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LAWYERS' REPORTS,

ANNOTATED.

BOOK VIII.

ALL CURRENT CASES

OF

GENERAL VALUE AND IMPORTANCE

DECIDED IN

THE UNITED STATES, STATE AND TERRITORIAL COURTS,

WITH FULL ANNOTATION

ВY

ROBERT DESTY, EDITOR.

BURDETT A. RICH AND HENRY P. FARNHAM, REPORTERS,

THE PUBLISHER'S EDITORIAL STAFF, AND THE SEVERAL REPORTERS AND JUDGES OF EACH COURT, ASSISTING IN SELECTION.

(8. L. R. A.)

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SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE

OF ALL

CASES REPORTED IN LAWYERS' REPORTS, ANNOTATED, BOOK 8,

NOT OFFICIALLY REPORTED WHEN THIS BOOK WENT TO PRESS.

(To be "tipped in" in front of regular table, used as a book mark or as data for marking each case. Like tables will be furnished for subsequent volumes as fast as possible.)

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
Abrahams v. Cal. Pdr. Wks. (-N.M)	378	Flaherty v. Moran (81 Mich. 52)	183
	123	Fobes v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co. (121 N.	100
Amsker v. New (33 S. C. 28)	687	Y. 505)	453
American Order of S. C. v. Merrill (151	•••	Fort Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Jennings	100
	320		180
	568	(76 Tex. 373) Freeman's Nat. Bank v. National Tube	100
Aszman v. State (123 Ind. 347)	33		40
		Works Co. (151 Mass. 413) -	42
	299	Frieszleben v. Shallcross (9 Houst. 1)	337
Ballock v. State (73 Md. 1)	671	Gardiner v. Gardiner (65 N. H. 230) -	383 70
Bancroft v. Home Ben. Asso. (120 N. Y. 14)	63	German Ins. Co. v. Gray (43 Kan. 497)	10
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt (100	440	Giant Powder Co. v. O. P. R. Co. (42	POO.
Mo. 22)	110	Fed. Rep. 470, 14 Saw. 560)	700
Belcher's Sugar Ref. Co. v. St. Louis Gr.	601	Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon	100
	801	(151 Mass. 460)	486
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	467	Gore v. Townsend (105 N. C. 228).	443
Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. Hascall		Goss v. Froman (89 Ky. 318)	102
(123 Ind. 502)	65	Guffey v. Hukill (34 W. Va. 49)	759
Bills v. Bills (80 Iowa, 269)	696	Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North Amer-	
Birmingham v. Klein (89 Ala. 461) -	369	ica (120 N. Y. 73)	79
Boston Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Coffin	- 1	Hamsher v. Hamsher (132 III. 273)	556
(152 Mass. 95)	740	Hanley v. Walker (79 Mich. 607)	207
Brannon v. Kanawha County Ct. (33 W.		Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 340)	450
	304	Harris v. Baltimore (73 Md. 22)	677
Bristor v. Burr (120 N. Y. 427)		Harwell v. Sharp (85 Ga. 124)	514
	562		393
	248	Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. 3) -	469
	446	Hinckley v. Horazdowski (183 Ill. 359)	490
	412	Hoffman v. Chippewa County (77 Wis.	~~.
Case v. Sun Ins. Co. (83 Cal. 473) -	48	214)	781
Catlin v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co. (123	- TO	Holland v. Citiz. Sav. Bk. (16 R. I. 734)	553
	60	Horsch v. Dwell. H Ins. Co. (77 Wis. 4)	806
Ind. 477)	62		837
	851	Hronek v. People (134 Ill. 139)	480
Central City First Nat. Bank v. Hum-	700	Hughes v. Brown (88 Tenn. 518)	458
	788	Ilion Nat. Bank, Re (121 N. Y. 328)	410
	828	Importers & T. Bank v. Colgate (120 N.	P10
	765	Y. 381) -	712
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Chapman		Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. Citi-	F00
	50 8	zens Street R. Co.(127 Ind. 369)	539
Chicago C. R. Co. v. Wilcox (See 21: 76,		Irving v. Campbell (121 N. Y. 353)	620
	494	James v. Wood (82 Me. 173)	448
Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. How-		Janesville v. Carpenter (77 Wis. 288) - ,	808
	593	Johnson v. Elkins (90 Ky. 163).	552
Coleman v. Fuller (105 N. C. 328) -	380	v. Jouchert (124 Ind. 105)	795
Com. v. Cleary (135 Pa. 64)	301	v. St. P. & D. R. Co. (43 Minn, 222)	419
Com., Burt v. Union League (135 Pa. 301)	195	g. Sup. Ldg. K. of H. (53 Ark. 255)	732
Cone v. Dunham (59 Conn. 145)	647	Kellny v. Missouri P. R. Co. (101 Mo. 67)	783
	822	Kern v. Myll (80 Mich. 525)	682
Cooper v. Armour (42 Fed. Rep. 215) -	47	Killmer v. Wuchner (79 Iowa, 722)	289
v. Richmond & D. R. Co. (42 Fed.		Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural Gas Co.	
Rep. 697)	366	(124 Ind. 577)	602
Creston First Nat. Bank v. Carroll (80	-	Kirkpatrick v. Clark (132 Ill. 342) .	511
Iowa, 11)	275	Knight v. Linzey (80 Mich. 396)	476
	243	Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. Scott (132 III. 429)	830
Davis v. Strange (86 Va. 793)	261	Lembeck v. Andrews (47 Ohio St. 336)	578
	814	v. Nye (47 Ohio St. 336)	578
Duffies v. Duffies (76 Wis. 374)	420	Lipman v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (121 N.	-10
Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co.	TAU	Y. 454)	719
	224	Logan v. Stogdale (123 Ind. 372)	58
(120 N. Y. 117)		Logan v. Stoguato (140 Ind. 014)	834
Emmons c. Lewistown (132 III. 380) -	328	Loomis v. Rockford Ins. Co. (77 Wis, 87)	202
Fifth Ave. Bank v. Colgate (120 N.Y. 381)	112	Lord v. Meadville Water Co. (135 Pa. 122)	402

: : :				
	Stiddi Ewer	TAT.	TABLE OF CASES.	- :
		TAL		
	Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Corps (124 Ind. 427)	636	Smith v. Kanawha County County Ct. (33 W. Va. 713)	82
•	Lyon v. Denison (80 Mich. 371)	358	v. Osage (80 Iowa, 84)	633
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	McClung v. Armstong (32 S. C. 203) - McClung v. Dearborne (134 Pa. 396) -	$625 \\ 204$		362
		- 778		858 410
**************************************	McKenzie v. Harrison (120 N. Y. 260) -		Stanley v. Stanley (47 Ohio St. 225)	333
	Manley v. Staples (62 Vt. 153) Martin v. Johnson (84 Ga. 481)	$\begin{array}{c} 707 \\ 170 \end{array}$		549
	Mauldin v. Greenville (33 S. C. 1)	291	State v. Boe (80 Iowa, 467)	767
	Merrell v. Springer (123 Ind. 485) - Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. v. Kneeland	61	v. Conery (80 Iowa, 467) v. Dowell (106 N. G. 722)	767 297
	(126 N. Y. 134)	252		259
	Midland R. Co. v. Fisher (125 Ind. 19) -	604 89		608
	v. Ottaway (81 Mich. 196)	428	v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Kahler (80 Iowa, 467)	529 767
	v. Shields (124 Ind. 166)	406		584
	Missouri P. R. Co. v. Sharitt (43 Kan. 375, 387)	385	v. McGonigle (101 Mass. 353) v. Robbins (124 Ind. 308)	735 433
	c. Whipker (77 Tex. 14)	321	v. Smith (44 Kan. 75)	774
	Mittel v. Karl (183 III. 65) Montana U. R. Co. v. Langlois (9 Mont.	655	v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) v. Tanna (80 Iowa, 467)	516 767
	419)	753	v. Voss (80 Iowa, 467)	767
-	Montgomery County v. Ristine (124 Ind.	464	Attorney-General v. Western U.	
*	242) Moore v. Francis (121 N. Y. 199)	461 214	Mut. L. & A. Soc. (47 Ohio St. 167)	129
	Morasse v. Brochu (151 Mass. 567) -	524	Goodwin v. Nelson County (1 N.	
	Mora Y Ledon v. Havemeyer (121 N. Y.	245	Dak. 88) Leeds v. Atl. City (52 N. J. L. 332)	283 697
· .	Moses v. Southern P. R. Co. (18 Or. 385)	135	Rotwitt v. Hickman (9 Mont. 370)	403
	Mosseller v. Deaver (106 N. C. 494) Moton v. Hull (77 Tex. 80)	537 722	Taylor v. Warrick County (124 Ind. 554)	607
*	Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Com. (152	1~~	Worrel v. Peeile (124 Ind. 515) -	228
	Mass. 28)	399 05		427
•	Murray v. Murray (90 Ky. 1) Newell v. Meyendorff (9 Mont. 254)		Summerville v. Pressley (33 S. C. 56) Swift v. Topeka (43 Kan. 671)	854 772
	Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R.		Symonds v. Jones (82 Me. 302)	570
=	Co. (52 N. J. L. 446) - Newport v. N. & C. Bridge Co. (90	842	Talamo v. Spitzmiller (120 N. Y. 37) - Tallman v. Met. Elev. R. Co. (121 N. Y. 119)	221 173
	Ky. 193)	484	Territorial Insane Asylum v. Wolfley (—	1.0
	New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. 306)	614	Ariz. —) Territory, Kelly v. Stewart (1 Wash. 98)	188 106 -
•	O'Donnell v. Glenn (9 Mont. 452)	639	Terry v. Munger (121 N. Y. 161)	216
	Palmer v. State (88 Tenn. 553)	280	Thomas v. Musical Mut. P. Union (121	105
	Pease v. Ritchie (132 III. 638) Peel v. Atlanta (85 Ga. 138)	566 787	N. Y. 45) Tipton, Re (28 Tex. App. 438)	$\begin{array}{c} 175 \\ 326 \end{array}$
	Pendergast v. Yandes (124 Ind. 159)	849	Tolchester Beach Improv. Co. v. Stein-	
	Pennypacker v. Cptl. Ins. Co. (80 Ia. 56) People v. Foss (80 Mich. 559)	236 472	meier (72 Md. 313) Townshend v. Gray (62 Vt. 373)	846 112
	o. Morris (80 Mich. 634)	685	Travelers Ins. Co. v. California Ins. Co.	
A	v. Remington (121 N. Y. 328) Phelan v. Brady (119 N. Y. 587)	458 211	(1 N. Dak.151) Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638)	769
	Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Anderson		Venable v. Rickenberg (152 Mass. 64)	277 623
	(72 Md. 519)	673	Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) -	591
	Phonix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller (151 Mass. 589)	644	Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. 191) - Wallace v. Evans (43 Kan. 509) -	39 52
	Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Shields	1	Weener v. Brayton (152 Mass. 101)	640
•	(47 Ohio St. 387) Pond v. Sheean (142 III. 312)	464	Weller v. McCormick (52 N. J. L. 470) West v. People's Bank (67 Miss. 729)	798 727
	Price v. Conway (134 Pa. 340)	193	Western U. T. Co. v. Taylor (84 Ga408)	189
	Reise v. Enos (76 Wis. 634) Rice v. Sanders (152 Mass. 108)	617	v. Williams (86 Va. 696)	429 375
	Richardson v. German Ins. Co. (89 Ky. 571)		Wheat v. Dingle (32 S. C. 473) Willard v. Finnegan (42 Minn. 476)	50
	Robinson, Re (29 Neb. 135)	398	Wilson v. Martin Wilson Automatic F.	900
* - *	Rowell v. Vershire (62 Vt. 405) St. Louis, T. M. & S. R. Co. v. Ramsey	708	Alarm Co. (151 Mass. 515) - Windram v. French (151 Mass. 547) -	309 750
* * *	(53 Ark. 314)	559	Witty v. Michigan Mut. L. Ins. Co. (123	. •
	Sanford v. Kane (133 Ill. 199) Savannah v. Weed (84 Ga. 683)	724	Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (- N. M. —)	365 691
	Shultz v. Wall (154 Pa. 262)		Wolf v. Bauereis (72 Md. 481)	680
	Singer v. State (72 Md. 464)	551	Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Johnson (84	
•	Skinner v. Henderson (26 Fla. 121)	55	Ga. 754)	273

TABLE

OF

CASES REPORTED

IN

LAWYERS' REPORTS, ANNOTATED, BOOK VIII.

A.	1	Belcher's Sugar Ref. Co. v. St. Louis	801
Abrahams v. California Powder Works		Grain Elevator Co. (Mo.) - Below v. Robbins (Wis.) -	467
(N, M,)	378	Benedict v. Chase (58 Conn. 196) · -	120
Alloway v. Nashville (88 Tenn. 510) Amaker v. New (S. C.)	123 687	Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. Hascall (Ind.)	65
American Order of Scottish Clans v.		Bills v. Bills (Iowa)	696
Merrill (Mass.) Anderson, Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co.	320	Birmingham v. Klein (Ala.) Boe, State v. (Iowa)	339 767
v. (Md.)	673	Boston, Curran v. (Mass.)	243
v. Robbins (82 Me. 422)	568	Boston Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Coffin	~ 10
Andrews, Lembeck v. (Ohio) Armour, Cooper v. (U. S. C. C. N. Y.)	578 47	(Mass.) Boutineau, Herreshoff v. (R. I.)	$\frac{740}{469}$
Armstrong, McCarter v. (S. C.)	625	Brady, Phelan v. (N. Y.)	211
Ashenfelter, Wolcott v. (N. M.) Aszman v. State (Ind.) -	691 33	Brannon v. Kanawha County Court (33 W. Va. 789)	804
Atlanta, Peel v. (Ga.)	787	Brayton, Weener v. (Mass.)	640
Atlantic City, State, Leeds v. (N. J.)	697		819
Attorney-General, State, ex rel., v. West- ern Union Mutual L. & A.		Bristor v. Burr (120 N.Y. 427) Brochu, Morasse v. (Mass.)	$\begin{array}{c} 710 \\ 524 \end{array}$
Soc. (47 Ohio St.—)	129	Brown, Hughes v. (Tenn.)	480
		Bueter v. Bueter (S. D.) Burr, Bristor v. (N. Y.)	562 710
В.	,	Burt, Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel., v.	
Been GoodD1 W-t G		Union League (Pa.)	195
Bacon, Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v.	486	C.	
Bain v. Richmond & D. R. Co. (105 N. C.			
Ballock v. State (Md.)	299 671	Calhoun v. Delhi & M. R. Co. (N.Y.) - California Ins. Co., Travelers Ins. Co. v.	243
Baltimore, Harris v. (Md.)	677	(N. D.)	769
Bancroft v. Home Benefit Asso. (120 N.	¢0	California Powder Works, Abrahams v.	378
Y. 14) Bank, Citizens Sav., Holland v. (R. I.)	68 553	(N. M.) Campbell, Irving v. (N. Y.)	620
Fifth Ave., v. Colgate (120 N. Y. 381)	712	Capital Ins. Co., Pennypacker v. (Iowa)	226
First Nat. of Central City, v. Hum- mel (Colo.)	788	Carleton Mills Co. v. Silver (82 Me. 215) Carpenter, Janesville v. (Wis.)	446 808
First Nat. of Creston, v. Carroll		Carroll, First Nat. Bank of Creston v.	-
(Iowa) - Freeman's Nat., v. National Tube	275	(Iowa) Carson v. Memphis & C. R. Co. (88 Tenn.	275
Works Co. (Mass.)	42	646)	412
Importers & T., v. Colgate (120 N.	P4 C	Case v. Sun Ins. Co. (83 Cal. 473)	48
Y. 381) New Vienna, v. Johnson (47 Ohio	712	Catlin, Receiver, v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co. (Ind.)	63
St. —)	614	Cedar Springs v. Schlich (Mich.)	851
People's of New Orleans, West v.	727	Chapman, Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v.	508
Phœnix Nat., v. Batcheller (Mass.)	644	Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron Works (82	
Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hunt (100 Mo. 22)	110	Me. 391) Chase, Admr., Benedict v. (Conn.) -	828 120
Batcheller, Phonix Nat. Bank & (Mass.)	644	Chicago v. McLean (Ill.)	765
Bauereis, Wolf v. (Md.)	680		858
8 L, R, A		*	3

Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Chapman (Ill.)	508	Fisher, Conrad v. (Mo. App.)	147
Chicago City R. Co. v. Wilcox (Ill.) -	494	Midland R. Co. v. (Ind.)	604
Chicago Gas Trust Co., People, Prabody,	TOI	Schloeter v. (Mo. App.)	147
	497	Flahartz a Maron (Mich.)	
v. (111.)	491	Flaherty v. Moran (Mich.)	183
Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co., Locey Coal		Fleming, Vannest v. (Iowa)	277
Mines v. (III.)	598	Fobes v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co. (N. Y.)	453
Chippewa County, Hoffman v. (Wis.)	781	Fort Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Jennings	
Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. How-		(76 Tex. 373)	180
ard (Ind.)	593	Foss, People v. (Mich.)	472
Citizens Sav. Bank, Holland v. (R. I.)	553	Francis, Moore v. (N. Y.)	214
Citizens Street R. Co., Indianapolis Cable		Freeman's Nat. Bank v. National Tube	
Street R. Co. v. (Ind.)	539	Works Co. (Mass.)	42
Clark, Kirkpatrick v. (Ill.)	511	French, Windram v. (Mass.)	750
Cleary Commonwealth of Do. 70			
Cleary, Commonwealth of Pa. v. (Pa.)	301	Frieszleben v. Shallcross (Del.)	337
Coffin, Boston Safe Deposit & T. Co. v.	P 40	Froman, Goss v. (Ky.)	102
(Mass.)	740	Fuller, Coleman v. (N. C.)	380
Coleman v. Fuller (105 N. C. 328)	380		
Colgate, Fifth Ave. Bank v. (N.Y.) -	712		
Importers & T. Bank v. (N. Y.)	721	G.	
Commonwealth of Pa. v. Cleary (Pa.) -	301	•	
Burt, v. Union League (Pa.) -	195	Gardiner v. Gardiner (N. H.)	383
Commonwealth of Mass., Murdock Parlor		Gaylord v. New Britain (58 Conn. 398)	752
Grate Co. v. (Mass.) - •	399		70
	393	German Ins. Co. v. Gray (43 Kan. 497)	
Comstock, Hegeler v. (S. D.)		Richardson's Admr. v. (Ky.)	800
Cone, Exr., v. Dunham (Conn.) -	647	Giant Powder Co. v. Oregon P. R. Co.	m .~~
Conery, State v. (lowa)	767	(U. S. C. C. Or.)	700
Conrad v. Fisher (37 Mo. App. 352)	147	Gilbert, Standard Oil Co. v. (Ga.)	410
Conway, Price v. (Pa.)	193	Glenn, O'Donnell v. (Mont.)	629
Cook v. Winchester (Mich.)	822	Goodwin, State ex rel., v. Nelson County	
Cooper v. Armour (U. S. C. C. N. Y.) -	47	(N. D.)	283
v. Richmond & D. R. Co. (U. S.		Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon	
C. C. Ga.)	366	(Mass.)	486
Corps, Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v.		Gordon, Brennan v. (N. Y.)	818
	636		
(Ind.)		Gore v. Townsend (105 N. C. 228)	443
Cummings, McDaniel v. (Cal.)	575	Goss v. Froman (Ky.)	102
Curran v. Boston (Mass.)	243	Gray, German Ins. Co. v. (Kan.)	70
		Townshend v. (Vt.)	112
•			
	İ	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.)	291
D.	İ		
D.	İ	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.)	291
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	261	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex.	291
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	261 204	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.)	291 759
Davis v. Strauge (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.)	204	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex.	291 759
Davis v. Strauge (Va.) - Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) - Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.)	204 537	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337)	291 759
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) -	204 537 248	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex.	291 759
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 358	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H.	291 759
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calboun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.)	204 537 248 358 375	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North Amer-	291 759 323
Davis v. Strauge (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) - Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503)	204 537 248 358 375 833	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73)	291 759 323 79
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.)	291 759 323 79 425
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73)	291 759 323 79 425 556
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Duffies v. Duffies (Wis.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.)	291 759 323 79 425
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Harnsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Harley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240)	291 759 323 79 425 556
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Harnsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Harley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240)	79 425 556 207
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Duffies v. Duffies (Wis.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Harnsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Harley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.)	79 425 556 207 450
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Dunbam, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) - Dwelling House Ins. Co., Horsch v. (Wis.) Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R.	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.)	79 425 556 207 450 677 257
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Duffies v. Duffies (Wis.) Dunham, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) Dwelling House Ins. Co., Hersch v. (Wis.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.)	79 425 556 207 450 677
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Dunbam, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) - Dwelling House Ins. Co., Horsch v. (Wis.) Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R.	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v.	79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Dunbam, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) - Dwelling House Ins. Co., Horsch v. (Wis.) Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R.	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.)	79 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Dunbam, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) - Dwelling House Ins. Co., Horsch v. (Wis.) Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R.	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 677 257 514 65 245
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 245 393
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) - Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Dunham, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) Dwelling House Ins. Co., Hersch v. (Wis.) Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (120 N. Y. 117)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 245 393 55
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Hawell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 245 393 55 469
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 657 257 514 65 245 393 469 403
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Hawell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 245 393 55 469
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 657 257 514 65 245 393 469 403
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 245 393 55 469 403 490
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R.	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 657 245 245 469 403 490 781
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Harnsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (Ill.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R.	291 759 323 79 425 556 677 257 514 65 245 393 490 781 553
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Duffies v. Duffies (Wis.) Dunham, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) Dwelling House Ins. Co., Hersch v. (Wis.) Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (120 N. Y. 117) E. Eaves, State v. (N. C.) Elkins, Johnson v. (Ky.) Emmons v. Lewistown (III.) Enos, Reise v. (Wis.) F.	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 257 514 65 245 393 469 403 490 781 553 68
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617 52	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 469 403 490 781 553 68 608
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617 52	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.) Hope, State v. (Mo.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 556 677 257 450 677 257 469 403 490 781 553 608 490
Davis v. Strange (Va.)	204 537 248 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617 52	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (Ill.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.) Hope, State v. (Mo.) Horsch v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Wis.)	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 469 403 490 781 553 68 608
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.)	204 537 248 858 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 552 328 617 52	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (Ill.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.) Hope, State v. (Mo.) Horazdowski, Hinckley v. (Ill.) Horsch v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Wis.) Howard, Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R.	291 759 323 79 425 556 677 257 514 65 245 393 490 781 553 68 698 490 806
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 523 617 52	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.) Hope, State v. (Mo.) Horazdowski, Hinckley v. (III.) Horsch v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Wis.) Howard, Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R.	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 245 393 490 781 553 68 490 806 593
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.) Dingle, Admr., Wheat v. (S. C.) Doe v. Roe (82 Me. 503) Dowell, State v. (N. C.) Dudley v. Dudley (Wis.) Duffies v. Duffies (Wis.) Dunham, Exr., Cone v. (Conn.) Dwelling House Ins. Co., Hersch v. (Wis.) Dwinelle v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (120 N. Y. 117) E. Eaves, State v. (N. C.) Elkins, Johnson v. (Ky.) Emmons v. Lewistown (Ill.) Enos, Reise v. (Wis.) F. Fifth Ave. Bank v. Colgate (120 N. Y. 381) First Nat. Bank of Central City v. Hummel (Colo.) First Nat. Bank of Creston v. Carroll	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 528 617 52 712 50 788	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (Ill.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harris v. Baltimore (Md.) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (Ill.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.) Hope, State v. (Mo.) Horazdowski, Hinckley v. (Ill.) Horsch v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Wis.) Howard, Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. (Ind.)	291 759 323 79 4256 5207 4506 677 2574 65 245 393 490 781 553 688 698 490 806 593 837
Davis v. Strange (Va.) Dearborne, McClung v. (Pa.) Deaver, Mosseller v. (N. C.) Delhi & M. R. Co., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) - Denison, Lyon v. (Mich.)	204 537 248 358 375 833 297 814 420 647 806 224 259 528 617 52 712 50 788	Greenville, Mauldin v. (S. C.) Guffey v. Hukill (W. Va.) Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) H. Halpin v. Insurance Co. of North America (120 N. Y. 73) Hammell, Stone v. (Cal.) Hamsher v. Hamsher (III.) Hanley v. Walker (Mich.) Hare v. McIntyre (82 Me. 240) Harrison, McKenzie v. (N. Y.) Harwell v. Sharp (Ga.) Hascall, Berkey & G. Furniture Co. v. (Ind.) Havemeyer, Mora y Ledon v. (N. Y.) Hegeler v. Comstock (S. D.) Henderson, Skinner v. (Fla.) Herreshoff v. Boutineau (17 R. I. —) Hickman, State, Rotwitt v. (Mont.) Hinckley v. Horazdowski (III.) Hoffman v. Chippewa County (Wis.) Holland v. Citizens Sav. Bank (16 R. I. —) Home Benefit Asso., Bancroft v. (N. Y.) Hope, State v. (Mo.) Horazdowski, Hinckley v. (III.) Horsch v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. (Wis.) Howard, Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R.	291 759 323 79 425 556 207 450 677 257 514 65 245 393 490 781 553 68 490 806 593

Cases Reported. 5			
Hukill, Guffey v. (W. Va.) - Hull, Moton v. (Tex.) Hummel, First Nat. Bank of Central City v. (Colo.)	759 722 788	Kansas v. Smith Karl, Mittel v. (III.) Kelluy v. Missouri P. R. Co. (Mo.) Kelly, Territory ex rel., v. Stewart (Wash.)	774 655 783 106
Hunt, Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. (Mo.) Hunter, State v. (N. C.)	110 529	Kern v. Myll (Mich.) Killmer v. Wuchner (79 Iowa, 722) Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural Gas. Co.	683 289
I. Ilion Nat. Bank, Re (N. Y.)	458	(Ind.) Kirkpatrick v. Clark (III.) Kleim, Birmingham v. (Ala.) Kneeland, Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. v.	602 511 369
Illinois, Hronek v. Peabody, v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. (130 Ill. 268)	837 497	(N. Y.) Knight v. Linzey (Mich.)	253 476
Importers & T. Bank v. Colgate (120 N. Y. 381) Indiana, Assman v.	712 33	L.	•••
v. Robbins Taylor v. Warrick County Comrs. Worrel v. Peelle Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. Citi-	438 607 228	Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Scott (III.) Langlois, Montana U. R. Co. v. (Mont.) Lawler v. Murphy (58 Conn. 294) Leake v. Watson (58 Conn. 332)	330 753 113 666
zen's Street R. Co. (Ind.) - Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., Kincaid v. (Ind.) Insurance Co. of North America, Halpin	539 603	Leeds, State ex rel., v. Atlantic City (N. J.) Lembeck v. Andrews (47 Ohio St. —) v. Nye (47 Ohio St. —) Levi, Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. (Tex.)	697 578 578 323
v. (N. Y.) California, Travelers Ins. Co. v. (N. D.) Capital, Pennypacker v. (Iowa)	79 769 236	Lewistown, Emmons v. (III.) Linzey, Knight v. (Mich.) Lipman v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. (N. Y.) Locey Coal Mines v. Chicago, W. & V.	328 476 719
Dwelling House, Horsch v. (Wis.) German, v. Gray (43 Kan. 497) German, Richardson's Admr. v. (Ky.)	806 70 800	Coal Co. (131 III. 9) Logan v. Stogdale (Ind.) Loomis v. Rockford Ins. Co. (Wis.) Lord v. Meadville Water Co. (Pa.)	598 58 834 202
Michigan Mutual L., Witty v. (Ind.) Niagara F., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Rockford, Loomis v. (Wis.) Sun, Case v. (Cal.)	365 719 834 48	Lyon v. Denison (Mich.)	636 358
Travelers, v. California Ins. Co. (N. D.)	769 767	м.	
v. Conery v. Kahler v. Tanna v. Voss	767 767 767 767	McCarter v. Armstrong (32 S. C. 203) - McClung v. Dearborne (Pa.) - McConnell v. Osage (Iowa) McCormick, Weller v. (N. J.)	625 204 778 798
Irving v. Campbell (N. Y.)	620	McDaniel v. Cummings (83 Cal. 515) McGonigle, Admr., State v. (Mo.) McIntyre, Hare v. (Me.)	575 735 450
James v. Wood (82 Me. 173) Janesville v. Carpenter (Wis.)	448 808	McKenzie v. Harrison (120 N. Y. 260) McLean, Chicago v. (Ill.) McMullen v. Ritchie (U. S. C. C. Ohio) Maine C. R. Co., Sullivan v. (Me.)	257 765 268 427
Jennings, Forth Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. (Tex.) Johnson v. Elkins (Ky.)	180 552	Manley's Estate v. Staples (Vt.) Manufacture of Gas & Electric Light, Re, (150 Mass. 392)	707 487
v. Jouchert (Ind.) Martin v. (Ga.) New Vienna Bank v. (Ohio) v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. (Minn.)	795 170 614 419	Martin v. Johnson (Ga.) Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., Wilson v. (Mass.) Maryland, Ballock v.	170 309 671
v. Supreme Lodge of K. of H. (Ark.) Wrought Iron Range Co. v. (Ga.)	732 273	Singer v. Mauldin v. Greenville (S. C.) Meadville Water Co., Lord v. (Pa.)	551 291 202
Jones, Symonds v. (Me.) Jouchert, Johnson v. (Ind.)	570 795	Memphis & C. R. Co., Carson v. (Tenn.) Mendenhall, Miller v. (Minn.) Merrell v. Springer (Ind.) American Order of Scottish Clans	412 89 61
K.		v. (Mass.) Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. v. Kneeland	320
Kahler, State v. (Iowa) Kaiser, State v. (Or.) Kanawha County Court, Braunon v. (W. Va.)	767 584 304	(120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Meyendorff, Newell v. (Mont.)	253 173 440 473
Smith v. (W. Va.) Kane, Sanford v. (III.) 8 L. R. A.	82 724	v. Morris	685

Midland R. Co. v. Fisher (Ind.) -	604		
Miller v. Mendenhall (Minn.)	89 428	(U. S. C. C. Or.) Osage, McConnell v. (Iowa)	700
v. Ottaway (Mich.) Exr., v. Shields (Ind.)	406	Smith v. (Iowa)	778 633
Missouri v. Hope (100 Mo. 347)	608	Ottaway, Miller v. (Mich.)	428
v. McGonigle	735	•	-
Missouri P. R. Co., Kellny v. (Mo.)	783	n	
v. Sbaritt (43 Kan. 375) v. Whipker (77 Tex. 14)	385 321 :	P.	
Mittel v. Karl (III.)	655	Palmer v. State (88 Tenn. 553)	280
Montana, Rotwitt, v. Hickman	403	Peabody, People ex rel., v. Chicago Gas	
Montana U. R. Co. v. Langlois (Mont.) -	753	Trust Co. (130 III. 268)	497
Montgomery County Comrs. v. Ristine	401	Peace v. Ritchie (Ill.)	566
(Ind.) Moore v. Francis (N. Y.)	$\frac{461}{214}$	Peel v. Atlanta (Ga.) Peelle, State, Worrel, v. (Ind.)	787 228
Moran, Flaherty v. (Mich.)	183	Pembroke Iron Works, Charlotte v. (Me.)	
Morasse v. Brochu (Mass.)	524	Pendergast v. Yandes (Ind.)	849
Mora y Ledon v. Havemeyer (N. Y.) -	245	Pennypacker v. Capital Ins. Co. (Iowa) -	236
Morris, People v. (Mich.)	685	People v. Foss (Mich.) -	472
Moses v. Southern P. R. Co. (Or.) Mosseller v. Deaver (106 N. C. 494)	135 537	Hronek v. (Ill.) v. Morris (Mich.)	837 685
Moton v. Hull (77 Tex. 80)	722	v. Remington (N. Y.)	458
Munger, Terry v. (N. Y.)	216	Peabody, v. Chicago Gas Trust Co.	
Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Common-		(130 III, 268)	497
wealth of Mass. (Mass.)	399	People's Bank of New Orleans, West v.	mar
Murphy, Lawler v. (Conn.) Murray v. Murray (Ky.)	113 95	(Miss.) Phelan v. Brady (119 N. Y. 587)	727 211
Musical Mutual Protective Union,	•	Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Ander-	~**
Thomas v. (N. Y.)	175	son (Md.)	673
Myll, Kern v. (Mich.)	682	Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co., New-	
		man v. (N. J.) Phœnix Nat. Bank v. Batcheller (Mass.)	842 644
N.		Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Shields	044
		(47 Ohio St. —) -	464
Nashville, Alloway v. (Tenn.)	123		414
National Tube Works Co., Freeman's Nat. Bank v. (Mass.)	42	Processor Superportille (C)	39
	4.		854
		Price v. (lonway (Pa)	
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403)	637	Price v. Conway (Pa.)	193
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.)	637	Price v. Conway (Pa.)	
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.)	637 283 687	Price v. Conway (Pa.)	
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.)	637 283 687 752	R.	
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.)	637 283 687 752 440	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., c. Chap-	193
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.)	637 283 687 752	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.)	
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.)	637 283 687 752 440	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. How-	193 508 494
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co.	637 283 687 752 440 697	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., c. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., c. Howard (Ind.)	193 508
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable	508 494 593
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citzens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.)	193 508 494
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 614	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings	508 494 593 539 248
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373)	508 494 593 539
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 614 458	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhour v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex.	508 494 593 539 248 180
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 614	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337)	508 494 593 539 248
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 614 458 224 719 637	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.)	508 494 593 539 248 180
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 614 458 224 719 637 297	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 458 614 458 224 719 637 297 259	R. Rallroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 614 458 224 719 637 229 529	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 458 614 458 224 719 637 297 259	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 614 458 224 719 637 259 529 516 283	R. Rallroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427 412
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 224 719 637 259 529 516	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427 412 253
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 614 458 224 719 637 259 529 516 283	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.)	508 494 593 539 248 180 823 539 330 636 427 412 253 173
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 614 458 224 719 637 259 529 516 283	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Midland, v. Fisher (Ind.)	508 494 593 5248 180 323 539 636 427 412 253 173 604
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.) Nye, Lembeck v. (Ohio)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 458 224 719 637 297 227 259 516 283 578	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Midland, v. Fisher (Ind.) Missouri P., Kellny v. (Mo.) v. Sharitt (43 Kan. 375)	508 494 593 539 248 180 823 539 330 636 427 412 253 173
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.) Nye, Lembeck v. (Ohio)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 614 458 224 719 637 259 529 516 283	R. Rallroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Midland, v. Fisher (Ind.) Missouri P., Kellny v. (Mo.) v. Sharitt (43 Kan. 375) v. Whipker (77 Tex. 14)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427 412 253 173 604 783 385 385 321
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N. Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.) Nye, Lembeck v. (Ohio) O. O'Donnell v. Glenn (Mont.)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 458 224 719 637 297 227 259 516 283 578	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Midland, v. Fisher (Ind.) Missouri P., Kellny v. (Mo.) v. Sharitt (43 Kan. 375) v. Whipker (77 Tex. 14) Montana U., v. Langlois (Mont.)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427 412 253 173 604 778 385
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York, C. & H. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.) Nye, Lembeck v. (Ohio) O'Donnell v. Glenn (Mont.) Ohio, Attorney-General, v. Western Union Mutual L. & A. Soc. (47 Ohio	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 224 2719 637 259 516 283 578	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Midland, v. Fisher (Ind.) Missouri P., Kellny v. (Mo.) v. Sharitt (43 Kan. 375) v. Whipker (77 Tex. 14) Montana U., v. Langlois (Mont.) New York C. & H. R., Dwinelle v.	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427 412 253 173 604 783 385 321 753
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York C. & H. R. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.) Nye, Lembeck v. (Ohio) O. O'Donnell v. Glenn (Mont.) Ohio, Attorney-General, v. Western Union Mutual L. & A. Soc. (47 Ohio St. —) Opinion of the Justices (150 Mass. 392)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 224 719 637 297 297 529 516 283 578	R. Railroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street, Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Midland, v. Fisher (Ind.) Missouri P., Kellny v. (Mo.) v. Sharitt (43 Kan. 375) v. Whipker (77 Tex. 14) Montana U., v. Langlois (Mont.)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427 412 253 173 604 783 385 385 321
Naugatuck Water Co. v. Nichols (58 Conn. 403) Nelson County, State, Goodwin v. (N. D.) New, Amaker v. (S. C.) New Britain, Gaylord v. (Conn.) Newell v. Meyendorff (Mont.) New Jersey, Leeds, v. Atlantic City Newman v. Phillipsburgh Horse Car R. Co. (N. J.) Newport v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.) Newport & C. Bridge Co., Newport v. (Ky.) New Vienna Bank v. Johnson (47 Ohio St. —) New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York, People of, v. Remington New York, C. & H. R. Co., Dwinelle v. (N Y.) Niagara F. Ins. Co., Lipman v. (N. Y.) Nichols, Naugatuck Water Co. v. (Conn.) North Carolina v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722) v. Eaves v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796) v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) North Dakota, Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.) Nye, Lembeck v. (Ohio) O. O'Donnell v. Glenn (Mont.) Ohio, Attorney-General, v. Western Union Mutual L. & A. Soc. (47 Ohio St. —) Opinion of the Justices (150 Mass. 392)	637 283 687 752 440 697 842 484 484 458 224 719 637 259 516 283 578	Rallroad Co., Chicago & N. W., v. Chapman (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Chicago City, v. Wilcox (Ill.) Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C., v. Howard (Ind.) Citizens Street. Indianapolis Cable Street R. Co. v. (Ind.) Delhi & M., Calhoun v. (N. Y.) Fort Worth & R. G., v. Jennings (76 Tex. 373) Gulf, C. & S. F., v. Levi (76 Tex. 337) Indianapolis Cable Street, v. Citizens Street R. Co. (Ind.) Lake Erie & W., v. Scott (Ill.) Louisville, N. A. & C., v. Corps (Ind.) Maine C., Sullivan v. (Me.) Memphis & C., Carson v. (Tenn.) Metropolitan Elev., v. Kneeland (120 N. Y. 134) Tallman v. (N. Y.) Midland, v. Fisher (Ind.) Missouri P., Kellny v. (Mo.) v. Sharitt (43 Kan. 375) v. Whipker (77 Tex. 14) Montana U., v. Langlois (Mont.) New York C. & H. R., Dwinelle v. (N. Y.)	508 494 593 539 248 180 323 539 330 636 427 412 253 173 604 783 385 321 753

