

MR 052, Sec. 2 -- DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

MR 052, Sec. 2 -- DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

1944 - 1945

Box 48

Map Room  
Box 48  
Folder 6

1944 - 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT  
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Forward, Rheims, France

To: War Department

Nr: 18903 (SCAF 271) 10 April 1945

FWD-18903 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat for information to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower this is SCAF 271.

1. On 1st March an inquiry was received through AFHQ from MACMIS asking whether a Yugoslav military mission would be acceptable to SHAEF. A reply was dispatched that as no Yugoslav troops were under command of SCAEF beyond a liaison officer for Prisoners of War and displaced persons, a mission was not required. If it was dispatched it should be accredited to the French government only.

2. A mission under Major General Rukavina and Major General Ilic as deputy with about ten officers and enlisted men has nevertheless arrived in Paris. Although Rukavina states that he himself is accredited to French government he has produced letter dated 14 March to SHAEF signed by Marshal Tito, nominating his mission to SHAEF.

3. This mission is not required and as its presence might lead to requests from other allied countries for similar missions to be accredited to SHAEF the sooner it is withdrawn the better. It is appreciated that a blunt refusal to accept this mission might cause serious trouble between the British

CM-IN-9182

(10 Apr 45)

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DECLASSIFIED JCS 34-71

RAF 6-16-71


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 TOT  
PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Forward, Rheims, France

To: War Department

Nr: 18903 SCAF 271 10 April 1945

and US governments and Marshal Tito at a time when this is most undesirable. A direct intimation here to Rukavina to this effect would also probably be exaggerated and distorted in transition to Marshal Tito. It is proposed therefore only to tell him that the status of his mission appears to be still in some doubt and to offer him every courtesy as a distinguished visitor to SHAEF. Meanwhile it is hoped that it will be possible to indicate through diplomatic or other channels that it is assumed that the Yugoslav mission to SHAEF is of a very temporary character.

End.

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RHP 6-16-71

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm Leahy, CG AAF, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King,  
C of S

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(10 Apr 45)

DTG 101830B

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~~SECRET~~

WJ

From: US Military Attache London, England  
To: War Department  
Nr: 24659 26 March 1945  
To MILID sr nr 24659

Info recd here from Moscow rated B 2 indicates Benes talks with Harriman reveal expectation of pre-Munich borders for Czechoslovakia, all prewar Soviet Czech agreements to remain in force and at least 4 of 16 Czech Ministerial appointments to be Communists.

End

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
Col Park  
C of S

CM-IN-27620

(26 Mar 45)

DTG 261628Z

rel

~~SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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[REDACTED] VI  
URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
Nr: FX 36532 NAF 871 2 March 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF for information FX 36532 signed Alexander cite PHCOS. [REDACTED] GOLDFLAKE. This is NAF 871.

1. Following is review of situation in Greece made in light of FAN 501 and with particular references to paramount need for earliest possible release of British troops

2. General background to situation is that although agreement recently signed between Greek Government and EAM/ELAS should result in disbandment, dispersal and substantial disarmament of ELAS forces with consequent diminution in control and influence they previously exercised, there is nevertheless conclusive evidence that EAM/ELAS under domination of KKE do not intend to honour their undertakings more than compelled, and are likely to retain and conceal maximum possible number of arms with view to a further bid for power should favourable circumstances develop. In these circumstances rate of establishment of effective control by Greek Government and corresponding release of British troops depends on following factors:

(A) Size and capabilities of National Guard forces now available to Greek Government. This in conjunction with backing that can be provided by British troops largely determines

CM-IN-2495 (3 Mar 45)

[REDACTED] DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

*osr Greece*

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[REDACTED] VI  
URGENT

Page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta Italy

Nr: FX 36532 NAF 871 2 March 1945

extent of territory which can be dealt with initially.

(B) Expansion of National Guard to enable further territory to be taken under control, reorganization of Gendarmerie to take over from National Guard the function of maintaining law, and raising of National Army to provide a mobile reserve behind National Guard. These processes also depend on availability of arms, clothing and equipment when required.

(C) Past experience has shown that no Greek Government is likely to establish rapid and effective control in face of open and clandestine opposition which will be organized by KKE extremists. Before civil administration begins to function in any particular area, control by National Guard must become effective. Such control will not be established without adequate backing by British troops and will take time.

(D) Restoration of effective government control and coherent functioning of civil administration depends on reconstruction of adequate telegraph and telephone communications. The civil systems have been heavily damaged throughout Greece and much equipment removed. Even such minimum repair as will suffice when augmented by wireless will take considerable time depending greatly on efficiency of Greek posts and telegraphs service and assistance we can give.

(E) State of road communications which largely determines ability of British troops to enter areas to collect surrendered arms and to provide for maintenance of National Guard.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

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[REDACTED] IVI

URGENT

Page 3

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta Italy

Nr: FX 36532 NAF 871 2 March 1945

3. The plan which has been proposed to comply with FAN 501 in the face of this situation accordingly provides for establishment of government control throughout Greece in two phases. Each phase involves consecutive execution of following tasks and will take a minimum of one month.

- (A) Deployment of British troops.
- (B) Deployment of National Guard.
- (C) Collection of surrendered arms.
- (D) Adequate establishment of civil authorities to organize further call up of National Guard.
- (E) Enrollment and equipment of National Guard.

4. Arrangements for redeployment of British troops and National Guard for second phase will take at least a fortnight from end of first phase.

5. Phase one covers major portion of Greece and will require all British forces now in country. In best circumstances it should be completed by 31st March. Allowing minimum time for establishment of effective National Guard control (see Para 1) (C), it should be possible to release 46th Division progressively throughout April but one Brigade Group is likely to be required till end of month. Surrender of German Forces in Crete which on present information may take place during March or April would retard this forecast for release of 46th Division. Plans for dealing with this contingency are still under examination.

6. Phase 2 covers remainder of Greece and requires all

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[REDACTED] IVI

URGENT

Page 4

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 36532 NAF 871 2 March 1945

present British forces less 46th Division. In best circumstances it should be completed by 15 May and it should be possible to release 4th British Division progressively thereafter. On present forecast one Bridage Group is likely to be required until end of June.

7. Call up of National Army cannot be completed before end of phase 2. It should however be possible to form 1st Division by about 15th April and 2nd Division by about 15th May and 3rd by 1st June. They might under most favourable conditions and provided equipment is available be ready to function as organized forces in reserve behind National Guard approximately 2 months after formation.

8. Timings to which attention is particularly called are:

(A). Disarmament of ELAS forces cannot be completed before middle of phase 2. Best date is 1st May.

(B) Effective control of Greek Government throughout country cannot be established before end phase 2 and is likely to be not before 1st June.

(C) First Division of National Army will not be ready to function as government mobile reserve before 15th June.

9. Depending on development of the situation meantime, it is proposed to make the final decision on release of 46th Division about 1st April and of 4th British Division about 15th May. It is intended that 4th British Division will proceed on release from Greece to Mideast relieving 1st British Division

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URGENT

Page 5

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 36532 NAF 871 2 March 1945

to complete GOLDFLAKE operations. In general, if 46th Division is released as indicated in paragraph 5, units etc, will reach Marseilles approximately 14 days after release. In case of 4th Division firm estimate of timings for arrival 1st Division at Marseilles must depend on situation at time.

End.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Cofs

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CM-IN-2495 (3 Mar 45) DTG 022032A bjm  
[REDACTED]

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 March 1945

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 2816


The White House Map Room  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A  
No. 2816, "A Tentative List of Japanese Diplomatic  
Representatives in Europe", prepared in the Research and  
Analysis Branch of this office and classified as  
confidential.

Sincerely yours,



William L. Langer  
Chief, Research and  
Analysis Branch

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

Washington, D. C.

13 February 1945

Copy No.

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052

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Research and Analysis Branch

R&A No. 2816

A TENTATIVE LIST OF JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC  
REPRESENTATIVES IN EUROPE

Description

A listing of Japanese diplomats in Europe by the country to which they are accredited, compiled from information received since 1 January 1944.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

Washington, D. C.

10 February 1945

Copy No. 52

(64594)

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This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Introduction

This report lists the members of Japanese Diplomatic missions and some press representatives accredited to European countries.

The lists are tentative in character. The information has been drawn from sources of varying reliability such as certain confidential sources, FCC radio monitoring reports, and the Almanac De Gotha. In all instances, the last known incumbent of any given position has been listed. The information was obtained at various times between 1 January 1944 and 10 February 1945; the date of the last report on each individual has been indicated on the lists.

Frequently the present location of the Japanese representatives is not known. This is particularly true in the case of recently liberated countries. Where such data are available the information has been included in the report.



BULGARIA

Diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Japan were broken off on 11 November 1944 and the Minister and his staff arrived in Istanbul, Turkey on 17 November 1944. 1

Minister	Akira YAMAJI as of 17 November 1944 <u>1</u>
First Secretary	Yoshio NOGUCHI as of 15 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Secretary	H. DOSHO (DOJO) as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Military Attache	Colonel Takeo SHIMIZU as of 15 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Assistant Military Attache	Akira KIKKAWA as of 15 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Naval Attache	Captain Akio MATSUBARA as of 1944 <u>1</u> (also accredited to Roumania and Turkey)
Attache	KI NEMOTO as of November 1944 <u>1</u>
Attache	K. OKUYAMA as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Chancellor	SHUNAGA as of 15 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Correspondent	MAKKI as of 17 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Correspondent	KI YAMATO as of 17 November 1944 <u>1</u>

CROATIA

Address of Legation  
Hotel Esplanado, Zagreb.

Minister & Charge d'Affaires  
in Jugoslavia

Kazuichi MIURA  
as of 10 January 1945 /1

Secretary

Mitsuo H.SHIZUME  
as of June 1944 /1

ASST. TO DIR.

ASST. TO DIR.

ASST. TO DIR.

ASST. TO DIR.

ASST. TO DIR.

ASST. TO DIR.

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FINLAND.

Finland severed relations with Japan on 22 September 1944.  
Tadashi SAKAYA, former Japanese Minister to Finland has returned  
to Japan and it is not known if the members of his staff accompanied  
him. 1

Attache

Eiji TOKURA  
as of 1944 3

Recording Secretary

Tadashi FUJII  
as of 1944 3

Recording Secretary

K. NAKASHITA  
as of 1944 3

FRANCE (VICHY)

The Ambassador and his staff were reported in Southern Germany on the 5th of October 1944. 1

Ambassador	Takanobu MITANI as of October 1944 <u>1</u>
Minister	Taro TERASAKI as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Counselor	Viscount Seiichi MOTONO as of 10 January 1945 <u>1</u>
First Secretary	S. MARUO as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Second Secretary	Senji TSURUOKA as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Second Secretary	Tokichi SAIDA as of 19 September 1944 <u>2</u>
Third Secretary	G. HATTORI as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Military Attache	Major General Eiji NUMATA as of 9 June 1944 <u>2</u>
Attache	Hideo KITAHARA as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Attache	Yoichi MAEDA as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Attache	SATO as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Attache	Akira SHIGEMITSU as of 1944 <u>3</u>

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## GERMANY

A report of 31 December 1944 states that on account of the military situation the Japanese Military Attache's Office has decided to reassign its personnel. A nucleus staff was left in Berlin while other members have been ordered to Bern and Stockholm. /1

A report of 25 November 1944 states that the Japanese Embassy in Berlin is evacuating its press personnel to Switzerland. /2

A report 6 October 1944 states that the Secretary and other official representatives of the Japanese Finance Ministry have been ordered to Switzerland. /2

Ambassador	Lt. General Hiroshi OSHIWA as of 12 December 1944 <u>/2</u>
Minister	Shikao MATSUSHIMA as of 13 May 1944 <u>/1</u>
Counselor	Shunichiro KAWAHARA as of 14 November 1944 <u>/2</u>
Censul General	Taro TOKUNAGA as of September 1944 <u>/1</u>
First Secretary	Kintaro MASE as of 25 September 1944 <u>/2</u>
First Secretary	Fujio UCHIDA as of 1944 <u>/3</u>
First Secretary	Fumiaki IRISAWA as of 15 January 1945 <u>/1</u>
Third Secretary	Shigeo IMAI as of 1944 <u>/3</u>
Third Secretary (Commercial affairs)	Tsuneo KOMURA as of 1944 <u>/3</u>
Third Secretary (commercial affairs)	Hiroshi SUGIURA as of 1944 <u>/3</u>
Military Attache	Major General Mitsuhiko KOMATSU as of 17 January 1945 <u>/2</u>

GERMANY

Assistant Military Attache	Colonel Kiyoshi HASEBE as of 20 November 1944 /1
Assistant Military Attache	Colonel Kiyokazu ITO as of 31 December 1944 /1
Assistant Military Attache	Major KAGOSHI as of 31 December 1944 /1
In office of Military Attache	Takeo KINOSHITA as of 15 January 1945 /1
Military & Air Attache	Colonel Yoshisada MISHIMA as of 25 July 1944 /1
In office of Military & Air Attache	Masayuke MIYAKAWA as of 25 July 1944 /1
Naval Attache	Vice Admiral Katsuo ABE as of 20 October 1944 /2
Assistant Naval Attache	Rear Admiral Tadao YOKOI as of 1944 /3
Commercial Attache	Alexander NAGAI as of 1944 /3
Financial Attache	Ryoichi HATA as of 8 September 1944 /1
Financial Attache	Shozo SATO as of 1944 /3
Financial Attache	Hisao TOMOOKI as of 20 November 1944 /1
Financial Attache	Takeo YUMOTO as of 1944 /3
Attache	Naraichi FUJIYAMA as of 1944 /3
Attache	Minoru IMAI as of 1944 /3

GERMANY

Attache Motoichi KISHI  
as of 1944 /3

Attache Hidehiko MAGATA  
as of 1944 /3

Attache Kinya NIISEKI  
as of 1944 /3

Attache Koshiro OGA  
as of 1944 /3

Attache Tetsumatsu SATO  
as of 22 December 1944 /1

Attache Shiro SHIMIZU  
as of 1944 /3

Attache Taketeru SOGI  
as of 1944 /3

Attache K. SUGA  
as of 1944 /3

Attache Sadamitsu SUZUKI  
as of 1944 /1

Attache Tsuneaki UEDA  
as of 1944 /3

Attache Toshio YAMANAKA  
as of 1944 /3

Chancellor Motonori EMURA  
as of 20 November 1944 /1

Department of Education official, Hideo INUMARU  
attached to the Embassy as of 23 November 1944 /1

Consul-General, Hamburg Otoshiro KURODA  
as of September 1944 /1

Consular official, Hamburg Professor T. TANAKA  
as of 29 January 1944 /1

Consul-General, Koenigsberg Toshihito SATO  
released from office as of  
20 December 1944 /2

GERMANY

Chief Asahi Shimbun Correspondent	Yoshio MORIYAMA as of June 1944 /2
Asahi Shimbun Correspondent	Takeo ENNA as of June 1944 /1
Asahi Shimbun Correspondent	Yoshiro HARA as of March 1944 /1
Asahi Shimbun Correspondent	SASAMOTO as of September 1944 /1
Chief Domei Correspondent	Susumu EJIRI as of January 1945 /1
Domei Correspondent	Rinichi SASAKI as of 23 June 1944 /1
Chief Nichi Nichi Correspondent in Europe	Dr. Mineo KATO As of 11 February 1944 /1
Chief Yomiuri Hochi Correspondent	Yasuo URESHINO as of 15 June 1944 /2
Yomiuri Hochi Correspondent	KAJI (KANI) as of November 1944 /2
Yomiuri Hochi Correspondent	SUGITA as of 11 May 1944 /1
Yomiuri Hochi Correspondent	Dr. Isao YAMAZAKI as of April 1944 /1
Correspondent	TOMOMURA as of 29 July 1944 /2

HUNGARY

Minister	Toshitake OKUBO as of 1944 /3
Military & Air Attache	Colonel Takei HAYASHI as of 9 September 1944 /1
Secretary & Interpreter	Ishinoŋu AOYAMA as of 1944 /3
Domei Correspondent	Yoshikazu ODA as of 20 January 1944 /1

ITALY

The Ambassador and his staff have been evacuated to Bern, Switzerland. A skeleton staff remains in Northern Italy in contact with the Fascist Republican Government.

Ambassador

Shinrokuro HIDAKA  
as of 2 October 1944 /1

Third Secretary

Yuki SHIRAHATA  
as of 25 May 1944 /1

Military & Air Attache to  
Fascist Republican Government

Lt. Gen. Moriaki SHIMIZU  
as of 23 June 1944 /1

Assistant Air Attache

Colonel HAYAKAWA  
as of 15 April 1944 /1

Assistant Air Attache

Major SHIOZE  
as of 15 April 1944 /1

Commercial Attache

TOYAMA  
as of 11 April 1944 /1

Attache

I. ABE  
as of 1944 /3

Attache

Yoshikazu KANAKURA  
as of 1944 /3

Attache

K. NISHIMURA  
as of 1944 /3

Attache

Matao URIU  
as of 1944 /3

Economic Adviser

Dr. OGISHIMA  
as of 31 May 1944 /2

Chancellor

Otokichi TAKESE  
as of 25 May 1944 /1



PORTUGAL

Address of Japanese Legation  
Prada de Rio de Janeiro 14, Lisbon

Minister	Morito MORISHIMA as of 20 November 1944 /1
△ Counselor	Masutaro INOUE as of 27 November 1944 /1
△ Counselor	Ryuji ITO as of 30 September 1944 /1
△ Counselor	Kotaro ONO as of 7 September 1944 /1
△ Counselor	Tokichiro UOMOTO as of 26 September 1944 /1
△ Counselor	Masami NAKANE as of 26 September 1944 /1
△ Counselor	Katsuo OKAZAKI as of September 1944 /1
First Secretary	Shunichi KOMINE as of 1944 /3
Second Secretary	Sashichiro M.TSUI as of 19 February 1944 /1
Third Secretary	Ryuichi ANDO as of 20 November 1944 /1
Third Secretary	Masanao HORIUCHI as of 1944 /3
Third Secretary	Kenichi TO as of 1944 /3
△ Third Secretary	Toshio YOSHIOKA as of 1944 /3
Military Attache	Lt. Colonel Mikio OKAWA as of 27 November 1944 /1

PORTUGAL

In Military Attache's Office	Satoru KUGEYAMA as of 20 November 1944 <u>/1</u>
In Military Attache's Office	Koko TAKI as of 20 November 1944 <u>/1</u>
Military & Air Attache	Lt. Col. Naoki MATSUYAMA as of 27 November 1944 <u>/1</u>
Naval Attache	Captain Munetaugu OISHI as of 1944 <u>/3</u> (also accredited to Spain)
Assistant Naval Attache	Captain Kenzo INOUE as of 18 March 1944 <u>/1</u> (also accredited to Spain)
In Office of Naval Attache	Dr. Kiyoshi KIDOSAKI as of 1 March 1944 <u>/1</u>
Financial Attache	Ryujiro UEMURA as of 20 November 1944 <u>/1</u>
Attache	Hiroshi HORI as of 1944 <u>/3</u>
Attache	Kenji ICHIKAWA as of 1944 <u>/3</u>
Attache	Atsushi ITOGA as of 20 November 1944 <u>/1</u>
Attache	Tadashi IWASE as of 5 May 1944 <u>/1</u>
Attache	Hiroshi NEMOTO as of 7 September 1944 <u>/1</u>
Attache	Hikoichi SOMEMIYA as of 1944 <u>/3</u>
Attache	Noboru SUGIURA as of 20 November 1944 <u>/1</u>
Attache	Takeo UENO as of 20 November 1944 <u>/1</u>

PORTUGAL

Domei Correspondent

Ryosuke HONDA  
as of 18 April 1944 /2

Domei Correspondent

Shigeo SATO  
as of 20 November 1944 /2

Nichi Nichi Correspondent

Junzo SAKURA  
as of 1 January 1944 /1

Correspondent

Shichiro, ONO  
as of 18 March 1944 /1

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent

Correspondent


Correspondent

Correspondent



ROUMANIA

Minister	Kiyoshi TSUTSUI as of 4 November 1944 /2
First Secretary	Ch. SUGIURA as of 26 September 1944 /1
Military & Air Attache	Lt. Colonel Tsuneyuki SHIMIZUKI as of 26 September 1944 /1
Assistant Military Attache	Major Kenichi NAKAMURA as of 26 September 1944 /1
Assistant Military Attache	KIMURA as of 15 November 1944 /1
Naval Attache	Captain Akio MATSUBARA as of 26 November 1944 /1 (also accredited to Turkey and Bulgaria)



RUSSIA

Ambassador	Naotake SATO as of 20 August 1944 /1
Minister	Goro MORISHIMA as of 16 December 1944 /1
Counselor	Iohiji KAMEYAMA as of 15 January 1944 /1
Counselor	Shoji OGATA as of 10 January 1945 /2
Counselor	Suemitsu KADOWAKI as of 10 January 1945 /2
First Secretary	Koto MATSUDAIRA as of 28 April 1944 /2
Military Attache	Major General Isamu ASAI as of 15 May 1944 /1
Assistant Military Attache	Colonel C. YABE as of 1944 /3
Naval Attache	Captain Suteji YAMAGUCHI as of 1944 /3
Attache	M. AKIYAMA as of 1944 /3
Attache	K. ISHIDA as of 1944 /3
Attache	J. KAWASAKI as of 1944 /3
Attache	N. KOMURO as of 1944 /3
Attache	S. TAKAHASHI as of 1944 /3
Attache	R. TAKAYAMA as of 1944 /3
Asahi Shimbun Correspondent	Shinichiro WATANABE as of 27 April 1944 /3

SPAIN

Minister	Yakichiro SUMI as of 20 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Counselor	Fumio MIURA as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Secretary	Sakai MANJO as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Secretary	Yukichi TAMURA as of 1944 <u>3</u>
Secretary	Rokuzo YAGUCHI as of 20 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Military Attache	Lt. Colonel Keizo SAKURAI as of 20 November 1944
Naval Attache	Captain Munetsugu OISHI as of 1944 <u>3</u> (also accredited to Portugal)
Assistant Naval Attache	Captain Kenzo INOUE as of 18 March 1944 <u>1</u> (also accredited to Portugal)
Attache	Yoshitaro YOSHIZAKI as of 21 April 1944 <u>1</u>
Correspondent	Kunisuke MATSUO as of 20 November 1944 <u>1</u>
Asahi Shimbun Correspondent	YAMAMOTO as of June 1944 <u>1</u>

SWEDEN

	Address of Legation 25 Strandvagen, Stockholm
Minister Plenipotentiary	Shin SAKUMA as of 10 January 1945 /1
Minister	Suemasa OKAMOTO as of 23 November 1944 /1
Counselor	Kazuichi MIHARA as of 27 December 1944 /1
Third Secretary	Tsunekichi SUGITA as of 1944 /3
Secretary	Kiyoshi MAKIMURA as of 13 April 1944 /1
Military Attache	Major General Makoto ONODERA as of 1944 /3
Naval Attache	Captain Iori MISHINA as of 1944 /3
Attache	R. SUGITA as of 1944 /3
Attache	G. TAKEUCHI as of 1944 /3
Yomiuri Hochi Correspondent	Dr. Hiroshi KITAMURA as of 10 January 1945 /1
Domei Correspondent	Masami S. ITO as of 28 June 1944 /2
Correspondent	Jiro HOMMA as of June 1944 /2
Correspondent	TOH as of 25 August 1944 /1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SWITZERLAND

Address of Japanese Legation  
55 Thunstrasse, Berne

Address of Japanese Legation  
55 Thunstrasse, Berne

Minister	Shunichi KASE as of 25 September 1944 /2
First Secretary	Suetaka HIYANO as of 31 March 1944 /2
First Secretary	D. NAGATA as of 1944 /3
First Secretary	Shu YOSANO as of 20 November 1944 /2
Second Secretary	Morio AOKI as of 13 September 1944 /2
Second Secretary	T. MORIYAMA as of 1944 /3
Military Attache	Brigadier General Kiyotomi OKAMOTO as of 1944 /3
Attache	T. ARAKI as of 1944 /3
Attache	J. INAGAWA as of 1944 /3
Attache	N. ISHIHARA as of 1944 /3
Attache	G. KIHARA as of 1944 /3
Chancellor	Haruo HORIKAWA as of 27 November 1944 /1
Consul-General at Zurich	Jotaro KODA (KANDA) as of 25 November 1944 /1
Domei Correspondent	Yoshinori HORIOUCHI as of 1 July 1944 /2
Mainichi Correspondent at Zurich	WAKAYAMA as of October 1944 /2
Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent	Hanzo KAWASAKI as of 13 November 1944 /1



TURKEY

Address of Japanese Legation  
59 Boulevard Tchankaya, Ankara

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Japan were severed on 6 January 1945. According to reports all Japanese diplomatic personnel in Turkey are trying to secure visas to return to Japan via Russia. Negotiations are being carried on between the two countries and it is not known how many have succeeded in arranging for repatriation.

