order to orient axis and to make changes in disposition; the lack of initiative of the destroyers in the van and their failure to attack when opportunity offered and when assistance was badly needed; the delay in air attack which rendered it ineffective and the direction of the deployment course which forced forces in the van to the disengaged bow.

(e) GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

This problem brings home the absolute necessity for a base of operations in or near the eastern extremity of South



America in case the South Atlantic is to be controlled by any force.

The Problem also served to accentuate the geography of the West Indies and the necessity for more cruising in these islands; many of our officers and men have never seen or been near the many islands and passages covered by this year's exercises.

War is a game of imagination and it is suggested that the initiative and resourcefulness of the officers conducting the destroyer raids be particularly noted. It is the unexpected and bold that usually turns out to be successful, especially when carried out by a determined commander.

Fleet Problem Twenty has demonstrated, in my opinion,

FIRST; the wisdom of providing fast battleships for support of raiding forces and for increasing the mobility of the Fleet.

SECOND; the necessity for well fortified and equipped bases in Florida, Guantanamo and the Puerto Rico Area.

THIRD; the immediate necessity for adequate and modern auxiliaries, tankers, tenders, repair and store ships.

FOURTH; the necessity for progressive training in supersonic detection.

FIFTH; the necessity for continuing the development of anti-submarine measures using aircraft and destroyers working together.

SIXTH; the necessity for an intensive study of weapons and methods for attacking aircraft and the progressive continuance of our gunnery training against aircraft.

SEVENTH; the necessity for wireless telegraphy which can be employed by submerged submarines.

EIGHTH; the justification of large submarines with their speed and seakeeping qualities. They can do all which the S-boats can, and a great deal more.

*Respy,  
J. Barragh*

1  
✓ PSF-Callaghan  
Navy  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

file  
private

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 11, 1939

Memorandum For The President:

The attached has been shown to the appropriate Division in the Navy Department and I am returning it for the White House file in accordance with your instructions.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. Callaghan.

re: <sup>(C)</sup> German submarine base -  
rec'd + filed State Dept.  
Folder - Drawer 1 - 1939

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you show this to  
the Navy and return for my files?

F. D. R.

Letter from Sumner Welles, State, 1/9/39  
to the President, with enclosed memorandum & chart  
which was left with Mr. Welles by the Spanish  
Ambassador, indicating the German sub-marine  
bases now established in Spanish territory.

January 9, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

The Spanish Ambassador left with me this morning a chart and memorandum indicating the German submarine bases now established in Spanish territory.

I believe you will find them of interest.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:  
Chart;  
Memorandum.

The President,  
The White House.



PSF Navy  
Callaghan

UNITED STATES FLEET  
CRUISERS, SCOUTING FORCE  
U. S. S. CHICAGO, Flagship

193

MEMORANDUM

To:

Confidential paper given  
Pres. last spring by Ad.  
Leahy re report of Capt.  
(Rear Ad. now) Ingersoll's  
visit to London.

If can be found  
Ad. Leahy would like to  
have back in order to  
destroy.

JG

This report was returned to  
Captain Callaghan for Admiral Leahy  
on February 6, 1939.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PF  
1-1-12

Has been seen only  
by Secy State, Mr. Keller  
and Admiral Leahy.

Admiral asks that you  
read and return to him  
via me.

Secy State wanted Mr.  
Hornbeck to see it, but  
Admiral Leahy recommends  
against this.

Woodson.

*d-2*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*P5 F  
Callaghan  
Navy*

Warm Springs, Ga.,  
April 1, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you send the attached to the Navy Department and the War Department for their information. It should, of course, be kept confidential.

F. D. R.

Note from Ambassador Bullitt enclosing information on the relative strengths of the French and Italian Navies.

PSF  
Callaghan  
Navy

File  
personal

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1250

Tuesday, 25 April

Memo for the President:

Admiral Leahy just had a phone call from Mr. Vinson, who appears to have some apprehension that the matter of the 45,000 ton battleships will not be reported favorably by the Appropriations Committee.

Respy,  
D. Callaghan



PSF Callaghan  
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you ask Admiral Leahy to pursue this further -- i.e., two 8,000 ton light cruisers to carry four 11" guns plus as many 5" dual purpose guns as possible? What chance is there of a three gun light turret or the 5" dual purpose guns, in order to save weight?

In other words, such a ship would have a good chance of standing up against the German pocket battleship type.

I still think an 8,000 ton light cruiser, mounting only ten 6" guns, provides too light an armament for the tonnage.

F. D. R.

PSF

Callaghan  
2

Navy

Memorandum for the President---May 26, 1939

From Capt. Callaghan

In re-talking with Admiral Stark sometime in August about attached memo in reference to abolishing the General Board which was created by the Navy Board General Order No 544--of 13 March 1900.

See:Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


May 29, 1939.

Memorandum For

The President.

I am forwarding the enclosed copy of the procedure which has been adopted in the attempt to salvage the SQUALUS. I thought that you would be interested in knowing the details of the proposed plan.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. Callaghan.

*file  
confidential*

*PSF  
Callaghan  
Navy*

27 May 1939

## MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Subject: At a Conference between representatives of Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., and of the Department, the following procedure was outlined for salvage of SQUALUS.

1. Clear up topside. (Remove all gear which might interfere with divers, hoses, life lines, etc.).
2. Attach permanent buoys and descending line.
3. Put pressure on empty compartments forward to reduce leakage (110 lbs.). (Survivors report leakage in various fittings. )
4. Flood all Main Ballast. This to be done from on deck by means of salvage connections.
5. Close and gag all outboard and inboard and after battery ventilation valves.
6. Tighten all hatches in flooded compartments. (Hatches have hand wheels outside by means of which they can be tightened. )
7. Determine whether after compartments are tight against sea pressure. (This will be done by putting air pressure into compartments and noting whether or not pressure drops. If pressure drops, leakage to be indicated.)
8. If After Torpedo Room is tight against sea pressure, connect salvage air to high valve in After Torpedo Room and to low valve in After Battery Room, Forward Engine Room, After Engine Room and After Torpedo Room.
9. Blow After Torpedo Room high salvage, using low salvage as spill pipes and indicators. ("High Salvage" refers to salvage connections which empty <sup>directly</sup> into compartment, whereas "low salvage" refers to salvage connection having spill pipe which goes to within twelve inches of the bilges of the compartment.)



10. Correct air leaks as they occur as practicable.
11. Close all emergency vents. (Emergency vents are merely stop valves on main ballast vent lines).
12. Rig pontoons aft at depth of 130 feet.
13. Connect salvage air to all main ballast and fuel tanks. Check moments to see if fuel can be blown first. ("Moments" refers to ~~weight~~ moment arm which is the leverage from the center of gravity obtained by adding weight or introducing buoyancy at a known distance from the center of gravity).
14. Vent down all main compartments. (This is done to prevent high pressure air from blowing off hatches as submarine rises to surface.)
15. Blow pontoons.
16. Blow after fuel tanks dry in succession as guided by moments. (This will spread a lot of fuel oil along the New England coast but can not be avoided).
17. Blow main ballast from aft in succession until pontoons break surface.
18. Blow main ballast from forward until bow rises.
19. Blow remaining main ballast until stern rises.
20. Finish blowing ballast and fuel.
21. Rig for towing.

In view of the large amount of diving at considerable depth, the operation outlined will necessarily require an extended period. The minimum time in which it is believed this operation can be conducted, with good luck as to weather and other factors, is two weeks.

C.A. Lockwood.

---

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
personal  
BSP*

May 31, 1939

Memorandum for

The President

I am forwarding a copy of a report concerning the SQUALUS for your perusal whenever you have sufficient leisure. It contains very interesting information on the rescue operations undertaken in connection with the SQUALUS.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

SS192/S94/H2-10

U. S. NAVY YARD,  
PORTSMOUTH, N.H.,

Tm.

*PSF  
Callaghan  
Navy*

28 May 1939

**From:** Commander Rescue Operations, U.S.S. SQUALUS.  
**To:** Chief of Naval Operations.  
**Subject:** U.S.S. SQUALUS (SS192) - Report of Rescue Operations.  
**Reference:** (a) U.S.S. SQUALUS Operation Order 4-39  
with Annex.  
**Inclosure:** (A) Comdt. Navy Yard, Ports. Communication Files  
covering Rescue Operations, during 23-25 May  
1939 inclusive.  
(B) Extract from Diving Log, U.S.S. FALCON, for  
period 24-25 May 1939 inclusive.  
(C) Officer Organization.

1. Attention is invited to the fact that times used in Inclosure (A) are zone plus five time, while those given in the remainder of the report are zone plus four time (Daylight Saving Time). The officer organization for the rescue operations is shown in Inclosure (C).

2. On 23 May 1939 the U.S.S. SQUALUS was operating off the Isles of Shoals in accordance with reference (a). On board the SQUALUS were her regular officers and crew, and in addition, the operating engineer regularly furnished by the machinery contractor, as well as two civilian representatives of the Navy Yard, who were assisting in preparation for trials. In accordance with the usual practice, the routine dive reports of the SQUALUS, which are the second and third despatches of Inclosure (A) were on the Commandant's desk for reference in order to keep in touch with operations. At about 1040 the Commandant noted that the expected surfacing report of the SQUALUS was then about one hour overdue. The Communication Officer was notified and directed to try to raise the SQUALUS by radio on the assumption that failure to receive a surfacing report was due to inadvertence of some sort.

3. Failure to communicate with the SQUALUS naturally caused some alarm. As it happened, the SOULPIN was due to leave the Yard for Newport at 1130, and the Commandant personally directed her Commanding Officer before she left, to pass through the SQUALUS operating areas, endeavor to make contact with her and report results. At 1155, after the SOULPIN had left, the Commandant further

Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS - Report of Rescue Operations.

-----

directed her by despatch to make every effort to contact the SQUALUS and remain in the area until successful.

4. The operating schedule of the FALCON was then consulted and it was found that she was scheduled for upkeep at New London at the time, whereupon the Commandant called Commander Submarine Squadron TWO by telephone, informed him of the situation, and warned him that the FALCON might be urgently needed. Commander Submarine Squadron TWO stated that the FALCON would be sent to the Isles of Shoals at once.

5. At 1241 a despatch was received from the SCULPIN to the effect that a red smoke bomb had been sighted and that the SCULPIN was proceeding to the vicinity. The Commandant immediately called the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, informed him that the SQUALUS was apparently down and in trouble, that he would personally proceed to the area involved and would keep the Chief of Naval Operations informed of developments. At the same time Commandant, First Naval District, was informed of the situation and requested to make the U.S.S. WANDANK available in the vicinity of the Isles of Shoals. Before embarking on the PENACOOK (Yard Tug) further messages were received from the SCULPIN that the marker buoy from the SQUALUS had been sighted and that the position was Latitude 42°53' N. Longitude 70°37' W. This position was 4-3/4 miles to the westward from the reported diving position of the SQUALUS and in nearly the opposite direction from her reported diving course. This fact is pointed out in order to emphasize the extreme value of the alert lookout kept by the SCULPIN, which resulted in sighting the smoke bomb fired from the SQUALUS, and undoubtedly saved a tremendous amount of time which would otherwise have been expended in searching for the SQUALUS.

6. The Commandant, accompanied by Captain H. R. Greenlee, USN, Commander A. I. McKee (CC), Lieutenant Commander F. A. Tusler (CC), Lieutenant Commander E. L. Sackett, USN, and Lieutenant Commander A. M. Morgan (CC), embarked on the U.S.S. PENACOOK at 1330 and proceeded at best speed to the designated position, arriving alongside the SCULPIN at 1513 and assumed the status of Rescue Officer. The Rescue Officer directed the PENACOOK to drop one buoy 100 yards north of the designated position of the SQUALUS and another 100 yards south of it. He then embarked on the SCULPIN with other officers accompanying him.

7. The Commanding Officer, SCULPIN, reported that he had picked up the marker buoy, which was the forward one of the SQUALUS, and had held about two minutes conversation over the buoy telephone.

SS192/S94/H2-10

AMP

Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS - Report of Rescue Operations.  
-----

with Lieutenant J. C. Nichols and Lieutenant O. F. Naquin,  
Commanding Officer, SQUALUS, which was in substance as follows:

WILKIN: "What is your trouble?"

NICHOLS: "High induction open, crew's compartment, forward and after engine rooms flooded. Not sure about after torpedo room but could not establish communication with that compartment. Hold the phone and I will put the Captain on".

(About thirty seconds delay to get Lieutenant Naquin on the telephone)

WILKIN: "How are things?"

NAQUIN: "Consider best method to employ is to send diver down as soon as possible to close high induction and then hook on salvage lines to flooded compartments and free them of water in attempt to bring her up; for the present consider that preferable to sending personnel up with lungs".

At this point the marker buoy cable parted. Later investigation by diver showed that a bight of the buoy cable had been caught on some sharp obstruction over the side of the SQUALUS, and pulling from the surface had caused it to part at that point, which was about 240 feet from the buoy. The Commanding Officer, SCULPIN, reported that he had located the SQUALUS with his super-sonic equipment, and that she was about 350 yards distant, bearing zero six six degrees true.

8. The PENACOOK had been directed to start dragging for the SQUALUS with grapnel after planting position buoys. It was shortly found that the grapnels on board were not heavy enough to sink the line, and one of the SCULPIN's boat anchors was then substituted for the grapnel. At 1720 the WANDANK arrived from Boston, and was also directed to start dragging. At 1726 the U.S.C.G. No. 991 brought out from the Navy Yard two divers, two diver's tenders, and two pipefitters, together with diving suits and equipment. At 1745 the privately owned tug CHANDLER arrived, bringing Lieutenant (jg) E. F. Slozsek (MC), USN, and three pharmacist's mates with fifty blankets from the Portsmouth Naval Hospital. At 1817 U.S.C.G. No. 158 reported for duty from Gloucester. At 1842 the CHANDLER and U.S.C.G. No. 991 were sent back to the Navy Yard for more diving equipment. At 1930 the PENACOOK reported hooking her drag anchor on what was believed to be the SQUALUS, and buoyed the line with a wooden



SS192/S94/H2-10

AMP

Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS - Report of Rescue Operations.

-----

grating. This buoy was on the line between the two buoys previously laid by the PENACOOK. The U.S.C.G. No. 158 was directed to circle the vicinity of the grating during the night, using her searchlight to keep watch for any SQUALUS personnel who might come up during the night with Momsen lung equipment. At 2145 the U.S.C.G. No. 409 arrived, bringing the following personnel of the Experimental Diving Unit who had been sent by airplane from Washington, D.C.:

Lieutenant Commander C. B. Momsen, USN.  
Lieutenant O. D. Yarbrough (MC), USN.  
Lieutenant A. R. Behnke (MC), USN.  
C. Msath. J. H. McDonald, USN (Diver).

At 2355 the Tug CHANDLER returned to Portsmouth.

9. No attempt was made to conduct diving operations during the night of 23-24 May because of the extreme depth and the difficulty of conducting such operations during darkness, and because of the fact that the FALCON was expected to arrive in the early morning in time to moor and conduct such operations with superior equipment and highly trained personnel. The personnel in the forward compartments of the SQUALUS appeared to be in no immediate danger. Satisfactory communications had been established by 1345 with the SQUALUS after being first heard at 1328, by tapping in Morse code with a hammer on the hull of the SCULPIN and hearing similar messages from the SQUALUS. Early messages indicated that 33 men were alive in the forward part of the ship. Conditions were reported satisfactory, but cold.

10. Operations on 24 May 1939 were as follows: At 0027 the U.S.C.G. HARRIET LANE reported for duty. At 0205 the U.S.S. SEMMES stood in and anchored close aboard, and Commander Submarine Squadron TWO (Captain R. S. Edwards, USN) reported on board for duty. At 0235, in response to a request from the FALCON that the position of the SQUALUS be cleared for a distance of at least 700 yards, the SCULPIN got underway and shifted berth to a position with Newburyport Aero Beacon bearing 241 degrees true, Wood Island Light bearing 359 degrees true, and Boon Island Light bearing 023 degrees - 45 minutes true. The estimated bearing of the SQUALUS from this position was 040 degrees true, distance 1450 yards. At 0415 Commander Allen R. McCann, USN, and 12 divers of the Experimental Diving Unit arrived at the scene of operations. At 0425 the U.S.S. FALCON

Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS - Report of Rescue Operations.

