

MEMORANDUM

Recent victories of American land, sea and air forces in the Pacific stand out in stark contrast to the current bitter retreat of Chinese armies in East China. The invasion of Leyte and the second Battle of the Philippine Sea are decisive victories over Japan but the fall of Kwailin and Imbance are major setbacks for allied forces in China. In the Pacific, the Battle of Midway slowed the surging tide of Japanese aggression. British, Dutch and American possessions when the war with Japan and only six months old; reconquest of stolen lands began two months later when United States Marines landed on Guadalcanal. China, on the other hand, is in the eighth year of war, Japanese armies are advancing farther into the interior than ever before and reconquest has not even begun.

THE PRESIDENT

and

U.S. AID TO CHINA

— 1944 —

The prospect has never been so dark for China as it is now. Japanese advances threaten to split the country in two and, as the enemy drives on, the Chinese Government is faced with increasing political and economic problems. Defeats have almost destroyed the Chinese army, political dissensions have paralyzed the government, and inflation is causing economic chaos throughout the country. The Chinese war potential is at its lowest ebb. The present crisis has so grave overtones that some observers in China believe the Chungking government might collapse if Japanese advances reach farther and the country might disintegrate in civil war or as a prey for the Japanese. If this should happen, all the effort which the United States has poured into the war in China would be lost.

The collapse of China would be tragic, not only because the rest of the Chinese people would become victims of Japanese aggression, but also because

INTRODUCTION


Recent victories of American land, sea and air forces in the Pacific stand out in sharp contrast to the current bitter retreat of Chinese armies in East China. The invasion of Leyte and the second Battle of the Philippine Sea are decisive victories over Japan but the fall of Kweilin and Luichow are major defeats for allied forces in China. In the Pacific, the Battle of Midway slowed the onrushing tide of Japanese aggression against British, Dutch and American possessions when the war with Japan was only six months old; reconquest of stolen lands began two months later when United States Marines landed on Guadalcanal. China, on the other hand, is in her eighth year of war, Japanese armies are advancing farther into the interior than ever before and reconquest has not even begun.

The prospect has never been so dark for China as it is now. Japanese advances threaten to split the country in two and, as the enemy drives on, the Chinese Government is faced with increasing political and economic problems. Defeats have almost destroyed the Chinese army, political dissensions rack Chungking, and inflation is causing economic chaos throughout the country. The Chinese war potential is at its lowest ebb. The present crisis is so grave that some observers in China believe the Chungking government might collapse if the Japanese advance much farther and the country might disintegrate in civil war -- an easy prey for the Japanese. If this should happen, all the effort which the United States has poured into the war in China would be irretrievably lost.

The collapse of China would be tragic, not only because the rest of the Chinese people would become victims of Japanese aggression, but also because we

would lose China as a base for a future assault on Japan. The loss of a foothold on the continent of Asia would be one of the gravest strategic setbacks which the Allies could suffer. It would mean for Japan what Dunkerque and the fall of France in 1940 meant for Germany; the Allies could return to the continent only at the cost of a great amphibious operation.

As the war in Europe draws to a close and we prepare for the final assault on Japan, China will assume a more important role than she has had in the past. Her military strength, therefore, is of great interest to the United States and from the outbreak of the war the United States has been supporting China. As the threat of military disaster grows, the President and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek work in closer cooperation than ever before to increase American assistance to China and to uphold and strengthen Chinese resistance. This paper is an account of the problems which the President has faced in the last year in carrying out the U.S. policy of aiding China.



Ground situation in China, 14 November 1944

U.S. POLICY

The current role of China in the war against Japan, so far as the United States is concerned, is to contain the bulk of the Japanese army and to serve as a base for limited operations against Japan. It is in our interest to support Chinese armies so that they will contain as many Japanese troops as possible, to extend the area of Allied-control in China so that Japan will be within easy bombing range, and to prevent the Japanese from getting complete control of the coast of China. Supplies in quantity can reach China only by sea, hence some of the coast and a route from the coast to the interior must be kept open if we are ever to supply large Chinese armies. Maintaining a corridor in China from the coast to the interior also prevents the Japanese from completing an overland route to Southeast Asia. The China Sea is now the lifeline of the Japanese Empire, a lifeline which is imperilled by the great superiority of the United States Navy. Should the enemy complete his overland route to the resources of Southeast Asia, he would become in a large measure immune from naval attack and our naval superiority would have much less significance. These are the strategic factors which have determined the U.S. policy towards China.

It is our policy to keep China in the war and to make her an effective military ally by training her soldiers, sending supplies to her troops, giving air support to her armies and encouraging unity among diverse political groups.

It is our hope that we can maintain China until National and Communist forces are united and Chinese armies are trained, organized, and supplied, when China herself will be able to drive out the Japanese without the assistance of great American armies.

This is a national policy and its execution is in the hands of the President. The War Department works out the details of our assistance to China, but when problems arise involving U.S. interests, they are referred to the President. From time to time the President must intervene to interpret to military planners the political implications of their decisions, which they may have overlooked when they were considering military objectives alone. Clausewitz said in his classic Principles of War that, "None of the main plans which are necessary for war can be made without insight into political relations." This dictum is amply illustrated in the following pages where the President's "insight into political relations" is evident in the execution of our policy of aid to China.

The major problem of the United States in carrying out that policy is how to use most effectively the limited supplies we can send to China. Only a few planes and a few thousand tons of supplies reach China each month; there have never been enough planes, ammunition, fuel, or weapons for allied forces in China. Resources are spread so thinly that their use assumes significance out of all proportion to their quantity. Where and how to use the air forces, trained troops and precious air freight is not only a tactical matter but also a strategic and political question which often requires decision by the President and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Because there is so much at stake -- keeping China in the war -- problems about the use of the limited war resources we send to her are hard to solve. Every decision involves at least two countries, the United States and China, and sometimes three; the United States, China, and Great Britain. Because of the great distances over which allied armies are fighting, no single command is possible and American forces are involved in complex command organizations in China, Burma and India. Different theories of strategy, conflicting opinions

of amphibious, land and air operations between Allied commanders, and even between American officers, confuse and further complicate debates over the use of meagre resources. American forces in China and Burma have a simple mission of engaging the Japanese, but Chinese forces must be disposed by Chiang Kai-shek with an eye to the stability of his government. His government is threatened not only by autonomous war-lords and "Communists" but by inflation which the United States encourages by pouring money into the construction of air fields for long range bombers.

These are only a few of the factors which complicate tactical and strategic decisions which the United States must make in support of its policy of aiding China. Simple questions become complicated, conflicting strategies hamstringing campaigns, and differences of military judgment become international issues.

In the solution of the major military problems which affect policy, the President and Chiang Kai-shek take a direct part. They are the Heads of State and Commanders-in-Chief of their respective armed forces and they must, therefore, act when a question of policy is an issue. Since 1941 when the United States entered the war against Japan, the President and Chiang have been in direct communication with one another about American aid to China, American military cooperation with Chinese forces, and the many related problems which their military staffs cannot solve themselves.

The President and the Generalissimo discuss these matters by dispatches, letters, and through the medium of personal envoys. They have met only once, at Cairo in November 1943. Constant discussion has brought about understanding and mutual confidence, and faith in their ability to solve their problems easily. Chiang has always been quick to reiterate his desire to follow the President's wishes whenever a particularly hard problem arises. For example, he sent word

to the President by General Hurley before the Cairo Conference that he had "implicit confidence" in the President's motives, that he was committed to the principles which the President represented, and that he would follow the President's leadership on the diplomatic and political questions to be considered at Cairo.² In July 1944, when there was a grave military crisis in East China and there was a difference of opinion between the President and Chiang over the means of dealing with that crisis, Chiang wrote:

"The basis of Sino-American cooperation rests upon high moral principles, mutual confidence, and unity of purpose. In the seven years of China's war of resistance, President Roosevelt has, from the very beginning, made the most earnest effort to assist her. As an industrially undeveloped and militarily unprepared nation, China has been able to attain her present position principally through the United States' consistent policy of aid to China, and this can never be forgotten, but will be gratefully remembered, by the entire Chinese people.

"The extent of close cooperation between China and the United States cannot, indeed, be compared or equalled by any other countries. Consequently China has always supported President Roosevelt's views and plans, whether in relation to China or to the world at large, and has not failed to accept any proposal which might advance the common purpose of China and the United States, and does not prejudice the fundamental national interests of China."³

Another characteristic of the correspondence of the President with the Generalissimo is the frequent restatement of the roles of the United States and China in the war. This results in so clear an understanding of responsibilities that there has never been a serious disagreement between the United States and China which was not settled in a short time.

The President and the Generalissimo dealt with all phases of allied support to China in the first two years of the war. Among the earliest problems were those of command and organization. After lengthy discussion, General Stilwell was named commander of all U.S. forces in China, Burma and India and Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and later, after the Quebec Conference of August 1943,

when the Southeast Asia command was organized, Stilwell was also named deputy to Admiral Mountbatten.

The President and Chiang also kept the use of air power in China under constant review. Chiang pressed continually for more planes for General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force, for more planes for the Chinese Air Force, and for an increased air lift by transport plane to China over the Hump. The President did the best he could to satisfy the Generalissimo by keeping pressure on the War Department to increase allocations to China while at the same time he explained to Chiang why all his requests were not met.

The training and use of Chinese ground troops in Burma and China grew in significance in the correspondence of the President and Chiang in late 1942 and 1943. The President urged Chiang to support to the fullest training programs which General Stilwell instituted in India for Chinese troops and to carry out reforms and reorganization in the Chinese army which Stilwell desired. When Chiang was won to the American position, the President then began urging the British to lend the necessary assistance and facilities in India for the training of Chinese officers at Ramgarh, India. The President's major efforts in the spring of 1943 were devoted to encouraging both the British and Chinese to throw their full weight into the campaign to retake northern Burma. After the Quebec Conference of August 1943, which provided for intensified operations in Southeast Asia, he increased his efforts to persuade Chiang to embark on a full-scale offensive in Burma.

The Cairo Conference in November 1943 brought together the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Chinese general officers for the first time and enabled them to thresh out many problems and to agree upon a plan for combined operations in 1944. At the same time the President and Chiang Kai-shek discussed major war

aims which were embodied and published in the Cairo Declaration. Due to a lack of resources and China's isolation, however, some of the commitments made at Cairo had to be broken and it has required the constant attention of the President and the Generalissimo since then to decide how available resources are to be used most effectively.

The principal issues which the President and the Generalissimo discussed in 1944 have been the campaign in Burma, use of air power, command and organization of allied forces, and the unification of China. These were not new issues, but they were shaped by the turn of events and the decisions of the Cairo Conference.

General Stilwell acting as Chiang's Chief of Staff presented to the Conference on 23 November a paper entitled "Role of China in the Defeat of Japan". This outline of Chiang Kai-shek's view discussed both current and future operations: the campaign in North Burma to open a land route to China, improvement of Chinese internal communications, and training and equipping the Chinese Army. As for future operations, he proposed intensive bombing of Japan by Very Long Range Bombers, the capture of Canton and Hongkong, air coverage to clear the Straits of Formosa and the South China Sea, and an amphibious operation against Formosa. The Generalissimo and General Stilwell thought that these operations could be mounted successfully and at low cost from China.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered Chiang's proposals carefully. There was no question about continuing current operations. They concurred in them as well as in the Very Long Range bombing program for which preparations were already underway. But the Chiefs found Chiang's proposed future operations unrealistic from the logistic point of view. How, for instance, were amphibious landings for an operation against Formosa to reach the Chinese coast? General Marshall and Admiral Nimitz were quick to point out to the British Chiefs of Staff, however.