Ambassador	Tadashi KURIHARA as of 28 January 1945 /1
Minister	Shinichi CHIBA as of September 1944 /1
First Secretary	Hideo NAKAO as of 8 April 1944 /1
First Secretary	Takeo KINOSHITA as of 8 April 1944 /1
First Secretary	Taro KASHIHARA as of 9 June 1944 /2
Second Secretary	Kozo IZUMI as of 8 April 1944 /1
Third Secretary	Yasutsugu GOTO as of 8 April 1944 /1
Third Secretary	Rikushiro KOBAYASHI as of 8 April 1944 /1
Third Secretary	M. TANABE as of 1944 /3
Secretary	Kwango M.TSUMURA as of 7 July 1944 /1
Secretary	Jiro NESAWA as of 7 August 1944 /1
Commercial Secretary	Yoshitsugu KIMBEI as of 8 April 1944 /1
Military & Air Attache	Major General Horyo TATEISHI as of 11 November 1944 /1

- 21 -

TURKEY

Assistant Military Attache

Colonel Umeichiro OTA  
as of 8 April 1944 1

Naval Attache


Captain Akio M.TSUBARA  
as of 26 September 1944 1  
(also accredited to Bulgaria  
and Rumania)

Assistant Naval Attache

Osamu TSUKUDA  
as of 8 April 1944 1

Chancellor

Yasuhara AOKI  
as of 8 April 1944 1



VATICAN

Minister


Ken HARADA

as of 8 December 1944 1

Third Secretary

Masahide KANAYAMA

as of 8 December 1944 1



SOURCES

1 --- OSS Confidential Sources

2 --- Federal Communications Commission Daily Monitored Report

3 --- Almanac De Gotha

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "TOT"

*PM News*

From: US Military Attache, London, England  
To: War Department  
Nr: 24241 20 February 1945  
To MILID from Morgan sr nr 24241.

As result of political developments caused by Yalta Conference the Polish President has summoned to London General Maczek, Commanding General of Polish Armored Division in Holland, General Anders, Commanding General of Polish Corps in Italy and General Gluchowski, Commanding General of Polish Troops in Scotland for conference to discuss the future of Polish Army. Birkeland recognized Maczek and Gluchowski today and Anders expected to arrive today. One question will probably be how release soldiers from binding oath to the Government of Poland anticipating Allied recognition of Lublin Group as that government.

Tindall

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
COL PARE  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)  
OSD letter, May 2, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-20851 (21 Feb 45) DTG 201735Z mcs  
[REDACTED]

052 Poland

44  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 "UHR"

PRIORITY

From: US Military Attache, Guatamala City, Guatemala

To: War Department

Nr: 552

20 February 1945

To MILID Washington DC signed Cruse, 552.

Secretary State Stettinius, invited Guatemala Delegation to Mexico Conference to accompany him in his plane from here and this was accepted by the Junta.

Comment:

This should end any resentment that might have been brought about by our recognition of Salvador Government.

End.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972


By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF

OPD  
Col. Park ✓  
C of S

CM-IN-20658 (21 Feb 45) DTG 201515Z es

  
42  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ TOT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France

To : War Department

No : S 77815 SCAF 192 29 January 1945

S 77815 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for  
action and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff for info  
signed Eisenhower. This is SCAF number 192.

Are asked by the British Foreign Office to accept at  
this Headquarters Mr. Christopher Steel as British political  
officer expert in German affairs. It is stated that his  
relationship with this Headquarters would be as nearly  
analogous as is possible in the circumstances with that of  
Mr. Robert Murphy.

This raises the question of the continuance of the  
appointments held at this Headquarters by Mr. Reber and Mr.  
Peake, who fill appointments created by you on the staff of  
COSSAC in 1943. These appointments were originally created to  
assist the Supreme Commander in his dealings with friendly  
nations about to be liberated.

The task of liberation now being for the most part  
complete, it is thought that the Supreme Commander is now in  
a position to deal with the liberated countries through normal  
diplomatic channels, and that two political officers, one  
British and one American, are adequate to provide the necessary  
political advice.

It is therefore recommended that for the future

CM-IN-29074 (30 Jan 45)

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DECLASSIFIED JCS 34-71

RHP 6-16-71

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] TOT

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France

No : S 77815 SCAF 192 29 January 1945

Mr. Robert Murphy and Mr. Christopher Steel shall be deemed  
to fill the appointments at present held by Mr. Reber and  
Mr. Peake.

End

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED JCS 34-71

RHP 6-16-71

NOTE: This message has been relayed to ARGONAUT (1)

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Admiral Leahy, CG AAF, OPD, General Bissell,  
Admiral King, Log

CM-IN-29074 (30 Jan 45) DTG 291450A m/m

[REDACTED]  
COPY NO.

40

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 UHR

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department 574  
CG, US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt 1242

Nr: 574 27 January 1945

Message number to MILID 574 AMSME 1242 .

Thinly veiled fear of Red bogey appears in editorial comments upon King Peter's current differences with Sabasitch. Yalcin in Istanbul Tanin asks if US and Britain are really in favor of aiding Croat Tito whose vowed aim is Pan-Slavic Federation and of crushing fiercely independent Serbes, who might otherwise constitute an obstacle to such federation. Sadak in Aksam voices generally expressed opinion that free elections must be held when proper calm atmosphere is attained and then asks whether this will be any more possible under Tito than it would be under EAM in Greece at any time.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
OPD  
Col Park  
Log

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972


By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-27600

(28 Jan 45)

DTG 271525Z

aj

  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 UHR

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey  
To: War Department  
CG, US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt  
Nr: 573 26 January 1945  
MILID msg nr 573 AMSME 1241

To be interned Friday 26 January are Japanese in Turkey according Turkish Secret Police source. Visa arrangements with Soviets to enable exchange with Turk diplomats in Japan not yet consummated.

End

**CLASSIFIED**


E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
OPD  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-26098 (26 Jan 45) DTG 261430Z bjm  


44

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052  
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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
FROM	<i>file</i>		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			
DECODED BY	<i>files</i>	CNO COM 8TH FLT ALUSNA ANKARA ALUSNA ISTANBUL ALUSNA LONDON	PRIORITY
TYPED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE IN ALL ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
240845 NCR 7201			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

(REQUEST COM 8TH FLT ALUSNA ANKARA ALUSNA ISTANBUL AND LONDON BE INFORMED. CNO FOR INFO AND PASS TO ADEES)

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ODESSA.

"ARRIVED ODESSA 1500Z JANUARY 22. OFFICE ESTABLISHED TEMPORARILY AT LONDON HOTEL ODESSA. REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT."

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1973  
By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

NOTE: NCR HAS REENCIPHERED AND PASSED TO NAVCOM FOR TRANSMISSION TO ALL AS RDO WASHINGTON'S 241210

16....COG

COMINCH...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P... . 19C....

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Office in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 052

240845Z

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA ODESSA		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM		CNO	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY 24 JAN 1945	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	1007	WSA	PRIORITY
DECODED BY HENKE	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
TYPED BY CHAPMAN			DEFERRED
BY WILLIAMS			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

221630

NCR 6988

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION, CNO; INFO, WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION.)

OFFICE ASST NAVAL ATTACHE ODESSA USNR LIEUT COMDR

JOHN H HARSHAW USN IN CHARGE COMMISSIONED AND

TEMPORARILY ESTABLISHED LONDON HOTEL ODESSA 22ND

JAN. CABLE ADDRESS ALUSNA ODESSA.

ACTION	
0	
F-00	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FI01	
FI37	
FI40	
I0-00	
VCNO	

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

16....ACT....

COMINCH....19....19C....BUPERS....20M....23....

OOR....BUSANDA....20R....00....CNO....NAVAIDE....

200P....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

221630

OPNAV 19-66

05

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

  
Operations Division WDG8  
American Theater WDOFD  
Lt Col Ashworth 6623

20 January 1945

Commanding General  
US Military Mission to USSR  
Moscow, Russia

Number WAR 24288

From Marshall TOPSEC to Deane reurad M 22407 of 19 January 45

Party being held in Washington pending further information  
from you important that answers to queries in WARX 21201 of  
15 January 45 be known as soon as practicable.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ORIGINATOR: Gen Hull

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
Adm Leahy  
JC/S  
Adm King  
CofS

CM-OUT-24288 (Jan 45) DTG 210206Z fbh

  
9

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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~~SECRET~~  
Operations Division,  
American Theater Section  
WDOPD OFD 381 TS (9 Jan 45)  
Lt Col Ashworth 6623

15 January 1945

US Military Mission  
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 21201

TOPSEC from Marshall to Deane

Passports issued 12 January 45 as follows: General Jones 55, Captain Porter 56, Colonel Earekson 57, Lt Col Gear 58, Captain Gray 59, Major Poorman 60. Commander Frankel 4842 issued 1 August 41, renewed 16 June 44, visas applied for 12 January not received reured M-22310, 9 January 45.

Suggest half track or full track vehicle be used in place of regular jeeps, your comment on this subject requested. Request recommendations concerning entertainment funds and supplies. Following are clothing sizes, in centimeters unless otherwise stated: Read in columns, Column 1 item, as follows: 1 height, 2 weight (kilograms), 3 hat (head diameter), 4 shirt neck, 5 shirt sleeve, 6 coat center of back from collar to waist, 7 center of back from waist to bottom of coat, 8 center of back--half shoulder width to seam of sleeve, 9 shoulder to elbow, 10 elbow to length of sleeve, 11 chest, 12 waist, 13 seat, 14 pants out-seam waist to length of pants, 15 pants crotch to length of in-seam, 16 pants waist, 17 pants seat, 18 gloves, 19 boots calf, 20 boots ankle, 21 length of foot, 22 boots width of foot, 23 size (American).

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972 NOV 2 1973

By RHP, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_

CM-OUT-21201

(Jan 45)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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16-50500-1 GPO

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[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Number: WAR 21201

15 January, 1945

<u>I</u>	<u>II</u> General Jones	<u>III</u> Col Barockson	<u>IV</u> Capt Gray	Capt Porter
1.	179	180	188	188
2.	95	80	82	91
3.	59.7	58.5	56.5	57.2
4.	41.9	40.6	41.9	40.6
5.	84	89	84	91
6.	47	51	53	55
7.	30	30	30	30
8.	26	26	23	23
9.	33	33	36	38
10.	26	27	28	27
11.	113	104	102	112
12.	97	79	92	97
13.	120	102	110	115
14.	107	109	114	114
15.	79	81	84	84
16.	97	79	92	97
17.	120	102	110	115
18.	21.6	25.4	24	24
19.	right 44 left 46	41	35	41
20.	28	27	29	29
21.	26	28	30.5	28.5
22.	10.2	10.8	10.8	10.2
23.	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ D	9 $\frac{1}{2}$ D	12D	10A.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-OUT-21201 (Jan 45)

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TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

Number: WAR 21201

15 January, 1945

Page 1

<u>I</u>	<u>VI</u>	<u>VII</u>	<u>VIII</u>
	Capt Frankel	LtCol Grear	Maj Poorman
1.	170	178	170
2.	75	75	75
3.	58.5	59.7	57.8
4.	39.3	38.1	39.3
5.	84	84	84
6.	46	46	46
7.	28	33	28
8.	24	24	23
9.	29	29	29
10.	27	30	27
11.	104	102	104
12.	87	89	92
13.	107	107	107
14.	100	104	100
15.	74	80	74
16.	87	89	92
17.	107	107	107
18.	23	24	23
19.	36	37	34
20.	27	27	27
21.	27	26	26
22.	10.2	10.2	9.5
23.	84D	74E	80.

Tentative plans party to arrive Fairbanks on or about 5 February. Nothing follows.

End.

ORIGINATOR : GEN HULL  
 INFORMATION: GEN SOMERVELL  
 JCS  
 ADM LEAHY  
 GEN ARNOLD  
 ADM KING  
 C OF S

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 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
 By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-OUT-21201 (Jan 45) DTG 152353Z mcs

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16-39000-1 GPO



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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 REO  
PRIORITY

From: US Military Attache, Bern, Switzerland

To : War Department

Nr : 2019

12 January 1945

2019

Train on Swiss territory in Chiasso station machine  
gunned by American fighter 11 Jan. Engineer killed fireman  
badly wounded. Second train enroute Como to Chiasso at  
exit Montecampione Tunnel at Chiasso fired at. Italian  
conductor badly wounded.

End

ACTION: G-2


INFO : CG AAF

OPD

~~COL PARK~~

C OF S

OM-IN-11024 (12 Jan 45) DTG 121131Z mcs



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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

UHR [REDACTED]

From: U.S. Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department

Hr: 553 8 January 1945

553 is message serial number. To MILID

Announced officially is as reported, new  
Turkish Ambassador to Washington Huseyin Ragix Daydur  
formerly Moscow Ambassador to.

End.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF

OPD

Col Park

CM-IN-7851 (9 Jan 45) DTG 081300Z bjm  
[REDACTED]

052

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - IVI

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: CG, US Army Forces in Rumania

To: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: M 221 2 January 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~ Ref No. M 221 to AGWAR for action G-2  
MIS from Schuyler Rumania.

There follows a paraphrase of OSS radio report:

During raid of 24 November which lasted 2-1/2 hours, population completely calm. There was considerable AA fire and Japanese fighters were seen. Japanese Press claimed destruction five bombers.

Raid of 27 November took place on cloudy day and planes could not be seen. No AA fire heard by source and no claims made by Japanese Press.

Civilian morale, majority of Japanese very high. People uninformed about truth of war and Japanese Naval defeats but appear to believe leaders implicitly. Respect for authority and veneration of Emperor and military commanders is great as ever; Morale of soldier also very high. Population was very quiet during Tokio raids of 24 and 27 November 1944 with no evidence of hysteria.

There is absolute blackout in cities. Theaters are closed and streets deserted from nine o'clock in evening.

CM-IN-2894 (4 Jan 45)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972; CIA Wt. 5-14-75

By SII

Date MAY 30 1975

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24-75724

052

Colonel Park

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ - IVI

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Page 2

From: CG, US Army Forces in Rumania

No: M 221

2 January 1945

A few large airraid shelters exist in large Tokio office buildings. Typical Japanese shelter is small narrow trench roofed over with planks and dirt.

Industrialists, professionals and others of upper class are not confident of ultimate Japanese victory. They have given up hope of separate peace between Germany and Russia but believe that after Germany is defeated Russia may intervene for peace between United States and Japan.

Russians hamper Japanese diplomatic travel, particularly couriers. Japanese diplomats forced to wait for months for visas to pass through Russia. Sub-source commented that diplomatic staff in Rumania has not yet left Japan because Russian permits not yet issued. Japanese diplomats from Finland reached Japan and were observed by sub-source passing Russian cash Manchukuo border on 7 December.

All labor unions suppressed and only Government approved patriotic associations permitted. No talk ever of strikes and Japanese blow up American labor difficulties as evidence internal dissension in America.

Sub-source informed of following by International Red Cross representatives; treatment American prisoners and food much improved. Entertainment now permitted and no cases of brutality mentioned. Representative expressed opinion that improved treatment resulted from better

CM-IN-2894 (4 Jan 45)

~~SECRET~~

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24-78724

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~ - IVI

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 3

From: CG, US Army Forces in Rumania

No: M 221

2 January 1945

Japanese understanding of American ways and habits. Large quantity parcels from United States received in Japan and assurances received that they would be distributed shortly. As result improved conditions morale American prisoners better.

Impossible for foreigners to ascertain who are Japanese leaders. Prime Minister subordinate to Army and Navy and all important actions determined by representatives of Army and Navy together with small group of business men and technical experts. Individual officials either unwilling or unable to act on own authority and all decisions made by boards and committees.

Civilian transportation curtailed and first class accommodations cancelled. Special authorization necessary for train travel. Entry and exit Manchukuo carefully controlled. Foreigners and civilians may enter only three days of each month.

End

Note: This message was received by AGWAR  
as retransmission under DTG: 03/1915.

ACTION: Gen Bissell

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold                      Adm King      Log  
                    Gen Hull                              Col Park

CM-IN-2894 (4 Jan 45)      DTG 021930Z bjm

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*Panama - Activation*



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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)  
OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

From: COM 15  
To: ONI  
DTG: 312212 NCR 2387 December 1944

COM 15 sends to ONI.


Reliably reported Samuel Lewis resignation requested today. Appointment Junta very doubtfull. Reference 302100.

President De La Guardia radio broadcast nation last night would remain in power until 15 June when would resign mandate to Constitutional Convention previously departed President refused request 33 prominent leaders to resign favor candidate acceptable all parties stating would resign only after formal request by all parties supporting government. Supporting parties in joint statement asked president name "Cabinet Government" reliably reported following cabinet named today no confirmation having assumed office.

- Alfonso Corraza Garcia Government and Justice,
- Roberto Jumenez Foreign Relations.
- Eduardo Morgan Education.
- Victor Tejeira Finance.
- Roberto F Chiari Health.
- Manuel Guardia Agriculture.
- Demetrio Porras Without Portfolio.

Attention invited Porras who heads Socialist Party which closed convention yesterday with Pro-Administration demonstration. No indication cabinet composition answer to joint parties request by appears representative all political parties. National Youth Congress still violently opposed to

CM-IN-1535 (2 Jan 45)



*Col Park*

052

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: COM 15

DTG: 312212 NCR 2387

December 1944

president scheduled close 30 Dec resolved continue sessions  
pending resolution crisis.

End

NOTE: 302100 is CM IN 709 (1 Jan 45) G-2

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-1535 (2 Jan 45) DTG 312212Z m/m


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OSD Letter, 5-8-72

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WA



Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

23 December 1944

Headquarters Communications Zone  
European Theater of Operations  
Main Echelon  
Paris, France

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
Versailles, France

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
U S Army Liaison Section  
Kandy, Ceylon

Commanding General  
United Kingdom Base Section  
London, England

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

Number: WARK 81582

Book message to Eisenhower Versailles, Alexander Caserta, and Mountbatten Kandy for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FACS 117 to Eisenhower and FAN 470 to Alexander from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The following is furnished as background and guidance in exercising discretionary powers given you in FACS 91 to SCATF, FAN 433 to SACMED and WARK 39514 to SACSEA dated 30 September 1944.

2. The Japanese military authorities have repeatedly searched diplomatic and consular premises in the Far East. So far they have not undertaken to give any excuse for their action although many strong protests have been lodged against their action on

CM-OUT-81582

(23 Dec 44)



052

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32

*adm. Leahy*

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Number: WARX 81582 23 December 1944 Page 2

the grounds of incompatibility with international practice. If Allied military forces should enter and search enemy diplomatic and consular premises without ample justification, the Japanese government would be provided, even at this late date, with an unanswerable defense against such protests.

3. The search of the German Embassy at Rome by Allied military authorities was amply justified on the basis of the proof presented and the espionage and sabotage material actually found on the premises. If the material found has been only of a long-range academic or planning value, an entirely different development of the incident might have been expected, including a protest from the German government and retaliation by that government. It is noted that the German government by its silence has accepted the situation at Rome.

4. Many important Allied diplomatic and consular establishments are in areas still under the control of the German and Japanese forces. The passport and visa records of those offices constitute one of the principal means with which to combat post-war efforts of war criminals and enemy agents falsely to assume the identity of persons entitled to passports and visas. An implementation of policy which would induce German or Japanese violation of these premises would imperil the safety and integrity of these important records, which are irreplaceable.

End.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy; CG AAF; OPD; Gen. Bissell;  
Adm. King; Log

CM-OUT-81582

(23 Dec 44)

2038Z

ef

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16-5609-1 GPO

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSLO BEYROUTH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE 21 DEC 44			RRRR ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 2027			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY SEVALD		FOR INFORMATION JICAME ALUSLO ALEXANDRIA	5
TYPED BY BOHAN / E Keckman			PRIORITY 6
ROUTED BY KLAFF			RRRR ROUTINE 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 8
211330 NCR 986			9
			PRIORITY 10
			RRRR ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			13
			14
			15
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			<input type="checkbox"/> 17
			18
			19
			20

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

(FOR CNO INFORMATION ON DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT)

ACTION

REFERENCE MY REPORTS 7S44 DECEMBER 11. EMIL BERTIN EXPECTED 23 DECEMBER. AUBOYNEAU ABOARD. DUFF COOPER INFORMED FRENCH GOVERNMENT DANGERS OF INCIDENTS AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN TO AVOID THEM. BRITISH LEGATION HERE MAKING SIMILAR STATEMENTS TO BEYNET AND LIBANESE GOVERNMENT. SHONE NEW BRITISH MINISTER ARRIVING 22 DECEMBER.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

16.....ACT

COMINCH...20G.....CNO.....NAVAIDE.....20OP.....

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FX37		39
FX40		40
IO-00		41
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 10-67

211330

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**  
~~SECRET~~

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

11 December 1944

Headquarters, Communications Zone  
European Theater of Operations  
Main Echelon  
Paris France

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
Versailles France

Commanding General  
Central District UK Base Section  
London England

Number WARX 75876

TOPSEC book message to SHAEP Versailles for Eisenhower for  
action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section  
London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information,  
FACS 115 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The appointment of Military, Air, and Naval Attaches  
to the governments of liberated countries within your sphere  
of military responsibility, provided that they in no way  
interfere with your jurisdiction and responsibilities as  
directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is a matter for  
diplomatic arrangements by the several governments concerned.  
So long as you are charged with principal military responsi-  
bility in the country concerned, you will have decision in  
the event of a question arising as to jurisdiction and res-  
ponsibility, subject only to matters involving a major conflict  
of interest being referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

CM-OUT 75876

(12 Dec 44)

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RAP 6-16-71

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**  
~~SECRET~~

WAFX 75876

Page 2

2. In reference to your SCAF 76 the Combined Chiefs Staff believe that the time has come when the Ambassadors to the French Government need Military Attaches to advise them on military problems which are now arising involving areas other than your own and matters of long-range military policy. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the formula in the preceding paragraph should provide a workable solution and ensure that your interests are not adversely affected by the appointment of Attaches.