-----

arrived and commenced laying out four point moorings. Divers from the FALCON were sent to the SCULPIN to familiarize themselves with the layout and equipment to be found on the SQUALUS, which is a sister ship. At 0700 the Rescue Officer, Commander Submarine Squadron TWO, other officers of the Navy Yard, and officers attached to the Experimental Diving Unit embarked on the FALCON.

11. The FALCON was occupied until 0840 in spotting herself between the four anchors laid out, in an effort to obtain a position over the SQUALUS. Due to wind and sea conditions, considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining the desired position, and at 0840 the WANDANK carried out an additional five-ton anchor on the port beam of the FALCON and brought the line to the FALCON. However, this expedient was not effective, and it was necessary to shift the lines of the FALCON so that the wind and sea were brought ahead instead of on the beam, after which the FALCON quickly swung into position and was secured. At 1014 the first diver, Martin C. Sibitzky, B.M. 1c, USN, was put over the side, reporting himself on the deck of the SQUALUS at 1017. The descending line used was the buoy line which had been attached to the drag anchor by the PENACOOK, and this line was fortunately discovered by the diver to be only about 6 feet aft of the forward torpedo room hatch, leading over the port rail near the stub mast. At 1028 the rescue chamber downhaul wire was shackled to the descending line and lowered to the diver, who shackled it to the hatch at 1039, and started coming up, being placed in the decompression chamber at 1124.

12. The extremely skillful work of this first diver resulted in marked expedition of the whole rescue operation and contributed greatly to its ultimate success. In addition to shackling on the downhaul wire it was necessary for him to clear the bight of the marker buoy line, which lay across the hatch, and was still fouled somewhere over the side. Had this buoy line been allowed to remain, it would have endangered rescue chamber operations by possibly fouling the downhaul or preventing a tight seal on the hatch.

13. The rescue chamber was hoisted over the side for the first rescue trip at 1130 and reported on the submarine at 1212. The operator reported the SQUALUS to have a seven degree list and to be down by the stern. At 1240 the chamber had been securely attached to the submarine, and the upper hatch opened. The lower escape hatch was found closed. This lower hatch was opened and contact established with the submarine crew at 1247. Provisions and dehydrating material were delivered to the crew, the submarine

SS192/394/H2-10

Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS - Report of Rescue Operations AAG

-----  
was ventilated through the chamber for several minutes, and seven passengers taken on board. At 1256 the submarine hatch was closed, and preparations made for the ascent. At 1342 the rescue chamber reached the surface, the hatch was opened, and survivors evacuated.

14. The first three rescue trips of the rescue chamber were made expeditiously, and equipment functioned as designed throughout these trips. The times at which detailed operations of the chamber were carried out are entered in Inclosure (B), together with the names of survivors removed on each trip. This was the first occasion in which the rescue chamber has been used for other than training purposes, and the results achieved have fully justified the vision, faith, and hard work of those involved in the development of the equipment.

15. The fourth trip of the rescue chamber proceeded apparently according to schedule up to 2022, when during the ascent, with the last survivors on board, the air motor which drives the downhaul equipment stalled and could not be re-started. An attempt was made to continue the ascent by controlling with the brake instead of the motor, but at 155 feet depth the reel again jammed and no further downhaul wire could be let out, even with the brake released. A heavy strain was taken on the retriever wire with the deck winch, but the chamber was apparently fouled, and could not be broken loose without danger of parting the retrieving cable. The downhaul equipment could not be moved either up or down, therefore the decision was made to lower the chamber to the bottom and send a diver down to unshackle or cut the downhaul wire to free the chamber. The chamber was given negative buoyancy in order to lower it to the bottom. The diver was put over at 2113 and reported on the submarine at 2115. At 2118 he reported that he could not unshackle the wire, and at 2122 reported that he had cut it. An attempt was immediately made to heave up the chamber with the winch, but the strain on the retriever wire was abnormally heavy and at 2125, the retrieving cable stranded. The strain was quickly taken off, and the chamber lowered to the bottom, in order to prevent parting the retrieving cable entirely, as only one small strand of the cable remained intact.

16. At 2149 a diver was put over for the purpose of bending a new retrieving cable to the chamber. This diver became involved in difficulties shortly after reaching the bottom, probably due to entanglement in one of the lines, and had to be hauled to the surface without having accomplished anything. At 2247 a second diver was sent down to the chamber, who also became involved in fouled lines and had such difficulties with lights that



Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS - Report of Rescue Operations.

-----

it appeared hopeless to accomplish anything by this method. After conference, a decision was reached that the best method of getting the chamber up would be to adjust the buoyancy of the chamber as nearly as possible to neutral on the negative side and then haul in the frayed retrieving wire carefully by hand in order not to part the remaining strand. In using this method, the danger of acquiring positive buoyancy of the chamber, with resultant swift ascent to the surface, and the possibility of its coming up under the FALCON had to be accepted. However, as no alternative appeared practicable, this method was decided upon at 2400.

17. Operations on 25 May 1939 followed. At 0004, in compliance with instructions from the controlling officer, the main ballast tank of the chamber was partially blown three times for periods of 30 seconds, 15 seconds and 15 seconds respectively, and a light strain taken by hand on the retrieving wire, with the result that after the last blowing, it was possible to lift the chamber without much strain on the stranded retrieving wire. By the exercise of excellent judgment, the chamber had been brought to exactly the condition of buoyancy desired, so that it could be hauled in with very little strain, thus avoiding the imminent danger of parting the one strand of the cable which was left, as well as the danger of rapid ascent of the chamber out of control. After once being started, the chamber came up easily, reaching the surface at 0023, and the last known survivors were evacuated at 0025.

18. Rescue operations might reasonably have been considered complete at this point. The Commanding Officer of the SQUALUS stated that he was absolutely sure that all after compartments with the possible exception of the after torpedo room, were flooded, and that in the absence of any communications from that compartment, the indications were that flooding was complete throughout the after part of the vessel. All evidence obtainable from the surface pointed to the same conclusion. However, in order that all possibilities of finding further personnel on board the SQUALUS alive might be explored and eliminated, it was decided to make a trip in the chamber to the after torpedo room at the earliest practicable moment, and determine definitely whether or not that compartment was also flooded. Accordingly, after shifting moorings in order to place the FALCON in a position more favorable to reach the after torpedo room hatch and renewing the downhaul wire of the rescue chamber and checking over the operating equipment of the reel, diving operations were again resumed at 1341 in order to attach the downhaul wire to the after torpedo room hatch. The first and second divers sent down failed to attach the wire due to fouling of lines and

great depth of water, but the third diver was successful at 1602 and was back in the decompression chamber at 1657.

19. At 1719 the rescue chamber commenced descent, and at 1745 reached the submarine. It was necessary in this operation to equalize the pressure in the chamber with that of the sea in order to enable the submarine hatch to be opened without flooding the chamber. This was done, and upon cracking the submarine hatch, water commenced to flood into the chamber from the torpedo room, proving that the after torpedo room was flooded. The submarine hatch was secured, and the rescue chamber started up, using the usual decompression schedule during the ascent because the operators had been subjected to full sea pressure. At 2107 the rescue chamber was landed on deck. Badders, W., C.M.M., U.S.N. was in charge of the chamber in this operation, and Mihalowski, J., E.M.1c. was his assistant. These men were fully aware of the great danger involved. If they became incapacitated, there was no way in which they could be rescued, as the chamber could not be entered from the outside. Considering all facts, it is felt that these men accepted the greatest personal risk of any during the entire rescue operations, and performed their duties in accordance with the highest traditions of the service.

20. Rescue operations were considered definitely at an end at this stage, and salvage operations started.

21. In concluding this report of Rescue Operations, it is desired to bring to the attention of the Department the efficiency displayed by all agencies taking part. The promptness of action of the Navy Department in getting personnel and material to the scene of the disaster undoubtedly had much to do with the success of the operation. During the operations, quick, thorough and efficient action was displayed without exception by all hands. Many difficult and unforeseen situations arose suddenly and were in all cases handled with a great display of efficient initiative. There was never any undue excitement or confusion.

22. The Commander Rescue Operations, U.S.S. SQUALUS, desires to invite the Department's particular attention to the following, which are deemed worthy of the highest praise:

The Commanding Officer of the SCULPIN; Lieutenant Warren D. Wilkin, U.S.Navy, for his alertness in picking up the distress signal of the SQUALUS and his efficient action in definitely locating the wreck.

The efficient action of the Boatswain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., Chief Boatswain David L. Ullman, U.S.Navy, in placing the marker buoys and in so promptly grappling the wreck, which enabled the FALCON to moor in position

SS192/994/H2-10

AAG

Subject: U.S.S. SQUALUS - Report of Rescue Operations.

-----

to begin operations immediately upon arrival.

The prompt arrival of numerous vessels of the U.S. Coast Guard and their inestimable usefulness and cooperation throughout the operations.

The efficient work of the divers and rescue chamber operators throughout the period of rescue, particularly Martin C. Sibitzky, B.M. 1c, of the FALCON, who secured the rescue chamber downhaul to the forward torpedo room escape hatch and cleared the hatch in 22 minutes from the time he landed on the deck of the SQUALUS. This was done at a depth of 220 feet of water at a temperature of 29 degrees.

The exceptional coolness, judgment and initiative of Commander Allan R. McCann, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander C. B. Momen, U.S. Navy, in handling what was probably the most trying and difficult situation of the rescue period, viz: the fourth and last trip up of the rescue chamber with survivors. Their outstanding handling of this situation undoubtedly prevented severe bodily injury to the occupants of the chamber and the possible damage to the chamber, the FALCON, or both.

The appearance and bearing of all SQUALUS officers and men as they stepped out of the rescue chamber to the deck of the FALCON indicated a high state of discipline and morale under the most trying conditions.

The exceptionally courageous and efficient conduct of W. Baddus, C.M.M., U.S.N., and J. Mihalowski, T.M. 1c, U.S.N., as described in paragraph 19 of this report.

The efficient administration of the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, by the Captain of the Yard, Captain William F. Amsden, U.S. Navy, and by the Commandant's Aide, Lieutenant Commander John J. Curley, jr., U.S. Navy, during conditions requiring the utmost energy and tact.

The generous response of individuals from all walks of life throughout the country.

C. W. COLE.

Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

Copy to -  
ComOne.

DIVING LOG  
OF  
RESCUE OPERATIONS  
OF  
U.S.S. STUALUS

FIRST DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER

NAME SIBITZKY, Martin C., B.M.1c. DATE 24 May, 1939.

DEPTH OF DIVE 220 ft.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1014.....	Left Surface.
1017.....	Reached bottom.
1039.....	Left bottom.
1041.....	Reached 90 feet.
1043.....	Left 90 feet.
1043.....	Reached 80 feet.
1046.....	Left 80 feet.
1046.....	Reached 70 feet.
1051.....	Left 70 feet.
1051.....	Reached 60 feet.
1058.....	Left 60 feet.
1058.....	Reached 50 feet.
1108.....	Left 50 feet.
1108.....	Reached 40 feet.
1123.....	Left 40 feet.
1124.....	Reached surface & in Chamber.
1325.....	Surface decompression in Chamber.
1251.....	Tender in Chamber - DAVID, Harold R., CPhM(PA), USN.
1255.....	Received seven (7) passengers from

NOTE: Purpose of dive was to attach Rescue Chamber down-haul line to forward hatch of Submarine.



# FIRST DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER

OPERATORS: **HARMAN, Walter E., G.M.lc.**      DATE 24 May, 1939  
**MIHALOWSKI, John, T.M.lc**

DEPTH 220 feet.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1130.....	Rescue Chamber left deck.
1131.....	Rescue Chamber in water.
1132.....	Blowing Main Ballast.
1134.....	Flooding Lower Compartment.
1159.....	Lower Compartment flooded. (Little pressure. Had trouble flooding). 150 feet down.
1202.....	Stopped to relieve pressure vent.
1204.....	20 pounds pressure.
1205.....	Started down again.
1208.....	Submarine in sight.
1212.....	On submarine at 185 ft. Submarine down by stern with 7 degree list.
1213.....	Flooding Main Ballast.
1217.....	Main Ballast flooded.
1217.....	20 lbs. pressure in Rescue Chamber.
1220.....	Blowing Lower Compartment.
1224.....	Testing to determine if Chamber had sealed.
1227.....	Seal completed on Submarine.
1228.....	Air shut off to Rescue Chamber.
1229.....	Air back to Rescue Chamber.
1229.....	Connecting holding-down bolts to Submarine.
1239.....	Holding-down bolts secured. Slacking off on cable to disconnect.
1240.....	Fir-lead clear.
1240.....	Opening Submarine hatch.
1242.....	Upper Submarine hatch open. No answer from Submarine.
1246.....	Down to lower hatch.
1247.....	Lower hatch opened; talking to Submarine men. Providing provisions to crew of Submarine.
1249.....	Taking passengers in Rescue Chamber from Submarine.
1251.....	Ventilating Submarine Torpedo Room from Rescue Chamber.
1255.....	Received seven (7) passengers from Submarine.

(continued on next page)

GROUND DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER

OPERATORS: M.ELAN, Walter S., O.S.1c, USN. DATE: 21 May 1970.  
 RAGGERS: W.P. S.M.1(PA), USN.

DEPTH 220 FT.

**FIRST DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER  
 (Continued)**

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1256.....	Submarine Hatch closed.
1256.....	Dumping portable ballast.
1257.....	Haul-down wire hooked up. Taking off holding-down bolts.
1306.....	Blowing lower compartment. Flooding to break seal.
1310.....	Lower compartment flooded. Blowing Main Ballast.
1312.....	Main ballast blown.
1313.....	Seal broken. Starting up.
1333.....	On surface.
1340.....	Lifting Rescue Chamber out of Water.
1342.....	Rescue Chamber hatch opened; men coming out.

Following survivors rescued on first descent of Rescue Chamber:

Lieutenant J.C.NICHOLS, (junior grade), USN.

ISAACS, William, S.C.2c, USN.

PREBLE, Harold C., Naval Architect. (civilian)

BLANCHARD, Roland, F.2c, USN.

JACOBS, Theodore, S.M.3c, USN.

McLEES, Gerald C., E.M.2c, USN.

YUHAS, Charles, E.M.1c, USN.

1447.....	Flooding lower compartment.
1448.....	Lower compartment flooded; blowing main ballast tanks.
1449.....	Main ballast blown; seal broken. Starting up.
1452.....	12-1/2 lbs pressure at 100 feet.
1455.....	30 lbs pressure at 75 feet; venting.
1458.....	30 lbs pressure at 50 feet; venting to 10 lbs.
1459.....	shifted to brake at 25 feet.
1459.....	On surface.
1459.....	Lifting rescue chamber out of water.
1459.....	Rescue chamber out of water.
1459.....	Opened hatch; men coming aboard.

(list of survivors on next sheet)

SECOND DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER

OPERATORS: HARMAN, Walter E., G.M.1c, USN. DATE 24 May 1939.  
BADDERS, W., C.M.1c (PA), USN.

DEPTH 220 ft.

-----

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1345	Flooding portable ballast.
1352	Rescue chamber lowered into water.
1355	Having trouble engaging clutch.
1401	Lifting rescue chamber out of water to open hatch.
1403	Clutch engaged.
1404	Flooding portable ballast.
1409	Ballast tanks flooded; taking in slack in wire. Starting down.
1422	Rescue chamber at 80 feet
1425	Exhausting; 105 feet.
1435	Venting pressure; 160 feet.
1440	25 lbs. pressure. Almost on submarine.
1441	On submarine.
1442	Flooding main ballast.
1450	Main ballast tank flooded. Venting upper compartment; preparatory to opening lower compartment.
1453	Blowing lower compartment.
1456	Seal not completed.
1458	Blowing lower compartment.
1505	Opening lower hatch.
1506	Lower hatch open; putting on holding-down rods.
1511	Holding down rods on; opening submarine hatch.
1515	Submarine hatch open; taking men into rescue chamber from submarine.
1527	Holding-down bolts off; blowing lower ballast. Down-haul wire secured.
1538	Flooding lower compartment.
1541	Lower compartment flooded; blowing-main ballast tanks.
1544	Main ballast blown; seal broken. Starting up.
1552	12-1/2 lbs pressure at 100 feet.
1555	20 lbs pressure at 75 feet; venting.
1602	20 lbs pressure at 30 feet; venting to 10 lbs.
1605	shifted to brake at 25 feet.
1608	On surface.
1609	Lifting rescue chamber out of water.
1610	Rescue chamber out of water.
1611	Opened hatch; men coming aboard.