THE CAIRO CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 1943


The Three-Power Conference of China, Great Britain and the United States held at Cairo in November 1943 was the first meeting of the President, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It was also the first time that their military staffs had met together although one of the American Chiefs, General Arnold, had been in Chungking. It was therefore with great interest that the Combined Chiefs of Staff heard the opinions of Chiang on proposed operations in his theatre for 1944.

General Stilwell acting as Chiang's Chief of Staff presented to the Conference on 23 November a paper entitled "Role of China in the Defeat of Japan".⁴ This outline of Chiang Kai-shek's views discussed both current and future operations: the campaign in North Burma to open a land route to China, improvement of Chinese internal communications, and training and equipping the Chinese Army. As for future operations, he proposed intensive bombing of Japan by Very Long Range Bombers, the capture of Canton and Hongkong, air coverage to close the Straits of Formosa and the South China Sea, and an amphibious operation against Formosa. The Generalissimo and General Stilwell thought that these operations could be mounted successfully and at low cost from China.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered Chiang's proposals carefully. There was no question about continuing current operations. They concurred in these at once as well as in the Very Long Range bombing program for which preparations were already underway. But the Chiefs found Chiang's proposed future moves unrealistic from the logistic point of view. How, for instance, were amphibious craft for an operation against Formosa to reach the China coast? General Marshall and Admiral King were quick to point out to the British Chiefs of Staff, however,

that these plans were apparently a significant change in Chiang's strategic thinking. Until this time his sole interest had been in a large U.S. air force and plenty of transport planes; his change of heart in the direction of building up his ground forces and using them offensively was encouraging. It had taken months to overcome his reluctance to let Chinese troops be trained at Ramgarh, India, under General Stilwell, more months before he let their numbers be increased, and still longer before he assented to the building up of his Yunnan forces. Now that Chiang seemed to be interested in his ground troops, said General Marshall,⁵ his interest should be encouraged.

Later the same day, the Generalissimo personally explained his views to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the First Plenary Session of the Conference. The President opened the discussion by remarking that their historic meeting would bear fruit for decades to come and he then invited a general discussion of planning by stating the basic understanding of the Conference: "unanimous agreement that every effort should be made to send more equipment to the Chinese, with a view to accelerating the process by which we could launch an air offensive against the heart of Japan itself."⁶ Prime Minister Churchill and Admiral Mountbatten described the buildup of British forces in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean and proposed operations for 1944. In brief, Mountbatten's plan provided for (1) the continuation of a drive down the Mogaung Valley by a Chinese corps to open the route of the proposed Ledo road, (2) an advance by a British Indian corps on the Arakan coast beginning in mid-January, (3) an advance at the same time by another British Indian corps from Imphal, (4) an air-borne operation to capture Indaw, and, (5) special operations beginning in late February by Long Range Penetration Groups in advance of the Ledo and Chinese Yunnan forces.⁷ Three hundred twenty thousand men, a far greater force



MOUNTBATTEN'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS

than ever before employed in this theatre, were to be engaged in a far-flung series of campaigns of daring design where surprise and secrecy of tactics and logistics were to be key factors. The plans of Admiral Mountbatten counted upon the cooperation and coordinated advances of Chiang's Army in the Yunnan Province across the Salween River.

The Generalissimo then explained his strategic concepts. He limited his discussion entirely to Burma. The operations which General Stilwell had proposed earlier, were, as a matter of fact, never referred to again. A successful campaign in North Burma in 1944 depended, said Chiang, on the strength of Naval forces in the Indian Ocean and on coordination of Naval and land action. Admiral Mountbatten had informed him in Chungking that there would be an amphibious operation in March 1944 and he was counting on it. Burma was the key to the whole campaign in Asia. If the Japanese were driven from Burma, Chiang continued, their next stand would be in northern China and finally Manchuria. Hence the loss of Burma would be a very serious matter to the Japanese and they would fight tenaciously to hold it. The Japanese, concluded the Generalissimo, surely would attempt to reinforce Burma once the Allied land drives from India and southern China began; their reinforcements could be stopped only by "vigorous Naval operations." Chiang was convinced simultaneous naval and land operations alone gave good chance for success in Burma.

Prime Minister Churchill replied that naval action would not necessarily be coordinated with an Army offensive and that he could not agree that land success hinged entirely on a simultaneous naval concentration; our great naval superiority would ensure safe communications and it seemed very unlikely that the enemy would send Naval forces of any strength to the Bay of Bengal.

Mr. Churchill's disclaimer of any obligation to provide an amphibious operation simultaneous with the opening of the land campaign in Burma ended the first Plenary meeting. The difference of opinion between Chiang, who believed in the need for an amphibious operation and the Prime Minister, who did not, was the subject of much debate in succeeding Combined Staff conferences. The President remarked at the Second Plenary Session on 24 November that the Generalissimo had been well satisfied with the previous day's discussion, but unfortunately the next two days' showed that to be a false hope.

Further discussion by Admiral Mountbatten, acting on behalf of the Combined Chiefs, with Chiang Kai-shek brought to light additional conflicts of opinion between the Generalissimo and the Anglo-American Staffs. Chiang demanded that the air lift over the Hump be increased immediately to 10,000 tons a month to build up the Chinese Air Force. He asked for a more ambitious ground campaign by the British forces on the Arakan coast of Burma and an additional advance of the Indaw and Imphal forces of northwestern Burma to Mandalay, while at the same time Chiang limited the advance of his own troops in Yunnan Province to Lashio. Finally, of course, Chiang repeated his demand for an amphibious operation in March which, he said, was necessary to draw off the enemy air force from Northern Burma, and without which he would not let his Yunnan force participate in the campaign.

While the President and the Generalissimo discussed war aims and the broad political questions facing the two nations, the Chinese military representative who had accompanied Chiang together with General Stilwell, Admiral Mountbatten, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff examined Mountbatten's proposals for the 1944 Burma campaign and the Chinese counter-proposals. A thorough re-examination of

available resources convinced the Chiefs of Staff that Chiang's demands were not feasible.

The campaign in Northern Burma was designed to open the land route to China in order to equip the Chinese Army. This was the major objective; it could not be hazarded by diverting planes to build up Hump tonnage as Chiang requested, for the short-term objective of supplying a few tons of material to the Chinese army by air when the long-term objective of a land supply route was at stake. As for the Generalissimo's second point, a more ambitious ground offensive by British troops, the Combined Chiefs decided it was not possible. Mountbatten's plan was to advance his Imphal force as far as he could before the monsoon began and to resume the offensive when the rains ceased. To reach Mandalay before the monsoon, as the Generalissimo demanded, would require greatly enlarged forces and an estimated 535 additional transport planes. And, said General Marshall, the planes simply were not available.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff instructed Admiral Mountbatten to present their conclusions to the Generalissimo on 26 November as he was preparing to leave Cairo. Chiang was informed that his proposals for the Northern Burma campaign were rejected but those which Mountbatten had presented for the Southeast Asia command were approved.

Admiral Mountbatten also informed Chiang that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had reached no decision on the amphibious operation which he had promised Chiang some weeks before and on which Chiang insisted. It would be studied later when an overall survey of amphibious operations was made. A fleet would be operating in the Indian Ocean by that time but specific supporting operations could not be promised. As for the Generalissimo's demand for 10,000 ton Hump traffic, Mountbatten informed him that the goal would be attempted but would probably not be

reached for several months.¹⁴

On the same day the Generalissimo received the disappointing news that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not agreed with his military plans, a joint communique was issued by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek on the Cairo Conference. They announced as their war aims that Japan would be stripped of all the territory she had seized since she began her war of aggression. The Cairo Declaration was of considerable value for allied political and psychological warfare and its publication greatly encouraged the Chinese people.

Before the Generalissimo had reached Chungking, the strategic picture of the war against Japan was altered by developments at the Teheran Conference of the President, Mr. Churchill and their military staffs with Marshal Stalin, and by further discussions of the Anglo-American Staffs at Cairo. In the first place, Marshal Stalin voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan when Germany had been defeated; secondly, the invasion of Normandy was set with May as the target date; thirdly, a new operation, the invasion of southern France, was also to be in May; and lastly, Admiral Mountbatten had prepared plans for an amphibious operation to support the Burma campaign (as Chiang had demanded) and his estimate of resources required was exceedingly high.¹⁵

These developments required a reorientation of strategy for the Far East. The Russian decision meant that bases better than there could ever be in China would be available for the assault on Japan; furthermore they might be usable sooner than Chinese bases could be recaptured from the enemy. Operations in Asia thus lost a good deal of their value at a time when their costs were rising very high. The decision to carry out two invasions of France in May meant that landing craft had to be withdrawn from the Bay of Bengal and the expensive invasion

of the Andaman Islands (which Mountbatten had chosen as the amphibious operation) either cancelled, cut down, or postponed. There simply were not enough craft for all three operations. When Admiral Mountbatten reported that he could not pare down the invasion of the Andamans without endangering its success, the British suggested that it be cancelled altogether and the Prime Minister in the Third Plenary Meeting on 4 December suggested that the landing craft for the Andaman operation be withdrawn for the European invasion at once.¹⁶

At this point the President intervened. He would not agree, he said, to dropping the Andaman invasion. Our moral obligation to China committed us to support her. Chiang Kai-shek had been promised, even before the Cairo Conference, that there would be an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal, and the President said he would not be prepared to forego the operation except for "some very great and readily apparent reason."¹⁷

The next day, at the Fourth Plenary Session, the subject was discussed again and the Prime Minister renewed his attempts to cancel the Andaman operation suggesting that Great Britain and the United States could be excused on the grounds of unforeseen developments during the Russian talks. The President refused to entertain the suggestion, repeating that Chiang had left Cairo clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried out simultaneously with the Upper Burma campaign. The President also remarked that he was a little dubious about putting all the eggs in one basket. If Stalin were unable to keep his promise to enter the war against Japan, England and the United States might find that they had forfeited Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians. Admiral Leahy, General Marshal and Admiral King supported the President's stand to respect our Chinese commitment against the British desire

to cancel or postpone the amphibious operation. They agreed that from a military point of view much could be said for strengthening the European assaults at the expense of other theatres but serious political issues were at stake. General Marshall summed up the probable results should we break our agreement with Chiang. If the amphibious operation were cancelled, he said, Chiang would not allow his Yunnan troops to advance, there would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have repercussions in the Pacific. "There would be a revulsion of feeling in China," General Marshall said, "the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication between India and China would be at hazard."

The Prime Minister conceded in the final Plenary Session that, "while he did not feel committed to an amphibious operation on any specific date in South-east Asia, he realized the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo." Nor, he concluded, had he realized that the amphibious operation was bound up so completely with the Upper Burma campaign.

The result of the Conference, with respect to Burma and China, was a compromise between the hard facts of logistics on one hand and the political implications of breaking a promise to Chiang Kai-shek on the other. The President particularly wanted to avoid a break with Chiang. The Combined Chiefs agreed that a shortage of landing craft would prevent a large-scale amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal until autumn of 1944, but there could be minor commando raids and carrier strikes. They proposed an alternative of either carrying out the Upper Burma campaign as planned, substituting raids and strikes for the supporting amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal, or postponing the entire campaign in Burma until many months later after the monsoon when amphibious craft might be available.