Railroad Co., Philadelphia, W. & B., v.		Stanley v. Stanley (47 Ohio St) -	833
Anderson (Md.) Phillipsburgh Horse Car, Newman	673	v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. (100 Mo. 435)	549
v. (N. J.)	842	Staples, Manley's Estate v. (VL.)	707
Pittsburgh, C. & St. L., v. Shields (47 Ohio St. —) -	464	State, Aszman v. (Ind.) Ballock v. (Md.)	33 671
Richmond & D., Bain v. (N. C.)	299	v. Boe (Iowa)	767
Cooper v. (U. S. C. C. Ga.) Rome, W. & O., Tobes v. (N. Y.)	366 453	v. Conery (Iowa) v. Dowell (106 N. C. 722)	767 297
St. Louis, I. M. & S., v. Ramsey		v. Eaves (106 N. C. 752)	259
(Ark.) St. Paul & D., Johnson v. (Minn.)	559 419	v. Hope (100 Mo. 347) v. Hunter (106 N. C. 796)	608 529
Southern P., Moses v. (Or.) -	135	v. Kahler (Iowa)	767
Wabash, St. L. & P., Stanley v.	549	v. Kaiser (Or.) v. McGonigle (Mo.)	584 735
Ramsey, St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.		Palmer v. (Tenn.)	280
(Ark.)	559 617	v. Robbins (Ind.) Singer v. (Md.)	438 551
Remington, People v. (N. Y.)	458	v. Smith (Kan.)	774
Rice v. Sanders (Mass.) - Richardson's Admr. v. German Ins. Co.	315	v. Steele (106 N. C. 766) v. Tanna (Iowa)	516 767
(Ky.)	800	v. Voss (Iowa)	767
Richmond & D. R. Co., Bain v. (N. C.) Cooper v. (U. S. C. C. Ga.)	299 366	Attorney-General, v. Western Union Mutual L. & A. Soc. (47 Ohio	
Rickenberg, Venable v. (Mass.) -	623	St)	129
Ristine, Admr., Montgomery County Comrs. v. (Ind.)	461	Goodwin, v. Nelson County (N. D.) Leeds, v. Atlantic City (N. J.)	283 697
Ritchie, McMullen v. (U. S. C. C. Ohio)	268	Rotwitt, v. Hickman (Mont.)	403
Robbins, Anderson v. (Me.)	566 568	Taylor, v. Warrick County Comrs.	607
Below v. (Wis.)	467	Worrel, v. Peelle (Ind.)	228
State v. (Ind.) Robinson, Re, (Neb.)	438 398	Steele, State v. (N. C.) Steinmeier, Tolchester Beach Imp. Co.	516
Rockford Ins. Co., Loomis v. (Wis.)	834	v. (Md.)	846
Roe, Doe v. (Me.) Rome, W. & O. R. Co., Fobes v. (N. Y.)	833 453	Stewart, Territory, ex rel. Kelly v. (Wash.) Stogdale, Logan v. (Ind.)	106 58
Rotwitt, State, ex rel., v. Hickman (Mont.)	403	Stone v. Hammell (83 Cal. 547)	425
Rowell v. Vershire (Vt.)	708	Strange's Exr., Davis v. (Va.) Sullivan v. Maine C. R. Co. (82 Me. 196)	261 427
8		Summerville v. Pressley (S. C.)	854
S.		Sun Ins. Co., Case v. (Cal.) Supreme Lodge of K. of H., Johnson v.	48
Sanders, Rice v. (Mass.)	315	(Ark.)	732
Sanford v. Kane (Ill.) Savannah v. Weed (Ga.)	724 270	Swift v. Topeka (43 Kan. 671) Symonds v. Jones (82 Me. 302)	772 570
Schlich, Cedar Springs v. (Mich.)	851		
Schloeter v. Fisher (37 Mo. App. 352) Scott, Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. (III.)	147 330	<u>_</u>	
Shallcross, Frieszleben v. (Del.)	337	Т.	
Sharitt, Missouri P. R. Co. v. (Kan.) Sharp, Harwell v. (Ga.)	385 514	Talamo v. Spitzmiller (120 N. Y. 37)	221
Sheean, Exr., Pond v. (Ill.) Shields, Miller v. (Ind.)	414 406	Tallman v. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co.	173
Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. 2.	461	(N. Y.) Tanna, State v. (Iowa)	767
St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., Belcher's Sugar Ref. Co. v. (Mo.)	801	Taylor, Western Union Teleg. Co. v. (Ga.)	189
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Ramsey		Comrs. (Ind.)	607
St. Paul & D. R. Co., Johnson v. (Minn.)	559 419	Telegraph Co., Western Union, v. Tay- lor (Ga.)	189
Duultz v, Wall (Pa.)	97	v. Williams (Va.)	429
Silver, Carleton Mills Co. v. (Me.) Singer v. State (Md.)	446 551	Tennessee, Palmer v. Territorial Insane Asylum v. Wolfley	280
DKINDER v. Henderson (Fla.)	55	(Ariz.)	188
Smith v. Kanawha County Court (33 W. Va. 713)	82	Territory, ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart (Wash.) Terry v. Munger (N. Y.)	$\begin{array}{c} 106 \\ 216 \end{array}$
v. Osage (Iowa)	633	Thomas v. Musical Mutual Protective	
v. Smith (Ga.) State v. (Kan.)	$\begin{array}{c} 362 \\ 774 \end{array}$	Union (N. Y.) Tipton, Re, (28 Tex. App. 438)	$\begin{array}{c} 175 \\ 326 \end{array}$
Snell v. Chicago (Ill.) Southern P. R. Co., Moses v. (Or.)			
A TOUR I . IV. CO., MIOSES T. (UT.)	858	Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Steinmeier	010
Spazminer, Talamo v (N. Y.)	858 135 221	(Md.) - Topeka, Swift v. (Kan.)	$\begin{array}{c} 846 \\ 772 \end{array}$
Springer, Merrell v. (Ind.)	135 221 61	(Md.) Topeka, Swift v. (Kan.) Townsend, Gore v. (N. C.)	772 443
Springer, Merrell v. (Ind.)	135 221 61	(Md.) Topeka, Swift v. (Kan.)	772

(N. D.) Tyler v. Waddingham (58 Conn. 375) U. Union League, Commonwealth of Pa., Burt, v. (Pa.) Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) Vershire. Rowell v. (Vt.) Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) Weller v. McCormick (N. J.) West v. People's Bank of New Orleans (Miss.) v. Western Union Mutual L. & A. Soc., State, Attorney-General, v. (Ohio) Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Taylor (Ga.) Western Union Teleg. Co. v. (Tex.) Williams (Va.) Vershire, Missouri P. R. Co. v. (Tex.) Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Western Union Teleg. Co. v. (Va.) Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Williams, Vought v. (Mass.) Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Williams, Vought v. (Misch.) Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Williams, Vought
Tyler v. Waddingham (58 Conn. 375) U. Union League, Commonwealth of Pa., Burt, v. (Pa.) V. Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) Vershire, Rowell v. (Vt.) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Voss, Voss, Voss, Vastin v. (Ind.) Villiams, Vos, Vastin v. (Ind.) Villiams, Vos, Vastin v. (Ind.) Villiams, Vos, Vastin v. (Ind.) Villiams, Voss, Vastin v. (Ind.) Villiams, Vos, Vastin v. (Ind.) V
U. Western Union Mutual L. & A. Soc., State, Attorney-General, v. (Ohio) 129
U. Western Union Mutual L. & A. Soc., State, Attorney-General, v. (Ohio) 129
Attorney-General, v. (Ohio) 129
Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Taylor (Ga.) 189 v. Williams (Va.) 429 Wheat v. Dingle (32 S. C. 473) - 375 Whipker, Missouri P. R. Co. v. (Tex.) 321 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ind.) 63 Willard v. Finnegan (Minn.) - 591 Western Union Teleg. Co. v. (Va.) 429 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 50 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) - 591 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 50 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) - 591 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 50 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) - 591 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 50 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) - 591 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 50 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) - 591 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) - 50 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) - 591 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) - 591 Wilcox, Chicago
Commonwealth of Pa., Burt, v. (Pa.)
Burt, v. (Pa.) Burt, v. (Pa.) Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) Venable v. Rickenberg (Mass.) Vershire, Rowell v. (Vt.) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. (Mo.) Wheat v. Dingle (32 S. C. 473) Whisker, Missouri P. R. Co. v. (Tex.) Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (Ill.) Wilcox, Silver Plate Co., Catlin v. (Ind.) Willard v. Finnegan (Minn.) Western Union Teleg. Co. v. (Va.) Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) Windram v. French (Mass.) Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) Wolfev, Bauereis (Md.) Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Whipker, Missouri P. R. Co. v. (Tex.) 321 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (III.) 494 Wilcox, Chicago City R. Co. v. (III.) 494 Wilcox, Silver Plate Co., Catlin v. (Ind.) 623 Willard v. Finnegan (Minn.) 50 Willard v. Finnegan (Minn.) 50 Willams, Vought v. (N. Y.) 591 Western Union Teleg. Co. v. (Va.) 429 Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) 309 Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) 822 Windram v. French (Mass.) 750 Windram v. French (Mass.) 750 Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) 365 Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) 690 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 680 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 680 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 680 Wolf v. Farritorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) 277 Venable v. Rickenberg (Mass.) 623 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) 591 Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) 591 Williams (120 N. Y. 253) 591 Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) 39 Williams, Vought v. (Mich.) 362 Williams (120 N. Y. 253) 591 Williams (120 N. Y. 253) 591 Williams (120 N. Y. 253) 591 Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) 822 Windram v. French (Mass.) 750 Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) 365 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 690 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 680 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 680 Wolf v. Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
V. Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) Venable v. Rickenberg (Mass.) Vershire. Rowell v. (Vt.) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Villoax Silver Plate Co., Catlin v. (Ind.) Willard v. Finnegan (Minn.) Villiams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Villiams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (Misson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Villiams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Villiams, Vough
Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) Venable v. Rickenberg (Mass.) Vershire, Rowell v. (Vt.) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) W. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. (Mo.) Willard v. Finnegan (Minn.) Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Vinchester, Cook v. (Mich.) Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) Windram v. French (Mass.) Vitty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) Wolfey, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Vannest v. Fleming (79 Iowa, 638) Venable v. Rickenberg (Mass.) Vershire, Rowell v. (Vt.) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) W. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. (Mo.) Williams, Vought v. (N. Y.) Western Union Teleg. Co. v. (Va.) Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) Alarm Co. (Mass.) Vindram v. French (Mass.) Windram v. French (Mass.) Windram v. French (Mass.) Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) Wolft v. Bauereis (Md.) Wolff v. Bauereis (Md.) Wolffey, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Venable v. Rickenberg (Mass.) 623 Vershire, Rowell v. (Vt.) 708 Voss, State v. (Iowa) 767 Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) 591 Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) 39 Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) 822 Windram v. French (Mass.) 750 Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) 365 Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) 691 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 680 Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Vershire, Rowell v. (Vt.) Voss, State v. (Iowa) Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) W. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. (Mo.) Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co. (Mass.) — 309 Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) Windram v. French (Mass.) — 750 Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) — 365 Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) — 691 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) — 680 Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) — 188
Voss, State v. (Iowa) Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) W. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. (Mo.) Volid v. Bauereis (Md.) Volid v. Bauereis (Md.) Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) Alarm Co. (Mass.) Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.)
Vought v. Williams (120 N. Y. 253) 591 Winchester, Cook v. (Mich.) 522 Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) 39 Windram v. French (Mass.) 550 W. Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) 691 Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) 680 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) 680 Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 649
Vroman v. Powers (47 Ohio St. —) Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. (Mo.) Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Witty v. Michigan Mutual L. Ins. Co. (Ind.) - 365 Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) - 691 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) - 680 Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Mo.) - 549 (Ariz.) - 188
W. Wolcott v. Ashenfelter (N. M.) - 691 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) - 680 Wolfey, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) - 188
Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. (Mo.) 549 Wolcott v. Ashénfelter (N. M.) - 691 Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) - 680 Wolffley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. Wolf v. Bauereis (Md.) - 680 Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Ariz.) 188
Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., Stanley v. Wolfley, Territorial Insane Asylum v. (Mo.) 549 (Ariz.) 188
(Mo.) 549 (Ariz.) 188
(Mo.) 549 (Ariz.) 188
Waddingham, Tyler v. (Conn.) - 657 Wood, James v. (Me.) - 448
Walker, Hanley v. (Mich.) - 207 Worrel, State ex rel., v. Peelle (Ind.) 228
Wall, Shultz v. (Pa.) - 97 Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Johnson (Ga.) 273
Wallace v. Evans (43 Kan. 509) - 52 Wuchner, Killmer v. (Iowa) - 289
Warrick County Comrs., State, Taylor
v. (Ind.) 607
Washington, Kelly, v. Stewart, - 106 Y.
Watson, Leake v. (Conn.) 666
Weed, Savannah v. (Ga.) 270 Yandes, Receiver, Pendergast v. (Ind.) 849
et. P a

IN OPINIONS OF THE JUDGES CONTAINED IN THIS BOOK.

A	Arnold v. Arnold, 20 Iowa, 275
4.	v. Danziger, 30 Fed. Rep. 898 718
Abbott v. Blossom, 66 Barb. 353 219	v. Delano, 4 Cush, 33, 38, 39 157, 158, 160
v. Peck, 35 Minn. 499 51	v. Elmore, 16 Wis. 510
	v. Engleman, 1 West. Rep. 482, 103 Ind.
Accommodation Loan & S. F. Asso. v. Stone-	t. Engleman, 1 West. Rep. 423, 103 1103. 512
metz, 29 Pa. 534. 256	v. Jacks, 24 Pa. 57
2201011 01 2500103 172 1201 002-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-	Arnolt v. Hartwig, 75 Mo. 486
Adams v. Bean, 12 Mass. 137	a Thingis C P Co 23 Th 273
v. Gav. 19 Vt. 358 665	771 779
v. McGlinchy, 66 Me. 474 449	Arundel v. M'Culloch, 10 Mass, 70 831
v. Merchants Nat. Bank. 2 Fed. Rep. 174.	Arundel v. M'Culloch, 10 Mass, 70. 831 Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym, 958. 423, 423 Ashcroft v. Walworth, 1 Hoimes, C. C. 152. 310, 314
9 Biss, 396	Ashcroft v. Walworth, 1 Holmes, C. C. 152310, 314
v. Scott, 7 Week. Rep. 213 555	Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S 129 (32 L. ed. 368) 243
9 Biss. 398. 152, 153 v. Scott. 7 Week. Rep. 213 555 v. Smith, 35 Me. 324 429 v. State, 52 Ga. 565 685 Adams County v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 38 Hows 50	ASDISTIC COUNTY T. MICHISTIC COUNTY INHIBITY.
v. State, 52 Ga. 565	7 Onto St. (1
Adams County v. Burnington & M. R. R. Co.,	Ashley v. Pease, 18 Pick. 268, 275. 447 Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 362
	v. LaCygne Exch. Bank, 83 Mo. 366 64
Adams Exp. Co. v. Stettaners, 61 Ill. 184	v. LaCygne Exch. Bank, 83 Mo. 366
" Tankson 16 D 31on 919	19 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 539, note 139
Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126, 130 (26 L. ed. 942, 943) 310, 311, 313, 314 Aiken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 130 Pa. 380 597 Aikin v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 504 525, 826 Alba v. Moriarty, 39 La. Ann. 680 412 Albin v. Stop 63 Lyd. 500	Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. V. 35, 13 Am.
943)	Rep. 556.
Aiken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 130 Pa. 380 597	v. Leavitt, 50 Barb, 135 606
Aikin v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 504 825, 826	Atkinson v. New castle & G.W. Co., L. R. 2 Exch.
Alba v. Moriarty, 39 La. Ann. 680 412	Div. 441
	Atty-Gen. v. Bay Co., 34 Mich. 46. 57 v. Boston Municipal Court, 103 Mass. 456. 439 v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425. 289 v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400. 229 v. Matyoroliya R. Co., 195 Mass. 515. 435
Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray, 99 452 Alden v. Johnson, 63 Iowa, 127 697	v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 35 Wis. 425 289
Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray, 99 452 Alden v. Johnson, 63 Iowa, 127 697 Alexander v. Tolleston Club, 110 Ill. 65 559 Alexander v. Tolleston Club, 110 Ill. 65 559	v. Fau Claire, 37 Wis. 400
Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick, 51. 411	v. Metropolitan R. Co., 125 Mass. 515 435 Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 5t0 166
Allegany Oil Co. v. Bradford Oil Co., 21 Hun, 26,	Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 5t0 166
86 N. Y. 638 : 763 :	Audunon County v. American Emigrant Co.,
Allegheny v. Ohio & P. R. Co., 26 Pa. 355 548, 549 Allen v. Codman, 139 Mass. 136 48	40 Iowa, 460. 658 Augusta Bank v. Earle, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 519 (10
Allen v. Codman, 139 Mass. 136. 48	Augusta Bank v. Earle, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 519 (10
v. Danielson, 4 New Eng. Rep. 106, 15 R.	14 (04 214)
1. 450 461	Austin v. Bremer County, 44 Iowa, 155 636 Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & El. 2 527
m Kinyon 41 Mich 981 187	Ayrey v. Fearnsides, 4 Mees. & W. 168
v. McKibbin, 5 Mich, 454 209, 210	Ayley b. Pearmades, Threes. at W. 100
v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 454 209, 210 v. Maine C. R. Co. (Me.) 19 Atl. Rep. 105 547	_
v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 454	В.
I. 480 461 v. Jay, 60 Me. 124 287 v. Kinyon, 41 Mich. 281 187 v. Mckibbin, 5 Mich. 454 209, 210 v. Maine C. R. Co. Me.) 19 Atl. Rep. 105 597 v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374 399 v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485 489	В.
v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 454 209, 210 v. Maine C. R. Co. Me.) 19 Atl. Rep. 105 597 v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374 399 v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485 489 Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141 42	В.
v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 454 209, 210 v. Maine C. R. Co. (Me.) 19 All. Rep. 105. 597 v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 574 399 v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485 489 Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141 42 Alyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77 597	В.
v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 454 299, 210 v. Maine C. R. Co. (Mc.) 19 All. Rep. 105. 597 v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374 399 v. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485 489 Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141 42 Alya v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335 227 Althory F. Corlos J. W. W. 335 327 Althory F. W. W. W. W. W. W. W. W. W. W. W. W. W.	В.
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West, Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244 151, 157 Bagby v. Atlantic, M. & O. R. Co., 86 Pa. 291 64 Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422 37 Baird v. New York, 96 N. Y. 567 112 Baker v. Baker, 16 Abb. N. C. 203 423
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allson v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. V. 355. 227 Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 397	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Alyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355. 327 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355. 327 v. Rittershofter, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell. 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Sav. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatban, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 78, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis, 36. 77, 78	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244 151, 157 Bagby v. Atlantic, M. & O. R. Co., 86 Pa. 291 64 Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422 37 Baird v. New York, 96 N. Y. 567 112 Baker v. Baker, 16 Abb. N. C. 293 423 v. Palmer, 83 III. 568. 270 Ralcom v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 21 Iowa, 103 141 Baldey v. Parker, 2 Bern. & C. 37, 44 158 Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 234 (17 L. ed. 534) 646 v. Hale, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 223, 231, 233 (17 L. ed. 531, 533, 534) 123, 231 (17 L. ed. 531, 533, 534) 645, 646 Balley v. Homestead F. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 21, 23 81 Ball v. Homestead F. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 21, 23 81
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244 151, 157 Bagby v. Atlantic, M. & O. R. Co., 86 Pa. 291 64 Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422 37 Baird v. New York, 96 N. Y. 567 112 Baker v. Baker, 16 Abb. N. C. 293 423 v. Palmer, 83 III. 568. 270 Ralcom v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 21 Iowa, 103 141 Baldey v. Parker, 2 Bern. & C. 37, 44 158 Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 234 (17 L. ed. 534) 646 v. Hale, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 223, 231, 233 (17 L. ed. 531, 533, 534) 123, 231 (17 L. ed. 531, 533, 534) 645, 646 Balley v. Homestead F. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 21, 23 81 Ball v. Homestead F. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 21, 23 81
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244 151, 157 Bagby v. Atlantic, M. & O. R. Co., 86 Pa. 291 64 Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422 37 Baird v. New York, 96 N. Y. 567 112 Baker v. Baker, 16 Abb. N. C. 293 423 v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 588. 23 balcom v. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 21 Iowa, 103 141 Baldey v. Parker, 2 Barn. & C. 37, 44 158 Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 234 (17 L. ed. 534) 646 v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678 (20 L. ed. 766) 60 v. Hale, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 223, 231, 223 (17 L. ed. 534) 645, 646 Baley v. Homestead F. Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 21, 23 81 Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jr. 191 564 Ballinger v. Bourland, 87 Ill. 513 725 Baltimore v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 6 Gill. 288, 48 Am. Dec. 531 234 v. Gill, 31 Md. 373-394 24 v. Green Mountain Cemetery Co., 7 Md.
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. 422 Allyn v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. 597 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 227 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 335. 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. 287 Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Say. Bank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatham, 11 Kan. 533, 549. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 489. 77	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244
Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141. Allya v. Boston & A. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355. Altman v. Fowler, 14 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 77, 70 Mich. 57. 306, 397 v. Rittershofer, 12 West. Rep. 581, 68 Mich. Almond v. Almond, 4 Rand. (Va.) 662. 564 Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones, Eq. 51. 300 Alvis v. Oglesby, 87 Tenn. 172. 484 Alvord v. Syracuse Sav. Hank, 98 N. Y. 599. 252 American Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanatban, 11 Kan. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36. 77, 78 v. Green, 57 Ga. 469. 76, 808 American L. Ins. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51 (25) L. ed. 993. Amsinck v. New Eugland Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Mass. 185, 186. Amy v. Manning, 38 Fed. Rep. 536. 367 Anderson v. Buchanan, 8 Ind. 132. 60 v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506 v. Simpson, 21 Iowa, 339. 250 v. Simpson, 21 Iowa, 339. 250 Andover v. Sutton, 12 Met. 182. 838 Andrews v. Durant, 18 N. Y. 496. v. Pond, 88 U. S. 18 Pet. 77 (10 L. ed. 66). 770 Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav, 551. Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav, 551. Arlington v. Lyons, 131 Mass, 328. 464	B. Babcock v. Bonnell, 80 N. Y. 244

Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 26 U. S. 1 Pet.	Birmingham & P. M. St. R. Co. v. Birmingham	
25 (7 L. ed. 37)	St. R. Co., 79 Ala. 465 548, Bishop v. Howard, 2 Barn, & C. 100 548,	544
Barber v. Reynolds, 33 Cal. 501	Bissell v. Taylor, 41 Mich. 702	445
658 50	Black and White Smiths Society v. Vandyke,	77
Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Cogreve (La.) 5 So.		202
Pon 818 974	Blackman v. Halves, 72 Ind. 515 Blackstock v. New York & E. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48 Blades Higgs 11 H J. Cos. 620	6
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (28 L. ed. 923) 551	Blackstock v. New York & E. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48	32
Barker v. Midland R. Co., 18 C. B. 46	Blaine v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 9 W. Va. 253	450
v. People, 3 Cow. 686	Blaine v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 9 W. Va. 253	141
v. Worcester, 139 Mass. 74. 428	l Blakas National Pity Bank Of II S 92 Wall	
Barker v. Midand R. Co., 18 C. B. 49. 439 v. People, 3 Cow. 686. 687 v. Worcester, 139 Mass. 74. 238 Barley v. Walford, 9 Q. B. 197. 527 Barlow r. Smith, 4 Vt. 139 710 v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88 Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 456, 58 N. Y. 73 163 Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 456, 58 N. Y. 73 422	307 (23 L ed. 119). v. Williams, 6 Pick, 286	368
Bariow v. Smith, 4 Vt. 139	v. Williams, 6 Pick, 286	391
v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88	Blanchard v. Bissell, II Ohio St. 96	110
Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 456, 58 N. Y. 73 165	v. Porter, 11 Ohio, 138, 142 581, Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641.	500
	Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641	627
Barnett v. Harshbarger, 3 West. Rep. 750, 105	Bliss v. Johnson, 73 N. Y. 529	711
Ind. 410 408, 796 Barney v. Keckuk, 4 Dill. 593, 94 U. S. 324, 325 328 (24 L. ed. 224, 228) 435, 501, 804		606 501
298 /94 L. od 924 298) 425 581 804	Bloomfield & R. N. Gas-Light Co. v. Calkins, 62	581
v. Oyster Bay & H. S. B. Co., 67 N. Y. 302	N. Y. 186, 1 Thomp. & C. 549	603
522, 523		603
Barrett v. Brooks, 21 Iowa, 144 57 v. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107 159, 160 Barroilhet v. Battelle, 7 Cal. 450 615	Bloomfield R. Co. v. Grace, 11 West, Rep. 368,	-
v. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107 159, 160	112 Ind. 128	605
Barroilhet v. Battelle, 7 Cal. 450 615		600
Barrus c, Kirkland, 8 Gray, 512	Blooming Valley, Borough of, 56 Pa. 66	102
Barry v. Abbott, 100 Mass. 396 309	Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 Barn. & C. 941, 948. 157, Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 Barn. & C. 232.	159
Barter v. Com., 3 Penr. & W. 253	Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 Barn. & C. 232	60
Bartholomew v. Bentley, 15 Ohio, 659	Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett, 107 III. 507,	
v. Weed, 127 Mass. 210 309	508433, 436,	603
Bartlett v. Fireman's F. Ins. Co., 77 Iowa, 155 78	Boatman's Sav. Inst. v. Holland, 38 Mo. 49. 167,	Too
Barton v. State, 67 Ga. 653		209
Bass v. Doerman, 112 Ind. 390 851 Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543 425	Boggett v. Frier, 11 East, 302	681
Bassett T. Bassett, 20 111 App. 343	Bolling v. Petersburg, 3 Rand. (Va.) 563	405
v. Bassett, 55 Barb. 505 336 v. Inman, 7 Colo. 270 794	431, 432, 434, 436, Bolt v. Rogers, 3 Paige, 154, 3 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 95	510
v. Bassett, 55 Barto 505 336 v. Inman, 7 Colo, 270 794 Basshor r. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 2 Cent. Rep.	Rond a Honking 1 Sch & Lef 413	48
	w Wiltse 12 Wis 612	42
Batchelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 414	Bonham v. Bishop, 23 S. C. 105	690
R9168. R6. H8 HL 524 461	Boone Co. v. State, 61 Ind. 379	231
Bates v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 60 Wis. 296,		157
304. 300	Booth r. Clark, 58 U. S. 17 How. 322 (15 L. ed.	
Bates v. New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co., 4 Abb.	161)	64
Pr. 72 387	v. Hubbard, 8 Ohio St. 247	581
Battle v. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234, 44 Am. Dec. 438,		19;
note, 441 373 Baughman v. Baughman, 29 Kan. 284 386	Boscowitz v. Adams Exp. Co., 93 III. 523	510
Baughman v. Baughman, 29 Kan. 284 386	Boston & W.R. Corp. v. Ripley, 15 Alien, 421	509
Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. Ch. 64.	Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Boston Rubber Co.,	32
Bayard, Re, 25 Hun, 546	149 Mass. 436. Boulware v. Robinson, 8 Tex. 327, 58 Am. Dec.	er.
Bayles r. Houghton, 15 Vt. 626 386, 387	117	420
Baxter v. Baxter, 122 Mass. 87 745	Bowe's Case, Aleyn, 4	569
Baxter v. Baxter, 122 Mass. 87 745 Beadell r. Eastern Counties R. Co., 2 C. B. N.S.	Rowen v Book Of N V 98	600
509 759	v. Hall, L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 333 v. State, 10 Cent. Rep. 517, 108 N. Y. 166. Bowery Nat. Bank v. New York, 63 N. Y. 336	4:2
Beal v. St. Croix County Supers., 13 Wis. 501., 782	v. State, 10 Cent. Rep. 517, 108 N. Y. 166	402
Beals v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 405	Bowery Nat. Bank v. New York, 63 N. Y. 336	$\frac{592}{247}$
Beam v. Macomber, 35 Mich. 457	Bowes v. Shand, L. R. 2 App. Cas. 455 Bowman v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 40 Md. 620	247
Beaman v. Whitney, 20 Me. 413 616	Bowman r. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 40 Md. 620	83
Bean v. Parker, 11 Mass. 391	v. Troy & B. R. Co., 37 Barb, 519	140
Beardsleer, French, 7 Conn. 125		4
Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa, 109 280 Beck v. Searson, 8 Rich. Eq. 132 691	Dowd m State St Ale 180	763
Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. Jr. 98.	Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169 Boyland v. State, 69 Md. 512 Boylston v. Bain, 90 III. 283 Bracken County Comes. Sinking Fund v.	250
	Boylston v. Bain 90 III 283	672 723
Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309 412	Bracken County Comes, Sinking Fund v.	•••
Beggs v. State, 55 Ala. 108. 362		738
Beitenman's App., 55 Pa. 183. 665	Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198,	581
Helanger v. Hersey, 90 111. 73 442	v. State, 31 Ind. 494	37
Bell v. Foutch, 21 Iowa, 119 57	Bradley v. Rice, 13 Me. 198. v. State, 31 Ind. 494 Brady v. Colhoun, 1 Penr. & W. 140. Brainard v. Reavis, 2 Mo. App. 490, 493	661
v. Lamprey, 57 N. H. 168	Brainard v. Heavis, Z Mo. App. 490, 493	167
t. Leggett, 7 N. Y. 176. 506		914
v. New York, 7 Cent. Rep. 286, 105 N. Y. 144 717 Benedict v. Schaettle, 12 Ohio St. 515, 521 157	Bratt v. Lamson, 2 Allen, 275 Bravard v. Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co., 14 West.	280
v. Thompson, 33 La. Ann. 196	Rep \$17 115 Ind 1	604
v. Thompson, 33 La. Ann. 196. 679 Beneficial Asso. of Brotherly Unity, 38 Pa. 299 201	Rep. 817, 115 Ind. 1 Braythwayte v. Hitchcock, 10 Mees. & W. 494	9-20
Benkert r. Jacoby, 36 Iowa, 273 697	Brazil Block & C. Co. v. Young, 117 Ind. 520	2::3 637
Benner v. Platter, 6 Ohio, 505, 508	Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 236	797
Bennett v. Bennett 6 L. R. A. 555, 116 N. Y. 584.	Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 523 Breiman v. Paasch, 7 Abb. N. C. 249	60
affirming 41 Hun, 640	Breiman v. Paasch, 7 Abb. N. C. 249	423
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 19 Wis. 145 140	Brennan v. Gordon, 13 Daly, 208, 219	81
E. COOK, 43 N. Y. 531	Brettle v. Williams, 4 Exch. 6:3 Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me, 62	679 353
v. Mattingly, 7 West. Rep. 912, 9 West.	Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62	353
Rep. 282, 110 Ind. 199		
Donoict a Marmin 47 Mo 507	Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 36	
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537.	Conn. 255	374
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 226. 717	Conn. 255 Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627, and Wilmot's	
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 228. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Benois v. Taylor 5 Hill 577 584	Conn. 255 Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627, and Wilmot's note, 61	267
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 228. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Benois v. Taylor 5 Hill 577 584	Conn. 255 Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627, and Wilmot's note, 61 Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 363.	267 774
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 228. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Benois v. Taylor 5 Hill 577 584	Conn. 255. Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627, and Wilmot's note, 61 Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 363. Brisendine v. Martin, 1 Ired. L. 236.	267 774 426
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 226. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584. 219 Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb, 199. 503 Bethell v. Moore, 2 Dev. & B. L. 316. 384 Betz. v. Daily. 3 N. Y. S. R. 309. 256	Conn. 255 Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 827, and Wilmot's note, 61 Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 363 Brisendine v. Martin, 1 Ired. L. 226. Bristow v. American, I., R. 3 App. Cas. 641, 652 Briton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 88 N. C. 556	267 774 426 580 523
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 226. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584. 219 Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb, 199. 503 Bethell v. Moore, 2 Dev. & B. L. 316. 384 Betz. v. Daily. 3 N. Y. S. R. 309. 256	Conn. 255 Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 827, and Wilmot's note, 61 Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 363 Brisendine v. Martin, 1 Ired. L. 226. Bristow v. American, I., R. 3 App. Cas. 641, 652 Briton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 88 N. C. 556	267 774 426 580 523
Benoist r. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton r. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 228. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Beriy v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584. 219 Berry r. Yates, 24 Barb, 199. 503 Bethell r. Moore, 2 Dev. & B. L. 316. 384 Betz r. Daily, 3 N. Y. S. R. 309. 256 Bigelow v. Cassedy, 26 N. J. Eq. 557. 555 r. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn, 555. 178	Conn. 255. Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627, and Wilmot's note, 61 Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 363. Bristow v. American, I., R. 3 App. Cas. 641, 652 Briston v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 88 N. C. 556 Broadway & L. Pt. F. Co. v. Hankey, 31 Md. 347 Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239	267 774 426 580 523
Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 228. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Berry v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584. 219 Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb. 199. 503 Bethell v. Moore, 2 Dev. & B. L. 316. 384 Betz v. Daily, 3 N. Y. S. R. 309. 256 Bigelow v. Cassedy, 26 N. J. Eq. 557. 555 v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 555 178 v. West Wisconsin R. Co., 27 Wis, 478. 774	Conn. 255. Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627, and Wilmot's note, 61 Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 363. Bristow v. American, I. Ired. L. 286. Bristow v. American, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 641, 652 Briton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 88 N. C. 536 Broadway & L. Pt. F. Co. v. Hankey. 31 Md. 347 Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239 Brodnay v. Ætna Ins. Co., 128 U. S. 236 (32 L. ed.	267 774 426 580 523 804 823
Benoist r. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton r. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 226. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Berly r. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584. 219 Berry r. Yates, 24 Barb, 199. 503 Bethell r. Moore, 2 Dev. & B. L. 316. 384 Betz r. Daily, 3 N. Y. S. R. 309. 256 Bigelow v. Cassedy, 26 N. J. Eq. 557. 557 r. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 555. 178 r. West Wisconsin R. Co., 27 Wis. 478. 774	Conn. 255. Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 827, and Wilmot's note, 61. Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 383. Brisendine v. Martin, 1 Ired. L. 286. Bristow v. American, I., R. 3 App. Cas. 641, 652 Briton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 88 N. C. 536 Broadway & L. Pt. F. Co. v. Hankey, 31 Md. 347 Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239 Brodnax v. Ætna Ins. Co., 128 U. S. 226 (32 L. ed.)	267 774 426 580 525 804 825
Benoist r. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. 445 Benton r. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 226. 717 Bergner v. Chicago R. Co., 13 Mo. App. 499. 153 Berly r. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584. 219 Berry r. Yates, 24 Barb, 199. 503 Bethell r. Moore, 2 Dev. & B. L. 316. 384 Betz r. Daily, 3 N. Y. S. R. 309. 256 Bigelow v. Cassedy, 26 N. J. Eq. 557. 557 r. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn. 555. 178 r. West Wisconsin R. Co., 27 Wis. 478. 774	Conn. 255. Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. &27, and Wilmot's note, 61 Briggs v. Lewiston & A. H. R. Co., 79 Me. 363. Briston in v. Martin, 1 Ired L. 286. Bristow v. American, I. R. 3 App. Cas. 641, 652 Briton v. Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 88 N. C. 536 Broadway & L. Pt. F. Co. v. Hankey, 31 Md. 347 Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms. 239 Brodnax v. Ætna Ins. Co., 128 U. S. 236 (32 L. ed. 445)	267 774 426 580 523 804 823

Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475 59. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co. v. New York Nat.	
	Callaway v. Johnson, 51 Mo. 33 442 Calloway v. Laydon, 47 Iowa, 456 423
Brookivh City & N. R. Co. v. New York Nat.	Calloway v. Laydon, 47 Iowa, 456 423
Bank of the Republic, 102 U. S. 14 (26	Calye's Case, 5 Coke, 32, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. *197,
L. ed. 61) 165, 160 Brooklyn Park Comrs. v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y.	note
Brooklyn Park Comrs. v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y.	
234	Cameron v. Little, 62 Me. 550
Brooks r. Burlington & S. W. R. Co., 101 U. S.	Campau v. Konan, 39 Mich. 362, 365
443 (25 L. ed. 1057)	v. North, 39 Mich. 606 781
v. Duffell, 23 Ga. 441	Campbell v. Beaumont, 91 N. Y. 465
Brookville & M. Hydraulie Co. v. Butler, 91	Camperon v. Little, 62 Me. 550. 563 Campau v. Konan, 39 Mich. 362, 365 475 v. North, 39 Mich. 606 781 Campbell v. Beaumont, 91 N. Y. 465 697 v. Bridwell, 5 Or. 312 142 Campion v. Kille, 14 N. J. Eq. 229 172 Campadigns Academy J. McKechnie 90 N. Y.
Ind. 136	Campion v. Kille, 14 N. J. Eq. 229 172
Broome n. New York & N. J. Teleph. Co., 5	Canandaigua Academy v. McKechnie, 90 N. Y.
Broome v. New York & N. J. Teleph. Co., 5 Cent. Rep. 814, 42 N. J. Eq. 141	81 618 692
Brown v. Brown, 103 N. C. 213 26 v. Byers, 16 Mees. & W. 252 67	
r. Byers, 16 Mees, & W. 252 67	Cannon, Re. 47 Mich. 481. 399
v. Catlettsburg, 11 Bush, 435	
t. Hamilton First Nat. Bank, 3 West. Rep.	Caraker v. Mathews, 25 Ga. 571
	Carey v. Smith. 11 Ga. 539 513
601, 44 Ohio St. 269 61. v. Howard, 2 Brod. & B. 73 31.	
c. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 8 Cent. Rep.	Carlos v. Fancourt, 5 T. R. 485
775, 65 Mich. 306. 78	Carothers v. Philadelphia Co., 11 Cent. Rep. 48,
r. People's Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Cush, 280. 83	118 Po. 468
775, 65 Mich. 306. 78 v. People's Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Cush. 280. 83 v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142. 76	Carpenter v. Soule, 88 N. Y. 251-256. 259 v. Wall, 4 Dev. & B. L. 144 381, 382
v. Ware. 25 Me. 411 44	m Well 4 Dev & R. I. 144 391 392
v. Ware, 25 Me. 411 Brown Chemical Co. v. Myer, 31 Fed. Rep. 453. 64	Come n. Lowery, 97 Do. 957
Browning r. Harris, 99 III, 456	
Browning v. Harris, 99 III. 456 81 Brua's App., 55 Pa. 294 27 Bruff v. Mali, 36 N. Y. 200, 205 55	Corson P. Harr /TI S. C. C. Mo.) S.L. P. 4. 614. 614.
Bruff v. Mali, 36 N. Y. 200, 205	Carson & R. L. Co. v. Holtzclaw, 39 Fed. Rep.
Buckhannon v. Com., 86 Kv. 110.	
Buffalo & N. Y. C. R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y.	Carter v. Howe Mach. Co., 51 Md. 298 847 Carton v. Climois C. R. Co., 59 Lowa, 148 550
	Common Coffman & Wort Dan 900 100 7-3
Buffett r. Troy & B. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 168	I Carver b. Comman, 6 or cer, hep, soo, for thu.
Bukup v. Valentine, 19 Wend. 554.	
Bulkley v. Marks, 15 Abb. Pr. 454	0. Peck, 15t Mass. 471
Bull v. Conroe, 13 Wis. 234. 81	Castle v. State, 5 Ind. 140.
Builard v. Bell, 1 Mason, 209 19	
Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason, 299 19 v. Briggs, 7 Pick, 533 44 Buncombe County v. Tommey, 115 U. S. 122 (29	Caulkins v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 452
nuncombe County v. Tommey, 115 U.S. 122 (29	Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N. Y. 517 214
L. ed. 3(5)	
Bunge r, Koop, 48 N. Y. 225 25	6
L. ed. 305) 70 Bunger, Koop, 48 N. Y. 225 25 Burbank v. Pilisbury, 48 N. H. 475 86 Burbank v. Pil & 60 A. 978	
DOLDANKS WILL WE OB TOWN STORM OF	Rep. 94, 97
Burke r. Child, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 441 (22 L. ed.	Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 32 W. Va. 134 765
623)	
Burke v. Savage, 13 Allen, 448. 44 v. Smith, 8 L. R. A. 184, note, 69 Mich.	
v. Smith, 8 L. R. A. 184, note, 69 Mich.	Co., 104 U. S. 54 (26 L. ed. 693)
380	
Burkham v. Lawrenceburg (Ind.) not yet re-	666 504, 505
ported 60	
Burlington v. Leebrick, 43 Iowa, 252 10	Central R. Co. v. Hearne, 32 Tex. 547
Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 31 Kan.	Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass, 248
180 190 388 390 391 592 45	4 Chadwick v. Covell, 6 L. R. A. 839, 151 Mass. — 642
Durington ing Co. 4 Cibbong (Kun 199 Pag	Chaffeelv. New York Fourth Nat. Bank, 71 Me.
The co. v. dippons (Ruit, as I ac.	
Burlington Ins. Co. v. Gibbons (Kan.) 22 Pac. Rep. 1010.	8 514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 64
Rep. 1010	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 Ill. 499 80 r. Webster 1 Woodb & M. 172	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345. 64 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 518 (21
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 Ill. 499. 80 r. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 22 Burns r. Lynde 6 Allen 26	68 514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 64 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 Ill. 499. 80 r. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 22 Burns r. Lynde 6 Allen 26	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S.
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 Ill. 499. 80 r. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 20 Burns r. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. 44 Burnall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. 64 Burnell r. Letson 1 Strobb L. 239. 75	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98. 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228). 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 788
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 Ill. 499. 200 T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. 200 Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 306. 44 Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. 64 Burrell v. Letson, I Strobh, L. 239. 65 Burton t, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. 44	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 78 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 771
Burnham r. Chicago. 24 Ill. 499. 80 r. Webster, I Woodb. & M. 172. 20 Burns r. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. 44 Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. 64 Burrell v. Letson, I Strobh. L. 239. 73 Burton r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. 41	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. I. P. C. 395, 4 Moore, P.
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 366. Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burrell v. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Button r. Great Northern B. Co., 9 Exch. 507. The stratton, 12 Fed. Rep. 686. Burwell r. Lockeg, 9, N. 535.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228). 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17. v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 366. Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burrell v. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Button r. Great Northern B. Co., 9 Exch. 507. The stratton, 12 Fed. Rep. 686. Burwell r. Lockeg, 9, N. 535.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L, ed. 98 191 L, ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 78 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Conn. 17 771 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. 80 v. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 22 Burns v. Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. 44 Burrall v. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. 64 Burrell v. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. 75 Burton v. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. 41 v. Stratton, 12 Ped. Rep. 686 55 Bush v. Com., 40 Ky. 244 v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 555 56	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 s. Stterlee, 40 Cal. 447 Stterlee, 40 Cal. 447
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. 80 v. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 22 Burns v. Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. 44 Burrall v. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. 64 Burrell v. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. 75 Burton v. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. 41 v. Stratton, 12 Ped. Rep. 686 55 Bush v. Com., 40 Ky. 244 v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 555 56	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) L. ed. 98 V. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 437 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 61 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. 7. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 8urns c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. 8urnsl c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. 8urrell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. 8urrell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. 8urton c, Great Northern R, Co., 9 Exch. 507. 41 8urvell c, Jackson, 9 N, Y, 535. 8ush c, Com., 40 Ky, 244. 7. Lathrop, 22 N, Y, 535. 8ush c, Com., 80 KJ, 244. 8ush c, Sherman, 80 III, 160. 8ush c, Sherman, 80 III, 160.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) Chambers v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 447 Champlin v. Champlin v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champlin v. Champlin v. G. Naw Eng. Rep. 707, 16
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. 7. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 8urns c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. 8urnsl c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. 8urrell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. 8urrell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. 8urton c, Great Northern R, Co., 9 Exch. 507. 41 8urvell c, Jackson, 9 N, Y, 535. 8ush c, Com., 40 Ky, 244. 7. Lathrop, 22 N, Y, 535. 8ush c, Com., 40 Ky, 244. 8ush c, Sterman, 80 III, 160. 8ush c, Sterman, 80 III, 160.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) Chambers v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 447 Champlin v. Champlin v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champlin v. Champlin v. G. Naw Eng. Rep. 707, 16
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lynde, 6 Allen, 365. Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 559. Burrell v. Letson, I Strobh, L. 239. Burton b, Great Northern B. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burtwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 26 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. T. Sherman, 80 III. 160. Butler v, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Butler v, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Butler, 21 Lath. 521. E. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 202. 564, 56	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 V. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17. 78 V. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 395, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 Champin v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champin v. Champin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188,
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. v. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. Burnell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burrell v, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R, Co., 9 Exch. 507. 41 v. Stratton, 12 Fed. Rep. 686. Suwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. E, Sherman, 80 III, 169. Buther s, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. v. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. v. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. v. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. v. Gettysburg & H. R. Co., 128 Pa. 180.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228). 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 437 Champlin v. Champlin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I.— Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, & Allen, 365. Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 559. Burrell v. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton r. Great Northern B. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burtwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 26 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butler v. Burler, 21 Kan. 521. Butler v. Burler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Let 11 Als. 855.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 V. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201. 78 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17. 771 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 395, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 78 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Gostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Champion, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Chaudler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 157, 188
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burtell v, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell v, Jackson, 9 N. Y, 535. Bush c, Com., 20 Ky, 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y, 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 238. Butler v, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E Get; sburg & H. R. Co., 129 Pa. 180. E Lee, 11 Ala. 885. T. Steep 21 Ind. 378.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) V. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201. Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. I. P. C. 385, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 Champlin v. Champlin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 K. I. Champlin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 S. Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 56, 71 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 56, 71
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burtell v, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell v, Jackson, 9 N. Y, 535. Bush c, Com., 20 Ky, 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y, 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 238. Butler v, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E Get; sburg & H. R. Co., 129 Pa. 180. E Lee, 11 Ala. 885. T. Steep 21 Ind. 378.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Stoley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 Chamberlain v. Stoley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 788 C. N. S. 158 v. Paul R. L. P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Champiin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. — Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, 50, 711 Chappion v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 56 Chapman v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 57 Chapman v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. Burnsl c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. Burrell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Et. Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. Et. Estrysburg & H. R. Co., 129 Pa. 160. Et. Lee, 11 Ala. 885. Et. Sate, 97 Ind. 378. Et. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17. 781 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 395, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 781 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 Champin v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champin v. Champin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. 681 Chamdler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. Hollingsworth. 3 Del. Ch. 99 151, 156 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 50, 771 Chapman v. Bauker & T. Pub, Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. Kimbail, 9 Conn. 38 560
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. Burnsl c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. Burrell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Et. Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. Et. Estrysburg & H. R. Co., 129 Pa. 160. Et. Lee, 11 Ala. 885. Et. Sate, 97 Ind. 378. Et. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 192 Chamberlain v. Stoley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 170 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 407 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Champiin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, 50 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 v. Rickersill, 2 Wils. 145.
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. Burnsl c, Lynde, 6 Ailen, 305. Burrell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Et. Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. Et. Estrysburg & H. R. Co., 129 Pa. 160. Et. Lee, 11 Ala. 885. Et. Sate, 97 Ind. 378. Et. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455. Et. Burler, 5 Gray, 455.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 192 Chamberlain v. Stoley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 170 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 407 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Champiin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, 50 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 v. Rickersill, 2 Wils. 145.
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 20 Fed. Rep. 686. T. Sherman, 80 IM, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 13). Buttnan r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201. Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Conn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 395, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satteriee, 40 Cal. 497 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champin v. Champin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Chaudler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 50, 71 Chapman v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. Fickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 366. Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burtell r. Letson, I Strobh. L. 239. Burton r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Extratton, 12 Fed. Rep. 686. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 20 Ky. 244. r. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. r. Sherman, 80 III. 100. r. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. r. Gettysburg & H. R. Co., 129 Pa. 180. r. State, 97 Ind. 378. r. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 615). Buttman r. Fowler, 17 Obio, 101. Buttre, r. More, 3 Merc. 18 Merc.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201. Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Conn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 395, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satteriee, 40 Cal. 497 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champin v. Champin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Chaudler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 50, 71 Chapman v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. Fickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159
Burnham r. Chicago. 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 366. Burrall r. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burtell r. Letson, I Strobh. L. 239. Burton r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Extratton, 12 Fed. Rep. 686. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 20 Ky. 244. r. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. r. Sherman, 80 III. 100. r. Sherman, 80 III. 100. r. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. r. Gettysburg & H. R. Co., 129 Pa. 180. r. State, 97 Ind. 378. r. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. r. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 615). Buttman r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Buttra. r. Homerial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158.	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L, ed. 98 191 L, ed.
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell r. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burtell r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch, 507. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butler r. Burler, 21 Kan. 521. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. Butler v. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. Butler v. France, 55 Gray, 435. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 435. T. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 615). Butt v. Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Buttrick r. Allen, 8 Mass. 23. Butts v. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick r. Butler, 41 Live. 550.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 437 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Champin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Chaudler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 v. Kimbail, 9 Conn. 38 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 420 (9 L. ed. 773) Charles to Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Bap-
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnsl c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Et. Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E. Sate, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. E. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 13). Buttan r, Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Buttan r, Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butts t, Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts t, Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v, Buzick, 44 Lowa, 259. Holy Collection of the coll	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 157 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 367 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 671 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 677 Chappan v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 12 Mans. 85 60 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 22 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 42 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnsl c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c, Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Et. Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E. Sate, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. E. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 13). Buttan r, Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Buttan r, Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butts t, Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts t, Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v, Buzick, 44 Lowa, 259. Holy Collection of the coll	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 157 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 367 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 671 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 677 Chappan v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 12 Mans. 85 60 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 22 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 42 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell r. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burtell r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ben. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butchers Ben. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 25 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. Butler v. Butler, 32 Kan. 522. Butler v. Butler, 32 Kan. 523. Butler v. Store, 54 Mich. 1, 5. Byne v. Sisters of Charitiv of St. Elizabeth, 45	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 157 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 367 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 671 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 677 Chappan v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 12 Mans. 85 60 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 22 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 42 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857
Burnham C. Chicago. 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb. & M. 172. Burns c. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c. Letson, 1 Strobh. L. 239. Burtell v. Letson, 1 Strobh. L. 239. Burten c. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 238. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 238. Butler v. Butler, 21. Kan. 521. T. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. Butman r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Buttnan r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Buttrick r. Allen, 8 Mass. 273. Butts r. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Butsck v. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Butsck v. Buzick 41 Iowa, 259. Bytes v. Colier, 54 Mich. 1, 5. Byter r. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45. Byter r. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 157 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 367 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 671 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 677 Chappan v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 12 Mans. 85 60 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 22 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 42 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell r. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burtell r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ben. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butchers Ben. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 25 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. T. Butler r. Butler, 31 Kan. 521. Butler v. Butler, 32 Kan. 522. Butler v. Butler, 32 Kan. 523. Butler v. Store, 54 Mich. 1, 5. Byne v. Sisters of Charitiv of St. Elizabeth, 45	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 157 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 367 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 671 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 677 Chappan v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 12 Mans. 85 60 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 22 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 42 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857
Burnham C. Chicago. 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb. & M. 172. Burns c. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c. Letson, 1 Strobh. L. 239. Burtell v. Letson, 1 Strobh. L. 239. Burten c. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 238. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 238. Butler v. Butler, 21. Kan. 521. T. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. Butman r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Buttnan r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Buttrick r. Allen, 8 Mass. 273. Butts r. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Butsck v. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Butsck v. Buzick 41 Iowa, 259. Bytes v. Colier, 54 Mich. 1, 5. Byter r. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45. Byter r. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 157 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 367 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 671 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 677 Chappan v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 12 Mans. 85 60 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 22 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 42 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. 80 T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 81 Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnel c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 12 Fed. Rep. 696. 81 Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. St. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. C, Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. St. Lee, 11 Ala. 885. C, Sate, 97 Ind. 378. C, State, 97 Ind. 378. C, Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. C, United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 13) Buttan r, Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butt c, Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts c, Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v, Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. Byre c, Sixter of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne r, Sixters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byron p, Emes, 12 Mod, 106, 2 Salk, 694. C,	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 157 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 367 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 671 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 677 Chappan v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 12 Mans. 85 60 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 22 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 42 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. 80 T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 81 Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnel c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 12 Fed. Rep. 696. 81 Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. St. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. C, Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. St. Lee, 11 Ala. 885. C, Sate, 97 Ind. 378. C, State, 97 Ind. 378. C, Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. C, United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 13) Buttan r, Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butt c, Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts c, Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v, Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. Byre c, Sixter of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne r, Sixters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byron p, Emes, 12 Mod, 106, 2 Salk, 694. C,	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 788 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 788 788 789 79 70 Ch. S. 158 70 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 71 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 71 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 71 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 72 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 73 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 74 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 75 76 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 77 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 78 79 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 79 70 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 70 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 71 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 72 73 74 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 75 75 76 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 77 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 78 79 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 79 70 71 72 73 74 75 75 76 77 77 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Burnham c, Chicago, 24 III, 499. 80 T. Webster, 1 Woodb, & M. 172. 81 Burns c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burnel c, Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c, Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burton c, Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c, Jackson, 12 Fed. Rep. 696. 81 Burwell c, Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c, Com., 80 Ky. 244. St. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. C, Sherman, 80 III, 160. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c, Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. St. Lee, 11 Ala. 885. C, Sate, 97 Ind. 378. C, State, 97 Ind. 378. C, Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. C, United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 13) Buttan r, Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butt c, Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts c, Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v, Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. Byre c, Sixter of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne r, Sixters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byron p, Emes, 12 Mod, 106, 2 Salk, 694. C,	514. 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed.
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell r. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch, 507. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butler r. Burler, 21 Kan. 521. Butler r. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 202. T. Butler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 202. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 615). Buttman r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butter t. Miperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Buttman r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butter t. Miperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Buttman r. Fowler, 18 Mass. Buttman r. Fowler, 18 Mass. Buttman r. Fowler, 18 Mass. Buttrick r. Allen, 8 Mass. Buttrick r. Allen, 8 Mass. Byrne r. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 N. J. L. 213 Byron r. Emes, 12 Mod. 106, 2 Salk, 694. C. Cagwin r. Hancock, 84 N. Y. 542.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 180 V. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 V. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 50, 771 Chappen v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 159 40 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 Chapter Siver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 420 (9 L. ed. 773) Chapter Siver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 420 (9 L. ed. 773) Chapter v. Cheney, 58 Il. 509 v. Palmer, 25 Me. 341, 346 v. Palmer, 25 Me. 341, 346 v. Williams, 74 Mo. 4:9 Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 Charlestor C. Releasence v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 387, 388 186 Chedel v. Mallard, 13 R. 1. 491
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 395. Burnel r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 395. Burrell r. Letson, I Strobh, L. 239. Burten r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch, 597. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. T. Butter, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. Gettysburg & H. R. Co., 126 Pa. 160. T. State, 97 Ind. 373. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. State, 97 Ind. 373. Buttar r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butter, Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 155. Butter, L. Man. 51. Butter, L. Man. 52. Butter, L. Allen, 8 Mass. Butts r. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick, Allen, 8 Mass. Byrner, Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 N. J. L. 213. Byron r. Emes, 12 Mod, 106, 2 Salk, 694. C. Cagwin r. Bancock, 84 N. Y. 542. Cain r. bavie County, 86 N. C. 8. Cairo & F. R. Co. r. Hecht, 55 U. S. 168 (24 L. ed.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 78 180 V. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 V. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 50, 771 Chappen v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 39 v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 159 40 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 Chapter Siver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 420 (9 L. ed. 773) Chapter Siver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 420 (9 L. ed. 773) Chapter v. Cheney, 58 Il. 509 v. Palmer, 25 Me. 341, 346 v. Palmer, 25 Me. 341, 346 v. Williams, 74 Mo. 4:9 Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 Charlestor C. Releasence v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 387, 388 186 Chedel v. Mallard, 13 R. 1. 491
Burnham r. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 395. Burnel r. Lvnde, 6 Allen, 395. Burrell r. Letson, I Strobh, L. 239. Burten r. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch, 597. Burwell r. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush r. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butter Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. T. Butter, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. Gettysburg & H. R. Co., 126 Pa. 160. T. State, 97 Ind. 373. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. State, 97 Ind. 373. Buttar r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butter, Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 155. Butter, L. Man. 51. Butter, L. Man. 52. Butter, L. Allen, 8 Mass. Butts r. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick, Allen, 8 Mass. Byrner, Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 N. J. L. 213. Byron r. Emes, 12 Mod, 106, 2 Salk, 694. C. Cagwin r. Bancock, 84 N. Y. 542. Cain r. bavie County, 86 N. C. 8. Cairo & F. R. Co. r. Hecht, 55 U. S. 168 (24 L. ed.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Stoley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 157 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 407 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Champlin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. — Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, 50 v. Rimball, 9 Conn. 38 v. Rickersgill, 2 Wils. 145 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 139 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 139 Chaptel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 159 Chales River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 420 (9 L. ed. 773) Chaptel v. Grock and 18, 186 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobb. L. 310 Chase v. Cheney, 58 Hl. 509 v. Palmer, 25 Me. 341, 346 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 Chasewore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 387, 388 Chastemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 387, 388 Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 Chesley v. King, 73 Me. 164 Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 Ch
Burnham c. Chicago. 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb. & M. 172. Burns c. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burtell v. Letson, 1 Strobh. L. 239. Burton c. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. Tinted States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 138). Buttan v. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butt. Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts t. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. Byrne v. Sterses of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Sixers of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Emes, 12 Mod. 166, 2 Salk. 694. Calon & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168 (24 L. ed. 242). Calaban v. Babouck, 21 Ohio, 57, 831 8 Am.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 L. ed. 98 Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) L. ed. 98 V. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201. 78 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17. 78 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17. 78 V. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 33 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 437 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 437 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Champlin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 661 To v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85 50, 711 Chapman v. Banker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. Nickersyill, 2 Wils. 115 422 v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 159 494, 565 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 420 (9 L. ed. 773) 548, 863 Chasteston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 857 Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509 841 v. Williams, 74 Mo. 439 Chasteld v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 68 Chacled v. Mallard, 13 R. I. 491 555 Chester County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64 Chevet County v. Malany, 64 Pa. 144 64
Burnham c. Chicago. 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb. & M. 172. Burns c. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burtell v. Letson, 1 Strobh. L. 239. Burton c. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. Tinted States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 138). Buttan v. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butt. Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts t. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. Byrne v. Sterses of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Sixers of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Emes, 12 Mod. 166, 2 Salk. 694. Calon & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168 (24 L. ed. 242). Calaban v. Babouck, 21 Ohio, 57, 831 8 Am.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Stbley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 157 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 407 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Champlin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. — Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, 50, 711 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 159 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 Chaptel v. St. Paul F. & Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 Chaptel v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49, 61 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 122 Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 122 Chicago v. Bartee, 100 Ill, 61 Chicago v. Bartee, 100 Ill, 61 Conditional control of the con
Burnham c. Chicago. 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb. & M. 172. Burns c. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305. Burrell c. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burtell v. Letson, 1 Strobh. L. 239. Burton c. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c. Com., 80 Ky. 244. T. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler v. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. T. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. T. State, 97 Ind. 378. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. T. Tinted States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed. 138). Buttan v. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butt. Imperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts t. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. Byrne v. Sterses of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Sixers of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Emes, 12 Mod. 166, 2 Salk. 694. Calon & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168 (24 L. ed. 242). Calaban v. Babouck, 21 Ohio, 57, 831 8 Am.	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98 191 L. ed. 98 191 Chamberlain v. Stbley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228) 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17 17 v. Davidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229 157 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 407 Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185 Champion v. Champlin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. — Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199 v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85, 50, 711 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 159 Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 137, 159 Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 Chaptel v. St. Paul F. & Charleston City Council v. Wentworth St. Baptist Church, 4 Strobh. L. 310 Chaptel v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49, 61 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152 chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164 Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 122 Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 122 Chicago v. Bartee, 100 Ill, 61 Chicago v. Bartee, 100 Ill, 61 Conditional control of the con
Burnham c. Chicago, 24 III. 499. T. Webster, I Woodb, & M. 172. Burns c. Lynde, 6 Ablen, 305. Burrell c. Rice, 5 Gray, 539. Burrell c. Letson, 1 Strobh, L. 239. Burton c. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 507. Burwell c. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535. Bush c. Com., 20 Ky. 244. St. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. E. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butchers Ren. Asso., 35 Pa. 151, 38 Pa. 298. Butler c. Butler, 21 Kan. 521. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E. Burler, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 292. E. Lee, 11 Ala. 885. C. Sate, 97 Ind. 378. S. T. Taylor, 5 Gray, 455. E. United States, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 274 (22 L. ed.) ed. 613). Buttan r. Fowler, 17 Ohio, 101. Butt. Limperial Gas Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 158. Butts c. Wood, 37 N. Y. 317. Buzick v. Buzick, 44 Iowa, 259. Byles v. Colier, 54 Mich. 1, 5. Byrne v. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Byrne v. Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth, 45 Cairo & F. R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U. S. 168 (24 L. ed.) Calais v. Dyer, 7 Me. 155. Calais v. Dyer, 7 Me. 155. Calais v. Dyer, 7 Me. 155. Calaic v. Buyle, 1 R. S. S. Dail, 337, 388 (1 L. ed.) Calair v. Bayle 3 U. S. 3 Dail, 337, 388 (1 L. ed.)	514, 36 Am. Rep. 345 v. United States, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 516 (21 L. ed. 98. Chamberlair v. Sibley, 4 Minn. 312 (Gil. 228). 189 v. West End & C. P. R. Co., 31 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 201 Chambers v. Atlas Ins. Co., 51 Cohn. 17. 788 C. N. S. 158 v. Pavidson, L. R. 1 P. C. 305, 4 Moore, P. C. N. S. 158 v. McKee, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 229. 730 v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 457. Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 185. Champion v. Rostwick, 18 Wend. 185. Champion v. Champiin, 6 New Eng. Rep. 707, 16 R. I. — Chamdler v. Fulton, 10 Tex. 2, 60 Am. Dec. 188, 199. v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85.50, 711 Chapman v. Bauker & T. Pub. Co., 128 Mass. 478 v. Nickeesill, 2 Wils. 145. v. Searle, 3 Pick. 38. Chappel v. Brocekway, 21 Wend. 187, 159. Chaple v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 187, 159. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. Charles Chorles, 58 Il. 599 v. Kittredge, 11 Alben, 49, 61. S55 v. Palmer, 25 Me. 341, 346. Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 599 v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 4 Cush. 152. Chaseled v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49. Chaefield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49. Chesiev v. King, 74 Me. 164. Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 122. 255 Chicago v. Bartee, 140 Ill, 61. 255 Chicago v. Bartee, 140 Ill, 61.

·	
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Becker, 76 Ill. 25, 84 Ill.	Commercial Nat. Bank v. Iola, 2 Dill. 353. 28 Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469, 488. 83 v. Alger, 7 Cush. 85, 89, 93, 95. 94, 85 v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234, 235. 83
483 495, 496 496 496	Commonwealth t. Alburger, 1 Whart, 409, 488. 88. 88. 94. 85. 94. 85.
v. Murray, 62 Ill. 326 496	v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234, 235 83
v. Ragland, 84 Ill. 375 322	v. Clue, 3 Rawle, 498
#83 8. 18. 226 495, 496 v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 226 496 v. Murray, 62 Ill. 326 496 v. Ragland, 84 Ill. 375 322 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Hedges, 118 Ind. 5 598 Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Flexman, 103 Ill. 548 227 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Montfort, 60 Ill. 175 569	v. Clue, 3 Rawle, 498
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Montfort, 60 Ill. 175 509	v. Gaming Implements, 119 Mass, 332 43
Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co. v. People's Gas-	1 Proceedings processing the second constitution with
Light & Coke Co., 11 West. Rep. 63, 121 11, 530 505, 508	v. Hill, 5 Gratt. 682
Chicago Lumber Co. v. Ashworth, 26 Kan. 212 616	v. Jennings, 121 Mass. 47 40
CHICAGO II. Mate Dank v. Chicago Le Equip. Co.	v. Keenan. 67 Pa. 203
25 Fed. Rep. 809 397 Chicago Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn, 530 397	v. McDonald, 16 Serg. & R. 390
Chicago Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 530 Chicago, P. & S. W. R. Co. v. Marseilles, 84 III.	521, 52
	t. Ober, 12 Cush. 493
Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co. v. Eninger, 114 Ill. 79 496 Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41 244	v. Pike Ben. Society, 8 Watts & S. 247
Chipman v. Morrill, 20 Cal. 136 427	v. Temple, 14 Gray, 69 43
Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. I, 190 483	v. Tuttle, 12 Cush, 502 40
Chouteau v. Burlando, 20 Mo. 482 166 Churton v. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174 574	v. Mitchell, 1 Phila, 63, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 431 v. Ober, 12 Cush. 493. v. Pike Ben. Society, 8 Watts & S. 247. v. Power, 7 Met. 596, 600. v. Temple, 14 Gray, 69 v. Tuttle, 12 Cush. 502 v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295 Compton v. Milton, 12 N. J. L. 71. v. Wilder, 40 Obio St. 130 Comstock v. Dodge, 43 How. Pr. 97. v. Hier, 73 N. Y. 269 Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 630 (23 L. ed. 630).
Churton v. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174. 574 Cigar-Makers P. Union v. Conhaim, 3 L. R. A. 135, 40 Minn. 243. 642, 644.	v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130
125, 40 Minn. 243 642, 644	Comstock v. Dodge, 43 How. Pr. 97
Cincinnati & L. R. Co. v. Smith, 22 Ohio St. 227. 141 Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v. Butler, 1 West. Rep. 110, 103 Ind. 31 596-598 Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Lang, 118	Concord v Postgrouth Say Pank 92 H S 620
Rep. 110, 103 Ind. 31	(23 L. ed. 630). 40
Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Lang, 118	Concord R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47 6
11Q- 949 094	Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166 60 Cone v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. 619 77
Cincinnati, W. & M. R. Co. v. Hiltzhauer, 99 Ind. 486	Cones v. Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co., 14
Citizens Gas & Min. Co. v. Elwood, 14 West.	West. Rep. 101, 114 Ind. 328 59
Rep. 92, 114 Ind. 332	(23 L. ed. 630). 400 Concord R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47 6 Conduit v. Ross, 162 Ind. 166 60 Cone v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. 619. 77 Cones v. Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co., 14 West. Rep. 101, 114 Ind. 328 59 Confrey v. Stark, 73 Ill. 187 Conkey v. People, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 418 68 Conklin v. State, 25 Neb. 784 Conlee Lumber Co., 86 Wis. 481 187 Co., 66 Wis. 481 85
Citizens Loan Asso. v. Friedley (Ind.) 7 L. R. A, 669 231	Conklin v. State, 25 Neb. 784
Citizens S. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 20	Conlee Lumber Co. v. Ripon Lumber & Mfg.
A, 669 231 Citizens S. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 655 (22 L. ed. 455) 287 Citizens St. R. Co. v. Jones, 34 Fed. Rep. 579, 548, 549 City Nat. Bank v. National Park Bank, 32 Hun,	Confee Lumber Co., 68 Wis, 481
City Nat. Bank v. National Park Bank, 22 Hun,	Connolly v. Poillon, 41 Barb. 366, 369 82
105221	Connor v. Hanover Ins. Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 549
City Sav. Bauk v. Hopson, 2 New Eng. Rep. 556, 53 Conn. 454. 665	Consolidated R. E. & F. Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. 59.
Clamageran v. Bucks, 4 Mart. N. S. 487	Consolidated R. E. & F. Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 41
Clark v. Clark, 11 West. Rep. 396, 122 Ill. 388 418	Md. 59 77
v. Conway, 23 Mo. 438 610 v. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86 475	Continental Ins. Co. v. Pearce, 39 Kan, 396 73 Cook v. Charlestown, 13 Allen, 190, note 8
v. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106	v. Chicago, B. & I. R. Co., 40 Iowa, 451 28
v. Harian, 1 Cin. Super. Ct. Rep. 418 423	v. Cook, 100 Mass. 194
53 Conn. 494. 665 Clamageran v. Bucks, 4 Mart. N. S. 487. 731 Clark v. Clark, 11 West. Rep. 396, 122 III. 388. 418 v. Conway, 23 Mo. 438. 610 v. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86. 475 v. Edgar, 84 Mo. 106. 750 v. Harian, 1 Cin. Super. Ct. Rep. 418. 423 v. Jones, 1 Denio, 516 763 v. New England Mut. F. Ins. Co., 6 Cush.	L. ed. 159, 165, 166) 64
342	v. Walling, 2 L. R. A. 769, 117 Ind. 9 796, 79
242 838 v. Nixou, 5 Hill, 36 622 Clarke v. Morgan, 38 L. T. N. S. 334 526 v. Postan, 6 Car. & P. 423 47 v. Watson, 18 C. B. N. S. 278, 235 209, 210 Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. v. Elliott, 4 Ohio St.	Cook v. Charlestown, 13 Allen, 190, note. v. Chicago, B. &t. R. Co., 40 Iowa, 451
v. Postan, 6 Car. & P. 423. 47	v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 65
v. Watson, 18 C. B. N. S. 278, 285	Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727 (28
475 141	L. ed. 1137) 55 Cooter v. Dearborn, 2 West. Rep. 399, 115 III.
	509
Cline v. State, 1 West. Rep. 81, 43 Ohio St. 322. 36 Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 299 48 Clough v. Dayis, 9 N. H. 500 665 Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263 37 Clussman v. Long Island R. Co., 9 Hun, 618, 73 N. Y. 606 227 Cluster, Fisher, 8 West. Rep. 121, 85 Mich. 48 531	Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich. L. 502
Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263. 37	1 74
Clussman r. Long Island R. Co., 9 Hun, 618, 73	Corgan v. Frew, 39 III. 31 85 Corning v. Lowerre, 6 Johns. Ch. 439, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 178 45
N. Y. 606 227 Clute v. Fisher, 8 West. Rep. 121, 65 Mich. 48 581	Ch. L. ed. 178.
Coates v. Campbell, 37 Minn, 498. 287	! Coffon n. Pocasset Mfg. Co., 13 Met. 433 60
v. Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co., 58 Md. 172	Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402 79 Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309, 28 N. Y. S. R. 684 22
Cute v. Fisher, 8 West. Rep. 121, 65 Mich. 48. 581 Coates v. Campbell, 37 Minn. 488. 287 v. Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co., 58 Md. 172. 770 Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 324. 321 Cobb v. Cowdery, 40 Vt. 25. 710 v. Standish, 14 Me. 198. 87 Coburn v. Ames. 52 Cal. 385 475	Countess of Plymouth v. Throgmorton, 1 Salk
v. Standish, 14 Me. 198	1 65
Cochron v Bartle & West Rep 707 91 Mo 636 612	Covel v. Hart, 56 Me. 518 44 Covenant Mutual Ben. Asso. v. Hoffman, 110
v. Ripey, 13 Bush, 495153, 154	III, 606 III Cowman v. Hall, 3 Gill & J. 398 81
v. Ripey, 13 Bush, 495 1133, 154 Cocke v. McGinnis, Mart. & Y. 361 483 v. Mobile Branch Bank, 3 Als. 175 679	Cowman v. Hall, 3 Gill & J. 398
Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns, 637	Cox v. Bent, 5 Bing, 185 22 v. Cox, 6 Rich, Eq. 275 69
Coe v. Columbus, P. & I. R. Co., 19 Unio St. 372 861	v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 48 Ind. 178 60
v. Hobby, 7 Hun, 157, 72 N. Y. 141	Craft n Roite I Sound 213 mate
Coffin v. Adams, 131 Mass, 133	v. McConoughy, 79 Ill, 346 50
Coggs v. Bernard, I Smith, Lead. Cas. *307, notes 100	Craig v. Andes, 93 N. Y. 405, 410249, 250, 251, 25
Cohn v. Virginia F. & M. Irs. Co., 3 Hughes, 272 808 v. Wausau Boom Co., 47 Wis. 314	7. Guoreta, 47 Me. 415
Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 115 (33 L. ed.	v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., 39 N. Y. 404 45
TT-11 100 YP 00	v. Sibbett, 15 Pa. 238.
v. Hall, 103 III. 30 839 v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1 (23 L. ed. 896) 287	658, 17 Am. Rep. 504 227. 42.
Coleman v. Second Ave. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 201 256	Cranston v. Crane, 97 Mass. 459 55
Contract of Communities of Contract Inter-	Cox v. Bent, 5 Bing, 185 22 v. Cox, 6 Rich. Eq. 275 22 v. Cox, 6 Rich. Eq. 275 22 v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 43 Ind. 178 80 cox's Will, Re, 1 Jones, L. 271 22 v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 229, 250, 251, 25 Craig v. Andes, 93 N. V. 405, 410 229, 250, 251, 25 craig v. Andes, 93 N. V. 405, 410 229, 250, 251, 25 v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., 39 N. V. 404 45 v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., 39 N. V. 404 42 craker v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 42 Cranston v. Crane, 97 Mass. 459 Cruske v. Christian U. Pub. Co., 17 Hun, 319 22 Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo., 498, 500 16
503 175 Colton v. Hanchett, 13 Ill. 615 57	i Crawiorosvilla & E. Turub, Co. 7, Simith, 89 ind.
Colmell a Maria Landing Water Dower Co. 19	290
N. J. Eq. 245 774 Com. v. Jolly, 3 N. J. Eq. 625 825	
	Creighton v. Piper, 14 Ind. 182 60
Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. v. Detroit F. & M.	Crofout v. Moore, 4 Vt. 204
	Croftov. Moore, 4 Vt. 204 31 Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84 64 Crolley v. Minneapolis & St.L.R.Co., 30 Minn. 541

