PSF West Africa

PSF: West Africa

[redacted]

FREETOWN.

At this port the chief present difficulty is that it is almost impossible to clear the existing Government Wharf at the speed at which stores can be landed thereat. The approach to the Wharf is very bad and the 2'6" gauge railway has a curve of 44ft radius and a gradient of 1 in 50 rising from this Wharf. In consequence, only very small wheel based locos can be used and these in turn limit the output of wagons daily off the wharf. If fact with very careful organisation 28 or 30 wagons a day can be shipped, or a daily total of about 250 tons. The rest of the stores have to be moved by Mechanical Transport; there is a shortage of this and roads are bad. There is an additional difficulty in that there is only one crane capable of a lift of over 5 tons, and this is a 10 ton luffing jib steam crane situated on a Freight section of Government Wharf. There are frequent delays while lighters await their turn for this crane.

All ships have to be unloaded by lighters as there is a limit of draught of about 15 feet alongside the jetties.

There seems no answer to the problem of improvement of this port except by improving the unloading facilities and by speeding up the means of wharf clearance. With this in view, the following are the general proposals which are being followed.

(i) To remove the existing wharf side offices of the shipping firms and build a new quay on the site with a 15-ton crane to serve it. This will give additional wharf frontage and remove the present delays awaiting the only available heavy-lift crane. Some piling and quay wall strengthening expected to be required and general construction work clearing up the site and getting the crane etc. and rail connections erected.

(ii) To build a new wharf at or near HASTINGS Aerodrome so as to take the petroleum traffic direct to that wharf and avoid it traversing Government Wharf at all. This wharf to be rail served by the 2'6" gauge railway. This wharf is to be for four lighters and soundings were being taken at the end of November. The general idea of this wharf is that it should be 300' long and provide a minimum draught at L.W.O.S.T. of 7ft. This wharf could be used as an avenue from which material could be distributed to the R.A.F. depots at JUI & BLENHEIM and would provide an alternative point for loading

/in the event of....

in the event of an accident to the main line from Government Wharf to up country.

It is considered three 3-ton and two 5-ton steam travelling cranes will be required at this wharf, if its construction proves practicable. Various covered sheds would also be required. These cranes have NOT been included in the list of stores required because survey has not yet proved this scheme to be practicable, although no obstacles are foreseen. As far as can be foreseen from a very hurried survey, there are not likely to be any requirements for subsequent operating personnel.

I append list of stores which are considered to be required and consider that any assistance which can be given in quayside construction work - largely pile driving and straightforward quay or narrow-gauge railway construction work - would be invaluable. No deep sea work, diving work or heavy construction is envisaged. There is a shortage in the colony of compressor plant and mechanical tools generally and all labour available is unskilled or semi-skilled.

BATHURST (GAMBIA).

At this port the ships have to unload by lighters. The wharves in the South Bank are of light construction and with light cranes and are incapable of strengthening short of rebuilding. There is only one jetty on the North Bank and this is incapable of greater loads than a porter can carry on his head. On the South Bank there are two slipways and on the North Bank there are none. The maximum loads required to be handled here are vehicles (such as Workshop Lorries) of from 10 to 12 tons. There are at present two decrepit pontoons for carrying vehicles and these are capable of about 12 tons and 8 tons respectively.

For a short term quick result policy the only apparent answer is to build two slipways on the North Bank and to provide Motor Landing craft and pontoons capable of conveying transport from the ships' slings in the stream to shore or the slipways. For a long term policy there are possibilities of proper wharf construction work on both North and South Banks and almost infinite possibilities in the way of employment for a Construction unit accustomed to work with pile driving, straightforward quay construction work, and a certain amount of preliminary survey.

There are no present indications of requirements for subsequent operating units.

TAKORADI.

No difficulties yet encountered.

LAGOS.

No difficulty.

PORT HARCOURT.

No difficulty yet. Work well within the capacity of the port.

PSF: West Africa

Launch Deficiencies.

Gambia.

2 Launches to tow horse boat for use between Cape St. Mary and Barra Point. (Provision being made by S.T.1.)

1 Launch for F.S.P. (Provision being made by S.T.1)
1 Launch to replace AJAX. Length 30 ft. Speed 12 knots. With awning. Carriage of personnel and stores.

Sierra Leone.

2 Launches for F.S.P. (Provision being made by S.T.1 and local purchase)

1 Launch to replace "HAWK" (Provision being made by S.T.1.)

1 Launch for E.M.O. capable of carrying at least 4 stretcher cases, and 6 sitting cases. Length about 42ft. Speed 10 knots. With awning.

1 Launch for Motor Boat Coy. (Provision being made by S.T.1.)

Gold Coast.

1 Launch for E.S.O. Takoradi. Length 30 ft. Speed 12 knots. With awning.

Nigeria.

1 Launch for E.S.O. Lagos. Length 30 ft. Speed 12 knots. With awning.

All launches are for use in tidal waters, and should have anti-corrosive hulls.

PSF: West Africa Appendix E

Ordnance Requirements at 12th December 1941.

		Nigeria.	Accra.	Freetown	Gambia.	Total	Reserve.
Drill White. 28"	yds.	30,000	20,000	20,000	15,000	85,000	
Drill Khaki. 28"	yds.	500,000	400,000	300,000	300,000	1,500.000.	
Boots Rubber Knee All Sizes		500	500		300	1,300.	
Bags Kit.			10,000	10,000	6,500	26,500.	
Brushes Hair		1,500	1,400	1,000	1,000	4,900	
" Shaving		1,000	1,250	2,000	1,500	5,750	
Combs Hair			1,500	1,000	1,500	4,000	
Buttons - Bone - any dark colour $\frac{3}{8}$" dia	gross	5,000	4,000	4,000	3,000	16,000	
Dressings Field		10,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	55,000	
Shirts Drab Union all sizes		115,000	56,000	18,000	50,000	239,000	
Puttees Long		20,000	20,000	10,000	15,000	65,000	
Knives Table		500	1,000	1,500	750	3,750	Br. European O Rs
Forks Table		500	1,000	1,500	750	3,750	
Spoons Dessert		500	1,000	1,500	750	3,750	
Shoes - Canvas	prs.	10000	1,0000	1,0000	1,0000	4,0000	
" " White (Nurses)	prs	150	100	100	50	450	
Stockings, White Lisle "	"	300	250	250	100	900	
Nails Tip Heel $\frac{3}{4}$"	lbs.	5,000	3,000	3,000	2,000	13,000	
" " " $\frac{1}{8}$"	"	5,000	3,000	3,000	2,000	13,000	
" Hob	"	9,500	12,500	12,000	8,000	42,000	
Thread Khaki	yds	6,500,000	6500000	6000000	6000000	25000000	
" White	"	500,000	400,000	400,000	300,000	1600,000	

PSF: West Africa

ORDNANCE REQUIREMENTS AT 12/12/41.