This alternative was perforce accepted by the President and the Prime Minister; the final decision would await the Generalissimo's reaction. ²⁰

The President telegraphed Chiang from Cairo on 5 December. He explained frankly that the Conference with Stalin had involved Great Britain and the United States in "combined grand operations" on the continent of Europe which had a "fair chance" of defeating Germany in 1944. So many landing craft were required that it would be impossible to mount an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal in the spring of 1944. "I am influenced in this matter," the President wrote, "by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany." The President put the issue to Chiang as a simple choice. Would he let his Yunnan army participate in the Burma campaign if, instead of the amphibious operation he had demanded, there were only carrier strikes and commando raids? Or, would he prefer that the whole campaign be postponed until November when a large-scale landing could be carried out? ²¹

Chiang's reply, which was awaiting the President when he returned to Washington, was a disconsolate message which described the difficulties of the Chinese Government in combatting poor morale, suspicion and dissent. The Cairo Declaration had swept away, Chiang wrote, the suspicion that the United States and Great Britain were leaving China to shift as best she could against Japan and the military plans made at Cairo had aroused the enthusiasm of his officers. Should the change in strategy proposed by the President now become known, he continued, there would be such serious repercussions that China might not be able to hold out much longer. Chiang readily granted that an early defeat of Germany would have great advantages but, he reminded the President, a Chinese collapse would have grave results.

To forestall a collapse, and as a "price" for accepting the President's statement that the Andaman invasion could not be executed as promised, the Generalissimo asked for a loan of one billion dollars in gold without which, he said, China could not hold out until November. He also asked that the air forces in China be doubled and that air transport tonnage be increased to 20,000 tons per month. Chiang said in conclusion that he would choose between the two alternatives offered by the President after he had conferred with General Stilwell.²²

In a heartening reply on 20 December the President sought to persuade Chiang to undertake the Burma offensive in the spring. "Your acceptance", he wrote, "of the strategy of concentrating all necessary means to defeat Germany first unites all of us completely." He promised an enlarged air force and additional transport planes. The President added a proviso to that promise, however, which was a frank warning to the Generalissimo not to interfere with the transport command and which was, at the same time, an inducement to improve Chinese ground troops. New goals would be reached, said the President, "provided there is no diversion of the aircraft allocated to the air transport route and provided the Japanese interruption of the air line is prevented by the advance of our land forces." The President repeated the axiom that an air force could be no more effective than its supply system. Supplies could be increased, Chennault's air force enlarged, and China's military and economic difficulties relieved only by the recapture of Upper Burma and the opening of a land route to China.

These were the reasons which the President gave Chiang in urging him to go ahead with the Burma campaign in the spring. The President asked Chiang to prepare his Yunnan troops for spring operations and to advance then in conjunction with the forces moving east from India.²³

But Chiang refused.

In a final reply to the President on 23 December, he chose the course which the President and the Chiefs of Staff had hoped against. He maintained his Cairo stand; he refused to allow his Yunnan troops to advance in the spring because there would not be a large-scale amphibious operation. The Yunnan force would not advance, he said, until the autumn.²⁴

The Generalissimo maintained this position for the next four months and he would not make any compromise or bargaining reply to all of the President's proposals. He refused for action by his troops.

THE BURMA CAMPAIGN

A friendly exchange of messages between the President and the Generalissimo at New Year's, when the President informed Chiang of new air and naval victories in the Pacific,²⁵ could not hide the fact that the year 1944 was off to a bad start. The need to concentrate all resources on the European front shattered the high hopes of the Cairo Conference. Promises made to the Generalissimo were broken after he returned to his capital and had made them known to his Government and his Generals. The financial and domestic situation in China had reached a crisis of serious proportions; it was embarrassing and dangerous to inform Chiang that "firm" plans for the spring campaign were not firm at all and that Great Britain and the United States could not carry out their part of the bargain. The British and American Chiefs of Staff never felt the military necessity of an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal but Chiang did and he had got their commitment to it. After the Teheran Conference the British were all for ditching the Andaman invasion, but the President objected. He fully understood and sympathized with Chiang in his difficulties, having been in intimate contact with him since the beginning of the war, and he refused to allow the Chiefs of Staff to cancel the Andaman invasion without first making a most careful search for an alternative. When the issue was put to Chiang, he chose exactly as he had said he would at Cairo, there would be no Upper Burma campaign by his troops unless there were an amphibious operation at the same time in the Bay of Bengal.

The Generalissimo maintained this position for the next four months and he sent evasive or bargaining replies to all of the President's messages which pleaded for action by his troops.

On 10 January Chiang told the President that he was in touch with Mountbatten on the Burma situation and that there was no hope for opening a land route across Burma before the autumn of 1944. He also spoke again about the dangerous psychological condition and the bad morale in China.¹⁶ In replying, the President reiterated that the best and most immediate solution to the Chinese situation would be to open a road through Burma, and he asked for all-out Chinese efforts to assist the Ledo Road forces advancing from India. Mountbatten's forces advancing from India, wrote the President, depended upon support from Yunnan; hence it was most important that all available means should be exerted by the Chinese Yunnan force. To drive his point home, and to show Chiang how serious the logistic problem was, the President commented that it might be necessary to withhold supplies from Chiang if his troops would not fight. He concluded: "If the Yunnan forces cannot be employed it would appear that we should avoid for the present the movement of critical materials to them over the limited lines of communication and curtail the continuing build-up of stock-piles in India beyond that which will be brought to bear soon against the enemy."¹⁷

On 3 February the Generalissimo answered the President: "I appreciate your desire to open the Ledo Road, a desire which is also my great concern since it is only through the opening of this land route that China may quickly obtain the heavy equipment much needed by her Army. You doubtless recall that at Cairo I reiterated and emphasized the fact that I am ready to send the Yunnan troops into Burma at any moment that large scale amphibious landing operations can be effected at strategic points. I stand ready to adhere to this decision, and hope that we can carry out operations even before November of this year, which date you mentioned as possible and probable for the diverting of the amphibious equipment

to Burma." ²⁸

This was the same tune, sung as determinedly as before.

While the Yunnan Army sat idly on the Salween River, other Allied forces were engaging in bitter struggle. Under General Stilwell's personal leadership, Chinese troops were advancing steadily from India along the proposed route of the Ledo Road. On his own motion, General Stilwell had temporarily accepted subordination to the British ground commander, General Slim, so that he might continue to be with the Chinese troops he had trained in their first test in offensive battle. ²⁹ British troops along the Arakan coast were inflicting heavy losses on the Japanese. Anglo-American Long Range Penetration groups under the command of Brigadier Wingate, which had been flown into Upper Burma and were being supplied by air, were a serious threat to Japanese supply lines. The Wingate operation was unique. "It is a test of the employment of air power after the manner of sea power," as General Marshall explained it to the President, "that is, selecting a landing point, convoying the troops to it, supplying them and protecting them in at least their initial occupation of it." ³⁰

In mid-March, in a counter-advance, the Japanese moved towards Imphal. They had not yet learned of the threat to their communications offered by Wingate's penetration groups operating on their flank and the opportunity unfolded to the Allies of cutting off several enemy divisions. On 17 March the President wired Chiang again and told him of General Stilwell's estimate. If our several land forces could be coordinated, Stilwell had said, there was good chance not only of cutting off several Jap divisions but of also reaching new ground objectives. "If your Yunnan Force would advance into Tengchung and possible to Lungling," the President told Chiang, "there is a good chance for the Ledo Corps under Stilwell to reach Myitkyina. However, I doubt if General Stilwell, deep in the Jungle and heavily preoccupied with fighting there, fully realizes the extent of

the opportunity which is now presented to us." The President described the enemy's precarious position and urged action. "I hope that you will give orders to the commander of your Yunnan forces to cooperate in developing what appears to be a great opportunity . . . If no aggressive action is taken by our troops, the enemy will certainly recover from his present disadvantage."³¹


Even this opportunity failed to bring the long-hoped for action from Chiang. Instead, it evoked a plaintive statement of China's difficult position. The Chinese situation was so grave, wrote the Generalissimo on 29 March, that the President must be told of it. Rather than act himself, Chiang blamed the Allies for their inaction. "Our Army and peoples belief in concerted action by the United Nations has been somewhat shaken; in other words our Army and people are beginning to ask themselves whether the United Nations pledges and declarations hold good." Chiang outlined his activities. China is devoting all her energy and resources, he said, to "maintaining" the various Chinese fronts against enemy surprise attack, and to preparing herself for the day when Allied land and naval forces "can be dispatched to the China coast and the Chinese Army can cooperate with them in consolidating our position in East Asia, which will be an important base for the invasion of Japan." These were, said Chiang, the most important tasks for China and they constituted the obligation she had assumed to the Allies. To ask her to do something beyond her strength was to court disaster; then the Japanese would invade Yunnan and Szechwan, the communists would revolt, and China would be lost entirely. The Generalissimo's conclusion ran true to form; "as long as our line of defenses has not been adequately strengthened it is impossible that our main forces undertake an offensive from Yunnan. In the course of our conversations at Cairo I told you that when the British began large

scale amphibious operations along the Burma coast, our main forces would launch a vigorous attack on Burma with all their might. That promise will be made good when the time comes." And then, for the first time yielding to the Allied plea for cooperation, Chiang informed the President that he had decided to send to India by air as many troops as he could spare in order to reinforce the Ledo force. He remarked at the same time that this did not fall within the scope of his work -- a strange statement inasmuch as the Ledo troops were Chinese although they were, it is true, fighting within Lord Mountbatten's theatre.³²

The President thanked Chiang on 31 March for his aid to the Ledo Road force and reminded him that should the Japanese succeed in their drive on Imphal it would wreck the air supply route to China from India.³³

By early April the Imphal situation was serious. The optimism of March about Wingate's success in cutting off the Jap column had been a mistake; the enemy was advancing rapidly. Two of the Indian divisions of the Imphal force were out of the picture and railway line to the British Base at Assam was endangered and the line of communication to China was at stake. To check Wingate's Penetration Groups and the Ledo Road drive, the enemy was moving troops from the Salween River (Yunnan) front. He left less than a full division to contain the Chinese Yunnan force of 10 divisions.³⁴

The President sent another dispatch to Chiang on 3 April. Should the Japanese offensive in the Imphal area succeed, wrote the President, the enemy could then concentrate and destroy the Ledo Road force and, finally, turn against Chiang's Yunnan force at its leisure. The British, pointed out the President, are meeting the Imphal threat and are also supplying the Chinese Ledo Road Corps in the Mogaung Valley. Heavy fighting had gone on for some time in western Burma



SITUATION IN NORTHERN BURMA, 5 APRIL 1944

1. Japanese attack on Imphal.
2. Ledo Road Force.
3. Long Range Penetration Groups.
4. Yunnan Army.

and the Arakan coast but the Salween front opposite Chiang's Yunnan force remained quiet. In fact, said the President, the enemy had moved troops from there to counter the other Allied forces. "It is inconceivable to me," he stated, "that your Y [Yunnan] forces, with their American equipment, would be unable to advance against the Japanese 56th Division in its present depleted strength. To me the time is ripe . . . A shell of a division opposes you on the Salween. Your advance to the West cannot help but succeed."