(list of survivors on next sheet)



SECOND TRIP OF RESCUE CHAMBER  
(Continued)

-----  
Following survivors rescued on second descent of Rescue Chamber:

MORRIS, L.B., E.M.3c, USN.  
BOLTON, T.D., Sea.1c, USN.  
GAINER, L.J., C.E.M.(PA), USN.  
SMITH, W.W., S.M.2c, USN.  
O'HARA, R.P., PhM.1c, USN.  
BLAND, J.T., E.M.1c, USN.  
MURPHY, F., Jr., Q.M.1c, USN.  
WASHBURN, R.L., Sea.2c, USN.  
GALVAN, B., M.Att.1c, USN.

THIRD DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER

OPERATORS: BADDERS, W., C.M.M. (PA), USN. DATE 24 May, 1939  
 MIHALOWSKI, John, T.M.1c, USN.

DEPTH 220 feet.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1624.....	Having trouble with clutch.
1625.....	Starting down; blowing Main Ballast.
1626.....	Main Ballast blown.
1630.....	14 lbs. pressure; venting 15 pds. pressure.
1633.....	Flooding Lower Compartment.
1634.....	Lower compartment flooded.
1643.....	Down 80 feet.
1646.....	15 pds. pressure; 115 feet.
1654.....	Down 175 feet.
1657.....	On seat; 22-1/2 lbs. pressure. 194 feet.
1657.....	Flooding Main Ballast.
1701.....	Main Ballast flooded; 198 feet.
1702.....	Blowing lower compartment; venting upper compartment.
1705.....	Blowing lower compartment.
1707.....	Venting lower compartment.
1708.....	Seal made; opening hatch.
1715.....	Seal broken.
1720.....	Putting on holding-down bolts.
1724.....	Holding-down bolts secured; opening hatch.
1736.....	Closing hatch.
1738.....	Taking off holding-down bolts.
1755.....	Flooding lower compartment.
1757.....	Lower compartment flooded; blowing Main Ballast.
1759.....	Main Ballast blown.
1801.....	Seal broken; starting up.
1803.....	Blowing small bubble in lower compartment.
1811.....	98 ft.; 20 lbs. pressure.
1813.....	70 ft. 22-1/2 lbs. pressure.
1815.....	Stopped to vent at 60 feet.
1817.....	15 pounds pressure.
1818.....	Pressure 11 pounds; starting ascent.
1820.....	13 pounds pressure; 42 feet.
1822.....	15 pounds pressure; 30 feet. Put on brake.
1823.....	On brake; coming up.
1824.....	Rescue Chamber on surface.
1825.....	Taking Rescue Chamber out of water.
1827.....	Hatch open; men disembarking.

Following survivors rescued on third trip descent of Rescue Chamber;

COYNE, Garvin J., MM2c, USN. POWELL, R.B., MM2c, USN  
 BOOTH, A.L. R.M.2c, USN.

THIRD DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER  
(Continued)

Third trip survivors (cont'd)

ELVINA, F., M.Att.1c, USN.  
FRIEN, A.G., MM.2c, USN.  
FITZPATRICK, Wm.J., T.M.2c, USN.

MADERIOS, L., T.M.3c, USN.  
CATTBELL, R.H., C.T.M., USN.

Third trip survivors (cont'd)

ELVINA, F., M.Att.1c, USN.  
FRIEN, A.G., MM.2c, USN.  
FITZPATRICK, Wm.J., T.M.2c, USN.  
MADERIOS, L., T.M.3c, USN.  
CATTBELL, R.H., C.T.M., USN.

Lieutenant R.N. ROBERTSON, USN.

THIRD DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER  
(Continued)

Third trip survivors (cont'd)

ELVINA, F., M.Att.1c, USN.  
FRIEN, A.G., MM.2c, USN.  
FITZPATRICK, Wm.J., T.M.2c, USN.  
MADERIOS, L., T.M.3c, USN.  
CATTBELL, R.H., C.T.M., USN.

Lieutenant R.N. ROBERTSON, USN.

THIRD DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER  
(Continued)

Third trip survivors (cont'd)

ELVINA, F., M.Att.1c, USN.  
FRIEN, A.G., MM.2c, USN.  
FITZPATRICK, Wm.J., T.M.2c, USN.  
MADERIOS, L., T.M.3c, USN.  
CATTBELL, R.H., C.T.M., USN.

Lieutenant R.N. ROBERTSON, USN.

FOURTH DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER

OPERATORS: McDONALD, J., CMSmth, USN. DATE 24 May, 1939.  
 MIHALOWSKI, John, T.M.1c, USN.

DEPTH 220 ft.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS.</u>
1841	Hatch closed.
1842	Blowing Main Ballast.
1843	Main Ballast blown; flooding lower compartment.
1849	Lower compartment flooded; slacked down-haul.
1852	Down 30 ft. Tank sloshed over;refilling.
1909	Down 130 ft.
1918	Flooding Main Ballast.
1922	Main Ballast Tank flooded.
1924	Down 191 ft.
1925	Blowing lower compartment.
1931	Seal made; opening lower hatch.
1931	Putting on holding down bolts.
1938	Opening Submarine Hatch.
1941	Upper submarine hatch opened.
1947	Taking passengers into Rescue Chamber.
1952	Hatch closed on Submarine.
1954	Taking off holding-down bolts.
1955	Emptying Portable Ballast.
2007	Portable Ballast Tanks Empty.
2007	Lower hatch closed; flooding lower compartment.
2011	Lower compartment flooded; blowing main Ballast.
2014	Seal broken; Main Ballast blown.Starting up/
2022	Motor turns over and then stalls.
2023	Start up on brake.
2025	Coming up on brake; 155 ft.
2027	Stopped; brake not working.
2029	Taking strain on down-haul wire.
2031	Fast heaving.
2033	Heaving around on down-haul wire.
2037	No strain on brake; depth 158 feet.
2038	Flooding main ballast.
2040	Taking more strain.
2041	Slack off.
2042	Stopped flooding main ballast; 170 feet.
2044	Depth; 185 feet.
2049	Depth; 195 ft.
2050	Depth; 200 ft.
2051	Depth; 205 ft.
2052	Starting to list over; 210 feet.

(continued on next sheet)

**FOURTH DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER  
(continued)**

---

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2115 .....	Diver on Submarine
2122 .....	Down-haul wire out.
2124 .....	Rescue Chamber on side of Submarine; 210 ft. Going up smoothly.
2125 .....	205 ft; going up slowly.
2126 .....	200 ft; going up slowly.
2126 .....	195 ft.
----- .....	215 ft.
----- .....	225 ft.
2127 .....	230 ft; hit bottom.
2129 .....	232 ft.

25 May, 1939

0004 .....	Blowing Main Ballast; one minute.
0005 .....	Up to 228 ft.
0006 .....	Up to 215 ft.
0008 .....	Up to 200 ft.
0012 .....	Up to 190 ft.
0013 .....	Up to 180 ft.
0014 .....	Up to 170 ft.
0019 .....	Up to 110 ft.
0020 .....	Up to 102 ft.
0022 .....	Up to 80 ft.
0023 .....	On surface.
0025 .....	Opening hatch.

Following survivors rescued on fourth trip descent of Rescue Chamber:

Lieut. Q.F. NAQUIN, USN. Comdg. USS SQUALUS.  
 Lieut. W.T. DOYLE, USN.  
 BRYSON, A.C., F.1c, USN.  
 KUNZY, C.S., Y.2c, USN.  
 POWELL, C.A., R.M.2c, USN.  
 PIERCE, C.W., M.M.2c, USN.  
 CRAVENS, E.D., G.M.1c, USN.  
 PERSICO, D., S.1c, USN.

NAME SQUIRE, W.H., C.T.M. USN.

DATE 24 May, 1939

DEPTH OF DIVE 200 ft.

-----

TIME

REMARKS

2112 ..... Left surface.  
2115 ..... Reached bottom  
2125 ..... Left bottom.  
2127 ..... Reached 60 feet.  
2130 ..... Left 60 feet.  
2130 ..... Reached 50 feet.  
2133 ..... left 50 feet.  
2133 ..... Reached 40 feet.  
2138 ..... Left 40 feet.  
2143 ..... Reached 30 feet - in chamber.  
2219 ..... Out.

Tender in chamber - DAVID, Harold R., CPhM. USN.

NOTE: Purpose of dive was to clear Rescue Chamber down-haul wire.

DEPTH OF DIAL  
 500 LF.  
 2000 FT. H. H. C. T. W. DEB.

NAME DUNCAN, J.E., T.M.1c, USN. DATE 24 May, 1939.

DEPTH OF DIVE 230 feet.

TIME	REMARKS
2149 .....	In water.
2155 .....	On bell
2205 .....	Left bottom.
2210 .....	Reached surface.

2212 .....	In chamber.
2213 .....	Pressure on.
2214 .....	On bottom. Decompressed.
0034.(25 May) .....	Out of chamber.

NOTE: Purpose of dive was to bend cable on to Rescue Chamber. Reports from diver were incoherent and he was hauled to the surface.

*[Faint, mostly illegible text from the reverse side of the page, including a second set of dive data and notes.]*



NAME CLAYTON, E.P. Msmth.lc, USN. DATE 24 May, 1939.

DEPTH OF DIVE: 230 feet.

-----

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2247	.....Reached bottom.
2320	.....Left bottom. coming down.
2322	.....Reached 100 ft. diver's line.
2307	.....Left 100 feet.
2327	.....Reached 90 ft.
2332	.....Left 90 ft.
2332	.....Reached 80 ft.
2342	.....Left 80 ft.
2342	.....Reached 70 ft.
2337	.....Left 70 ft.
2357	.....Reached 60 ft.

25 May, 1939

0012	.....Left 60 ft. chamber.
0012	.....Reached 50 ft.
0052	.....Left 50 ft.
0032	.....Reached 40 ft.
0102	.....Left 40 ft. wash surface.
0103	.....Reached surface.
0105	.....In chamber; 30 ft.
0236	.....Out. shifted wire from forward to aft.

Tender in chamber- FUEDLER, Roland, G.M.2c, USN.

NOTE: Purpose of dive of second attempt to bend cable on Rescue Chamber. Was hauled to the surface due to failure of lights and fouled lines.



WASH OF DIAF: 320 leaf.  
KVIN GIVALOR 3.5. Ready to

NAME Lieutenant MORRISON, USN

DATE 25 May, 1939.

DEPTH OF DIVE: 247 feet.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1341	Left surface.
1344	Reached bottom.
1355	Down-haul wire coming down.
1400	Wire fouled on Diver's line.
1409	Left bottom.
1411	Diver fouled.
1412	Ascent began.
1415	Reached 90 feet.
1417	Left 90 ft.
1417	Reached 80 ft.
1420	Left 80 ft.
1420	Reached 70 feet.
1425	Left 70 feet.
1425	Reached 60 feet.
1432	Left 60 feet.
1432	Reached 50 feet.
1442	Left 50 feet.
1443	Surfaced; in chamber.

45 min. oxygen at 40 feet.  
1558 ..... 10 min. to reach surface.

NOTE: Purpose of dive was to secure down-haul wire to SQUALUS.  
Shifted wire from forward to aft.

NAME Gunner BARON, USN.

DATE 25 May, 1939.

DEPTH OF DIVE: 247 ft.

-----

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1449 .....	Left surface.
	No report was received that diver reached bottom; Diver hauled up.
1455 .....	Started up.
1600 .....	Reached 80 ft.
1603 .....	Left 80 ft.
1603 .....	Reached 70 ft.
1605 .....	Left 70 ft.
1605 .....	Reached 60 ft.
1607 .....	Left 60 ft.
1607 .....	Reached 50 ft.
1610 .....	Left 50 ft.
1613 .....	Reached 40 ft.
1618 .....	Left 40 ft.
1619 .....	Surfaced - in chamber. 30 mins. oxygen at 40 feet.
1659 .....	10 minutes to reach surface.

Note: Purpose of dive was to secure down-haul wire to after hatch of SQUALUS. Failed in attempt to reach bottom and was hauled up.

NAME: BAYER, James E., B.N.lc, USN. DATE 25 May, 1939

DEPTH OF DIVE: 247 feet

-----

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1531.....	Left surface.
1534.....	Reached bottom.
1535.....	Cable going down.
1536.....	Diver received cable.
1537.....	Taking strain on cable.
1540.....	Take cable up and re-shackle.
1544.....	Wire cable sent down.
1546.....	Diver received cable.
1554.....	Diver found hatch.
1602.....	Cable made fast to hatch.
1603.....	Left bottom.
1606.....	Reached 90 feet.
1611.....	Left 90 feet.
1611.....	Reached 80 feet.
1616.....	Left 80 feet.
1616.....	Reached 70 feet.
1626.....	Left 70 feet.
1626.....	Reached 60 feet.
1641.....	Left 60 feet.
1641.....	Reached 50 feet.
1656.....	Left 50 feet.
1657.....	Surfaced & in Chamber. 60 minutes at 50 ft. with oxygen.
1815.....	18 minutes to reach surface.

NOTE: Purpose of dive was to secure down-haul wire to after hatch of SQUALUS.

(continued)

FIFTH DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER

OPERATORS: BADDERS, W., C.M.M., USN.  
 MIHALOWSKI, John, T.M.18.

DATE 25 May, 1939.

DEPTH: 239 ft. on gauge. 247 ft. to deck of Submarine.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1704.....	Rescue chamber in water.
1705.....	Taking in slack in wire.
1707.....	Blowing main ballast.
1709.....	Flooding lower compartment.
1715.....	Lower compt. flooded; starting down.
1719.....	Descent actually started.
1725.....	Reported at 60 feet.
1729.....	Reported at 100 feet.
1738.....	Reported at 195 feet.
1745.....	On the Submarine; 239 feet.
1746.....	Flooding main ballast.
1749.....	Recompression tables phoned down.
1753.....	Blowing lower compartment.
1756.....	Lower compartment blown; Equalize pressure in main chamber.
1803.....	Pressure equalized.
1805.....	Opening hatch. Lower hatch is open.
1816.....	Slack off down haul wire to open submarine hatch.
1819.....	Trying to open submarine hatch.
1820.....	Water flooding bell from submarine.
1821.....	Leave bolts on hatch.
1826.....	Lower hatch closed.
1828.....	Reached 100 ft.
1830.....	Left 100 ft.
1834.....	Reached 90 ft.
1837.....	Left 90 ft.
1830.....	Blowing main ballast.
1838.....	Reached 80 ft.
1839.....	Main ballast blown. Left 80 ft.
1840.....	Rescue Chamber coming to 100 ft. level.
1843.....	Reached 70 feet.
1850.....	Left 70 feet.
1851.....	Reached 60 feet.
1901.....	Left 60 feet.
1902.....	Reached 50 ft. Main ballast equalized.
1917.....	Left 50 feet.
1917.....	Reached 40 feet.

(continued)

FIFTH DESCENT OF RESCUE CHAMBER  
(Continued)

-----

<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1932.....	Left 40 feet.
1932.....	Reached 30 feet.
1933.....	Rescue Chamber at 30 feet.
1957.....	Left 30 feet.
1957.....	Reached 20 feet. (Rescue Chamber at 30 ft.)
2027.....	Left 20 ft.
2028.....	Reached 10 feet.
2056.....	Left 10 feet.
2059.....	Atmospheric pressure.
2101.....	Clutch disconnected - up on brake.
2102.....	Rescue Chamber on surface.
2103.....	Blowing lower compartment - hooked to boom - up on deck.
2107.....	Bell on deck - hatch open.