3. Steps will be taken to have Attaches instructed in accordance with paragraph 1 above.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
C of S  
Adm King

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RHP 6-16-71

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division  
ASiatic Section WDOPD  
OPD 336 TS (6 Dec 44)  
72578

9 December 1944

Commanding General  
USAF India Burma Theater  
New Delhi India

Commanding General  
USAF China Theater  
Chungking China

Number WARX 75106

TOPSEC for Sultan and Wedemeyer from Marshall

Directive of President that no political decisions may be made with French Military Mission attached to Southeast Asia Command is subject, reference WARX 66178 November 21 from JCS.

Secretary of State in a letter to the Secretary of War dated December 6 has just indicated that a message recently received from the US Consulate in Colombo reported that in the early part of October Lord Louis Mountbatten is understood to have advised the staff of the Southeast Asia Command that the French Mission under General Blaizot had been recognized officially on the basis of a verbal agreement between the Prime Minister and the President.

Upon this being communicated to the President, the Secretary of State further indicates the President replied that the British should be advised that he and the Prime Minister did not recognize the French Military Mission at Southeast Asia Command officially.

The State Department plans to advise the British Embassy of the Presidents reply verbally.

CM-OUT 75106 (9 Dec 44)

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**  
[REDACTED]

WARX 75306

Page 2

~~SECRET~~

The above is being sent to you for your information and it is also desired that General Sultan at the first opportunity give this information to General Wheeler privately.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bull

INFORMATION: JC/S  
Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Mr McCloy  
C of S

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CN-OUT 75106 (9 Dec 44) 23392 khc  
[REDACTED]

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Copy # 375 Copies

8 December 1944.

G R E E C E

W3  
WHL

The Current Situation.

British military forces are in conflict in Athens against mutinous Greeks. The mutineers are mostly members of ELAS, the militia of EAM, or National Liberation Front. EAM is the largest and strongest of the many guerrilla resistance groups originally formed to fight the Axis; its militia is believed to number 35,000 in 11 divisions. Directed to lay down its arms and disband, EAM/ELAS refused, ordered a general strike, and, on 3 December, began armed revolt against the British-sponsored government.

British infantry, tanks, and planes have been employed against the Greeks in widespread fighting. There have been casualties on both sides. Fresh hands of ELAS are reported moving from the rural districts toward Athens. Fighting continues.

The American and British governments are not in agreement as to action to be taken in Greece. On 5 December, Mr. Churchill said that British and Americans are doing their utmost to assist the Greeks, faced with the most desperate economic and financial problems, apart from civil war. He said: "We shall not hesitate to use the considerable British army now in Greece, and being reinforced, to see that law and order are maintained." He added that the Greeks cannot be assisted, however, "if the tommy-guns provided for use against the Germans are now used in an attempt to impose by violence a Communist dictatorship."

The State Department followed with a statement which said that it is American policy to expect countries to work out their problems along democratic lines without influence from outside. On 7 December, Mr. Stettinius put the U. S. on record as favoring complete freedom of political

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DATE 01/10/2001

~~TOP SECRET~~

action for the people of Greece.

The Background.

The crisis has been mounting since the occupation of Greece in 1941.

Inside Greece, there has been a period of subjugation under miserable conditions which included not only a continuing struggle against the Germans but also an internal revolution similar to those in other Axis-occupied countries. The people were exhausted physically, economically, and financially. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that Leftist groups, trained in underground activity, grew in size and importance.

To this date the Leftist revolution has remained largely a domestic uprising for control of the government. Although EAM contains a hard core of true Communists, Greece does not seem to have been the object of unusual attention from the Soviet Union.

Outside Greece, the Government-in-Exile was subjected to continued criticism. It was charged by Greeks remaining in the homeland that the government abroad was making no serious efforts to include representatives of the resistance groups. The government, it was said, consisted mainly of professional politicians out of touch with the situation in Greece. A climax was reached in April when there was a mutiny of Greek forces in Egypt that could not be quelled without British assistance.

A conference at Lebanon in May brought together representatives of the eight leading parties and factions, and resulted in the eventual formation of a coalition government under Papandreou. But the Lebanon conference served only partially to clarify Greece's problems and the Papandreou government found itself in difficulty from the beginning,

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principally because it was unable to satisfy ever-increasing demands by EAM.

When it became clear that the Germans would have to withdraw from Greece, the Government-in-Exile prepared to return to Athens and set about formulating a post-war policy. An attempt was made to alleviate the economic distress and straighten out the financial tangle. As sections of the country were liberated, representatives of the government were dispatched to Greece. However, signs of instability remained evident:

The Liberal Party abstained from participation because they considered the government ineffective and the attitude of Papandreou high-handed and subservient to the British. The Leftists were reported in renewed opposition to the Government. The Royalists, particularly Royalist officers in Cairo, denounced Papandreou's collaboration with EAM.

As the Germans evacuated Greece, the situation became more tense. ELAS took over in many areas. In Peloponnesus, EAM secured virtual control. In Macedonia, EAM apparently cooperated with Bulgarians in achieving control. On the island of Mytilene, EAM set up Peoples' Courts, held elections, and refused to obey the orders of the Government. Only the Athens area seemed to be under the domination of the established government. The situation was aggravated by the almost complete collapse of transport and communications facilities.

On 18 October the Greek government and a supporting British force under General Scobie made a triumphal entry into Athens. On 3 November all Greek forces in Attica, including the gendarmerie and the Athens police, were placed under General Scobie. On 5 November Papandreou issued an order abolishing ELAS as of 10 December, commanding them to lay down

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their arms. Demonstrations followed and General Scobie warned EAM's leaders to have them halted.

On 16 November General Scobie reported to APHQ in Italy that he had discovered an ELAS plot to seize power in Athens. He called the situation "extremely critical" and asked for instructions. General Wilson instructed him to declare Athens a military zone, if necessary, and take measures to maintain law and order. Mr. Churchill was advised.

Various attempts were then made by Papandreou to secure Leftist agreement on dissolving the guerrillas. Concessions were made such as appointing the EAM/ELAS commander in Chief, Gen. Sarafis, to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army, and naming another of ELAS officers Under-Secretary of War. But the crisis continued to mount. A series of cabinet meetings at the end of November failed to produce a solution, owing to the presentation of new demands by EAM. Negotiations broke down 1 December and resulted in the resignation of the 6 Leftist members from the cabinet of 22.

On 3 December EAM staged a demonstration for which permission had been granted and then withdrawn. A riot followed in which the police fired on the crowd. A curfew was imposed and British tanks patrolled the streets. The next day a general strike was called and martial law was declared by Scobie.

Reports indicate disappointment among the Greeks that liberation has not provided food, shelter, clothing and medicines. The Greeks are reported discouraged that the Allies have made no official commitment concerning the acquisition territories, particularly the Dodecanese islands. The Greeks

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JANUARY 6  
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[REDACTED]

are apparently concerned that the Allies, particularly the British, seem to have infringed on Greek internal affairs on the score of military necessity. They are reported disappointed that American troops have been seen so little in Greece and can only interpret that as lack of interest on our part in the fate of a small but gallant ally.

On 7 December Mr. Stettinius issued a statement to the American press which said: "It is our earnest hope that the people and authorities of Greece and our British Allies will work together in rebuilding that ravished country." The statement omitted all mention of American participation.

According to London N/A, the London Times has taken a highly critical view of the British government's handling of the Greek crisis. Most other London papers in commenting on the situation have taken the same general line, which is to the effect that British policy should favor no Greek group or faction.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 2752

THE GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS

Description

An analysis of the origin, development, and implications of the present Greek political crisis.

4 December 1944

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S. C. 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

Copy No. 27

052

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1-2 December with the resignation of the ILO...  
... by some... a general strike...  
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**II. The Leftist Resignations** **4**  
**III. The Opposing Forces** **7**  
**IV. Conclusion** **8**

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SUMMARY

The crisis over the position of EAM-ELAS came to a head on 1-2 December with the resignation of the six EAM members of the cabinet, followed by mass demonstrations, a general strike, and street fighting. The crisis arose from plans to strengthen the authority of the British-supported Greek national government by disbanding the ELAS guerrilla formations. EAM-ELAS, fearing the installation of a rightist regime, refused to disband unless satisfactory arrangements were made to neutralize the rightist armed formations (Mountain Brigade, EDES, etc.), and protested the "unilateral decisions" of the British commander, General Scobie.

In the impending trial of strength between the British-supported government and the EAM, the government can count on the rightist armed formations, some of the recently-mobilized National Guard, the Royalist and most of the Liberal political groups. The British and the government have a further potent weapon in their control of food and relief imports. Nevertheless EAM, which controls the greater part of Greece and claims a total military strength of some 140,000, is likely to be a formidable opponent if it can preserve its unity. There is no doubt of General Scobie's and the government's ability to prevail in the long run, if the crisis develops into a bitter-end fight regardless of future consequences. EAM leaders, however, have appealed to Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR, and obviously hope that British policy may be modified as the result of Allied intercession or the pressure of international public opinion.

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

THE GREEK POLITICAL CRISIS

The long-anticipated crisis over the position of EAM-ELAS came to a head on 1-2 December, when the six EAM members of the Greek cabinet resigned because of failure to reach an agreement on the disbanding of the guerrilla forces. The former Minister of Agriculture, John Zevgos (Communist), protested against what he termed the "unilateral decisions" of General Scobie, British commander in Greece, who had informed the Greek people by leaflets dropped from British planes that he had undertaken to carry out "the Premier's orders on guerrilla demobilization." General Scobie was also quoted as saying that he would stand by the side of the "present constitutional government" of Papandreu until a National Army has been organized and "free elections" are possible, and that he (Scobie) was "convinced that in many parts of Greece freedom of the people does not exist." "There is still terrorism and deception," Scobie said. "All this delays distribution of food as well as general relief coming from Allied Governments." Mass demonstrations, a general strike, and large-scale violence have followed.

I. Background of the Crisis

While the immediate steps leading to the cabinet resignations are not yet fully known, the general factors which produced the crisis are clear. The basic characteristic of Greek politics since liberation has been the fact that the legal and generally recognized national government, which is supported by the British, has a tenuous control only over the Athens-Piraeus area, while the rest of the country is administered and dominated by the left-wing, anti-monarchist EAM-ELAS

(with the exception of Corfu and a part of Epirus, which are under EDES). The problem, therefore, has been that of ending this anomalous situation and securing the transfer of full power and authority to the central government.

On 10 November Premier Papandreu, after a visit to General Scobie and without consulting the EAM members of his cabinet, announced that ELAS should be disbanded by 10 December. Since this announcement the principal political question has been whether EAM-ELAS would submit to this dissolution order or whether it would resist unless its own conditions -- aimed at preventing the installation of a rightist regime -- were fulfilled.

The principal EAM demands have been (1) that all the rightist armed groups (Mountain Brigade, Sacred Company, RAN, and Chi) be dissolved together with ELAS and EDES, and (2) that a plebiscite be held by February 1945. The Mountain Brigade and Sacred Company are units of the Greek national army which have been outstanding for their conservative and monarchist orientation. EAM's insistence on the dissolution of the rightist armed bodies is explained by a reliable American observer as follows: "EAM's fear, and it is a real one, is that not only will ELAS be dissolved and disintegrated but that there will be no popular national army in the true sense. Not only are the ex-Tsoliadhes [Gestapo-controlled Greek secret police] and members of the Security Battalions being trained as units but there is a strong tendency to place Royalist and ex-Metaxist officers in high-ranking positions." This analysis is specifically substantiated by an American

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correspondent who reported that former Security Battalion collaborationist officers were being given commissions in the national army by former Under Secretary of War Lambriasides (member of Papandreou's own party) without securing the approval of the cabinet as had been previously agreed.

While presenting its conditions, the EAM bloc sought to arrive at a compromise which would avert an open break -- mainly because it was convinced that civil strife would lead to full-scale British occupation and the return of the King. It is worth noting that this conviction has not been peculiar to EAM, but has been shared by many individuals of varying political beliefs during the past several weeks. Liberal leaders Gonatas and Venizelos both have expressed precisely the same fear of British intervention and the return of the monarchy. It has also been widely believed in Greece that the reason for the delay in the return of General Plastiras (popular conservative but anti-monarchist army officer, in exile since the early 1930's, who is now reported to be en route from Nice to Greece) is the opposition of the British, who are thought to disapprove of his anti-monarchism. Other recent reports from Greece allege that General Scobie has openly stated that he will restore the King, and that another British representative told Gonatas that President Roosevelt was likewise supporting the return of King George. More significant is the conclusion of a dependable American representative in Athens that, whereas Mr. Leeper, the British Ambassador, has been anxious to avoid a clash with EAM, General Scobie is "ardently and openly anti-EAM,...would like nothing

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better than to cause the disruption of the organization, ...and is developing the habit of presenting the Greek Government with faits accomplis." As an example of the latter tendency the observer reports that Scobie "unilaterally announced that he and Papandreou had agreed to station British troops all over Greece before Papandreou had time to consider the matter fully."

Because of the generally held fear of British intentions, both the EAM bloc and Papandreou had given way recently on certain controverted points in order to avoid civil strife. The EAM acquiesced in the disarming of ELAS groups in Athens and also instructed its members not to retaliate when the royalist Mountain Brigade, upon its arrival in Athens, proceeded to obliterate EAM signs, cry "Long live the King," and force passers-by, occasionally at pistol point, to pay verbal homage to the King. Papandreou on his part appointed the liberal General Ptolemaios Sariyiannis as deputy War Minister and established a Supreme Military Council to judge all Greek officers in a purge of Nazi collaborationists in the army. On 29 November an American correspondent reported that conversations were being carried on for the solution of the crucial issue of the disbandment of the rightist groups, and that a compromise agreement was expected within twenty-four hours.

## II. The Leftist Resignations

On the basis of intelligence now available, which is incomplete and one-sided because of the very severe censorship,<sup>1</sup> it appears that

1. An American correspondent cabled to his paper on 14 November: "Present inhibitions make impossible for this correspondent to describe accurately or fully present activities of certain pressure groups which have important bearing on Greece's future political pattern.... While continuing make every effort tell as much truth as can, specifically disavows any responsibility for giving either complete or neutral view of Greek situation pending lifting of censorship. Athens situation differs from Cairo in that censorship here is wholly British." [REDACTED]

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between 27 November and 1 December three principal developments occurred, culminating in the resignations. The exact chronology of these developments and the relation of one to the other are impossible to determine at present.

(1) On 27 November some sort of agreement on guerrilla disbandment was made and apparently embodied in a decree. It is reported that this agreement provided that the Mountain Brigade, the Sacred Company, and the Zervas forces should be included in the National Army and that an ELAS brigade should be created within the army equal in number to the total of the three above units.

(2) Two days later the EAM charged that Papandreou had "gone outside the terms of the decree." The basis or meaning of this charge is not known. It seems that at this stage the EAM reverted to its earlier demands that all military bodies (both leftist and rightist) should be disarmed by 10 December and the trials of the chief quislings be started immediately and concluded by 10 December.

(3) General Scobie during this period was pressing actively for the disbandment of the ELAS and the EDES, although apparently unwilling to envisage the disbandment of the Mountain Brigade and Sacred Company. It is reliably reported that in this respect General Scobie was acting on orders emanating from the highest authorities in London. General Zervas of EDES, who has always acted under direct British orders, accepted Scobie's orders to disband his forces; on the other hand, General Sarafis, Commander of ELAS, refused to accept Scobie's orders and instead raised the fundamental question of the legal position of the British in Greece.

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Sarafis protested that the agreement entered into at Caserta, to take orders from Scobie applied only to operations against the common enemy, and questioned Scobie's competence to issue orders affecting the internal reorganization of Greek forces.

On the morning of 29 November Papandreu and Kanellopoulos attempted to persuade the EAM cabinet members to reconsider, on the ground that the British would not agree to the dissolution of the Mountain Brigade, that it would be difficult to restrain the British from attacking ELAS, and that the final outcome would be civil war, the return of the King, and dictatorship. Nevertheless on 1 December the four non-Communist EAM ministers handed in their resignations, and were joined on the next day by the two Communist ministers. EAM's apprehension of the policies which might be followed upon the dissolution of ELAS proved stronger than its fear of the consequences of a test of strength with the rightist and British forces.

Papandreu has issued a statement declaring, "Today our conscience is clear. All responsibility, before history and before the nation, is upon the leaders of the extreme left." Nitsos Partsalides, Secretary General of EAM, has countered with a statement that "Henceforth Papandreu is an outlaw. The people will fight for liberty without counting the sacrifices." When asked whether ELAS would surrender its arms on 10 December, Partsalides replied, "After this morning (Sunday) how can we?" EAM leaders have also announced the formal reconstitution of the ELAS military organization. The situation has thus become a test of strength and will between the EAM bloc and the British-supported Papandreu government.

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III. The Opposing Forces

In this test the British and the government can count on the enthusiastic support of the Mountain Brigade, the Sacred Company, the Zervas bands (EDES), the Chi group, and other rightist armed bodies. The British expect that the 9250 National Guardists (1936 class) who were called to the colors during the past week will also aid them, but this is by no means certain as these men have not been thoroughly indoctrinated as have the members of the rightist organizations. All the Royalist and most of the Liberal political groups are likely to support Papandreou and the British. This will be of little military significance, but if Papandreou is able to persuade prominent Royalist and Liberal political leaders to fill the vacant cabinet posts, it will appreciably increase the prestige of his government. The British also have a potent weapon in their control of the importation of food and other relief supplies.<sup>1</sup>

On the other side, the EAM will probably prove to be a formidable opponent, particularly if it is able to preserve its unity. It controls the administration of the greater part of Greece, and its military arm,

---

1. As has been noted, General Scobie has charged that EAM "terrorism and deception" have delayed the distribution of food and general relief. No independent evidence is available that the distribution of food supplies already in Greece has been hampered by EAM activities. The chief difficulty thus far has been to bring sufficient supplies to Greece and to effect their unloading. General Scobie may have had in mind a two days' delay in the unloading of ships in Piraeus. Concerning this incident, an American official in Athens reported that one day was lost because the EAM demanded higher wages for the dock workers, and that the second day was lost because the British officials forgot to issue identity cards to the workers and had to register them all a second time. The same source adds: "There have been American claims that with proper administration Greece could have sufficient food in a short time."

the ELAS, is by far the strongest Greek armed force, claiming a strength of 70,000 officers and men plus a reserve of another 70,000. Reports have been received recently that the population "hates" the EAM and is turning against it, and that its only real source of power is ELAS. Such reports have, however, been received frequently in the past, particularly from British sources, but have not been borne out by the course of events. A dependable American official concludes that, although many EAM members are drifting away now that the Germans are gone and food is available from other sources, "EAM and the left remain the most potent political group in the capital and in the country, and as long as ELAS keeps its arms, perhaps the most potent military force."

V. Conclusion

In the light of the gravity of the issue involved and of its well-known militancy and tenacity, the EAM is not likely to give way in the present crisis. On the other hand General Scobie also has made clear his determination to support the government to the limit of his resources, and this stand has been explicitly endorsed by Prime Minister Churchill. With his military reserves and his control of food supplies, General Scobie will obviously be able to prevail -- whatever the ultimate consequences for Greece and for Great Britain -- if it proves to be a fight to the bitter end.

There remains the possibility that British policy may be modified as a result of Allied intercession and/or the pressure of international public opinion. Thus far both the Soviet and American Governments have

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tended to recognize British primacy in matters concerning Greece. Both sides, however, are now clearly endeavoring to gain the support of public opinion in the Allied countries. EAM leaders have addressed an appeal to Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union demanding that Greece's right to self-determination be respected, and it is possible that this appeal may arouse considerable sympathy in the Allied countries. It is undoubtedly with this hope that large crowds before the American Embassy are crying "Long live Roosevelt" and other crowds before the British Embassy bear signs reading "British Soldiers: Let us choose our own government."

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

From: Chiefs of Staff

To: Joint Staff Mission  
Rptd: SHAEF

Nr: COS (W) 473

28 November 1944

Following from Chiefs of Staff. Reference SCAF 135  
dated 24th November.

1. Presume proposals referred to are those in paragraphs (2) and (6) of enclosure to C.C.S. 653. 20,000 Belgians for internal security duties referred to in this paper will eventually be found from liberated manpower units organized by and equipped through S.H.A.E.F., and do not therefore raise any question of conflict either as regards manpower or equipment.

2. As regards 3 divisions since receipt of Lord Halifax's telegram No. 5712\* dated 21st October, 1944, discussions have taken place between foreign office and Belgian Foreign Minister and as first step towards formation of these divisions the British Government has agreed in principle to formation of 6 Belgian Inf. Bdes. S.C.A.E.F. has been informed of this step and been asked whether these formations will be accepted for operations. No reply yet received to this question.

3. Priority for the allocation of Belgian manpower as between Brigades and SCALF's requirements for liberated

CM IN 28954

(30 Nov 44)

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By Authority of JCS

SM 522-71

By R/AB

Date SEP 7 1972

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 2.

From: Chiefs of Staff

Nr: COS (W) 473

28 November 1944

manpower units must, and of course will be, fully discussed between War Office and SHAEF before program for formation of Brigades drawn up.

End

\* A telegram to the Foreign Office informing them that the State Department saw no objection in principle to the proposals in C.C.S. 653 and no objection to H.M.G. opening discussions with the lesser Western European Allies.

Note: SCAF 135 is CM IN 24043 (25 Nov 44) CCS

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
C of S

CM IN 28954 (30 Nov 44) 0325Z khc

COPY No.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] DHR

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey  
To: War Department  
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt  
Nr: 516 24 November 1944  
Number MILID 516 AMSME 1194

New Yugoslavia will be composed of six federal units namely Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro according to statement attributed to Tito by Bulgarian Communist Journal. Certain regions such as Vovvodino also would have autonomy. Close collaboration with sister Bulgaria promised.

End.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (K)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
COL PARK  
LOG

CM-IN-23783 (24 Nov 44) 2009Z mcs  
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052

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COPY No.

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3

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*prop Room  
file*

November 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Miss Tully:

The attached papers were shown to the President by Admiral Leahy on November 18th. The President indicated that he knew their substance and did not want to read them. Accordingly, they are forwarded to you for file.