The President concluded in a very frank fashion. "To take advantage of just such an opportunity, we have, during the past year, been equipping and training your Y forces. If they are not to be used in the common cause our most strenuous and extensive efforts to fly in equipment and to furnish instructional personnel have not been justified. They should not be held back on the grounds that an amphibious operation against the South Burma coast is necessary prior to their advance. Present deployments negate such a requirement . . . I do hope you can act."³⁵

To this last urgent plea by the President for action there was no answer. Instead, a disquieting report reached the President three weeks later from the State Department that his message had been delivered as usual to Madame Chiang for the Generalissimo but that she had not passed it promptly to him. Instead, she sought to tone it down. The Chief Military Aide to Chiang had never heard of such a message and it was not known whether Chiang himself ever saw it. The³⁶ circumstances surrounding the message seemed like a "medieval court intrigue" -- a phrase used months before by General Somervell in describing Chaing's household.³⁷ There was no solution to this impasse and the President stopped trying to prod Chiang Kai-shek into action.

AIR OPERATIONS

During the long discussion on the use of Chinese ground troops in 1944, the same debate continued about air supplies to China which had persisted since the beginning of the war. The Allied request that his troops attack became in Chiang's hands a tool with which to bargain for more air strength. Chiang wanted a larger air transport tonnage of war materials over the Hump and a greatly enlarged U.S. Fourteenth Air Force and Chinese Air Force. The United States, on the other hand, maintained that enlarged air forces would be ineffective unless there were stronger Chinese ground forces to protect their bases. In acknowledging, on 9 December 1943, the President's announcement that the Bay of Bengal amphibious operation could not be carried out as planned, Chiang stated: "You will doubtless realize that . . . my task in rallying the nation to continue resistance is being made infinitely more difficult." And, as if he could overcome his difficulties by better means than those proposed by the President, the Generalissimo asked that the air forces in China -- both Chinese and American -- be doubled at once. Air transport tonnage must be raised to 20,000 tons per month to supply these additional planes.³⁸

The President pointed out in his reply of 20 December that General Chennault's Air Force already in China was severely hampered by supply difficulties, and he repeated the simple logic which Chiang was refusing to accept: a land supply route across Burma would be the greatest possible aid for the air forces. The line of communication and the air ferry route to China must be improved before we could commit ourselves to further increases in China. As a step in enlarging the ferry route, the President reported that about 100 transport planes were en route or being prepared for the Chinese Theatre and the new goal would be 12,000 tons per month over the Hump into China. The President also reminded the General-

issimo that rapid preparations were proceeding for the initiation of the Very Long Range Bombing of the Japanese mainland from Chinese bases.³⁹

On 23 December Chiang replied. He agreed that the VLR program would be a valuable aid to morale but he repeated old arguments for an additional allotment of American air strength to China. "I am strongly of the opinion that in order to ensure the success of these operations, the present American Air Force stationed in China should be immediately increased to such an extent as to be able to protect our air bases from attack or destruction by the enemy."⁴⁰

Assurance of this protection was forthcoming at once. On 27 December the President promised that sufficient fighters would be provided and he added the good news that on Christmas day the tonnage for December had reached 10,000 tons.⁴¹

In response to further questioning, the President added on 14 January that a total of two fighter groups (225 planes) would go to China as an integral part of the VLR force for the protection of the bombers. For his part, he wanted Chiang's assurance that work on the VLR fields was proceeding according to schedule.⁴²

Chiang gave this assurance on 10 January when he promised that he would do the utmost to speed work with all available manpower and materials.⁴³

Other than a minor difficulty in April when Chiang insisted on having command of the VLR bombing forces,⁴⁴ no serious problems concerning air operations in China engaged the President's attention until the end of May. The command question was settled when the President explained that B-29's throughout the world are under the strategic direction of General Arnold but that the coordination of VLR bombers in China with other units would be under the control of the Generalissimo.⁴⁵ When this had been explained by the President, Chiang assented

to the arrangements already made.⁴⁶

B-29's made their first attack on Japan from the new Chinese fields on 15 June when they struck the steel mills at Yawata, but even as their operations began General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force was being driven from its forward bases. The critical state of affairs which Chiang had been predicting for many months arrived in June; the Japanese opened an offensive in eastern and central China which the Chinese Army Staff thought was an attempt to knock China out of the war in 1944. Chiang's one hope was increased action by his air force. In an Aide Memoire which the Chief of his Military Mission in Washington, General Shang Chen, presented to the President on 31 May, Chiang asked for immediate reinforcement of the Fourteenth Air Force and the Chinese Air Force. He also asked that stores in the Chengtu Area (which were being assembled for the B-29's) be turned over to the Fourteenth Air Force, so that it could operate along the line of the Peiping-Hankow railway which appeared to be an enemy objective.⁴⁷

The President had the War Department study these requests carefully before he replied to General Shang Chen on 26 June.⁴⁸ His reply was a thorough analysis of the air picture in China and he described General Stilwell's efforts to meet the new enemy offensive. Stilwell was diverting supplies to the Fourteenth Air Force from other activities and he was increasing the Hump tonnage. The President refused, however, to divert B-29 stores at Chengtu to the Fourteenth Air Force, nor was he willing to strengthen the Chinese Air Force as Chiang had asked.⁴⁹ There had been difficulties over the Chinese Air Force before. General Chennault wrote to General Arnold in March explaining that the Chinese Air Force was not fighting and yet the Chinese wanted to build it up at the expense of the other forces in China. The Munitions Assignment Board thereupon changed its policy, with the President's approval, sharply cut the number of planes going to

the Chinese Air Force and increased the allocation to the Fourteenth Air Force which was actually fighting.⁵⁰

The President suggested other ways to strengthen Chinese resistance. If the Chinese would build more all-weather landing fields in the Kuming area, transport planes could fly over the Hump for a higher proportion of the monsoon season. Planes of the Chinese National Aircraft Corporation might be diverted to carry supplies for the Fourteenth Air Force. Most necessary, said the President, was a strong drive in North Burma to open the land route. If the Ledo and Salween forces would push forward and capture Myitkyina, a lower altitude air route over the Hump could be opened and Hump tonnage would be greatly increased.⁵¹

None of the measures suggested or attempted was sufficient to stop the Japanese advance in Central and Eastern China in June and July. It was as menacing as Chiang predicted. In July the situation deteriorated rapidly. The Fourteenth Air Force lost effectiveness as it was driven farther and farther away from the coast and even the B-29 bases in the Chengtu area were endangered. The small Air Forces which were supported by a slender thread of communication over the mountains could not stave off the onslaught of a powerful Japanese Army when their only ally was a weak, divided, and ineffectual Chinese Army.

COMMUNISTS IN NORTH CHINA

In an effort to learn what form the Japanese offensive was going to take, the U.S. Army had proposed in February to send an observers' mission to northern China. Large areas of China were controlled by Chinese Communists over whom Chiang, as President of China, exerted only nominal authority and against whom he was waging active civil war. He kept the Communist area "protected" by about 200,000 troops. Although the Communist provinces bordered Japanese controlled territory, military information from them about the enemy was extremely meagre. To obtain more intelligence about the Japanese Battle Order and to survey air and ground bases in northern China which might be used eventually in our attack on Japan it was very desirable to send observers into Shensi and Shansi, the two principal Communist Provinces. President Roosevelt knew very well that Chiang would object for political reasons but on 9 February he broke the ice: "It appears to be of very great advisability that an American Observers' Mission be immediately dispatched to North Shensi and Shansi Provinces and such other parts of North China as may be necessary. May I have your support and cooperation in this enterprise?"⁵²

The Generalissimo hesitated before replying. On 22 February he informed the President that he would be glad to aid an American Mission gather information about the enemy in northern China and Manchuria but he very carefully worded his permission to cover only those "areas where the political authority of the National Government extends or wherever our army is stationed."⁵³ While in appearance assenting to the President's request, in reality Chiang's reply was worded to prohibit the mission from entering the Communist area. He was more direct



CHINA, MAY 1944

showing Chinese Communist Border Regions
and Japanese-occupied territory

The Communists, Suich had refused. It was contrary to our interests for Chiang to use his troops and our supplies to fight all Communists directed against the Japanese. The President thought the fight with the Communists, but he wished to avoid any further struggle and to indicate disapproval of it and the American desire for Chiang's reconciliation with the Communists, he put the issue squarely to Chiang to allow Americans to enter Yenching, a city in Shensi. Chiang refused. We told General Stilwell that "the President does not understand the position and the sinister intentions of the Communists," and he gave his final refusal on 23 March.

Unfortunately the President could not press the point, for he was writing Chiang at this time to attack in Burma with Sir James Dorn. Yenching was more

with General Hearn, Stilwell's Deputy in Chungking, than he was with the President and he told Hearn that the mission could not enter Shensi or Shansi.⁵⁴

The President thanked the Generalissimo on 1 March with diplomatic ambiguity. He observed that "North and Northeastern China should be a particularly fruitful source of important military intelligence of the Japanese," and he promised to send the mission soon.⁵⁵ The President did not refer, obviously, to the fact that Chiang had acknowledged his request in very different terms than those for which we had asked or which we were accepting.

The President knew, of course, that Chiang had forbidden General Hearn to send observers into Northern China but he let the matter rest until 20 March when he again referred to the mission's entering the Communist area.⁵⁶ There was good reason for his insistence at this time and a clear-cut issue more important than military intelligence was at stake. In February Chinese military authorities in Chungking had asked General Hearn for Lend-Lease supplies with which to fight the Communists. Hearn had refused.⁵⁷ It was contrary to our interest for Chiang to use his troops and our supplies in civil war; we wanted all resources directed against the Japanese. The President could not forbid Chiang to fight the Communists, but he withheld Lend-Lease supplies from that struggle and to indicate disapproval of it and the American desire for Chiang's reconciliation with the Communists, he put the issue squarely to Chiang to allow Americans to enter Yen-an, a city in Shensi. Chiang refused. He told General Stilwell that "the President does not understand the condition and the sinister intentions of the Communists," when he gave his final refusal on 30 March.⁵⁸

Unfortunately the President could not press the point, for he was urging Chiang at this time to attack in Burma with his Yunnan force. Yunnan was more

important than Yenan; to get Chiang to attack in the South was more important than to force his hand in the North. Plans for an American mission to the Communist area were abandoned.

The problems of Chiang Kai-shek with respect to the Communists were aggravated at this time by border episodes in Sinkiang Province. Alarmed and angered by the Soviet policy in Asia of which he was highly suspicious, Chiang informed the President on 17 March 1944 that Red Army planes had bombed Chinese troops in Sinkiang while they were "suppressing bandits." This said Chiang, was not a local incident but a very significant indication of the Soviet Far Eastern policy. Furthermore, he believed that the Chinese Communists were preparing to launch a big revolt; they would not make such a move unless there was a secret understanding between the Soviets and the Japanese.⁵⁹ On the 29th, Chiang told the President that all Sinkiang was tense since the bombings and he added that Soviet Outer Mongolian troops had invaded Sinkiang at the same time.⁶⁰

The President refused to be drawn into this dispute. He expressed simple regrets to Chiang and hoped that the situation would clarify, adding that he very much doubted that an agreement existed between Japan and the Soviet Union.⁶¹ He was certain that there was no agreement but he did not wish to reveal his sources of information to the Generalissimo.