*B F  
Callaghan  
Navy*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
Confidential*

June 20, 1939

Memorandum For

The President

The ports of embarkation for evacuation of Americans from Europe have been listed by Commander Squadron 40-T in his Evacuation Plan. Among these ports are Lisbon, Casablanca in Africa, ports in the Swedish Peninsula, etc. The points finally decided upon would, of course, depend upon the situation existing at the time.

Arrangements have been made with the Maritime Commission for the diversion and despatch of vessels of the American Merchant Marine in the event they are needed for this purpose.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. Callaghan.

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. Commander Squadron 40-T (Rear Admiral Lackey) prepared an Evacuation Plan for European waters in January 1939 which shows the following estimate of the number of Americans which might require evacuation service from the countries indicated in the event of a war in Europe. This data was compiled from information obtained by the Admiral from the various Embassies and Legations throughout Europe.

Denmark	-	No est.	Germany	-	1100	Hungary	-	500
Norway	-	2400	Netherlands	-	No est.	Yugoslavia	-	962
Sweden	-	1000	Belgium )			Albania	-	222
Finland	-	200	Luxemburg)	=	715	Rumania	-	95
Estonia	-	15	France	-	1500	Bulgaria	-	32
Latvia	-	90	Portugal	-	2700	Greece	-	480
Lithuania	-	45	Switzerland	-	377	Egypt	-	450
Russia	-	No est.	Italy	-	4815	Turkey	-	145
Poland	-	10000	Czechoslovakia	-	750	Aegean Islands-		45

Grand Total - - - - - 28,638.

2. Naval ships now available in the Atlantic to ferry Americans to European ports for further embarkation on merchant vessels are:

<u>Immediately Available</u>	<u>Immediately Available</u>	<u>Under overhaul available</u>
<u>In Europe</u>	<u>In Atlantic</u>	<u>in 1 or 2 weeks</u>
1 light cruiser	4 battleships	<u>In Atlantic</u>
2 old destroyers	4 heavy cruisers	1 heavy cruiser
	1 light cruiser (until 5 July)	1 light "
<u>In Canal Zone</u>	1 " "	5 new destroyers
2 gunboats	19 old destroyers	1 aircraft carrier
2 old destroyers	3 new " (until 26 June)	
	3 " " fitting out	

Respectfully,

*William D. Leahy*  
William D. Leahy.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*BF  
Callaghan  
Navy*

June 28, 1939.

*2 W*

Memorandum for

The President

I am forwarding a digest of the situation with respect to the small boat program, as I thought you would be interested in knowing the present situation in this respect.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN. (2)



NOV 23 1939  
MIDWAY/ELDA  
LIVE SHIP/LE MOUSE

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND NO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

RBC:Kr

27 June 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Subject: Inspection of Construction Yards, Experimental Building Program,  
Small Craft.

1. On 13 June I left Washington with Captain Chantry and Lieutenant Howard of the Bureau of C.&R. to inspect the three plants building Motor Torpedo Boats for us and also the DeFoe Plant at Bay City, Michigan, which has a contract for one 170-ft. steel sub-chaser.

2. Lieutenant Howard has a dual role in that he is the Superintending Constructor of the M.T.B.-type, as well as the Type Desk officer in the Bureau; he has full authority to approve plans and he will spend about one week on the road and one week in the Bureau until the completion of the M.T.B. program.

3. Lieutenant Leahy, (C.C.), U.S. Navy, will perform the same function for the yards constructing sub chasers, and he also will divide his time between the Department and work in the field.

4. In addition to the traveling Superintending Constructors, there is at each yard a resident inspector to keep track of the work as it progresses.

5. The purpose of our trip was to acquaint the building yards with Navy methods, to make sure that they were properly organized to meet our specifications and to assist them in getting a prompt and efficient start on their contracts.

6. By good luck the yards are widely scattered as to locality; the Fogal Boat Yard in Miami is constructing two 59-ft. M.T.B.s; Higgins of New Orleans is building two 81-ft. M.T.B.s; Fisher of Detroit is building two 59-ft. M.T.B.s.

7. One 110-ft. wooden sub-chaser is being built at the American Car and Foundry plant at Wilmington, and Luders of Stamford, Conn.

8. DeFoe has a contract for one 170-ft. sub-chaser; the invitations to bid on the second 170-footer have not yet gone out due to the fact that

1774 J. DEBY

RBC:Kr

Memo. for -  
Captain Callaghan

Hull plans also been revamped somewhat, I am assured }  
by C & K and Eng. that plans now (28 June) complete, }  
and bids out the end of this week. (2/4)

the Bureau of Engineering has not yet completed its designs for the experimental steam plant to be used. There will be separate bids on this second 170-footer.

9. We found the various yards appreciative of the opportunity to build these boats and ready and willing to adopt every suggestion which would expedite the contract; there was a wide range in the amount of preparatory work that had been done. The Fogal Yard was well organized and had already laid down lines and made considerable progress; the Fisher Yard (Detroit) on the other hand had made virtually no progress and needed help; they wisely decided to employ Sparkman and Stephens for their drafting work and we are confident that they will turn out a good job. The Higgins Yard in New Orleans is capable of producing excellent work, but will require some pressure to prevent them from deviating from the Department's specifications. The DeFoe Yard has had a great deal of experience in building Coast Guard boats and is thoroughly familiar with government procedure and capable of turning out an excellent boat.

10. I have not yet inspected the A.C.F. or Luders' yard, but reports indicate that excellent results may be expected and both companies are staffed with experienced people.

11. There is one contract yet to be signed: that for the steam-driven 170-footer. None of the steam propulsion plant designs received in the Design Competition met the requirements of the Bureau of Engineering and that Bureau is now preparing designs for an experimental steam plant. As soon as the plans are completed, invitations to bid will be sent out.

12. We do not anticipate any trouble from the yards meeting their completion dates, as far as hull work is concerned; the governing factor will be engine deliveries, and in view of the fact that all of the engines for the M.T.B. program are experimental, I, personally, am not too optimistic about delivery dates being met. However, the Bureau of Engineering is alert to this possibility and is putting on pressure to obtain deliveries on time.

13. The first of the Motor Torpedo Boats should be ready for delivery about the first of the year and the big Sub-chaser will be delivered about this time next year.

14. There are two other boats in the M.T.B. program not mentioned heretofore. They are both of the 81-ft. class and are being constructed at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. One of the hulls is of aluminum and the engine plants for both boats are still highly confidential and the desire not to compromise these engine designs was a principal factor in the decision

Memo. for -  
Captain Callaghan


RBC:Kr

- 3 -

to build these boats at Philadelphia. The Philadelphia boats will not be completed until some time after the commercially-built boats, due to the time required to make engine deliveries.

15. The Experimental Building Program is now well launched and is being prosecuted with the utmost vigor by the Bureau. The special set-up for supervision of plants, inspection, etc., will insure the rapidest possible action on all matters in connection with construction and the closest attention is being paid to eliminating every possible cause of delay. Progress on these boats will be tabulated in the regular monthly Progress Reports, as in the case of larger ships in the program. The coordination and arrangements between this office and the Bureau which were set up in connection with the Design Competition are being continued in the administration of the Experimental Program.

16. Detailed technical memoranda have been prepared covering our visits to the construction yards and may be had on demand, but I believe that I have covered here the highlights of the situation as it exists now.

  
Robt. B. Farney

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1939.

*P.S.F.  
file  
Presidential  
Cabinet  
collection*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

You said you wanted  
to talk with the Secretary of  
State about this at Cabinet.

G.

APTS 42 CHITRAE  
121 The Department of  
100 1019 100 1019  
THE MEMORANDUM  
2012 14 1000  
MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE WHITE HOUSE


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum indicates the latest story on the question of Russian destroyers.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND NO.

RBC:Kr

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

7 July 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Subject: Negotiations with U.S.S.R. for construction of destroyers  
and leaders.

1. The President's directives as transmitted to Mr. Edison on Friday, 30 June, concerning features of proposed Russian ships, were incorporated in a letter to the State Department and delivered to Mr. Green of the State Department about 12:15 Saturday.
2. The Navy Department was today, July 7th, in receipt of a communication from the State Department to the effect that the Navy Department's position on A.C., torpedo tubes, machinery installations, etc., had been transmitted to Gibbs and Cox and the substance of the Navy Department's position had been communicated to Mr. Oumansky, Russian Ambassador, on 1 July.
3. Mr. Green of the State Department informed me by telephone today that there were no further developments and at this writing the Navy Department has received no further information as to the Russian reaction nor has any further comment yet been received from Gibbs and Cox. As the matter stands it appears that the next move should come from the Russians and/or Gibbs and Cox, the Navy Department having done everything possible to further negotiations up to this point.
4. Certain other inquiries from possible sub-contractors have been received and replies are being prepared in conformity with the basic principles enunciated to the State Department in our letter of 1 July.
5. A special point occurs to me: so far there has been no request from the Press concerning these negotiations and the Department's policy has been to treat the matter as confidential and not to volunteer any information concerning negotiations. However, more and more information appears to be leaking out to manufacturing concerns and I consider that it is only a question of time before the negotiations are brought to the attention of the Press. If the President or the Secretary of State have any policy in mind concerning publicity on this subject, I believe that it would be wise to acquaint the Navy Department with such policy for our guidance.

*Chase*  
Robt. B. Cassey.



PSF Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
personal  
Callaghan  
2*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 20, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

Knowing your interest in this particular matter, I am forwarding herewith a memorandum from Admiral Moreell addressed to the Acting Secretary of the Navy, and a further notation by Mr. Edison. From data that are available in the Bureau of Yards and Docks, I feel, with Admiral Moreell, that the subject firm does not have the requisite reliability and technical integrity to render it eligible for contemplated work on the air bases.

Respectfully,

*J. Callaghan*  
J. J. CALLAGHAN

IN REPLY ADDRESS  
THE BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS  
AND REFER TO NO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

19 July 1939

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-19-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for the Acting Secretary.

Subject: Consulting Architects - Report on Carneal,  
Johnston & Wright of Richmond, Virginia.

1. In compliance with your directions, I have reviewed the data relative to the qualifications of the subject firm and their eligibility for a commission as Consulting Architects on our work.

2. The available data consist of statements, including drawings and specifications, submitted by the firm, and information obtained by an officer of this Bureau who made a personal inspection of the firm's offices and personnel. This officer also consulted with some of the clients of the firm and with architects, engineers, and others who are in a position to know of the firm's work. He also inspected some of the buildings designed by this firm.

3. Careful consideration of all available data leads me to the conclusion that the work of this firm is not in conformity with the standards required by the Navy Department and that other architectural services which are in conformity with our standards are obtainable. Therefore, in my opinion it would not be in the best interests of the service to engage this firm for our work.

*B. Moreell*

B. Moreell.

July 17/39

Capt. Callaghan -

I understand the President is interested in this -  
After carefully looking into this situation and  
on the basis of evidence on hand I have  
ruled this firm out -

*Charles Dixon*

PS#  
Callaghan  
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

file  
album sent  
to the King

September 2, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT

I am forwarding to the White House today a second album containing enlargements of certain photographs taken during the recent visit of Their Britannic Majesties to Washington. This second album is identical to the first, and was prepared in accordance with the expressed wishes of the President.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN.

*Callaghan*  
↓

Conf Memo to Edgar Hoover from the President

October 5, 1939

In re-report from Captain Callaghan regarding a commission of "Captain" for Kindler--Marine Corps Reserve-Pres asks Hoover to check on Kindler.

See:Edgar Hoover -Justice folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF

October 10, 1939

Callaghan  
Navy

Memorandum for the President from Capt. Callaghan

Re: Crash of Ecuadoran Plane

State Dept instructed Ambassador Boaz Long to transmit  
condolences to the President of Ecuador on October 9-1939

See: State Dept folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF  
Callaghan

Navy

✓  
OCT 10/1939

Memo for the President-

1230

at 1100 today, Tuesday,  
Navy patrol planes joined  
Inquis and escort ships  
some 600 miles from  
New York.

file  
journal

Respy,  
D. Callaghan



1.

*file  
confidential*

BF  
Callaghan  
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

11 October, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Investigation of delay in despatch re: German ship  
HAVILAND.

1. I have investigated the delay incident to State Department despatch reporting departure of HAVILAND from Punta Arenas, Costa Rica.

Listed below is the story, with the remedial action taken noted after each fact:

(A) There is no agent at Punta Arenas specifically designated to watch the German ships in port there. The information on the HAVILAND despatch apparently was received by our minister to Costa Rica from the local steamship agent at Punta Arenas, on the morning of 9 October.

ACTION: State Department has directed a clerk from legation at San Jose to go immediately to Punta Arenas for purpose of keeping German ships under surveillance. He will endeavor to contact reliable confidential agent there for continuance of this duty.

(B) Cable in code from Costa Rican Minister was received in State Department at 1248, 9 October. It was decoded, paraphrased and sent to White House at 1553 on 9 October. (President did not see this message until about 2100, 9 October).

ACTION: State Department has sent despatch to all agents in Central and South American Republics emphasizing the vital necessity of this type of information, and directing that the information be forwarded immediately in plain English.

(C) ONI received similar information about HAVILAND at approximately 1100, 9 October, from MID, (through Military Attache, Costa Rica). Through lack of proper appreciation of value of this information on the part of subordinates in ONI, the data was not forwarded promptly to responsible action officials in Navy Department.

ACTION: Finally, everyone in ONI, (as well as in Navy Department), understands now the importance of messages of this character. In addition, instructions have been issued that this type of information will be given to me as soon as received, as well as to Admiral Stark, so that I can transmit it to the President.

*A. J. Callaghan*

Page #2 - MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Investigation of delay in despatch re: German ship HAVILAND.

2. In conference this morning in the State Department I was informed that State Department will organize a separate section to handle promptly all messages relating to movements of vessels and information on neutrality matters, and will insure that this information is transmitted to the President, to the Navy Department, and to other interested Government agencies.

Respectfully

*A. J. Callaghan*  
A. J. CALLAGHAN.

Originals of the attached returned  
to Capt.Callaghan's office on Nov  
25, 1939.

Copy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*PSF  
Callaghan  
Navy*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT

November 18, 1939.

The attached is a short resume of the political situation in the Far East, compiled by ONI from sources of which the President is aware.

It is requested that the attached memorandum be returned to me when the President has finished with it.

Respectfully,

D.J. Callaghan

Copy

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON

*Keelaghan*  
2

In reply refer to No.  
Op-16-B-11

November 17, 1939.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese Policy Toward American Nationals and Interests in China.

The Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet has forwarded the information that he has strong reasons to believe that the Japanese military forces in China are cooperating with the Japanese Foreign Office in a policy calculated to mollify American opinion toward Japanese activities in China by taking steps to prevent occurrence of incidents adversely affecting U.S. Nationals, and by effecting settlements of incidents regarding which American protests are still outstanding. The Commander in Chief is of the opinion, however, that despite the present conciliatory attitude of the Japanese toward Americans, there will be no modification of the Japanese plan to acquire progressively a monopoly of the principal business ventures in China, and to bring about the abolition or the strict regulation under Japanese auspices of all non-Japanese instruments of any political influence, including foreign garrisons and educational institutions.

Other information considered highly reliable indicates that various of the principal Japanese diplomatic and military authorities in China are unanimously advising their Government that the institution of the so-called "New Order" in China will require a marked reduction of the rights and privileges of the United States in China, notably:

- (a) The garrisoning of troops in China including the right to have Legation Guards must be abolished.
- (b) Churches, schools, hospitals and other cultural establishments to be strictly regulated, particularly with a view toward controlling the political import of their teachings and attitude.
- (c) Business interests to be left unhampered provided they have not assumed or do not assume any political significance. The monopolistic tendencies of the following U.S. interests are considered to smack of political significance. Therefore the operations of the following interests must, in the view of the Japanese authorities, undergo a marked revision:

1. Universal Tobacco Co.
2. British-American
3. U.S. Financial and economic interests in railroads and their equipment
4. Standard Oil Company
5. Texas Oil Company
6. China National Aviation Corporation
7. Importation of radio sets--particularly high frequency receiving sets--must be prohibited. This is considered of the utmost importance

The Japanese military and diplomatic authorities in China are insistent that the "New Order" in China be established regardless of the necessity for policing or seriously reducing U.S. rights and interests in China.