	O.O. ACCRA	O.O. IJORA	O.O. FREETOWN	O.O. GAMBIA	TOTALS
CROCKERY					
Basins Pudding	800	1000	600	600	3000
Bowls Sugar	500	700	300	300	1800
Cups Breakfast with saucers	2500	3000	1500	1500	8500
Plates Dinner	4000	5000	3000	3000	15000
Plates Small	1500	2000	700	2000	6200
Plates Soup	3500	4000	2500	2500	12500
Plates Breakfast	2500	3000	1500	1500	8500
Tumblers ½ pint	3000	3000	2000	2000	10000
CUTLERY					
Forks Table Large	3000	4000	1800	1800	10600
Forks Table Small	3000	4000	1800	1800	10600
Knives Table Large	3500	3500	3000	3000	13000
Knives Table Small	2500	3000	2000	1800	9300
Spoons Table	2500	3000	1800	1600	8900
Spoons Tea	2500	2800	1800	1600	8700
KITS HAND TOOLS					
Wireless Mechanics	4	10	4	2	20
Instrument Mechanics	10	5	10	5	30
CHESTS TOOL FILLED					
R.A.O.D. Artificers	5	10	10	5	30
SIGS. INST. MECHS.	20	-	20	10	50
Tinsmiths and Coppersmiths	4	-	4	2	10
A.A. Fitters	25	-	20	5	50
A.A. Carpenters	40	-	25	10	75
A.A. Instruments	15	5	20	10	50
Fitters R.A.	5	10	5	-	20

PSF: West Africa

ODNANCE REQUIREMENTS at 12.12.41.

		O.O. ACCRA	O.O IJORA	O.O. FREETOWN	O.O. GAMBIA	TOTAL
Mosquito Nets	G.S.	3200	6000	2500	3000	14,700
Beds Folding		2000	2500	1500	1500	7,500
Canvas	yards	7000	10000	6000	6000	29,000
Refrigerators		80	100	70	70	320
Plates Steel Tinned		30000	15000	20000	15000	80,000
Tins Mess		3000	4000	2000	2000	11,000
Web Equipment Complete Sets		3000	2000	2000	3000	10,000
Stoves Soyer		100	120	80	40	340
Cookers Portable w/oven		100	120	50	50	320
Lamps Hurricane		400	600	300	300	1,600
Basins Soup Steel Tinned		1000	1000	500	500	3,000
Stoves Oil Wickless		100	120	60	60	340
Flit Guns.		300	600	300	300	1,500
Augers 16"		6	12	4	4	
Watches Non-Military		750	1,000	750	500	3,000
" G.S.		500	800	500	200	2,000
Bicycles		50	70	50	50	220
Paint Red	cwt	10	20	10	10	50
" White	"	20	40	20	20	100
" Blue	"	2	5	2	2	11
" Khaki	"	20	40	20	20	100
" Bfown	"	5	10	5	5	25
Turpentine	gal.	40	80	40	40	200
Linseed Oil	"	40	80	40	40v	200

PSF: West Africa

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION

Cairo, December 20, 1941.

Strictly
Confidential.

Dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith a memorandum on a conversation that I had with General Sir George Giffard who commands the entire West Coast of Africa for the British.

You will be shocked to know that there was no mosquito gauze in Accra and, by the time I passed through, forty percent of the Pan American staff there - composed in part of Army pilots - had come down with malaria.

I believe that the question of improving port facilities at Freetown and Bathurst which is covered by the enclosed memorandum is of great importance and should receive immediate attention.

Good luck.

Yours always,

Bill

The Honorable
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,

PSF: West Africa

MEMORANDUM

At General Sir George Giffard's Headquarters on December 12, 1941, at noon General Giffard and the chief members of his staff, including Brigadier W. H. A. Bishop, went over with me the entire situation on the West Coast of Africa which General Giffard commands.

The General expressed the absolute conviction that there were no German submarines based at Dakar. He and his intelligence officer both stated that they were positive that the only Germans in Dakar were approximately fifty members of the German Armistice Control Commission and that there were approximately eighty members of the German Armistice Control Commission at Casablanca. The General said that he had suspected that German submarines might be based at Portuguese ports or islands on the West Coast of Africa. He had made careful investigations and had come to the conclusion that German submarines were not based on Portuguese territory but that the German submarines now operating in the Atlantic as far south as the Union of South Africa were being supplied by supply ships.

The General went into the problem of the capture of Dakar exhaustively. He said that he considered that a large

PSF: West Africa

land force coming from the north would be necessary for the capture of the city. He could supply for an attack on Dakar only one brigade which could strike northward from Gambia in conjunction with an attack on Dakar from the north. He believed that it would be unwise to attempt an attack on Dakar with less than fifty thousand troops with appropriate air and sea support.

General Giffard stated that he did not consider it possible for the Germans to make any serious attack by air on the Gold Coast or Nigeria unless and until they should be able to establish themselves firmly in the Dakar region. He again emphasized the fact that he saw no signs and had no reports which indicated any immediate or early German attempt to move down to Dakar.

The General emphasized, as did all his officers, the need for improved port facilities at Freetown and Bathurst; the need for rifles; and especially the need for mosquito gauze. The General stated that numbers of ships were coming into Takarade to pick up manganese and that he understood that these ships for the most part arrived in ballast. He could see no reason why one of them could not be loaded with sufficient mosquito gauze to reduce greatly the proportion of Americans coming down with malaria.

The General said that the five Polish officers who had had been sent to him from London had been most excellent

PSF: West Africa

fellows and had proven useful to him in the training of native troops in the Gold Coast. He emphasized the fact that these troops were excellent in the bush but could not be used, in his opinion, in desert fighting in North Africa since outside their native bush they felt lost.

I asked the General if he would set down for me in memorandum form the most urgent needs of the portion of West Africa which was under his command. He did so in the appended memorandum signed by Brigadier W. H. A. Bishop of his staff.

S. P. B.
W. C. B.

December 12, 1941.

PSF: West Africa

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION

Cairo, December 27, 1941.

Personal and [redacted].

Dear Mr. President:

The British here are confident that they will be able to reach the border of Tunisia in about six weeks. In consequence, Lyttelton and all the British Generals, General Catroux and all the French officers talk to me constantly about the problem of getting Tunisia and all the rest of French North Africa to side with us at the moment of the arrival of the British forces on the Tunisian frontier.

It will be impossible for the British to maintain a force of more than one division on the Tunisian frontier due to the length of the 1450-mile line of communications from Cairo. It is, therefore, clear that Tunisia can not be taken by force in the face of resistance by the Vichy French troops now in Tunisia.

It might conceiveably be possible to send a surprise expedition

The Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

PSF: West Africa

expedition to land to the south of Bizerta and seize the base but I believe that Bizerta could not possibly be held against the French troops which would be brought rapidly from Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

The problem is, therefore, the old one of obtaining the voluntary cooperation of the French in North Africa.

The Frenchmen with whom I have talked agree that there will be no chance of getting the French in North Africa to come over to our side unless we can send an American Expeditionary Force to Casablanca. We should probably have to send one hundred thousand men, - to be safe against German attack through Spanish Morocco, - and we should have to take the Azores, Madeira and the Canaries and maintain a large naval force and air force for the protection of transport.