Chiang refused to let the matter drop, although it should have been apparent from his non-committal response that the President would take no active interest in the matter. On 4 April he informed the President about additional border difficulties which had occurred in March. Soviet planes, he reported, had penetrated as far as 120 kilometers into Chinese territory. The Soviet explanation was totally unsatisfactory to him. "It clearly reveals," he said, "Soviet policy in the Far East, vitally affecting the general war situation I believe

you will also regard this as a vital matter which has arisen among the United Nations, and consequently would appreciate your advice thereon."⁶²

If Chiang expected the President to take up the matter with Moscow he was disappointed. The President advised him on 8 April to "leave it on ice... Any attitude which would be harmful to our united effort in winning the war would be unwarranted and I am confident that misunderstandings which may arise among members of the United Nations can be dispelled by the exercise of self-restraint and good-will."⁶³ In the President's mind, border episodes on the Outer Mongolian-Sinkiang frontier should not be allowed to jeopardize the fragile harmony between the Great Powers.

Chiang acknowledged this statement in good grace. "I sincerely accept your recommendations. China's policy towards world problems and towards the common enemy alike in belief and action is identical with that of the United States and I gladly support your ideas." However, added Chiang, self-restraint on his part was not apt to solve the problem. Should more affairs occur, he feared "unfortunate consequences to the world as a whole." He included at the end, as a final effort at shifting part of the burden to the President, "Therefore I feel confident that you will exert your best efforts wherever possible, so that the policy of extreme restraint on my part may prove effective."⁶⁴

CRISIS IN EAST CHINA

A much more serious matter than border disputes to which the President's interest and attention now turned was the military situation in East China. Many months before, in December 1943, Chiang had warned of a coming "all-out" offensive to split China in two and knock her out of the war; almost every message thereafter sounded this alarm. His forebodings were well-founded; in May the Japanese launched a major drive and began to score their first important advances in a year. Late in May Chiang wrote the President that the enemy had reduced his garrison in Manchuria from 20 to 6 divisions; a half million men had moved south from Manchuria in March and April; and 60,000 troops reached Nanking alone in one week. Reinforcement in the "war areas" of East China, said Chiang, could be only for the purpose of pushing the "ground offensive in all directions." If the U.S. Army Observers' Mission had been allowed to enter the Communist area, Stilwell would have had more information about the enemy's preparations and probable objectives. As it was, Chiang's alarmist and pessimistic information had to be taken at face value.

But even if some of the Chinese figures were exaggerated, the danger could not be minimized. The Japanese High Command was prompted by desperate circumstances. A serious shipping shortage, growing allied air strength in China which threatened the homeland, and the factor of time forced Japan to make her continental position more secure. Time was running short; the rapid U.S. advance across the Pacific meant that most Japanese troops would be needed for defense and none would be available for a Chinese offensive after the summer of 1944. Japan had to strike, strike hard, and strike fast. The most fruitful, and the most likely,

Japanese plan called for a drive southward from Peiping to capture the Peiping-Canton railway. This drive, if successful, would ease the strain on Japanese shipping, endanger all forward allied airfields in East China and would be so grave a blow that it might put China out of the war. In addition to the opening moves of this campaign by the enemy, the Chinese were alarmed by Jap troop concentrations threatening Changsa and Kunming (the Hump terminal). There was even a possibility, Chiang told the President, that the Japanese might drive up the Yangtze River towards Chungking.⁶⁷

The worst fears of the Allies were realized in June. Strong, well-equipped and well-trained Japanese troops advanced very rapidly in a drive which poorly equipped and ill-trained Chinese Armies were unable to halt or even retard. Chinese resistance was crumbling rapidly; China's position had never been so precarious as it was on 7 July as she entered her eighth year of war. Twin Japanese columns had almost achieved their objective of splitting China in two by driving from the north and from the south along the Peiping-Canton railway. The Chinese-held gap was less than 180 miles wide, the important rail center of Hengyang and the nearby airfields had fallen, and enemy columns were pushing rapidly towards Kweilin, a major base of the Fourteenth Air Force.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported this grave state of affairs to the President on 4 July.

"The situation in Central China," they wrote, "is deteriorating at an alarming rate. If the Japanese continue their advance to the west, Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force will be rendered ineffective, our Very Long Range bomber airfields in the Chengtu area will be lost and the collapse of China must inevitably result The Chinese ground forces in China, in their present state of discipline, training and equipment, and under their present leadership, are impotent. The Japanese forces can, in effect, move virtually unopposed except by geographical logistic difficulties Under the present leadership and organization of the Chinese Armies, it is purely a question



SITUATION IN CHINA, 3 JULY 1944

of Japanese intent as to how far they will advance into the interior of China. The serious pass to which China has come is due in some measure to mismanagement and neglect of the Army. Until her every resource, including the divisions at present confronting the Communists, is devoted to the war against the Japanese, there is little hope that she can continue to operate with any effectiveness until the end of the war."⁶⁷

There was only one remedy in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff. That was the appointment by Chiang of General Stilwell to command all Chinese ground forces. There was no doubt in the minds of the Chiefs that Stilwell's strategy had been sound. Had his advice on the Burma campaign been followed, the Japanese would have been thrown out of Upper Burma before the monsoon and an effective overland route to China opened. There was much doubt, however, they told the President, whether there was now any chance of averting a disaster to the American war effort in the Chinese Theatre. If disaster could be averted, it could be done only by entrusting to one man such resources as were left in China.

The President accepted the advice of the Chiefs of Staff and sent a message to Chiang Kai-shek requesting General Stilwell's appointment to command the Chinese Army. He told Chiang that the critical military situation in China made it essential that Stilwell be given the power to coordinate all allied military resources in China, including the Communist Armies.⁶⁹

For the President to inform Chiang, the head of the State, that he must delegate to a foreign officer such sweeping military power was tantamount to challenging Chinese sovereignty. And it was certainly a reflection on Chiang's conduct of the war. That the President's message was not regarded as a challenge was due to Chiang's confidence in him and to strong assurances which the President included in this message. He asked Chiang not to be offended at the frankness of his remarks; he assured him that he had no intention of dictating on matters regarding China; and he explained that he asked for Stilwell's appoint-

ment only because the future of all Asia was at stake.

"I think I am fully aware of your feelings regarding General Stilwell" wrote the President, "nevertheless I think he has now clearly demonstrated his far-sighted judgment, his skill in organization and training, and, above all, in fighting your Chinese forces. I know of no other man who has the ability, the force, and the determination to offset the disaster which now threatens China and our over-all plans for the conquest of Japan. I am promoting Stilwell to the rank of full General and I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you recall him from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American forces, and that you charge him with full responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's advance. I feel that the case of China is so desperate that if radical and promptly applied remedies are not immediately effected, our common cause will suffer a disastrous setback."⁷⁰

On 8 July Chiang replied that he agreed to the President's proposal -- he would place Stilwell in command of all Chinese forces -- but that he could not act at once. He explained that Chinese political conditions were very complex and if he were to appoint Stilwell at once "it would not only fail to help the present war situation here but would also arouse misunderstanding and confusion which will be detrimental to Sino-American cooperation." A preliminary period was necessary before General Stilwell could assume control of all Chinese troops and in the meantime, to bridge some "political gaps" Chiang asked the President to send a personal representative to Chungking. A personal representative, he explained, could adjust "the relations between me and General Stilwell so as to enhance the cooperation between China and America. You will appreciate the fact that military cooperation in its absolute sense must be built on the foundation of political cooperation."⁷¹

Chiang's request was a danger signal from Chungking. The President knew that the Generalissimo and Stilwell had clashed occasionally but that their differences were at the point where a "trouble-shooter" was necessary was alarming news.

Stilwell and Chiang had differed for a long time on military strategy and organization and training of the Chinese Army. Stilwell's blunt outspoken manner and trenchant criticism antagonized Chiang, and Chiang's apparent vacillation and procrastination angered Stilwell. The President had tried for a long time to smooth out their personal difficulties. For example, in February, 1943, in a letter to General Marshall, Stilwell made a typical comment about the Generalissimo:

"Chiang Kai-shek had been very irritable and hard to handle, upping his demands no matter what is given him, and this attitude will continue until he is talked to in sterner tones. For everything we do for him, we should exact a commitment from him." ⁷²

Stilwell's tone alarmed the President and he wrote to General Marshall about it. The President's letter was an application of Clausewitz's dictum that military plans cannot be made without an insight into political relations, and his analysis was so clear and revealing that General Marshall asked permission to send it to Stilwell for his guidance.

"My first thought," the President said, "is that Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with Generalissimo Chiang When Stilwell speaks about the fact that the Generalissimo is very irritable and hard to handle, upping his demands, etc., he is, of course, correct, but when he speaks of talking to him in sterner tones, he goes about it just the wrong way.

"All of us must remember that the Generalissimo came up the hard way to become the undisputed leader of four hundred million people -- an enormously difficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse group of all kinds of leaders -- military men, educators, scientists, public health people, engineers, all of them struggling for power and mastery, local or national, and to create in a very short time throughout China what it took us a couple of centuries to attain.

"Besides that the Generalissimo finds it necessary to maintain his position of supremacy. . . . He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander-in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him. . . .

"Our relations with China are important and I wish you would impress on Stilwell and Chennault that they are our representatives over there in more senses than one. Compatible with their military duties,

they may well turn out to be the best 'Ambassadors' we have in China. I hope they will." ⁷³

The President's desires apparently had little effect on General Stilwell and his differences with Chiang were now at the point where Chiang was asking for a mediator. Alarming as this was, it was even more alarming for the President to be told by Chiang that Chinese domestic politics stood in the road of necessary military reforms. The President expressed his concern when he replied to the Generalissimo on 13 July.

The President recognized, he said, that "internal political conditions must have an important bearing on major military decisions," but time was short and Stilwell had to be appointed at once. The President was frank: "The situation with its danger to our common cause calls for quick action. If disaster should overtake our combined efforts against the Japanese in China there will be little opportunity for the continuance of Sino-American cooperation. Therefore, some calculated political risks appear justified when dangers in the overall military situation are so serious and immediately threatening." ⁷⁴

The President himself took a "calculated political risk" a month later. He left for the Pacific on 13 July for a military inspection trip and throughout his entire cruise he expected a reply from Chiang Kai-shek about General Stilwell. There was none, nor was there any apparent reason for Chiang's failure to answer, unless he were waiting for the President to name a personal representative. This the President was not ready to do. He regarded the emergency as military, not political, although he was aware of some of the political difficulties Chiang faced at this time. Reactionary elements of the Kuomintang were increasing their control of the Central Government, driving liberal groups into bitter hostility.

As his Government split into two camps, Chiang's own position weakened and there was a growing underground movement in China to oust him. In the face of this threat the President hesitated to upset the delicate balance in Chungking between Chiang and Stilwell by injecting new personalities into the scene. The military situation was desperate, however, and if Chiang were waiting for a representative then the President would send one. There was less risk of upsetting the Chungking apple cart by sending out a personal representative than there would be by letting Chiang postpone Stilwell's appointment still longer. Hence on 9 August the President wired Chiang that he was sending Major General Patrick J. Hurley to China as his personal representative.⁷⁵

Chiang replied on 15 August. This message, together with an earlier one of 23 July which had not been delivered before,⁷⁶ was disappointing. In spite of a long dissertation on Sino-American friendship and a detailed analysis of Stilwell's proposed title and authority, it was apparent that Chiang had made no move to appoint Stilwell. He still maintained his position of early July, when he said that a period of preparation before the appointment was necessary to avoid "doubts and apprehensions".⁷⁷ How long these "preparations" might take was anyone's guess.