*J. W. Smith*  
J. W. Smith,  
Commander, U.S.N.  
Aide

052

CS 11324



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Full  
WAB*

17 November 1944

[Redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Inclosed are papers bearing on a recent incident in which Allied Air Forces attacked a Russian column in Yugoslavia. It is felt that this matter should be brought to your attention.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*E. J. King*

E. J. KING,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and  
Chief of Naval Operations.

- 7 Incls.
- 1 - Brief of incident and action taken
- 2 - Map of target area
- 3 - Proposed message to Red General Staff
- 4 - Copy of letter from Gen. Antonov
- 5 - Copy of JCS message to Red General Staff
- 6 - Copy of preliminary report from Gen. Eaker
- 7 - Full report from Gen. McNarney

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

ATTACK BY U.S. FIGHTER PLANES ON SOVIET TROOPS

caused entirely by a navigational error on the part of the group commander.

On 10 November 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received a radio message involving 15 minutes of flying time, together with the following radio clarity from General Deane in Moscow repeating a letter from General Antonov, the Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff. This letter stated that between the target for which he was ordered and the target actually attacked, the Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff. This letter stated that the following restrictions have been applied in the theater and during allied operations closer than 50 miles from known Soviet air bases:

on 7 November, between Nis and Aleksinao in Yugoslavia (map attached), a group of 27 American Lightning fighters strafed a column of Soviet troops and attacked a group of 9 Soviet fighters protecting the column. The group commander of the American attacking force has been relieved and recalled to the U.S.

Results of the attack - a corps commander, Lieutenant General Kotov, and 9 other personnel were killed, 20 cars set on fire and 3 Soviet planes shot down killing 2 pilots. This letter requested the Combined Chiefs of Staff be informed and asked to conduct an immediate investigation, punish those responsible and henceforth not allow Allied flights into the zone of activity of Soviet troops without preliminary agreement with the Red General Staff. General Deane orally expressed regret of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and assured General Antonov that the requested measures would be taken. The following action has been taken:

A message was immediately dispatched from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Red General Staff expressing regret and assurance that appropriate action would be taken.

General Arnold sent a personal cable to the Chief of the Red Army Air Forces expressing his regret and hope that closer liaison between field forces would prevent recurrence of such an incident.

A preliminary report was received from General Eaker on 10 November and a more complete report from General McNarney on 13 November. These reports verified the Russian account and stated that the incident was

[REDACTED]

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974





[REDACTED]

From: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

To: General Deane

You should present the following to the Red Army General Staff from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Detailed investigation of the attack by United States Lightnings on a Soviet column in Yugoslavia on 7 November has been completed. The results of this investigation show that the strafing between Nis and Aleksinac was carried out by one squadron of a group which had been dispatched to attack enemy columns and rail movements between Sjenica, Novi Pazar, Raska and Mitrovica. After group split-up, this squadron headed for its assigned portion of the target at treetop level. Arriving at what the leader thought to be Novi Pazar, heavy traffic was observed and the column was immediately strafed. At the completion of the strafing run, squadron was justifiably attacked by Soviet fighters defending their column and 1 Lightning was shot down in the first clash. The U.S. leader then recognized the Soviet markings, but before he could disengage his unit from the ensuing air fight, another Lightning and 2 or 3 Soviet fighters were shot down. The Soviet flight leader courageously closed into formation with the U.S. flight leader and mutual identification was confirmed.

"The group commander who personally led the squadron which made the strafing run was an experienced combat pilot, having flown more than 4000 hours. The group was carefully briefed on their assigned target. A navigational error by the leader, together with striking similarity between the map appearance of the target briefed and the target actually attacked,

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\ JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974



[REDACTED]

caused the leader to feel positive as to the identification of the communication lines he was attacking. All personnel on the mission were equally certain that this was the correct target until gun camera film was developed which positively established that the wrong road had been attacked. The respective roads are approximately 45 miles, or less than 10 minutes flying time, apart. After careful analysis, we find that this regrettable incident has resulted from a type of error which has occurred in all theaters of war and which we have been unable to eliminate entirely, even with the exercise of the greatest care and foresight. In our experience, it has been demonstrated that the best way to prevent such incidents is to maintain close liaison between air and ground forces involved. This is particularly true in fast offensive operations, such as our breakthrough in France.

"Between 18 August and 11 November, the Fifteenth Air Force has flown 37 bombing and strafing missions near Soviet lines in Yugoslavia and Hungary against the escape route of retreating Nazi columns. These missions have resulted in the destruction of 621 enemy aircraft and damage to 306 others, as well as destruction of large numbers of railway rolling stock, vehicles and Germans. The incident of 7 November is the only known error that has occurred.

"The group commander who led the attacking squadron has been relieved of his command. Additional restrictions have now been applied in this theater normally prohibiting tactical air operations closer than 80 miles from known Soviet positions. Exceptions to these restrictions will be made only by agreement and after special briefing.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

[REDACTED]

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff again express their deep regret that such an incident has occurred. We feel that we must continue our efforts to develop a system of close liaison between operational headquarters with a view to eliminating the possibility of mistakes while at the same time retaining the material contribution to the destruction of the common enemy that can be attained through close cooperation of our air and ground forces in the field."

In MX-36696, November 10 and MX-37011, November 13, both from Eaker, you now have copies of all available information on the results of the investigation of this incident. Copies of the detailed report referred to in the latter message will be forwarded to you by courier.

"The attack of the Lightnings was stopped only after the leader of the group of Soviet Fighters, Captain Ialdunov, at the risk of being shot down, took position under the leader of the group of American Fighters and showed him the markings of his plane.

"As a result of the attack of the American planes on the Soviet automobile column, Lieutenant General Kotov, the Commander of a Corps, was killed, also 2 officers and 3 men. Twenty automobiles with equipment were set on fire. Of the group of Soviet Fighters, 3 planes were shot down. Two pilots were killed. In addition to this, in the region of the airbase, 4 people were killed by the fire from the American planes.

"This unwarranted instance of an attack by American planes on a column of troops and the group of Red Army planes completely perplexes us, since the attack was 50 kilometers behind the front line, between the towns of Wis and Alaksimae. On the 14th and 16th of October information was given in the Soviet Communiqué that these 2 towns had been captured by the Red Army. The clearly visible markings on the Soviet planes also removes the possibility that there might have been mistakes in determining to whom these planes belonged. There is also no justification for these operations of American planes having been coordinated with the General Staff."

"Please inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the altogether deplorable facts stated above and ask them to carry out an immediate

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: General Deane

Investigation of this incident and to severely punish those responsible  
To: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Soviet Units. Ask them also that hence-  
force they not allow flights of Allied aviation into the Zone of Activity  
No: MX 21660 Date: 10 November 1944  
of the Red Army.

General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff, called me to his office tonight and handed me the following letter:

"This is to bring to your attention that at 1250 hours, 7 November 1944, between Nis and Aleksinao in Yugoslavia an automobile column of Red Army troops was attacked by a group of American Fighters, composed of 27 Lightning planes. A protecting group of 9 Soviet Fighters took off from the Nis Airdrome. The Soviet planes were attacked while they were gaining altitude in spite of the fact that they were clearly marked as planes of the Red Army Air Force.

"Nevertheless for 15 minutes the American Lightning planes continued attacking the Soviet Fighters, forcing them to defend themselves.

"The attack of the Lightnings was stopped only after the leader of the group of Soviet Fighters, Captain Koldunov, at the risk of being shot down, took position under the leader of the group of American Fighters and showed him the markings of his plane.

"As a result of the attack of the American planes on the Soviet automobile column, Lieutenant General Kotov, the Commander of a Corps, was killed, also 2 officers and 3 men. Twenty automobiles with equipment were set on fire. Of the group of Soviet fighters, 3 planes were shot down. Two pilots were killed. In addition to this, in the region of the airdrome, 4 people were killed by the fire from the American planes.

"This unwarranted instance of an attack by American planes on a column of troops and the group of Red Army planes completely perplexes us, since the attack was 50 kilometers behind the front line, between the towns of Nis and Aleksinao. On the 14th and 16th of October information was given in the Soviet Communiqué that these 2 towns had been captured by the Red Army. The clearly visible markings on the Soviet planes also removes the possibility that there might have been mistakes in determining to whom these planes belonged. There is also no justification for these operations of American Air Forces not having been coordinated with the General Staff of the Red Army.

"Please inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the altogether deplorable facts stated above and ask them to carry out an immediate

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

investigation of this incident and to severely punish those responsible for this unexplainable attack on Soviet Units. Ask them also that henceforth they not allow flights of Allied aviation into the Zone of Activity of the Soviet Troops without preliminary agreement with the General Staff of the Red Army.

To: General Deane  
"Please let me know the results of the investigation and the measures being taken. Sincerely yours, Antonov."  
October 1944

Please deliver the following to the Red General Staff:  
CM-IN-9448 (10 Nov 44)

"The United States Chiefs of Staff have received from General Deane your report of the incident of 7 November in Yugoslavia and express their deep regret. Immediate investigation is being made and appropriate action will follow. You will be informed of the results of the investigation and the measures being taken to prevent a recurrence."

CM-IN-60823 (10 Nov 44)

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

[REDACTED]

From: General Eaker

To: General Arnold

From: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Date: 10 November 1944

To: General Deane

Preliminary reports indicate that P-38 fighters of the Strategic  
No: WAR 60623 Staffing mission in Yugoslavia Date: 10 November 1944 engaged  
Soviet fighters and possibly attacked Soviet columns.

Please deliver the following to the Red General Staff:  
of formation leader caused penetration low over to east. This being  
supp. "The United States Chiefs of Staff have received from General  
Deane your report of the incident of 7 November in Yugoslavia and  
express their deep regret. Immediate investigation is being made and  
appropriate action will follow. You will be informed of the results  
of the investigation and the measures being taken to prevent a  
recurrence." Force fighters also missing from this engagement.

The IAK and P-38 fighters finally established mutual recognition,  
broke off engagement and flew formation with own another before proceed-  
CM-IN-60623 (10 Nov 44)

Believe every effort has been made to prevent such incidents by  
close liaison, etc., and that present procedure is as near perfect as  
can be expected in the circumstances.

While not suggesting that this incident could have been avoided,  
would like to point out that Russians have not appreciated necessity  
for a bomb line clearly defined by present at least partly and been most  
tardy in giving approval for liaison mission to such area Second  
Slovakian Army.

Portion of U.S. Army Air Force element of the Mediterranean Allied  
Air Force mission with the Army Headquarters is at present functioning  
there in its incomplete form and without official Russian permission.

In view of extremely fluid situation and desire to inflict maximum  
damage on fleeing enemy, many air elements are operating in restricted  
areas when weather permits and occasional incidents such as that  
reported are apt occasionally to occur.

CM-IN-9840 (10 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: General McNarney  
From: General Eaker  
To: General Marshall  
To: General Arnold  
Re: MX 36696

Date: 10 November 1944

Preliminary reports indicate that P-38 fighters of the Strategic Air Force on strafing mission in Yugoslavia 7 November became engaged Soviet fighters and possibly attacked Soviet columns.

First reports indicate possibility of navigational error on part of formation leader caused penetration too far to east. This being supplied for your information and no action is expected.

Investigation continues and will advise any additional information.

Believe 2 YAK fighters destroyed and 2 of the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force fighters also missing from this engagement.

The YAK and P-38 fighters finally established mutual recognition, broke off engagement and flew formation with one another before proceeding to respective bases.

Believe every effort has been made to prevent such incidents by close liaison, etc., and that present procedure is as near perfect as can be expected in the circumstances.

While not suggesting that this incident would have been avoided, would like to point out that Russians have not appreciated necessity for a bomb line clearly defined by prominent land marks and been most tardy in giving approval for liaison mission to work with Second Ukrainian Army.

Portion of U.S. Army Air Force element of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force mission with the Army Headquarters is at present functioning there in its incomplete form and without official Russian permission.

In view of extremely fluid situation and desire to inflict maximum damage on fleeing enemy, many air elements are operating in restricted areas when weather permits and occasional incidents such as that reported are apt occasionally to occur.

CM-IN-9840 (10 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: General McNarney

To: General Marshall

No: MX 37011

Date: 13 November 1944

Detailed report is being forwarded to you by courier including  
Detailed investigation here completed concerning attack by U.S.  
Army Air Force Lightnings on Soviet column in Yugoslavia on 7 November.

The 82nd Fighter Group was dispatched on adequate information to attack a legitimate target after proper briefing. The Group Commander Colonel C. T. Edwinston, an experienced pilot with more than 4000 hours and a veteran of 27 combat missions, personally led the mission. The assigned mission was to attack enemy columns and rail movements between Sjenica, Novi Pazar, Raska and Mitrovica. Colonel Edwinston assigned one squadron to the section between Sjenica and Novi Pazar. He assigned another squadron to act as high cover and he led the third squadron in the attack on the balance of the route.

At about 60 miles southwest of Sjenica the squadron split up and hit the deck headed for their respective assignments. Colonel Edwinston's squadron arrived at what he thought to be Novi Pazar, found the road heavily trafficked and proceeded with his strafing. Actually as verified by our camera later, he began his strafing at Krusevac and continued through Cicevan to Nis.

As his squadron completed its strafing and pulled off they were attacked by Red Air Force Yaks and in first pass one Lightning was shot down. Colonel Edwinston immediately recognized the attackers as Yaks but in the ensuing air fight before he could disengage and assemble his fighters another Lightning and 2 or 3 Yaks were shot down. As his squadron was assembling the Yak flight leader slid up to him and the two flight leaders confirmed mutual identification. Throughout this time the top cover squadron did not join the fray.

There is a startling similarity between the map appearance of the briefed target and the actual target strafed as will be seen on map being forwarded. Map used was British 1 to 500,000 Europe Air Shkodra (Scutari) sheet corrected through January 1942. Recommend you have plotted now.

Upon return to base the top cover leader was equally as positive as to the identification of the point where strafing began and only when gun camera film was developed did it become established that the wrong road had been attacked. The respective roads are roughly 55 miles apart.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

All pilots will readily understand how even one as experienced as Colonel Edwinton, flying on the deck in such rugged country, under frequent flak attack as he was, could make a mistake of 10 minutes in navigation.

Detailed report is being forwarded to you by courier including copies of radiograms of regret sent to Marshal Tolbukin by General Wilson and by me upon my arrival 12 November.

Careful analysis reveals that the incident had only the one cause: navigational error. There were no contributory causes. In the face of the subject incident and two days later the Soviets have requested through our established skeleton liaison that we attack the same road as briefed upon 7 November as it is of vital and continuing importance. We are taking every conceivable precaution however, so as to avoid that type of mistake, as well as any others. Restrictions have been applied normally prohibiting ground operations of strategic fighters closer than 80 miles from known Soviet positions. In exceptional circumstances with special briefing exceptions will be authorized.

Entirely aside from this incident, however, it is desirable that we continue our efforts to establish closer and more complete liaison. Obviously General Antonov in Moscow does not understand that our tactical forces, as well as strategic, operating in a tactical role, are making consistent material contribution to the destruction of the enemy in the Balkan and Hungarian areas. Timely, accurate, field liaison is essential for their efficiency.

Point out that 37 bombing or strafing missions have been flown by the 15th Air Force between 18 August and 11 November near Soviet lines in Yugoslavia and Hungary. They have resulted in destruction of 621 enemy aircraft and damage to 306, as well as destruction of great numbers of railway rolling stock and vehicles and Germans. This is first unfortunate occasion in all that effort.

This Headquarters, the 15th Air Force and the pilots involved are sincerely distressed at this unfortunate incident and do not blame the Red fighters for fighting to protect their charge. We are determined to leave no stone unturned to prevent such accidents but do not intend to allow these hazards to cause a reduction of pressure upon the enemy.

CM-IN-12918 (14 Nov 44)

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JOS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Hq AAF ACAS Intelligence  
AFICL-LI Major J Z Mims/bje  
5264

11 November 1944

Military Attache  
American Legation  
Bern Switzerland

Number WAR 61437

Signed Bissell for Chestle from Arnold

Further information concerning your 1896 and 1899 is requested. In all such incidents following information should if practicable be obtained: Hour date objective place number and type aircraft damage and casualties. If location of attacks cannot be precisely reported by reference to place names on standard maps Greenwich coordinates should be used. After receipt of more details air commanders will be requested to investigate the alleged incidents and report of investigation will be forwarded when obtained.

End

ORIGINATOR: CGAAF

INFORMATION: OFD  
G-2  
Log

CM-OUT-61437 (11 Nov 44)

2246Z

bem

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COPY NO. 38

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ACAS, Plans AFAEP Operational  
Plans Dir. European Br.  
Lt. Col Gutru 6724

8 November 1944

Commanding General  
Strategic Air Forces in Europe  
London, England

Number: WAR 59725

To Spaatz from Arnold.

*our air attacks in Sweden*

Last report from Hardison on 23 October regarding release of our internees from Sweden indicated 298 who had been released by the Swedes were still awaiting evacuation. There were 460 more not yet released but we have reason to believe the Swedes will let them go when we have evacuated the other. Hardison implied that 150 per week could be taken out with present equipment and good weather. If anything other than weather is causing the delay, what is it? I strongly desire that every effort be made to expedite getting our airmen out of Sweden; if lack of aircraft is the reason for the delay I will take action toward providing more for the ATC Stockholm route. In the meantime, until our own people have been evacuated, I am unwilling to sanction use of the planes now on this run for any other purpose. I desire that you give this matter your personal attention and that you inform me of its present status.

End.

AF 1236

ORIGINATOR : CG AAF

INFORMATION: CPD  
G-1  
G-2  
Col Park ✓  
C of S

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date ~~NOV 2~~ 1973

CM-OUT-59725

(9 Nov 44) 0047Z vh

34

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052  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 UHR

From: US Military Attache, Quito, Ecuador

To : War Department

No : 69 7 Nov 1944

MILID Washington DC. 69 MID and CDC.

Assembly has recommended Ecuadorian Govt proceed recognition of Russia. If President Velasco refuses to act Communists may attempt to provoke political crisis.

Andrews

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
OPD  
Col. Park  
Log

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 9(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972


By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-8204

(9 Nov 44)

0947Z

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052  
COPY No.

42

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ ARM

From: US Military Attache, San Jose, Costa Rica

To: War Department

Nr: 67898

7 November 1944

A-2 for G-2 Caribbean Defense Command Military Attache  
at Guatemala Cite Military Intelligence Division Number 67898.

Costa Rica will recognize Guatemalan Government  
5:00 PM this day.

Roberts

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
OPD

Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-7043 (8 Nov 44) 0623Z bjm

~~SECRET~~

052

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42

NAVY MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA, MOSCOW</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY			2
DATE <b>3 NOV 44</b>	<i>J</i>	<b>CNO</b> <i>WTS</i>	PRIORITY 3
TOR CODEROOM <b>1248</b>			<b>ROUTINE</b> 4
DECODED BY <b>MCDONALD</b>	<i>J</i>	DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letter, May 3, 1972 By <b>RHP</b> , NARS Date <b>NOV 2 1973</b>	DEFERRED 5
TYPED BY <b>SANDERS</b> <i>Parker</i>			PRIORITY 10
ROUTED BY <b>SORENSEN</b>			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			13
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			52

PAGE 1 OF 2

030935Z

NCR 604

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

EMBASSY NUMBER 4207 OF 2 NOV GIVES PRESENT STATUS AND VERSION OF NAVAL VISA REQUESTS. IMPOSSIBLE TO DO ANY PERSONNEL PLANNING HERE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. CANNOT GET RELIEFS IN FOR MEN ALREADY DETACHED OR DUE TO BE DETACHED. PERSONNEL REQUESTED IN JUNE TO TRAIN IN NORTHERN PORTS FOR POSSIBLE USE ON BLACK SEA STILL NOT HERE. BLACK SEA SITUATION NOW IMMINENT AND IF SOVIET AUTHORIZE OFFICES THERE I MUST STRIP PRESENT STATIONS OR REQUEST TEMPORARY SERVICES OF ARMY PERSONNEL FROM PERSIAN GULF COMMAND OR BOTH. IN VIEW OF OUR POSITION IN THIS WAR AND THE THOUSANDS OF SOVIETS WE INVITE AND ACCEPT INTO THE US I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN TOLERATE SOVIET VISA ATTITUDE.

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 1970

*052*

030935Z

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
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F-1	
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F-34	
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FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

BELIEVE THAT POSITIVE STAND MUST BE TAKEN AND THAT IT SHOULD  
END IN A DEFINITE RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS THAT ANY  
VISA REQUEST WILL BE ACTED UPON WITHIN 15 DAYS OR REASON GIVEN.  
BRITISH ACHIEVED SUCH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN EDEN AND MOLOTOV AT  
TEHERAN LAST FALL AND BRITISH NAVY AT LEAST HAS LITTLE TROUBLE  
ALTHOUGH HAVING 10 TIMES THE TURNOVER WE HAVE. THIS CAN ONLY BE  
ACCOMPLISHED ON HIGH STATE DEPT LEVEL. RECOMMEND NAVY DEPT PUSH  
SUBJECT STRONGLY WITH STATE DEPT. GENERAL DEANE CONCURS AND SUB-  
JECT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN NOW IN WASH-  
INGTON.

DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 5-8-78

16....ACT

COMINCH....CNO....20G...NAVAIDE....200P....13....

Originator ALUSNA MOSCOW D/T Group 030935Z 604 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

OPNAV-10-51  
A74100

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Hq AAF ACAS Intelligence  
AFICL-LI Major J.Z. Mims/bje  
5264

31 October 1944

Commanding General  
Strategic Air Forces in Europe  
London, England

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta Italy

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta Italy

Number WAX 55152

To Spatz and to Devers for Eaker signed Arnold.

According to report by Swiss to Military Attache Bern  
4 Army Air Forces Thunderbolts from formation of seven  
attacked Moirmont at 0900, 29 October. Report says  
incendiaries burned 2 farms; 2 persons were wounded;  
machine gun bullets struck some houses. Request  
investigation and report of this alleged incident.

End  
4448

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD  
G-2  
Log

CM-OUT-55152 (31 Oct 44) 1945Z ngs

*Col Park*

COPY NO. 40

1052  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 IVI

From: US Military Attache, London, England  
To: War Department  
NR: 69364, 12th October 1944  
Msg. Srl Nbr 69364.

Churchill visit Paris expected shortly according  
British Officer Prospective AMA there rated B two. Premiers  
visit might coincide with British extension full diplomatic  
recognition French Govt for which considerable Parliamentary  
and newspaper pressure.

End

ACTION: G-2  
INFO: CGAAF  
OPD  
Col Park  
Log

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-11433 (12 Oct 44)

 1631Z

bem

  
42

052 COPY NO.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ **DISPATCH**

DRAFTER <b>OP 13</b>	EXT <b>2612</b>	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMINCH AND CNO</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY <b>R S EDWARDS</b>		<b>COM 4TH FLEET</b> <i>[Signature]</i>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>6 OCTOBER 1944</b>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROO <b>1932</b>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>LAWRENCE</b>	CHECKED BY <b>POWLEY</b>		6
ROTTED BY			7
			8
			PRIORITY 9
			ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			BASEGRAM 12
			13
			14

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

**061915** **NCR 47202**

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP. (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

*[Handwritten signature]*

STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISES START OF STAFF CONVERSATIONS ON 10 OCTOBER AGREEABLE. YOUR 031146. YOU ARE THEREFORE AUTHORIZED TO START THE CONVERSATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

COMINCH HAS PASSED TO NCR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION TO:  
NCR TOR: 0823  
OP 13 (#9).... OP 17 (#10)... NAVAIDE (#11)...