I assume that the fighting in the Far East has drained our resources to such an extent that, at this moment, it is impossible for us to consider any such expedition however desirable it might be. If I am mistaken in this assumption and if you can even consider sending such a force; I hope that you will cable me at once just two words: "Can consider."

I assume that any such reply from you is out of the question. If it is out of the question, we can do something to prepare the way for the moment when we shall be able to

send

PSF: West Africa

send such an expedition. Both the British and Free French feel certain that the Vichy French forces on the frontier of Tunisia will be most hostile to them and that it will be difficult for them to avoid frontier incidents if they should reach the Tunisian border. They are most anxious to have some sort of an American force on that border, as they say - truly, I think - that the French have only the friendliest feelings towards Americans.

Two suggestions have been made to me:

(1) We have in Egypt now a large number of American planes. If we could send over sufficient American pilots and officers to establish a Lafayette Escadrille which would use these American planes, and operate against the Germans and Italians as they retreat toward the Tunisian frontier, a great effect would be produced on the French in Tunisia. This ought to be possible.

(2) There are still a large number of American tanks ready for action in Egypt. If we could send over sufficient personnel and officers to make up one tank unit, the presence of such a unit would have a great effect on the French on the Tunisian frontier.

I have not the slightest doubt that the presence of American troops on the Tunisian frontier would be most valuable especially if a considerable number of men or officers should

be

PSF: West Africa

be able to speak French. If our men could establish the first contacts on the frontier of Tunisia, it might be possible for them to oil the way for the British and Free French,- who should be able to send a vast number of agents into North Africa.

All this is in the realm of hypothesis, and I am writing this letter merely because I am certain that I shall have - and you, perhaps, will have - dozens of appeals from the Free French and British to do something immediately about North Africa.

I returned to Cairo yesterday from Syria, the Lebanon, and Palestine. In those countries all is quiet on the surface but seething underneath. There is no sign whatsoever of reconciliation between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The British Generals, officers and colonial officials in those areas are not only anti-Vichy French but also anti-de Gaulle French, and say perfectly frankly that they think the French ought to be kicked out of the Near East permanently and that Great Britain should take over the Near East permanently. I am not sure that they are wrong; but they are carrying their hostility to the French to stupid lengths. Everyone for the moment loves us. And I think that our policy in this area ought to be the simple one of keeping the French and British pulling together until the end of the war.

The British have 84,000 Australians in Syria, the Lebanon

and

PSF: West Africa

and Palestine. They spend their time running trucks off roads, getting drunk and smashing up bars. Indeed, the British Command in these regions under General "Jumbo" Wilson still seems to be imbued with the idea that war is a polo game in which personal courage and individual heroism will counterbalance lack of preparedness and supplies. For example, the vital railroad link from Haifa to Beirut which the British have said they were going to get finished in six months is being worked on at the moment by 150 native laborers equipped with the most primitive tools!

The question of transport and communications in this area is vital and I hope that before this letter reaches you, you will have ordered to this area the transport units and signal units requested in my telegram to you of December 20, and in the supplementary telegram which I sent through General Maxwell to the War Department.

Christmas in Bethlehem was a beautiful experience.

Bless you.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

PSF: West Africa

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Bof

January 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached papers which I am returning contain information of considerable value to us. I have paraphrased pertinent parts for our use, without giving the source, and have taken necessary action where required.

Chief of Staff.

PSF: West Africa

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

For your confidential information and return to me. If you want to put any of this information on paper, paraphrase it and do not give the source.

F. D. R.

Received by special messenger 1/22/42

PSF: West Africa

Telegraphic Address:
MILWESTAF.

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS,
MILITARY FORCES IN WEST AFRICA,
ACCRA, GOLD COAST.

Ref: 3301/AQ

12th December, 1941.

Dear Mr Bullitt,

As arranged during your discussion with General Giffard this morning, I enclose lists showing the deficiencies in the West African Command in weapons, ammunition, transport, and stores and equipment of all types.

With the exception of the "controlled stores", e.g., weapons, ammunition and certain technical eqipment, whose issue is arranged by the War Office, and for which we are not permitted to forward specific demands, the whole of the material referred to in the lists has been "demanded". ~~The~~ Consignments of stores and equipment are, of course, coming out to this Command each month, and the lists show the deficiency situation today.

I also include certain notes on the efforts we are making at the ports of Freetown and Bathurst, and the resources which we require to put these ports in a position in which they will have some chance of handling the amount of traffic required.

I am afraid the lists are not as well set out as I would have wished, but you will realise that this has been a "rush job", and has had to be completed in three hours.

/You asked me.....

William Bullitt, Esq.

You asked me to try to indicate which are the items most urgently required.

There is no doubt that anything which could be done to improve the port facilities at Freetown and Bathurst would be of the first importance, in that it would have a direct effect on the acceleration of the turn-round of shipping.

Rifles, anti-tank weapons, anti-tank ammunition, mosquito gauze, water piping, mosquito nets, folding campbeds, canvas, watches, (this is a very vital deficiency), flit guns, hurricane lamps, small portable cookers with ovens, for use in the field, khaki drill and launches are the articles which are most urgently needed.

With best wishes for a safe and pleasant journey.

Yours sincerely,

W. H. A. Bishop

(Brigadier,
D.A. and Q.M.G., West African Force).

FREETOWN.

(i) Permanent Way Material.

Four miles of plain track are required and will be obtained from GOLD COAST Government Railway.

EHUTTE METTA (NIGERIA) shops are fabricating twelve 1 in 8 turnouts.

(ii) Locomotives.

Eight locomotives are required, I am corresponding with INDIA on this matter. To facilitate the procuring of spares, engines should be all of the same type. General Manager SIERRA LEONE Railways favours tender engines as these can with advantage replace tank engines at present working trains thereby releasing the latter for shunting. If tenders are not available tanks would be accepted. Present engines have maximum rigid wheel base of 9' 0" but main essential is capability of negotiating five chain curves. (See Footnote for further particulars.)

(iii) Wagons.

Fifty wagons are required and these have been ordered from INDIA. (25 open and 25 covered)

(iv) Cranes.

A 15 ton steam or electric crane is required at once to replace existing 10 ton crane. A steam crane is preferred if obtainable in reasonable time. The crane should be on portal pedestal about 18' 9" by 18' 9".

BATHURST.

(i) Pontoons.

Pontoons, suitable for conveyance of lorries etc. Capacity 15 to 25 tons. Number required- two. NOT yet demanded from any other source.

(ii) Motor Landing Craft.

Motor Landing Craft capable of a load of up to 15 tons. Number required- two. NOT yet demanded from any other source.

(iii) See next page.

TAKORADI.

NIL.

LAGOS.

NIL.

 PORT HARCOURT.

PORT HARCOURT.

Cranes.

Two RANSOME three and a half five ton Mobile Cranes are being supplied by U.K.

FOOTNOTE.