One fact was clear. The Japanese were advancing rapidly and "doubts and apprehensions," which Chiang said he wanted to avoid in Chungking, were increasing in Washington. The President wired Chiang again on 21 August. He understood, he said, the political difficulty of putting an American in command of the Chinese Army but there was no time to lose on the military front. He informed Chiang that General Hurley would be in Chungking in a few days to assist Stilwell in working out political problems.⁷⁸

The President hoped -- in vain -- that the prospect of General Hurley's

arrival would encourage Chiang to act. Chiang did not answer the President; he apparently was waiting to see what General Hurley would do.

General Hurley arrived in Chungking on 7 September at the most critical period of the Sino-Japanese war, and he was faced immediately with major political and military crises. The President told him, as he was leaving Washington, that his (the President's) overall aim was to prevent a collapse of China and to keep the Chinese Army in the war. As part of a plan to do this, the President said that he had decided to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.⁶⁷ It was therefore General Hurley's job in Chungking to carry out the President's policy; his task in doing this had three phases. He first had to persuade the Generalissimo to appoint Stilwell.⁶⁸ He then was to study the situation in China and report to the President on the principal issues affecting our support of China. Finally, by using his prestige as a personal representative of President Roosevelt, General Hurley was to help Chiang work out China's political problems, such as the relations of the Central Government to the Chinese Communists.

Hurley's initial report was optimistic, possibly because he had not yet learned about the fine Chinese art of procrastination. Chiang told him in their first meeting on 7 September that "he was prepared to give General Stilwell actual command of all forces in the field in China and that with this command he is also giving to him his complete confidence."⁶⁹ Hurley informed the President, after he had discussed Chinese Army reorganization and Chinese relations with Russia, that "there is a good prospect for unification of command in China and Chiang Kai-shek shows a definite tendency to comply with your wishes."⁷⁰

But the Generalissimo had shown a "tendency to comply" since July and there was little to show for it other than a few conferences.⁷¹ Meanwhile at Exeter, one

GENERAL HURLEY'S MISSION

General Hurley arrived in Chungking on 7 September at the most critical period of the Sino-Japanese war, and he was faced immediately with major political and military crises. The President told him, as he was leaving Washington, that his (the President's) overall aim was to prevent a collapse of China and to keep the Chinese Army in the war. As part of a plan to do this, the President said that he had decided to sustain the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.⁷⁹ It was therefore General Hurley's job in Chungking to carry out the President's policy; his task in doing this had three phases. He first had to persuade the Generalissimo to appoint Stilwell. He then was to study the situation in China and report to the President on the principal issues affecting our support of China. Finally, by using his prestige as a personal representative of President Roosevelt, General Hurley was to help Chiang work out Chinese political problems, such as the relations of the Central Government to the Chinese Communists.

Hurley's initial report was optimistic, possibly because he had not yet learned about the fine Chinese art of procrastination. Chiang told him in their first meeting on 7 September that "he was prepared to give General Stilwell actual command of all forces in the field in China and that with this command he is also giving to him his complete confidence." Hurley informed the President, after he had discussed Chinese Army reorganization and Chinese relations with Russia, that "there is a good prospect for unification of command in China and Chiang Kai-shek shows a definite tendency to comply with your wishes."⁸⁰

But the Generalissimo had shown a "tendency to comply" since July and there was little to show for it other than a few conferences.⁸¹ Meanwhile at Kweilin, one

of the last forward bases of the Fourteenth Air Force, United States forces were pulling out just ahead of the onrushing Japanese and at Luichow, another large base, defences were so poor that Stilwell was preparing to evacuate there if the enemy drew much closer. More alarming than these reverses which General Stilwell blamed on poor command and "back-seat driving" from Chungking, was Chiang's plan to withdraw from Lungling in North Burma to the east side of the Salween River. This appalled Stilwell when he heard about it and he protested vigorously.⁸² With Lungling in Allied possession we controlled the route of a road to China. This was the goal of the war in Burma; to abandon it was to sacrifice the results of two and a half years' fighting.

The Generalissimo was unimpressed by Stilwell's protests. He seemed afraid that his Army would be beaten at Lungling and then the Japanese would advance on Kunming. But if the loss of Lungling were really his fear, he had failed, said Stilwell, to take the most elementary steps to protect it. The Yunnan force at Lungling had not been kept at full strength and its combat strength was now only 14,000. "I am convinced", concluded General Stilwell in a dispatch to General Marshall on 15 September, "that he [Chiang] regards the South China catastrophe as of little moment, believing that the Japs will not bother him further in that area, and he imagines he can get behind the Salween and there wait in safety for the U.S. to finish the war."⁸³

The President was in Quebec with Prime Minister Churchill for a military conference with the Combined Chiefs of Staff when this depressing report arrived. Since a major part of the conference was devoted to developing plans for the defeat of Japan, the President was in a position to grasp quickly the full significance of Chiang's defection and the consequence of China's collapse. In the sternest message of his entire correspondence with the Generalissimo, the President

wired him on 16 September.

Should Chiang fail to strengthen his divisions in North Burma, wrote the President, and should he withdraw his Yunnan force from the Salween, all chance of opening land communications through Burma to China would be lost and the air route over the Hump would be jeopardized. The President warned Chiang: "For this you must yourself be prepared to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility." In East China, continued the President, the loss of a critical area around Kweilin will open the Kuming air terminal to constant air attack, the Hump tonnage will be reduced, and the air route might even be severed. "Political and military considerations alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster."

The President made a final demand for action. "I am certain that the only thing you can now do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce your Salween Armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces."⁸⁴

The President's message was followed two days later by a joint statement to Chiang from the President and Prime Minister Churchill on the conclusions of the Quebec Conference. The statement was designed to allay Chinese fears that the United States and Great Britain were not devoting their best efforts to the war with Japan. It also forestalled criticism by Chiang, although that was not its purpose, that the United States was forcing the appointment of General Stilwell by threatening to withdraw U.S. support otherwise.⁸⁵

General Hurley optimistically reported to the President on 23 September that, in spite of differences of opinion between Stilwell and Chiang, he believed the

situation would iron itself out and that a harmonious solution was possible. This was wishful thinking on General Hurley's part probably due to the fact that Chiang was holding a series of conferences. Hurley had Chiang's agreement to an agenda on the objectives of Sino-American collaboration but he had no agreement on the Stilwell appointment.

The conferences were, in fact, bogged down in discussions of Army reorganizations and Communism in northern China, and although Hurley had seen the President's strong message of the 16th, his efforts were directed more towards preventing an open break than encouraging Chiang to act. "I have been advising the Generalissimo not to make a response to your note which might cause a deadlock," he wrote. What is needed to save the situation in China is harmonious action"

All possibility of harmonious action vanished on 25 September when Dr. T. V. Soong, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed General Hurley a letter from Chiang.

Chiang asked that General Stilwell be relieved from duty in the China theatre and he gave blunt and frank reasons for his demand. Chiang said he had considered Stilwell's appointment favorably, against his better judgement, because he wanted to comply with the President's wishes. Conversations with General Hurley were so satisfactory that he and Hurley had been "on the eve of a complete agreement" on all their problems. But then, continued Chiang, "all this ended when it was made manifest to me that General Stilwell had no intention of cooperating with me, but believed that he was in fact being appointed to command me. If you will place yourself in my position, I believe you will understand how in the future I can never direct General Stilwell, or in all seriousness depend on General Stilwell to conform to my direction. If, ignoring reason and experience, I were to appoint General Stilwell as Field Commander, I would knowingly court inevitable disaster."

The Generalissimo was careful to explain that his request for Stilwell's recall did not affect his agreement to appoint an American general as Commander-in-Chief of Chinese-American forces. He would name an American officer his Chief of Staff and place under his command all Chinese field armies and air forces -- so long as that officer was not General Stilwell! As T.V. Soong phrased it, "The issue is one of personality and not of principle."⁸⁷

What had forced Chiang's hand and made him reject Stilwell? He said he was on the verge of appointing Stilwell when the latter's inability to cooperate "was made manifest" to him. General Hurley was not sure what Chiang referred to, but he reported that Chiang's decision was not made until after General Stilwell had delivered the President's message of the 16th. Stilwell often "lectured" to the Generalissimo when he delivered messages from the President and their meetings were sometimes stormy. It is possible that Stilwell's attitude on this occasion, when he had stronger support for his position in the form of the President's message than he had ever had before, was the straw that broke the camel's back. Whatever the cause of the break, General Hurley had no illusions about re-establishing harmony between Chiang and Stilwell. The decision was final. "There can no longer be any doubt," he wrote the President, "of the fact that the Generalissimo and General Stilwell are incompatible."⁸⁸

The breakdown in the Chungking negotiations was a disappointment to the President but he accepted without question the fact that Stilwell had to be relieved as Chiang's Chief of Staff. He went much farther than that. In his answer to Chiang on 5 October, the President withdrew the request that an American officer be appointed commander of all forces in China. "The ground situation in China has so deteriorated since my original proposal," he wrote, "that I am now

inclined to feel that the United States Government should not assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of your ground forces throughout China."

The President knew that, although the military situation was on the verge of collapse, American assistance could do a great deal to help the political situation and so he outlined new proposals to help the Chinese Government. Supplies flown over the Hump were small but vital to air operations and to Chinese morale. To protect the air route and to hold the line of communications, the President proposed a reorganization in South China and Burma. He outlined the changes to Chiang:

"The maintenance of the Hump tonnage is of such tremendous importance to the stability of your Government that the continuance of a reasonably secure situation regarding operations over the Hump demands that Stilwell be placed in direct command under you of the Chinese forces in Burma and of all Chinese ground forces in Yunnan Province, it being understood that adequate support in replacements and supplies be furnished these armies by you. Otherwise I am convinced that the Hump tonnage will be interrupted by Japanese action." 89

The President's proposal meant that the American commitment in China would be much less than if Stilwell were Commander-in-Chief of all ground forces there and yet, even with the reduced responsibility, we could give maximum aid to China by maintaining the supply route. There was grave danger of losing the route if Stilwell were recalled, and the President told Chiang, "should we remove Stilwell from the Burma campaign the results would be far more serious than you apparently realize."

If Chiang realized this, he would not admit it. The President's plan to shift General Stilwell to Burma was doomed even before it was proposed, for on 2 October Chiang had told a large group of government officials in Chungking that the President had agreed to recall Stilwell and would shortly appoint his

successor.⁹⁰ This was not true; Chiang had been misinformed by H. H. Kung in Washington.⁹¹ Denials were of no use, however, for the damage was done. Chiang, having informed his government that Stilwell was leaving, could not, for reasons of "face", accept any proposal which would retain the American General in a position of power in China.