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OPNAV 1976 *052*

**061915**

11

~~TOP SECRET~~ DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COM 4TH FLEET</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION <b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>3 OCT 1944</b>			<b>ROUTINE</b> 3
TOR CODEROOM <b>1541/03</b>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <b>DORSEY</b>		INFORMATION	BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ZIMMERMAN</b>	CHECKED BY <b>ZIMMERMAN</b>		PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY <b>BALDWIN</b>	DITTOED BY <b>ZIMMERMAN</b>		ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 12
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			BASEGRAM 13
PAGE 1 OF 2                      031146                      NCR 4446			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 15
			<input type="checkbox"/> 16
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.) 18

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(FROM COM 4TH FLEET ACTION CNO)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

**TOP SECRET.**

I RECOMMEND THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT BE REQUESTED TO DIRECT ACTING AMBASSADOR DONNELLY TO START STAFF CONVERSATIONS

WITH BRAZIL IMMEDIATELY IN VIEW OF MY ORDERS TO REPORT IN WASHINGTON OCTOBER 20. PRESIDENT VARGAS WILL PRESIDE AT

OPENING AND READY NOW. AMBASSADOR CAFFERY AND I HAD TENTATIVELY AGREED ON LATE OCTOBER WHEN MINISTER OF WAR

AND GENERAL WOOTEN RETURN FROM ABROAD. ALL COMMITTEES ARE ORGANIZED AND THE START NOW WILL MEET WITH APPROVAL OF

GENERAL WOOTEN AS THERE WILL BE POSSIBLY 2 MONTHS PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL MEAN THAT WE WILL ALL BE HERE

FOR THE IMPORTANT FINALS. DONNELLY CONCURS IN THIS REQUEST BUT ASKED ME TO INITIATE IT. HE IS CONVERSANT WITH THE

WHOLE SITUATION AND THERE IS EXCELLENT COOPERATION BETWEEN

No. 1 ADMIRAL.                      No. 2 FILE.                      No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.                      No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
COM 4TH FLEET		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
FROM	FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			BASEGRAM
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		9 PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			10 ROUTINE
CHECKED BY			11 DEFERRED
DITTOED BY			12 BASEGRAM
ROUTED BY			13

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PAGE 2 OF 2

031146

NCR 4446

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

HIM AND ALL UNITED STATES MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES HERE. PRESIDENT VARGAS SUPPORT VERY NECESSARY AND HE IS

READY TO START AT ONCE.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:

13(#1).....ACT

17(#2).....COMINCH(#3-10).....NAVAIDE(#11-12).....

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.


~~TOP SECRET~~

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031146

COPY NO.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

  
Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

30 September 1944

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
London, England

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Commander  
Southeast Asia Command  
Kandy, Ceylon

Commanding General  
United Kingdom Base Section  
London, England

Number: WARX 39514

Book message to Eisenhower London, Wilson Caserta, and Mount-  
battan Kandy for action, to Central District United Kingdom  
Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for  
information. This message is FACS 91 to Eisenhower and FAN  
433 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Policy for your guidance reference NAF 724 in treatment of  
enemy diplomatic and consular property captured within  
territory of 3rd powers, in which Department of State and  
Foreign Office concur, is as follows:

The bona fide diplomatic and consular property of enemy  
governments (including their diplomatic and consular archives)  
and the property of enemy diplomatic and consular personnel,  
found in the territory of 3rd powers occupied in the course  
of hostilities, will be accorded the following treatment:

CM-OUT-39514

(30 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

  
33

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

30 September 1944

Number: WARX 39514

a. If any such property is in the custody of the protecting power, that custody will be respected in every way.

b. If any such property is not in the custody of the protecting power, it will be safeguarded until such time as the governments represented by the occupying forces may give specific instructions as to its disposition. In such cases important diplomatic and consular archives may be copied, pending disposition, but not confiscated.

This policy with respect to bona fide diplomatic and consular establishments does not preclude the theater commander at his discretion and on his responsibility from entry and search of premises allegedly diplomatic or consular in character, which he has substantial reason to believe to be or to have been recently used for clandestine, warlike operations against his own forces or examination of which he believes to be essential to the security of his own forces, communications, and operations. In the case of property in the custody of the protecting power, the theater commander will request the representatives of that power for permission to search the premises. If such permission is refused or unreasonably delayed, however, entry and search by the theater commander is not precluded. In all such cases a full report must be rendered to the governments to which he is responsible justifying the entry and search.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy  
CG AAF  
OPD  
Gen. Bissell  
Adm. King  
Log

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

CM-OUT-39514

(30 Sep 44)

23082 es

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16-58809-1 GPO

**DISPATCH**

DRAFTER <b>F-15</b>	EXT. <b>2875</b>	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMINCH</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY <b>ADM. EDWARDS</b>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<b>CINCPAC</b> <i>WR</i>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>30 SEPT 1944</b>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM <b>1715</b>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY			<b>DDDDDD</b> BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>KIRKBRIDE</b>	CHECKED BY <b>WOODWARD</b>	<b>COMNORPAC</b>	PRIORITY 9
BY	DITTOED BY		ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY <b>KIRKBRIDE</b>	BY		DEFERRED 11
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			12
<b>DECLASSIFIED</b>			<b>DDDDDD</b> 13
<b>E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)</b>	<b>301550</b>	<b>NCR 47079</b>	14
Originator <i>OSD letter, May 8, 1978</i>	<b>NOV 2 1973</b>		15
By <b>RHP</b> , NARS Data			16

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF DISPATCH FROM UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW RUSSIA:

FOLLOWING VIOLATIONS OF THE SOVIET STATE BORDER BY AMERICAN PLANES ARE ALLEGED BY USSR PEOPLES COMMISSARIAT. IT IS ALSO REQUESTED THAT IMMEDIATE MEASURES BE TAKEN PREVENTING FURTHER VIOLATIONS. 2 US AIRCRAFT WERE SIGHTED WITHIN THE 3 MILE TERRITORIAL ZONE 2 MILES SE OF CAPE LOPATKA KAMCHATKA ON 18 SEPTEMBER AT 1830. 1 PLANE FIRED ON THE USSR BORDER COAST GUARD SHIP DZERZHINSKI IN THE 1ST KURILE STRAIT. DURING THE WEEK 14-21 SEPTEMBER THERE WERE 13 REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF THE SOVIET STATE BORDER BY US PLANES. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE RELATED TO ABOVE COMPLAINT. THE VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFICATION WARNING INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET COASTAL VESSELS WHICH WAS REQUESTED IN US NAVCOM 232151 WAS MADE OF THE RED NAVY ON 24 SEPT. AND NO ANSWER YET RECEIVED. END OF PARAPHRASE.

REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON WHICH REPLY CAN BE BASED.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

COMINCH COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL **TOP SECRET**

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER EXTENSION NUMBER ADDRESSEES PRECEDENCE

FROM ALUSNA MADRID  
RELEASED BY  
DATE 27 SEPT 44  
TOR CODEROOM 222/27  
DECODED BY SACHS  
TYPED BY SACHS  
ROUTED BY KLAFF

ASTERISK (\*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE  
C10  
COMORSEAFRON  
COMNAVEU

PRIORITY  
RRRRRR  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

271903 ICR 9703

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALUSNA MADRID TO CNO COMORSEAFRON COMNAVEU

FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS DIRECTED MINISTRY MARINE INTERN ALL 6 GERMAN VESSELS IN PASAJES. SEE MY CONFIDENTIAL REPORT 317. FRIESIA IN BILBAO OMITTED APPARENTLY THROUGH ERROR BUT INTERMENT ORDERS EXPECTED MOMENTARILY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date

NOV 2 1973

16.....ACT

COMINCH.....20G.....CNO.....NAVAIDE.....200P.....

13.....

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
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F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-68

271903

052

**DISPATCH**

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>US MILITARY ATTACHE</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
<b>LISBON PORTUGAL</b>			2
RELEASED BY		<b>WAR DEPT</b>	3
DATE <b>27 SEP 1944</b>			4
TOR CODEROM <b>1058</b>			5
DECODED BY <b>ARMY</b>			6
PARAPHRASED	CHECKED		7
BY <b>ROWLAND</b>	BY <b>HARTIGAN</b>		8
ROUTED BY	DITTOED		9
	BY <b>ROWLAND</b>		10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMIRALTY PRIORITY			11
PRIORITY			12
ROUTINE			13
DEFERRED			14
BASEGRAM			15
OPERATIONAL			16
CHECK BELOW			17
<b>PAGE 1 OF 4</b>	<b>NO. 447</b>	<b>26 SEP 44</b>	<b>NCR 13382</b>

INFORMATION FOR ACTION

**DECLASSIFIED**  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) on (S)  
 OSD letter, May 8 1972  
 RHP, NARS

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

*Received By Hand from Army*

**TOP SEC 447 TO BISSELL FOR HANDY FROM CHANEY. MILID.**

**RESUME OF EVENTS OF YANK BRIT STAFF TALKS WITH PORTS**

**RE CAPABILITIES IN ANY TIMOR OPERATIONS HEREWITH FOR YOUR**

**INFO. FIRST SESSION WITH PORTS 18 SEPT MISSION WAS HANDED**

**PAPER RECITING HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENTS IN**

**TIMOR. IN ONE PARAGRAPH SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT MADE THAT,**

**"PORT GOVT HAS ENDEAVORED SINCE THEN (JAP INVASION TO TIMOR)**

**TO PREVAIL UPON JAP GOVT TO ORDER EVACUATION OF COLONY SO**

**IT COULD BE OCCUPIED BY PORT FORCES." FURTHER STATED THAT,**

**"SHOULD IT BECOME IMPOSSIBLE BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATION TO DE-**

**CIDE SATISFACTORILY PROBLEM CREATED BY JAP OCCUPATION, THE**

**PORT GOVT HAS EXPRESSED WISH THAT PORT FORCES SHOULD BE**

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHART ROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

**TOP SECRET** **ACTION-F1**  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
 OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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OPNAV 19-76 **052**

**3**



BYCE I CA V

NO. 447

26 SEP 44

NCR 13382

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1029

21 SEP 1944

MYR DELI

RECEIVED

**DISPATCH**

CHAPTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODERODD			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		PRIORITY 9
BY	BY		ROUTINE 10
QUOTED BY	DITTOED BY		DEFERRED 11
		BASEGRAM 12	
			13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 4

NO. 447

26 SEP 44

NCR 13382

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN OPERATIONS EVENTUALLY BY FORCES OF UNITED NATIONS AGAINST PRESENT OCCUPIERS OF PORT TIMOR."

IN THIS CONNECTION PQRTS HAVE ADDED IN THEIR SECOND PAPER, "SHOULD EVACUATION OF TIMOR BY JAPS TAKE PLACE BEFORE ALLIED OPERATIONS FOR RECONQUEST OF ISLAND HAVE BEGUN, THE PORT GOVT WOULD LIKE REOCCUPATION TO BE CARRIED OUT BY PORT FORCES ONLY WHO MIGHT ALREADY BE IN \*\* THERE TO".

THESE STATEMENTS AND INFORMAL STATEMENTS BY PORTS INDICATE THEY WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPS TO GET EVACUATION OF TIMOR BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS POSSIBLE AND ARE POSSIBLY USING THESE STAFF TALKS TO AID IN ACCOMPLISHING THIS OBJECTIVE OR TO PREPARE FOR PORT

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 0-3-72

NOV 2 1973

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

**DISPATCH**

CHAPTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE 2
DATE			DEFERRED 4
TOR CODEBOOK			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	PRIORITY 6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		ROUTINE 9
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		DEFERRED 10
			BASEGRAM 11

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRIS PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 3 OF 4

NO. 447 26 SEP 44 NCR 13382

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PARTICIPATION IN LIBERATION IN EVENT DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. STATEMENTS ALSO INDICATE PORTS MAY WISH TO NEUTRALIZE TIMOR IF JAP EVACUATION IS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

IN MEETING 19TH, THE SECOND PORT PAPER MADE DEFINITE PROPOSAL OFFERING REINFORCED BATTALION OF 2200 MEN OR REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM OF 3700 MEN. THEY INDICATED EITHER FORCE WOULD NEED SOME ADDITIONAL SHIPPING AND MATERIEL. ANGLO AMERICAN MISSION ANSWERED WITH PAPER PRESENTED TO PORTS 23RD SEPTEMBER WHICH INCLUDED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS EXPLORING THEIR POSSIBILITIES MORE FULLY AND ALSO ASKING WHAT THEIR MAXIMUM CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE WHICH REQUIRED NO OUTSIDE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

SD Letter, 6-3-72

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BYUL... IN EACH... NEEDY

NOV 26 1944

**DISPATCH**

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) / AIRGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOX CODE/ROOM			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		PRIORITY 7
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		ROUTINE 8
			DEFERRED 9
			BASEGRAM 10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			11
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			<input type="checkbox"/>
PAGE 4 OF 4 DATE AND TIME NO. 447 26 SEPT. 44 NCR 13382 (G. C. T.)			15

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

AID WHATEVER. NOW AWAITING THEIR REPLY. ANSWERS TO ANGLO AMERICAN MISSION QUESTIONS SHOULD INDICATE PORT CAPABILITIES AND DETAILS OF NATURE AND EXTENT OF THEIR PROPOSED PARTICIPATION.

OUR ATTITUDE IS NON COMMITAL. INFORMALLY WE ARE ENDEAVORING TO HELP AMBASSADOR IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE ON HIS SANTA MARIA NEGOTIATIONS.

DEALINGS WITH THE BRIT MISSION AND BRIT AMBASSADOR TO DATE INDICATE UNDERLYING BRIT POLICY TO BRING PORT INTO WAR AGAINST \*\*TO USE PRESENT TALKS TO EXTENT POSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE.

\*\* BEING SERVICED SOLBORG

CM-IN-24607  
 COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL. FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
SD Letter, 5-3-72

NO: 447 26 SEP 44 NCR 13382 NOV 2 1973

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
77500

22 September 1944

Commanding General  
US Military Mission in USSR  
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 35194

To Deane Moscow from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to your M-20800, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in your views that as National Governments are reestablished in Czechoslovakia and other liberated countries, it will be desirable to have military attaches accredited to those governments. With reference to your offer to provide personnel for this duty, one of the assistants to the Military Attache to the governments-in-exile, London, although not specifically accredited to Czechoslovakia, is now charged with matters affecting that government, and should be available to accompany Czechoslovakian officials upon their return to their liberated country. It would be desirable as suggested by you that in an emergency you should furnish representation on a temporary basis until other arrangements could be made. Assignment of Naval attaches to small land-locked nations of Europe is not contemplated by the Navy Department. Decision as to inclusion of a representative from the Office of Strategic Services will be delayed until the Czechoslovakian Government is reestablished in home territory.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy  
CG AAF  
OPD  
G-2  
Adm. King  
CofS

DECLASSIFIED  
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 37-73  
By RTD Date MAY 15 1974

CM-OUT-35194

(23 Sep 44) 0249Z es

SECRET

40

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15-39000-1 GPO

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] IVI

PRIORITY

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England  
To : War Department  
CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy  
CG, 15th Air Force, Italy  
Nr : UX 68210 18 September 1944

To Arnold, Eaker and Twining from Spaatz UX 68210

Preliminary summary of Eight Air Force Operations  
18th Sept. Airborne on shuttle mission to Russia was force  
of 107 Bombers and 73 Fighters. Also 86 Fighters provided  
penetration escort. Objective of mission was dropping  
supplies to Ground Forces in Warsaw, which was done visually  
with unobserved to excellent results. Radio flash reports  
indicate force experience moderate and accurate flak but no  
air opposition.

Two Bombers lost. Escorting fighters that returned  
to UK bases claim 4 destroyed in air and 3 destroyed and 6  
damaged on ground. One fighter lost to flak.

New subject:

Force of 250 bombers with escort of 132 fighters  
airborne to drop supplies to Airborne Army in Holland. Supplies  
dropped successfully in good weather with fair to good results.  
Preliminary losses are 11 bombers. In addition 433 fighters  
airborne to furnish escort to Troop Carrier Aircraft. No  
further details available.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFO: CC/S  
CG AAF  
G-2

Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-17180

(19 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

0200Z

pa  
59

COPY NO.

052 Polish-Russian  
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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ADMIRALTY</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	<b>PPPPP</b>
RELEASED BY		<b>ANCXF</b>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>14 SEPT 1944</b>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <b>1624</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY <b>SANDBERG</b>		<b>(PH) CINCMED COMNAVEU BAD</b>	<b>RRRRP</b>
ROUTED BY <b>WHITTINGTON</b>			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

DECLASSIFIED  
JOB MEMO, 1-17-78  
BY RT, DATE NOV 2 1973

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

131507B NCR 10876

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RECEIVED BY HAND FROM BAD

CAPTAIN WHARTON LATELY SENIOR NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER WITH FRENCH AT ALGIERS IS ACCOMPANYING MR. DUFF COOPER TO PARIS WHERE HE WILL REMAIN FOR SHORT PERIOD AND RETURN TO ADMIRALTY TO REPORT. PENDING CLARIFICATION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE FRENCH HE WILL RECEIVE NO APPOINTMENT AND HIS POSITION WILL BE THAT OF NAVAL OBSERVER WITH MR. DUFF COOPER. PROPOSE THAT YOU SHOULD MEANWHILE APPOINT FROM YOUR STAFF BRITISH NAVAL OFFICER TO REPRESENT R.N. IN NAVAL ELEMENT OF SHAEF MISSION TO FRENCH.

2. REQUEST REPORT WHAT DIRECTIVE SAC HAS GIVEN CONCERNING NATURE AND SCOPE OF DUTIES OF SHAEF MISSIONS.

COPYCH.....COG

~~SECRET~~ 13...CNO...  
NAVAIDE...200P.....

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-19-67

131507B

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

UHR

WS

Pouch

From: US Military Attache in Ankara, Turkey  
To: War Department 396  
CG US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt 1035

14 September 1944

Number MILID 396 AMSME 1035


Views of Bulgarian Milattache, who was for several years on General Staff at GHQ before coming here month ago in regard Russian intention, follow. Milattache seems Pro Bulgarian and not Pro German he insists his views are based on info which he got in official position from 1940 on. Should be noted that info likely to have German source.

Russians are in process of taking permanent hold on Balkans. Will not be temporary matter as Russians say. Kingship in Bulgaria will disappear. Present Cabinet will last some time as it is doing everything Russians ask. (This contrary to views expressed by some intellectuals but seems reasonable).

Russians will soon occupy most or all of Greece under pretext of attacking Germans. Already have sent parachute troops into Northwest Greece, not to fight Germans, but to support Communistic Greeks.

Russia will seize some opportunity, probably soon, to attack Turkey and seize Turkish Thrace and Straits. All past troubles between Russia and Turkey will be settled by arms and views of Western Allies will count for nothing. Already Russian radio and press assails Turkey as it did Bulgaria

CM-IN-13589 (15 Sep 44)



DECLASSIFIED  
ODD Letter 5-8-78  
MAY 15 1974

052

42 Col. Park

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[REDACTED] "UHR"

Page 2

From: US Military Attache in Ankara, Turkey

14 September 1944

short time ago.

Russia also intends sooner or later to control  
Persian Gulf, Iran, Iraq and Arabian Peninsula.

Anatolia will be left as nation probably but under  
government more along Russian lines.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
OPD  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-13589 (15 Sep 44) 04427 bjm

[REDACTED]

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OSD Letter, 5-3-78  
MAY 15 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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Military Intelligence Ser-  
vice, G-2, S/C Unit, Foreign  
Branch/WDGBI/JMH/ejt 5902

12 September 1944

Headquarters, Communication Zone  
European Theater of Operations  
United States Army, France

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Number: WARX-29357

From Bissell WDGBI signed Marshall

Proposed by Swiss that 4 or 5 Swiss officers be assigned as military observers to American Armies in France. Repeated violations of Swiss frontier and neutrality and likelihood of similar future incidents might indicate desirability of approving request. Necessary security measures could be taken with respect to observers who would provide basis for mutual understanding, appreciation by Swiss of difficulty in determining border in all cases and understandable confusion in targets, and would likewise remove in large measure basis of Swiss protests over continuing violations. Approval of Swiss request urged by American Military Attache Switzerland particularly as Germans and Italians refused similar proposals early in war. Request your prompt comment and if approved suggestions as to manner of assignment and practical considerations involved.

End

ORIGINATOR: G-2

INFORMATION: CG-AAF, OPD Log

CM-OUT-29357

(12 Sept 44)

2333Z

wg

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15-39600-1 GPO

052

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

██████████ "TOP"  
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
London, England (Forward Echelon)

To: War Department

Nr: FWD 13979

6 September 1944

FWD 13979 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat for information to SHAEF Main signed Eisenhower reference cable W-82927 of 19 August 1944 this is SCAF number 76.

So long as I carry the principal military responsibility in France I consider that there is no need for the appointment of military and naval attaches since they would not represent me nor be under my control. If you are considering such appointments, therefore, I would be grateful if you would review the matter in the light of this telegram. Small naval and air components will be included in my mission to De Gaulle, components of which have already been set up in Paris, and I consider that this organization will be all that is required during my period of responsibility.

End

ACTION: CCS  
INFO : ADM LEAHY  
CG AAF  
OPD  
GEN BISSELL  
ADM KING  
LOG

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RA# 6-16-71

CM-IN-5508 (7 Sep 44) ██████████ 0734Z mcs

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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[REDACTED] "UHR"

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey  
To: War Department  
CG, US Army Forces in the Far East, Cairo, Egypt  
Nr: 363 2 September 1944  
Number MILID 363 AMSME 995

Recognition of Free French representative here as responsible for French interests in Turkey promised by Turks within 2 or 3 days according Free French here. Desthardouid will be allowed to occupy French Embassy. Promise made by Turk Foreign Minister but formula still vague.

End

ACTION: G-2  
INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
COL PARK

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

OM-IN-1873 (3 Sep 44) 0401Z mcs  
[REDACTED]

.052

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ - TOT

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
Nr: M 20800 1 Sept 1944

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane M 20800

At the present time there is a Czechoslovakian Mission in Moscow which is prepared to move into Czech Territory and establish a Czech provisional government as soon as Czechoslovakia or parts of it have been recaptured by the Russians. In this connection, is it desired that we send military and naval attaches into Czechoslovakia to be accredited to this provisional government. The same situation will apply possibly with reference to other countries liberated by the Red Army, and I would appreciate being advised as to your wishes in the matter. In an emergency we will have sufficient Army and Navy Officers on hand in the Military Mission in Moscow to send on this duty, at least on a temporary status, until they can be replaced by permanent assignments.