The loading gauge of the SIERRA LEONE Railway is as follows:-

Buffer height 2' 0".
Dimension restrictions 4' 9" wide 3½" from rail to 1' 6".
7' 2" wide 1' 6" to 2' 9".
7' 4" wide 2' 9" to 6' 3".
7' 9" wide 6' 3" to 10' 6".

Small variations above these limits would have to be specially considered. Maximum load per axle 5 tons. Engines with small excess loading might be used for yard shunting only. Vacuum brake. WESTINGHOUSE engines might be accepted if considered capable of conversion and necessary equipment obtainable.

BATHURST. (continued)

(iii) Cranes.

Three 2½ ton mobile cranes are required at BATHURST. These have been asked for from the U.K. but no reply has yet been received to our telegram to TROOPERS .

List of Sports and Welfare Goods which would be welcomed in West Africa.

16 M.M. Cinema projectors complete (for mobile vans) together with 5% spares. Operator for each set. Films of all kinds - including natural history and educational.

3 sets for Gambia
3 sets for Freetown
4 sets for Accra
5 sets for Lagos

Battery radio sets with 5% spares.

25 Bathurst
2o Freetown
35 Lagos
20 Accra

200 Earphones with Flex for Hospital patients.

50 doz Golf Balls.

100 doz Tennis Balls.

100doz Table Tennis Balls.

10 doz Tennis Racquets.

100 doz Darts.

100 assorted Golf Clubs.

10 doz Hockey Balls.

2 doz Sets Base Ball equipment - including extra Balls.

500 maps of the Pacific suitable for Offices and Messes (These to come by air as occasions allows)

Indoor games of all kinds:-

50 sets Chess.
100 sets each - Checkers, Ludo, Halma etc.

The U.S.A. has already provided two mobile canteens VANS; one in Sierra Leone and one in Gambia which are doing most useful work in visiting outlying detachments: if two more could be provided, one in Gold Coast and one in Nigeria, they would be very welcome.

[redacted] PSF: West Africa

Notes on equipment.

1. Transport.

The Command has about 60% of its transport either in West Africa or on the water. Main deficiencies are shown in Appendix A

2. Equipment.

(a) Clothing 10% of our requirements are outstanding.

(b) General Stores. 20% of our requirement still outstanding.

See appx B

(c) Spare parts for weapons etc.

40% of our requirements still outstanding.

(d) Controlled Stores i.e. war-like stores subject to War Office control.

Units and Ord. Depots hold percentages of requirements varying between 40% and 85%. A statement of deficiencies in arms and ammunition is at Appendix B

This statement excludes releases and consignments not received.

(e) Reserves of equipment including war-like stores

These are very low and, as far as war-like stores are concerned, virtually nil.

3. Engineer Stores.

Main deficiencies are at Appendix C

4. Medical Stores.

Main deficiencies are at Appendix D

TRANSPORT STATE - WEST AFRICA.

Total deficiencies by colonies against present approved War Establishments (including 25% reserve for non-technical vehicles) as at the 12th December 1941. Figures allow for transport advised as shipped up to and including Troopers cable 55106 dated 1st December 1941.

GAMBIA.

Motor Cycles	14
Trucks and Vans G.S. - 15 cwt	3
Wireless Trucks 15 cwt. G.S.	6
Lorries G.S. - 3 Ton	6
Cars - 4 Seater	1
Launches	3

See note attached re launches.

SIERRA LEONE.

Motor Cycles	193
Cars - 4 Seater	108
Trucks and Vans G.S. - 15 cwt	138
Trucks Wireless 15 cwt. G.S.	11
Trucks Wireless Cable Layer	1
Lorries G.S. - 3 Ton	785
Lorries Workshops	9
Lorries Breakdown	9
Lorries Stores	16
Lorries 30 cwt. Breakdown	1
Lorries 24 KW Workshops	1
Lorries Breakdown (~~Derrick~~)	1
Lorries Office	2
Lorries FBE	10
Lorries SBG	8
Trailers FBE	6
Trucks Compressor	6
Trucks Water 15 cwt.	4
Carriers Universal	16
Armoured Cars	19
Launches	5

GOLD COAST.

Motor Cycles	44
Cars - 4 Seater	27
Trucks and Vans G.S. - 5 cwt	14
Trucks Wireless G.S.	23
Trucks Wireless Cable Layer	1
Lorries G.S. - 3 Ton	1
Lorries Breakdown	2
Lorries Stores	2
Lorries Breakdown (Derrick)	1
Lorries 24 KW Workshops	1
Lorries FBE	2
Lorries SBG	2
Trailers FBE	1
Ambulances	6
Trucks Compressor	4
Trucks Water 15 cwt.	3
Armoured Cars.	9
Launches	1

PSF: West Africa

NIGERIA.

Motor Cycles	216
Cars 4 Seats	30
Trucks and Vans G.S. 15 Cwt	104
Trucks Wireless G.S.	38
Trucks Wireless Cable Layer	4
Lorries G.S. 3 Ton	335
Lorries Workshops	3
Lorries Breakdown	7
Lorries Stores	17
Lorries 24 KW Workshops	1
Lorries Breakdown (Derrick)	1
Lorries FBE	2
Lorries SBG	2
Trailers FBE	1
Lorries Office	-
Trucks Compressor	7
Trucks Water 15 cwt.	6
Armoured Cars	26
Launches	2

G Grant.

Colonel,
A.D.S.T.

12th December 1941.

PEF: West Africa

APPENDIX B.

DEFICIENCIES IN ARMS AND AMMUNITION, WEST AFRICA AS AT 20.11.41.

[redacted]

A. Arms

Item	Deficiency
Guns, A.A., 40 mm	46
Guns, A/tk 2pr	85
L.M.G's. (Brens)	436
M.M.G's. (Vickers)	117
Machines, Carbine, Thompson	471
Rifles, A/tk	315
Rifles	15,842
Pistols, .38 or .45	3,730
Pistols, Signal	136

B. Ammunition

Item	Deficiency
.303-in Ball	13,017,000
.303-in Tracer	4,381,000
.380	14,500
.45 Thompson	1,531,000
3-in Mortar H.E.	157,000
3-in Mortar Smoke	72,700
Signals, Red	71,000
Signals, Green	74,000
.55 -in Armour Piercing	553,000
Grenades, 68 A/tk	21,000
2pdr A/tk	250,000