On 11 October the Generalissimo made his final reply to the President. He told the President that he had no confidence in General Stilwell and he refused to have him as Commander-in-Chief of Chinese forces or even as Commander of the Yunnan and Burma forces. Another American officer would be acceptable but not Stilwell. The issue was still one of personality and not policy; "We are in entire agreement on all points of policy." Chiang supported his lack of confidence in General Stilwell by reviewing at length the failures in Burma. He had never agreed, he reminded the President, with General Stilwell about the war in Burma. Chiang maintained that a sound campaign would have included an amphibious operation in South Burma, but Stilwell had pressed for what Chiang called a "limited offensive." Once Stilwell began his "limited offensive", said Chiang, he found himself in such difficulties that his campaign drained off most of the properly equipped and trained reserves in China, reduced the incoming supply tonnage so greatly that it was not possible to strengthen the military supply position any place in China, and left the way open for the Japanese to launch a big offensive in East China. East China was so weak -- and with no reinforcements -- that the enemy advanced rapidly there. The result of Stilwell's strategy was summed up in a sentence by Chiang: "We have taken Myitkyina but we have lost almost all of East China." Chiang concluded by reproaching the President for his remark that the Chinese situation had so deteriorated that the

United States should not accept the responsibility of command of the Chinese ground forces. "Aid is most needed in an hour of crisis. The statement I have referred to appears to imply that aid will be withheld precisely because this is an hour of crisis."⁹²

When Chiang had made his final decision not to appoint General Stilwell, the first phase of General Hurley's mission ended -- in failure. He had been unable to establish harmony between Chiang and Stilwell. His second job was to report to the President on the current situation in Chungking and to make recommendations. This he did frankly and he posed the issue clearly -- the President had to choose between Chiang and Stilwell. Hurley wrote on 10 October:

"In studying the situation here I am convinced that there is no Chinese leader available who offers as good a basis of cooperation with you as Chiang Kai-shek. There is no other Chinese known to me who possesses as many of the elements of leadership as Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell are fundamentally incompatible. Today you are confronted by a choice between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell. There is no other issue between you and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek has agreed to every request, every suggestion made by you except the Stilwell appointment."⁹³

General Stilwell protested to General Marshall the same day that the emphasis on personality differences was false and misleading, that personality was not an issue but a smokescreen to conceal the facts. The real issue was the extent of Chinese participation in the war. "In nutshell," Stilwell said, "situation now has reached deadlock and real reason is not that Gissimo objects to me but rather desires to avoid any further military effort. He bases his present stand solely on personal objections to me but if he wins out on this he will find some other reason for avoiding any really honest cooperation with my successor It is not a choice between throwing me out or losing CKS and possibly China. It is case of losing China's potential effort if CKS is allowed to make rules now."⁹⁴

General Stilwell's message was followed immediately by another one from Hurley who spoke out in vigorous disagreement with Stilwell's denial that "personal differences" were involved:

"Stilwell repeatedly showed that he had no intention of cooperating with the Generalissimo. His one intention was to subjugate him. Stilwell's fundamental mistake is in the idea that he can subjugate a man who has led a nation in revolution and who has led an ill-fed, poorly equipped, practically unorganized army against an overwhelming foe for seven years. My opinion is that if you sustain Stilwell in this controversy you will lose Chiang Kai-shek and possibly you will lose China with him. . . . The impasse between General Stilwell and the G'issimo is big with potentialities involving a prolongation of the war and increased cost to America in material and blood. If we permit China to collapse, if we fail to keep the Chinese army in the war, all the angels in heaven swearing that we were right in sustaining Stilwell will not change the verdict of history. America will have failed in China. . . . We should prevent the collapse of China. The situation in China is chaotic but it is not hopeless. . . . I respectfully recommend that you relieve General Stilwell and appoint another American general to command all the land and air forces in China under the Generalissimo."⁷⁵

Once the true situation in Chungking was apparent, the President acted quickly. Stilwell's protests, that Chiang's "personal differences" were excuses to avoid fighting, were overridden by reports from General Hurley. Chiang was the head of an allied state and the President could not ignore a direct request by him. Only a few hours after he received General Hurley's last message, the President asked for the name of an officer whom Chiang would consider as a relief for General Stilwell.⁷⁶ Chiang named three American generals.⁷⁷ Three days later the President informed him of a new American military organization in the Far East.

Stilwell's China-Burma-India Command was split; Major General A. C. Wedemeyer was placed in command of American forces in China and Lieutenant General D. I. Sultan assumed command of U.S. troops in Burma and India. The President repeated his statement of 5 October that the United States was no longer willing

to assume responsibility for the over-all command of ground forces in China. He stoutly defended Stilwell's Burma campaign and, by way of rebuttal to Chiang's remark that Myitkyina was not worth the price, he reminded Chiang that the capture of that place opened a low-level flying route from India to China which was most important for the East China campaign. The responsibility for the Burma campaign, added the President, was not Stilwell's; the plans had been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister and himself and Stilwell should not be blamed. In order that Chiang could not possibly mistake Stilwell's recall for a change in our strategy, the President repeated the request which Stilwell had made so vigorously and so frankly that it cost him his job: "I should like your assurance," he said, "that your Yunnan forces will advance in conjunction with Mountbatten's Burma offensive."⁹⁸

The Generalissimo's reply on 20 October was warm and cordial. He accepted the command changes which the President proposed and he assured the President of his whole-hearted cooperation, which he demonstrated by announcing that he was sending replacements to his Yunnan force with the "utmost dispatch."⁹⁹

It is still too early to tell what will be the effects of General Stilwell's recall from China, made under fire from the Generalissimo. Stilwell's dour prediction was that Chiang would continue to play Chinese politics and refuse to fight. But Chiang told General Hurley that he thought the change in command would bring a "more intimate and fruitful understanding" with the United States, he has sent replacements to his Yunnan force, which Stilwell was not able to get him to do, and he has apparently been making good progress in solving some of his political and administrative problems with General Hurley's assistance.

The most important political question facing the Chungking Government is its relations with the Communists in northern China. Prolonged failure to reach an understanding with them has resulted in civil war and the diversion of thousands of troops desperately needed to fight the Japanese. As late as 23 July Chiang told the President that he refused to consider incorporating Communist troops into the Chinese National Army.¹⁰⁰ Since then Chiang has been under constant fire from liberal groups in Chungking, however, and the arrival of General Hurley brought the matter to a head.


Hurley came to Chungking by way of Moscow, where he held long conversations with the Soviet Foreign Minister. Molotov assured him that the Soviet Government was not aiding the so-called Chinese Communists, whom it did not regard as Communists at all, that it was not using them to prevent the unification of China, and that the Soviets desired, in fact, closer relations with the Chinese National Government.¹⁰¹

Hurley found the Generalissimo "skeptical" about the Communists when he arrived in Chungking.¹⁰² He described his Moscow conversations to Chiang and, at Chiang's request, defined the subjects he had come to discuss. He made the American desire for political unity in China unmistakably clear. "The paramount objective of Chinese-American collaboration," he told Chiang, "is to bring about a unification of all military forces in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the liberation of China."¹⁰³

In the face of strong American desires and the assurances of good-will from Moscow, Chiang agreed to accept Communist troops in the National Army provided they would accept his authority without question. He then began conferences with members of his government on the details of unifying the two groups and he con-

mented to, and even encouraged, General Hurley's meeting Communist military and political leaders. General Hurley is now in the Communist area, at the invitation of Communist Party officials, working out a basis of agreement between the National Government and the Communist Party. The conferences appear to have every chance of success and Chiang, now completely won over, has expressed gratitude to the President for assistance in bringing about unification.¹⁰⁴

Another matter of great importance in strengthening the Chinese war effort is the reorganization of the Chinese Army and the civil government. General Hurley has carried on discussions with the Generalissimo about overhauling the supply system, modernizing army administration and streamlining the government. Conferences are continuing but there has been little progress yet. General Stilwell's recall probably delayed action in this field because General Wedemeyer does not, and will not, have the authority over the Chinese Army which was proposed for Stilwell. The Chinese will move more slowly in their reforms, no matter how badly needed, if there is not a Stilwell to goad them on.



Ground situation in Burma, 14 November 1944

SUMMARY

Japan is striving to consolidate her position on the continent of Asia before she must use all her strength to defend the homeland against American attack. The stakes are high and she has thrown a powerful army into a drive which she hopes will knock China out of the war this year. Although she has almost succeeded in her aim, the threat of military disaster has not weakened American determination to support China. The President and Chiang Kai-shek continue their close cooperation to strengthen China and to increase our assistance to her. The basis of U.S. policy to keep China in the war and to make her an effective military ally is the hope that she will be strong enough eventually to throw out the Japanese without relying on large American armies.

The President's problems during the last year in carrying out this policy were shaped largely by the turn of events and the decisions of the Cairo Conference in November, 1943. Disagreements on strategy, shortage of resources, and political considerations entered into the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President and the Prime Minister at that conference. The President bent every effort to have the plan of operations in the Far East meet the wishes of the Generalissimo but the needs of the war in Europe precluded an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal which Chiang thought essential to a successful campaign in Burma. The failure to provide this operation became the basis for most of the disputes with Chiang during 1944 over the use of Chinese ground forces. The Soviet decision, at that time, to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany reduced the value of China as a base for future operations but this did not affect the determination of the President to support China. He made this very clear when the British were anxious to disavow the commitments made at the Cairo Conference.

During 1944 the United States continued to aid China along the lines determined at Cairo. Our policy, as carried out by the President, had many phases. The President supported Chiang's personal leadership; he continued his efforts to bring about political and military unity in China; he controlled U.S. military activities in the Far East; and he tried to persuade Chiang to accept the strategic decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to engage in combined operations with Anglo-American forces.

The President supported Chiang through a difficult year when his leadership was threatened by political rivals. Their joint Declaration of Cairo, because of its political and psychological value, greatly increased Chiang's prestige. The President sent a personal representative, General Hurley, to him at a time when the opposition was coming to a head and the military situation was deteriorating rapidly; Hurley's presence strengthened Chiang's hand and helped him ride out the storm. In the crisis of a dispute between Chiang and the senior U.S. Army officer in China, the President upheld Chiang. The choice cost the United States the services of General Stilwell in China, but the President believed that the support of Chiang was worth more in the long run. No other Chinese figure appeared to have so many of the elements of leadership or to offer so good a chance for cooperation with us.

The most effective way to strengthen China is to settle the disputes of her quarreling, fighting factions. The future of China is jeopardized by civil war between the National Government and the Communists in northern China. The President is determined to resolve their differences. At every step he opposed Chiang's desire to fight the Communists. He refused to give Chiang Lend-Lease supplies to use against Communist armies. When Chiang was suspicious of the Soviet Union and tried to draw the President into a

Soviet-Chinese border dispute, the President told him to "leave it on ice."

The President illustrated the American desire that National and Communist forces cooperate by urging Chiang to allow a U.S. military mission to enter the Communist Provinces at a time when Chiang was still actively fighting the Communists. The President's personal representative went to Chungking by way of Moscow to help settle Soviet-Chinese differences and, when he arrived in Chungking, he expressed the President's views by telling Chiang that the principal object of Chinese-American collaboration was to bring about a unification of all military forces in China.

In July 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that General Stilwell be placed in command of all ground forces in China. The President supported this move for military coordination by many direct appeals to the Generalissimo; when these had no effect, he sent General Hurley to China. Chiang refused to appoint Stilwell; the President then proposed that Stilwell command all forces involved in opening the land supply route from India to China. When Chiang refused to assent even to this, the President directed General Hurley to exert his efforts to bring about other military and administrative reforms.

U.S. military operations in the Far East are the most tangible aids which the United States has given China; an air freight route is maintained over the Hump to carry Lend-Lease goods and military supplies and the Fourteenth Air Force operates from Chinese bases. In addition, some U.S. Army officers are assigned to the Chinese army for command, administrative or training duties. The details of these activities are the War Department's but the President supervises and controls them. There have never been as many supplies nor has the Air Force been as strong as the Generalissimo wished. Discussions by the President and Chiang have dwelt on increasing the supplies, building up the Air

Force, and using available resources most effectively.

Throughout the year the President supported the strategic policies and decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff when they were challenged by Chiang Kai-shek. He endeavored to persuade the Generalissimo to adopt the views of the Chiefs of Staff and to embark on combined operations with other allied forces.