It would appear therefore that while personal relationships may be somewhat improved by the Japanese policy of preventing disagreeable incidents of a purely personal nature, this conciliatory attitude will not be extended toward American political and economic interests, which latter the Tokyo Government is being urged to suppress.

Signed--- W.S. Anderson

Copy By Hand to Mr. Hamilton, State Department

CONFIDENTIAL



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

11/30

*PSF*  
*Callaghan*  
*2*  
*File Navy*

Captain Callaghan 'phoned. He said:

"The destroyer REUBEN JAMES  
is aground on the north coast of Cuba  
in 5 ft. of water. She is badly  
holed but they think she is in condi-  
tion to be floated.

"U.S.S. RANGER, several  
destroyers and four tugs are proceeding  
to her assistance and they hope to  
refloat her today on high tide at  
10 o'clock."

*file personal*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*PSF  
Callaghan 2  
Navy*

December 6, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to our conversation on the train during the return trip from Warm Springs, anent orders for Admiral Byrd, I find in the President's letter of instructions to Admiral Byrd, dated November 25, 1939, the following:

"6. (h) Upon completion of your duties in the Antarctic during the spring of 1940 you will return to the United States, as your presence in this country at that time is essential for other duties in connection with the administration of the United States Antarctic Service."

It appears to me that the above paragraph is so specific as to admit of no delay in Admiral Byrd's return next spring, when he has established his two beach heads.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

BF

Capt Callaghan  
Navy

December 8, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT. CALLAGHAN

Attaches two letters containing information which may prove to be of interest to the President. One letter is from Allan Kirk-London and the other from Hayne Ellis-Naval Operating Base-Norfolk, Va.

See: Capt Callaghan memo of Dec 8, 1939-Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF

Capt Callaghan  
Navy

December 9, 1939.

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPT. CALLAGHAN

Attaches summary of the latest information on  
German magnetic mines.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF

Capt Callaghan  
2  
Navy

December 11, 1939.

Memorandum for the President from Capt. Callaghan

Attaches sheets containing compilations in tabular form of the graphic data presented in the attached books of graphs from Ambassador Kennedy.

Re-Merchant Marine Losses

BRITISH--ALLIED--NEUTRAL

These are compiled from official British Graphs and prepared by the ONI

See: Joe Kennedy folder-Drawer 1-1939

COPY

PSF

*Capt Callaghan  
Navy*

December 12, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FORSTER  
FROM D. J. CALLAGHAN

For the information of the President there is attached hereto a report showing progress on vessels under construction for the Navy, as of December 1, 1939.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939



147  
PSF  
Callaghan  
Navy

December 16, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Attaches tabulation of British Naval losses to Dec 15, 1939

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

*Callaghan*  
*2*

December 8, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Attaches tabulation of British naval losses to Nov. 29, 1939.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

PSF

Callaghan  
Navy

December 20, 1939.

Memorandum for the President from Capt. Callaghan

Re-characteristics of Arauca (German ship)

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939

fill  
personal

UNITED STATES SHIP POTOMAC

PSF  
Callaghan<sup>N</sup>

Navy Yard,  
26 Dec. 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

As I sit and read about  
the methods pursued by our  
Navy in "tackling" California,  
I flick ashes from my  
inevitable cigarette into  
an ash-tray inscribed-  
"F.D.R. TO D.J.C."

Mr. President, I have  
no words with which to  
thank you for remembering  
me so generously at  
Christmastide; your kind  
thought of me, translated

into two such appropriate  
and appreciated gifts, has  
made me extremely proud  
and happy.

Ever, your loyal aide  
Dan Callaghan

Y

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PSF  
Callaghan  
Navy

Memo for President:—  
(Re your memo concerning  
pants-less sailormen)

Inquiry by the Navy Dept.  
Research Division indicates  
that the newspaper article  
is a dastardly canard.

Naval custom invariably  
operates in the reverse direction—  
and no sailor was ever  
departs without grimly  
hanging on to his pants.

Respy  
J. Callaghan

PSF

Capt Callaghan  
2  
Navy

FOR-----CONF DAILY NEWS SHEETS

PREPARED BY THE NAVY DEPT FOR SEC EDISON

Which the President requested a copy of each day through  
Capt Callaghan.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939



Copy

BSF

*Callaghan  
Navy*

January 4, 1940.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is the study made by General Board on super-battleship-- which I mentioned several days ago.

Admiral Stark is opposed to this ship because of the disadvantages outlined in paragraph 7 (Page 5) of the attached report.

If asked in Congressional hearings, Admiral Stark will not defend the acquisition of such a proposed ship.

Respectfully request that the President return attached to me when the President no longer desires to retain.

Respectfully,

G.B. No. 420-6  
Serial No. 1911

D. J. Callaghan

Enc-Secret Report from Chairman General Board--Dec 27, 1939  
To Sec of the Navy  
Subject-Battleship Design--Ship X  
Reference: (a) Secret letter of the SecNav of Nov 20, 1939

See: Navy folder-General Board Corres-Drawer 1-1939

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *[Signature]*

*P5F Navy Callaghan*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

In regard to the proposed interior route for moving planes, etc., to South America, I make this comment: While the route is good, it ought not to replace the upper route via the Bahamas, for the reason that it involves the use of fields in Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Such use is not absolutely sure in case of such a movement.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 2, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE PRESIDENT

I feel sure the accompanying chart will be most interesting to the President.

I knew during the cruise that negotiations were underway with PAA, but was not aware of their extent.

Route (a) and Route (b) (as far as St. Croix) appear to fill the bill acceptably. If no Bahama landing field be eventually found, short range land planes can use Route (b). Looking at the chart, it might be better for this type of plane to use the interior (via Guantanamo, etc.) line anyway, in preference to one via Bahamas where sudden hostile action might have a more favorable chance of damaging the more eastern fields.

Respectfully,

  
L. J. CALLAGHAN

**DECLASSIFIED**

**DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)**

CONFIDENTIAL

Date- *4-8-70*  
Memorandum

Signature- *JHR*

31 December 1940

Subject: Air routes and facilities between the United States and South America.

1. The attached chart has been marked to show the air routes and facilities available for moving aircraft between the United States and South America.

2. Under the contract with Pan American Airports Corporation, there are being developed two landplane routes:

(a) Via Brownsville, Tampico, Vera Cruz, Tapachula, Guatemala City, Managua, David, Panama, Barranquilla, Maracaibo, La Guaira, Carapito and Georgetown.

(b) Via Miami, Camaguey, Guantanamo, Port au Prince, Ciudad Trujillo, Borinquen, San Juan, St. Croix, Martinique and Port of Spain. (This route will not be available for fighters and other short range landplanes until Martinique or some other field between St. Croix and Trinidad can be developed.)

3. As may be seen from the attached chart, a landplane field in the Bahamas is not necessary for the purpose of moving landplanes between the United States and South America.

*but we are working on it just the same --- now investigating Turk's Id - and will shortly Cal.*


*Survey on ~~at~~ Magaguana not yet reported -*

Op-12A-4-drc

*JHR*

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.







Washington, D.C. published May, 1928, at the Hydrographic Office,  
under the authority of the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.



THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.







PSF

Callaghan - Fading  
41 JP

Navy

Office of Naval Intelligence  
January 4, 1941.

ANNUAL BUILDING RATE (BRITISH MERCHANT SHIPS)

NO. AND TONNAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION

1. Annual building rate (1600 tons and over).

(a) 1,165,000 tons including 290,000 tons of tankers.  
(ALUSNA LONDON 651212).

(b) 1,250,000 including 290,000 tons of tankers.  
(Lord Lothian report).

2. Estimated deliveries from 10/1/40 to 9/30/41.

1,245,000 tons excluding sundry small vessels but including 290,000 tons of tankers.  
(Lord Lothian report).

3. Ships under construction - 8/10/40.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
179	1,003,000

(ALUSNA MADRID REPORT of 9/5/40).

4. Actual amount of new tonnage.

Completed first year of war 760,000 tons.  
(Lord Lothian report).

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 8200.9 (9/27/98)

Date - 8-5-66

Signature - *Carl L. Spicer*

*Done - compiled for President  
at his request  
JRS*

Secret

COPY

*Original with Chart "Escort Destroyer" and  
Characteristics, Jan. 24/41 sent to Capt Callaghan*

*Callaghan  
Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE

*1/27/41  
D.J.C.*

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Some time ago the President asked for studies of small destroyers (900 tons and 1100 tons displacement) for use as escort ships. In August, plans for three ships of this type were forwarded to the President and I believe the President still has these plans on hand.

In a short conversation with the President relative to these plans I pointed out the low speed, the comparatively small cruising radius, the ineffectual armament, and withal the excessive cost, which ran to some five million dollars in the case of an 800 ton destroyers and in the neighborhood of 7 million dollars for 1100 tons.

Since that time the General Board and Bureau of Ships have made further studies in connection with possible reduction of cost but find that practically no reduction can be made in the original estimates of cost. Also, these small DD's were conned over in connection with the British experience on the HUNT type of escort DD. The inevitable conclusion has been reached by all hands here in the Navy Department that for the money we are not getting enough out of those small DDs. All things point to taking the present plans for the 1620 ton DDs and modifying them somewhat to increase the effective armament by the addition of two 40 mm Bofors machine guns (heavy) and four 20 mm Oerlikon light machine guns, which gives a respectable anti-aircraft and surface battery. Moreover, DDs on these plans can be built in a hurry because the plans are already out and they are in production. The estimate is 16-18 months for an escort DD of this type, as against 30 months for the 1175 tonner and for the 875 tonner whose plans would have to be drawn up on an entirely new basis. In the case of the 1620 tonner, one of the two quintuple tubes can be removed and additional AA machine guns installed to replace them. This would increase the AA battery aboard and strikes me as being a good thing to do.

The tonnage in connection with these 4 small DDs has been saved out of the total allowed tonnage for destroyers, so the problem now boils down whether or not to proceed with the four 1620 tonners or prepare further designs for smaller DD escort types which do not appear to be effective.

I recommend that the President consider approving the four 1620 modified type shown on the attached table of characteristics, with the additional proviso that one of the quintuple tubes be replaced by anti-aircraft machine guns.

Respectfully,

(Signed) D. J. CALLAGHAN

President's notation:

"D.J.C.

O.K.

F.D.R."

*B.F. Callaghan*  
*Navy*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The following information, considered reliable, pertaining to British convoy operations has been furnished me by ONI:

"During the week of December 8th to 14th, convoys totalling 904,000 tons came into Britain.

"During the preceding week, 571,000 tons came in.

"The average for the ten weeks previous to the 8th is 820,000 tons per week.

"On December 25th the 10,000-ton British cruiser BERWICK, on convoy duty in the Atlantic engaged a German cruiser armed with 8-inch guns 700 miles west of Finisterre, Spain. The German vessel suffered one hit abaft the funnel and possibly other hits and was driven off. The British cruiser had five casualties and suffered some damage.

"On December 24th a convoy arrived from Halifax. Only two of the 21 ships were lost. On the same day 19 vessels in convoy arrived in Britain from Gibraltar with no losses. Certain new precautions are being taken for the protection of convoys in the Atlantic."

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

*RSF Navy; Callaghan folder*

COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I introduced to Captain James of ONI the Messrs. Fahnestock, about whom General Watson had given me instructions concerning their use in the East Indies for "look-see" purposes.

Three alternatives, as listed in the attached secret memorandum from Captain James, propose themselves as methods of getting these young gentlemen to the subject area. Of the three, the last appears to most logical and simplest procedure. Under this suggested arrangement they can go to the area ostensibly to make records of native folk lore music for the American Museum of Music in capacity of private citizens. They can also charter, as necessary, small sailing craft to visit the various and sundry islands and other places of importance, or can make inter-port visits by local steamers and other small craft.

If the President approves, I shall ask ONI to go ahead with the third alternative plan commented on above.

Respectfully,

(Signed) D. J. CALLAGHAN

D. J. CALLAGHAN

President's notation:  
"O.K."  
"PDR".

The original of this memorandum and Secret memo for Capt. Callaghan, 1/28/41 from Capt. Jules James, the third alternative plan being that "We can simply finance their expedition, allowing them to obtain their own passports and make the trip as private American citizens. With this procedure they would have the full protection afforded all American citizens", returned to Capt. Callaghan 1/30/41.

Callaghan folder

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1941.

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Bermuda Base -  
Site for.

I have the following information regarding Bermuda Base site, which may be of interest to the President:

- (a) Since receipt of surveys, borings and layouts of sites on Morgan and Tuckers Islands, it is found that the space will prove inadequate for the approved development for base for seaplane operations.
- (b) It is proposed to exchange the islands between Coopers Island and Castle Point (including 40 acres on St. George Island) for some 113 acres on mainland opposite Tuckers Island to be used for ammunition storage, housing some personnel, construction camp, etc. The islands proposed for relinquishment contain certain historic buildings which Bermuda wishes preserved, and therefore the suggested trade may prove attractive.
- (c) The Base Lease Commission is now taking up the proposed exchange.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

~~SECRET~~

PSF

Callaghan Files  
Navy

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-11 Hu

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

21 February 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

file ↗  
Last night Admiral Stark told me to give you a brief of the following messages which he would like to have you show to the President:

On 17 February the British sent us a despatch in which they stated that the repairing of the ILLUSTRIOUS in an American shipyard was considered important by the Admiralty.

We asked the British if the ILLUSTRIOUS could be repaired in Australia or in Singapore.

The British replied that due to the lack of facilities the repairs to the ILLUSTRIOUS in Australia were impossible. They also stated that the work could be done in Singapore provided all the materials were sent from Great Britain and it would require fabrication of all of the materials. They also added that due to the present political situation in the Far East and the lack of necessary materials that it was highly inadvisable to send damaged ships from Alexandria to Singapore for repairs. There is a 10,000-ton light cruiser also at Alexandria which is in need of repairs from battle damage.

In my own opinion this interchange of telegrams shows that Singapore is not considered as a suitable place by the British for the repair and upkeep of aircraft carriers or large cruisers and shows the difficulty that we might have if we sent aircraft carriers or large cruisers to base on Singapore. There would be no place nearer than Pearl Harbor where such vessels could be repaired if they received any serious damage.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

*R. E. Ingersoll*  
R. E. Ingersoll.

Date- 7-27-59

Signature- *Carl J. Spicer*



Callaghan folder  
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~██████████~~ ← File

February 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The new Chief of Bureau of Ordnance  
has given me the attached memorandum in  
answer to the President's queries.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

WASHINGTON  
THE ARMY STORE

FIG. 6

IN REPLY ADDRESS  
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT  
AND REFER TO NO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

FEB 21 1941

EE1/AB-3(61)  
(K13)

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.  
To: Captain D. J. Callaghan, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President,  
Room 2049, Navy Department.

1. In reply to your memorandum of 19 February 1941, regarding information for the President on AA bursts at low and at high altitudes, the following brief statements can be made:

- (a) At 35,000 ft. the air density is about one-third what it is at sea level. "Concussive effect" at a distance from explosions is greater when the explosive is underwater than when it is in the air; and the concussive effect would be less in the less dense air at high altitudes. (Note: Damage against airplanes from blast effects is of no practical importance, because the average effective radius of fragment damage always greatly exceeds the average effective radius of blast damage against airplanes.)
- (b) In the less dense air at high altitudes fragmentation would be insignificantly affected. The effective range of damaging fragments would be three times as great in air of only one-third standard density. In brief, equally well-placed AA bursts are considerably more effective at extremely high altitudes.
- (c) The 5"/38 caliber gun has a ceiling in excess of 35,000 ft.
- (d) The increased effective ranges (from the burst) of fragments from AA projectiles at extremely high altitudes has been mentioned in foreign technical literature. (C. Rougeron, "L'Aviation d'Bombardement", page 57, Volume I.)

CW

*W. H. P. Blandy*  
W. H. P. BLANDY.