PSF: West Africa

MAJOR DEFICIENCIES - WEST AF[redacted] APPENDIX C

	LAGOS	FREETOWN	TAKORADI	BATHURST
Water Piping 3/4" F.R.	10,000	10,000	5,000	5,000
" " 1" F.R.	30,000	40,000	20,000	20,000
" " 1½" F.R.	15,000	20,000	10,000	8,000
" " 2" F.R.	40,000	80,000	30,000	20,000
" " 3" F.R.	10,000	15,000	10,000	8,000
" " 4" F.R. with fittings in proportion to above.	15,000	15,000	5,000	
Bibcocks 1/2"	200	200	100	50
" 3/4"	200	250	50	50
Mosquito Gauze, F.S.	50,000	400,000	150,000	100,000
Nails, 2" tons	5	15	10	10
" 4" "	10	10	8	8
Hose Delivery, 2". F.R.	400	600	300	200
Wood Preservative. Galls.	1,000	4,000	2,000	1,000
Bitumen Emulsion "	50,000	100,000	30,000	5,000
Electric Switches, 5 amp. doz.	100	100	50	30
Electric Light Sockets pendant, doz.	100	100	50	30
Cable electric T.R.S. 3/.029 single, yds.	3,000	3,000	2,000	1,000
Hinges Butt, 4". No.	1,000	1,000	1,000	500
" Tee, 6" No.	1,000	2,000	2,000	1,000
" Butt, 10" No.	1,000	2,000	1,000	500
~~Cement (must be in hermetically sealed drums) tons.~~	~~1,000~~	~~8,000~~	~~1,000~~	~~1,000~~

[signature]
Colonel.
CE. HQ MFWA
12/12/41

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. [redacted] Memo 1-17-73
By RT Date APR 10 1973

PSF: West Africa

"Q". APPENDIX D

Reference our conversation of this morning, herewith list of medical stores required :-

Antivenene (polyvalent against West African venomous snakes, including Bitis Gabonica if possible.)	doses	500.
Yellow Fever Vaccine	doses	50000.
Dried Plasma or Serum (bottles of 540 cc.)	bottles	1000.
Administration Sets for dried plasma or serum (if possible)	No	350.
Sulphanilamide Powder	lbs	100.
Sulphathiazole (0.5 g. tablets)	tablets	10000.
Sulphanilylguanidine	Grammes	30000.

R A Hepple

"M".
12.12.41.

Brigadier,
D.D.M.S.

West Africa
Special file

No. 294
February 27, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

FROM: William J. Donovan

The attached is a memorandum on West and Equatorial Africa. This is a summary in conclusion of a large report which I think unnecessary to impose upon you.

I think we are going to have this area pretty well covered by our Intelligence, and I will advise you of the specific means later.

C[redacted]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

MONOGRAPH No. 4

WEST AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA

FEBRUARY 15, 1942

Copy No. 100

[redacted]

NOTE

The photographs of Trans-Sahara roads which appear on the map, opposite page 9, are from *I. S. I. S. Report on Trans-Sahara Routes*, Inter-Service Topographical Department, October 1941. Permission to reproduce these photographs here is gratefully acknowledged to H. M. Government.

WEST AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA

The political divisions covered by this report are French West Africa,[1] Gambia, Portuguese Guinea, and the Bissagos Islands, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gold Coast, British and French Togoland, Nigeria, British and French Cameroons, French Equatorial Africa, Rio Muni (Spanish Guinea) and Fernando Po and the Belgian Congo. The area examined is, at present, under diverse control. The colonies are administered by the British, Belgian, Free French, Vichy, Portuguese, and Spanish governments; Liberia is an independent republic.

The region offers two main prizes: strategic position and economic resources. The familiar description of the strategic importance of Dakar and the other ports is omitted here.

In this preface to the summary it may not be amiss to point out the advantages which the Axis would enjoy by occupying the entire area:

---

[1] Which includes the District of Dakar, Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, French Nigeria.

(a) Excellent bases for air and naval operations in the South Atlantic.

(b) Potential bases for attack on South and East Africa, and on Latin America.

(c) Raw material resources capable of reducing significantly present stringencies in the Axis food and minerals position.

(d) Denial to the Allies of convoy assembly points, and disruption of the present British sea route to the Middle and Far East.

(e) Denial to the Allies of bases now used to supply aircraft to the Middle East (Takoradi to Cairo).

(f) Denial to the Allies of essential food and mineral resources on a scale sufficient to reduce seriously the military potential of the Allies.

CONTENTS

This monograph is a summary of the detailed study of West and Equatorial Africa prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of the Coordinator of Information.

POLITICAL COMPLEXION



WEST AND EQUATORIAL AFRICA

I. *Economic Resources*

The economic resources of West and Equatorial Africa include minerals of great strategic importance to both the Allies and the Axis. At the present time French West Africa is furnishing its total exportable supply of peanuts and palm oil to the Continent, where there is a major shortage of vegetable oils. Some small supplies of gold, diamonds, rutile, and wild rubber are also moving to the Continent from Vichy-administered regions; it is believed that an important smuggling trade in industrial diamonds is being carried on between Angola and Germany. Liberia, the Free French territories, the Belgian Congo, and the various British possessions are supplying the Allies with extremely important vegetable oils and rubber, as well as the following basic minerals: tin, copper, cobalt, manganese, chrome, columbium, tantalum, uranium, gold, and diamonds. The quantities involved are sufficient to make the resources a major prize for the Axis and are capable of eliminating the danger of several critical shortages. Their loss to the Allies might induce an appreciable decline in war production.

The following catalogue summarizes basic information with respect to the principal resources. Figures in parentheses indicate the percent of world production yielded from this area in 1938.[1]

A. MINERALS

(a) Cobalt (40 percent). The Belgian Congo produces about 2,000 tons of cobalt metal, which goes almost exclusively to

[1] An asterisk (*) indicates that no estimate of quantity is available.

the United States, where refining plants have recently been converted to deal with it. The Belgian Congo is probably the largest single world producer. The Continent is short of cobalt. Cobalt is used both as a steel hardener and catalyst in the manufacture of synthetic petroleum.

(b) Tin (11 percent). The Belgian Congo and Nigeria are expanding their output, which is expected to yield 32,000 tons in 1942. This output is of crucial importance since the loss of Far Eastern supplies. Tin is a major shortage in German war industries.

(c) Copper (6 percent). The Belgian Congo produces about 160,000 tons annually, which is badly needed in Germany despite substitutions. This copper is extremely important to the Allies.

(d) Manganese (10 percent). The Gold Coast produces about 600,000 tons, the Belgian Congo about 30,000 tons; these are major Allied sources. Germany needs manganese unless the Ukraine mines can be held, exploited, and their output transported.

(e) Columbium and Tantalum(*). These metals come from Nigeria and the Belgian Congo, respectively. They are important steel hardeners, required by both the Axis and the Allies. Columbium is especially important in welding hardened steels, which is an expanding use.

(f) Titanium (rutile) (2 percent). The relatively small supplies available are needed by the Axis especially as steel hardener. Titanium is also used as a paint pigment.

(g) Chrome (less than 1 percent). A considerable output is available at Sierra Leone, although internal transport facilities will probably limit 1942 exports to 5,000 tons. The Axis supply is short.

(h) Diamonds (86 percent). The industrial uses of diamonds are important. The Axis supply is short. This area includes the major world producers.

MAJOR STRATEGIC RESOURCES
OF WEST & EQUATORIAL AFRICA





PERCENTAGE OF WORLD PRODUCTION IN WEST & EQUATORIAL AFRICA

(i) Uranium and Radium(*). The Allies have sufficient stocks. The Axis probably needs new supplies for medical and industrial uses.