I have received a cable from General Donovan addressed from Caserta in which he indicates that the Czechoslovakian Mission now in Moscow indicated, while passing through Cairo, that it would like to have an OSS delegation with their mission. General Donovan states that the invitation is subject to the approval of the British and has asked me to find out if the Soviet Government will approve having an OSS delegate with the provisional Czechoslovakian Mission

CM-IN-1383

(2 Sep 44)

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JCS memo, 1-6-74; CIA Nr. 5-14-75  
By SLR, NLR, Date MAY 30 1975

~~SECRET~~

33

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~~SECRET~~ TOT

Page -2-

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Mission

Nr: M 20800 1 Sept 1944

and authorize him to set up radio communications with OSS Headquarters, probably in Cairo. I have radioed to General Donovan the suggestion that he clear the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before I take action here, and it may be that you will hear from him on the subject. My personal view is that when a provisional government is established, it would be desirable to have regular military observers who might include an OSS representative.

End

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74; CAR 116-5-14-75  
By SLR, NLR, Date MAY 30 1975

CM-IN-1383

(2 Sep 44)

1116Z

pa

~~SECRET~~

33

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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~~SECRET~~

PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT  
FOR WAR DEPARTMENT INFORMATION

From: Secretary of State, Washington  
To: American Legation, Bern  
Nr: 2876 21 August 1944

FOLLOWING IS FOR THE MINISTER'S ATTENTION

Our making a formal demand, together with the British, that all exports to the enemy be suspended by the Swiss and all enemy transit traffic through Switzerland be prohibited will soon be justified by military developments. It is assumed that the Swiss expect and are prepared at least partially to meet such a demand, in view of our reservation of rights in the London negotiations and the subsequent landings in Southern France by the Allies. However, it is felt that it would be preferable if the Government of Switzerland came forward and, frankly recognizing an obvious situation forestalled by independent and voluntary action the demands we have indicated will be made by us. Swiss action at this time to suspend within the framework of their agreements with the Germans all exports to enemy territory and that occupied by the enemy and prohibiting transit traffic on the part of the enemy would make an excellent impression in American public opinion as well as in official circles here. It is felt that such a voluntary move would also be supported by Swiss public opinion. If made immediately, its effect on post-armistice and post-war econ. negotiations doubtless would be more favorable to them than their grudging assent under pressure to demands regarding which they have already received warning.

We will authorize you and, at your discretion, your staff to take every opportunity informally to present the trend of our thinking here to Pilet Golaz and other appro-

GM-IN-24453 (27 Aug 44)

~~SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

*Col. Park*  
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: Secretary of State, Washington

Nr: 2876 21 August 1944

private officials of Switzerland unless you or the Embassy at London, to whom this is being repeated, perceive some objection. In this case time is of the essence and the British are being requested to give their Minister in Bern authority to make informal demarches paralleling ours. Furthermore, you may desire to illustrate how the rapid extension of the front of the Allies in Southern France foreshadows the collapse of German military control in that region and, as a result, of the blockade of Switzerland by Germany. The July 14 remarks by the Secretary to Bruggmann and our whole attitude as already known to you toward further aid to our enemies by Switzerland should be kept alive by you in the degree you judge most telling.

Should the Swiss inquire whether we would be willing to assume an obligation to replace supplies obtained from Germany at the present time, you may state that we will be glad to enter into immediate negotiations with the Swiss for an agreement concerning the supply of goods, purchased by the United Nations of Swiss products and other economic questions as soon as Swiss exports to Germany and German transit traffic through Switzerland have completely stopped. It should be emphasized by you that in the immediate future the ability of the Germans to supply and deliver goods to Switzerland may be expected to deteriorate increasingly.

It is requested that you urgently cable us, repeating to London, your comments regarding this.

OM-IN-24453 (27 Aug 44)

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

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Page 3

From: Secretary of State, Washington

Nr: 2876 21 August 1944

The foregoing message was repeated to London as the Department's No. 6665, adding a final paragraph which reads in substance as follows: It is requested that you discuss with appropriate British officials at once and cable the Department, repeating to Bern, the reaction of the British to (1) their associating themselves in the very near future with a formal demand, to be made when our forces reach the Franco-Swiss border at the very latest and (2) their associating themselves with immediate informal demarches as outlined in the foregoing message. It is hoped to instruct Bern to proceed with the informal approach this week in view of the urgency of the matter.

HULL

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
COL PARK  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

CM-IN-24453 (27 Aug 44) 0237Z mcs

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COM 4TH FLT</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION	<b>CNO</b> <i>WJ</i>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>10 JULY 1944</b>			<b>RRRRR</b>
TOR CODEROOM <b>1558</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>MACFARLANE</b>	INFORMATION	<b>CINCLANT</b>	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <b>LAIRD/TECHSTEIN</b>			<b>RRRRRR</b>
ROUTED BY <b>WILLIAMS</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
	<b>101250</b>	<b>NCR 8179</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ GCT \_\_\_\_\_

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

GENERAL POLITICAL UNREST IN SOUTH AMERICA IS IN A MEASURE COUPLED WITH COMING ELECTIONS IN THE USA. I AM NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH GENERAL REPORTS FROM LA PLATA AREA. OUR PEOPLE UNDULY EXERCISED. REMOTE POSSIBILITY ONLY OF RADICAL GROUPS IN ARGENTINE GETTING HOSTILE. THINK IT HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE TO SHOW ANY FORCE THERE AT THIS TIME. URUGUAY WILL REMAIN IN LINE WITH US POLICY. SITUATION IN BRAZIL WILL IMPROVE WITH REPORTED ARRIVAL BRAZ EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
IG-00	
VCNO	


16.....ACT.....  
 ADD: COMINCH...CNO...NAVAIDE...13...17...ARMY(FOR G-2)....  
 (PER 16)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 EG. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)  
 OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
 By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
 OPRAY 19-67 *052*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

  
AC/AS Intelligence Collection  
Division/CVBC/am 71097

6 July, 1944

Military Attache  
US Legation  
Stockholm, Sweden

Number: WAR 61375

From Arnold for Hardison signed Bissell

According to reliable source recently returned from Stockholm, Stockholm populace talk openly of shooting down of crippled Army Air Force aircraft by Swedish fighters. Further states newspaper account later confirmed these discussions by publishing account of 5 American bombers downed for invasion of Swedish territory by Swedish Squadron. Request immediate confirmation and full details.

End.

723

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ORIGINATOR: CGAAF

INFORMATION: OPD  
G-2  
Log

OM-OUT- 61375 ( 6 July 44 ) 2247Z

wk

*Col Park*  
38

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE



From: US Military Attache, Asuncion

To: War Department

Nr: 157 1 July 1944

Msg nr 157 MILID

State Dept told by For Minister that Paraguayan  
Ambassador to Argentina instructed return EP leave  
immediately. Leave may develop into formal recall.

Considine

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CGAAF  
OPD  
Colonel Park

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972


By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-936

(2 Jul 44)

0440Z

ejv



052

COPY NO.

42

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache Bern Switzerland

To: War Department

No. 1466 15 June 1944

To MILID for Marshall from Legge 1466.

Samsen bombing October 1st 43. Re WAR 2724 Swiss have presented satisfactory proof that bombs dropped were ours. I have examined fragments and find American markings. All other events likewise point to fact that bombs were ours.

Political Department addressed note to Legation June 10th, stating damage Swiss Francs 229,082 plus interest 5% from 1st October 43 plus Francs 4,383 expenses experts in determining damage.

From my investigation I believe this claim fair and just and should be settled at once. Recommend prompt action.

Legge

2724 not identified by WDCMC.  
See: CM-IN-13517 (18 May 44) OPD  
CM-OUT-40795 (24 May 44) OPD

ACTION: OPD  
INFO : CG AAF  
G-2  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-12993 (16 Jun 44) 0939Z mcs

[REDACTED]

052

COPY NO.

42

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM OPD

RELEASED BY

DATE 7 JUNE 44

TOR CODE/ROOM 0331

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY KULKA/ Kohnoutete

ROUTED BY KNIGHT.

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

ASTERISK (\*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

CG USAF NORTH AFRICAN  
THEATRE OF OPERATIONS  
CG USAF MIDDLE EAST  
CAIRO

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

NR. WARK 46971

4 JUNE 44

NOR 19127

IF OPERATIONAL  
CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RECEIVED BY PRINTER FROM ARMY

FOR DEVERS FOR ACTION TO GILES FOR INFO SIGNED MARSHALL.  
STATE DEPT REQUESTS ADVICE CONCERNING CLAIM OF THE TURKISH  
FOREIGN MINISTER FOR COMPENSATION FOR CREW MEMBERS ON 2  
TURKISH MOTORBOATS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN BOMBED AND  
MACHINE GUNNED ON 15 DEC 1943. ATTACK ALLEGED TO HAVE  
BEEN MADE EAST OF ISTANKOY ISLAND WHILE BOATS WERE IN  
TURKISH WATERS BY 4 AMERICAN PLANES OF UNREPORTED SERVICE,  
COMING FROM EAST OF KOS GULF. REQUEST YOU INVESTIGATE  
AND FURNISH INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE A REPLY AS SOON  
AS PRACTICABLE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

by RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

13...COG

16...COMINCH...OPD3...31...NAVAIDE...200P...

CM-OUT-46971

ACTION

F-0

F-01

F-02

F-05

F-07

F-1

F-2

F-20

F-3

F-30

F-31

F-32

F-33

F-34

F-4

FX01

FX30

FX37

FX40

IG-00

VCNC

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 10-69

052

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MADRID</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION <b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>2 JUNE 44</b>			<b>RRR</b> RINE 3
TOR CODEROOM <b>020259</b>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <b>GOLDEN</b>		INFORMATION	5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ADAMS / THOMPSON</b>			PRIORITY 6
ROUTED BY <b>ROLL</b>			DEFERRED 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
<b>011602 NCR 6566</b>			9
			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			13
			14
			15
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			<input type="checkbox"/> 17
			18
			19
			GCT 20

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALUSNA MADRID TO CNO.

AMBASSADOR HAS RECEIVED STRONG PROTEST FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ACCUSING AMERICAN AIR AND NAVAL FORCES OF ATTACKS ON SPANISH SHIP CABO SAN SEBASTIAN AND GERMAN VESSELS KILLISI. SAUMUR. HOCHHEIMER AND BALDUR IN SPANISH WATERS. AMBASSADOR ASKS IF WE CAN CONFIRM REPORTS FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT AMERICAN UNITS WERE NOT INVOLVED.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date ~~NOV 2 1973~~

16...ACT

COMINCH...20G...NAVAIDE...CNO...20P...13...

ACTION		21
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNC		42
		43
		44
		45
		46
		47
		48
		49
		50
		51
		52

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

011602 052

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache, Stockholm, Sweden.

To: War Department

Nr: 358 25 May 1944

358 ref London's 13068 repeated to WAR for info

No change in policy of Swedish Government toward release of internees over that outlined in my 23 to London and 43 to Washington of 5 Feb. American Minister and Staff constantly seeking new approaches as are British opposites. Release of 47 Allied internees and 32 American evaders are results so far. Future release possibilities can not be judged. Please assure Air Force no stone being left unturned by Minister in search for new reasons for further releases.

Rayens

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF

OPD

Col Park

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (K)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-19378 (26 May 44) 0108Z mcs

[REDACTED]

000.52

COPY No. 47

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache, Tangiers, Morocco  
To: War Department.  
Nr: 12371 17 May 1944.

Message serial number 12371. To MILID.

German Consulate General closed at midnight 16th May. Personnel will leave in about ten days.

Will postpone my departure until that time if no objection.

Childs due to arrive here 20th May and would like to confer with him in any case.

Babbitt.

ACTION: G-2  
INFO : OFD  
SGS  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-12908

(17 May 44)

2035Z

ejv

[REDACTED]

*Col Parks*

052

COPY NO.

34



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: Military Attache Bern Switsland.

To: War Department.

No. 1383 13 May 1944.

1383.

In amplification my 1365 May 6th had conference Chief Swiss Air Corps yesterday on attack our plane shot down Greifensee April 24th. Stated plane arrived over Uster 2000 meters Swiss fighter to left front fired green rocket our pilot replied with same. Plane circled Dubendorf Greifensee then south toward Meilen where second rocket fired by Swiss plane. No reply. Continued circle over Zurich Dubendorf Greifensee always at 2000 meters. On second circle arriving again vicinity Meilen third rocket fired by Swiss no reply. When plane arrived over Greifensee Swiss fighters thought crew must have parachuted and that plane was working on automatic pilot. Therefore attacked it. They point out similar case of pilotless plane brought down 13 April Siebnen south east corner Zurich see par following precautions to avoid future incidents: Foreign planes which arrive vicinity Swiss airdromes will not be attacked within radius of 12 kms from center of said airdrome. Should planes leave this area Swiss fighters will again fire rocket signals and attempt to guide plane to landing. If plane disregards and approaches frontiers they will open fire.

He points out that if as soon as plane enters Swiss air space landing gear is dropped and plane begins to loose altitude sharply there is little danger they will be fired on by mistake. Altitude suggest between 1000 and 1500 meters.

Reference action Swiss flak orders that first salvo will be a warning. Plane should then immediately release landing gear and begin lose altitude sharply.

CM-IN-10508 (14 May 44)

[REDACTED]

*Col Park*  
45  
COPY NO.

05 ✓  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Military Attache Bern, Switzerland.  
No. 1383 13 May 1944.

Page-2-

Swiss have experimented with use of white cross at critical points on frontier where orientation difficult. Visibility good at 5000 and fair at 7000 meters. Cost of construction each cross about 2000 francs. Therefore matter not favorably considered by Swiss who now appear satisfied our precautions against violation their frontier. Dubendorf remains in principle air field to which Foreign planes will be guided. Geneva Payern and Emmen (near North Lucerne) will also be used in case planes approach from direction favorable for landing there.

Legge.

FOOTNOTE: 1365 is CM-IN-4923 (7 May 44) CG AAF

ACTION: CGAAF

INFO : OPD  
G-2  
Log

CM-IN-10508 (14 May 44) 1559Z mlo

45

COPY NO.

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPART

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE <b>09 MAY 1944</b>			<b>ROUTINE</b>
TOR CODEROOM <b>0627/09</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>KRANING</b>		FOR INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <b>DE LA MATYR</b>			<b>ROUTINE</b>
ROBOTTED BY <b>DE LA MATYR</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY			DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 9(B) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letter, May 3, 1972 RHP <b>NOV 2 1973</b>
<b>PAGE 1 OF 2</b>	<b>081020</b>	<b>NCR 8118</b>	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ GCT \_\_\_\_\_

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THIS IS TOPSEC. ALUSNA MOSCOW SENDS.

IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS MADE TO PLACE LIAISON OFFICER AT PETROPAVLOVSK REPLACE OFFICER AT VLAD TEMPORARILY OR PERMANENTLY IF POSSIBLE TO MOVE HIM TO PETRO AND SOUNDING TAKEN ON PREPARING A LIAISON OFFICER FOR THE SOVIET PACIFIC CINC STAFF THE NAVAL STAFF REACTION IS THAT THEY DO NOT WISH ANY CHANGE OR ANY ACTIONS WHICH IN ANY WAY MAY INCITE JAP SUSPICIONS. THEY ARE EXTREMELY TOUCHY ON JAP RELATIONS WHICH ONLY HANDLED BY HIGHEST FEW. THEY GREATLY CONCERNED POSSIBLE LEAKS FROM DISPATCHES AND OUR WAYS OF HANDLING SECURITY AT HOME COMPARED TO THEIRS. JAP CONSUL AT VALD THERE 20 YEARS IS WELL INFORMED AND SOVIETS FEEL HE WOULD LOOK WITH SUSPICION ON EVEN MINOR

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

~~SEALED~~ ~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Commanding Officer's Writing Desk in person. See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18


052

~~TOP SECRET~~



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

WS




From: US Military Attache Bern, Switzerland  
To: War Department  
No: 1365 6th May 1944  
Mag Srl Nbr 1365.

This follows my 1337 April 28th careful investigation reveals following: Four men wounded before reaching Switzerland:

- Lt Greenbaum Bombardier,
- Lt Wallach Navigator ,
- Sgt Silag Top Turret Gunner ,
- Sgt Sendelbeck Radio.

Swiss fighter picked up plane one minute after it crossed Lake Constance and entered Swiss air space. All bombs dropped Friedrichshafen. Plane had been hit number of times was losing altitude rapidly controls badly damaged scarcely able to operate. Pilot had given bail out order over Germany but rescinded when he saw he could reach Switzerland. Two engines out ball turret gun jammed in vertical position. Pilot circled twice over Zurich Dubendorf area then headed for Greifensee in order drop ball turret there. Again circled over Greifensee three men working to release same. Two Swiss fighters above plane one to the left front. When plane reached south end Greifensee Swiss opened fire. Swiss fighters then made two passes second set plane on fire. Pilot called on inter phone bail out.

CM-IN-4923 (7 May 44)



Col. Park

1052

COPY NO. 45

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page #2

From: US Military Attache Bern, Switzerland

To: War Department

No: 1365

6th May 1944

Sgt Silag relayed flames heavy. Sgts Silag, Newall, Hollingsworth bailed out at or below 600 Ft. Sgt Malizzis body found near lake. He probably jumped also. Lts Bailey and Wallach landed plane in Greifensee former drowned latter swam until picked up by small Swiss boat. Lts Greenbaum Burry, Sgts Sendelbeck, Pratt may have been dead before landing. Plane had left front wheel shot off right wheel and tail wheel down. No evidence that rocket signal was fired but plane evidently in distress did not return fire and no hostile maneuver. In my opinion thoroughly unjustified. All survivors have been carefully questioned.

Several reports from Swiss observer on ground concur my opinion. Have received partial explanation from Chief Air Corps still investigating. States that when plane started south Swiss fighters believed was attempting leave Switzerland. Further when final report made.

Legge

Note: 1337 is CM-IN-21144 (28 Apr 44) CGAAF

ACTION: CGAAF

INFO : OPD  
G-2  
LOG


CM-IN-4923

(7 May 44) 0608Z

e jv

COPY NO.

45



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**



P R I O R I T Y

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
S

From: Military Attache London, England

To: War Department

Rr: none, 22nd April 1944

AGWAR for Arnold rptd to CG USSTAF London from  
Deane TOP SEC.

Foreign office tonight issuing new instructions  
regarding group visas which will enable movement to proceed  
without delay from now on.

New subject- - Ambassador taking his plane to  
Marrakech to meet Stettinius-as this was one that was to be  
used on Teheran Poltava Movement request that it be  
replaced by ATC.


No Sig

ACTION: Gen. Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD  
Col. Park  
LOG


DECLASSIFIED  
EO 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (A)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-16978 (23 Apr 44) 1103Z lee



14

052



COPY No.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

WZ

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache, Bern, Switzerland  
To: War Department  
Nr: 1323, 22 April 1944.  
1323.

Swiss Commander in Chief Air Corps given information reur 25165. My cables 13, 15 and 16 give report. Because of probable reaction of public to explanation of error, I told Chief Air Corps that we desire no publicity on explanation which would probably lead to press criticism and be unconvincing to laymen. Chief of Swiss Air Corps informs me communique on our preventive measures will be published near future. As he will presumably inform federal council, minister agrees with me that no further action would appear to be required.

Legge

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
G-2  
Log

CM-IN-16871 (23 Apr 44) 0553Z bjm

Col. Park

45

[REDACTED]

052

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE



2

From: CG, US Forces in the European Theater of Operations  
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: E-24474 22 April 1944

E-24474 signed Eisenhower. From Betts cite Combined  
Repatriation Committee for Personnel Division G-1 General  
Staff.

SHAEP and Admiralty approve para 1 urad WAR 25409  
April 20.


Regarding para 2 urad WAR 25846 April 20, it is  
informal opinion of War Office and Foreign Offices that  
Swiss representative is sufficient. Confidential information  
indicates that there is friction between delegates of inter-  
national Red Cross and representatives of Swiss Government,  
which makes it undesirable to have both abroad.

No Sig

ACTION: G-1

INFO : CC/S, ASF, OPD, G-2, Col. Park, Log

CM-IN-16673 (23 Apr 44) 0205Z jb



DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

52

052

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

**From:** US, Military Attache Stockholm, Sweden  
**To:** War Department  
**No:** 281 21 April, 1944

Message Serial Number 281.

Evident from your 25381<sup>WH</sup> that my 263 was not understood. Letter had to do with "Too much spending money" not with improper conduct of internees of which there has been practically no complaint. All of the detail directives contained in your cable and many other salutary measures have been stressed since internees first arrived. Recreational funds were made available by you in your cable 208 of 14 Sept 43. Sports material etc not available here has been furnished by 8th Bomber Command. These problems have been solved. It is not a matter of discipline that Swedish girls prefer "wealthy" American corporals to their former Swedish officer friends but it does make good "copy". The point is that in rural Sweden American pay schedules are fantastically high. It is a source of continual wonderment that a Junior American Flying Officer gets the pay equivalent to a Senior USAF General the papers find this "news". These practical aspects result in domestic and social problems for the Swedes and rivalries and jealousies among the less fortunate United Nations internees also in Falun. This may cause the authorities to move all internees into a special camp etc. To avoid this I asked in my 263 for authority which I do not now have to apply financial controls which the Swedes may invoke as suggested in your message. Recommendations in my message are timely and necessary from the point of view of the man on the spot. Recommend reconsideration.

References are: Rayens  
CM-OUT-25381 (19 Apr 44) G-2  
CM-IN-10976 (15 Apr 44) G-2

ACTION: G-2  
INFO : CG AAF, OPD, Col. Park, Log 0519Z vh  
CM-IN-15971 (22 Apr 44)

COPY NO.

40

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache Berne Switzerland  
To: War Department  
No: 1316 20 April, 1944  
Message Serial Number 1316.

Interview with 62519 at his request April 14th. Discussed Schaffhouse bombing and gave causes as outlined Gen Spatz report which he accepted without question but urged every effort prevent repetition.

States large number American planes in Switzerland might be cause of trouble with Boche who will claim we are building up plane reserve in Switzerland. Suggest to avoid that we agree to complete or partial dismantling.

Believes if Germans decide withdraw from Italy they may find necessary invade and defend Switzerland. Sees no danger at present. Earnestly requested that I support comparatively small demands Swiss Army for strategic materials not obtainable elsewhere. Stated combat practice necessitates replacement of ammunition and that Swiss need rubber for tires and other critical employment was urgent.

Again gave promise that no part this would be used except by Army and gave guarantee that none would ever reach enemy hands.

Feeling necessity for support of Swiss Army and knowing attitude towards us I again fully support this request.

ACTION: OPD Legge  
INFO: CGAAF, G-2, Col. Park, Log  
CM-IN-15061 (21 Apr 44) 0325Z med

[REDACTED]

052

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

R

[REDACTED]

From: U.S. Military Attache,  
Berne, Switzerland

To : War Department

Re : 1315

20 April 44

MILID Washington.

Please transmit to Generals Arnold and Spaatz:

Conference with Chief Swiss Air Corps last night.  
Reur 19699. He is extremely pleased with limits of zone in  
which no targets to be bombed unless positively identified.  
States that on maps of our navigators Swiss boundary not out-  
lined in clear relief. Request that this be done as well  
as perimeter of 50 mile zone. I agree.

I suggested marking with large Swiss Cross certain  
frontier points such as Schaffhouse Buckle which difficult  
to locate from air. He agrees to study.

Pleased with our approval of request to fly one  
model each plane reur 23704.

Question of Swiss purchase interned aircraft  
discussed. He thought possibility of conversion of some  
as transport planes. Swiss Air Force not interested in  
long range bombers.