Since the outbreak of the war, the United States has insisted on the need for improving the combat efficiency of Chinese ground forces as the only means of safeguarding our air bases in China. Only a small air force can be maintained in China and it cannot hold off a determined, powerful ground army. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, has demanded that more supplies be flown over the Hump for Chennault's Air Force and for the Chinese Air Force; the equipment of his ground forces was incidental to him. The President repeatedly pointed out to Chiang the necessity for training and equipping his armies to protect the air bases. He repeated the military axiom that the air forces could be no stronger than their supply services and he asked for cooperation from Chiang's troops in opening a better supply route. Chiang turned a deaf ear and asked for supplies for the air forces themselves. The U.S. view is now proved; as Chennault's planes became more effective against the Japanese, the enemy drove inland and eliminated the allied air fields because the Chinese army was too ill-equipped and poorly trained to halt them.

At the Cairo Conference Chiang expressed for the first time an interest in land campaigns in China. His interest was soon forgotten, however, in the heat of debate over plans for Burma in 1944. Burma is the key to all operations in China until the Allies can secure and maintain a port on the coast of China, and recapture of Upper Burma is necessary to open a supply route to China. The plan of the Combined Chiefs of Staff counted upon the advance of Chiang's Yunnan Army

into Upper Burma in conjunction with British, Indian and Chinese troops moving forward at the same time from India. To his customary plea for more air power, at Cairo Chiang added a new note -- a demand for an amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal. He refused to let his Yunnan Army participate in the Burma campaign because there was no such operation. Chiang had not been interested in sea power before, but his insistence that an amphibious operation was essential to success in Burma conformed to his curious and persistent underestimate of land power.

In spite of urgent pleas from the President throughout the year that he attack with his Yunnan force, Chiang remained adamant and none of the inducements or arguments offered by the President could move him. When the President tried with a flood of messages to persuade Chiang to fight, he calmly stated that China's role was to "maintain" her various fronts against enemy attack. This lent considerable weight to Stilwell's bitter accusation that Chiang wanted to sit the war out and await the arrival of U.S. Armies in China. The President's efforts to educate Chiang to the significance of Burma seem to fall on barren ground; when the Japanese began to advance in East China, Chiang blamed his weakness there on the fact that supplies had been used to recapture Upper Burma. At the same time he announced his intention of withdrawing the Yunnan Army from its position in Burma, thus exposing the route of a road to China to enemy recapture and risking the results of two and a half years' fighting. At the President's urgent request, Chiang changed his mind and reinforced his Yunnan troops, but he expressed scornful disagreement with Allied strategy in Burma.

The question of strategy is unfinished business for the President and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang told the President that Stilwell's departure brought them into

complete harmony and that they are now in complete agreement on all matters of policy, but the extent and nature of Chinese military collaboration with Allied forces is an issue which will require the constant attention of the President.

Memoranda, letters, reports and Espaco and Minutes of the Staff and Espaco Conferences are filed in the Office of the Naval Aide. Information on the military situation in China and Burma was obtained from reports and records in the War Zone.

U.S. POLICY

1. Quoted in Frederick Maurice, *Statement Substantive of the Civil War*, Boston, 1936, p. 152.
2. Patrick J. Hurley to the President, 20 November 1943.
3. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 23 July 1944.

THE CASINO CONFERENCE

4. Memorandum from General Stilwell to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 22 November 1943, in *Process and Minutes of the Indian and Burma Conferences*. (Hereafter referred to as *Indian*). pp. 212, 213.
5. Combined Chiefs of Staff 127th Meeting, *Indian*, pp. 417-417.
6. First Plenary Meeting, 23 November 1943, *Indian*, p. 376.
7. *Ibid.* pp. 378, 379.
8. *Ibid.* p. 380.
9. *Ibid.* pp. 380, 381.
10. Second Plenary Meeting, 24 November 1943, *Indian*, p. 386.
11. CCS 127th Meeting, 24 November 1943, *Indian*, pp. 427-429, 431-435.
12. *Ibid.* p. 433.
13. CCS 130th Meeting, 29 November 1943, *Indian*, pp. 428-428. CCS 131st Meeting, 30 November 1943, *Indian*, p. 443. "Operations in the Southwest Asia Command", *Indian*, pp. 241-243.
14. *Ibid.* p. 243.

NOTES

Dispatches, letters, memoranda and Papers and Minutes of the Sextant and Eureka Conferences are filed in the Office of the Naval Aide. Information on the military situation in China and Burma was obtained from reports and records in the Map Room.

U.S. POLICY

1. Quoted in Frederick Maurice, Statesmen + Soldiers of the Civil War, Boston, 1926, p. 152.
2. Patrick J. Hurley to the President, 20 November 1943.
3. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 23 July 1944.

THE CAIRO CONFERENCE

4. Memorandum from General Stilwell to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 22 November 1943, in Papers and Minutes of the Sextant and Eureka Conferences. (Hereafter referred to as Sextant). pp. 212, 213.
5. Combined Chiefs of Staff 128th Meeting, Sextant, pp. 415-417.
6. First Plenary Meeting, 23 November 1943, Sextant, p. 378.
7. Ibid, pp. 378, 379.
8. Ibid, p. 380.
9. Ibid, pp. 380, 381.
10. Second Plenary Meeting, 24 November 1943, Sextant, p. 388.
11. CCS 129th Meeting, 24 November 1943, Sextant, pp. 427-429, 431-435.
12. Ibid, p. 433.
13. CCS 130th Meeting, 25 November 1943, Sextant, pp. 438-440. CCS 131st Meeting, 26 November 1943, Sextant, p. 443. "Operations in the Southeast Asia Command", Sextant, pp. 241-245.
14. Ibid, p. 243.

15. Third Plenary Meeting, 4 December, 1943, Sextant, pp. 391-394.
16. Ibid, p. 395. CCS 134th Meeting, 4 December 1943, Sextant, pp. 477, 478.
17. Third Plenary Meeting, 4 December 1943, Sextant, pp. 395, 396.
18. Fourth Plenary Meeting, 5 December 1943, Sextant, pp. 398-404.
CCS 135th Meeting, 5 December 1943, Sextant, pp. 482-486.
- 18a. Third Plenary Meeting, 4 December 1943, Sextant, p. 396. CCS 135th Meeting, Sextant, p. 483.
19. Fourth Plenary Meeting, 5 December 1943, Sextant, p. 402.
20. Fifth Plenary Meeting, 6 December 1943, Sextant, p. 407. CCS 136th Meeting, 5 December 1943, Sextant, pp. 491-495. CCS 137th Meeting, 6 December 1943, Sextant, pp. 498-501. CCS 138th Meeting, 7 December 1943, Sextant, pp. 505, 506.
21. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 5 December 1943.
22. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 9 December 1943.
Details of the loan of \$1,000,000,000 were discussed by Secretary Morgenthau with Chinese Finance Minister H.H. Kung. The loan was referred to only briefly thereafter by the President and Chiang.
23. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 20 December 1943.
24. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 23 December 1943.

THE BURMA CAMPAIGN

25. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 31 December 1943.
Mme. Chiang Kai-shek to President, 31 December 1943.
Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 10 January 1944.
26. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 10 January 1944.
27. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 14 January 1944.
28. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 3 February 1944.
29. General Marshall to the President, 29 January 1944.
30. General Marshall to the President, 15 March 1944.
31. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 17 March 1944.
32. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 29 March 1944.
33. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 31 March 1944.

34. General Marshall to the President, 31 March 1944.
General Stilwell to General Marshall, 2 April 1944.
General Marshall to the President, 3 April 1944.
35. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 3 April 1944.
36. Secretary Hull to the President, 28 April 1944.
37. General Somervell to General Marshall, 24 October 1943. General Marshall sent a copy of this letter to the President on 1 November 1943.

AIR OPERATIONS

38. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 9 December 1943.
39. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 20 December 1943.
40. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 23 December 1943.
41. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 27 December 1943.
42. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 14 January 1944.
43. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 10 January 1944.
44. General Marshall to the President, 12 April 1944.
45. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 12 April 1944.
46. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 23 April 1944.
47. "Aide Memoire to President Roosevelt," delivered by General Shang Chen to the President 31 May 1944.
48. President to General Shang Chen. This letter was dated 12 June 1944, but was not signed and delivered until 26 June 1944.
49. President to General Shang Chen, 12 June 1944.
50. General Arnold to the President, 22 April 1944.
51. President to General Shang Chen, 12 June 1944.

COMMUNISTS IN NORTH CHINA

52. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 9 February 1944.
53. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 22 February 1944.
54. General Hearn to General Marshall, 23 February 1944.

55. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 1 March 1944.
56. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 20 March 1944.
57. General Marshall to the President, 28 February 1944.
58. General Stilwell to General Marshall, 30 March 1944.
General Marshall to the President, 4 April 1944.
59. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 17 March 1944.
60. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 29 March 1944.
61. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 20 March 1944.
President to Chiang Kai-shek, 31 March 1944.
62. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 4 April 1944.
63. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 8 April 1944.
64. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 13 April 1944.

CRISIS IN EAST CHINA

65. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 9 December 1943.
66. "Aide Memoire to President Roosevelt" from General Shang Chen, 31 May 1944.
67. Ibid.
68. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, 4 July 1944.
69. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 6 July 1944.
70. Ibid.
71. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 8 July 1944.
72. General Stilwell's remarks were forwarded by General Marshall to the President on 18 February 1943.
73. President to General Marshall, 8 March 1943.
General Marshall to the President, 16 March 1943.
74. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 13 July 1944.
75. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 9 August 1944.
76. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 23 July 1944. This message was held in Washington by H. H. Kung for delivery to the President upon his

return from Pacific. Kung finally delivered to Mr. Hopkins on 15 August without waiting longer.

77. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 12 August 1944.

78. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 21 August 1944.

GENERAL HURLEY'S MISSION

79. General Hurley to the President, 11 October 1944.

80. General Hurley to the President, 7 September 1944.

81. On 9 September 1944 the President added another item to the agenda of unfinished business with Chiang when he asked for the use of 50,000 Chinese civilians for service troops for General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific Area. Chiang never acknowledged this message.

82. General Stilwell to General Marshall, 15 September 1944.

83. Ibid.

84. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 16 September 1944.

85. President and Prime Minister Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek, 18 September 1944.

86. General Hurley to President, 23 September 1944.

87. General Hurley to the President, 25 September 1944.

88. Ibid.

89. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 5 October 1944.

90. General Hurley to the President, 6 October 1944.

91. Mr. Harry Hopkins to General Hurley, 7 October 1944.

92. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 9 October 1944, quoted in General Hurley to the President, 10 October 1944.

93. General Hurley to the President, 10 October 1944.

94. General Stilwell to General Marshall, 10 October 1944.

95. General Hurley to the President, 13 October 1944.

96. President to General Hurley, 14 October 1944.

97. General Hurley to the President, 15 October 1944.

98. President to Chiang Kai-shek, 18 October 1944.
99. General Hurley to the President, 20 October 1944.
100. Chiang Kai-shek to the President, 23 July 1944.
101. General Hurley to the President, 7 September 1944.
General Hurley to the President, 23 September 1944.
102. General Hurley to the President, 7 September 1944.
103. General Hurley to the President, 23 September 1944.
104. General Hurley to the President, 23 October 1944.
General Hurley to the President, 29 October 1944.
General Hurley to the President, 7 November 1944.