(j) Gold (5 percent). Gold is useful to the Axis for political purposes in acquiring foreign exchange.

B. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

(a) Peanuts (20 percent). French West Africa, Nigeria, the Belgian Congo, and Gambia are major producers. Peanut oils are critically needed by the Axis and are important to the Allies. Dakar employs pressing facilities. The oil is used as diesel fuel.

(b) Palm Oil (42 percent) and Palm Kernel Oil (81 percent). Nigeria, the Belgian Congo, French West Africa are major producers. These all serve the same needs and uses as peanut oil, although their fuel use is less highly developed.

(c) Rubber (less than 1 percent). Liberia will produce 10,000 tons of crude rubber in 1942, which is badly needed by the Allies. The estimated 1943 production is 17,000 tons. French West Africa is believed to furnish 2,300 tons of wild rubber to the Axis. Crude rubber is needed to supplement synthetic rubber in tire manufacture.

(d) The area also produces cocoa, coffee, cotton and cotton-seed, sesamum, copra, timber, sugar, tobacco, beeswax, and lesser quantities of other tropical products.

The minerals of the Belgian Congo constitute the greatest single stake within the region; the other major mineral deposits lie in British-held Gold Coast and Nigeria. Extensive military operations would be required by the Axis to get a significant amount of these minerals; and this would remain true even should Vichy enter full military collaboration with Germany.

The distribution of resources in this area also makes it likely that an Axis occupation, limited to Dakar and its hinterland, would re-

sult in a net economic loss to Germany. At the present time the resources of French West Africa are sent to the Continent not only from Dakar, but also from Conakry, Abidjan, Lomé, and Porto-Novo. These latter ports would be subject to Allied blockade unless a movement into Dakar were accompanied by a great increase in Axis naval strength in the area, or by successful action against the British colonies which flank important segments of French West Africa, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria.

II. *The Character of the Theater*

There are four factors which handicap extensive military action in the area by either side:

(a) Although the ports virtually dominate the individual regions, they are, on the whole, well defended from the sea.

(b) Overland transport, from Northwest to West Africa is inadequate for the large scale movement of troops and supplies; while the intercolonial rail, river, and road net has also remained relatively primitive.

(c) The climate, generally hot and humid, would, at best, restrict operations to the dry seasons.

(d) Health conditions are forbidding for Europeans. Malaria and dysentery are endemic. Elaborate precautions and continuous care would be required to keep any considerable number of white troops in action.

A. PORT FACILITIES

The ports dominate the road and railway systems of each region; the resources of the regions are, almost without exception, drained off from the hinterland to the ports. In most cases command of the port virtually ensures domination of the region. Defensive installations are concentrated overwhelmingly at the coastal outlets.

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The following table lists the principal ports and roughly characterizes them:

Port	Region	Comment
St. Louis	Senegal	Defended port, quay facilities, harbor bar limits vessels to 10-foot draft.
Dakar	Dakar District	Major commercial harbor and naval base; third largest port of France.
Rufisque	Senegal	Defended port, open roadstead, 4 wharves.
Kaolak	do	Estuary port, minor.
Bathurst	Gambia	Well-equipped minor port and naval base.
Ziguinchor	Senegal	Estuary port, minor.
Bissau	Portuguese Guinea	Major port of colony, adequate commercial facilities; 1 long quay, 18-foot low water draft.
Bolama	do	Minor port, important as Pan-American base.
Conakry	French Guinea	Defended port, considerable commercial facilities; 2 quays dredged to 26.4 and 19.8 feet.
Freetown	Sierra Leone	Major British port in area, defended; fairly large but antiquated facilities.
Monrovia	Liberia	Minor commercial port.
Abidjan	Ivory Coast	Large defended port, reported improved as secondary French naval base.
Grand Bassam	do	Port accessible only to small craft; cargo handled by surf boats.
Sekondi	Gold Coast	Open roadstead; considerable commercial facilities.
Takoradi	do	Well-equipped port, with minor repair facilities; important as way station for transfer of planes to Middle East.
Accra	do	Small harbor, shallow depth.
Lomé	Togo	Fairly adequate small port: new quay.
Cotonou	Dahomey	Minor commercial port; long pier for surf boats and small vessels.
Lagos	Nigeria	Major commercial port, capable of handling 3,000 tons per day.
Port Harvourt	do	Important coaling station, 41 miles up the Bonny River.
Calabar	do	Situated 29 miles up the Calabar River; wharf with 18-foot low water draft.
Douala	Cameroons	Defended river port, 15 miles from coast; 19-foot draft at the quays.



TYPICAL TRANS-SAHARAN "ROUTE" CONDITIONS



TRANSPORTATION

Port	Region	Comment
Kribi	Cameroons	Small landlocked harbor, available only to small craft and lighters.
Santa Isabella	Fernando Po	Safe anchorage; cargo handled by surf boat and lighter.
São Thomé	Portuguese island, same name.	Safe anchorage for small and moderate draft vessels.
Libreville	French Equatorial Africa.	Small river port; harbor and docks in poor condition.
Port Gentil	do	Good anchorage; 12-foot draft at the quays; minor commercial facilities.
Pointe Noire	do	Most important Free French port; adequate commercial facilities. Some new equipment needed.
Cabinda	Angola	Minor harbor.
Banana	Belgian Congo	Estuary port, 2 small piers; the Congo is navigable for 90 miles.
Boma	do	2 small piers; wharfage and lighter facilities; small floating dock; river port.
Ango-Ango	do	Fuel oil station.
Matadi	do	Uppermost river port on the Congo; piers cranes, and other facilities; link to the rail and road net of the Congo and Equatorial Africa.

B. INLAND TRANSPORT

West and Equatorial Africa were developed in accordance with the hypothesis that the exploiting power would have free access to the region by sea. To this primary assumption the French offered a qualified exception, for in their dream of African empire they saw a time when an easy way across the Sahara would make them independent of the sea. But even the French in their day-to-day development of African lands copied other colonizers and built inland routes to drain the produce of the hinterland down to the ports. All the powers used three methods of inland transport: rivers, roads, and railroads.

River traffic, which is the cheapest and easiest in theory, has its drawbacks. These rivers are seldom navigable over the full length

of their commercially important stretches; rapids may spoil an otherwise perfect stretch; river mouths may be clogged by sandbars or deltas. Furthermore there are not enough navigable rivers. The building of roads and railroads has become obligatory.

By and large, the trunk lines (both railroad and highway) drive straight for the coast, as the map indicates, but since feeders are essential there has developed a supplementary road net which leads out from the trunk lines to other productive areas. While these routes, primarily designed to serve a single colony, are sometimes well-built, they seldom join similar routes in the neighboring colonies. And as long as the sea is able to perform the function of binding colony to colony, there is little economic stimulus for building great intercolonial highways.

Today's situation will impose almost insuperable transport difficulties upon the power which tries to exploit West and Equatorial Africa without free employment of the sea. For the only alternative to water transport is the land route across the desert. This alternative presents two great problems.