Crompton v. Anthony, 13 Allen, 33, 37	8 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Cañon City & S. J. R.
Crosin v. Foster, 13 R. I. 196.	7 Co., 99 U. S. 463 (25 L. ed. 438) 548 Denver & S. R. Co. v. Denver City R. Co., 2
Crosm v. Herring, 4 Hawks, 893 73 Crosby v. Harlow, 21 Me. 499 76 Croydon v. Sullivan County, 47 N. H. 179 70	8 1 Colo. 681
Crosby v. Harlow, 21 Me. 499 56	9 Des Moines St. R. Co. v. Des Moines B. G. St. R.
Crosby v. Harlow, 21 Me. 499 50 Croydon v. Sullivan County, 47 N. H. 179 70 Cuculin v. Orleans Ins. Co., 6 Mart. N. S. II 83	il Notroit M. & M. Rank a Hibbard 48 Mich 118, 153.
Cucullu v. Orleans Ins. Co., 6 Mart. N. S. 11 83 Culver v. Rhodes, 87 N. Y. 348	3 Devaynes v. Noble, 2 Russ, & M. 495 632 Dew v. Judges, 3 Hen. & M. 1 699
53 67 Cummings v. Vorce, 3 Hill, 283 27 Cummings v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 60 Cunningham v. Cassidy, 17 N. Y. 276 5 Cupp v. Campbell, 1 West, Rep. 255, 103 Ind. 213 Currner v. Rauh, 100 Ind. 247 6	6 Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 9 Cent. Rep.
Cummins v. Seymour, 79 Ind. 491 60	6 Dibble v. Rogers, 13 Wend. 536
Cupp v. Campbell, 1 West, Rep. 255, 103 Ind. 213 40	8 Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S 578 (25 L. ed.
Currine v. Rauh, 100 Ind. 247 6 Curran v. Boston (Mass.) 8 L. R. A. 243 6 Currier v. Boston & M. R. Co., 34 N. H. 498 11	2 619) 438 2 Dickey v. Maine Teleg. Co., 46 Me. 483 88
Currier v. Boston & M. R. Co., 34 N. H. 498	7 Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 Barn. & C. 128 679
Curtis v. State, 5 Ohio, 324 58 Cutler v. Cambridge, 6 Alien, 20 83 Cutliff v. Albany, 60 Ga. 597 27	Dilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 256, 263. 81
Cuant v. Albany, or Ga. 59/	12 Dilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 256, 263. 81 22 Dillon v. Linder, 36 Wis. 344. 424 Dixon v. Yates, 5 Barn, & Ad, 313, 341. 157, 159, 169
\mathbf{D}_{\bullet}	1 DOUDING T. STRIE, 12 OUTO St. 450
Dair v. United States, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 1 (21 L.	Dobbs v. Norcross, 24 N. J. Eq. 327 592 Dodd v. Bartholomew, 3 West. Rep. 123, 44 Ohio St. 171 615
ed. 491) Dekate a Winnegenne EE Wie 599	8 Dodge v. Coffin, 15 Kan, 285
ed. 491)	43 N. J. Eq. 351, 36 Am, & Eng. R. R.
Dale, Exparte, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 772 79 Daly v. State, 13 Lea, 228 28	1 Dodsley v. Varley, 12 Ad. & El. 632 158
Daly v. State, 13 Lea, 28 28 Dan v. Brown, 4 Cow, 490 38 Daniels v. Clark, 38 Lowa, 555 38 v. Marr, 75 Me, 397 38 Darst r. Daoyle, 61 D1 285 55	84 Doe v. Manifold, I Maule & S. 294
v. Marr, 75 Me. 397 33 Darst v. People, 51 Hl. 286 53	2 Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230 592
Date v. Gore Dist. M. F. Ins. Co., 14 U. C. C. P.	Donald v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co., 52 Iowa,
Davenport v. Lamson, 21 Pick, 72 61	9 Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Pa. 301
Davey v. Turner, 1 U. S. 1 Dall, 14 (1 L. ed. 16) 6	14 Doody v. Higgins, 2 Kay & J. 729 734 31 Dorchester & M. Bank v. New England Bank.
Davidson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 4 Sawy. 594	9 1 Cush. 1.77
Davies v. Davies, L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 359 47	Dorlan v. East Brandy wine & W. R. Co., 48 Pa.
v. Mann, 10 Mees, & W. 546	10 1 20 a 0.1 A 1 a 0.01
Davis v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co., 26 Iowa, 554	781 Dotton v. Albion, 57 Mich. 575
v. Carson, 69 Mo. 609, 610. 18	57 Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Bl. 527, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. *199
230 v. Macon, 64 Ga. 128. c. Richardson, 45 Miss, 499. c. Russell, 52 Cal. 611. c. State, 25 Ohio St. 369. v. Werden, 13 Gray, 305. c. Wetherell, 13 Allen, 60 Davison r. Holden, 4 New Eng. Rep. 818, 55 Conn. 163	55 Dorman v. State, 34 Ala 231 613 56 Dorman v. Albion, 57 Mich. 575 781 58 Dougherty v. Cooper, 77 Mo. 523 168 59 Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Bl. 527, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. *199 42. 50 Dow v. Norris, 4 N. H. 17 774 70 Tuttle, 4 Mass. 414 429 70 Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23 88 71 Down v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23 88
t. Richardson, 45 Miss, 499 67	79 Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23. 86 52 Downie, Re, 42 Wis. 66. 825
v. State. 25 Ohio St. 369.	6 Dox v. Postmaster-General, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 318
v. Wetherell, 13 Allen, 60 4	12 d
Conn. 103	18 v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 13 West, Rep.
Conn. 103 1 Dawson v. State, 16 Ind. 428 v. State, 62 Miss. 241 v. Vanesndau, 11 Wook, Rep. 518	720, 69 Mich. 168. 386, 387 38 Dreyfous v. Adams, 48 Cal. 131. 442 47 Drucker Case, 8 Cent. Rep. 66, 106 N. Y. 157. 457
v. State, 62 Miss, 241 v. Vansandau, 11 Week, Rep. 516 Day v. Pittsburgh, Y. & C. R. Co., 5 West, Rep. 206, 44 Ohio St. 496	
206, 44 Ohio St. 406.	si Dume v. Corndon, 40 Ga. 122 825
Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 239	[3 13 day of 100 00 110 11 010 11 110 110 110 110 1
v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590	12 Dumpor's Case, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. *109, notes 763 65 Dun v. Cullen, 13 Lea, 202, 205
Deansville Cemetery Asso., Re. 66 N. Y. 569 De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir, 3 H. L. Cas. 553,	30 Dunham v. State, 6 Iowa, 245
Beckern Mathews 19 N. T. CO.	34 Dunn v. Weston, 71 Me. 273. 168 55 Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, 2 Cent.
There of Marsdell, 88 MO. 312	67 Rep. 379, 101 N. Y. 388
De Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368	86 Durand v. Abendroth, 69 N. Y. 148 716 79 Durant v. Riddell, 12 La. Ann. 746 187
De Grove r. Vetropolitan Ing Co. 21 N. V. 501	52 Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis, 464
Toster, 4 Auen, 50	23 Dutton v. Strong. 66 U.S. 1 Black. 32 (17 L. ed.
Delaplaine v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 42 Wis. 214 8	
Delayan t. Dunean 49 N V 485	13 Dwelly v. Dwelly, 46 Me. 377 451 92 Dwineln Bernard 28 Me. 554 570 832
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13	92 Dwinel v. Barnard, 28 Me. 554, 570 832 Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend, 446 54
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 311 (20 L. ed. 581) Deleon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483	72 15
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 311 (20 L. ed. 581) Deleon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483	773 15 86 92. 25.
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 311 (20 L. ed. 581) Deleon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483	173 15
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13 DeLeon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483 Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316-320 Dempster v. West. 69 Ill. 618 Den v. Matlack, 17 N. J. L. 56 Denno v. Reid, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 524 (9 L. ed. 519). Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 6	72 55 56 57 58 59 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 311 (20 L. ed. 581) DeLeon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483 Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb, 316-320 Dempster v. West, 69 III, 618 Den v. Matlack, 17 N. J. L. 85 Denni v. Reid, 35 U. S. 10 Pet, 524 (9 L. ed. 519) Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 497, 498 (32 L. ed.	Earle v. Earle (Neb.) 43 N. W. Rep. 118. Earnsha w. Sun Mutual Aid Society, 11 Cent. Rep. 509, 68 Md. 467.
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 311 (20 L. ed. 581) DeLeon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483 Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb, 316-320 Dempster v. West, 69 III, 618 Den v. Matlack, 17 N. J. L. 85 Denni v. Reid, 35 U. S. 10 Pet, 524 (9 L. ed. 519) Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass, 591 Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 497, 498 (32 L. ed.	Earle v. Londonderry, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 633, 751 Earle v. Earle (Neb.) 43 N. W. Rep. 118
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 311 (20 L. ed. 581) DeLeon v. Higuera, 15 Cal. 483 Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316-320 Dempster v. West, 69 Ill. 618 Den v. Matlack, 17 N. J. L. 65 Denni v. Reid, 35 U. S. 10 Pet, 524 (9 L. ed. 519) Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591 Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591 Denny v. Bennett. 128 U. S. 489, 497, 498 (32 L. ed. 491, 494, 495) V. Cabot, 6 Met. 82	Eaglesfield v. Londonderry, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 633, 751 Earle v. Earle (Neb.) 43 N. W. Rep. 118 Earnshaw v. Sun Mutual Aid Society, 11 Cent. Rep. 508, 68 Md. 467 East Alabama R. Co. v. Doe, 114 U. S. 341 (29 L. ed. 137) Eastern P. R. Co. v. Vaughan, 14 N. V. 546 Eastern R. Co. Relief Eing Co. 28 Mess 420

Eastin v. Pank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 56 Am.	48	Fletcher v. Peck. 10 U. S. 6 Cranch, 87, 128 (3 L. ed. 162, 175) 356, Foakes v. Deer, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605, 614, 617 Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns. 395 Foes v. Whitmore, 82 N. Y. 405 Foot v. Card, 6 L. R. A. £29, 58 Conn. 1. 423, Forbes v. Wallamette Fulls Electric Co. (Or.) 23	258
Rep. 77 East Tennessee & V. R. Co. v. Love, 3 Head, 67 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 83 Ala. 462	125	Foakes v. Deer, L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605, 614, 617	259
Ala. 463	388	Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns. 395	87 59∷
v, Burnett, 11 Lea, 526, 527 Eccleston v. Petty, Carth. 79	128 825	Foot v. Whitmore, 82 N. Y. 405	697 425
Relection. In a 125 M Hanren Krite ha III. 463	76		
Eddings v. Long, 10 Ala. 203 Edelen v. Hardey, 7 Har, & J. 61	734 825	Ford v Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 14 Win 616	705 433
	374	v. Knapp, 3 Cent. Rep. 411, 102 N. Y. 135 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27 Foster v. Hughes, 51 How. Pr. 20	291
Edmondson r. Jersey City, 2 Cent. Rep. 413, 45 N. J. L. 121	782	Foster v. Hughes, 51 How. Pr. 20	325 555
Edmondson r. Jersey City, 2 Cent. Rep. 713, 48 N. J. L. 121 Edward's App., 105 Pa. 103. Edward's r. Ramsey, 30 Minn. 91	442 397	v. Jones, I McCord. L. 116 Fourth Nat. Bank v. St. Louis Cotton Compress Co., II Mo. App. 341. Fowler v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 4 L. R. A. 145, 113	730
r. State, 8 Lea, 412	281	press Co., 11 Mo. App. 341.	152
Eichelburger v. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co.,	414	Fowler v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 4 L. R. A. 145, 113	990
r, State, 8 Lea, 412 Fichelburger v. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co., (Ohio) 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 188 Eigleberger v. Kibler, 1 Hill, Cb. 113. Eigleberger v. Wittel House Bldy. Asso. 69	691	N. Y. 430 Fuller v. People, 93 III 183 v. Swett, 6 Allen, 219, note Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass, 500 317, 318, Furrow v. Chapin, 13 Kan. 107 Field v. Chicago & R. I. R. Co., 71 III, 458 Fields v. Hunter, 8 Mo. 123	839
Mo 59	169	v, Swett, 6 Allen, 219, note Furnas v, Durgin 119 Mass 500 317 318	569 319
Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80. Elkhart Mutual Aid, B. & R. Asso. v. Houghton, 1 West. Rep. 284, 106 Ind. 286. Elliott v. Gregory, 14 West. Rep. 830, 115 Ind. 88 v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co., L. R. 2 Exch.	94	Furrow v. Chapin, 13 Kan. 107	386
Elkhart Mutuai Aid, B. & R. Asso. v. Hough- ton, I West, Rep. 284, 103 Ind. 286	119	Field v. Unicago & R. I. R. Co., 71 III. 458 Fields v. Hunter, 8 Mo. 128	509 610
Elliott v. Gregory, 14 West. Rep. 830, 115 Ind. 88	409	Fight v. State, 7 Ohio, pt. 1, 180	613
	209	Findlay v. Hosmer, 2 Conn. 350	210 461
Ellis v. Bristol County, 2 Gray, 370 r. Brown, 6 Barb, 282 Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89	699 381	Field v. Chicago & R. I. H. Co., 41 Ill. 458 Fields v. Hunter, 8 Mo. 128 Fight v. State, 7 Ohio, pt. 1, 180. Fildew v. Besley, 42 Mich. 100 Findlay v. Hosmer, 2 Conn. 350. Finley v. Simpson, 22 N. J. I. 331 Finney v. Cadwallader, 55 Ga. 78 Firestone v. Firestone, 2 Ohio St. 415 Fischer v. Hope Mut. I. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 161 Fisher R. Roston, 104 Mass. 87	ÚÜÜ
Ellsworth v. Lockwood, 42 N. Y. 89	555	Firestone v. Firestone, 2 Ohio St. 415	172 818
v. Lord, 40 Minn. 337. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U. S. 10 Wheat. 168 (6 L. ed. 244). Emery v. Ridwell, 1 New Eng. Rep. 231, 140	475	Fischer v. Hope Mut. L. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 161.	(11)
L. ed. 294)	483	v. Keane, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 353.	$\frac{244}{180}$
Emery v. Bidwell, 1 New Eng. Rep. 231, 140	625	v. Minot, 10 Gray, 260 247.	248 37
Emery v. Badwell, I New Eng. Rep. 231, 140 Mass. 271 v. Lowell, 104 Mass. 13 Emmett v. Emmett, 14 Lea, 370 Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Ga. 200 England v. Downs, 2 Beav. 522 Engs v. Peckham, 11 R. I. 233, 224 Ensign v. Wands, 1 Johns, Cas. 171 Equipple Compressive Foundry Co. v. Hersee.	244	Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass, 87 v. Keane, L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 353. v. Minot, 10 Gray, 230. 247. v. State, 64 Ind. 435 Fish v. Henarie, 35 Fed. Rep. 230, 417-421367.	368
Emmett v. Emmett, 14 Lea, 570	414 724	riske v. Cobb, o Gray, 141	697 449
England v. Downs, 2 Beav, 522	817	Fitchburg Cotton Mfry. Corp. v. Melven, 15	
Engs v. Peckham, 11 R. J. 25, 224 Engion v. Wands, 1 Johns, Cas. 171	93 662	Fitchburg R. Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 3 Cush	56 9
Editions of the Co-obertainter out and a co. of the coof		71, 67	91
4 Cent. Rep. 189, 103 N. 1. 25 Erie R. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Dl. 289	219 509	Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 Mass, 371	153 526
Ervine's App., 16 Pa. 256	813 384	Fitzsimmons v. Allen, 39 III. 440	417 442
Estes v. State, 55 Ga. 131	685	Fitz, Exparte, 2 Lowell, 519 152, Fitz, Exparte, 2 Lowell, 519 152, Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 Mass. 371 Fitzsimmons v. Allen, 39 III. 440 Franklin, Re (Mich.) 43 N. W. Rep. 997 Franklin v. Geho, 30 W. Va. 27 Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio	685
Eswin v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 96 Mo. 290	786 774	Franklin v. Geho, 30 W. Va. 27 Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio	86
4 Cenf. Rep. 189, 103 N. Y. 25. Erie R. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill. 239 Eryine's App., 16 Pa. 256 Eschbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478 Estes v. State, 55 Ga. 131. Eswin v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 96 Mo. 290 Eudora v. Miller, 30 Kan. 494. Eyans v. Elliot, 9 Ad. & El. 342 v. Harries, 1 Hurlst. & N. 251 v. Philadelphia Club, 50 Pa. 107 v. Salt, 6 Beav. 236 Evertson v. Booth, 19 Johns. 486. Ewing v. Savary, 3 Bibb, 235 Excelsior P. & Mig. Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann.	509	St. 350	503
v. Harries, 1 Hurlst. & N. 251	526 200	St. 350 Franklin Ben. Asso. v. Com., 10 Pa. 357 Franklin County v. Lewiston Sav. Inst., 68 Me.	201
v. Salt, 6 Beav. 206	734	Franklin Wharf v. Portland, 67 Me. 46, 55. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 304. Freedom v. Weed, 40 Me. 383.	505
Evertson v. Booth, 19 Johns. 486 Ewing v. Savary. 3 Bibb. 235	460 656	Franklin Wharf v. Portland, 67 Me. 46, 55 Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294-304	832 186
Excelsior P. & Mfg. Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann.		Freedom v. Weed, 40 Me. 383	833
£31	374	Freeman v. National Ben. Society, 42 Hun, 252 Freese v. Tripp, 70 III, 503	118 423
. 108		Freese v. Tripp. 70 III. 503. French v. Marstin, 24 N. H. 440 Freund v. Importers & T. Nat. Bank, 76 N. Y.	619
F.		352, 14 Am. Law Rep. 486. Friesmuth v. Agawam Mut. F. Ins. Co., 10 Cush.	168
Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231	35 442	Friesmuth v. Agawam Mut. F. Ins. Co., 10 Cush.	835
Fant c. Tandy, 7 Mont. 443 Farmer v. Gregory, 73 Ky. 475 Farmers Bank v. Lang, 87 N. Y. 209	153	Frost v. Chester, 5 El. & Bl. 531	698
Farmers Bank v. Lang, 87 N. Y. 209 Farmers & M. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 52 Mo. 17	152 64	v. Piumb, 40 Conn. 111 Fryer v. Rockefeller, 63 N. Y. 268.	665 622
Farmers & M. Nat. Bank r. King, 57 Pa. 202	792		
Farmers & M. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 52 Mo. 17. Farmers & M. Nat. Bank r. King, 57 Pa. 212. Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Harmony F. & M. Ins. Co., 51 Barb. 33.	808	G.	
Farmain v. Denedick a Cent Rep. 501, 101 IV.	256	Coffee Wilder 194 Noon 201	910
Y. 159 Farr v. Farr, 1 Hill, Ch. 387	691	v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 15 R. L. 456.	637
Faulkner v. Hyman, z New Eng. Rep. 181, 142	64	Gage v. Charleston, 3 S. C. 491	295 815
Mass. 53. Fawcett r. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co., 24 W. Va. 755 Feder v. Abrahams, 28 Mo. App. 454, 457 Ferbrache r. Ferbrache, 110 Ill. 210 Ferdon v. Jones, 2 E. D. Smith, 106 Ferguson v. Bank of Kansas City, 25 Kan. 333 388.	00	v. Shillock (Dak.) 29 N. W. Rep. 631	612
Va. 755 Feder t. Abrahams, 28 Mo. App. 454, 457	88 167	Gales v. State, 64 Miss, 105 Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Fil 153	613 110
Ferbrache r. Ferbrache, 110 III. 210	417	Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 205	565
Ferguson v. Jones, z. E. D. Smill, 10 Ferguson v. Bank of Kansas City, 25 Kan. 333	429	Gans v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 108	521 77
388,	390 779	Gantt v. Am. C. Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 533	770
v. Davis County, 57 Iowa, 601. 388, v. Galt, 23 U. C. C. P. 66. v. Northern Bank of Ky., 14 Bush, 555. Ferrill v. Scott, 2 Speers, L. (S. C.) 344, 42 Am. Dec. 371.	209	Gardner, Re, 68 N. Y. 467	698
v. Northern Bank of Ky., 14 Bush, 555	153	Gardner v. Hust, 2 Rich. L. 601	731
Dec. 371	710	Gaffney v. Hicks, 124 Mass, 301 v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 15 R. L 456 Gage v. Charleston, 3 S. C. 491 Gale v. Morris, 29 N. J. Eq. 292 v. Shillock (Dak.) 29 N. W. Rep. 631 Gales v. State, 64 Miss, 105 Galestorg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 153 Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 255 Gallney v. Marshall, 9 Exch. 294 Gans v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 43 Wis, 108 Gantt v. Am. C. Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 533 Gardia v. Territory, 1 N. M. 415 Gardner v. Hust, 2 Rich. L. 601 Gardio v. American C. Ins. Co. (Cal.) 8 Pac. Rep. 512 Gardner v. Contend & Wish 504	772
Ferry v. Sampson, 112 N. Y. 415	593 259	Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91	565 48
First Nat. Bank v. Carson, 60 Mich. 432	397	Garretson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 65 Iowa, 488	772
(26 L. ed. 704)	850	Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505.	374
Flanagan v. Meyer, 41 Ala. 152.	665	Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104	206
Fleming v. Burnham, 1 Cent. Rep. 287, 100 N.	T:343	varuagu v. Toleuo, w. & w. s. co., of 111 498,	493
Y. 1, 10 592, 593,	621	Gardio v. American C. Ins. Co. (Cal.) 8 Pac. Rep. 512	836 731
8 L. R. A.	TOU !	WAVES OF P. HILL C. OF DIESE, CONT	.04
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	

Gatewood v. Gatewood, 75 Va. 407 555	Green v. Kennedy, 6 Mo. App. 577
Gatewood v. Gatewood, 75 Va. 407 555 Gauch v. St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co., 88 III. 251 735	v. Neal, 51 U. S. 6 Pet. 291 (8 L. ed. 402) 631
Gavin v. Chicago, 97 Ill. 66. 496 Gavit v. Chambers, 3 Ohio, 496 581, 583	v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 12 Abb. N. Cas. 124
Gaynor v. Old Colony & N. R. Co., 100 Mass. 208 676	v. Purnell, 12 Md. 333 405
Gehb v. Rose, 40 Md. 387 796 i	v. Van Buskirk, 72 U. S. 5 Wall, 310 (18 L. ed. 600), 74 U. S. 7 Wall, 139, 150 (19 L. ed. 109, 113)
Geides v. Bennett, 6 I.a. Ann. 516 153 Geismer v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 3 Cent.	ed. 600), 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 139, 150 (19 L.
Rep. 829, 102 N. Y. 563	ed. 109, 113) 64, 65, 883, 516 Green Bay Lumber Co. v. Ireland, 77 Iowa, 636 291
Rep. 829, 102 N. Y. 563 325 Genesee Chief, The, v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 12	Greenbaum v. Megibben, 10 Bush, 419
How, 445 (13 L. ed. 1058)451, 561 (Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 117
Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Comrs., 2 New Eng. Rep. 619, 15 R. I. 334 93	Greenwood v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & M. 185 460, 461
Getchell v. Renedict, 57 Town, 121 636	Gregg v. Massachusetts Medical Society, 111 Mass, 185, 194 180, 321
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat, I. 188 (6 L.	Gregory v. Derby, 8 Car. & P. 749
eu. 20. 00/	v. Pierce, 4 Met. 478 682
v. United States, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 269 (19 L. ed. 453) 402	v. Winston, 23 Gratt. 102 817 Greer v. McCarter, 5 Kan. 18, 22 86 Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. Cas. 319, 323 158, 159
Gibbs v. Raltimore City Consol. Gas Co., 120 H.	Grice v. Richardson, 3 App. Cas. 319, 323 158, 159
S. 396 (32 L. ed. 979)505, 508	Grinen v. House, 18 Jouns. 397
S. 316 (32 L. ed. 979)	Griffin v. Shemeid, 55 bliss, 509
ed. 1123, 1129) 164	Griffiths v. Wolfram, 22 Minn, 185 452
Gifford v. Choate, 100 Mass, 343	Grinison v. Russell, 14 Neb. 521
	Griswold v. Webb, 7 L. R. A. 302, 16 R. I. — 523
676 161 Gillett v. Bate, 86 N. V. 87 310	Guernsey v. Wood, 130 Mass. 503 645 Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478 187
Gilman v. Lockwood, 71 U. S. 4 Wall, 409 (18 L.	Guetio v. State 63 Ind. 278 39
ed. 432) 646 i	Guit, C. & S. F. R. Co. c. Fuller, 63 Tex. 467 181
v. Sheboygan & F. du L. R. Co., 37 Wis.	Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657.
817 605 v. Wills, 66 Me. 273 569	Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93. 222, 697 Gulzoni v. Tyler, 64 Cal. 334. 379
v. Wills, 66 Me. 273 560 Gilmanton v. Sanbornton, 56 N. H. 336 709 Gilmanton v. Stope, 104 F. 5 566 (30 I. ed. 724) 558	Gumberts v. Adams Exp. Co. 28 Ind. 181 697
2 dimer of proper 170 C. P. 200 (85 IV ed. 1957 299)	Gunn r. Barry, 82 U.S. 15 Wall. 623 (21 L. ed. 215) 405
Gittings v. McDermott, 2 Myl. & K. 69	Gunson v. neary, 100 Pa. 42
Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479-489 373 Glass v. Gelvin, 80 Mo. 297, 800 156	Gurney v. Atlantic & G. W. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 358 851 Guy v. Hermance, 5 Cal. 74 94
Glazier v. Bailey, 47 Miss, 396 732	Gwathmey v. Pearce, 74 N. C. 398
v. Douglass. 32 Conn. 393	
Glen v. Hope Mut. L. Ins. Co., 56 N. Y. 379 770	•
Glenn v. York County, 6 S. C. 412 295 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S.	H. .
196 (29 L. ed. 158) 300, 301	
196 (29 L. ed. 158) 300, 301 Glover v. Glover, 16 Ala. 440 564	Haas v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co., SI Ga.
Godard v. Gray, L. R. 6 Q. B. 139	792, 25 Am, & Eng. R. R. Cas. 572 225
Goddord v. Lambert, 8 Rich. Eq. 162-164	792, 25 Am, & Eng. R, R. Cas. 572 225 Hacker v. Everett, 57 Me. 548 336 Haddock v. Grinnell Mfg. Corp., 1 Cent. Rep.
Am. Rep. 39 227	600. R# P8. 845 718
Godfilos v. Harris, 81 N. Y. 263	Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341
Goldsborough v. United States, Taney, C. C.	Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449 817
Dec. 80	Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449 817 Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297 244 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. 111 U. S. 701-715 (28
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 367	Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297
Dec. 89. 782 Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 367 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464	Haffer v. Haffer, 33 Kan. 449 817 Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 207 244 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U. S. 701-715 (28 L. ed. 509-574) 355 Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 746 515
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 367 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U.	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 746 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 36
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 313 15 L. ed. 334 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490. 859	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 38 Haikes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart 45 Pa. 514 148
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 367 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds. 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 934) 166, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 374	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 745 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 36 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 367 Haildeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 189 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 530
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 367 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds. 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 934) 166, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 374 Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 143 431	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph 154 38 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 38 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 188 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 530
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 367 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 454 Goodman v. Simonds. 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 934) 166, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 374 Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 143 431 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) 561 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph 154 38 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 38 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 188 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 530
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodinan v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 334) v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 c. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 c. C. Giffis & S. N. Y. 620 28 29	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph 154 38 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 38 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 188 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 530
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodana v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 343 (15 L. ed. 934) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 c. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 c. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis,	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph 154 38 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 38 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 188 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 530
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 334) Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 c. Girffis, 88 N. Y. 6:2) Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph. 154 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 184 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 550 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 367 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 152 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 81 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 81
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 312 15 L. ed. 334 St. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 c. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 62 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har, & R. 67 Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 512	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 36 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 18 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 550 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 367 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 152 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 11 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 81 Halsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 186
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 334) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Groffiffs, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 542 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v.	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 36 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 18 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 550 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 367 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 152 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 11 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 81 Halsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 186
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 334) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 St. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Grodyn v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 542 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 588 (32)	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 36 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 18 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 550 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 367 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 152 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 11 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 81 Halsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 186
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodinan v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 334) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 374 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 374 Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 143 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Grodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 542 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 555) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 310, 314	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 745 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hall garten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smitt, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Halsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Alien, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 313 15 L. ed. 334 St. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 11 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 209 Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 542 Goodyear India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 588 (32) L. ed. & 551 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Blatchf, 234	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 515 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 36 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 367 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 18 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) 550 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 367 Hallgarten v. Oidham, 135 Mass. 1 152 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 110 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 110 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 51 Hallsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 333 166 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 318 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98, 159, 160, 165 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 453 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 557 v. Elliott, 5 Serg, & R. 375 76
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 313 d5 L. ed. 334 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 62 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har, & R. 67 Goodyear Poental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 655) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gornan v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 Gornan v. Lowell 117 Mass. 65	Hager v. Adams, 70 Lown, 745 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haildeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 367 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 18 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 18 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98 159, 160, 184 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Alien, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers 10 West. Rep. 963 67 Mich, 135
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 313 (15 L. ed. 334) S. 20 How. 313 (15 L. ed. 334) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 S. 20 How. 313 (15 L. ed. 334) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 S. 20 How. 313 (15 L. ed. 220) Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 S. 20 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodyear v. Weynouth and Melcombe Regis, 11 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 542 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 588 (32 L. ed. 555) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Blatchf. 234 Gorham v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 V. Pacific R. Co. 28 Mo. 6441	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph. 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 37 Hallgarten v. Oidham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 St. Hallsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 169, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliett, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hambir P. Pairpoitt Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep.
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 15 L. ed. 334 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Pental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear S. India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. &S) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gordan v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gordan v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 V. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Suggiston 2 Head 70	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph. 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 37 Hallgarten v. Oidham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 St. Hallsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 169, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliett, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hambir P. Pairpoitt Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep.
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 381 d5 L. ed. 934 166, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490. 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) 561 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 666 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 218, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 19 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 20 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 20 Goodyear Poental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear Bubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 565). 69 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 310, 314 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornam v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornam v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 F. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 142 Goss v. Singieton, 2 Head, 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph. 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 37 Hallgarten v. Oidham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 St. Hallsa v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 169, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliett, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hambir P. Pairpoitt Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep.
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 381 d5 L. ed. 934 166, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490. 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) 561 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 666 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 218, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 19 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 20 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 20 Goodyear Poental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear Bubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 565). 69 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 310, 314 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornam v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornam v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 F. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 142 Goss v. Singieton, 2 Head, 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haikes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haildeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hail v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 397 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 S1 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98 159, 160, 108 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Alien, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mtg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammet v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 334) Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 23 Ind. 119 3.4 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 3.4 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 490 v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Grodwin v. Weynouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weynouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 555) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gornam v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 v. Sizer, 39 Miss. 805 Gorham v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 v. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 866	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haikes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haildeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hail v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 397 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 S1 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98 159, 160, 108 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Alien, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mtg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammet v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 (15 L. ed. 334) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 28 Ind. 119 V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 28 Ind. 119 St. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 Led. & S5) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 Gornan v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 Gornan v. Dodge, 11 West, Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gotsman v. Ponsylvania Ins. Co., 55 Pa. 210 V. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gotsman v. Ponsylvania Ins. Co., 55 Pa. 210 Souverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch.	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haikes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haildeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hail v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 397 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 S1 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98 159, 160, 108 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Alien, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mtg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammet v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 d5 L. ed. 334 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 d5 L. ed. 334 V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 C. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Poental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear S. India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. \$55) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 V. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 187 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Goulstone v. Royal Ins. Co., 1 Fost. & F. 276 Goulstone v. Soyal 10, C. 71 Goody v. Schole, 274 Goody v. Schole, 274 Goody v. A. Red, 79 V. Whitney, 24 Vt. 187 Gould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowd v. Schole, 274 Goody v.	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). 530 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 81 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Halls v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 363 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98. 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 445 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfz. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 144 Mass. 57 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammet v. Queen Ius. Co., 50 Wis. 240 S. 77 (26 L. ed. HII) Hanney v. Com., 8 Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 d5 L. ed. 334 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 343 d5 L. ed. 334 V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 C. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Poental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear S. India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. \$55) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 V. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 187 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Goulstone v. Royal Ins. Co., 1 Fost. & F. 276 Goulstone v. Soyal 10, C. 71 Goody v. Schole, 274 Goody v. Schole, 274 Goody v. A. Red, 79 V. Whitney, 24 Vt. 187 Gould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowd v. Schole, 274 Goody v.	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). 530 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 81 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Halls v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 363 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98. 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 445 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfz. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 144 Mass. 57 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammet v. Queen Ius. Co., 50 Wis. 240 S. 77 (26 L. ed. HII) Hanney v. Com., 8 Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 769 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 313 (15 L. ed. 334) S. 20 How. 313 (15 L. ed. 334) V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 V. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 V. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 588 (32 L. ed. 555) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Blatchf. 234 Gornam v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 Ill. 528 V. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head, 79 V. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Ponsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 866 Gouverneur, v Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 S53 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf. 433, 129 109 U. S. 278 et 21 Led. 323	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). 530 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 81 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Halls v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 363 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98. 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 445 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfz. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 144 Mass. 57 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammet v. Queen Ius. Co., 50 Wis. 240 S. 77 (26 L. ed. HII) Hanney v. Com., 8 Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 209 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Pental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 118 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 565) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gordon v. Sizer, 39 Miss. 805 Gorham v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 F. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. V. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). 530 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 81 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Halls v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 363 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98. 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 445 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfz. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 144 Mass. 57 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammet v. Queen Ius. Co., 50 Wis. 240 S. 77 (26 L. ed. HII) Hanney v. Com., 8 Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 209 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Pental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 118 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 565) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gordon v. Sizer, 39 Miss. 805 Gorham v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 F. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. V. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). 530 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 81 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Halls v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 363 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98. 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl. 445 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfz. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 144 Mass. 57 Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammet v. Queen Ius. Co., 50 Wis. 240 S. 77 (26 L. ed. HII) Hanney v. Com., 8 Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 209 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Pental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 118 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 565) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gordon v. Sizer, 39 Miss. 805 Gorham v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 F. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. V. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323	Hager v. Adams, 70 Lown, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 153 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Hams v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl, 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammel v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (26 L. ed. Hill) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527) v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 28 Kan,
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 209 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Pental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 118 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 565) Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 Gordon v. Sizer, 39 Miss. 805 Gorham v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 F. Pacific R. Co., 26 Mo. 441 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. V. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Blatchf, 433, 105 Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323	Hager v. Adams, 70 Lown, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 153 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Hams v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl, 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammel v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (26 L. ed. Hill) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527) v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 28 Kan,
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 160, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490. 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) 561 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 666 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 218, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Wolcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. 70 Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 685). 673 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 310, 314 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornan v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Foos v. Singieton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 55 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Biatchf, 433, 109 v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323 Grafton v. Eastern Countes R. Co., 8 Exch. 699 Graham v. Grabam, 10 Ired L. 219 Grant v. Holmes, 75 Mo. 109 v. Kidwell, 30 Mo. 455 Grave v. Graves, 38 Iowa, 310	Hager v. Adams, 70 Lown, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 153 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Hams v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl, 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammel v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (26 L. ed. Hill) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527) v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 28 Kan,
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 160, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490. 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) 561 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 666 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 218, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Wolcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. 70 Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 685). 673 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 310, 314 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornan v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Foos v. Singieton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 55 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Biatchf, 433, 109 v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323 Grafton v. Eastern Countes R. Co., 8 Exch. 699 Graham v. Grabam, 10 Ired L. 219 Grant v. Holmes, 75 Mo. 109 v. Kidwell, 30 Mo. 455 Grave v. Graves, 38 Iowa, 310	Hager v. Adams, 70 Lown, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 153 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Hams v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl, 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammel v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (26 L. ed. Hill) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527) v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 28 Kan,
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 160, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490. 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) 561 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 666 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 218, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Wolcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. 70 Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 685). 673 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 310, 314 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornan v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Foos v. Singieton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 55 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Biatchf, 433, 109 v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323 Grafton v. Eastern Countes R. Co., 8 Exch. 699 Graham v. Grabam, 10 Ired L. 219 Grant v. Holmes, 75 Mo. 109 v. Kidwell, 30 Mo. 455 Grave v. Graves, 38 Iowa, 310	Hager v. Adams, 70 Lown, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 153 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Hams v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl, 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammel v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (26 L. ed. Hill) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527) v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 28 Kan,
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 464 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How, 318 15 L. ed. 934 160, 167 Goodrich v. Reynolds, 31 III. 490. 859 v. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 26 Ind. 119 T. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How, 471 (13 L. ed. 220) 561 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 666 v. Griffis, 88 N. Y. 629 218, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, 219 Goodyear v. Wolcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. 70 Goodyear Rubber Co., 123 U. S. 598 (32 L. ed. 685). 673 Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Biatchf, 234 310, 314 Gorman v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Gornan v. Dodge, 11 West. Rep. 602, 122 III. 528 Foos v. Singieton, 2 Head. 79 v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 137 Gottsman v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 55 Pa. 210 Sould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 686 Gouverneur, v. Lynch, 2 Paige, 300, 2 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 916 Gowdy v. Sanders, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 912 Grace v. American C. Irs. Co., 16 Biatchf, 433, 109 v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 323 Grafton v. Eastern Countes R. Co., 8 Exch. 699 Graham v. Grabam, 10 Ired L. 219 Grant v. Holmes, 75 Mo. 109 v. Kidwell, 30 Mo. 455 Grave v. Graves, 38 Iowa, 310	Hager v. Adams, 70 Lown, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547) v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 153 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Ætna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Hams v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly. 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Lubukee, 51 Hl, 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 57 Hammel v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (26 L. ed. Hill) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527) v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 28 Kan,
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513 Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106, 107, 116, 61 U. S. 20 How. 313 (15 L. ed. 334) W. Winchester & D. Turnp. Co., 25 Ind. 119 C. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 8 Burr. 143 V. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220) Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodwin v. Gilbert, 9 Mass. 510 Goodyear v. Weymouth and Melcombe Regis. 1 Har. & R. 67 Goodyear Pental Vulcanite Co. v. Bacon, 148 Mass. 542 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear's India Ru	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hall garten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 Halls v. Halsa, 8 Mo. 303 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98. 159, 160, 108 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Alien, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Eliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee. 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 st. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 V. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 144 Mags. 57 Hammet v. Oucen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (25 L. ed. Hill) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 (24 L. ed. 527) v. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Farmer, 14 Mass. 227 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawlet, 37 Vi. 38 Vi. 380 Hargrave v. Lee Breton, 4 Burr. 2422 52 Harkness v. Burton, 39 Jowa, 101 Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341 Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341 Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341 Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341 Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Gray, 341 Harriman v. Harriman, 25 Cray, 341
Goldsworthy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 709 Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N. Y. 513	Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa, 748 Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 154 Haile v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33 Haideman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 483 (24 L. ed. 547). 550 v. Toby, 1 Cent. Rep. 54, 110 Pa. 318 Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. 1 Halloran v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 257 Halpin v. Etna F. Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. S. R. 259 81 v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 165 181 Ham v. Hill, 29 Mo. 275 Hamburger v. Rodman, 9 Daly, 93, 98, 159, 160, 168 Hamilton v. Boston, 14 Allen, 473 v. Dobbs, 19 N. J. Eq. 227 v. Elliott, 5 Serg. & R. 375 v. Lubukee. 51 Hl. 415 v. Rogers, 10 West. Rep. 903, 67 Mich. 135 32 v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 144 Mags. 57 Hammet v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 151 Hammock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77 (26 L. ed. HII) Hanney v. Com., 8 Cent. Rep. 184, 116 Pa. 323 Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 c/4 L. ed. 527) s. Martin, 111 Ill. 219 Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227 Hardin v. Osborne, 94 Ill. 571 Hardwick v. Pawiet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawiet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawiet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawiet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawiet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawiet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Pawiet, 36 Vt. 320 Hardwick v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189 Harriman v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189 Harriman v. Haight, 30 Cal. 189 Harriman v. Harriman, 12 Grav, 341 25 v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co., 9 West.