Felt sure bombs on Sarnen ours and will furnish  
proof.

Interview gave every intimation of cooperation now  
and in future.

Loggs.

CM-IN-15080 (21 Apr 44)

Col. Park

45

052 [REDACTED] COPY NO.

CONFIDENTIAL  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: U.S. Military Attache,  
Berne, Switzerland

Nr : 1315 20 April 44

"This message has been relayed to CG Strategic  
Air Forces in Europe, London, England by the War Department  
Code Center in accordance with the originator's request".

ACTION: OMD

INFO : CG AAF  
Q-2  
Log

CM-IN-15080 (21 Apr 44) 0344Z 1a

45

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA RIO</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION MESSAGE	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>16 APRIL 44</b>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM <b>161435</b>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <b>GIDEON</b>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>JANES /FMW</b>		<b>ONI (CNO)</b>	PRIORITY 6
ROUTED BY <b>MORRIS</b>		<b>COM 4TH FLT</b>	DEFERRED 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
	<b>151612</b>	<b>NCR 9914</b>	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 9
			10
			11
			12
			13
			14
			15
			16
			17
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			19
			20

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(INFO ONI AND COM 4TH FLT)

MY REPORT 108-44. DECREE PUBLISHED TODAY APPOINTING ADMIRAL NORONHA NEW NAVAL ATTACHE TO US. CONSIDERED EXCELLENT SELECTION. WILL ADVISE DEPARTURE DATE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

16...COC

COMINCH...20C...CNO...NAVAIDE...20OP...13...17...

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
	43
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	51
	52

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OPNAV-NCR-16

151612 .052

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: (1957) 1-10

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: CG US Army Forces in the Middle East  
Cairo, Egypt

To: War Department

Nr: 23GY 11 April

For Bissell from Larrabee Msg Nr 23GY.

Reciprocating the Russian Military Mission sent to Tito refer my number 2, 31st January Tito has now sent Partisan Military Mission to Moscow. Mission headed by Lieut General Djilas reputed to be fanatical Communist Soviet trained, able speaker and writer and the brains of Partisan faction. Mission also includes 1 Major General 2 Colonels and 8 other officers all arrived Cairo 5 days ago by plane and left for Moscow this morning by air further details will be reported. Believed that Dillas will stay one or two months Russia and then return Yugoslavia.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
Col Park  
Log

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-7765 (11 Apr 44) 2035Z mcs

[REDACTED]

40

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Operations Division, WDGS  
Chief, Theater Group, WDOGPD  
JEH 6314, Rm 3E816

April 6, 1944

Military Attache  
American Embassy  
Berne, Switzerland

Number WAR 19699

From Marshall to Legge

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date

NOV 2 1973

In order that you may be informed and for such use you desire to make of the information, the following paraphrase of message from General Spaatz reporting on the cause of the Schaffhausen bombing is furnished you: "Investigation of the bombing of Schaffhausen by B-24's on April 1, 1944, indicates the following: winds encountered were 60 miles per hour greater than expected. The lead Pathfinder aircraft was shot down and replaced by deputy division leader, whose special equipment failed while the target was approached over 8/10 cloud coverage. The loss of the division leader and the unanticipated high wind caused the variation from the intended course. Through a hole in the clouds, the bombardier of the leading aircraft thought he had identified the target, and bombed. Following aircraft bombed on markers of the lead group, in the belief that they were dropping on a primary target. The town and river front were hit by bombs of the 2nd group. Directives now in effect prohibit bombing of any targets not positively identified if they are within 50 miles of the borders of Germany or in enemy occupied country".

The operations report for the mission indicates that bad weather forced B-17 missions to abandon their missions over France on the day of the Schaffhausen attack. Heavy cloud layers greatly increased the difficulties of formation flying. Bombardiers were hindered by ground haze and undercast. It was reported that 38 B-24's attacked Schaffhausen, in the belief that it was a German town. Photographs taken on the mission show that majority of the bombs pictured struck in woods outside the towns, but that the railway yards and river front were hit by the rest.

CM-OUT-19699

(6 Apr 44)

38

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number WAR 19699

Page 2

The Secretary of State is transmitting \$1,000,000 today to  
Gene as an advance payment with instructions to the Minister  
that it is the desire of this government that this money be  
utilized at once to relieve the distress of those who have  
suffered as a result of the bombing. Additional funds will  
be made available to meet in full all claims for damage or  
loss of life. It is the hope of the War Department that no  
delay will ensue in the distribution of these funds.

WHEN DIRECTIONED BY ALICIA SANTIAGO US MAIL...  
CONDUCTOR FULL OR CLOSED...  
TO US...  
AND ALL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY TO ALICIA SANTIAGO FOR...  
ALLOCATION...  
FINAL DISBURSING RECEIPTS...  
BUDGET OF EXCHANGE BORANDA...  
UPON CLOSING OF POST...  
SERIES...  
ORIGINATOR: OPD  
INFORMATION: CG AAF  
3-2  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 5-8-72

CM-OUT-19699 (6 Apr 44) 2258Z 1cm

COPY No. 38

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	CNO	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	SCHUTTMANN	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	5 APRIL 1944	FOR ACTION	ALUSLO CONCEPCION ALUSNA SANTIAGO	RRRRRR
DATE	042347			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY	WILLIAMS, F.M.			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY	BALDWIN			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY				
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			042154	NCR 4871

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
-----------------------------------	------	------	-----

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WHEN DIRECTED BY ALUSNA SANTIAGO US NAVAL LIAISON OFFICE  
 CONCEPCION WILL BE CLOSED. BUPERS ORDERING PERSONNEL  
 TO US. TURN OVER SUPPLIES EQUIPMENT ALL MAIL FILES  
 AND ALL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY TO ALUSNA SANTIAGO FOR RE  
 ALLOCATION. OBTAIN RECEIPTS AND FORWARD TO ONI. MAKE  
 FINAL DISBURSING RETURNS. FORWARD OFFICIAL CHECKS  
 BILLS OF EXCHANGE BUSANDA. RENDER BALANCE C AND C  
 FUND TO ALUSNA SANTIAGO WITH APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTSNG.  
 UPON CLOSING OF POST, TRANSFER CSP 1551/52 AND 1497/98  
 SERIES, 847 (A), 1 COPY CSP 845, CSPM EXTRACTS (1) AND  
 GIRO TO AMCON CONCEPCION. RETURN CSP 953 (A) AND REMA  
 ING COPIES CSP 845 TO NEAREST US NAVAL ACTIVITY FOR  
 RETURN TO ANY RP10. DESTROY BY BURNING ALL OTHER  
 PUBLICATIONS.

ACTION	
	22
	23
F-01	24
	25
F-02	26
	27
F-05	28
	29
F-07	30
F-1	31
	32
F-2	33
	34
F-20	35
	36
F-3	37
	38
F-30	39
	40
F-31	41
F-32	42
	43
F-33	44
	45
F-34	46
	47
F-4	48
	49
FX01	50
	51
FX30	52
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

16...ORIG

19...19C...20R...20Y...20F...30...13...COMINCH...FX37.  
BUPERS...OP17...20M...BUSANDA...NAVAIDE...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCL-10

042154 052

~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPD 336 Switzerland (4 Apr 44).  
"Bombing of Swiss City of Schaffhausen  
(Allied Planes)."  
Operations Division, WDGS, Theater  
Group, Liaison Section, WDOPD  
HRM 74575

5 April 1944

U.S. Military Attache  
American Embassy  
Bern Switzerland

Number WAR 19196

To Legge signed Marshall reference your 1285 of 4 April

Paraphrase of your 1285 of 4 April 1944 together with a  
paraphrase of Gen Arnolds radio has been furnished Eisenhower  
with information copy to Spaatz. Suggest you see State  
Departments message 1147 April 5 to Bern which directs action  
along the line recommended by you.

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
G-2  
LOG

CM-OUT-19196 (5 Apr 44) 2355Z eng

052

*Col Park*  
COPY No. 38

~~SECRET~~  
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**From:** U.S. Military Attache Bern Switzerland

**To:** War Department

**No:** 1285

4 April 1944

**To MILID (1285)**

Our London RS AAF Communique April 2nd states unfavorable weather conditions were cause of error. This has met with uniform unfavorable criticism Swiss press and should be repudiated. See my 1283. Light clouds were reported to have partly obscured planes from view of observers in Schaffhausen. This should not be used as reason for error. General Arnolds radio best. Stick to that. We should accept full responsibility without seeking reasons to excuse. Earnestly recommend full settlement of damages claimed without discussion or investigation. At same time Samaden damages October 1st should also be settled without question. Our prestige at stake. If we do this promptly and in our way, best interest will be served.

**Legge**

1283 is CM-IN-1489 (3 Apr 44)OPD  
ACTION: OPD

INFO: CG AAF  
G-2

Colonel Park  
BPR  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 3(D) or (L)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

CM-IN-2980 (5 Apr 44)

0253Z med

052

COPY No.

40

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MADRID</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO COMNAVNAV COMORSEAFRON	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>3 APRIL 1944</b>			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROM <b>030251</b>		FOR INFORMATION	RRRRRRRR 4
DECODED BY <b>RAMSAY</b>			PRIORITY 5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>WILLIAMS, F. M. / MCK</b>			DEFERRED 6
ROUTED BY <b>MORRIS</b>			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
	<b>021330</b>	<b>NCR 508</b>	9
			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			13
			14
			15
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			17
			18

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ALUSNA MADRID TO CNO COMNAVNAV COMORSEAFRON.)

⊙ M A TANGIER REPORTS ATTACK BY NAVAL VESSELS ON SUBMARINE NEAR CAPE SPARTEL 10200 MARCH 27. 1 UNEXPLODED SHELL MARKED "USN FUSF MARK 16 MOD 5-920 LANDED INTERNATIONAL ZONE AND OTHER EXPLODED 2 YARDS FROM LIGHTHOUSE. LOCAL SPANISH PROTESTED TO BRITISH MA. AS YET NO INFORMATION OF PROTEST TO AMERICAN LEGATION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) at (2)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

\*AS RECEIVED

*B*....ACT

COMINCH.....CNO.....21G.....NAVAIDE.....21OP.....

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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OPNAV-NCR-16

**021330 052**

ACTION	GCT
-0	22
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-05	27
F-07	29
F-1	30
-2	31
-20	32
-3	34
-30	36
F-31	37
F-32	39
F-33	40
-34	41
F-4	43
FX01	45
FX30	46
FX37	48
FX40	49
IC-00	51
VCNO	52

**CONFIDENTIAL**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

Commanding General Army Air Forces

April 3, 1944

Military Attache  
American Legation  
Bern, Switzerland

Number WAR 18076

To Legge for Colonel Divisionnaire F Rhiner Swiss AF from  
Arnold.

As Commanding General of the United States Army Air Forces I wish to express personally to you as commander of the Swiss Air Force my extreme regret over the sad occurrence at Schaffhausen on April 1. I know that you understand that the bombing of this peaceful and friendly town could only have taken place as a result of error. Causes of this error and responsibility will be promptly and thoroughly investigated. In the meantime I give you my personal assurance that every possible precaution will be taken to prevent any repetition.

186

ORIGINATOR: CGAAF

INFORMATION: OPD  
G-2  
Col Park  
Log

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 8, 1972

RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

CM-OUT-18076

(3 Apr 44)

2151Z

mw

052

COPY No.

34

~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

**From: U.S. Military Attache, Bern, Switzerland**

**To : War Department**

**Nr : 1283      2nd April, 1944**

Visited Schaffhausen 4:30 P.M. April 1st. Many buildings still smoking fires under control. Swiss have announced officially 27 dead including a national councilor and about 100 wounded.

Official communique states 3 waves USAAF planes coming from direction Frauenfeld crossed over Schaffhausen altitude about 5,000 to 7,000 meters at 1050 A.M. Leading waves circled dropped smoke signal. Bombs fell at about 1055. Second wave did not bomb. Third wave same as first: Total 30 planes. Light small clouds obscured planes at times. No mention made of flak in communique but eye witnesses state planes did not bomb until fired on.

Railway station several important factories hit, city museum and number dwellings gutted. Large number incendiaries. I estimate HE bombs to be 500 lbs but I am not sure.

With two exceptions all bombs fell on north side of Rhine. Urge prompt investigation and official action and every precaution prevent similar incident. Swiss indignant but officials I have seen are polite.

Legge

**ACTION: OPD**

**INFO: CGAAF, G-2, Col Park, Log**

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(B) and 5(B) of (B)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, MARS Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-1489

(3 Apr 44)

0114Z

HW

COPY No. 40

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

P R I O R I T Y

EO 11652, Sec 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

*see attached*

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe London,  
England

To: War Department

Nr. U60482

2 April 1944

Arnold from Spatz U60482.

After investigation of B24 operations for 1 April the following comments made concerning accidental bombing of Schaffhausen. Wind encountered was 60 miles per hour in excess of briefed winds from direction of approximately 310 degrees. This factor coupled with fact that division leader flying lead pathfinder aircraft was shot down enroute to target is accountable for great variation from briefed course. Deputy leader also in pathfinder aircraft assumed division lead. Special equipment in his aircraft functioned intermittently and while on bombing approach over 8/10 clouds failed completely. Bombardier of lead aircraft seeing a target through hole in cloud and believing it was an identified target released bombs: following group thought they were attacking primary target and bombed on markers released by lead group. These bombs released by second group hit river front and town. Existing directives in all operational units definitely prohibit bombing of any target in enemy occupied countries and within 50 miles of German borders that are not positively identified.

American Ambassador Winant has been contacted for assistance in making necessary arrangements in order to make diplomatic apologies to Swiss Government Representatives in London. It is recommended that an apology be made by the State Department in Washington to representatives of Swiss Government in Washington.

ACTION: OPD

INFO: CGAAF, G-2, Col Park, JEIA  
Log

No Sig.

052 CM-IN-1331

(2 Spatz) 2027Z

41  
COPY No.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**From: US Military Attache Ankara Turkey**

**To: War Department  
CG US Army Forces in the Middle East  
Cairo Egypt**

50  
671

25th March 1944.

Number MILID 50 AMSME 671 from Tindall Ankara,

Clear cut disagreement on fundamentals of post war settlement exists between Russia and Anglo Saxons furthermore Russia will have her own way in Europe with little regard for what British and Americans may say do or think is view increasingly held by Turk officials. They say Russia and Anglo Saxons are agreed only on necessity of defeating Germany before airing their quarrel. Some concern evinced over possibility Third World War soon but bulk Turk opinion holds British and Americans will give in to Russia on every point at issue. They had hoped otherwise.

For several weeks Turk Foreign Minister has been saying achievements of Teheran Conference had been nullified. Now Turks who naturally suspicious are inclined surmise Teheran was big failure veiled by vague glowing generalities.

Speaking of recognition Badoglio Government by Russia, Turk Foreign Office official in inner circles said "Apparently Russians will continue play their own hand. Obvious differences and mistrust between Russians and Anglo Saxons are particularly disturbing to Turkey.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CM-IN-18426 (26 Mar 44)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

*Col Matheson*

052

COPY No. 40

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
by RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

From: US Military Attache Ankara Turkey  
To: War Department Book  
Number: 50, 25th March 1944. Page 2.

This sort of thing is to continue and there is every reason to suppose it will, we might just as well forget about any post war peace. With such mistrust no one can get any where. I suppose the only hope for you is to get along with Russians politically".

SADAK often regarded as representing Foreign Office view voiced interesting views in AKSAM Tuesday. Extracts follow:

Articles in British press on necessity for allies to reach final understanding now Russians have crossed Dniester arouse strange doubts. Are there undefined points unrevealed views and no harmony yet in peace projects all of which must be discussed now Russians have crossed Dniester? Certain recent events and repercussions in Anglo Saxon press are far from conveying impression harmony prevails between Anglo Saxons and Soviets.

Other events prove Anglo Saxons lack joint well defined European Policy. Russia however pursues unchanging policy based on own experiences and lessons drawn from war. Russia who holds own interests principles and security above all else may not desire to discuss and share fruits of bloody war she is waging at very moment she is crossing Dniester. However no one has right to see in this policy any tendency liable to cause alarm in England and Balkans since the fact that British Premier himself considered it natura' right of Russia to annex part of Polish territory in return for her sacrifices shows that Russian demand was not exaggerated or imperialistic claim.

Recognition of Badoglio makes it sufficiently clear that future developments will take place not according agreements but entirely according will and policy of Soviets End Sadak extract.

ACTION: G-2

No Sig

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, Col Mathewson, Log

OM-IN-18426 (26 Mar 1944) 0523Z bjm

COPY No. 40

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[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: Dublin  
To : MILID  
No : 17 13th March 1944

Press pulpit and people united in supporting De Valera's rejection of US request to remove Axis nationals. Anger and resentment growing. Widespread belief attempt being made to embroil Eire in war. Indignation expressed over alleged nonuniformity in treatment of neutral states. Fear of economic or other reprisals general.

Hathaway

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD  
CG AAF  
LOG

CM-IN-9100 (13 Mar 44) 1740Z ong

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (K)

OSD letter, May 3, 1973

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

052

[REDACTED]

COPY No. 44

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

STATE DEPT CABLE FOR INFO OF WAR DEPT

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

From: Stockholm

Dated: March 6, 1944, 9 p.m.

No. 769

Rec'd: March 6, 1944, 11:20 p.m.

The Legation has been informed by Soderblum that arrangements have been completed for the release of 15 additional interned aviators of whom 9 will be American and 6 British. (In this connection please refer to \*Legation's 3928 of 4 December.) The number of aviators to be released is equivalent to the number who have landed in the channel between Denmark and Sweden and have been interned in Sweden under Swedish neutrality law since the beginning of the war. Due to the fact that the channel has been recognized as international for air traffic, the Swedes, endeavoring to find a formula for releasing British and American aviators, have now recognized that these aviators may be considered as having landed outside Swedish territory and Sweden, therefore, will consider aviators landing in the channel as refugees when they come ashore in Sweden.

\*3928 is CM-IN 4381 (7 Dec 43)

ACTION: G-2  
INFORMATION: OPD  
CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

CM-IN-6091 (9 Mar 44)

1509Z

amr

COPY No. 41

.052

~~SECRET~~

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[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

From: MA London  
To: MILID

Nr: 6926 24 February, 1944

Sgd Peabody.

War Office announces relief Lt Gen Le Queen Martel, Moscow Military Mission replaced by Lt Gen Brocas Burrows who speaks Russian and was formerly Mil Attache Rome, lately Commanding British 11th Armored Div.

no sig

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD  
CG AAF  
JC/S (Capt Royal, USN)  
Adm. King  
Log

CM-IN-16914 (24 Feb 44) 1808Z 1bw

.052

[REDACTED]

COPY No. 51

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAPER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMNAVEU</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE <b>13 FEB 1944</b>			<b>RRRR</b> ROUTINE
TON CODEROOM <b>2352/12</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>TABB</b>		FOR INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <b>HATCH</b>			<b>RRRR</b> ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <b>PIPP</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTERED			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
	<b>121459</b>	<b>By RHP, NABS Date NOV 2 1973</b> <b>NCR 454</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ GCT \_\_\_\_\_

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

**CNO FROM COMNAVEU INED BUPERS.**  
*NOT IN M.K.*  
**BUPERS 090633 HEAD OF MISSION GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE**  
**CONSIDERS CONTACTS BY NAVAL ATTACHE WILL BE FACILITATED**  
**AND HIS DUTIES BETTER ACCOMPLISHED IF CAPTAIN CALLAN'S**  
**RELIEF PREFERABLE WERE OF CAPTAINS RANK. HE CONSIDERS**  
**GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH ACCREDITED WOULD BE OFFENDED BY**  
**REPLACEMENT OF CAPTAIN BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER AND**  
**FEELS THIS WOULD AFFECT EXISTING GOOD WILL AND CORDIAL**  
**RELATIONS AND HAVE ADVERSE AFFECT ON FUTURE RELATIONS**  
**WHICH MOST ESSENTIAL WE MAINTAIN. NO REFLECTION ON**  
**LT COMDR DAWES PROFESSIONALLY OR PERSONALLY BUT CONSIDER**  
**HE WILL BE SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPED IN DEALING WITH SENIOR**  
**OFFICERS WITH PRESENT RANK, NO OBJECTION TO DAWES AS**  
**NAVAL ATTACHE BUT IF RETAINED SHOULD BE PROMOTED TO**  
**COMMANDER IN BEST INTEREST OF NAVY AND MISSION.**  
**(PAGE ONE OF TWO)**

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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	52

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCH-10  
**121459 052**

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMNAVEU</b>	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____	<b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY 2
DATE _____		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM _____		DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY _____		5
PARAPHRASED BY _____	<b>BUPERS</b>	DEFERRED 6
ROUTED BY _____		PRIORITY 7
		ROUTINE 8
		DEFERRED 9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		10
<b>121459</b>	<b>NCR 4540</b>	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 11
		<input type="checkbox"/> 12

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(PAGE TWO)

DAWES WILL SERVE AS ACTING NAVAL ATTACHE PENDING YOUR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND DECISION.  
 BIDDLE CONCURS. I CONCUR.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)  
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
 By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

16...ACT  
 BUPERS...COMINCH...CNO...NAVAIDE...13...