Callaghan files  
File  
personal  
confidential

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the President's memorandum concerning work at the Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, I have consulted Admiral Towers on the matter and I am forwarding his comments herewith.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

In reply address not the signer of  
this letter but Bureau of Aeronautics,  
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

Refer to No.

Aer-M-AQ  
NP11

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS  
WASHINGTON

FEB 26 1941

MEMORANDUM

From: The Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.  
To: Captain D. J. Callaghan, U.S.N.  
SUBJECT: Manufacture of Airplanes and Engines at the Naval  
Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, Pa.

1. Performance of the Naval Aircraft Factory in the manufacture of its current order of training planes has been highly satisfactory. Scheduling of this order was determined from the ability of vendors to supply materials, accessories and special equipment. These considerations fixed the scope of employment. The schedule proved to have been wisely determined since it has only been possible to meet it by continuous and vigorous efforts to obtain materials.

2. The Bureau has authorized the Naval Aircraft Factory to manufacture 300 observation-scout airplanes of OS2N model, together with spare parts. Scheduling of this order will again be arranged on the basis of availability of supplies from vendors. The maximum rate now envisaged contemplates some expansion of employment and utilization of space for manufacture.

3. When the need can be determined, the Bureau proposes to authorize manufacture at the Aircraft Factory of a considerable quantity of patrol-bombers that will quite fully occupy the manufacturing facilities of the Factory subject only to the requirement that the schedule must not exceed the availability of vendors' materials.

4. The engine manufacturing plant at the Naval Aircraft Factory probably can be kept engaged in manufacture at close to capacity, either of the R-760 type engine or of the R-970 type.

5. A greater rate of manufacture than could be supported by the balanced supply of materials would result in augmented absorption of certain materials and of labor at a time when both are in great demand without, in fact, delivering anymore airplanes than are now being delivered. Airplanes would accumulate lacking completion in one or more respects. Ultimately, it would become necessary to contract employment and efficiency would decline due to the shifting of employees from one factory to another.

Tanner

NAVAL AIRCRAFT FACTORY PHILADELPHIA

---

It is now running out of work; facing a possible lay-off.

Has met every delivery date in production and it is one of the two American plants which has met schedule delivery of planes.

It can handle twice the amount of work ever assigned it.

While factory is now working three shifts - with 4500 employees - it has facilities for 2500 additional men without additional space or buildings.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:  
TO: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: [illegible]  
SUBJECT: [illegible]

249  
Official

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

Transmitting to Capt. Daniel J. Callaghan, <sup>x50-78</sup>  
memorandum in re Naval Aircraft Factory at Philadelphia which is  
running out of work and facing a possible lay-off, attached to  
which is President's penciled note: "Dan - Getting short of  
work? FDR". <sup>x18-78</sup>

2/24/41  
hm

x526  
x18

*Callaghan folder  
1-41  
File  
personal*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

For the President's information, there is forwarded herewith a brief resume of Admiral Marquart's record of naval service.

The President's query of me, several days ago, indicated that the President was not particularly familiar with Admiral Marquart's record, and I thought that the attached information would be of interest.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN



Service Record of Rear Admiral Edward John Marquart, U. S. Navy.

Rear Admiral Marquart was born in Indiana on March 11, 1880; entered the Naval Academy September 1898 and graduated therefrom May, 1902. He is now 61 years old.

As a junior officer and until promotion to the grade of commander in July, 1919, he served in various classes of vessels including submarines, with a majority of duty in connection with Engineering and Ordnance. During World War I, he was assigned at the Gun Factory, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., as Assistant Inspector and in Charge of Planning and Estimating; his record in this duty includes several expressions of commendation and appreciation from higher naval authority for work well done.

In the grade of captain, he was assigned as follows: Completed the senior course, Naval War College; commanded Submarine Divisions, Asiatic Fleet; Material Division, Office of Naval Operations; Technical Aide to the Secretary of the Navy and Director of Naval Research Laboratory; commanded LOUISVILLE; Director, Material Division, Office of Naval Operations; Commandant, 16th Naval District. His record of reports of fitness in these duties are uniformly outstanding.

In his current grade of rear admiral, since January 1936, he has been assigned as: Commandant, 16th Naval District; Commander, Yangtze Patrol during 1937 and 1938; a member of a board to investigate and report on the need for the establishment of additional naval bases; member, Naval Examining Board, Navy Department; Commander, Minecraft, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet, where he is now assigned.

He received a special letter of commendation from the Navy Department for his services during World War I and a letter of commendation from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet (Admiral Yarnell), for his performance of duty as Commander, Yangtze Patrol, during the Sino-Japanese hostilities. His campaign medals and badges include (1) Spanish Campaign Medal, (2) Philippine Campaign, (3) Cuban Pacification, (4) Mexican Service Medal, (5) Victory Medal with silver star.

*C. W. Thumby*

PSF Navy : Callaghan folder

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Handwritten signature*

For the President

Returned

ER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from Captain Shafroth, which has the concurrence of Admiral Nimitz, contains a resumé of the Nolan case.

I gave Mrs. Roosevelt a somewhat similar memorandum a few weeks ago, in response to a letter written to Mrs. Roosevelt by Mrs. Nolan.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

*done  
3-5*

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. ROOSEVELT

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

*I wrote letter for to Mrs. Galt  
quite last page to  
Mr. Nelson - report from  
Army - Army -*

In reply address not the signer of this letter, but Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Refer to No. Nav 1616 JO  
62988

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2 - 27 - 59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

February 25, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Mr. John C. Nolan - Separation from Naval Service.

1. Mr. John C. Nolan has been a member of the Naval Reserve for 11 years, (December 12, 1929). He had taken much interest in the Navy with cruises and training duty as follows:

ONI - 1931	U.S.S. SARATOGA	- 1934
VN-5RD4, Cape May - 1932	U.S.S. PHOENIX	- 1938
VN-5RD4, Philadelphia-1933	ONI	- 1939

2. On October 20, 1939, he was ordered to active duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

3. His wife is an attractive young woman who was born in Germany and whose family still resides there. During the period he was on duty in Washington, he and his wife were intimate with personnel of the German Embassy. While attached to the Office of Naval Operations, he made use of the diplomatic pouch for the transmission of personal letters to his wife's family in Germany. Subsequent to his detachment from active duty on July 3, 1940, he continued to make such use of the diplomatic pouch until stopped by the authorities in O.N.I. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Walter Anderson, made definite and positive recommendations to the effect that Mr. Nolan's connection with the naval service be severed. Mr. Nolan was informed in the premises and given an opportunity to be heard in person.

4. This hearing took place in the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and present thereat were Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Walter Anderson, Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain J. F. Shafroth, Director of Naval Reserve, and Captain Jules James, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence.

5. Mr. Nolan plead that his discharge from the Reserve would be a bar to his securing employment; that he was completely loyal to this country, and that he should not be penalized on account of the fact that his wife happened to be born and had parents living in Germany.

Nav 1616 JO  
62988

February 25, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. Admiral Nimitz explained that the Bureau had no desire to penalize Mr. Nolan but that he must realize that under present conditions, with his German connections, he could not be retained in the Naval Reserve, but that his resignation, if accepted, would be under entirely honorable conditions. Mr. Nolan subsequently tendered his resignation.

7. The connection and friendships which Mr. Nolan has established with personnel of the German Embassy in this country; the fact that he had made use of the diplomatic pouch after his detachment from O.N.I. to communicate with his wife's people in Germany, and the further fact that the presence of his wife's family in Germany might subject him to great pressure from German officials, made it desirable to demand and accept Mr. Nolan's resignation.

Attachments.

*John F. Shafer*

OK

CWN

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR  
CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

To look into and speak  
to me about.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

2627 Adams Mill Road  
N.W. Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

When you issued your Emergency Call on 8 September 1939 I volunteered my services as a member of the Naval Reserve. I was ordered to direct a training program, with the full knowledge of the Navy Department that I had a German-born, naturalized American wife.

After eight months I was removed from active duty for the vague reason that other officers should be given an opportunity for training. Subsequent inquiries revealed the actual cause was a recommendation by Admiral Walter S. Anderson to the effect that "because of his German born wife and their intimacy with the German Embassy," I was no longer desired for Navy duty.

This latter reason is fantastic. We have never been intimate with any embassy, accepted no invitations except those extended and accepted by other officers at the same time, and never without the full knowledge of my superior officers.

I then requested a transfer from I-V(S) to class D-V(S). Commandant, Fourth Naval District recommended my transfer and promotion to the rank of Lieut. Comdr. Admiral Anderson however refused to release me and followed with a recommendation for my separation from the Naval Reserve, after my eleven years of regular duty and intense interest. I was given ten days to resign or be honorably discharged. I resigned on 1 November 1940.

Originally I had given up an excellent position to offer my services during the Emergency, having been Executive Ass't. to the Attorney General of Pennsylvania (Hon. Guy K. Bard, whom you subsequently appointed a Federal Judge).

Today I am without commission or job and with small prospect of securing one, in view of the unfortunate experience - which originated through my volunteering for service at a time when unity and patriotism should be acknowledged, instead of punished.

Surely, with all your grave problems and the pressing demands, you can find time to permit justice to prevail in my case. The Navy Department has been most considerate, but precedence of rank prevents a reversal of Admiral Anderson's wishes. May I ask you with all sincerity and honesty, for an impartial consideration and a final authoritative decision ?

Respectfully submitted,

*John Coppinger Nolan*  
John Coppinger Nolan.

16 February 1941

The President,  
The White House.



*Callaghan*  
*1-41*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you speak to me  
about this tomorrow?

F. D. R.

Memorandum from Admiral  
Nimitz to Captain Callaghan  
re Admiral Taussig's request  
to be retained on active duty  
in his present assignment as  
Commandant of the Fifth Naval  
District and Naval Operating  
Base, Hampton Roads, after his  
retirement on September 1st.

*PSF Navy: Callaghan, folder  
1-41*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1941.

*file →*  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with the President's instructions, I have written a letter to Dr. Nelson, copy attached.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 13, 1941.

Dear Dr. Nelson:

The President has considered your memorandum written over date of February 17th, and has asked me to reply for him.

The President is intensely interested in the area mentioned in your memorandum, is fully aware of your study of the region - and remembers, of course, with regret, that your projected expedition had to be postponed because of the international situation.

I have been asked to convey to you that the President appreciates your reminder of our interest in that area, and the necessity of obtaining all possible information, hydrographic and geographic. To this end we have sought and are obtaining from certain friendly sources, information which is vital to our store of knowledge of particular regions in the area.

In the present state of international relations, the President feels that, for many reasons, it would be unwise to disclose our particular interest in certain regions in the South Seas, by sending an expedition or a Presidential envoy for study in the area. It is certain that the presence of such an expedition or envoy would become known shortly, and, possibly, would have a deleterious effect on projected plans.

The President has asked me to express his regret that, for the reasons given above, he feels that he cannot give favorable consideration to your suggestion at the present time.

With my own personal good wishes, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

D. J. CALLAGHAN,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Dr. Wilbur A. Nelson,  
Corcoran Professor of Geology,  
University of Virginia,  
Charlottesville, Virginia.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

Will you break this  
news to Professor Nelson in  
your best manner?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In re the proposal made by Dr. Nelson, the Navy Department feels as follows:


(a) There is on hand a considerable amount of confidential information on the islands in question, contained in Pacific Airpilot, in confidential monographs, and in sailing directions.

(b) War Plans is in the process of obtaining additional needed information from Australia and New Zealand.

(c) That sending an expedition to these islands now, would inevitably become known to ORANGE, would disclose our hand, and destroy the element of future surprise, in any contemplated use.

While it is true that one can never have enough hydrographic and other pertinent information on hand, re particular areas, it is felt that the thought contained in paragraph (c) above is of paramount importance, as indicating the undesirability of undertaking such an expedition at the present time.

Respectfully,

  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

It is suggested that a study be made of the little known island region of the South Pacific between Hawaii and New Zealand, much of which region is under mandate to New Zealand and Great Britain, to acquire comprehensive data on this region which will be of immediate benefit to the United States and to New Zealand in the present emergency.

A number of these islands, which were first discovered and claimed for the United States by the captains of American clipper ships, are now uninhabited or have only a small remnant of their former population.

As the leader of the temporarily postponed National Geographic Society - University of Virginia Pacific Islands Scientific Expedition, with the cooperation of the United States Coast Guard, and as one who has been studying this area rather intensively in preparation for this important Expedition, the necessity for such an immediate study by a special Presidential envoy is considered to be of utmost importance in this time of emergency.

*Wilbur A. Nelson.*

Wilbur A. Nelson,  
Cordoran Professor of Geology,  
University of Virginia,  
Charlottesville, Virginia.

February 17, 1941.

155  
May  
Callaghan

**LOG**  
**OF THE**  
**PRESIDENT'S INSPECTION CRUISE**  
**THROUGH THE WEST INDIES**  
**ON BOARD THE U. S. S. TUSCALOOSA**  
**3-14 DECEMBER**  
**1940**



THE PRESIDENTIAL DETACHMENT

U. S. S. TUSCALOOSA, Presidential Flagship,  
Captain L. P. Johnson, U.S.N., Commanding.

U. S. S. MAYRANT, Escort Vessel,  
Commander H. D. Clarke, U.S.N., (Comdesdiv-16),  
Lt. Comdr. E. A. Taylor, U.S.N., Commanding.

U. S. S. TRIPPE, Escort Vessel,  
Lt. Comdr. R. L. Campbell, Jr., U.S.N., Commanding.

THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY

T h e P r e s i d e n t

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Guest of the President

Personal Staff

Major General Edwin M. Watson, U.S. Army,  
Secretary to the President; Military Aide  
Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire, (MC), U.S.N.,  
The President's Physician  
Captain Daniel J. Callaghan, U.S.N., Naval Aide

Staff

Lieutenant W. R. Loud, U.S.N. (Communications)  
Chief Pharmacist George A. Fox, U.S.N.

Chief Boatswain's Mate W. A. Bartos, U.S.N.  
Chief Yeoman F. J. Terry, U.S.N.

Secret Service

Embarked in U.S.S. TUSCALOOSA

Mr. Thomas J. Qualters  
Mr. Dale B. Whiteside  
Mr. James M. Beary  
Mr. James J. Rowley  
Mr. Howard S. Anderson

Embarked in U.S.S. TRIPPE

Mr. J. Frank Blackistone  
Mr. Vernon D. Spicer

---

Embarked in U.S.S. MAYRANT

Mr. Thomas F. Reynolds - - - United Press Associations  
Mr. Douglas B. Cornell - - - The Associated Press  
Mr. George E. Durno - - - International News Service

---

Mr. Leo A. deWaard, Post Office Inspector



I T I N E R A R Y

<u>Arrived</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Departed</u>	<u>Miles</u>
. . . . .	Washington, D. C.	2 December	. . .
3 December	Miami, Florida	3 December	1120
4 December	Quantanamo Bay, Cuba	4 December	589
5 December	Kingston, Jamaica	5 December	187
5 December	Portland Bight, Jamaica	5 December	36
6 December	Beata Island	6 December	316
7 December	Aves Island	7 December	465
8 December	Fort Castries, St. Lucia	8 December	185
8 December	Gros Islet Bay, St. Lucia	8 December	4
8 December	Fort De France, Martinique	8 December	35
9 December	St. John Harbor, Antigua	9 December	166
10 December	Navidad Bank	10 December	475
11 December	West Caicos Island	11 December	240
11 December	Mayaguana Island	12 December	55
12 December	Long Island	12 December	110
13 December	Eleuthera Island	13 December	137
14 December	Charleston, S. C.	14 December	545
15 December	Warm Springs, Ga.	15 December	365
16 December	Washington, D. C.	. . . . .	<u>722</u>
		TOTAL	5752

NARRATIVE

Monday    2 December

During the latter part of November the President had come to the conclusion that he had best inspect at first hand the tentative sites of a number of the naval bases which the United States had gained permission to construct in British territory, under long term lease, in exchange for the fifty destroyers transferred to Great Britain. The President had cruised to Newfoundland in August of 1939, and having neither the time nor the inclination to go as far south as British Guiana, he decided to visit only the base sites located in the British West Indies, omitting Trinidad, the President being quite familiar with the features of that place, having been there previously. No publicity had been given to the details of the President's projected cruise, other than he would depart Washington by train today and later embark in a naval vessel at a "southern port," to be gone for an indefinite period. Captain Dan Callaghan, the President's Naval Aide, had quietly arranged to have the heavy cruiser TUSCALOOSA withdrawn from regular service and made ready to cruise the President. Two escort vessels, the destroyers MAYRANT and TRIPPE, had been given similar orders and word had been received that the three vessels were in all respects ready and were standing by at Miami.