Harris v. Elliott, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 25 (9 L. ed. 333) 431	Hinde v. Longworth, 24 U.S. 11 Wheat, 206 (6
v. Knapp, 21 Pick. 412 697 v. New York Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Pa. 341 808	L. ed. 455) 612 Hindmarsh v. Carlton, 8 H. L. Cas. 160. 825
v. New York Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Pa. 341	Hinds v. Harbou, 58 Ind. 121 455 v. Overacker, 66 Ind. 547 455
v. Ross, 11 West. Rep. 670, 112 Ind. 314 797	Hinds v. Harbou, 58 Ind. 121 455 v. Overacker, 66 Ind. 547 455
v. Stevens, 31 v t. 19	Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan, 186. 374 Hinman v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 38 Wis, 159. 835
Harrison v. Raltimore, 1 Gill, 264	Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105 U.S. 416 (26 L. ed.
v. Hatcher, 44 Ga. 638 514	1079)
v. Parker, 6 East, 154 431	v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 349 (24 L. ed. 661). 298 Hix v. Gosling, 1 Lea, 568. 488
U. V reeland, 38 N. J. L. 300 000	Hix v. Gosling, 1 Lea, 568. 482 Hoard v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 123 U. S. 222
Hartfield r. Roper, 21 Wend, 615	(31 L. ed. 130) 605
Hartford & D. Turnp, Corp. v. Baker, 17 Pick.	(31 L. ed. 130) 608 Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 248. 118 Hoboken v. Gear. 27 N. J. L. 265. 639 Hodges v. Black, 8 Mo. App. 394, 76 Mo. 537. 167 Hodgkins v. Montgomery Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Rarch 213
432 862	Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. L. 265 699
Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 54 Ill. 164	Hodges v. Black, 8 Mo. App. 394, 76 Mo. 537 167
Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 54 Hll. 164	Barb. 213 24 Hodsdon v. Kilgore, 77 Me. 155 44 Hogg v. Beerman, 41 Ohio St. 81 58 Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 278 26 Hoke v. Field, 10 Bush, 144, 19 Am. Rep. 58 Holbrook v. Wightmen, 31 Minn, 168 81
Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130 526	Hodsdon v. Kilgore, 77 Me. 155
Hascall v. Cox, 49 Mich. 440, 441	Hogg v. Beerman, 41 Ohio St. 81
Hatch v. Bayley, 10 Cush. 29 156	Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav, 278 267 Hoke v. Field, 10 Bush, 144, 19 Am. Rep. 58 235
Hathaway r Toledo W & W. R. Co., 48 Ind.	Holbrook v. Wightman, 31 Minn, 168.
25 596, 597	Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396. 813
Hatfield v. Central R. Co., 33 N. J. L. 251 175	Holden v. James, 11 Mass 396 815 Holder v. Lafayette, B. & M. R. Co., 71 III. 106 25 Holladay v. Marsh, 3 Wend 142 47 Holland v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 16 Lea, 418, 419 41 Hollen Davis 59 Lowa 414 41 An Rep 888
Hauer's Case, 60 Md. 462, 463 676 Haupt's App. 125 Pa. 222 204	Hollanday v. Marsh, 3 Wend, 142
Havens v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 28 Conn.	Holland v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 16 Lea, 418, 419 414 Hollen v. Davis, 59 Iowa, 444, 44 Am. Rep. 688,
663	and note 366
v. Home Ins. Co., 9 West. Rep. 635, 111 Ind.	and note 366 Holloway v. Holloway, 5 Ves. Jr. 401. 734 Holmes v. Holmes, B. & A. Mfg. Co., 37 Conn.
90 836 Haviland v. Chace, 39 Barb, 283 716	Holmes v. Holmes, B. & A. Mig. Co., 31 Conn.
Hawks v. Humphrey, 9 Pick, 550. 42 Hawks v. Evans, 76 Iowa, 593 48 Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark, 570. 189	7.8 32 v. Manning (Mass.) 19 N. E. Rep. 25 172
Hawk v. Evans. 76 Iowa, 593	v. Manning (Mass.) 19 N. E. Rep. 25
Hawkins v. Governor, 1 Ark, 570 189	Home Ins. Co. v. Heck, 65 Ill. 111
	Honsei v. Conant, 12 III. App. 259
v. Fearce, H. Hunn, 491	v. Manning (Mass.) 19 N. E. Rep. 25. 177. Home v. Richards, 4 Call (Va.) 441 431. Home Ins. Co. v. Heck, 65 Ill. 111 722. Honsel v. Conant. 12 Ill. App. 259. 185. Hood v. Adams, 124 Mass. 481. 318. v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 22 Conn. 1.502, 502. Hopkins v. Kent, 9 Ohio, 13. 382. Hopt v. Utah. 104 U. S. 631 (26 L. ed. 873) 382. Hopt v. Utah. 104 U. S. 631 (26 L. ed. 873) 5826, 527. Horton v. Meakin, 115 Mass. 263, 309 526, 527. Horton v. Taunton, 87 Mass. 263, note. 870. v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513. 252. Hot Springs R. Co. v. Maher, 48 Ark. 522. 163.
Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302	Hopkins v. Kent, 9 Ohio, 13. 58
Hay v. Star F. Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 241 50	Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631 (26 L. ed. 873) 36
Hayden v. Allyn, 5 New Eng. Rep. 37, 55 Conn.	Hopwood t, Thorn, 8 U. B. 308, 309
280 662 v. Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817 374	Horton r. Taunton, 97 Mass. 256, note. 85
v. Palmer, 2 Hill, 205 612	v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513 25:
Haydock Carriage Co. v. Pier, 74 Wis. 582 797	Hot Springs R. Co. v. Maher, 48 Ark. 522 209
Hayes v. Michigan C. R. Co., 111 C. S. 228 (28 L. ed. 410)	Houdlette v. Tallman, 14 Me. 400 156 Houghton v. Chicago, D. & M. R. Co., 47 Iowa,
Havnes v. Thomas 7 Ind. 38 603	
Haynes v. Thomas, 7 Ind. 38 613 Hayse v. Willar, 77 Pa. 238 206 v. Pacific M. S. S. Co., 53 U. S. 17 How. 596	v. Kendall. 7 Allen. 77
v. Pacific M. S. S. Co., 58 U. S. 17 How. 596	Houser v. Tuily, 62 Pa. 92
(15 L. ed. 254) 301 Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 214. 559	Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Odum, 53 Tex. 353 187 Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & Lef. 652 483
(15 L. ed. 254) 301 Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 214. 559 v. Gunn, 82 Ill. 885. 653 Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill. 90. 711 Hazard v. Martin, 2 Vt. 77 Hazelehurst v. Case, 46 Wis. 391 Hazlehurst v. Savannah, G. & N. A. R. Co. 43 163 505	Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U. S. 13 How, 381 (14 L.
Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill, 90 711	ed. 189)
Hazard v. Martin, 2 Vt. 77	v. Reid, 51 Ga. 328 274
Hazeltine v. Case, 46 Wis. 391 813	
	v. Sexton, 4 N. Y. 157
Ga. 13 503, 505	v. Sexton, 4 N. Y. 157
Ga. 13	v. Sexton, 4 N. Y. 157
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 606 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend, 58 58 54	v. Sexton, 4 N. Y. 157
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co. 79 Ga. 338 192	v. Sexton, 4 N. Y. 157. 611 v. Whenstone Twp., 10 Ohio, 365. 46. Howard F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Cornick, 24 Ill. 455. 83 Howe v. Peabody, 2 Gray, 556. 758 Howel v. Fountain, 3 Ga. 176. 516 v. Young, 5 Barn. & C. 259. 879. 100, 143
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co. 79 Ga. 338 192	v. Whetstone Twp., 10 Ohio, 365
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head. 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 504	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 Ill. 392 72
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head. 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 504	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 Ill. 392 72
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head. 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 504	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 528 66 Hudbard v. Harrison 6 Kv J. Rep. 304
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 600 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 53 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 353 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 382 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 Heine v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 528 66 Hudbard v. Harrison 6 Kv J. Rep. 304
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 600 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 53 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 353 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 382 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 Heine v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 725 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 528 666 Hudspet v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 108 600 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 28. Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat, 489 (6 L.
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 600 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 53 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 353 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 382 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 Heine v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72: Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 523 666 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 108 600 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 280 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat, 489 (6 L. 61)
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 53 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 538 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 54 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 392 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 392 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 170 Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72: Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 523 666 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 108 600 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 280 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat, 489 (6 L. 61)
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 564 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 170 Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56 Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443 Finderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443 S N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 S N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 5:28 666 Hudspet v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 108 600 v. State. 2 Swan, 279 28 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 489 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 399 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr. 273 286
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 600 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 53 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hencherson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 731 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415 302 Hermanns v. Fanning, 151 Mass. 319 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 523 666 Hudspet v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 108 600 v. State. 2 Swan, 279 600 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 489 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 399 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr. 273 267 Hillortt v. New York C. R. Co. 40 N. Y. 154 227
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145. 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145. 302 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heine v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443. 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 507 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 319 Herrman v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzon v. Hertzon, 29 Pa. 467, 448. 81	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 523 666 Hudspet v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 108 600 v. State. 2 Swan, 279 600 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 489 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 399 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr. 273 267 Hillortt v. New York C. R. Co. 40 N. Y. 154 227
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145. 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145. 302 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heine v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443. 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 507 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 319 Herrman v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzon v. Hertzon, 29 Pa. 467, 448. 81	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 5:23 666 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 600 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 200 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 611 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 399 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 200 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 400 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 600 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 800
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145. 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145. 302 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heine v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443. 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 507 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 319 Herrman v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzon v. Hertzon, 29 Pa. 467, 448. 81	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 626 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 626 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 202 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 266 Hundert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 227 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 68 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 665
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 600 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97 564 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 Heine v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 170 Hellreigel v. Manning, 97 N. Y. 56 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443 FN. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 SN. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 Herkenrath v. Ain. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415 Hermanns v. Fanning, 151 Mass Herrman v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Culver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498 477, 480 Heyword v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 334 48 Heyword v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540 250	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 626 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 626 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 202 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 266 Hundert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 227 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 68 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 665
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. Mc Ewen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 75 Hermann v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 190 N. Y. 415 722 Hermann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 463 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 18 N. Y. 540 230	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 626 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 626 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 202 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 266 Hundert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 227 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 68 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 665
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. Mc Ewen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 75 Hermann v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 190 N. Y. 415 722 Hermann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 463 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 18 N. Y. 540 230	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 626 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 626 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 202 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 266 Hundert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 227 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 68 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 665
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heck v. Mc Ewen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 302 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 75 Hermann v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 190 N. Y. 415 722 Hermann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 463 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 18 N. Y. 540 230	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 626 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 626 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 202 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 266 Hundert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 227 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 68 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 665
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heinz v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinet v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443. 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498. 477, 480 Heyward v. Cutbert, 4 McCord, L. 354. 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540. 250 Hibbs, Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421. 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367. 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200. 433 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115. 42	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 626 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 626 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 202 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 61 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 266 Hundert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 227 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 68 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 665
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heinz v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinet v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443. 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498. 477, 480 Heyward v. Cutbert, 4 McCord, L. 354. 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540. 250 Hibbs, Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421. 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367. 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200. 433 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115. 42	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 666 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 600 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 600 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 611 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 266 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 461 Hull v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 800 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 675 Hund v. Geier, 72 III. 393 495, 497 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 210 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 60 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396 32 Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 663 73 Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1 60 v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 202 61 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent.
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heinz v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236. 170 Heinet v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443. 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498. 477, 480 Heyward v. Cutbert, 4 McCord, L. 354. 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540. 250 Hibbs, Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421. 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367. 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200. 433 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115. 42	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 22 Conn. 5:23 666 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 555 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 600 v. State, 2 Swan, 279 600 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) 611 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 397 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 206 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 461 Hull v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 661 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 800 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 675 Hund v. Geier, 72 III. 393 495, 497 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 210 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 60 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396 32 Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 663 73 Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1 60 v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 202 61 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent.
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heinz v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinet v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 371 Hernann v. Magara F. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498. 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540 250 Hibbs, Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200 433 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115. 42	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 523 666 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 55 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 60 v. State, 2 Swan. 279 28 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 439 (6 L. ed. 142) Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 39 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr. 273 26 Huguenin v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 45 Hulbert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 22 Hulbert v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 666 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb. & M. 337 88 v. Rugeles, 56 N. Y. 424 67 Hund v. Geier, 72 III. 393 495, 491 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 26 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 6 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396 32 Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 663 73 Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1 6 v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 222 61 Hurrt v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452 159, 164 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent. Rep. 250, 100 N. Y. 605 18
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heinz v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinet v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 371 Hernann v. Magara F. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498. 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540 250 Hibbs, Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200 433 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115. 42	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 523 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 V. State, 2 Swan. 27 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 459 (6 L. ed. 142) Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr. 273 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 Hullett v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohlo St. 23 Hullett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohlo St. 23 Hullett v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 Hullett v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 V. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 U. State, 22 Tex. App. 396 Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 663 Hurt v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1 V. Robinson, 11 Ohlo St. 232 Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452 Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent. Rep. 250, 100 N. Y. 905 Huskins v. Checinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 504.
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heinz v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinet v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 371 Hernann v. Magara F. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498. 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540 250 Hibbs, Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200 433 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115. 42	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 5:23 66 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 55 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 60 v. State, 2 Swan. 279 20 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 489 (6 L. ed. 142). Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 39 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 26 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 45 Hulbert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 22 Hulett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 66 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 8 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 Hulet v. Geier, 72 III. 393 495, 498 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 21 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 60 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396 32 Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 663 73 Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1 6 v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 232 61 Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452 159, 16 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent. Rep. 250, 100 N. Y. 605 18 Hussine v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 504 Hussner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 114 N. Y. 433 Hussner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 21 Ohio St.
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 eck v. Mc Ewen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 392 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 170 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 392 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 170 Heinele v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 371 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 TO, 100 N. Y. 415 722 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415 Hermann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540 250 Hibbs. Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200 483 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115 42 Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 402 v. Dunham, 7 Gray, 543 665 v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243 374 v. Jordan, 30 Me. 367 589 v. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 618 735 v. Ressegien, 17 Barb, 162 445 v. Sheiblev, 83 Ga. 556 661 v. State, 17 Wis. 676 613	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 5:23 66 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 55 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 60 v. State, 2 Swan. 279 20 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 489 (6 L. ed. 142). Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 39 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 26 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 45 Hulbert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 22 Hulett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 66 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 8 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 Hulet v. Geier, 72 III. 393 495, 498 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 21 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 60 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396 32 Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 663 73 Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1 6 v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 232 61 Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452 159, 16 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent. Rep. 250, 100 N. Y. 605 18 Hussine v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 504 Hussner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 114 N. Y. 433 Hussner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 21 Ohio St.
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 eck v. Mc Ewen, 12 Lea, 97 504 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 392 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 170 Heine v. Com., 91 Pa. 145 392 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 236 170 Heinele v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 371 Henderson v. Thornton, 37 Miss. 443 731 Herkenrath v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818 TO, 100 N. Y. 415 722 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415 Hermann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540 250 Hibbs. Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200 483 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115 42 Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 402 v. Dunham, 7 Gray, 543 665 v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243 374 v. Jordan, 30 Me. 367 589 v. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 618 735 v. Ressegien, 17 Barb, 162 445 v. Sheiblev, 83 Ga. 556 661 v. State, 17 Wis. 676 613	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392. 722 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 523. 666 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304. 553 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106. 600 v. State. 2 Swan. 279. 282 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 439 (6 L. ed. 112). 611 Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865. 393 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273. 283 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455. 453 Hulbert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154. 223 Hulbert v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233. 683 Hull v. Riehmond, 2 Woodb. & M. 357. 883 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424. 684 Hunt v. Geier, 72 III. 393. 495, 493 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173. 211 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290. 67 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396. 323 Hunt v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1. 67 v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 223. 613 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent. Rep. 250, 100 N. Y. 805 Hussner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 114 N. Y. 433 Huston v. Cincinnati, & T. R. Co., 21 Ohio St. 235 Huston v. Cambania & T. R. Co., 21 Ohio St. 235 Huttor, v. Camden, 39 N. J. L. 122. 813
Hazlett v. Sinclair, 76 Ind. 488. 606 Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58. 54 Head v. Georgia P. R. Co., 79 Ga. 338. 192 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 v. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 r. Head 2 Ga. 191 362 Heinz v. McEwen, 12 Lea, 97. 504 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinz v. Railroad Transfer Co., 82 Mo. 233, 238. 170 Heinet v. State, 72 Ind. 297 231 Hench v. State, 72 Ind. 297 371 Hernann v. Magara F. Ins. Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63, 5N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 818. 770 Hermann v. Nisgara F. Ins. Co., 1 Cent. Rep. 707, 100 N. Y. 415. 722 Herrmann v. Merchants Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 184. 80 Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 467, 468 191 Hess v. Clark, 11 Mo. App. 492 167 v. Cuiver (Mich.) 6 L. R. A. 498. 477, 480 Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354 48 Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 540 250 Hibbs, Ex parte, 25 Fed. Rep. 421 399 Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367 65 Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg, 200 433 Higgins v. Cariton, 28 Md. 115. 42	Hoyt v. Pawtucket Sav. Inst., 110 III. 392 72 Hubbard v. Callahan, 42 Conn. 5:23 66 Hudspeth v. Harrison, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 304 55 Huff v. Nickerson, 27 Me. 106 60 v. State, 2 Swan. 279 20 Hughes v. Edwards, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 489 (6 L. ed. 142). Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 Fed. Rep. 865 39 Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. Jr., 273 26 Hine v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455 45 Hulbert v. New York C. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 154 22 Hulett v. Fairbanks, 40 Ohio St. 233 66 Hull v. Richmond, 2 Woodb, & M. 337 8 v. Ruggles, 56 N. Y. 424 Hulet v. Geier, 72 III. 393 495, 498 Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N. Y. 173 21 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290 60 v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396 32 Huntington v. Allen, 44 Miss. 663 73 Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1 6 v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 232 61 Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452 159, 16 Hurst v. New York Produce Exchange, 1 Cent. Rep. 250, 100 N. Y. 605 18 Hussine v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 504 Hussner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 114 N. Y. 433 Hussner v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 21 Ohio St.

I.	K.		
Iddings v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. Ch. 252 65 Iglehart v. Moore, 21 Tex. 501 323 Illinois & St. L. R. & C. Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dill.	Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 120, 2 N.Y. Ch. L. ed. 241 483 Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. v. Gough, 35		
70 803 Filinois C. D. Co. n. Adams. 49 711 474 500	Kan. 1		
v. Frankenberg, 54 III. 88	401 75 v. Whitt, 36 Kan. 760 119 Kastner v. Piblinski, 96 Ind. 229 62 Kaufman v. Cook, 114 Ill, 13 418		
Imlay v. Union Branch R. Co., 26 Conn. 255 433 Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. Rep. 389 584 Indiana, B. & W. R. Co. v. Allen, 12 West. Rep. 887, 910, 113 Ind. 308, 581 604 v. Dailey, 8 West. Rep. 516, 110 Ind. 75 637	Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88. 109 Keech v. Hall, I Doug, 21, 1 Smith, Lead, Cas. *653, 7th Am. ed. 879. 569 Keeley v. Goodwin, 111 Mees. 460, 462		
v. Greene, 5 West. Rep. 885, 100 1101, 219, 596, 597, 598	Keenan v. Com., 44 Pa. 55 36 Kehn v. State, 93 N. Y. 291 782, 783 Kehrer v. Richmond City, 81 Va. 745. 435		
v. Hammock, 12 West. Rep. 297, 113 Ind. 1. 598 Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181. 637 Indianapolis v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9. 603 v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 211. 603	Keenan v. Com., 44 Pa. 55 38 Kehn n. State, 93 N. Y. 291 782, 783 Kehrer v. Richmond City, 81 Va. 745 485 Keith v. Mies, 39 Miss. 442 710 Kelley v. Drury, 9 Allen, 27 645, 646 Kellinger v. Forty-Second St. & G. St. F. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 296		
110 313 766 n. Watson, 12 West, Rep. 285, 114 Ind. 275, 637	Kellock's Case, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 769 460, 461 Kelly v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 70 Mo. 604 780 v. Harrison, 2 Johns. Cas. 29 445		
Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v. Hartley, 67 Ili. 439 Indianapolis, C. & L. R. Co. v. Harter, 38 Ind.	v. Humboldt F. Ins. Co. (Pa.) 6 Atl. Rep. 740 v. Partington, 5 Barn, & Ad. 648 Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708 87		
Inkster v. Carver, 16 Mich, 484	v. Sargent, 40 Hun, 150 256 Kelso v. Frye, 4 Bibb, 493 429 Kendall v. United States, 37 U. S. 12 Pet, 521 (9		
Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster Co., 21 Iowa, 271 Irwin r. Mobile, 57 Ala. 6	Kensington v. Keith, 2 Pa. 218. 641 Kent v. Rand, 2 New Eng. Rep. 858, 64 N. H. 45 797		
Isbell v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 27 Conn. 393 142 Ives v. Farmers Bank, 2 Allen, 236 366	Kerr v. Forgue, 54 Ill. 482		
J.	Kerwhaker v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172		
Jackson v. Bellevieu, 30 Wis. 251 87 v. Bull, 10 Johns. 20 697 v. Edwards, 7 Paige, 386, 408, 4 N. Y. Ch.	Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 617 (25 L. ed. 769) 573 Killips v. Putnam F. Ins. Co., 28 Wis. 472 50 Killmer v. Wuchner, 74 Iowa, 359, 360 290, 291		
L. ed. 200 445 v. Gumaer, 2 Cow.552 622 v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 394 384	Kilpatrick r. Com., 31 Pa. 198		
v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 25 Vt. 161. 142 v. State, 8 Cent. Rep. 581, 49 N. J. L. 252. 613 Jacobs v. Jacobs, 16 Beav. 457, 560. 734 Jaffray v. Davis, 48 Hun. 500. 239	Dec, 387 60 v. Hildreth, 8 Allen, 167 132 v. Howard F. Ins, Co., 8 Gray, 38 85 v. Lockwood, 6 R. I. 138, 140 570 Kimbro v. Bullitt, 63 U. S. 22 How, 256 (16 L.		
Jamison v. Beaubien, 4 III. 113	Kimbro v. Bullitt, 63 U. S. 22 How. 256 (16 L. ed. 313) 679 Kincaid v. Neall, 3 McCord, L. 201 679 Kincaid v. Neall, 3 McCord, L. 201 787		
v. Edwards, 7 Paige, 386, 408, 4 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 200 v. Gumaer, 2 Cow. 552 v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 394 v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 25 V t. 161 142 v. State, 8 Cent. Rep., 581, 49 N. J. L. 252 613 Jacobs v. Jacobs, 16 Beav. 457, 560 Jaffray v. Davis, 48 Hun. 500 Jamison v. Beaubien, 4 III. 113 Jasper County v. Osborn, 59 Iowa, 208 Jaynes v. Javnes, 39 Hun, 40 J. B. Paimer's Trade Mark, Re, L. R. 24 Ch. Div. 504, 517, 521 Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 224 Jenkins v. Jones, 2 Giff, 99 v. Pierce, 98 III. 648 Jenne v. Burt, 121 Ind. 275 410 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500 Jenness v. Cutter, 12 Kan, 500	Col. 313 Col. 3	v. Pierce, 98 Ill, 648 568 Jenne v. Burt, 121 Ind, 275 410 v. Marble, 37 Mich, 319 796 Jenness a Cytler 12 For, 500	N. Y. S. R. 520. 215 v. Dedham, 13 Allen, 186. 86 Kinsey v. Kinsey, 37 Ala. 393. 564 Kirby v. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354. 160
Jenness v. Cutler, 12 Kan. 500. Jersey City v. Morris Canal & Bkg. Co., 12 N. J. Eq. 547. "Joannes" v. Burt, 6 Allen, 236	Kirtland v. Moore, 1 Cent. Rep. 466, 40 N. J. Ec.		
Eq. 547 833 "Joannes" v. Burt, 6 Allen, 238 215 Johannes v. Phœnix Ins. Co., 66 Wis. 50. 770 Johnson v. Ames. 11 Pick. 173 791 v. Hudson R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 455, 462 771 v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 91 Ill. 92 771 v. Williams, 4 Minn. 230 (Gil. 183). 51 Johnston's Ann. (Pa. 15 Cent. Rep. 564	Kisler v. Cameron, 39 Ind. 488. 607 Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696, 710, 713		
v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 91 III. 92 771 v. Williams, 4 Minn. 260 (Gil. 183) 51 Johnston's App. (Pa.) 5 Cent. Rep. 564 604 Jones v. Ashburnbam, 4 East, 455 710			
v. Bacon. 68 Me. 34 697 v. Com., 75 Pa. 403 36, 37 v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 225 219	Knight v. Heaton, 22 Vt. 480 83: v. Norris, 13 Minu. 473 (Gil. 438) 83: v. Thayer, 123 Mass, 25 72: Knowles' Petition, 13 R. I. 90. 550		
Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455 710 v. Bacon, 68 Me. 34 697 v. Com., 75 Pa, 403 38, 37 v. Hoar, 5 Pick, 285 219 v. Lees, 1 Hurlst, & N. 189 471 v. Neale, 2 Pat, & H. (Va.) 339 618 v. Pettibone, 2 Wis, 388 812 v. Radatz, 27 Minn, 240 395, 398 v. Soulard, 65 U. S. 24 How, 41 (16 L. ed. 604)	v. Thayer, 125 Mass, 25 736 Knowles' Petition, 13 R. I. 90 441 Knowles' Petition, 13 R. I. 90 451 Knowles v. Maynard, 13 Met. 352, 255 569, 576 Knowlton v. Rock County, 9 Wis. 410 356 Knov County v. Johnson (Ind.) 7 L. R. A. 684 236, 600		
v. Soulard, 65 U. S. 24 How. 41 (16 L. ed. 604) 562 v. State, 29 Ga. 594 36	Kohn v. Koehler, 96 N. Y. 362, 21 Hun, 466-470 673		
v. Soulard, 65 U. S. 24 How. 41 (16 L. ed. 604) v. State, 29 Ga. 594 36 v. Tracy, 75 Pa. 417. 822 Tuck, 3 Jones, L. 202 825 Jouchert v. Johnson, 6 West. Rep. 880, 108 Ind. 436 Judge v. Braswell, 13 Bush, 67 679			
alliforn a Treada and the service of	54, 59. 81 Kugler's App., 55 Pa. 123. 86 Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 Ill. 514 41 Kyle v. O'Neil, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 709 555		
Julia Bldg Asso. v. Bell Teleph. Co., 5 West. Rep. 557, 88 Mo. 258. Junction R. Co. v. Rugeles, 7 Ohio St. 1. 182, 182 Junction R. Co. v. Rugeles, 7 Ohio St. 1. 182, 183 June v. Purcell, 36 Ohio St. 396. 581	Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 346		
8 L. R. A.	2		

Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Strange, 1004 Lafayette v. Nagle, 12 West. Rep. 637, 113 Ind.	431		
Latayette v. Nagie, 12 west. Rep. 537, 113 Ind.	603	Loehner v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247	16 i 83t
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U. S. 18 How.	UUU	! Logan v. Anderson, 18 R Mon 114	461
404 /15 T. od 451)	313	v. Logan, 77 Ind. 559	42
Lahr Case, 6 Cent. Rep. 371, 104 N. Y. 268	457	v. Logan, 77 Ind. 559 v. Smith, 62 Mo. 455, 458 Logansport v. Shirk, 88 Ind. 563	167
Laird v. Allen, 82 Ill. 43. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Griffin, 92 Ind. 492	$\begin{array}{c} 417 \\ 605 \end{array}$	n Ithl 99 Ind 594-544	603 604
v. Griffin, 5 West, Rep. 807, 107 Ind. 464	605	v. Uhl, 99 Ind. 534-544 Lohart v. Buchanan, 50 Mo. 201	610
v. Griffin, 5 West, Rep. 807, 107 Ind. 464 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Bennett, 89 Ind. 457, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 402		LOUR V. FOX. 100 III. 43	44
457, 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 402	326	t v. wade, 70 Me. 358	569
v. Pinchin, 11 West, Rep. 247, 112 110, 592	598 206	Loosemore v. Badford 9 Moor & W. 657	661 318
v. Pinchin, 11 West. Rep. 247, 112 Ind. 592 v. Rosenzweig, 4 Cent. Rep. 112, 113 Pa. 519 v. Stupak, 6 West. Rep. 244, 108 Ind. 1. v. Stupak (Ind.) 23 N. E. Rep. 246	637	Loomis v. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69 Loosemore v. Radford, 9 Mees, & W. 657 Lord Audley's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 401	298
v. Stupak (Ind.) 23 N. E. Rep. 246	637	Lord v. Unadbourne, 42 Me. 429, 439	450
rake substruct rang Co. r. whereout so minn.		v. Crago, 6 C. B. 90	223
Lalande v. Aldrich (La.) 6 So. Rep. 28	94 412	Lough v. Machlin, 40 Ohio St. 332 Loughlin v. State, 7 Cent. Rep. 90, 105 N. Y. 159,	582
Lanande v. Adrich (1A.) v 80. Rep. 20. Lamb v. Girtman, 33 Ga. 29. v. Montague, 112 Mass, 352. v. Reclamation Dist., 73 Cal. 125. v. Rickets, 11 Ohio, 311. v. Story, 45 Mich, 48. Lamberton v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co., 1 L. R. A. 222, 59 Minn. 120. v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 24 Minn, 281. Lamourieux v. Hewit 5 Wend, 307.	825	162, 163	821
v. Montague, 112 Mass. 352	555	Louisiana Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 74 U. S. 7	
v. Reclamation Dist., 73 Cal. 125	577	Wall. 52 (19 L. ed. 67)	88
0. Rickets, 11 Ohio, 311	582	Louisville & F. R. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Met. (Ky.)	+ 10
Lamberton v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co., 1 L. R.	, 000	177 Louisville & N. A. R. Co. v. Koelle, 104 Ind. 455 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dooley, 78 Ala. 524	$\frac{140}{619}$
A. 222, 59 Minn, 129	77	Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dooley, 78 Ala, 524	OT
v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 24 Minn, 281	52	390.	387
Lamourieux v. Hewit, 5 Wend, 307	001	v. Tennessee Railroad Commission, 19	,
Lamourieux v. Hewit, 5 Wend. 307 Lampreli v. Billericay Union, 3 Exch. 283 Lamson v. Drake, 105 Mass. 564	209 555	Fed. Rep. 679, 16 Am. & Eng. R. R.	550
Lancaster Highway Comrs. v. Baumgarten, 41	000	Cas. 1 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Beck, 119 Ind.	UUU
III. 254	864	174	604
Landers v. Frank Street M. E. Unurch, y. N. Y.		v. Power, 119 Ind. 269 v. Sandford, 117 Ind. 265 v. Soltweddle, 116 Ind. 259	605
120 Landgrove v. Plymouth, 52 V t. 503	712	v. Sandford, 117 Ind. 265	637
Lane v. National Bank of the Metropolis, 6	709	Love v Wells 25 Ind 509	604
Kan. 74	336	Love joy v. Albee, 33 Me. 414	287
Kan. 74 v. Schlemmer, 12 West. Rep. 922, 114 Ind.		v. Softweddle, 116 Ind. 209 Love v. Wells, 25 Ind. 503 Love v. Wells, 25 Ind. 503 v. Augusta Mut. F. Ins. Co., 45 Me. 472 v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379 Low v. Smith, 2 Jur. N. S. 344 Lowder v. Noding, 8 Ired. Eq. 208 Lowel v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 Lowry v. Hall. 2 Watts & S. 131	$\tilde{835}$
296 408, Lathrop v. Atwood, 21 Conn. 117 Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns, 330	798	v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379	665
Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330	318 258	Low v. Smith, Z Jur. N. S. 341	734
	223	Lowell v. Boston, III Mass 454 987	189
Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 209 Lavallee v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 40 Minn.		Lowry v. Hall, 2 Watts & S. 131 v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 162, 35 Am. Rep. 420	64
249	420	v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 162, 35 Am. Rep. 420	439
Law v. Mills, 18 Pa. 185.	64	I wodows a Hostford I & A Too Co. 12 Fed	795
wrence v. Batchelder, 131 Mass. 504v. Houghton, 5 Johns. 129	515 612	Ren 465	119
v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641	441	Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush, 60	489
v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641 v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586, 589.	466	Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cromp. & J. 301	527
C. SHILLA 43 N. H. 253	387		
e Stonington Bank & Conn. 521		Lumbey v. Crye, & Ed. & Di. 210	422
v. Smith, 45 N. H. 533 v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521 Awson v. Morrison, 2 Am. Lead, Cas. 5th ed.	46	Lux v. Hoff, 47 Ill. 425. Lycoming F. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 55 Vt. 526	655
pawson v. morrison, z Am. Leau, Cas. sm eu.	46 384	Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush, 60 Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush, 60 Lumby v. Aliday, 1 Cromp. & J. 301 Lumley v. Gye, 2 Fl. & Bl. 216 Lux v. Hoff, 47 Ill. 425 Lycoming F. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 55 Vt. 526 Lyman v. Brown, 2 Curt. 559	655 64 269
Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146	46 384 270	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189	635 64 269 613
Lazier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146.	46 384 270 48	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cos., 577, 600, 422, 423, 425.	635 64 269 613 526
Layier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146. Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111. Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449.	46 384 270	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600, 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227	635 64 269 613
Layier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146. Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111. Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449.	384 270 48 607 96 46	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68. Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Lyons v. People, 68 IU. 271.	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685
Layier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146. Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111. Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449.	46 384 270 48 607 96 46 165	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68. Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419.	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 596
Layier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146. Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111. Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449. v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201. Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269. Leark v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 576. Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345.	384 270 48 607 96 165 471	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68. Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Lyons v. People, 68 IU. 271.	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685
Lawson v. Morrson, 2 Am. Lead. Css. sin ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 38 Barb. 102 Lear Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583	384 270 487 607 467 1671 15885	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68. Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419. Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 596
Lawson v. Morrson, 2 Am. Lead. Css. sin ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 38 Barb. 102 Lear Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583	46 384 270 48 607 46 165 471 5835 168	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68. Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419.	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 596
Layer v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146	46 384 270 48 607 96 46 165 471 5835 168 151	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 III. 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Spruff, 1 Dev. Eq. 130	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 596 36
Lawson v. Morrson, 2 Am. Lead. Css. sin ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 28 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 38 Barb. 102 Lear Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583	46 384 270 48 607 46 165 471 5835 168	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 III. 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Spruff, 1 Dev. Eq. 130	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 596 36
Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Am. Lead. Cas. sin ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 628 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Legan v. State, 3 Heisk, 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West. Rep. 618, 122 III.	384 270 48 607 96 46 165 471 5895 168 161 687 656	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 517, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68. Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 191 Ind. 419. Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall. 147 Mass. 81 310, McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep.	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 596 36
Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Am. Lead. Cas. sin ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb. 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 628 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Legan v. State, 3 Heisk, 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West. Rep. 618, 122 III.	384 270 48 607 96 46 165 471 5895 168 161 687 656	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Hl. 271 v. Terre Haute & H. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343	635 64 269 619 526 697 46 685 536 36
Lawson v. Morrson, 2 Am. Lead. Css. 3m ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 43 Me. 269 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leadyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Leave v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 623 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leesan v. State, 3 Heisk, 139 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 Ill. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 388, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311)	46 384 270 48 607 96 46 165 471 5835 168 151 687 656 390 301	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCaun v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCaun v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCardle v. Stepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 596 36 734 311 48 653 428
Layer v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146. Lea v. Write, 4 Sneed, 111. Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449. v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201. Leary v. Blanchard, 43 Me. 269. Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376. Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345. Ledyard v. Ten Eyok, 35 Barb. 102. Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583. v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 623. Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223. Legan v. State, 3 Heisk. 159. Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 Ill. 317. Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 689. 388, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311). Lessessier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36.	46 384 270 48 607 96 46 165 471 5835 168 161 687 656 390 301 165	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Hl. 271. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 130 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass. 81 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McClary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McClary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 118 McClarekey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 596 36 734 311 48 653 428 717
Layer v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146. Lea v. Write, 4 Sneed, 111. Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449. v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201. Leary v. Blanchard, 43 Me. 269. Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376. Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345. Ledyard v. Ten Eyok, 35 Barb. 102. Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583. v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 623. Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223. Legan v. State, 3 Heisk. 159. Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 Ill. 317. Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 689. 388, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311). Lessessier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36.	46 384 2770 48 607 96 46 165 4711 4550 835 168 151 687 656 390 301 818	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McClusy v. Haps & West Rep. 683 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McCours v. Haps & West Rep. 683 M	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 596 36 734 311 48 653 428
Lawson v. Morrson, 2 Am. Lead. Css. 3th ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 43 Me. 269 Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leadyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Leave v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 623 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leesen v. State, 3 Heisk, 139 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 Ill. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 388 Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) 310 Lessassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad, 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369	46 384 270 46 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467 467	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClane v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McClane v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McClane v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512 McComas v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512 McComb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 233, 1 N. Y. Ch.	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 36 734 311 48 653 428 717 397
Layer v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146. Lea v. Write, 4 Sneed, 111. Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449. v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201. Leary v. Blanchard, 43 Me. 269. Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376. Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345. Ledyard v. Ten Eyok, 35 Barb. 102. Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583. v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 623. Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223. Legan v. State, 3 Heisk. 159. Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 Ill. 317. Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 689. 388, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311). Lessessier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36.	46 384 2770 48 607 96 46 165 4711 4550 835 168 151 687 656 390 301 818	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 517, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68. Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227. Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419. Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall. 147 Mass. 81	635 64 269 613 526 697 46 685 596 36 734 311 48 653 428 717
Layier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 45 Me. 269 Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather V. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, I Met. (Ky.) 628 Leather v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leather v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leather v. Cope, 11 West. Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 388, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) Leassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 92 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall, 462 (18 L. ed. 513)	384 987 98 46 165 471 5885 658 80 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 130 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass. 81 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343 McClane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McCinskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComas v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N.Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87	655 642 613 526 613 526 687 685 653 653 423 717 737 598 612 191
Layier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 45 Me. 269 Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather V. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, I Met. (Ky.) 628 Leather v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leather v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leather v. Cope, 11 West. Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 388, Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) Leassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 92 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall, 462 (18 L. ed. 513)	46 35 3 4 6 6 7 4 6 6 7 4 6 6 7 4 6 6 7 4 6 6 7 4 6 6 7 4 6 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 6 7 4 7 4	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271. v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 130 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass. 81 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343 McClane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McCinskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComas v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N.Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87	655 642 613 526 613 526 687 685 653 653 423 737 593 612 191 142
Lawson v. Morrson, 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 3th ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 43 Me. 269 Leask v. Scott, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 376 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leadyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Leave v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 623 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leeser v. State, 3 Heisk, 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 Ill. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 388 Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 310 Lessessier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethoridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 92 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall, 462 (18 L. ed. 497) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith Lead	## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComas v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 69, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCoun v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176 McCover, V. California P. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532 McCreery v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCully v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCully v. Mayland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheet, 488,44	655 642 613 526 613 526 687 685 653 653 423 717 737 598 612 191
Lawson v. Mortson, 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 3th ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Banchard, 43 Me. 269 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leadyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) E23 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leesen v. State, 3 Heisk, 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) 310 Lesassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethoridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 12 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 462 (18 L. ed. 497) Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 388 Lindau v. Arnold, 4 Strobh, 290	45 354 457 457 55 45 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComas v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 69, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCoun v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176 McCover, V. California P. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532 McCreery v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCully v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCully v. Mayland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheet, 488,44	655 642 613 526 613 526 687 685 653 653 423 737 593 612 191 142
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Layier v. Westcott, 25 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 223 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leesen v. State, 3 Heisk, 139 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 683 388 Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) Lessassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 22 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 622 IS L. ed. 497) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Lessassier v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Line weaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Linoleum Mfg. Co. Nairn, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 834	## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ## ##	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Sepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComs v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 699, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCoun v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532 McCreery v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 428 (4 L. ed. 606) McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ind. 187 McDermett v. State, 89 Ind. 187	635 64 64 64 65 65 66 68 65 66 68 66 65 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Layier v. Westcott, 25 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269 Leary v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 36 Barb, 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 223 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leeser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leesen v. State, 3 Heisk, 139 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 683 388 Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) Lessassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 22 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 622 IS L. ed. 497) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Lessassier v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Line weaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Linoleum Mfg. Co. Nairn, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 834	**************************************	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Sepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComs v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 699, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCoun v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532 McCreery v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 428 (4 L. ed. 606) McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ind. 187 McDermett v. State, 89 Ind. 187	635 64 64 65 65 66 65 65
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Layier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Bianchard, 45 Me. 269 Leaker Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather V. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 Lesser v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leagan v. State, 3 Heisk, 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 689 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 683 Lelouv v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 313) Lessesier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 33, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 Lekbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 388 Lindau v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172 Line weaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Line leum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 834 Line Meadows, Borough of, 28 Pa. 256 Little Meadows, Borough of, 28 Pa. 256 Little Meadows, Borough of, 28 Pa. 276 Little Maimi R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Obio St. 110	**************************************	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 84 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComss v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 197 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1977 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCoun v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532 McCreery v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCullock v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 428 (4 L. ed. 606) McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (23 L. ed. 259), 100 U. S. 508 (25 L. ed. 631) McEwan v. Smith, 24 H. L. Cas. 309, 328	635 6426 6526 6526 6526 6526 6526 6526 652
Layier v. Westcott, 25 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blauchard, 45 Me. 269 Leaker Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leagn v. State, 3 Heisk, 159 Lean v. State, 3 Heisk, 159 Lehlord v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 Ill. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 683 Lelour v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac, R. Co., 49 Iowa, 683 Lesassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 32 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 462 (18 L. ed. 477) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. (23 L. ed. 514) Linduu v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Linewayer v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Linewayer v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Linewayer v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Linewayer v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Linewayer v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Linewayer v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Little Madows, Borough of, 28 Pa. 256 Little Mamin R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 Little Mamin R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 Little Mamin R. Co. v. Vetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 Little Mamin R. Co. v. Vetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 Little Mamin R. Co. v. Vetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110	\$\frac{465}{245}\$\frac{465}{255}\$\frac{665}{25	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McClare v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McClare v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComas v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 197 Ind. 512 MrComb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 233, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCour v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176 McCory v. California P. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532 McClev v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCullock v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 428 (4 L. ed. 606) McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (28 L. ed. 269), 100 U. S. 508 (25 L. ed. 631) McEwan v. Smith, 2 H. L. Cas. 309, 329 MrEvran v. Powers, 1 Serg, & R. 101	635 642 652 665 685 685 685 685 685 685 685 685 685
Lawson v. Mortson, 2 Am. Lead. Cas. 3th ed. Lazier v. Westcott, 23 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Bianchard, 43 Me. 269 Leaker Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Ledyard v. Ten Eyck, 38 Barb. 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 628 Leegan v. State, 3 Heigk. 139 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West. Rep. 618, 122 III. 1817 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 Ledou v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 317) Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 683 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 96 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 32 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 662 (18 L. ed. 497) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 388 Lindau v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172 Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 475 L	\$\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprufl, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComss v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 197 Ind. 512 MrComb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 233, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb. 87 McCoun v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176 McCoy v. California P. R. Co., 40 Cal. 532 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDormott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDormott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDormott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDornald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (28 L. ed. 269), 100 U. S. 508 (25 L. ed. 631) McEwan v. Smith, 2 H. L. Cas. 399, 328 MrFerran v. Powers, 1 Serg. & R. 101 McGebee v. State, 1 West. Rep. 467, 163 Ind. 444 McGebee v. State, 1 West. Rep. 467, 163 Ind. 444 McGebee v. State, 1 West. Rep. 467, 163 Ind. 444	635 69 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 66 68 65 68 65 68 65 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Layer v. Westcott, 25 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blauchard, 45 Me. 269 Leaker Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leadyrd v. Ten Eyck, 35 Barb. 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 628 Lees v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leegan v. State, 3 Heisk. 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 Lelour v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) Lesassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 36 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 92 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 462 (18 L. ed. 477) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 388 Lindau v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172 Line West v. Holt, 1 Sneed, 50 Litt v. Cowley, 1 Holt, N. P. 338, 7 Tannt. 169 Little Meadows, Borongh of, 28 Pa. 256 Little Mami R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 Living States v. McDonald, 21 Iowa, 169 Livingston v. McDonal	** ***********************************	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprull, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343 McCane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComs v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCour v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176, McCory v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cent. Rep. 118, 67 Md. 554 McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (28 L. ed. 269), 100 U. S. 508 (25 L. ed. 631) McGee v. State, 1 West. Rep. 467, 163 Ind. 444 McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark, 40 McGowar v. People's Mut. F. Ira Co. 54 Vt. 211	6355 6913 6526 6536 6531 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453
Layer v. Westcott, 25 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blauchard, 45 Me. 269 Leaker Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leadyrd v. Ten Eyck, 35 Barb. 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 628 Lees v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leegan v. State, 3 Heisk. 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 Lelour v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) Lesassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 36 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 92 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 462 (18 L. ed. 477) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 388 Lindau v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172 Line West v. Holt, 1 Sneed, 50 Litt v. Cowley, 1 Holt, N. P. 338, 7 Tannt. 169 Little Meadows, Borongh of, 28 Pa. 256 Little Mami R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 Living States v. McDonald, 21 Iowa, 169 Livingston v. McDonal	** ***********************************	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprull, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343 McCane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComs v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCour v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176, McCory v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cent. Rep. 118, 67 Md. 554 McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (28 L. ed. 269), 100 U. S. 508 (25 L. ed. 631) McGee v. State, 1 West. Rep. 467, 163 Ind. 444 McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark, 40 McGowar v. People's Mut. F. Ira Co. 54 Vt. 211	6355 64135 6526 651 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653 653
Layer v. Westcott, 25 N. Y. 146 Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111 Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449 v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201 Leary v. Blauchard, 45 Me. 269 Leaker Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345 Leadyrd v. Ten Eyck, 35 Barb. 102 Lee v. Howard F. Ins. Co. 3 Gray, 583 v. Smead, 1 Met. (Ky.) 628 Lees v. Boekhoff, 33 Mo. App. 223 Leegan v. State, 3 Heisk. 159 Lehndorf v. Cope, 11 West, Rep. 618, 122 III. 317 Leiber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 688 Lelour v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (32 L. ed. 311) Lesassier v. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35, 36 Lethbridge v. Mytton, 2 Barn. & Ad. 772 Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369 v. State, 36 N. Y. 71 v. United States, 92 U. S. 618 (23 L. ed. 513) License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 462 (18 L. ed. 477) Lickbarrov v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 388 Lindau v. Arnold, 4 Strobh. 290 Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172 Line West v. Holt, 1 Sneed, 50 Litt v. Cowley, 1 Holt, N. P. 338, 7 Tannt. 169 Little Meadows, Borongh of, 28 Pa. 256 Little Mami R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 Living States v. McDonald, 21 Iowa, 169 Livingston v. McDonal	** ***********************************	Lynch v. Com., 88 Pa. 189 v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas., 577, 600. 422, 423, 425, Lynde v. Estabrook, 7 Allen, 68 Lynn First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass, 227 Lyons v. People, 68 Ill., 271 v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 101 Ind. 419 Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 M. McCabe v. Sprull, 1 Dev. Eq. 190 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass, 81 McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343 McCane v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McClare v. Shepherd, 21 N. J. Eq. 79 McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593 McComs v. Haas, 5 West, Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512 M'Comb v. Wright, 5 Johns, Ch. 253, 1 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1077 McCormick v. Laughran, 16 Neb, 87 McCour v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176, McCory v. Day, 6 L. R. A. 503, 119 N. Y. 1 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullock v. Aten, 2 Ohio, 308 McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cent. Rep. 118, 67 Md. 554 McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (28 L. ed. 269), 100 U. S. 508 (25 L. ed. 631) McGee v. State, 1 West. Rep. 467, 163 Ind. 444 McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark, 40 McGowar v. People's Mut. F. Ira Co. 54 Vt. 211	63556965696665936 7311 483674777 59321114258 3532 17166317483674836 7716631748368074787 59321114258 3532 1716631748368074787 7716631748368074787 7716631748368074787 77186317483836 7718631748380 7718631748380 77186317480 7718600 77186000 77186000 771860000 7718600000000000000000000000000000000000
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19

McKenzie's App., 41 Conn. 607	Metcalf v. First Parish in Framingham, 128
McKinney v. Grand Street P. P. & F. R. Co., 8 Cent. Rep. 496, 104 N. Y. 532 780 McKircher v. Hawley, 16 Johns. 289 569 McKnight v. Crinnion, 22 Mo. 559 863	Mass. 375. 748 Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Sirret, 97 N.Y. 320 717,718
McKircher v. Hawley, 16 Johns. 289 569 McKnight v. Crinnion, 22 Mo. 559 863	
McLead v. Ætna L. Ins. Co., 5 West, Rep. 633,	Metzuer v. Bauer, 98 Ind. 425 63 Meyer v. McCabe, 73 Mo. 236 153 v. Pacific R. Co., 40 Mo. 151 786 Meyers v. Schemp, 67 Ill. 469 413
McLead v. Ætna L. Ins. Co., 5 West. Rep. 633, 107 Ind. 594, 396. 408, 409 McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (24 L. ed. 528) 572, 644 McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401. 592	v. Pacific R. Co., 40 Mo. 151. 786
McLean v. Fleming, 90 U. S. 245 (24 L. ed. 528) 5.2, 611 McLead v. Evans 66 Wis. 401	Meyers v. Schemp, 67 Hi. 469 Meyerstein v. Barber, L. R. 2 C. P. 38, 661, L. R.
piclimans v. lancaster, to wis. 550, 000 455 [4 H. L. 317 152 M. Foster Vinegar Mfg. Co. v. Guggemos, 98
McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa, 1. 561 McMillan v. Cronin, 75 N. Y. 474. 711	M. Foster Vinegar Mfg. Co. v. Guggemos, 98
v. Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311	Mo. 391 Michigan C. R. Co. v. Phillips, 60 Ill. 190, 193, 156, 157
McNamara v. Garrity, 106 Ill. 387 417	Michigan C. R. Co. v. Phillips, 60 Ill. 190, 193, 156, 157 Middleton v. Pritchard, 4 Ill. 510
McNichols v. Rubleman, 13 Mo. App. 515, 522 166 Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss, 378 374	Midland R. Co. v. Smith, 12 West. Rep. 699, 113 Ind. 233
McPherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf. 92 384	Milbank' v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 64
v. Runyon (Minn.) 40 Alb. L. J. 403 48 McQueen v. Gamble, 33 Mich, 344 442	How. Pr. 20. 503, 505
Magee v. Scott, 9 Cush, 148.	Miles v. Gorton, 2 Cromp. & M. 504, 4 Tyrwh. 295 159 Milford v. Com., 3 New Eng. Rep. 781, 144 Mass.
Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320. 839 Manady v. Bushwick R. Co., 91 N.Y. 149. 456 Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261, 264. 185, 186, 187	61. 401
Mahan v. Brown 13 Wend, 261, 264 185, 186, 187	Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611 832 Miller v. Gaston, 2 Hill, 188, 190 381
Maine v. Cumston, 98 Mass. 317 606	Miller v. Gaston, 2 Hill, 188, 190 381 v. Hooe, 2 Cranch, C. C. 622 387 v. Marckle, 21 Ht, 152 513
Mallory v. Norton, 21 Barb. 424 468	v. Marckle, 21 III. 152
Maione v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 35 Fed. Rep.	v. Poage, 56 Iowa, 96. 397 v. Simonds, 72 Mo. 669. 287 Millett v. Parker, 2 Met. (Ky.) 608. 738 Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400. 112 112 112
Mandeville v. Parker, 31 N. J. Eq. 242 825 Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer, 11 Cent. Rep. 329, 108 N. Y. 578, 582 718 Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218	Millett v. Parker, 2 Met. (Ky.) 608. 738
Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer, 11 Cent. Rep. 329, 108 N. Y. 578, 582	Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400 112 v. Hall, 9 Wend. 315 832
Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218	v. Hail, 9 Wend, 315 832 Milne v. Moreton, 6 Binn, 361 64
_ (21 L. ed. 100)	penton v. dauson, v Anen, 523
Manistee, The, 5 Biss. 382 241 Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135 685	Milwaukee v. Milwaukee & B. R. Co., 7 Wis. 85 812 Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.
Mann v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 91 N. Y. 500 821 v. Lovejoy, Ryan & M. 355 223	S. 26 (32 L. ed. 585)
Mann v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 91 N. Y. 500 821 v. Lovejoy, Ryan & M. 355 223 Mannix v. State, 13 West. Rep. 109, 115 Ind. 245. 607	Minnick v. Union Ins. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 369 367
Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Continental Bank,	Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477. 684 Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 77 U. S. 10
2 L. R. A. 699, 148 Mass. 553	Wall, 515 (19 L. ed. 998)
Marbourg v. Smith, 11 Kan. 554 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 1 Cranch, 137, 170,	Mississippi & R. R. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 405, 407, 408 (25 L. ed. 206, 207, 208)
178 (2 L. ed. 60, 71, 73) 189, 231, 232, 405 Mariner v. Saunders, 10 Ill. 124 Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 530 523, 524 Marriott v. London & S. W. R. Co., 1 C. B. N. S.	125 . 128
Mariner v. Saunders, 10 Ill. 124 655	Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Long, 27 Kan. 684 54 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (32 L.
Marriott v. London & S. W. R. Co., 1 C. B. N. S.	
200	v. Maltby, 34 Kan. 125, 128, 151386, 592, 303
Martin v. Drinan, 128 Mass. 515	Mitchell, Exparte, 70 Cal. 1. 686
	l Mitchall e Marca 77 Ma 424 697
v. McKnight 1 Overt (Tenn.) 380	v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 471
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 350	Mitchell v. Morse, 77 Me. 423 697 v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 471 Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310 374, 375
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Mitchell v. Morse, 77 Me. 423 697 v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 471 Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310 374, 375 v. Royal St. R. Co., 45 Ala. 322 374, 375 v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 570 373
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Mitchell v. Morse, 77 Me, 423 697 v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms, 181 471 Mobile v. Dargan, 45 Ala, 310 374, 375 v. Royal St. R. Co., 45 Ala, 322 374, 375 v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala, 570 373 Mohr v. Boston & A. R. Co., 106 Mass, 67, 70, 71, 157, 161
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	ed. 177) v. Maltby, 34 Kan. 125, 123, 131
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 483 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Woody Walker 3 Ark 147 734
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark, 147 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346, 388, 390, 414
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385
r. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark, 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 355 87 v. Moore, 11 West, Rev. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62
72. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 73. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 73. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 738 74. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 75. Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 75. Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 75. Martyland F. & Mfg. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 75. Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 III. 163. 725 76. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 491 77. Mathews v. Beach, 58 andf. 258. 215 78. Wathews v. Beach, 58 andf. 258. 751 78. Machews v. Beach, 58 Mg. Co. 447 78. Mathews v. Beach, 58 Mg. 448 78. Mathews v. Beach, 58 Mg. 448	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark, 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 355 87 v. Moore, 11 West, Rev. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 v. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 738 v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997). 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600 553 Masyland F. & Mfg. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 397 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 III. 163 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 258 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Mauck v. Meiton, 69 Ind. 414 418 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346388, 330, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West, Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 v. Williams, 115 N. V. 586, 599 621
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 v. Dotter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 67 s. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997). 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Masyland F. & Mfg. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534. 397 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 491 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 258. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396. 750 Mauck v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 418 Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 .388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385 387 387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morran v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 .388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385 387 387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morran v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 .388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing. 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 50, 515
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 .388, 390, 414 Moore v. Chircago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 355-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 596, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa, 52, 53 388, 390, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 303) 301
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 737 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346385, 300, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-887 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 627 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo, 551. 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 390, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 Minn. 331 466
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 373 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 397 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beack, 5 Sandf. 258. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 t. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Mauk v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 256 W. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 25 Mo. 95 U. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 25 Mo. 95 Maywell v. Cochran, 156 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 55 Mo. 95 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 143, 149. 825, 836	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 737 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 299 v. Dod, 3 Colo, 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 395, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 Miun. 351 466 Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 566
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 373 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 397 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beack, 5 Sandf. 258. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 t. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Mauk v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 256 W. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 25 Mo. 95 U. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 25 Mo. 95 Maywell v. Cochran, 156 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 55 Mo. 95 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 143, 149. 825, 836	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 554 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 754 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 627 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing. 672 209 v. Dod., 3 Colo. 551 122 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 530, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 303) Morrier v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 Minn. 331 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566
r. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 v. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689) v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 725 v. Bogg. 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 648 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 15 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 648 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 15 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158 Mead v. Noves, 44 Conn. 487. 662 Med Med v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Weidell v. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Mee v. Med Sider V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Mee v. Med Sider V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Mee v. Med Sider V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Mee v. Med Med V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med V. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Me	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark, 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 .388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West, Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 637 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 330, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 63 Pa.
r. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 v. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689) v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 725 v. Bogg. 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 648 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 15 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 648 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 15 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158 Mead v. Noves, 44 Conn. 487. 662 Med Med v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Weidell v. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Sider V. Courly, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Mee v. Med Sider V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Mee v. Med Sider V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. Med Mee v. Med Sider V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Mee v. Med Med V. Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med Med v. Noves, 44 Courley, 8 Mo. 235 Med V. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Med Med v. Me	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 468 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark, 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346 .388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West, Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 637 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 330, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 63 Pa.
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 384 v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 258. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 Mauk v. Meiton, 68 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95. 611 v. Tumlin, 73 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158 v. Medin, v. Patte Count. 487 Medlin v. Platte Count. 87 Medlin v. Platte Count. 87 Meev. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. V. 502 Meerv. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. V. 502 Meerv. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. V. 502 Mechrofi v. Methroff, 26 Eed. Rep. 13. 425	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 299 v. Dod, 3 Colo, 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa, 52, 53 v. Neville, 74 Pa, 52, 53 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall, 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Parham, 83 N. H. 123 568 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 69 Tex. 383 Morrison v. North America Ins. Co., 69 Tex. 383
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 384 1. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 385 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martins v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 386 750 Mauck v. Meiton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 256 W. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 11d. 361. 256 W. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 11d. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 78 N. C. 158 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Mee v. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 500 Merphis v. Holton, 9 Heisk. 509. 125 Memphis & J. R. R. Co., Repry 112 II S 600 Memphis & J. R. R. Co., Repry 112 II S 600	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346385, 330, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo, 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 390, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 Morristown v. North America Ins. Co., 69 Tex. 353 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse r. Bichmond, 87 III 338
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 v. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 397 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 256 W. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 390 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 78 N. C. 158 625 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 739 Mee v. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 500 Meese v. Fond du Lac, 48 Wis, 323 425 Menphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Mendon v. 560, 851	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346385, 330, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo, 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 390, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 Morristown v. North America Ins. Co., 69 Tex. 353 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse r. Bichmond, 87 III 338
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 v. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 397 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 256 W. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 390 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 78 N. C. 158 625 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 739 Mee v. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 500 Meese v. Fond du Lac, 48 Wis, 323 425 Menphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Mendon v. 560, 851	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346. 388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 637 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 380, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 63 Pa. 173 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill. 343 661 Morror v. Caldwell, 3 Strobh, Eq. 166. 377 Mortor v. Lorgram Il Ired, 248 42
v. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 v. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 v. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 397 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 751 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 256 W. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 390 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 78 N. C. 158 625 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 739 Mee v. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 500 Meese v. Fond du Lac, 48 Wis, 323 425 Menphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Mendon v. 560, 851	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346. 388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 637 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 380, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 63 Pa. 173 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill. 343 661 Morror v. Caldwell, 3 Strobh, Eq. 166. 377 Mortor v. Lorgram Il Ired, 248 42
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689) 9. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997) 561 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 384 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600 Maryland F. & Mfg. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 755 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 755 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 163. 755 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandi. 236. 215 9. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 215 9. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 255 Mauck v. Meiton, 69 Ind. 414. 418 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 9. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95 91 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15 92 93 94 94 95 95 96 96 96 97 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346. 388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 637 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 380, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 63 Pa. 173 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill. 343 661 Morror v. Caldwell, 3 Strobh, Eq. 166. 377 Mortor v. Lorgram Il Ired, 248 42
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 731 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 Mauck v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 366 Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo., 95. 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 100 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158. 666 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 148, 149. 825, 825 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 739 Mee v. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 500 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Menderson v. Specker, 79 Ky. 509 Menderson v. Specker, 79 Ky. 509 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McL	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346385, 300, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-887 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 388, 390, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 Minn. 351 466 Morris C. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 655 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 Morrison v. North America Ins. Co., 69 Tex. 353 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill, 348 661 Morton v. Caldwell, 3 Strobh. Eq. 166 37 v. Ingram, 11 Ired. L. 388 461 Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 485 374 Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 485 374 Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 533 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 731 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Mauck v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95. 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 163 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158. 666 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 148, 149. 825, 825 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Meev. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 502 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Menderson v. Specker, 79 Ky, 509 Mencer v. Cook, 11 Cent. Rep. 319, 108 N. Y. 504 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346388, 330, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo, 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa, 52, 53 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Biair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 63 Pa. 173 Morrisown v. North America Ins. Co., 69 Tex. 363 Morrisown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill. 303 651 Mortram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629 163 Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629 163 Moutney v. Blamire, 4 Russ, 384 734 Mounsey v. Blamire, 4 Russ, 384 734 Mounsey v. Blamire, 4 Russ, 384 734
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 533 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 731 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Mauck v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95. 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 163 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158. 666 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 148, 149. 825, 825 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Meev. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 502 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Menderson v. Specker, 79 Ky, 509 Mencer v. Cook, 11 Cent. Rep. 319, 108 N. Y. 504 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 554 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 533 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 731 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Mauck v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95. 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 163 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158. 666 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 148, 149. 825, 825 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Meev. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 502 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Menderson v. Specker, 79 Ky, 509 Mencer v. Cook, 11 Cent. Rep. 319, 108 N. Y. 504 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346388, 390, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 298 64 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 299 v. Dod, 3 Colo, 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 325, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa, 52, 53 388, 520, 515 v. Parham, 33 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 622 v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123 636 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 63 Pa. 173 Morrison v. North America Ins. Co., 69 Tex. 353 Morrison v. Sheiton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill. 333 661 Morton v. Caldwell, 3 Strobh. Eq. 166. 377 v. Ingram, 11 Ired. L. 368 42 Moses v. Ranlet, 2 N. H. 488 461 Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629 163 Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629 163 Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629 163 Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629 163 Moutson v. South Side F. Ins. Co., 57 Pa. 389 722 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (IL. ed. 205) 551
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martins v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 553 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 731 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 Mauck v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 366 Maxwell v. Cochran, 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo., 95. 661 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 168 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158. 666 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 148, 149. 825, 825 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 739 Mee v. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 500 Mensev v. Kond du Lac, 48 Wis, 323. 425 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Mencheson v. Specker, 79 Ky, 509 Mencheson v. Specker, 79 Ky, 509 Mencheson v. Specker, 79 Ky, 509 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrill v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrill v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88 Merrille v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 452. 88	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346385, 330, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 385, 305, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 Miun. 331 463 Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill. 338 661 Mortron v. Caldwell, 3 Strobh. Eq. 166 377 v. Ingram, 11 Ired, L. 308 42 Moses v. Ranlet, 2 N. H. 488 461 Mot v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495 374 Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 Mounsey v. Blamire, 4 Russ. 384 734 Moyer v. Himman, 13 N. Y. 184 734 Mueller v. South Side F. Ins. Co., 67 Pa. 339 722 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130
2. McKnight, 1 Overt (Tenn.) 330. 191 9. Potrer, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689. 64 9. Thomas, 65 U. S. 24 How. 315 (16 L. ed. 689). 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martins v. Gardiner, 8 Sim. 73. 381 Martus v. Houck, 39 Mich. 431. 210 Martz v. Pfeifer, 80 Ky. 600. 533 Maryland F. & Mig. Co. v. Newman, 60 Md. 534 Mason v. Ainsworth, 58 Ill. 103. 725 v. Bogg, 2 Myl. & Cr. 447. 378, 461 Matthews v. Beach, 5 Sandf. 236. 215 v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 53. 731 v. Massachusetts Nat. Bank, 1 Holmes, 396 750 Mauck v. Melton, 69 Ind. 414 Maux Ferry Gravel Road Co. v. Branegan, 40 Ind. 361. 136 Mass. 73. 624, 645 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 85 Mo. 95. 611 v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570. 190 May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15. 646 v. Quinby, 3 Bush, 96. 163 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Moore, 76 N. C. 158. 666 Maynard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 115 Mass. 460. 140 v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 148, 149. 825, 825 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Medlin v. Platte County, 8 Mo. 235 Meev. McNider, 12 Cent. Rep. 776, 109 N. Y. 502 Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 112 U. S. 609 Menderson v. Specker, 79 Ky, 509 Mencer v. Cook, 11 Cent. Rep. 319, 108 N. Y. 504 Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11 Merrifact, Farmers Ins. Co., 42 Iowa, 11	Montgomery County v. Riley, 75 N. C. 144 488 Montague v. Dawes, 12 Allen, 397 555 Moody v. Walker, 3 Ark. 147 734 Mooney v. Union P. R. Co., 60 Iowa, 346385, 330, 414 Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208 64 v. Chicago, R. L. & P. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 385-387 v. Moore, 11 West. Rep. 229, 112 Ind. 149 62 v. Sanders, 15 S. C. 440 697 v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592 621 Morgan v. Birnie, 9 Bing, 672 209 v. Dod, 3 Colo. 551 152 v. Lingen, 8 L. T. N. S. 800 215, 216 v. Neville, 74 Pa. 52, 53 385, 305, 515 v. Parham, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 471 (21 L. ed. 363) Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 31 Miun. 331 463 Morris v. Keyes, 1 Hill, 540 566 Morris & E. R. Co. v. Blair, 9 N. J. Eq. 635 548 Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24 110 Morse v. Richmond, 97 Ill. 338 661 Mortron v. Caldwell, 3 Strobh. Eq. 166 377 v. Ingram, 11 Ired, L. 308 42 Moses v. Ranlet, 2 N. H. 488 461 Mot v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495 374 Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 Mounsey v. Blamire, 4 Russ. 384 734 Moyer v. Himman, 13 N. Y. 184 734 Mueller v. South Side F. Ins. Co., 67 Pa. 339 722 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130 Mublior Fisika 131 Mass. 130

Mullir v. Pendir, 55 N. Y. 325, 337 Mumper v. Wilson, 72 Iowa, 163 Municipality No. 2 v. Dunn, 10 La. Ann. 57 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (24 L. ed. 77) Murroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. 307 v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 238 Mumply v. Iowell 194 Mass. 884	258 244 646	Nowland v. Martin, 1 Ired. L. 307 Noyes v. Rich, 52 Me. 115 v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59 Nutter v. Sydenstricker, 11 W. Va. 536 Nye v. Liscombe, 21 Pick. 263	428 569 821 86 887
v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611. Muster v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624, 22 Am. L. Reg. 522. Mustard v. Wohlford, 15 Gratt, 329. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (29 L. ed. 997). Myar v. Snow. 49 Ark. 129. Myer v. Liverpool, L. & G. Ins. Co., 40 Md. 595. Myers v. English, 9 Cal. 348.	603 319 797 763 613 734 387 405 767	Oates v. Montgomery First Nat. Bank, 100 U.S. 239, 249 (25 L. ed. 581, 584). Ober v. Carson, 62 Mo. 200, 213, 215	831 630 47 577 256 646 598
N.		t 9. McClelland, 25 HJ, 140	442 863 496
National Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 4I Kan. 161 Negus, Re, 7 Wend. 499 Neil v. Neil, 1 Leigh, 6 Neilson v. Iowa Eastern R. Co., 44 Iowa, 71. Neilson v. Clark, 20 Wend. 24 Newbury v. Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151 Newbury v. Brunswick, 2 Vt. 151 Newbor v. Oregon Cent. R. Co., Deady, 609 Newcombe v. Cabell, 10 Bush, 460 Newell v. Hill, 2 Met. 180 v. Keeler, 13 Mo. App. 189	248 411 503 182	v. Stratton, 78 Ill. 88. Ohio S. R. Co. v. Morey, 7 L. R. A. 701, 47 Ohio S. R. Co. v. Morey, 7 L. R. A. 701, 47 Ohio S. R. Co. v. Morey, 7 L. R. A. 701, 47 Ohio S. L. College St. —	772 758 725 244 215 256 509 -506 471
New London v. Bramard, 22 Conn. 552 Newman v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso., 72 Iowa,	774 294 119	v. Walker, 21 III. 605 Owen v. Dixon, 17 Conn. 496 v. Miller, 10 Ohio St. 138 Oxford First Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 72 N. Y. 201	695 65 253
New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 10 Pet.	798 294	Ρ.	
00% (9 Lr. eq. 5/5)	562	Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520 310	. 314
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana L. & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 (25 L. ed. 516, 524)	547	Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439	275 4, 65
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana L. & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 & L. ed. 516, 524)	547 806 547 833 539	Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439. Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196. Painter v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co., 2 C. R. N. S. 702. Palmer v. Thorpe, 4 Coke, 20. v. Way, 6 Colo, 110. Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488. Panabora w. Westlake 38 Jowa 543. 241	275 4, 65 759 422 374 632 243
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana L. & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 (29 L. ed. 516, 524). New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 156 (26 L. ed. 1015). New Jorleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (29 L. ed. 525). New Salem v. Eagle Mill Co., 138 Mass. 8. Newton v. Hariand, 1 Man. & G. 644. New Windsor First Nat. Bank v. Bynum, 34 N. C. 24. New York v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 45. New York & E. R. Co. v. Skinner, 19 Pa. 298. New York City Grocers Bank v. Penfield, 69 N.	547 806 547 833 539 397 50 140	Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439. Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196	275 4, 65 759 422 374 632 48 186 51 722 160
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana I. & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 (29 L. ed. 516, 524) 405, 506, New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 656 (26 L. ed. 1015) 804, New l'Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (29 L. ed. 525) New Salem v. Eagle Mill Co., 138 Mass. 8. Newton v. Harland, 1 Man. & G. 644 538, New Windsor First Nat. Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24 New York & E. R. Co. v. Skinner, 19 Pa. 238. New York & E. R. Co. v. Skinner, 19 Pa. 238. New York City Grocers Bank v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502 Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189 1200 24 Heigh 102 33 Ann Dec. 892	547 806 547 833 539 397 50 140 168 374 60 429	Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439. Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196. Painter v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co., 2 C. R. N. S. 702. Palmer v. Thorpe, 4 Coke, 20. v. Way, 6 Colo. 110. Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Bull, 1 Wend. 345. Panton v. Holland. 17 Johns. 92-88. Paquin v. Braley, 10 Minn. 379 (Gil. 304). Parker v. Byrnes, 1 Lowell, 559, 540. v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309. v. West Coast Packing Co., 5 L. R. A. 61, 17 Or. 515. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487 (27 L. ed.	275 4, 65 759 422 374 692 186 51 722 160 187
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana L. & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 (29 L. ed. 516, 524). Wife. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 (29 L. ed. 516, 524). When orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 676 Cd. L. ed. 1015). Sold. New Yorkans, Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (29 L. ed. 525). New Salem v. Eagle Mill Co., 138 Mass. 8. New Windsor First Nat. Bank v. Bynum, 34 N. C. 24. New York v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 45. New York v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 45. New York City Grocers Bank v. Penfield, 69 N. Y. 502. Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189. v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302. v. Sober, 33 Mich. 631 Nicholson v. Munigle, 6 Allen, 215. v. New York & N. H. R. Co., 22 Conn. 85. v. Patchin, 5 Cal. 474. Niantic Bank v. Dennis, 37 Ill, 335 Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff, 145. Noble v. Blount, 77 Mo. 225.	547 \$06 54339 \$50 140 168 \$5431 168 \$459	Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439. Paine v. Loster, 44 Conn. 196. Painter v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co., 2 C. R. N. S. 702 Palmer v. Thorpe, 4 Coke, 20. v. Way, 6 Colo. 110 Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92-98. Paquin v. Braley, 10 Minn. 379 (Gil. 304) Parice v. Lindley, 31 Ill. 174. Parker v. Byrnes, 1 Lowell, 539, 540. v. Foote, 19 Wend, 309. v. West Coast Packing Co., 5 L. R. A. 61, 17 Or. 515. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487 (27 L. ed. 289) Parmater v. State, 102 Ind. 90 Parmelee v. Oswego & S. R. Co., 6 N. Y. 74. Parshall v. Eggart, 54 N. Y. 18, 52 Barb, 367. 152 Parsshall v. Eggart, 54 N. Y. 18, 52 Barb, 367. 152 Parsshall v. Eggart, 54 N. Y. 18, 52 Barb, 367. 152 Parsshall v. Eggart, 54 N. Y. 18, 52 Barb, 367. 152	2755 4, 65 759 4224 5742 632 180 51 180 51 180 94 257 667 766
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana L. & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 (29 L. ed. 516, 524)	547 806 54% 59 57 5140 168 4569 44517 521 169 68 87	Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439. Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196. Painter v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co., 2 C. R. N. S. 702. Palmer v. Thorpe, 4 Coke, 20. v. Way, 6 Colo, 110. Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Bull, 1 Wead. 345. Pangborn v. Bull, 1 Wead. 345. Pangborn v. Bull, 1 Wead. 345. Pangborn v. Bull, 1 Wead. 345. Pangborn v. Braley, 10 Minn. 379 (Gil. 304). Pandee v. Indley, 31 Ill. 174. Parker v. Byrnes, 1 Lowell, 539, 540. v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309. v. West Coast Packing Co., 5 L. R. A. 61, 17 Or. 515. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 437 (27 L. ed. 283) Parmater v. State, 102 Ind. 90. Parmater v. State, 102 Ind. 90. Parmater v. State, 102 Ind. 437 Parshal v. Ergart, 54 N. Y. 18, 52 Barb, 367. 152 Parsons v. Brown, 15 Barb, 530. v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 3 L. R. A. 683, 113 N. Y. 335. v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592. Partington, Exparte, 6 O. B. 649, 653. Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51. Patten v. Gleason, 106 Mass, 439. v. Tallnan, 27 Me. 27	275 65 242 486 572 160 187 9 287 65 442 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana L. & H. P. & Mfg. Co., 115 U. S. 650, 672 (29 L. ed. 516, 524)	3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 439 Paine v. Loster, 44 Conn. 196. Painter v. London, B. & S. C. R. Co., 2 C. R. N. S. 702 Palmer v. Thorpe, 4 Coke, 20. v. Way, 6 Colo, 110 Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 548. Pangborn v. Holland, 17 Johns, 92-98. Paquin v. Braley, 10 Minn. 379 (Gil. 304). Pardee v. Lindley, 31 Ill. 174 Parker v. Byrnes, 1 Lowell, 539, 540. v. Foote, 19 Wend, 309. v. West Coast Packing Co., 5 L. R. A. 61, 17 Or. 515. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 437 (27 L. ed. 283) Parmelee v. Oswego & S. R. Co., 6 N. Y. 74. Parrish v. Thurston, 87 Ind. 437 Parrish v. Thurston, 87 Ind. 437 Parshall v. Eggart, 54 N. Y. 18, 52 Barb. 367. 152 Parsons v. Brown, 15 Barb. 530. v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 3 L. R. A. 633, 113 N. Y. 335. v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592. Partington, Ex parte. 6 Q. B. 649, 653 Pastey v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51 Patten v. Gleason. 106 Mass. 439 v. Tallian, 27 Me. 27 Patten's App., 45 Pa. 151. Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. 54 v. Lawrence, 30 Ill. 174 Paul v. Fulton, 25 Mo. 156 Payne v. June, 92 Ind. 252 Peak v. Ellicott, 30 Kan. 156	27565