1. Before goods can be fetched across the Sahara from the south they must be gathered at what might be considered the ports of the desert's southern rim. There are three of these which serve the three most favored trans-desert routes—Dakar, Gao, and Zinder—and none of them, except Dakar, is well nourished by feeder routes or able to offer suitable warehouse and sorting facilities. Getting the goods to Gao and Zinder is likely to be as strenuous a business as assaulting the Sahara itself.

2. The Sahara is wide, rough, and dry. Its roads are not roads at all, but merely tracks which pass over hard rocky ground or crusted sand. The shortest of them is 1,609 miles in length and is marked by infrequent cairns and monuments. The long distances between the oases and the inadequately stocked depots force today's desultory trans-desert auto traffic to overburden itself with gas, oil, water, and food. Furthermore, the few cars which now make the crossing (some two to three hundred are supposed to have made the trip in 1935) must be equipped with special tires, water condensers, and other desert paraphernalia.

To run motor convoys over the three best routes in sufficient number to make them commercially useful would not only demand a vast development of desert provision stations and of special vehicles, but would also require an improvement of the road itself. The surface is not able to take the pounding of a continuous heavy motor transport.

Because of these difficulties the French are said to have abandoned the attempt to conquer the Sahara by motortruck. Rather they seem to have put their faith in a railroad line which they are even now pushing forward with considerable effort and scant hope of success.

C. COMMUNICATIONS: RADIO, TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE

The principal seaports are adequately equipped for radio communication with ships. Only short-wave broadcasts from Europe and America are easily and regularly heard; adequate sets are almost exclusively in the hands of the white population. There are also numerous small radio stations, for intercolonial communication and for communication between the towns and their hinterland.

The French colonies are linked to Casablanca, France, and South America (Recife) by cables out of Dakar. Accra, in the Gold Coast, is the cable center for the British colonies, with lines to England and South America. Cable lines also link Dakar and Accra with the other major ports.

The major towns have local telephone systems, and are linked by telegraph lines which follow the railways in most cases.

D. CLIMATE

The climate in these regions varies not only with the latitude, but with the terrain and the distance from the coast. There are in general, a wet and dry season and high mean temperatures. For the area north of Douala (French Equatorial Africa) the rainy

season is roughly from May to November. South of Douala the seasons are reversed: June to September is relatively dry, the other months are rainy, in varying intensity. The Guinea and Liberia regions experience two rainy seasons. In West and Equatorial Africa total rainfall decreases and temperatures become more extreme inland. In Angola, on the other hand, temperatures decrease and rainfall increases as one moves eastward from the coast.

E. HEALTH

Health conditions in tropical Africa impose a severe handicap on military operations. Virtually all of the diseases characteristic of the tropics are to be found there as well as numerous others, more typical of temperate climates, such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, typhoid, diphtheria, and smallpox. The diseases most prevalent are malaria, black-water fever, relapsing fever, sleeping sickness, yellow fever, dengue, dysentery (amoebic and bacillary), leprosy, yaws, worm and venereal diseases and ailments deriving from nutritional deficiencies, e. g., scurvy and pellagra.

The diseases most to be feared by Europeans are malaria, black-water, relapsing and yellow fevers, the dysenteries, and venereal infections. The combination of hot, humid climate, the primitive nature of the country, its relative isolation from the rest of the world, and the lack of normal associations and recreation, induces a sort of tropical neurasthenia which also incapacitates many Europeans. Yellow fever is widely endemic but is well under control in so far as its incidence among Europeans is concerned, although epidemics break out sporadically in native communities. Sleeping sickness is severe among the native inhabitants of those sections in which the tsetse fly breeds, but has not greatly threatened the well-being of Europeans.

Danger from these diseases varies from locality to locality. Malaria is widespread, but its incidence is much higher along the coast than in such hinterland sections as Chad and the Sudan. Yellow fever and sleeping sickness areas are well charted. The rainy seasons are generally less healthy than the dry.

CLIMATE and VEGETATION

On the whole, the area, especially in the coastal sectors, is one of the most unhealthy in the world. The Guinea Coast has been known since the days of the slave trade as the "white man's graveyard." Yet it has been found that most of the diseases can be avoided or remedied by proper precautions and prophylaxis. The greatest health problems of the European in tropical Africa today are associated with malaria and dysentery. The white Free French troops in Equatorial Africa have suffered from a high incidence of both malaria and venereal disease. Among the Pan-American Airways personnel at Accra, Gold Coast, malaria has attained a cumulative incidence of 55 percent, and it is anticipated that eventually 90 percent to 95 percent of the men will have been attacked by the malaria parasites. White British troops stationed in West Africa have suffered equally. Reports indicate, however, that barracks frequently have been inadequately protected by screening and lighting. Dysentery is more easily controlled.

It is now generally recognized that the habitual "five grains of quinine daily" is not infallible against malaria. The one certain preventive is to avoid the bite of an infected mosquito. This can be done only by staying out of areas in which the infected mosquito is bred, or by wearing mosquito boots and clothing designed to lessen the body area exposed to bites; by living in quarters tightly screened and well lighted; and by sleeping under individual mosquito nets. Strict precautions with regard to water for human consumption, such as boiling and filtering, or chemical treatment, and careful supervision of native cooks and mess hands for cleanliness, adequately protect against the dysenteries.

There is nothing in the climate which makes it prohibitively dangerous for the European, adequately equipped, clothed, instructed, and protected, to live and work in central Africa in reasonable comfort and safety. European officials, missionaries, traders, and their families remain in the tropics for extended periods, and live normally long lives. European troops have operated successfully in some of the worst sections of tropical Africa. Substantial numbers of Allied white troops and technicians are now stationed in this area, but native troops under white officers comprise the bulk of the forces.

III. *Native Manpower and Morale*

West and Equatorial Africa, with a population in excess of 61,000,000 inhabiting an area of 4,452,954 square miles, offers no unlimited reservoir of manpower for additional economic or military activities. Most of this region is sparsely settled, with an average population density of only 13.5, and few large concentrations of population. The number of Europeans resident in this area, in which the severely tropical climate has discouraged white settlement, is about one-tenth of 1 percent of the native population.

The manpower resources of French Equatorial Africa are already utilized fully. Only in British West Africa (mainly in Nigeria and the Gold Coast), are limited native surpluses available.

The climate and disease characteristic of tropical Africa have left their impress upon the native. Large numbers of natives work reluctantly, if at all, in this hot climate; while many others are incapacitated for useful productive effort by the ravages of disease. Widespread physical debility, general nutritional deficiency, hookworm, malaria, yaws and venereal disease all serve to reduce greatly the number of able-bodied native men available for work or combat. While African women normally serve as an important labor force in the traditional native economy, they do not willingly work for white men.

The native constitutes the indispensable labor supply in modern Africa. Long accustomed to a communal way of life, he is not eager to work for wages, and capitation levies in the form of head and hut taxes are employed to induce him to work.