The President and members of his party, consisting of Pa Watson, Harry Hopkins, Ross McIntire, Dan Callaghan, Chief Pharmacist Fox, Chief Yeoman Terry, and the ever present Secret Service men, entrained

at the Union Station just before noon, and a few minutes later were rolling out of Washington enroute to Miami. The usual crowd of newspaper correspondents, broadcasting representatives, photographers and newsreelmen were passengers on board the President's train as it pulled out of Washington and on our way southward during the rest of this day speculation was rife as to where the President was going, what he was planning to see, who would accompany him, when he would be back, etc., etc.

Tuesday   3 December

We had run according to schedule during the night and consequently it appeared that we would arrive in Miami at one o'clock this afternoon, as planned. Pa Watson had informed the gentlemen of the press that the President would hold a short press conference in his car at noon, and some hope ran through the train that the President might at this time give some indication as to what his plans were for the next few days. These hopes proved to be false though, for after the usual salutations had been exchanged, the President, in answer to a direct question as to where he was going, told the press he wished he knew. In a lighter vein he went on to say that while he had deceived them by mentioning some phoney islands at the start of the previous cruise, he wouldn't do it again. The President then admitted that we were going to Christmas Island to buy Christmas cards then on to Easter Island to buy Easter eggs. After the President had made it known that it was possible to take only the "Three Musketeers" (Messrs. Reynolds, Durno and Cornell) aboard ship, he was

then implored to designate a point along his planned route to which the press might travel by plane with the probability of seeing the President again during the course of his trip. This hot potato was tossed back with the usual skill when the President told them how in the summer of 1919 he had unintentionally been responsible for keeping Herbert Bayard Swope sitting on the end of a dock in Lisbon for two weeks waiting for the NC boats to complete a flight which had been carefully planned as the first continuous regular flight of planes across the ocean, and which the President, then being the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had hoped and felt would not consume more than three days. The President replied in the affirmative when the press asked if "Fala," his newly acquired Scottie, was going to sea with his master, stating that the little dog was a very good sailor, the chief trouble being to keep the crew from feeding him. The conference ended in a round of laughter when a newspaperman asked if the President didn't have the same trouble with Pa Watson.

The deductions drawn by the local population from the heretofore unexplained presence of the TUSCALOOSA at Miami proved to be logical ones when the President's train entered the city at one o'clock. It was a beautiful afternoon, flooded with Florida sunshine, and the schools had excused their pupils early to afford them an opportunity to see the President. Large crowds of men, women and children lined the route which the President's automobile took from the train to where the TUSCALOOSA was moored at Municipal Pier No. 3, and the applause was heavy and continuous from the time the President would first come into view until he had passed well out of sight. It



was one of the largest and most spirited demonstrations on the occasion of a little publicized appearance that the President had witnessed for some time. At about 1:30 the automobiles carrying the President and his party drew abreast of the TUSCALOOSA, and after acknowledging the cheers of the huge crowd gathered in the vicinity of the TUSCALOOSA, the Presidential party went on board, the President being received with full honors upon his arrival on board. As he reached the deck, the President's flag was hoisted at the maintruck, and at 1404 TUSCALOOSA was underway and standing out of the harbor, preceded by MAYRANT and followed by TRIPPE. The only press representatives who were to accompany us on the cruise were the Three Musketeers aforementioned, and they had embarked in the MAYRANT upon detraining at Miami.

While proceeding out of the main ship channel of beautiful Biscayne Bay, with the skyline of Miami as a background, TUSCALOOSA fired a 21-gun salute to the President at 1414, and at 1500, after clearing the harbor, MAYRANT and TRIPPE took anti-submarine position B-1 on starboard and port bows, respectively. Increased speed to 27.5 knots and a course was laid for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, via Santaren and Old Bahama Channel and Cape Maysi. All hands of the President's party spent the rest of the afternoon and the early evening shaking down aboard the TUSCALOOSA as all good sailors do at the start of a cruise. (Ed. Note: Pa Watson will probably be mighty pleased should he ever read the preceding sentence.)





**Captain Johnson greeting the President at Miami.**

Wednesday 4 December

We had maintained 27 knots through a smooth sea all during the night and the day dawned sunny and clear. During the forenoon two Navy patrol planes, a part of the Neutrality Patrol forces operating from the Guantanamo Bay Base, zoomed low over the three ships of our detachment in order to establish our identity. At 1315 speed was decreased to six knots and the TUSCALOOSA steamed along the south coast of Cuba, 500 yards from shore and inside the 15 fathom curve while the President, Admiral McIntire, General Watson and Captain Callaghan trolled from the stern. Ross McIntire won the fishing prize of the day by catching a four-pound Barracuda, the only fish caught. He had about a hundred feet of line out, and as this was probably the first time a fish was caught from a ship as large as the TUSCALOOSA, underway, it tends to prove that ships do not frighten fish. TUSCALOOSA came to anchor in berth #25, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 6 fathoms of water at 1519, the following ships being present: LANSDALE, RUSSELL, LIVERMORE, MADISON, SAPELO and MONTCALM.

Shortly after we had anchored, the Commandant of the Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Captain George W. Weyler, U.S.N., came on board and for the next half hour the President conferred with the Commandant and the senior Marine and Medical officers of the base, going over plans for the extensive development of the base then in progress.

Our two escort destroyers had gone in to the fuel dock each to take on 55,000 gallons of fuel oil, while the TUSCALOOSA commenced

taking 144,000 gallons from a barge alongside. Pay Clerk Learson, of the TUSCALOOSA, who had been the Naval Aide's yeoman before attaining warrant rank, and Chief Yeoman Terry, his successor, took a ship's boat and went off up the bay to Caimanera to lay in a stock of Cuban cigars which were available there in extremely good quality and at very moderate prices. They returned with a sizeable supply of assorted cigars and these were later made available to all members of the President's party, as well as to TUSCALOOSA personnel.

The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RUSSELL, Lieutenant Commander J. C. Pollock, U.S.N., called on the President at 1615 and left the ship a few minutes later.

Fueling operations having been completed in a routine manner, the three vessels of the Presidential Detachment got underway at 2238 and stood out, enroute Kingston, Jamaica, course 188, speed 22 knots.

Thursday    5 December

The overnight run from Guantanamo was without incident, the sea being smooth and the weather warm. With the MAYRANT stationed ahead and the TRIPPE following astern, TUSCALOOSA entered the harbor of Kingston, Jamaica, and came to anchor in 7 fathoms of water at 0838. Prior to our arrival a radio message had been sent to Sir Arthur F. Richards, Governor General of Jamaica, stating that the President would be pleased to have him and a number of others come on board during the morning and remain for luncheon, during which it was planned to cruise to Portland Bight, 36 miles distant, for an inspection of the proposed fleet base at that place. With a thought

for the comfort of his prospective guests, the President included in his message a request that those invited wear informal clothes, rather than uncomfortable official uniforms, the day already giving promise of being an exceedingly warm one.

At 0845 Captain C. B. Turner, R.N., Captain in charge of the port, and Captain Percy Jeffs, Army Aide-de-Camp, called officially and left the ship at 0910. The United States Consul General, the Honorable Hugh H. Watson, came on board to make an official call on the President at 0929, departing at 1050. Only side honors were being accorded to the visiting officials, it having been agreed upon to dispense with the usual formalities, including gun salutes.

At 1120 the Governor General of Jamaica, Sir Arthur F. Richards, Lady Richards, Colonial Secretary and Mrs. A. W. G. H. Grantham, Director of Public Works M. P. Martin-Cooper, and two children, Master Fraser Richards and Miss Maurine Grantham came on board and were received by the President. A few moments after the President's guests had come on board, vessels of the detachment got underway for Portland Bight, where TUSCALOOSA came to anchor in 11 fathoms of water at 1410. The weather during the journey to Portland Bight was delightful and the President entertained his guests at a buffet luncheon served on the communication deck. Besides the members of the President's personal staff, the following named officers from TUSCALOOSA were also present at this luncheon:

Captain Lee P. Johnson, Commanding.  
Commander Thomas D. Warner, Executive Officer.  
Lt. Comdr. Adolph H. Oswald, Gunnery Officer.  
Lt. Comdr. Joseph O. Saurette, First Lieutenant.

The Governor General and his party transferred from TUSCALOOSA to MAYRANT at 1445 for passage back to Kingston. The MAYRANT's return trip to Kingston gave the Three Musketeers ample opportunity to obtain Sir Arthur's reaction to the President's visit and judging from the length of the radio despatches which were sent by the newsmen a very satisfactory interview must have taken place. Two of the Governor General's authorized quotations seem to warrant a place in the record. The first was a statement to the newspapermen, "You must get accustomed to the admiration other people feel for your President." In reply to a query as to how the people of Jamaica viewed the prospective establishment of a United States Naval base in Jamaican territory, Sir Arthur said, "The people of Jamaica recognize it to be of immense benefit to the island apart from its military or naval significance. The money it will bring, the employment and the tourist attractions for Americans will be most welcome."

While the MAYRANT was returning her passengers to Kingston, the President and Captain Callaghan left the ship in a motor whaleboat to fish in nearby waters and to inspect the locality at closer hand. Admiral McIntire and Pa Watson were in a motorboat on a like combination inspection-fishing trip, and while trolling a school of small Mackerel were breaking all around both boats. Several strikes were had by the President and Captain Callaghan, but Admiral McIntire won the prize of the day with a small Mackerel weighing about two pounds.

The President and his fishing companions returned to the ship at about five o'clock and at 1757 we took departure from Portland Bight for Beata Island on course 110, speed 19.5 knots.

Friday 6 December

TUSCALOOSA lay to off Beata Island at 0945 in order to rendezvous with two Navy patrol planes from San Juan, P. R., one of which had as a passenger Post Office Inspector deWaard bringing White House mail pouches which had previously been flown from Miami to San Juan. Contact with planes was made according to plan, but patrol plane 54-P-1 damaged her tail surface in transferring mail from the plane to the ship's boat which had been sent alongside after she landed close aboard TUSCALOOSA. When it developed that plane 54-P-1 would be unable to take off on the return trip until she could taxi to shallow water for further inspection and repair of the damage sustained, TUSCALOOSA at 1326 anchored to westward of Beata Island in 15 fathoms of water to stand by plane until temporary repairs could be accomplished. While this was being done, the President and Harry Hopkins left the ship in a motor whaleboat to troll in adjacent waters. Several strikes were had, the fish being small and hard to hook. The President snagged a gold, pink and purple fish weighing about a pound which could not be identified by name, while Harry Hopkins caught a little Runner also weighing about a pound.

Upon completion of repairs to the damaged plane, both aircraft took off on the return trip to San Juan and at 1518 we were again underway, enroute to Aves Island on course 103, speed 22.

The President, his aides and Mr. Hopkins were guests of Captain Johnson at dinner this evening, and later attended a smoker held on the well deck. The President, Pa Watson, and Harry Hopkins officiated




as judges of the boxing bouts, which were followed by a "hot drumming" contest, several selections by an amateur "Hill Billy Band," and an excellent technicolor movie, "Northwest Mounted Police," starring Gary Cooper, Madeleine Carroll and Paulette Goddard.

Saturday    7 December

When Aves (Bird) Island was sighted shortly after three o'clock this afternoon, we had covered 465 miles since leaving Beata Island just 24 hours before. This small, low-lying, uninhabited island is the breeding ground for thousands of sea birds, and is nothing more than an exposed reef in the Caribbean. The President had last visited this spot in February, 1939, aboard the U.S.S. HOUSTON, at which time he also witnessed the closing phases of the annual Fleet Problem involving the larger part of the United States Fleet which had cruised from West Coast bases mainly for this purpose.

The seas in the vicinity of the island were quite choppy at this time, and so the President, General Watson, Admiral McIntire and Captain Callaghan fished from the forecastle of the TUSCALOOSA, the President bringing half a Red Snapper to the deck, and Admiral McIntire catching a 3-pound Snapper, a 4-pound Trigger Fish and a Jack weighing 6 pounds. Harry Hopkins and George Fox took a ship's boat and trolled in the vicinity of the island. This proved to be a fortunate move, for Harry caught the largest legitimate fish of the trip, an 8-pound Grouper, and also boated a 5-pound Barracuda. Needless to say, the day's fishing prize went to Harry.

Having seen enough of Bird Island, we were underway again at



Divine Service on Board TUSCALOOSA, Port Castries, St. Lucia, December 8th.



1736, enroute to Port Castries, St. Lucia, B.W.I., on course 123, at a speed of 13 knots.

Sunday    8 December

Weather continued to be of the best, and after a leisurely run at 13 knots during the night, TUSCALOOSA and escorts anchored off Port Castries, St. Lucia, at 0835 in 17 fathoms of water. During the morning the U.S.S. MOFFETT, flying the broad pennant of Captain W. L. Ainsworth, U.S.N., Commander Destroyer Squadron Two, had requested and received permission to join the President's escort during the time we were to be in the vicinity of St. Lucia.

Chaplain F. W. Meehling, attached to the TUSCALOOSA, conducted Divine Services in the open air on the well deck this morning, the President and members of his party attending.

At 1058 the U. S. Consular Agent at St. Lucia, Mr. Alan G. Peter, called officially and was received by the President. At 1105 Sir Henry B. Popham, Governor of the Windward Islands, called on the President, being accompanied by his Aide-de-Camp, Mr. A. Denell Winslow; and Mr. Allan A. Wright, the Administrator of St. Lucia. The President conferred at length with these officials regarding suitability of the region for a Naval base, their conversation touching on aviation facilities, water supply, barracks, subsistence of personnel, sanitary conditions, and whether or not the surrounding territory would lend itself to the installation of the necessary artillery protection. At 1140 the President, the aforementioned British officials and Mr. Peter embarked in ship's boat and made a

detailed inspection of the inner harbor, returning to the ship at 1230. Our detachment got underway a few minutes later, and while the President entertained his guests at luncheon in the cabin, cruised to Gros Islet Bay, St. Lucia, coming to anchor there at 1314, in 12 fathoms of water. An interesting bit of history in connection with Gros Islet Bay is that, on Pigeon Island in this bay, Admiral Lord Rodney maintained one of his main bases in Revolutionary days. His old forts and crude barracks still stand on the island.

Sir Henry and his party left the TUSCALOOSA at 1405, transferring to the U.S.S. MOFFETT, which had been pressed into service to return the Governor's party to Port Castries.

At 1424, we got underway and stood out of Gros Islet Bay, bound for a point just outside Martinique territorial waters off the harbor of Fort De France, speed 25 knots. Our destination was only 35 miles away, and so at 1543 TUSCALOOSA and the two escorts lay to off Fort De France awaiting the arrival of the U.S.S. SIMS, bringing Commander E. J. Blankenship, U.S.N., (Ret.), our Naval Observer at Martinique, and Mr. Brocker, the United States Consul there, to the TUSCALOOSA for a conference with the President. These two officials came on board from the SIMS at 1610, and after the President had conferred for almost an hour with them, regarding local conditions, they left the ship at 1705 to return to Fort De France.