(PAGE TWO OF TWO)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
 OPNAV-NCR-16

ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-05	24
F-07	25
F-1	26
F-2	27
F-20	28
F-3	29
F-30	30
F-31	31
F-32	32
F-33	33
F-34	34
F-4	35
FX01	36
FX30	37
FX37	38
FX40	39
IG-00	40
VCNO	41
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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA CHUNCKING	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY	8 FEB 1944	CNO	2
DATE	071638		3
TOR CODEROOM			4
DECODED BY	RATLIFF/SOBEL/GREEN		5
PARAPHRASED BY	ZUND		6
ROUTED BY	REEGAN		7
			8
			9
			10
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			15
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			16
PAGE 1 OF 2	071204	NCR 1133	17
			18
			19
			20

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 071205 NCR 1137  
 PART 2 071206 NCR 1139  
 PART 3 071204 NCR 1133

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
 By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

(ACTION CNO)

	ACTION	
	F-0	22
	F-01	23
	F-02	24
	F-05	25
	F-07	26
	F-1	27
	F-2	28
	F-20	29
	F-3	30
	F-30	31
	F-31	32
	F-32	33
	F-33	34
	F-34	35
	F-4	36
	FX01	37
	FX30	38
	FX37	39
	FX40	40
	IG-00	41
	VCNO	42
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		51
		52

SOVIET CREATION SEPARATE REPUBLICS STRENGTHENS FEARS  
 SOME CHINESE THAT INTENTION IS TO USE THESE STATES AS  
 BUFFERS TO GAIN STRATEGIC HOLD ON ADJOINING TERRITORY.  
 TSU YEE PEI GENERAL MGR BANK OF CHINA EXPRESSED PRIVATE  
 VIEW NOT TO BE QUOTED THAT BY THIS MOVE SOVIET CENTRAL  
 GOVT CAN GAIN HERE ENDS BOTH IN EUROPE AND FAR EAST BY  
 DISCLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HER REPUBLICS MAY  
 DO WITH REGARD TO BORDER DEFINITIONS AND UNDERGROUND  
 POLITICAL AGGRESSION AND BY TREATING SUCH ACTIONS ON  
 PART THESE REPUBLICS AS LOCAL INCIDENTS. PEI MADE  
 PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO MANCHURIA AND MONCOLIA. CHOW LU  
 LEADING POLITICAL THINKS FORMER PRESIDENT SOUTHWEST  
 POLITICAL COUNCIL GAVE HIS VIEW THAT BIGGEST QUESTION  
 FACING CHINA WAS SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND STATED THAT  
 CHINESE GOVT HAD COMPLETED COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON CHINESE

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

071204 052

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM	ALUSNA CHUNCKING	PRECEDENCE	1
RELEASED BY		PRIORITY	2
DATE		ROUTINE	3
TOR CODEROOM		DEFERRED	4
DECODED BY			5
PARAPHRASED BY			6
ROUTED BY			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
071204		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	9
PAGE 2 OF 2		<input type="checkbox"/>	10
NCR 1133			11

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ TIME \_\_\_\_\_ GCT \_\_\_\_\_

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMMUNIST SITUATION LAST SEPTEMBER BUT THAT SINCE CAIRO CONFERENCE DECIDED WITHHOLD SAME FROM ALLIED NATIONS BECAUSE IT INVOLVED SOVIETS. DESPITE OFFICIAL ENDEAVOR MAINTAIN BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS MANY RESPONSIBLE WELL INFORMED CHINESE ARE PESIMISTIC RE NORTHERN PROVINCES EXPECTING SOVIETS WILL PERMIT JAPS REMAIN AS BUFFER BETWEEN THEIR REPUBLICS AND CHINA. COMMENT PEI IS ONE OF KEENEST CHINESE BANKERS AND THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION OF CHINESE APPREHENSION REGARDS FUTURE SINO SOVIET RELATIONS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3 1972 NOV 2 1973

By RHP, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_

16....ACT

COMINCH....CNO....2IG...NAVAIDE...200P....13....

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COM 15</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	<b>PPP</b>
RELEASED BY		<b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>5 FEB 1944</b>			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DISPATCH PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMIN			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
	<b>052004</b>	<b>NCR 142</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COLONEL JORGE ANTEZANA ARRIVED BALBOA VIA PANAGRA  
 4 FEB CLAIMING TO BE BOLIVIAN MILITARY ATTACHE TO  
 PANAMA AND VENEZUELA. TRAVELING UNDER DIPLOMATIC  
 PASSPORT ISSUED BY PENARANDA GOVERNMENT WITH  
 CREDENTIALS FROM NEW REGIME. REFUR 221929. PLANS  
 REMAIN HERE UNTIL RECOGNITION ACCORDED HIS GOVERNMENT.  
 REPORT FOLLOWS.

*Request for information*

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
 By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

16....ACT  
 13....17...COMINCH...NAVAIDE...CNO....

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-16  
 052004 052

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA LIMA, PERU</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		<b>CNO DECLASSIFIED</b> E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letter, May 8, 1972 By RHP, NARS Date <b>NOV 2 1973</b>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>26 JANUARY, 1944</b>	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <b>030319</b>	INFORMATION		<b>RED</b>
DECODED BY		<b>ALUSNA RIO DE JENEIRO</b>	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <b>REBER</b>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <b>WILLIAMS</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
262101		NCR 17454	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MAILGRAM

THE EMBASSY RECEIVED A NOTE FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE THIS DATE NOMINATING CAPITAN DE NAVIO (CAPTAIN) MANUEL R NIETO CHIPOCO, PERUVIAN NAVY, TO RELIEVE CONTRALMIRANTE ENRIQUE S. LABARTHE DURAND AS PERUVIAN NAVAL ATTACHE IN WASHINGTON. CAPTAIN NIETO HAS SERVED DURING THE PAST TWO AND A HALF YEARS AS NAVAL ATTACHE IN RIO. BOTH OF THE ABOVE NAMED OFFICERS WILL MEET IN LIMA, WHERE THE TURNOVER WILL TAKE PLACE AND CAPTAIN NIETO RECEIVE NEW INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR WASHINGTON.

ADD 13...17...CNO...COMINCH...

ACTION.....16

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 8, 1972

ACTION		GCT
P-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42

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OPNAV-NCR-16  
 262101 .052

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

*Deep?*

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA CHUNGKING</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE <u>26 JAN 1944</u>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROM <u>26236</u>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <u>JOHNSON/SCHMICK</u>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>PARKER</u>			6
ROUTED BY <u>SOBEL</u>			7
			8
			9
			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			13
			14

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

CORRECTED TEXT

250400 NCR 1381 - 2023

PAGE 1 OF 2

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 251110 NCR 1381 PART 2 261000 NCR 2023  
 FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING TO CNO  
 MYDIS 211203 POLISH MILITARY ATTACHE CHUNGKING STATES  
 2 OF BEST INFORMED PERSONS AND HIS MOST INTIMATE FRIENDS  
 ARE V.T. BIELECKE PRESIDENT POLISH NATIONAL PARTY AND  
 2ND LATTERS FRIEND AND CONFIDENT ME ROYEK EDITOR POLISH  
 PAPER. BIELECKE MAY BE CONTACTED THRU EDITOR ROYEK.  
 MANNER OF APPROACH IS TO PRESENT TO ROYEK AT ADDRESS NR  
 129 RANDOLPH AVENUE LONDON FOLLOWING SECRET MESSAGE FROM  
 COL KEDZIOR CHUNGKING. "DEAR EMILE THE AMERICAN NAVAL  
 OFFICER WHO BRINGS THIS MESSAGE IS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH  
 ME PLEASE ENABLE HIM TO CONTACT TADF AT ONCE IN INTEREST  
 OF POLAND SO HE MAY RECEIVE WITHOUT RESERVATION OF ANY  
 KIND ALL AVAILABLE DATA ON REAL POLISH SITUATION AND OUR  
 EXACT RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIETS PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-05	24
F-07	25
F-1	26
F-2	27
F-20	28
F-3	29
F-30	30
F-31	31
F-32	32
F-33	33
F-34	34
F-4	35
FX01	36
FX30	37
FX37	38
FX40	39
IG-00	40
VCNO	41
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 OPNAV-REGS) 08D Letter, 8-3-72

250400

052

MAY 15 1974

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		5
PARAPHRASED BY			PRIORITY 6
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE 7
			DEFERRED 8
			9
			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			13
			14
			15

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2

250400

NCR 1381-2023

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT


THRU THIS AMERICAN OFFICER PLUS ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE RE SUBJECT MATTER. SIGNED ALE." OUR ATTACHE LONDON CAN ALSO BE PUT IN CONTACT WITH POLISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF GENERAL SOSENKOWSKI AND CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF GENERAL KOPANSKI BUT THESE LATTER MAY BE UNDER TOO GREAT PRESSURE BY BRITISH AT THIS TIME TO ENABLE THEM TO SPEAK FREELY ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ALSO CLOSE FRIENDS OF COLONEL KEDZIOR WHO WILL GIVE US MESSAGE FOR THEM SHOULD IT BE THOUGHT ADVISABLE.

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IC-00	41
VCNO	42
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16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...13...NAVAIDE.....

DECLASSIFIED  
 OSD Letter, 5-3-72  
 MAY 15 1974



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 OPNAV-NCR-14

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEE	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>CNO</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY <b>SCHUIRMANN</b>		<b>ALUSNA CHUNGKING</b>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>23 JAN 1944</b>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <b>2106</b>			<b>DDDDDD</b>
			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ROTHROCK</b>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <b>WIDMAN</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>222112</b>		<b>NCR 2846</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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AFFIRMATIVE YOUR 211203.\*  
 DETAILS OF BACKGROUND DESIRED.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
 EO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
 By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

\*RE: CONTACT ON SOVIET-POLISH AFFAIRS.

16...ORIG  
 COMINCH...CNO...210P...NAVAIDE...13...

**SECRET**

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 OPNAV-NCR-15

222112 052

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>CNO</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY <b>SCHUIRMANN</b>		FOR ACTION	ROUTINE
DATE <b>23 JAN 44</b>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <b>2004/22</b>		FOR INFORMATION	PRIORITY
DECODED BY			<b>RRRR</b>
PARAPHRASED BY <b>HAMILTON</b>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <b>HARFINGTON</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>221929 NCR 2817</b>			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

*Attached*  
YOUR DIS 211936\* NO INFORMATION

RE REQUEST FOR INFO ON COL JORGE ANTEZANA

16..ORIG

13...17..COMINCH.. NAVAIDE..CNO...

- F-0 22
- F-01 23
- F-02 24
- F-05 25
- F-06 26
- F-07 27
- F-1 28
- F-2 29
- F-20 30
- F-3 31
- F-30 32
- F-31 33
- F-32 34
- F-33 35
- F-34 36
- F-4 37
- FX01 38
- FX30 39
- FX37 40
- FX40 41
- IG-00 42
- VCNO 43

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-16

221929 052



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COM 15</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		<b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY 3
DATE <b>21 JANUARY 1944</b>	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM <b>2051</b>			ROUTINE 5
DECODED BY <b>SHOAF</b>			DEFERRED 6
PARAPHRASED BY <b>HERWITZ</b>	INFORMATION		7
ROUTED BY <b>HUTCHINSON</b>			8
			9
			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			DEFERRED 13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

211936

NCR 9217

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY PANAMA REPORTS COLONEL JORGE ANTEZANA DESIGNATED BOLIVIAN MILITARY ATTACHE PANAMA, LEFT LA PAZ WITH FAMILY 20 JANUARY ENROUTE PANAMA. ANTEZANA FIRST BOLIVIAN MILITARY ATTACHE ASSIGNED PANAMA. PANAMA HAS NOT RECOGNIZED PRESENT BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT. INFO RE ANTEZANA REQUESTED.

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FR01	37
FR30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

13.....ACTION

17.....16.....COMINCH.....NAVAIDE.....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCH-16

2/1936 052

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA CHUN KING</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION	<b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>21 JAN 44</b>			<b>RRRRR</b>
TOR CODEROOM <b>1611/21</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>LAWRENCE</b>	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <b>HAMILTON</b>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <b>WIDMAN</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>211203 NCR 9080</b>			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

**ALUSNA CHUN KING SENDS TO CNO**

IF DEPARTMENT DESIRES OUTSTANDING CONTACT ON SOVIET POLISH AFFAIRS THE POLISH MILITARY ATTACHE HERE WILL FURNISH SAME FOR CONTACT WITH OUR NAVAL ATTACHE AT LONDON.

16...ACT  
 COMINCH...CNO...200P...NAVAIDE...

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (B)  
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
 By RHP, NARS Date **NOV 2 1973**

~~**SECRET**~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)  
 OPNAV-NCR-15  
**211203 .052**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*Am*  
**SECURITY CONTROL**

P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: AGWAR

Number W/394/2999 NAF 600 17 January 1944.

To AGWAR for The Combined Chiefs of Staff and to  
USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff, signed Wilson cite  
FHDCS NAF 600.

I wish to endorse General Eisenhowers view expressed  
in his NAF 560.

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

No Sig

INFORMATION: CID  
Gen Strong  
White House  
Gen Arnold  
Adm King  
Log

*Map Room has*

DECLASSIFIED  
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-71  
RAP Date NOV 2 1973

CM-IN-11088 (17 Jan 44) 2052Z vh

26

COPY No.

**SECRET**  
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-53394ABC

*.052*

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	CNO	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	SCHUIRMANN	SECRET  ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
DATE	8 JAN 1944		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	081932		DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY	BRUCE	AMCON VLADIVOSTOK	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY	ROONEY		ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
		081836	NCR 411

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PRESIDENT HAS SEEN YOUR 281716 AND STATES THAT THIS IS A MATTER THAT SHOULD BE HANDLED BY AMBASSADOR THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. PLEASE INFORM AMBASSADOR.

ACTION

- F-0
- F-01
- F-02
- F-05
- F-07
- F-1
- F-2
- F-20
- F-3
- F-30
- F-31
- F-32
- F-33
- F-34
- F-4
- FX01
- FX30
- FX37
- FX40
- IC-00
- VCNO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

16.....ORIG

13...NAVAIDE...CNO.....COMINCH.....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-16

081836 .052

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA CHUNGKING</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	1
RELEASED BY		<b>SECNAV</b>	<b>PRIORITY</b> 2
DATE <b>3 JAN 1944</b>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM <b>031250</b>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <b>TABB/ADAMS</b>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ADAMS</b>			6
ROUTED BY <b>PIPP</b>			7
			8
			9
			<b>PRIORITY</b> 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			13
			14
			15

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

031201

NCR 7774

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
			20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALUSNA CHUNGKING SENDS TO SECNAV.

FOREIGN MINISTER T V SOONG MUCH GRATIFIED FOR SECRETARY'S MESSAGE. HE IS HAPPY TO ADVISE THAT TENSION WITH GENERALISSIMO GREATLY RELAXED AND LATTER COMING TO REALIZE THAT SOONG'S DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BASED ON CHINA'S GOOD.

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

13...ACT

00A...NAVAIDE...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCH-16

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-50819-5

031201 .05v

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

*man Room*

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*EM*

PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE  
FOR INFO OF W.D.

January 3, 1944

FROM: Algiers  
TO: Secretary of State, Washington  
DATED: 28 December 1943  
NUMBER: 261

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

For the handling of consular and diplomatic personnel and their premises in Rome the HQAF has prepared a draft outline. We are now submitting the substance of this for the Department's comment.

A. Personnel of Axis powers and their satellites.

The consular and diplomatic offices of Japan, Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria must be taken into custody. Treatment should be according to the rules of courtesy but the individuals must not be permitted to escape. Information on their apprehension should be transmitted at once to AFHQ, which will, in turn give instructions for their further treatment.

The Legation and Embassy buildings of these Axis states should not be entered and subjected to search unless there is considerable reason for assuming that there has been abuse of diplomatic privilege. (The British Resident prefers the expression "proof" to "considerable reason".) Such abuse would be constituted by any hostile acts from the premises, presence of W/T sending apparatus, war materials except the recognized armament of the Mission, setting of any explosives.

The consular premises, however, should be entered, and, after search, all papers should be sequestered.

The private houses of the Axis and satellite

CM-IN-2357 (4 Jan 44)

COPY No.

43

*105*

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[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

NUMBER 261                      January 3, 1944                      Page two

personnel must be searched and interesting papers seized. No other property should be taken away and the houses must not be seized, or occupied. They must be sealed and left for disposal by the protecting powers.

The diplomatic buildings and the private homes of diplomatic personnel should be protected from wanton abuse in every way. If necessary, guards should be set until the protecting power assumes charge.

British troops, rather than American, will be expected to deal with the buildings and the personnel of the Finnish Government since a state of war does not exist between Finland and the United States.

B. Representatives of occupied territory (held by the Axis).

Diplomatic privileges do not apply to the representatives of the puppet Danish regime or of Vichy France. They should receive courteous treatment but all premises may be seized and searched.

C. Representatives of the neutrals.

These consular and diplomatic officials should be shown the greatest courtesy. No premises should be entered unless we have considerable evidence (again the British Resident Minister prefers the expression "proof") that some abuse has been committed.

The office of the British Resident Minister has expressed its approval of this draft, after examination.

Wilson

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD CC/S (Capt Royal USN)  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

CM-IN-2357 (4 Jan 44) 2013Z JB

[REDACTED]

COPY No. 43

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMCARIBSEAFRON	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE	3 JAN 44		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	030650	FOR INFORMATION	ROUTINE
DECODED BY	GOLDEN/GRAVES		DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY	THOMSON		DDDD
ROUTED BY	ROLL		
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
(PAGE 1 OF 2)	030011	NCR 7670	<input type="checkbox"/>

CNO  
 DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(C) and 8(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
 RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

ALUSLO MARTINIQUE  
 COMGEN ANTILLES

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

PART 1 030011 NCR 7670  
 PART 2 030121 NCR 7671  
 PART 3 030231 NCR 7650

(ACTION CNO INFO ALUSLO MARTINIQUE. COMGEN ANTILLES HAS. FROM COMCARIBSEAFRON)

MY SECRET DISPATCH 271337. IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAST SENTENCE PARAGRAPH 2 CND SECRET LETTER SERIAL

0128413 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1943 WITH MY APPROVAL AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF GENERAL JACOMY THE SENIOR FRENCH

MILITARY COMMANDER, THE COMMANDING GENERAL ANTILLES DEPARTMENT ORDERED CAPT R H FETNER USA TO FORT DE

FRANCE MARTINIQUE AS US MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER REPRESENTING THE COMMANDING GENERAL ANTILLES DEPT

WITH THE COMMANDING GENERAL FRENCH FORCES FBDL

CANTKILES AND FRENCH GUIANA. AS MATTER OF COURTESY CAPT FETNER CALLED ACCOMPANIED BY SENIOR US CONSULAR

REPRESENTATIVE AND OUR ALUSLO Z J GOVERNOR OF MARTINIQUE AND INFORMED HIM OF HIS ASSIGNMENT AND THAT IT HAD

MET WITH GENERAL JACOMY'S APPROVAL. CAPT FETNER REPORT SENDER 2 JANUARY THAT HE IS IN RECEIPT OF MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-10

036011 .052

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
G-00	
VCNQ	



NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
FROM	DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letter, May 3, 1972 By RHP, NAES Date <u>NOV 2 1973</u>	PRIORITY	
RELEASED BY		ROUTINE	
DATE		DEFERRED	
TOR CODEROOM		10	
DECODED BY		PRIORITY	
PARAPHRASED BY		ROUTINE	
ROUTED BY		DEFERRED	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	
030011 NCR 7670		<input type="checkbox"/>	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM AMERICAN VICE CONSUL CONTAINING RESULTS HIS CONVERSATION ON 30 DEC WITH GOVERNOR PONTON WHICH VOICED PONTON'S PERSONAL OBJECTIONS OPENING ARMY LIAISON OFFICE AS FOLLOWS "PARA 1 NO NECESSITY FROM MILITARY POINT OF VIEW PARA 2 BAD PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT NATIVES". FETNER ALSO REPORTS OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION GENERAL JACOMY RECALLED TO BE REPLACED BY A COLONEL. PONTON CABLED ALGIERS AGAIN ON 30 DEC FOR INSTRUCTIONS. THE ORDERS ISSUED CAPT FETNER RESTRICTED HIS DUTIES TO DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN GENERAL SHEDD COMGEN ANTILLES DEPT AND GEN JACOMY COMGEN FRENCH FORCES AND IN NO WAY INFRINGED ON THE DUTIES OF THE NAVAL LIAISON OR CONSULAR OFFICERS STATIONED FORT DE FRANCE. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY IN VIEW FACT COMGEN ANTILLES DEPT CONSIDERS IT HIGHLY DESIRABLE MAINTAIN DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN HIS OFFICE AND THAT OF SENIOR FRENCH MILITARY COMMANDER CAPT FETNER WILL CONTINUE PRESENT STATUS IN FORT DE FRANCE.

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-03	27
F-07	28
F-1	30
F-2	31
F-20	33
F-3	34
F-30	36
F-32	38
F-33	40
F-34	42
FX01	45
FX30	46
FX37	48
FX40	49
IG-00	51
VCNO	52

13....ACT  
 16....17...COMINCH...CNO...NAVAIDE....200P.....

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ADUSNA MEXICO CITY</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		<b>DNI</b>	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>3 JAN 44</b>			ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM <b>031750</b>			DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY <b>THOMSON</b>		<b>DECLASSIFIED</b> E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (S) OSD letter, May 3, 1972 By RHP, NARS Date <b>NOV 2 1973</b>	PRIORITY 10
ROUTED BY <b>HILL</b>			ROUTINE 12
			DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			15
	<b>311600</b>	<b>NCR 12188</b>	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

**-A-I-R-M-A-I-L-G-R-A-M-**

REF: NA MEXICO REPORT 465-43 OF DEC 28, 1943.

GENERAL CRISTOBAL GUZMAN GARDENAS FORMER MA IN WASHN AND RECENTLY HEAD OF MECHANIZED DIVISION OF MEXICAN

ARMY, APPOINTED COS OF DEFENSA NACIONAL SUCCEEDING GEN SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ.

GUZMAN IS CONSIDERED THE MOST PRO-UNITED STATES OFFICER IN HIGHER RANKS OF MEXICAN ARMY AND HAS BEEN WAGING AN

UNDER-COVER BATTLE WITH SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ TO ELIMINATE FRENCH TACTICS IN THE ARMY WHICH SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ FAV-

ORED AND TO SUBSTITUTE US ARMY TACTICS.

THERE ARE ADDITIONAL INDICATIONS THAT GENERAL URQUIZO WILL BE PROMOTED TO SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WHEN

GENERAL GARDENAS LEAVES AND THAT GENERAL HENRIQUEZ WILL SUCCEED URQUIZO AS SUB-SECRETARY.

16...ACT

20G...13...17...COMINCH...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P...

ACTION	
-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
F-01	37
F-30	38
F-37	39
F-40	40
F-00	41
F-30	42

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCH-16  
311600 1052

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>	FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			DEFERRED
DATE <u>4 JANUARY 1944</u>	INFORMATION	AMERICAN CONS'L VIA DIVOSTOK	PRIORITY
TOR CODEROOM _____			ROUTINE
DECODED BY _____			DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY _____			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

( ACTION CNO INFO VIA DIVOSTOK.)

CONTINUATION GALLIN RESTRICTIONS PRACTICALLY HERMETICALLY SEAL ROULLARD AND CONSULAR STAFF FROM ANY SOCIAL AND MOST OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH VIADT OFFICIALS OR CIVILIANS. NOT ALLOWED FOR RECREATIONAL FACILITIES AVAILABLE SUCH AS RED NAVY THEATRES OR CLUBS CONTINUALLY AND OPENLY SHADOWED. LEGITIMATE MOVEMENTS THWARTED AND EVERY OBSTACLE PLACED IN WAY MAINTAINING REASONABLE EXISTENCE. REDS EXPLAIN DUE FEAR OFFENDING JAPS WHICH NOT VALID IN VIEW OPEN DISCRIMINATION MOSCOW AGAINST JAP NEWS CORRS AND ATTITUDE TOWARD JAP OFFICIALS AT MIXED FUNCTIONS AS COMPARED TO MARKED FRIENDLINESS ACCORDED ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES. APPARENTLY SOLE PURPOSE ENCOURAGE FREEZE OUT OUR OFFICES THERE. REQUEST BRIEFLY LIMITATIONS IMPOSED FACILITIES OFFERED SOVIET NAVAL OFFICERS USA REGARDING MEMBERSHIP CLUBS TRAVEL HOUSING OR PERSONAL AFFAIRS IN ORDER BE IN POSITION LODGE COMPLAINT SUGGEST YOU OBTAIN MORE DETAILS FROM LT CRD TABCKER AS PRESENT CONDITIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE EXISTING WHEN HE WAS THERE.

16.....ACT

COMINCH...20G...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P.....

FA-5 Action....

16-P..FA,,16..FE..B-7.....S

DECLASSIFIED

5255

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date NOV 2 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

281716

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)