Peay v. Little Rock, 32 Ark, 31 374 Peck v. Smith, 1 Conn. 103 432, 603 Peddicord v. Baltimore, C. & E. M. Pass, R. Co., 470	Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 127 Mass. 558 309, 312		
Peddicard n Reltimore C & E M Pass R Co.	v. Lawrence, 4 Met. (Kv.) 9 836 v. Pickle, 119 Ind. 155 836		
	v. Pickle, 119 Ind. 155 836 Pickard v. Pullman S. C. Co., 117 U. S. 34 (29 L.		
Pella v. Scholte, 24 Iowa, 283 635			
94 Md. 493 454 1694 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695 1695	Pickett r. Bullock, 52 N. H. 354 157 Pierce v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 36 Wis. 283,		
Pennell v. Duffell, 4 DeG. M. & G. 372 791, 792	Pierce v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 36 Wis. 283,		
Pennover v. Allen. 56 Wis. 502	288 380, 388, 390, 414 v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75 435 v. Ernow, 28 N H 454		
n. Neff. 95 IT S 714 (24 T., ed. 565)			
Pennsylvania Co. n. O'Shanghnessy, 122 Ind. 588 657 l	Picetor v Dicetor 92 S C 146 277		
v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451 (26 L. ed. 141) 226	Piester v. Piester, 22 S. C. 146 377 Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555 36 Pinkam v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 600 158		
Pennsylvania Nat. Gas Co. v. Cook, 123 Pa. 170 004	Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555 36 Pinkam v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 600 158 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am.		
Penry Pot Landing Case 18 Pa 79 832	Dec. 660. 523		
Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. W. U. Teleg. Co., 96 U.	Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph, 663 36 Pitcher v. Chicago Board of Trade, 20 Ill. App.		
S. 1 (24 L. ed. 708) 438	Pitcher v. Chicago Board of Trade, 20 Ill. App.		
V. Roy, Itz U. S. 451 (25 L. ed. 141) 279 Pennsylvania Nat. Gas Co. v. Cook, 123 Pa. 170 604 Penny, Re, 26 L. J. N. S. Q. B. 225, 783 Pennsacola Teleg. Co. v. W. U. Teleg. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (24 L. ed. 708) 436 People v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353 574 v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544 36 v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 109, 110 v. Bissell. 19 111, 229 189	519		
v. Berencia, 21 Cal. 341	Pitts v. Carr, 61 Ga. 454		
v. Bissell. 19 Til. 229 189	Pitispurch, A. & M. P. R. Co. v. Donahue, 70		
- Donal of Dollor // N. W. 20	Pa. 119 206 Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hollowell, 65		
7. Bragle, 88 N. 1. 585	Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hollowell, 65		
v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 420	1Hu. 139		
v. Brown, 55 N. Y. 180. 253 v. Bumberger, 45 Cal. 650. 39	v. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 222 256 v. Martin, 32 Ind. 476 598		
v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 394 178	v. Stuart, 71 Ind. 504 140		
v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 89 110	Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Burnstead, 48		
7. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 8 West, Rep. 342, 118 III. 520 864	111. 221 496		
v. City Bank, 96 N. Y. 32. 793	v. Hazen, 84 III, 36. 328		
v. Conley, 42 Hun, 98 712	479 836		
v. Copely (Ill. C. C.) 4 Crim. Law Mag. 187 439 1	Platt v. Pennsylvania Co., 1 West. Rep. 11, 43		
	Ohio St. 228, 22 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas.		
v. Dennis, 39 Cal. 625	129 183, 183		
	Plummer v. People, 74 Ill. 361 839 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 3 How. 212, 213, 229,		
570 180	230 (11, L., ed. 565, 566, 573, 574)		
v. Ferris, 76 N. Y. 326	v. Maddox, 28 Ala, 321 183		
v. Fisher, 50 Hun, 552 643	Pomeroy v. Milwaukee & C. R. Co., 16 Wis, 641 433		
v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N. Y. 514	Pontifex v. Midland R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 27, 192 Pooley v. Whitmore, 10 Heisk, 629 679		
v. French, 91 N. Y. 265 782	Pope v. Biggs, 9 Barn. & C. 254 569		
v. Erie County Medical Society, 24 Barb. 570 180 v. Ferris, 76 N. Y. 326 693 v. Fisher, 50 Hun, 552 643 v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N. Y. 514 235 v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553 110 v. French, 91 N. Y. 285 782 v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 189 v. Kankake River Imp. Co., 103 Ill. 491 882	v. Jones, 79 Ga. 487 190		
v. Kankakee River Intp. Co., 105 111, 451 X. 502	v. Pollock (Ohio) 4 L. R. A. 255 48 Port v. Jackson, 17 Johns, 239 318		
v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 189 v. Kankakee River Imp. Co., 103 III. 491 x 86 v. Kerr, 27 N. V. 185 455, 457 v. Lane, 55 N. V. 217 698 v. La Salle County Supps 111 Ill. 577 864	Porter v. Cocke, Peck, 43. 483		
v. La Salle County Suprs., 111 Ill. 527 864 v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 3 West. Rep. 90,	v. Briggs, 38 Iowa, 166 566		
v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 5 West. Rep. 90, 120 Ill. 48 862	Potter v. Everitt, 7 Ired, Eq. 152 444 Potts v. Smith, L. R. 6 Eq. 311 157		
v. Lyon, 99 N. Y. 224 613	Potwin v. Johnson, 108 Ill. 71 839		
v. Mueller, 15 Chicago Legal News, 364 768	Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (32 L. ed.		
120 III. 48	253)		
N. Y. 396 549	Power v. Tazewell, 25 Gratt, 786. 94 Prater v. Prater, 87 Teun, 83 414 Prather v. Prather, 5 Decaus, Eq. 33 564 Pratt v. Lamson, 2 Allen, 275 447 Prentice v. Brimhall, 123 Mass, 291 318 Presbyterian Society v. Auburn & R. R. Co., 3		
N. Y. 396 549 v. New York, 3 Johns. Cas. 79 698 v. O'Brien, 60 Mich. 8-13 475	Prather v. Prather, 5 Desaus. Eq. 33 564		
v. O'Brien, 60 Mich. 8-13 475 v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48 813	Pratt v. Lamson, 2 Allen, 275 447 Prentice v. Brimhall, 123 Mass. 291 318		
v. O Srieft, 60 Mrch. 6-13. 413 v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 43. 813 v. Scrugham, 20 Barb. 302. 639 v. Shotwell, 27 Cal. 394. 685 v. University of Michigan, 4 Mich. 98. 189 v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. 358, 380. 717 v. Willams, 43 Cal. 435. 37 v. Wright, 70 III. 389. 839 People's Lee Co. or The Evectsion 44 Mich. 299.	Presbyterian Society v. Auburn & R. R. Co., 3		
v. Shotweil, 27 Cal. 394 685	Hill, 567 603		
v. University of Michigan, 4 Mich. 98 189 v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns, 358, 380 717	Prescott v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 121		
v. Williams, 43 Cal. 345	v. Hubbell, I Hill, Ch. 212		
v. Wright, 70 III, 389 839	Price v. Jennings, 62 Ind. 111 797		
	v. State, 36 Miss. 531		
233 475 Peorla & S. R. Co. v. Thompson, 103 III. 187 601 Pepper v. Labrot, 8 Fed. Rep. 29 573 Perkins v. Eastern R. Co., 29 Me. 307 140 v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 465 216 Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454 432 Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343 569 v. Com., 3 Gratt. 682 841	Hill, 567 v. Aldulff & E. K. Co. S. Hill, 567 v. Holdell, 1 Hill, Ch. 212 607 v. Hubbell, 1 Hill, Ch. 212 607 Preston v. Fryer, 38 Md. 221 790 Price v. Jennings, 42 Ind. 111 797 v. State, 36 Miss. 531 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 615 (10 L. ed. 1085) 401		
Pepper v. Labrot, 8 Fed. Rep. 29 573	Designation Marketine 10 Designation 10 Percent	Perkins v. Eastern R. Co., 29 Me. 307.	Pumpeliy v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 80 U.S.
v. Mitchell, 31 Barb, 465 216 Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass, 454 432	15 Wall, 166 (20 L, ed, 551)		
Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343 569	Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 166 (20 L. ed. 557) 453, 815 Purcell v. Purcell, 4 Hen. & M. 507 554 Purvis v. Carstaphan, 73 N. C. 575, 444 Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204 693 v. Mercantile M. Ins. Co., 5 Met. 386, 886 v. Wise, 1 Hill. 234, 240, and note. 219		
v. Com., 3 Gratt. 632. 841	Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204		
Peters n Barnbill 1 Hell T 227	v. Mercantile M. Ins. Co., 5 Met. 385 808		
Peters v. Barnhill, 1 Hill, L. 237. 426 Peterson v. Noble, 35 Wis. 80. 423	v. Wise, 1 Hill, 231, 240, and note 213		
Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139 603	_		
v. Petty, 4 B. Mon. 215 445	Q.		
Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39 186	Quarrier v. Peabody Ins. Co., 10 W. Va. 507 836		
v. Smith, 116 Ind, 387. 408	Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 Ill. 68		
Philadelphia n Philadelphia & P. Co. 58 Pa	Quinn v. Quinn, 1 Thomp. & C. 437 384		
Perry v. Aldrich, 13 N. H. 343 569 v. Com., 3 Gratt. 632 841 Pesterfield v. Vickers, 3 Coldw. 205 535 Peters v. Barnhill, 1 Hill, 1. 237 426 Peterson v. Noble, 35 Wis. 80 423 Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139 603 Petty v. Fleisel, 31 Tex. 169 366 Petty v. Fleisel, 31 Tex. 169 366 v. Petty, 4 B. Mon. 215 445 Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39 186 v. Smith, 116 Ind. 387 408 Philadelphia v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 55 Pa.	,		
Thuadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 11 Cent.	R.		
Philadelphia & T. R. Co's Case & Whert 25	Radley v. London & N. W. R. Co., L. R. 1 App.		
	Cog 750		
Philadelphia Medical Calland Gran 9 771 and 467	Ragiand v. Huntingdon, 1 Ired. L. 561		
Philadelphia Medical College Case, 3 Whart. 445 Philissen 113, 504	Rahm v. Deig, 121 Ind. 283 67 Ralph's Trade-Mark, Re, L. R. 25 Ch. Div. 194.		
** Ritchie County Ct., 31 W. Va. 478 88	1 199		
Philp v. Squire Peaks N. D. Con. 82	Ram v. Lamley, Hutt. 113		
Phipps v. Sedgwick, 95 II. S. 3 (24 L. ed. 591) 498	Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio St. 22, 52 616 Bamsdell v. Ramsdell, 21 Me. 288 697		
8LRA			

Ramsey v. Ramsey, 121 Ind. 215-222. 463 Rauck v. Albright, 36 Pa. 367 411	Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543	75 50
Rawson v. Rawson, 52 Iil. 62	v. Taintor, 97 Mass. 201 v. Union C. L. Ins. Co., 9 West. Rep. 878,	2
v. Thexton, v Mont. 305 443	III ind. 545, 24 Am. L. neg. 45, and note 79	98
Redden v. Covington, 29 Ind. 118	Rohrbach v. Germania F. Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 54, 80 Romeyn v. Sickles, 11 Cent. Rep. 312, 108 N. Y.	38
354	650 29	21
354 808 Redmond v. Rutherford County Comrs., 57 N. C. 122 300	Rommel v. Schambacher, 9 Cent. Rep. 742, 120	26
Reece v. Allen, 10 III, 236 512 Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294 825	Pa. 579 52 Rona v. Meier, 47 Iowa, 607 69	21
Reeder v. Purdy, 41 Ill. 279 538	l Roosevelt v Godard 52 Rarb 533 - 77	74
C. 122 300	Rosa v. Pratner, 1 West. Rep. 267, 103 Ind. 191. 40 Rosenberg v. Doe, 148 Mass, 560, 562. 75	
v. Davis, 14 Cox, Cr. Cas. 563, 28 Eng. Rep. (Moak's notes) 657	Ross v. Innis, 26 III. 260	
v. Justices of Sussex, 2 Best & S. 664 632	Roundtree v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 612.	.4
v. Metropolitan hourd of works, a best &	i Russin T. St. Louis Perbeluhi Ins. Co., 15 Mo.	71
v. Rymer, 13 Cox, Cr. Cas. 378	244 61 Rowan r. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232 85	10
Renier v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 74 Wis. 89 77	Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307, 313. 15 Rude v. St. Louis, 12 West. Rep. 238, 93 Mo. 406. 78	57
Renshaw v. Bean, 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 417. 187 Rensselaer v. Leopold, 3 West. Rep. 874, 106 Ind.	Rude v. St. Louis, 12 West. Rep. 238, 95 Mo. 406. 78 Ruggles v. Nevada, 63 Iowa, 185	38 79
29. 60, 603 Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129. 54 Reuter v. Sala, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 239. 248 Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126. 48 Rex v. Bankes, 3 Burr. 1452, 1454, note. 698	Rules for the Regulation of Practice in Chan-	
Reuter v. Sala, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 239. 248	Rung v. Shoneberger, 2 Watts, 23	32
Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126. 48 Rev v. Bankes, 3 Burr. 1452, 1454, note. 698 Combridge 4 Rupr. 2008	Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 565	64 86
v. Cambridge, 4 Burr. 2008. 698	t - v. Bandeira, 13 C. B. N. S. 149 - 20	09
v. Cambridge, 4 Burr. 2008	v. Fabyan, 28 N. H. 543 56 v. Falls, 3 Har. & McH. 457 8	69 25
v. Hastings, 1 Dowl. & R. 148	1 9. MHTON, 155 M988, 180 31	
v. Kent Co., 2 Maule & S. 513 54	Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410	21
v. Lisle, Andrews, 163, 2 Strange, 1090. 698 v. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445 521	Ryder v. Mansell, 66 Me. 167	09 09
v. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445		
v. West Riding of Yorkshire, 5 Burr, 2594 54	8.	
v. York, 4 T. R. 699 698 Reynolds v. Caldwell, 51 Pa. 298 209 v. Reynolds, 1 Speers, L. 253 825 v. State 61 Ind 322 231	Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala, 311	60
v. Reynolds, 1 Speers, L. 253 825 v. State, 61 Ind. 392 231	Safford v. Grout, 120 Mass. 20, 25	51 58
m (Forder 43 Ale 420) 405		13
v. United States, 98 U. S. 161 (25 L. ed. 248) 613 Rhame v. Rhame, 1 McCord, Eq. 197	St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Morrison,	94
v. United States, 98 U. S. 181 (25 L. ed. 248) 613 Rhame v. Rhame, 1 McCord, Eq. 197 . 564 Rhawn v. Pearce, 110 III, 330	St. Clair Turnp. Co. v. People, 96 U. S. 63 (24 L.	61
v. Forwood, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 230 411	St. George v. Wake, 1 Myl. & K. 610	17
Ricard v. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179 606 Rice v. Beers, 1 Rice, Dig. (S. C.) 75 751	St. Joseph's Orphan Society v. Wolpert, 80 Ky.	63
v. Stearns, 3 Mass, 225, 227	St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Ross, 9 Mo. App. 399 13	52 60
	St. Paul Roller Mill. Co. v. Great Western Des-	
Richardson v. Chynoweth, 26 Wis. 656 67 v. Crandall, 43 N. Y. 348 504	patch Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 434. 16 St. Tammany Water Works Co. v. New Or-	65
Richmond v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 79 N. Y. 230. 77	St. Tammany Water Works Co. v. New Or- leans Water Works Co., 120 U. S. 64,	47
Richmond Second Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 75 Mich. 546	St. Vincent Orphan Asylum v. Troy. 76 N. Y.	
Ricket v. Metropolitan B. Co., L. R. 2 H. L. Cas.	Salem & H. Turnp. Co. v. Lyme, 18 Conn. 451 8	32 63
Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U. S. 7	Salmon v. Matthews, 8 Mees, & W. 827	69 00
Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371 439	Salter v. Jonas, 39 N. J. L. 469 Sanders v. St. Louis & N. O. Anchor Line, 3 L.	
Riding v. Smith. L. R. 1 Exch. Div. 91 526	R. A. 300, 97 Mo. 27 6 v. State, 94 Ind. 147 38,	10 39
Riggin v. Love, 72 III. 556 656	v. State, 94 Ind, 147	28
Wall. 387, 389 (19 L. ed. 257, 259) 49, 771, 772 Ridgeway v. West, 69 Ind. 371 439 Ridgeway v. Ludlow, 58 Ind. 248 581 Ridging v. Smith, L. R. 1 Exch. Div. 91 528 Ridgin v. Love, 72 Ill. 556 658 Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass, 238 836 v. Palmer, 5 L. R. A. 340, 115 N. Y. 506 618 Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 32, 788 Riley v. Horne, 5 Bing, 220 783 Riley v. Horne, 5 Bing, 220 783 Riley v. Wow York 96 N. V. 331 789	A. 83, 78 Cal. 63	
Rigney v. Chicago, 102 III. 64	Sanford v. Eighth Ave. R. Co. 23 N. Y. 343	19
Riley v. Horne, 5 Bing, 220 325 v. New York, 96 N. Y. 331 782, 783 Rinchey v. Stryker, 26 How. Pr. 75 695		05
Rix v. Adams, 9 Vt. 233 710	Sanxay v. Hunger, 42 Ind. 44	έŎ
Rix v. Adams, 9 Vt. 233. 710 Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 553. 186 Robbins v. Shelby County Tax Dist., 120 U.S.	Sargeant v. Helmbold. Harp. L. 219	31 38
489 (30 L. ed. 694) 275, 329	Sater v. State, 55 Ind. 378 Saulet v. Shepherd, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 502 (18 L. ed. 442)	62
v. People, 19 Mich, 401.	Savage v. Whitaker, 15 Me, 24 1 Savannah v. Hancock, 8 West. Rep. 248, 91 Mo.	17
Robertson v. Norris, 1 Giff. 421	Bavannah v. Hancock, 8 West. Rep. 248, 91 Mo.	60
Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213 495	Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 80	38 57
Robbins v. Shelby County Tax Dist., 120 U. S. 489 i30 L. ed. 694) 275, 329 Roberts v. Macord, 1 Moody & R. 230. 187 v. People, 19 Mich. 401. 38 Robertson v. Norris, 1 Giff. 421 555 Roberson v. Roberts. 20 Ind. 155 62 Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213 495 v. Deering, 56 Me. 357 569 v. State, 13 West. Rep. 309, 113 Ind. 510 37 Robion v. Walker, 82 Ky. 60 352 Rockford, R. L & St. L. R. Co. r. Irish, 72 Ill. 404 142 Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, L. R. 2 P. C. 393 184 164	Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 80 v. Thompson, 24 N. H. 510 Schaffer v. Reilly, 30 N. Y. 61 Schaffer v. McNamee, 13 Serg. & R. 44 Schlereth v. Missouri P. R. Co., 96 Mo. 509 7	63
v. State, 13 West. Rep. 309, 113 Ind. 510 37 Robion v. Walker, 82 Ky. 60	Schauer v. McNamee, 13 Serg. & R. 44	92 86
Rockford, R. L & St. L. R. Co. r. Irish, 72 Ill. 404 142	Schlesinger v. Sherman, 127 Mass, 206.	25
2 P. C. 393	Schlesen v. Missouri P. R. Co., 59 Mb. 505 45 Schlesinger v. Sherman, 127 Mass, 206 66 Schlussel v. Willett, 34 Barb. 615, 12 Abb. Pr. 397, 22 How. Pr. 15 66 Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. 335 2 Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. 335 2 Schmeider v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104 66 Schneider v. Williams, 13 Cent. Rep. 255, 44 N. J. 642, 6	95
Rogers v. Brent, 10 III. 573 513	Schmertz v. Dwyer, 53 Pa. 335 2 Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan, 104 6	247 306
	Schneider v. Williams, 13 Cent. Rep. 255, 44 N. J.	
v. Marsh, 73 Mo. 64 169	Eq. 391 642, 6 Schrock v. Crowl, 83 Ind, 243 7	97
RT. D. A		

Schuler v. Israel. 120 U. S. 506 (30 L. ed. 707)	269	Smith v. Porter, 10 Grav, 66 619	
Cabpenitab a American Inc Co 49 Wig 90	835	v. Shelden, 35 Mich. 42. 797	
Schuster v. Dutchess County Ins. Co., 3 Cent. Rep. 183, 102 N. Y. 250 Schwabacher v. Kane, 13 Mo, App. 126, 129 Schwabzter v. Cowell, 71 Cal. 306 Scott v. Pilkington, 2 Best & S. 11 v. Simons, 54 N. H. 426 v. State 31 Miss 473	836	v. Shepard, 15 Pick. 147	
Schwabacher v. Kane, 13 Mo. App. 126, 129	157	v. Smith 20 Hup 555	
Scott v. Pilkington, 2 Best & S. 11	731 270	v. State, 68 Md. 170 672 v. State, 23 N. J. L. 712 580, 832 v. Union R. Co., 61 Mo. 588 786	
v. Simons, 54 N. H. 426.	684	v. Union R. Co., 61 Mo. 588 786	
v. State, 31 Miss. 473. Scribner v. Fisher, 2 Gray, 43, 47 Scarle v. Lackswanna & B. R. Co., 33 Pa. 57. Scarles v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 35 Iowa,	685 646	v. United States, by U.S. Z Waii. Zig (17 1.,	
Searle v. Lackawanna & B. R. Co., 33 Pa. 57	126	v. Watson, 2 Barn. & C. 401 661	
Searles v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 35 Iowa,	141	Smurr v. State, 88 Ind, 504 37 Smyth, Ex parte, 1 Swanst, 337, note a 569	
Security Co. v. Arbuckle, 119 Ind. 69	410	Suce v Prescott 1 Atk 245 250 170	
Sefton v. Hargett, 13 West. Rep. 42, 113 Ind. 592 Seibert v. Wise, 70 Pa. 147	797 697	Check a Charge 95 Object 510 510	
Selking r. Hebel, 1 Mo. App. 340	153	Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43. 215 Society for Visitation of Sick v. Com., 52 Pa.	
Sellick's Case, 1 City Hall Rec. 185 Semmes v. City F. Ins. Co., 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 160	39	Society for Visitation of Sick v. Com., 52 Pa.	
(30 La eq. 490)	771	125 201, 203	
Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 Hurlst. & N. 365 Shafer v. Phænix Ins. Co., 53 Wis, 361	206 77	Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703 (28 L. ed. 1145)	
Shafer v. Phænix Ins. Co., 53 Wis, 381 Shaffer v. Shaffer, 37 Pa. 525	763	South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Williams, 65 Ala.	
Shanahan v. Madison, 57 Wis. 276 Shannon v. White, 6 Rich. Eq. 96	4.25 691	74. 142 Southard v. New Jersey C. R. Co., 26 N. J. L. 13 182	
Snarp v. Hutchinson, 1 Cent. Rep. 717, 100 N. Y.		South Bend First Nat. Bank v. Lanier, 78 U. S.	
Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 168	716 353	11 Wall. 369, 378 (20 L. ed. 172, 175) 750 South Carolina R. Co. v. Steiner, 44 Ga. 546 433	1
Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 168 Shearer v. Ranger, 22 Pick, 447	445	South Carolina Steamboat Co. v. South Caro-	
Sheboygan v. Sheboygan & F. du L. R. Co., 21 Wis. 668	812	lina R. Co., 30 S. C. 539 294 Southee v. Denny, 1 Exch. 196, 202, 203 528	
cheenan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo.		Southern Bank of Mo. v. McDonald, 46 Mo. 31. 731	
Shelby r. Shelby, Cooke, 184	374 483	517 iso	,
Shelby v. Shelby, Cooke, 184 Shelbyville & B. Turnp. Co. v. Green, 99 Ind. 214		Southwestern F. & C. Press Co. v. Stanard, 44	
Shell v. Kemmerer, 13 Phila. 502 Shepherd v. Mackoul, 3 Campb. 326	603 187	Mo. 71, 83	
Shepherd v. Mackoul, 3 Campb. 326	566	Co., 46 Ga. 43	
Shepperd v. Sumter County, 59 Ga. 535 Sheratzv. Nicodemus, 7 Yero, 12	272 484	Southworth v. Reid, 36 Fed. Rep. 451	
Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184, 204	597	Fed. Rep. 568 49	
Sheratzv. Nicodemus, 7 Yerg. 12 Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184, 204 v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co., 14 West. Rep. 843, 115 Ind. 22	604	Fed. Rep. 568 49 Sparkman v. Gove, 44 N. J. L. 252 606 Spartali v. Benecke, 10 C. B. 212 157	
Sherman v. Bank, 66 Miss. 648	731	Spaulding v. Hallenbeck, 35 N. Y. 206 606	
Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis, 324, 332	442 616	v. Presion, 21 Vt. 9. 438 Spinner v. New York C. & H. B. R. Co., 67 N. Y.	
Sherwood r. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 447,		153	
Shobert Case, 70 Cal. 632	801 673	Splittorf v. State, 10 Cent. Rep. 699, 108 N. Y. 205 402 Spoor v. Newell, 3 Hill, 307 219	r
Rep. 843, 113 Ind. 22 Sherman v. Bank, 66 Miss. 648 v. Higgins, 7 Mont. 479 Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. 324, 332 Sherwood v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 447, 29 Am. Rep. 180 Shobert Case, 70 Cal. 632 Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 114		Spring v. Ausoma Clock Co., 24 Hun, 175 209	
Rep. 114 Short v. Smith, 4 East, 419 Shriver v. Shriver, 86 N. Y. 575 Shroder v. Brenneman, 23 Pa. 348 Shuford v. Lincoln County, 86 N. C. 552	367 384	Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 43 N. Y.	i
Shriver v. Shriver, 86 N. Y. 575	593	Springfield Twp. v. Demott. 13 Ohio. 104 464	:
Shuford v. Lincoln County, 86 N. C. 552	619 374	Springport v. Teutonia Sav. Bank, 75 N. Y. 397, 84 N. Y. 403 250	1
Sigcurney v. Lloyd, 8 Barn. & C. 622 Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298	46 445	St. 1. 408 200 Spurlock v. Sproule, 72 Mo. 503 1199 Stachelberg v. Ponce, 23 Fed. Rep. 430, 123 U.	
connect the cornell of the L. 519	832	S. 686 (32 L. ed. 569)	
Simmons v. State, 61 Miss. 243 Simmons Hardware Co. v. McGuire, 39 La.	38	S, 686 (62 L ed. 569) 574 Stackpole v. Healy, 16 Mass. 33 475 v. Symonds, 23 N. H. 229 665	
Ann RIS	275	CHUIEF V. UTICOCH, DI W.M. DOV	,
Simplot v. Dubuque, 49 Iowa, 639 Sims v. Walsham (Ky.) 7 S. W. Rep. 557 v. Wilson, 47 Ind. 226	636 553	Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill, 93, 96 166 Stambaugh v. Smith, 23 Ohio St. 596 616	
v. Wilson, 47 Ind. 226	62	Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434.	i
Siner r. Great Western R. Co. J. R. 3 Eyeh 150	848 227	Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439 251 Stark v. Bare, 39 Kan, 100 388, 392	į
SHEET, Wayne I winty Poor Superintendents		Starrett v. Wynn, 17 Serg. & R. 130. 683	1
8ipple r. State 99 N. V. 284	$\frac{412}{402}$	Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434. 506 Startin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y. 439. 525 Stark v. Bare, 39 Kan. 100. 388, 382 Startett v. Wynn, 17 Serg. & R. 120. 633 State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60. 408 v. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 113. 768 v. Agee, 63 Ala, 110. 275 v. Agee, 63 Ala, 110. 275	i
c. nomian, a mo. App. 10, 10 mo. 005,		v. Agee, 83 Ala, 110 275	b-
Skinner r. Oakes 10 Mo. Apr. 45	573	v. Anderson, 40 I owa, 207 590	
		v. Baker, 64 Mo. 167	3
Sloan v. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492	774 581	- Douglotto 62 Ind 105	
Slatten v. Des Moines Valley B. Co., 29 Iowa, 149 Sloan r. Biemiller, 34 Ohio St. 492 Smith's App., 104 Pa. 381 Smith v. Alexandria, 33 Gratt. 208. v. Bartholomew. 1 Met. 276. r. Bond 8 Al. 886	64	v. Berg, 50 Ind. 496	
v. Bartholomew, 1 Met. 276	435 710	v. Berlin, 21 S. C. 296 857 v. Blackburn, 2 Coldw. 235 281	
v. Bond, 8 Ala. 386	336	v. Braunschweig, 36 Mo. 397	
v. Briggs, 3 Denio, 73	209 209	v. Camden, 39 N. J. L. 416 699	}
v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173 v. Briggs, 3 Denio, 73 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 34 Iowa, 508	140	v. Camdeu, 42 N. J. L. 335 699 v. Chapin, 9 West. Rep. 53, 110 Ind. 272 232	
		v. Chase, 5 Ohio St. 535	í
v. Clay, Ambl. 645, 3 Bro. Ch. 640, note 251 v. Com., 1 Duyall, 27 v. Cunningham, 1 Addams, Eccl. 455	36	v. Collins, 3 L. R. A. 394, 16 R. I. —	
t. Hubbs, 10 Me. 71	513	v. Craig, 58 Iowa, 238 738, 739)
v. Hubbs, 10 Me. 71 v. Hudson, 6 Best & S. 431, 445 v. Kay, 7 H. L. Cas. 750	158 267	v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332 612 v. Dooly, 64 Mo. 146 612	
v. Kerr, 33 Hun, 567-571, 10 Cent. Rep. 842.	401	v. Duncan, 16 Lea, 81	?
v. Kerr, 33 Hun, 567-571, 10 Cent. Rep. 842, 168 N. Y. 31 v. Maryland, 59 Iowa, 645	258 397	v. Freemao, 86 N. C. 683 533 v. Garvey, 11 Minn, 163 36	
L. Myers, 7 West. Rep. 90, 109 Ind. 1, 7.	235	v. Grate, 68 Mo. 22 613	3
v. Nightingale, 2 Starkie, 375v. Otley, 26 Miss 201	395 732	v. Griffin, 98 Mo. 672 611 v. Hall, 40 Kan, 308 399	
v. Myers, 7 West. Rep. 90, 109 Ind. 1, 7 v. Nightingale, 2 Starkie, 375 v. Otley, 26 Miss. 291 v. Phillips, 77 Va. 548	259		ó
8 L. R. A.			