The vast majority of natives are plodding, simple peasants, wedded to their communal lands, and endowed with a typically peasant outlook on life. Among these are found many tribes whose members are industrious and skillful agriculturists. They are exceedingly provincial, and their world is still largely bounded by the territorial limits of the tribal domain. In the large trading centers, and especially in the seaports, however, there has developed a substantial wage-earning class of natives who are largely detribalized, and divorced from the land and the traditional native way of life. In

POPULATION DENSITY

PER SQUARE MILE



5 LARGEST POPULATION UNITS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

this group are to be found some highly undesirable elements which have absorbed most of the vices and few of the virtues of the European. Living in the squalor of native slums, addicted to alcohol, disease-ridden, lazy, and venal, this derelict element in the native population constitutes a vexing problem for the European.

The low wages prevailing for all but a few clerical positions offer natives little incentive for industry or efficiency in their work. Unskilled native workers in both British and French territories commonly receive from 6 to 10 cents a day, while native artisans draw from 20 cents to $1 a day.

Full utilization of the available native manpower is hampered by the lack of simple machinery.

In the past, France has utilized much more of this colonial manpower for military service than has Britain, but both countries during the present war have increased their existing establishments. Small but well-trained infantry forces, under European officers, are stationed at many points, especially in Senegal, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Chad. The tribes vary greatly in skill and valor on the field of battle, but the Senegalese and Hausas have won high praise in this war and the natives of the Belgian Congo attacked and beat numerically superior Italian forces at the sources of the Nile.

There have been no serious disturbances and no organized opposition to the war effort in the territories controlled by the British and Free French, and native morale is not a critical problem. But the attitude characteristic of most natives appears to be one of passive indifference, with little comprehension of the great issues in conflict. Native attitudes are difficult to appraise, because of the general lack of education.

There is, however, a highly articulate native élite. This group is concentrated primarily in the towns. It embraces the affluent chiefs and their retainers,[1] the educated natives (many of whom hold

[1] Where the administrative policy of Indirect Rule is applied, as in British Nigeria, the tendency is for the responsible chiefs to command large salaries in addition to the services traditionally rendered by their native subjects. The Nigerian Emirs draw the highest incomes among the native rulers of West and Equatorial Africa. The Emir of Kano, for example, receives a salary of £8,000, together with an allowance of £2,500. Other British Emirs are in proportionate income brackets; the chiefs of French territories receive much less.

degrees from Oxford, Cambridge, French or American Universities), and the ambitious native youth. It has newspapers and organizations to express its views. In the French colonies the élite are absorbed in the administrative system and show a definitely pro-French attitude; that is, they reflect the attitudes of their white administrative superiors. In the British colonies, where barriers between Europeans and Africans are higher, many of the élite remain closer to the native masses and have a sharply critical, though not pro-Nazi, outlook.

Throughout West and Equatorial Africa the natives ordinarily live and think on a tribal basis, and "nationalism" as known elsewhere can hardly be said to exist. What little "ideology" there is, especially among the élite, is strongly anti-German in the former German colonies and anti-Nazi in general. This attitude, however, is based on racial grounds, as a reaction to Nazi ideas and practices, rather than upon political considerations. It is essentially negative in character, that is, anti-Nazi but not pro-Ally. Little has been done in British West Africa, even by way of symbolic gestures, toward creating among native masses any positive sentiment for the democratic cause. In both British and Free French territories members of the native élite have made substantial monetary contributions to the war chests.

The entrance of the United States into the war on the side of Britain is a factor calculated to improve native morale and to win greater sympathy for the Allied cause, since the United States legendarily is held in great respect by natives.

Administrative policies in the several political subdivisions of this area are varied. The British, especially in Nigeria, have applied the method of Indirect Rule, which embodies principles of tutelage and trusteeship, under which the natives are to be trained in self-government. The French have adhered to a policy of *association*, a combination of a mild version of indirect rule with the earlier and unsuccessful French policy of *assimilation*, by which the natives were to become full-fledged French citizens. In some territories a form of direct rule is employed, with a minimum of native participation. In none of the territories, not excepting Liberia, has the native gained a


Canary Is.
Portuguese Guinea
Liberia
Fernando Po
Spanish Guinea
Portuguese Angola
NAZI INFILTRATION POINTS

controlling voice in the policy-making deliberations of the territory; in most his participation is advisory. Where the franchise exists, its extension to natives is very limited. The native chief holds a position of important local responsibility, especially under the British, but he is subject to the direct supervision of British officials.

Reports indicate that there has been a tendency for the Vichy French to modify the traditional French native policy in favor of a more authoritative and repressive regime, with resultant restiveness among the natives in Vichy-controlled Africa.

IV. *German Preparations and Current Activities*

In 1936 Germany began an extensive agitation for the return of her former colonies. In the course of the present war, her aims have gradually expanded to include all Africa as the logical economic complement to the New Order in Europe. Tropical agricultural produce and minerals are particularly coveted.

In order to awaken sympathy for its African designs among the German people, and to enlist and train Germans to become colonists, the National Socialist government established the *Reichskolonialbund*. By 1939 this organization had approximately 8,000 officials and 1,000,000 members. Since 1936, and particularly between 1938 and the opening of the Russian campaign in June 1941 its activities have included:

(a) An enormous propaganda campaign to enlist recruits for colonial training and to prepare the German public for action in Equatorial Africa;

(b) The establishing of schools and lecture courses in which tens of thousands of German men and women have been prepared for life and work in the tropics.

While the demands made upon Germany's energy and manpower by the Russian war have reduced the intensity of *Reichskolonialbund* activity and the number of its members, the German government nevertheless has at its disposal a substantial body of trained colonists.

In addition to this group, Germany has trained a large number of specialists in the following fields: tropical medicine, colonial administration, colonial forestry, colonial mining, colonial geography, and colonial technology. The Reich Research Council has coordinated and directed the activities of German Colonial scientists, specializing in two activities:

(a) The production of convenient handbooks and compendia of colonial knowledge;

(b) Planning extensively for the exploitation of African resources.

Germany has supplemented these domestic preparations with familiar Fifth Column operations in Equatorial Africa. Colonial scientists have gathered information not only in their own special fields but also on harbors, trails, disease areas, and highways. German nationals have been mobilized for espionage, while efforts have been made to influence the natives, and even to organize them, as German Allies.

On the whole, it appears that these operations have been successfully eliminated in British and Free French possessions. There remains, nevertheless, a chain of bases for German activity. These stretch from Spanish Morocco down through the Canaries, Portuguese Guinea, Liberia, Spanish Guinea, and Portuguese Angola. In the Canaries and Angola there are, undoubtedly, considerable numbers of pro-Nazi Germans; and the Canaries may, even now, serve as a German submarine base. In the other areas some German agents are believed to be operating, but the reports of their efficacy and number are conflicting. It is clear, however, that Germany has created and is holding a fringe of "infection points" which flank the whole West and Equatorial African area with the active cooperation of the Spanish government and the helpful incompetence of the Portuguese.

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