During the time consumed by the conference mentioned above, the attention of nearly all the others who could beg, borrow or steal a pair of binoculars, was focused on the French aircraft carrier BEARN, which had sought comparative safety in the harbor of Fort De France

following the collapse of the French Government. This vessel had been under the constant surveillance of our Neutrality Patrol for many months. The BEARN was laid down in January, 1914, as a battleship of the NORMANDIE class, but was not launched until April, 1920, construction having been suspended during the World War. She was later redesigned as an aircraft carrier, conversion having begun at La Seyne in 1923, with final completion in May, 1927. Capable of accommodating about 40 planes, for operational purposes, the vessel has a full load displacement of 25,000 tons, an overall length of 599 feet, extreme beam of 115 feet, maximum draft of 30 feet, and a designed speed of 21.5 knots. At the time the BEARN sought safety in Fort De France, she was engaged in transporting to France 110 American-made fighting planes for use against the Germans. It was understood that the planes had since been removed to shore, and that due to prolonged exposure to sun, wind and rain, they were no longer capable of taking to the air without extensive repairs.


TUSCALOOSA, MAYRANT and TRIPPE were underway at 1707 at 11 knots speed, enroute to St. John Harbor, Antigua, some 160 miles to the northward, where we were due to arrive the following morning. Escort destroyers had reported their fuel running low and accordingly at 1905 TRIPPE was temporarily detached from the formation with orders to proceed to San Juan, refuel and rejoin the TUSCALOOSA Tuesday morning.

Monday    9 December

After an uneventful run at 11 knots speed during the night, TUSCALOOSA and MAYRANT anchored off St. John Harbor, Antigua, at 0832 in 7 fathoms of water. Harbormaster Griffen and the Chief of Police, Major Branch, came on board at 0943 and left TUSCALOOSA at 0950. Navy Patrol plane 54-P-1 brought mail from San Juan in the custody of Post Office Inspector Carlton, and after the President had given attention to the mail requiring his signature, the White House pouch was started on its return trip at 1145.

Shortly before noon His Excellency, Sir Gordon J. Lethem, Governor of the Leeward Islands; the Administrator of Antigua, the Honorable Herbert Boon; and the Governor's Aide-de-Camp, Captain M. P. Stebbings, came on board, were received by the President, and remained on board for luncheon as the guests of the President. After luncheon the President conferred with the Governor and the Administrator regarding the United States defense activities that were planned for Antigua, with particular reference to the use of Parham Sound as a patrol plane base. The Governor and his party left the ship at 1340, and at 1450 TUSCALOOSA departed St. John Harbor, enroute to Navidad Bank via Mona Passage, speed 18 knots. MAYRANT had departed St. John at 1300, with orders to proceed with despatch to San Juan, replenish her fuel supply and join up again Tuesday afternoon.

The President and the members of his party were dinner guests of the Wardroom Mess this evening, and after dinner attended movies shown on deck. The feature picture was titled, "I Love You Again,"



U. S. S. TUSCALOOSA anchored off St. John Harbor, Antigua, B. W. I.





**The President trolls through Mona Passage.**

starring William Powell and Myrna Loy. The showing of this picture was preceded by the initial number of "Hobby Lobby," a short subject, showing scenes of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt towards the conclusion of the reel.

Tuesday 10 December

At 0100 TRIPPE rejoined the formation and took station 1500 yards ahead. At 1000, while proceeding through Mona Passage, speed was reduced to 7 knots while the President trolled from the stern. The water here was over 1500 feet deep, and the President's decision to try his luck was based mainly on the contents of a radio message which he had received from Ernest Hemingway recommending the locality as one in which many big fish had been caught and suggesting the use of a feathered hook baited with a piece of pork rind. The President trolled for an hour or more, without even a strike, and so fishing operations were discontinued at 1130, following which speed was increased to 25 knots. While back on the TUSCALOOSA's fantail this morning, the President gladly responded when he was asked to be photographed with the Chief Petty Officers of the ship, and a very nice picture was obtained showing the President with a fishing pole in his hand, flanked by about 40 CPO's.

MAYRANT rejoined the formation during the late afternoon, having topped off with fuel at San Juan the night before.

Upon anchoring in 17 fathoms of water on Navidad Bank at 1646, Dan Callaghan and Pa Watson went trolling in the motor whaleboat, despite the choppy sea. The President, Ross McIntire and Harry Hopkins

fished from the forecastle, Ross landing a 2-pound Grouper. Out in the boat, things went better, Pa landing a 6-pound Tuna and Dan reeling in a 7-pound, 30-inch Barracuda, the latter winning the day's fishing prize. When the boat returned and had been hoisted in, TUSCALOOSA upped anchor and got underway for West Caicos Island, where we expected to arrive the following morning.


Tonight's dinner was a merry one, for 57 years ago today, the world had been made richer by the addition of one more Watson. Congratulations were in order and all hands wished Pa many happy returns. After dinner, the President, Harry, Pa, Dan and Ross went on deck to witness the screening of a very entertaining movie, "Tin Pan Alley," with Alice Faye and Betty Grable.

Wednesday    11 December

TUSCALOOSA and escorts lay to off West Caicos Island at 0955 unable to anchor due to deep water. At 1040 the President and the members of his party left TUSCALOOSA in ship's boats to fish in the vicinity of the island, a spot which had proven in the past to afford the best fishing in the Bahamas. The seas were too rough to troll out by the reef and so the boats were forced to remain in the lee of the island close to the shore. The President caught a 5-pound Grouper and Pa Watson trailed with a 4-pound Jack. The fishing party returned to the ship at 1245.

A White House pouch had arrived by Navy plane during the morning and signed mail was despatched on its return trip after the President had given the contents of the pouch his attention following





The President with the TUSCALOOSA'S Chief Petty Officers.

luncheon on board. Our detachment got underway at 1452 and at 1747 arrived off the western end of Mayaguana Island, the eastern end of which was shrouded in a heavy rain squall. The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey ship HYDROGRAPHER was sighted at 1807 anchored in the entrance to Abraham Bay. This vessel informed us that there was no safe anchorage to be had in the vicinity, and as darkness was approaching, the ships of our detachment remained underway all night, steaming slowly on course 102 and 282 at 6 knots, five miles south of the island. During the early evening the President and his party attended the movies on deck, being entertained with a showing of "They Knew What They Wanted," featuring Carole Lombard and Charles Laughton. A particularly timely short subject, "Gateway to Panama," (March of Time) was also enjoyed.

Thursday    12 December

The TUSCALOOSA and escorts devoted three hours of the morning to conducting an investigation of the southern coast of Mayaguana Island, utilizing various courses and speeds from 0730 until 1040, when we took departure for Long Island, B.W.I., at a speed of 25 knots on course 290.

During the morning the President received a radio message from Secretary of State Hull containing the shocking news that Lord Lothian, British Ambassador to the United States, had suddenly passed away at two o'clock Thursday morning. The President immediately sent the following radio despatch to the State Department:

"For transmission to His Majesty, The King of England: USS TUSCALOOSA - At Sea - I am shocked beyond measure to hear of the sudden passing of my old friend and your Ambassador, the Marquis of Lothian. Through nearly a quarter of a century we had come to understand and trust each other. I am very certain that if he had been allowed by Providence to leave us a last message he would have told us that the greatest of all efforts to retain democracy in the world must and will succeed. (Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt."

In view of our unsuccessful attempt to find a suitable anchorage at Mayaguana, and the information developed by the survey conducted during the morning, the President sent the following radio message to the Secretary of the Navy:

"Please hold in abeyance all negotiations for use of and installations on Mayaguana Island. No anchorage for surface vessels in northeast trades such as we have experienced that locality."

At 1639 TUSCALOOSA came to anchor off southern end of Long Island in 12 fathoms of water with 45 fathoms of chain to the port anchor. Again the seas were too rough to put out in ship's boats so the President and a number of the others bottom fished from the fore-castle. Pa Watson caught a 2½-pound Red Snapper, Dan Callaghan caught a Mango Snapper weighing about a pound and a half, while Ross McIntire caught a little Bass weighing only a half pound. Just before sunset the President hooked a very large fish and played it for almost two hours on a light rod before his line parted and the fish escaped.

We were underway again at 1937, making 15 knots towards Eleuthera Island where we were to arrive in the morning for a scheduled visit with H.R.H. the Duke of Windsor, arrangements for the rendezvous having been made by radio despatch.

Friday 13 December

At 0753 TUSCALOOSA and destroyer escorts came to anchor in Miller Anchorage, Eleuthera Island, B.W.I., in 12 fathoms of water. In acknowledgment of his message of condolence on the death of Lord Lothian, the President received the following message from the King of England:

"I am very grateful for your kind message on the tragic death of my Ambassador, Lord Lothian. It was always most gratifying to me that his personal relations with you were so happy and cordial, and I know, as you do, how devoted he was to the ideals which inspire our two people. (Signed) George R."

Word having been received that the plane had taken off bringing H.R.H. the Duke of Windsor, Governor General of the Bahamas, for his scheduled meeting with the President, Pa Watson sent a message to the MAYRANT hinting to the Three Musketeers that something quite interesting would probably occur on board TUSCALOOSA today, and suggesting that they come over early, remain for luncheon in the wardroom, and watch developments. The President and Pa then embarked in a motor whaleboat, Harry Hopkins and Ross McIntire taking another, and the four shoved off for an hour's fishing in the vicinity of the anchorage. Harry Hopkins hooked a 36-inch Grouper which was played by Admiral McIntire, who really gave the fish a working over on the way in, taking only a few minutes to reel in 250 yards of line with 20 pounds of fish on the other end. This fish was by far the largest caught during the entire trip, but was not a legitimate catch for determination of fishing honors, two members of the party having handled the rod. Pa Watson most emphatically protested even the

mention of this fish in connection with any claims to piscatorial ability, employing colorful language at times to establish the fact that Harry hooked the fish, Ross played it and the crew finally boated it. Pa Watson caught a 6-pound Barracuda, 36 inches long, while the other boat was struggling with the big Grouper, the President catching only a little Yellowtail, about 6 inches long and weighing only half a pound. Ross McIntire's boat returned to the ship early so that he and Harry could prepare for the Duke's visit, but the President and Pa fished until the giant 4-motored Navy patrol plane bringing the Duke of Windsor from Miami landed close aboard TUSCALOOSA at 1116, then they returned, going on board shortly before H.R.H. and his aide, Captain Vyvyan Drury, came on boat at 1125. TUSCALOOSA, MAYRANT and TRIPPE manned the rail in honor of the Duke and he was received with full honors upon his arrival on board, with the exception that no salute was fired. Captain Dan Callaghan met the Duke at the gangway and conducted him to the communication deck where the President was waiting to welcome him. A very pleasant buffet luncheon was served at noonday, the following persons being present:

The President

H.R.H., The Duke of Windsor  
Captain Vyvyan Drury, Aide-de-Camp

Mr. Harry L. Hopkins  
Major General Edwin M. Watson  
Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire  
Captain Daniel J. Callaghan

Captain Lee P. Johnson  
Commander Horace D. Clark  
Lieutenant Commander E. A. Taylor  
Lieutenant Commander R. L. Campbell  
Lieutenant Commander J. C. Lester



The President and the Duke were engaged in conversation before, during and after luncheon, and went very thoroughly into the problems which faced the Duke in the administration of his Governorship of the Bahamas, and those which were occupying the President's attention at the present time in choosing a location for the naval base which the United States was to construct in the Bahamas. About 1:45 the Duke indicated that he would be glad to answer any questions which Messrs. Reynolds, Cornell and Durno might wish to ask, and our three gentlemen of the Fourth Estate literally jumped at the chance. The Duke told the newsmen that this was not his first meeting with the President, he having met him in 1919 when the President was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the two of them were inspecting the Regiment of Midshipmen at Annapolis. With respect to the base sites, the Duke pointed out that the establishment of the base in the Bahamas would be most welcome to the people of the islands, and that "whatever the President wants, we will give him the best we have." The Governor General went on to say that he was very much interested in establishing throughout the Bahamas something on the order of the Civilian Conservation Corps in the United States, and that he hoped to confer with CCC officials in the United States during the early part of 1941, the President having indicated that he would be glad to give the Duke a letter of introduction to the proper people in Washington.

The Duke and his Aide-de-Camp, Captain Drury, left the ship a few minutes after two o'clock, and shortly after took off on the return trip to Miami in the Navy plane which had brought them from there to Eleuthera. Back on the communication deck, the President

signified that he had some additional information to impart which he felt would be of interest to the press, although he mentioned at the start of his remarks that a large part of what he was to say was confidential and could therefore not be published, it being supplied for "background." As the President continued to talk he pointed out that the need for numerous bases to serve as Atlantic outposts embraced far more than just the defense of the Panama Canal, such bases being vital to the defense of the United States, Central America as a whole, and South America. The President emphasized that the farther away from the American continent a potential attack can be kept, the safer it is for the continent itself. The President stated that with a little dredging an excellent harbor could be had at the Jamaica base site, that the St. Lucia and Antigua sites were quite satisfactory, although the proposed base at Mayaguana was by no means satisfactory, because of the absence there of a lee and an anchorage, a ship seeking to anchor being either in a thousand fathoms or on the beach. It was remarked that even though some of the locations were mainly for aircraft bases, supplies would still have to be brought in by the ship method. In closing, the President sketched the highlights of his talks with the British officials he had conferred with during the past few days and also dispelled the darkness which our newspapermen had been in during the week by announcing that we would dock at the Navy Yard in Charleston, S. C., the following afternoon, leave for Warm Springs shortly after docking, spend most of Sunday at Warm Springs and arrive in Washington about the middle of Monday afternoon. When the subject got around to mileage, the press volunteered the



information that they hadn't been seasick, whereupon the President said that there had been a little difficulty among the members of his party but he thought they would live until tomorrow.

The three ships were underway for Charleston at 1447 and during the evening all hands started to pick up loose ends in preparation for our disembarkation on the morrow. The President and his party went to the movies after dinner, witnessing a showing of "U. S. Navy, 1940," (March of Time), and "Arizona," starring Jean Arthur and William Holden.

Saturday    14 December

This was to be our last day at sea for we had held to schedule and were to arrive at Charleston about four o'clock this afternoon. Fort Moultrie fired a 21-gun salute to the President when we passed at 1426 and the Charleston Navy Yard fired a like salute at 1530 just before TUSCALOOSA moored to the south pier at the Navy Yard. At 1610 the Honorable Burnet R. Maybank, Governor of South Carolina, accompanied by Mayor Lockwood of Charleston, Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, Rear Admiral W. H. Allen, Commandant of the Navy Yard, and Major General Charles P. Summerall, U.S. Army, (Ret.), came on board to call on the President. A large party of news correspondents and photographers came on board at 1630 and the President received them in his cabin for a short press conference and to permit them to take photographs. One particularly good picture was taken showing the President, tanned and looking very fit after ten days at sea, patting Fala, his little Scottie, who had taken a position close to the

President's chair to see what went on at a shipboard press conference. The President answered a number of questions, but indicated that he had given out most of his stock of news during the long conference with the Three Musketeers the afternoon before. A local newspaperman asked if the President felt that the South could play any distinctive part in National Defense and the President replied by asking him that of the million four hundred thousand people who were to be trained, how many would be trained in the South. The press conference ended on this note and preparations were started for transferring to the President's waiting train in uptown Charleston.

The good weather that we had enjoyed all during the week had not held through to this day, and the sky was overcast with rain-clouds and a slight rain was falling when the President left the TUSCALOOSA at 1643. TUSCALOOSA fired a 21-gun salute to the President upon his departure and at the last gun hauled down the President's flag. It was only a short ride to the train, and just before six o'clock we pulled out of Charleston enroute to Warm Springs, Georgia, where the President was to spend the following day in the company, among others, of Mr. Basil O'Connor and Mr. Aubrey Williams, NYA Administrator, both of whom had joined the President's party when he arrived at Charleston. Harry Hopkins remained behind when we left Charleston, as he planned to spend the week-end as the guest of Governor Maybank before returning to Washington.

Sunday 15 December

Our train reached Warm Springs at nine o'clock this morning and a short while later the President and his party left in automobiles for the Warm Springs Foundation, where the day was spent in rest and in quiet Sunday visiting. The President enjoyed a belated Thanksgiving dinner with the patients at the Foundation. The party returned to the train during the late afternoon and at five o'clock that evening we were again traveling towards Washington, where we expected to arrive Monday afternoon after a trip of 5752 miles, 3545 of which had been at sea.

Monday 16 December

The President's train covered the 722 miles from Warm Springs to Washington according to schedule and pulled into the Union Station at 3:00 P. M.