State v. Harris, 63 N.C. 1	Stormfeltz v. Manor Turnp. Co., 13 Pa. 555 861, 863
	Didly b. Hew Tolk installed it, Co., SV 11. 1.
v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431	Stose v. Heissler, 8 West. Rep. 441, LU III. 433. 209
v. Howard County Ct., 41 Mo. 248 737 v. Indiana & O. O. G. & M. Co., 120 Ind. 575	Stotesbury v. Smith, 2 Burr. 924 710 Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522 832
v. Jacksonville, P. & M. R. Co., 15 Fla. 202 6	Stover v. Kendall, 1 Coldw. 557
v. Jersey City, 51 N. J. L. 240 69 v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 3	Stowell v. Hastings, 59 Vt. 494 697 Strang v. Beach, II Ohio St. 283 615
19. Johnson, 41 Conn. 585	SUBLUMORE T. DOWES, 2 COX, 23
v. Jones, 19 1nd, 356 60 v. Kelley, 97 N. C. 404 61	
v. Kennett, 13 West, Rep. 818, 114 Ind. 160 79. v. Lafayette County Ct., 41 Mo. 221 73.	
v. Lewis, 69 Mo. 92 612 v. McNinch, 90 N. C. 695, 87 N. C. 567 58	Stroop v. Swartz, 12 Serg. & R. 16
v. Maddox, 74 Ind. 105	Stryker v. Cassidy, 76 N. Y. 50
v. Mathews, 2 Dev. & B. L. 424 52. v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266 11	. [7, People, 4 III, 405
v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266 11 v. Miler, 24 Conn. 522 40 v. Miler, 45 N. J. L. 251 69 v. Modrel, 69 Mo. 152 73	U Stubba v. Laund. 7 Mass. 453
v. Modrel, 69 Mo. 152 738	$1 \mid Studahaker v. Marouardt, 55 Ind. 341 798$
v. Moody, 95 N. C. 658. 26 v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 7, 39 Ohio St. 486. 133, 13-	Stumpf's App., 8 Cent. Rep. 112, 116 Pa. 35 603 Sturdivant v. Birchitt, 10 Gratt. 67
v. Myrick, 38 Kan, 238 28	Stuvvesant v. Roomson, 18 Pick. 115
v. Myrick, 38 Kan. 238. 778 v. Nashville, 15 Lea, 697, 54 Am. Rep. 427. 78 v. Norwalk & D. Turnp, Co., 10 Conn. 157. 86	ed. 762 762 Suffield v. Hathaway, 44 Conn. 521, 527 475
	Suggs v. Travelers Ins. Co., I L. R. A. 847, 71
v. Oliver, 70 N. C. 60 29 v. Osawkee Twp., 14 Kan. 422, 424 28	Tex. 579 772 Sullivan v. Phenix Ins. Co., 34 Kan. 170 75
v. Paterson, 35 N. J. L. 190	Summer v. Huston, 48 Ind. 228 62 Summer v. Marcy, 3 Woodb, & M. 105 503
v. O'(01107, 5) MO. 5/4	v. Williams, 8 Mass, 162
v. Peck, 53 Me. 284 73	1 Tre Table 000 Tre
v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & B. L. 365	3 Sutton v. Aiken, 62 Ga. 733, 741
v. Potter, 63 Mo. 212 73 v. Pugh, 101 N. C. 737 53	v. Beckwith, 12 West. Rep. 647, 68 Mich.
v. Pugh, 101 N. C. 737	Swainson v, North-Eastern R. Co., L. R. 3 Exch. Div. 341, 343 452
v. Readington Twp., 36 N. J. L. 66	Swan's Case, 7 Coke, 16.
v. Peck, 53 Me. 284 v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & B. L. 365 v. Pepper, 3l. Ind. 76 v. Potter, 63 Mo. 212 v. Pugh, 10l. N. C. 737 v. Pugh, 10l. N. C. 737 v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213 v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213 v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 23 Fla. 642 v. Readington Twp., 36 N. J. L. 66 v. Readington Twp., 36 N. J. L. 66 v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799 36. 36	Sweeny n Easter, 68 H. S. 1 Wall 166 (17 L. ed.
799 36, 37 v. Schoenwald, 31 Mo. 147 61: v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 411 86 v. Shuchardt. 18 Neb. 454 77	
v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St. 411 866	Sweet v. Dutton, 109 Mass. 590 734 Sweetser v. French, 13 Met. 282 366 v. Odd Fellows Mut. Aid. Asso. 117 Ind.
v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262 39	
v. Sopher, 70 10wa, 494	Sweezy v. Chandler, 11 III. 449 568
v. Swift, 10 Nev. 176 32. v. Towns, 8 Ga. 360 18	Swenson v. Halberg, 1 McCrary, 96, 1 Fed. Rep.
v. Tuller, 34 Conn. 280 685	Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 16 Pet. 1 (10 L. ed. 865) 166, 167
t. Vanderpool, 39 Onio St. 225. 38	462, 464
v. Weston, 4 Neb. 216	_
v. Weston, 6 Neb. 16	T.
v. Whitfield, 8 Ired. L. 317 538 State Worrell v. Peelle, 121 Ind. 495	Talcott v. Dudley, 5 Ill. 435 568 Tailon v. Grand Portage Copper Min. Co., 55
State Nat. Bank v. Cason, 39 La. Ann. 865. 423	Mich, 147. 412 Tanner v. Scovell, 14 Mees. & W. 23. 159
Statham v. Ferguson, 25 Gratt. 38. 25 Stearns v. Mullen, 4 Gray, 151 619	Tanner v. Scovell, 14 Mees. & W. 28
Stearns v. Mullen, 4 Gray, 151 619 Steel v. Grigsby, 79 Ind. 184 60 Steen v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, 223, 323	Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56
326 40, 7 Statson e. Rengor 72 Wo 257 250	v. Columbian Ins. Co., 14 Allen, 353 64
Stevens v. Cady, 55 U. S. 14 How. 528, 531 (14 L.	Tattan v. Great Western R. Co., 2 El. & El. 851 193 Tattar v. Great Western R. Co., 2 El. & El. 851 193 Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56. 412 Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349 v. Columbian Ins. Co., 14 Allen, 353 60 v. Evansville & G. H. R. Co., 121 Ind. 124 637 v. Goodwin, 40 L. T. N. S. 458 77 v. Purch 1 Hare 808
Stetson v. Bangor, 73 Me. 357, 559 83. Stetson v. Bangor, 73 Me. 357, 559 83. Stevens v. Cady. 55 U. S. 14 How. 528, 531 (14 L. ed. 528, 529). Stevens v. Gladding, 53 U. S. 17 How. 451 (15 L. ed. 156).	p. Warnaky, 55 Cal. 350 60
ed. 156) 310, 313 v. Morsc, 47 N. H. 552 60	Taylor County v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 161
v. Wheeler, 25 III, 309	1 v. King, 73 10wa, 153 738
Stewart v. Brooklyn & C. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 588	Temple v. Johnson, 71 Ill. 14
v. Harriman, 58 N H 25	v. Scott, 3 Minn. 419 (Gil. 306) 468 Templeton v. Stratton, 128 Mass. 137 464
v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331 68 Stiger v. Bent, 111 Ili. 328 78 Stillwater First Nat. Bank v. Larsen, 60 Wis.	7 Templeton v. Stratton, 128 Mass, 137 464 1 Tennessee & A. R. Co. v. Adams, 3 Head, 600 125 1 Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 11 West, Rep. 33, 112
	Ind. 542 67
Stinson v. Chicago, St. P. & M. R. Co., 27 Minn.	253, 108 Ind. 113. 603
	Terry r. Hickman, 1 Mo. App. 119, 124
Stockton v. Frey. 4 Gill, 414. 677 Stoddard v. Harrington, 100 Mass. 87, 89. 677 Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 181 (10 L.	HICARS OF F. R. CO. D. ROSCURIC CL. D. CO. OF
	Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305 256
Stone v. Miller, 62 Barb. 430 73 v. Patterson, 19 Pick. 476 56 Stoner v. Rice, 6 L. R. A. 387, 121 Ind. 51 58 Stoppelbein v. Shulte, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 200 44	Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 71 860
Stoppelbein v. Shulte, 1 Hill, L. (S. C.) 200 443	v. Fleury, 26 N. Y. 26 59: v. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 118 223
8 L. R. A.	michard mic ar more man - man -

Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189 404, 405	Union Nat. Bank v. International Bank, 13
Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189	West. Rep. 773, 123 III, 510
(b L. ed. 358) 437	L. ed. 739) 492, 821 v. Peniston, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 5 (21 L. ed.
**Tunipson, Re. 49 Mo. 35	
406, 407	787) 300 Union Slate Co. v. Tilton, 69 Me, 244 449 United States v. Cook, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 168 (21 L. ed. 538) 408
v. Kenney (Mont.) Jan. 28, 1890	L. ed. 538) 408
c. Lusk, 2 Watts, 17	L. ed. 538) 408 v. Davis, 6 Blatchf, 464 513 v. Holmes, 1 Wall, Jr. 1 298 v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 720 (6 L. ed. 199)
v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71 395 v. Union P. R. Co., 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 579 (19	v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 1 298 v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat, 720 (6 L.
1. ed. 702) 300 v. Van Vechten, 27 N. Y. 582 695 Thomson v. Davenport, 9 Barn, & C. 78 695	Out 100/ _ 2104 - 210 - 200 -
v. Van Vechten, 27 N. Y. 582 695 Thomson v. Davenport, 9 Barn, & C. 78 662	v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (30 L. ed. 425) 399 v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (23 L. ed. 563) 60
v. widchester is rick 214011	Unruh v. State, 2 West, Rep. 632, 105 Ind. 117 38
Thorn v. Thorn, 14 Iowa, 55	Unruh v. State, 2 West, Rep. 632, 163 Ind. 117 38 Uppinghouse v. Mundel, 1 West. Rep. 204, 103 Ind. 238 516 Upton v. Larkin, 7 Mont. 462 442 v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45 (23 L. ed. 203) 751 Usener u. State & Tey Ann 177
Thorne v. First Nat. Bank. 37 Ohio St. 254 152	Upton v. Larkin, 7 Mont. 462 442
THOTHER NEW YORK I AS H. K. K. LO YON Y	v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45 (23 L. ed. 203) 751 Usener v. State, 8 Tex. App. 177 327
402, 406 226 Throop v. Hart, 7 Duvall, 512, 521 157 Thurston v. Rosenfield, & Mo. 474, 97 Am. Dec.	Utsey v. Hiott, 30 S. C. 365 857
Thurston v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 474, 97 Am. Dec.	Uurns v. Lane, 138 Mass. 350, 354
10	
v. Warren, 37 Barb, 571, 24 How. Pr. 293 695	v.
Tillman v. Davis, 95 N. Y. 17 734 v. Jackson, 1 Minn, 183 (Gil. 157) 52	Vail v. Jersey Little Falls Mfg. Co., 32 Barb. 564 411 Valley Nat. Bank v. Frank, 12 Mo. App. 460 152, 153
Tillotson v. Wolcott, 48 N. Y. 188 468	l Van Alen v. Am. Nat. Bank 52 N. V. 1 792
Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593 839 Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass, 171 244	Van Arnam v. Ayers, 67 Barb, 544
Tingley v. Bateman, 10 Mass. 343	Vandegrift v. Rediker, 22 N. J. L. 185
Strange, 1003	Van Horn v. Great Western Mfg. Co., 37 Kan.
Titus v. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 265	523. 399 Van Ingen v. Whitman, 62 N. Y. 513. 716
Titusville & P. C. R. Co. v. Warren & V. R. Co., 12 Phila 642 548	Van Ingen v. Whitman, 62 N. Y. 513 716 Van Riper v. Poppenhausen, 43 N. Y. 73 718 Van Schaack v. Northern Transp. Co., 3 Biss.
Tobias v. Lissberger, 7 Cent. Rep. 723, 105 N. Y.	1 7094
Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 IIL 80 509	Vangwakal v Tryon & Dhila 401 187
v. Brannagen 75 Ind. 490 597	Van Valkenburgh v. Lenox F. Ins. Co., 51 N.Y.
v. Grable, 88 Ill. 441	Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 135 215
v. Grable, 88 Ill. 441	Van Winkle v. American S. B. Ins. Co., 52 N. J.
Toole v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247	Vartion Underwood 18 Barb 561 445
Tootle v. Taylor, 64 Iowa, 629 A 242 Topsham v. Chelsea, 60 Vt. 219 709	Vaughan v. Marable, 64 Ala. 60 555 Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462 250, 253
Toran v. Howard Ben. Asso., 4 Pa. 519	Verdery v. Summerville, 82 Ga. 138. 273
Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray, 370, 374 447 Tousey v. Roberts, 21 Jones & S. 446, 447 227	Vickery v. McCormick, 117 Ind. 594-597 67
Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray, 370, 374. 447 Tousey v. Roberts, 21 Jones & S. 446, 447. 227 Tower v. Providence & W. R. Co., 2 R. I. 404. 140	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton, 51 Miss. 185 143
Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray, 370, 374. 447. Tousey v. Roberts, 21 Jones & S. 446, 447. 227. Tower v. Providence & W. R. Co., 2 R. L. 404. 140. Towle v. Wilder, 57 Vt. 622. 387. Townley v. Crump. 4 Ad. & Fl. 58. 160.	Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505
Tourtellot v. Phelps, 4 Gray, 370, 374. 447. Tousey v. Roberts, 21 Jones & S. 446, 447. 227. Tower v. Providence & W. R. Co., 2 R. L. 404. 140. Towle v. Wilder, 57 Vt. 622. 387. Townley v. Crump, 4 Ad. & El. 58. 160. Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, 333. 157.	Virden v. Allan, 107 III. 505
Tousey v. Roberts, 21 Jones & S. 446, 447. 227. Tower v. Providence & W. R. Co., 2 R. I. 404. 140. Towle v. Wilder, 57 Vt. 622. 387. Townley v. Crump, 4 Ad. & El. 58. 160. Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 225, 333. 157. v. Smith, 47 Wis. 623. 399. Trade Ins. Co. a. Borresciff 45 N. I. I. 543. 398.	Virden v. Allan, 107 III. 505
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 808 Trade-Mark Coses 160 U.S. 82 05 L. ad 550)	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 188. 142. Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505. S39 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 771 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55. 407, 468, 79 Vollmer's Avv., 61 Pa. 130.
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 808 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 60 Trade-rs Pank r. Alson, 64 Yows, 97	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 188. 142 Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (29 L. ed. 185). 60 Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 771 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55 407, 468, 797 Vollmer's App., 61 Pa. 130 187
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 808 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 60 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travia v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 188. 142. Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505. S39 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 771 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55. 407, 468, 79 Vollmer's Avv., 61 Pa. 130.
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 808 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 60 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travia v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Pattol, 31 Miss. 188. 183. Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 808 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 60 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N.	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Pattol, 31 Miss. 188. 183. Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 88 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 68 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 46	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Pattol, 31 Miss. 188. 183. Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 88 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 68 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 46	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Pattol, 31 Miss. 188. 183. Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 88 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 68 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 46	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Pattol, 31 Miss. 188. 183. Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 88 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 68 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 46	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550). G0 Traders Bank v. Aisop, 64 Iowa, 97. Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 206 Treothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100. 46 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trinty & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34. ISI Tript v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 142 Trow v. Vermont C. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Troy & G. R. Co., Con. 127 March 444 441	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550). Curaders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 198 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 554 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 612 v. McDonsid 105 Mass. 423 39	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 183. 183. 183. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (29 L. ed. 185)
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550). Curaders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97. Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29. Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415. Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100. Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354. Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34. Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439. Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494. Trov & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43. Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488. v. Tucker, 5 Lred, L. 161. Tuff v. Weyers, 5 Led. L. 161.	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 183. 183. 183. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (29 L. ed. 185)
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550). Curaders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97. Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29. Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415. Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100. Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354. Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34. Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439. Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494. Trov & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43. Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488. v. Tucker, 5 Lred, L. 161. Tuff v. Weyers, 5 Led. L. 161.	Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 183. 183. 183. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (29 L. ed. 185)
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travia v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 J. L. 402, 415 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 142 Trow v. Vermont C. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Trucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 v. McDonsid, 105 Mass. 423 20 Tuff. v. Tucker, 5 Ired. L. 161 Tuff. v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 143 Turner v. Hadden, 62 Barb, 480 461 Turner v. Wilton, 28 Ill 2009 462	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 717 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 32 (25 L. ed. 550) Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 108 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 429 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com. 127 Mass. 43 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 v. McDonald, 105 Mass. 423 Turney v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 Turney v. Watton, 38 Ill. 338 Turnives d. H. 1450 S. Mass. 43 Turney v. Witton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 330 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 717 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 32 (25 L. ed. 550) Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 108 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 429 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com. 127 Mass. 43 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 v. McDonald, 105 Mass. 423 Turney v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 Turney v. Watton, 38 Ill. 338 Turnives d. H. 1450 S. Mass. 43 Turney v. Witton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 330 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 32 (25 L. ed. 550) Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 108 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 429 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com. 127 Mass. 43 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 v. McDonald, 105 Mass. 423 Turney v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 Turney v. Watton, 38 Ill. 338 Turnives d. H. 1450 S. Mass. 43 Turney v. Witton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 330 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 32 (25 L. ed. 550) Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 108 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 429 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com. 127 Mass. 43 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 v. McDonald, 105 Mass. 423 Turney v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 Turney v. Watton, 38 Ill. 338 Turnives d. H. 1450 S. Mass. 43 Turney v. Witton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 330 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travia v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 J. L. 402, 415 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 142 Trow v. Vermont C. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Trucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 v. McDonsid, 105 Mass. 423 20 Tuff. v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 143 Turner v. Hadden, 62 Barb, 480 461 Turner v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 143 Turner v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 462 Turner v. Wilton, 28 Ill 2009 463	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 32 (25 L. ed. 550) Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 108 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 429 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com. 127 Mass. 43 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 v. McDonald, 105 Mass. 423 Turney v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 Turney v. Watton, 38 Ill. 338 Turnives d. H. 1450 S. Mass. 43 Turney v. Witton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 339 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 330 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340 Turnives d. Vitton, 36 Ill. 340	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550)	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550). Cultivate Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. 0. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 Triper, Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 Trow v. Vermont C. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 0. Tucker, 5 Ired. L. 161 Tuff v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 Turner v. Hadden, 62 Barb. 480 Turneyeed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 19 Am. Rep. 15 Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280 v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648 0. Tyler, 126 Ill. 525 U. Uline v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Cent.	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550)	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 543 88 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 69 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 255 Trentell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. 0. 354 255 Trinity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 142 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43 401 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43 401 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 612 v. McDonald 105 Mass. 423 39 v. Tucker, 5 Ired. L. 161 42 Turney v. Wilton, 36 III. 393 Turnipseed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 19 Am. Rep. 15 200 Turnipseed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 19 Am. Rep. 15 Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280 209 v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648 60 v. Tyler, 126 III. 525 514 U. Uline v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Cent. Rep. 116, 101 N. Y. 98 174 Union College v. Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88, 98 214 Union Depot, S. R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, 21 Miss. 421 U. Stransfer Co. v. Brunswick, 21 Miss. 421	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 711 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 80 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 22 (25 L. ed. 550) 60 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 256 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 Trimity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripev. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 142 Trow v. Vermont C. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 141 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43 401 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 612 v. McDonsid, 105 Mass. 423 399 Turner v. Hadden, 62 Barb, 480 464 Turner v. Hadden, 62 Barb, 480 464 Turney v. Wilton, 36 Ill, 303 Turnipseed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 19 Am. Rep. 15 Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend, 213. 214 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 230. 209 v. Takes, 6 Lans. 230. 209 v. Tyler, 125 Ill, 525 614 U. Uline v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Cent. Rep. 116, 101 N. Y. 98 21 Union College v. Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88, 98 214 Union Depoc, S. R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 301 U. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMillen, 24 Ohio St. 47	Virgen v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 717 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 80 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (25 L. ed. 550) 60 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 108 206 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 402, 415 791 Trentell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 45 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. 634 25 Trinity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 142 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com. 127 Mass. 43 401 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com. 127 Mass. 43 401 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 612 v. McDonald 105 Mass. 423 39 v. Tucker, 5 Ired. L. 161 42 Turney v. Wilton, 36 III. 393 144 Turney v. Wilton, 36 III. 393 144 Turney v. Wilton, 36 III. 393 214 Turney v. Wilton, 36 III. 393 214 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280 214 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans. 280 229 v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648 60 v. Tyler, 126 III. 525 514 U. Uline v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Cent. Rep. 116, 101 N. Y. 98 174 Union Depot. S. R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, 21 Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMillen, 24 Ohio St. 67 v. Slee, 10 West. Rev. 154, 123 III. 93 725	Virgen v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 717 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 717 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55. Vollmer's App., 61 Pa. 130 Vought v. Williams, 8 L. R. A. 591, 120 N. Y. 253 W. Wabash R. Co. v. Elliott, 98 Ill. 481. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Jaggerman, 2 West. Rep. 863, 115 Ill. 407. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Jaggerman, 2 West. Rep. 863, 115 Ill. 407. V. McCleave, 106 Ill. 363. Wager v. Troy Union R. Co., 25 N. Y. 528. Wajner v. Diedrich, 50 Mo. 434. Walker v. Board of Public Works, 16 Ohio, 549 v. Roberts, 4 Rich. L. 561. v. Staples, 5 Allen, 34. v. Staples, 5 Allen, 34. v. Staples, 5 Allen, 34. v. Staples, 5 Allen, 34. v. Long, 3 West. Rep. 870, 105 Ind. 522. 418 Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. 184. v. Long, 3 West. Rep. 870, 105 Ind. 522. 419 Wangler v. Swift, 30 N. Y. 133. Wangler v. Swift, 30 N. V. 133. Wangler v. Swift, 50 N. V. 133. Wangler v. Swift, 50 N. V. 133. Wangler v. Bright, 52 Ill. 33. Warner v. Helden, 23 Wis. 517. v. Jaffray, 96 N. Y. 285. Washington v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190 Washington v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190 Washington v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190
Trade Ins. Co. v. Barracliff, 45 N. J. L. 513 80 Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 22 (25 L. ed. 550) 60 Traders Bank v. Alsop, 64 Iowa, 97 276 Travis v. Continental Ins. Co., 22 Mo. App. 198 208 Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 29 791 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 4(2, 415 200) 2526 Trenton Mut. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 4(2, 415 200) 2526 Trenttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100 46 Trimmier v. Bomar, 20 S. C. 354 255 Trinity & S. W. R. Co. v. Meadows, 73 Tex. 34 181 Tripe v. Marcy, 39 N. H. 439 Trout v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 623 142 Trow v. Vermont C. R. Co., 24 Vt. 494 141 Troy & G. R. Co. v. Com., 127 Mass. 43 401 Tucker v. Allen, 47 Mo. 488 423 309 v. Taucker, 5 Ired. L. 161 42 Turner v. Hadden, 62 Barb, 430 464 Turner v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 143 Turner v. Warman, 5 C. B. N. S. 573 143 Turner v. Hadden, 62 Barb, 430 464 Turney v. Wilton, 36 Ill. 333 83 Turnipseed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 19 Am. Rep. 17 Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend, 213 214 Tyler v. Ames, 6 Lans, 280 220 v. Reacher, 44 Vt. 648 60 v. Tyler, 128 Ill. 525 174 Union College v. Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88, 68 214 Union Depoce, R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, 31 Minn, 301 32, 44 Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McMillen, 24 Ohio St. 67	Virgen v. Allan, 107 III. 505 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 289 (29 L. ed. 185) Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. 717 Vogel v. Leichner, 102 Ind. 55

Waterbury v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co., 54	Willet v. Equitable Ins. Co., 10 Abb. Pr. 193 887
Barb. 388 548 Waterford & W. Turnp. v. People, 9 Barb. 161 717 Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa, 437 635	Williams v. Alison, 33 Iowa. 278. v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 249. v. Duanesburgh, 66 N. Y. 129. 252 v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 2 Mich. 265. 140 v. New York C. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97. 455 v. Paul. 6 Bing. 653. 653 v. Reed. 29 N. J. L. 385. 289 v. Robinson, 39 Vt. 267 v. Roger Williams Ins. Co., 107 Mass. 377-
Waterloo v. Union Mill Co., 72 Iowa, 437 635 Waterman v. State, 116 Ind. 51	v. Duanesburgh, 66 N. Y. 129 252 v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 2 Mich. 265 140
Watkins v. Blatschinski, 40 Wis. 347	v. New York C. R. Co., 16 N. Y. 97. 455 v. Paul, 6 Bing. 653. 665
v. Cason, 46 Ga. 444 414 414 Watt v. Wright, 66 Cal. 202 731	v. Reed, 29 N. J. L. 385
v. (2ason, 46 Ga. 444	v. Robinson, 39 Vt. 267
Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 297	
webb, Re, 24 How. Pr. 247. 681 v. Ohio Gas Fuel Co., 16 West. L. Bull. 121 603	v. Terboss, 2 Wend, 151 693 v. Vermont Ins. Co., 20 Vt. 222 772 v. Worthington, 49 Md. 572 697
Webber v. Chapman, 42 N. H. 526. 832 Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn. 131. 294	v. Worthington, 49 Md. 572
Wedge v. Moore, 6 Cush. 8 445	William Frie Teler & Telenh Co. 27 Minn 247 422
Wedge v. Moore, 6 Cush. 8. 445 Weed v. Panama R. Co., 17 N. Y. 362 227, 325, 467 Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 243. 374 Wegg v. Drake, 16 U. C. Q. B. 252 157	Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577 64 Wilson v. Ætna Ins. Co., 27 Vt. 99 771 v. Baltimore & P. R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 538,
Wegg v. Drake, 16 U. C. Q. B. 252 157 Weidenger v. Spruance, 101 Ill. 278 505	1 545 355
Weider r. Maddox, 66 Tex, 372, 59 Am. Rep. 617 64	v. Holmes, 5 Mass. 543. 46 v. Joseph, 5 West, Rep. 681, 107 Ind. 490. 515
Weise v. Milwaukee County Suprs., 51 Wis. 564 411 Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 105 251	т. кену, 10 S. U. 210 083
Weiss v. Whittemore, 28 Mich. 395	v. Kirby, 88 Ill. 566, 98 Ill. 240
Weldon v. Winslow, L. R. 13 Q. B. Div. 786 425 Welfare v. Thompson, 83 N. C. 276 381, 382	v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm
Weller v. McCormick. 1 Cent. Rep. 462, 47 N. J.	Co., 149 Mass. 24, 25 310, 313, 625 v. Stilwell. 9 Ohio St. 467 318
Weller v. McCormick, 1 Cent. Rep. 462, 47 N. J. L. 397 799 Wells v. McLaughlin, 17 Ohio, 99 57	v. Stilwell, 9 Ohio St. 467. 318 v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 37 Minn. 326. 637 Wingfield, v. Wingfield, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 653, 26 Eng. Rep. (Moak) 422. 734
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (23 L. ed. 347) 550	Eng. Rep. (Moak) 422 734
Wendiandt v. Sohre, 37 Minn. 162	Winks v. Hassell, 9 Barn. & C. 373. 159 Winne v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 185 770
Wesson v. Com., 3 New Eng. Rep. 778, 144 Mass. 60 401	Winslow v. Henry, 5 Hill, 481 693
West v. New York, 10 Paige, 539 180 West v. Rutland, 19 Vt. 403 461	Winslow v. Henry, 5 Hill, 481. 633 Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 581. 422 Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 524. 800 Winterfield v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 29
	Winterfield v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 29 Wis, 589
Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143, 76, 77 Western & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 32 Mo, 456 Western R. Co. v. Thornton, 60 Ga. 300 387	Wis. 589 322 Wisconsin R. Imp. Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61 813
Western R. Co. v. Thornton, 60 Ga. 300	Wisconsin R. Imp. Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61 813 Withers v. Lys, 1 Holt, N. P. 18 160 Wolf v. Bollinger, 62 Ill. 368 384
430 192	t – v. Holton, 61 Mich, 5a0⊨553
v. McKibben, 12 West. Rep. 279, 114 Ind.	Wolfe v. Burke, 56 N. Y. 118 180 Wolff v. Schaeffer, 74 Mo. 154 738 Wood v. Gamble, 11 Cush. 8 269
v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 (31 L. ed. 790) 300 v. Mayer, 28 Ohio St. 521 154	1 10. Kellev. 30 Me. 47
v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12	v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 488 569
n Seav 132 II. S. 472 (33 L. ed. 409) 436	v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414 267 v. Thornly, 58 Ill. 465 417
v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460 (26 L. ed. 1067) 300, 436 Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621	v. Thornly, 58 Ill. 465
West Point Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703. 622	141 Mass. 329
West Virginia Transp. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 600	Woodfolk v. Nashville & C. R. Co., 2 Swan, 437. 125 Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 169. 475
Wetherell v. Devine, 3 West. Rep. 519, 116 III. 631 864 Weyman r. Murdock, Harp. L. 125 731	Woods v. Finnell, 13 Bush, 629 48 v. North, 84 Pa. 407 396, 397 Wooldridge v. Planters Bank, 1 Sneed, 297 482
Wheat v.Platte City & Ft. D.R.Co., 4 Kan. 370, 387, 393	Wooldridge v. Planters Bank, 1 Sneed, 297 482
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528. 186 Wheeldon v. Burrows, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 31. 187	Wooliscroft v. Norton, 15 Wis. 198
Wheeler v. Bent, 7 Pick. 61	i Workman n Oominick 3 Strobb 1, 589 49
Colo. 248289	Worth v. Ashe County Comrs., 30 N. C. 409 300 Worthington's Case, 21 Md. 23 678 Wright v. Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co., 19 Neb. 175
v. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377. 584 Wheelock v. Noonan, 10 Cent. Rep. 512, 108 N.	Wright v. Chicago, B. & Q. H. Co., 19 Neb. 175, 176
Y. 179 Whelan v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 35 Fed.	m. Methodist Enisconal Church, Hottm
Rep. 849	Ch. 211, 213, 6 N. Y. Ch. L. ed. 1119, 1120 734 c. Roxburgh, 2 Ct. Sess. Cas. 3d Series (Macpherson, L. & B.) 748 452
Whipple v. Fulier, 11 Conn. 582. 48 Whistler v. Foster, 14 C. B. N. S. 248. 169	(Macpherson, L. & B.) 748. 452 v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 9 West, Rep.
White v. Crew, 16 Ga. 416	744, 120 111, 541
0. Hart, 60 U. S. 15 Wall, 603 (20 L. eq. 66) 405	v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389 884 Wyckhoff v. Meyers, 44 N. Y. 143 209
v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550	Wyckhoff v. Meyers, 44 N. Y. 143. 209 Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654 (27 L. ed. 1068) 6. v. Wyman, 28 N. Y. 233 801 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378. 813
v. Snell, 5 Pick. 425	Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378 813
v. Stanfield, 6 New Eng. Rep. 56, 146 Mass. 425	Wynstanley v. Lee, 2 Swanst. 333 187
v. Welsh, 38 Pa. 396, 420, 421. 157, 158, 160 Whitecomb v. Jacob, I Saik. 161 792	Y.
Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East, 614.	Yates v. Jack, L. R. 1 Ch. 295 187 v. Judd, 18 Wis. 119 813
Whittaker v. Bradley, 7 Dowl, & R. 649	v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 10 Wall. 497 (19 L.
Wigget v. Fox, 11 Exch. 832, 839. 452 Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455. 60	ed. 984)
Wild Cat Branch v. Ball. 45 Ind. 213	(24 L. ed. 590) 568 Venni v McNames 45 N V 614 159 159
Wildey v. Fractional School Dist. No. 1, 25	Yeatman v. New Orleans Sav. Inst., 95 U. S. 766 (24 L. ed. 590) Yenni v. McNamee, 45 N. Y. 614
Mich. 422 209, 210 Wilkinson v. Byers, 1 Ad. & El. 106 259	v. Kellar, 94 Mo. 581 165, 166 v. Lambert, L. R. 3 P. C. 142, 156 152
v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 30 Iowa,	Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406 283
119	
v. Worcester First Nat. F. Ins. Co., 72 N. V.	Z. 70 internal Comp. 12 Source & 10 100
Willcutz v. Northwestern Mut. F. Ins. Co., 81	Zeigler v. Gram, 13 Serg. & R. 102 193 Zimmerman v. Franke, 34 Kan. 650 388, 302 Zule v. Zule, 24 Wend. 76, 78 659
Ind. 308	Zule v. Zule, 24 Wend. 76, 78 569
√ adv ± 4a dda	

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS CITED, CONSTRUED, ETC.

England.	ı	Statutes.	
Statutes.		1850, p. 219. Enacting the common law	577
6 Richard II. chap. 8. Forcible entry and de-		Civîl Code.	
tainer 1 Edw. VI. chap. 12, § 10, Penalties of horse-	527	\$ 801. Easements defined.	577
stealing	687	Political Code.	
France.			577
Code Civil Law.		Colorado.	
Bk. 2, chap. 3, §§ 1, 2. Easement; howacquired tit. 4, § 3. Windows	187 187	Code.	
United States.		8 8. Actions; plaintiffs. 5. Suit by trustee. 10. Parties to action 12. Joinder of parties. 5024 Eminent domain. compensation.	794 794
Constitution.		10. Parties to action 12. Joinder of parties	$\frac{794}{794}$
Art. 1, \$ 8, par. 3. Power to regulate com-	000	5024.Eminent domain: compensation	788
merce 301, 5th Amend. Equal protection of laws.	813	Connecticut.	. *
5th Amend. Equal protection of laws. 14th Amend. Due process of law. 551, 813, 15th Amend. Rights of negroes.	895 346	Special Laws.	
. Statutes.		1887, p. 571. Corporate charter	638
1796, May 18. Survey and sale of public lands. 1887, March 3. Removal of causes	561 367	Dakota.	
Revised Statutes.		Statutes,	00*
Tit. 32, chap. 6. Mining claims	629	1889, chap. 43. Bonds to procure seed grain	287
3267. Internal revenue; custody of distilled	367	Delaware.	
epirits	154 156	For Provincial Laws, see Pennsylvania.	•
3271. Internal revenue distillery warehouse. 3272. Removal of whiskey from warehouse. 3273. Government storekeeper	$156 \\ 156$	Constitution, 1792.	
3274. Removal of spirits from storehouse	156	Art. 4, § 1. Electors defined	34
ises after payment of tax.	156	Constitution.	
3295. Regauging and branding of whiskey	$\begin{array}{c} 156 \\ 156 \end{array}$	Art. 1, \$3. Elections to be free and equal 2, \$1. Taxing power, legislative power,	356
330. Withdrawal for exportation	156 310	2, \$1. Taxing power; legislative power, where vested	, 356 356
4747. Pensions; aftachment 4898. Assignability of patent	552 31 0	Statutes.	
Revised Statutes, Supplement.			341
P. 530, \$ 4. Spirits in bonded warehouse; bond	156	1776, Sept. 20, art. 5. Rights of suffrage	$\frac{342}{344}$
for payment of taxes	150	1847, Feb. 16. Duty of assessors.	344
Alabama.		1738. Electors 1776, Sept. 20, art. 5. Rights of suffrage. 1843, Feb. 27. Tax assessments. 1847, Feb. 16. Duty of assessors 1873, Apr. 9. Taxes; elections; duties of assessors and levy courts. 1873, Apr. 10. Collection of taxes	, 349 349
· Constitution, 1868.	.	Laws.	014
Art. 9, § 1. Assessment of taxes	875	Vol. 1. p. 38. Electors defined	842
Constitution, 1875.		Vol. 1, p. 33. Electors defined D. 146. Electors Appendix, p. 83. Right of suffrage 9, p. 545. Election Laws 10, p. 171. Duty of assessors p. 518. Act to extend privileges of poor white taxables 13. chan 294. Taxes continuation of rat-	342 342
Art. 11, 5 1. Taxes; assessment of	3.3	9, p. 545. Election Laws	343
5. County taxes 7. Municipal taxation	373 373	p. 518. Act to extend privileges of	0**
Statutes.	919		
1885, Feb. 16. Birmingham, power to improve		ing	34.7 34.7
sidewalks	871	t e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	
Session Acts.		chap. 372, \$ 1. Duty of collectors.	346
1884-85, pp. 620, 622. Birmingham, power to improve sidewalks	371	Revised Code.	312
Arkans2s.		1874, pp. 32, 33. Elector defined. P. 62, chap. 8, 8 II. Levy court as court of ap-	916
Mansfield's Digest.		peals 12. Power of levy court 14. Questioning assessment	346 346
	734	14. Questioning assessment	346 346
2522. Distribution 2528. Wife as heir 2592. Dower	734 734	21. Settling collector's accounts	316 350
		Chap. 9, \$27. Copies of hundred lists	347 345
California.		S1, chap. 10, \$ 17. Duty of assessors	346 347
Constitution. Art. 4, \$23. Drawing money from public treas-		84. Valuation of property	345 342
ury	405	90. Delinquent Act	347
8 L. R. A.	4 05 ,	Duty of conectors	346 27

	-			
28	C	ITA'	TIONS.	
#8 11-14. # 15. Po 18. To P. 290. 1 375. 0 380. 7	. \$ 10. Collector's duty to render account for taxes Duty of collector	349 842 347 343	\$13. Eminent domain; damages	840 833 838 506 308 864 506 861
	Florida. Constitution. Municipal taxes Georgia. Constitution, 1868. tion of justices of the peace	55 190	1849, Feb. 12. Northwestern Plank Road Co 1854, March 1. Northwestern Plank Road Co 1859, Feb. 21. Roads	859 869 863 726 859 793 557 859 838
Art. 6, 5	Constitution, 1877. 7. par. 2. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace 2. par. 1. Taxation to be uniform	190 272	Laws. 1859, p. 154. Roads	863 557
1850. Ca 1863, Dec	Statutes. hildren of divorced parents legitimate uses of divorce. 14. Requisites of marriage. Pamphlet Laws. 8. Requisites of marriage. 11. Receipt and delivery of telegraph	362 362 363 363	Revised Statutes, 1889. Chap. 24, art. 5, \$ 1, par. 41. Power to license peddlers. 28. Adoption of common law. 30, \$ 5. Estates and joint tenancy. 22, \$ 1. Incorporation Act. \$ 5. Corporate power to own property	329 505 656 503
1656. 1 1658. 1 1657. 1	Code, 1863. Requisites of marriage	190 862 362 362 362 362 362 362	\$6. Corporate powers to be exercised by directors. 38, §5 § 54 h-54 n. Explosives	504 838 838 735 726 656 601 509
5104.	Code, 1873. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace Code, 1882.	190	Starr & Curtiss Statutes. P. 623. Corporations	859 557
533. 1 536. 1 1631. 1 1635. 1	Peddler's license. Penalty for peddling without license. Penalty for peddling without license. Punlshment for illegal peddling. Peddler defined. License for wagon used in vending merchandise Oath of peddlers. Marriages	274 275 274 274 274 275 274 862	Indiana. Constitution. Art. 9, § 3. Support of benevolent institutions Statutes. 1889, March 9. Establishment of branch high-	
2183. 1 2714. (2718. 8 2731. (2731. 9 2031. (2731. 9 3250. 3254. 3254. 3254. 33556. 33554. 33	Principal and agent; revocation of contract Contract defined Simple contract defined Contracts of infants Actions ex contractu Actions Actions Actions Grantiff in penal action Joinder of actions Garnishment; exemption of wages Void judgment Void judgment Void judgment	412 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 1	Way Revised Statutes, 1881. \$ 359. Interrogatories before trial 943. Intervention 1623. Gaming devices; return of, to owner 1904. Homicide; murder in first degree 2088. Prohibition of gaming devices. 5115. Disabilities of married women 5117. Power of married woman to contract. 5119. Married woman as surety 408. \$\$ 5142-5150. Insane persons, restraint of \$ 5500. Negotiability of instruments. \$ 5600-6080. Support of poor	596 639 439 35 408 408 797 462 365 462
P. 325. (Taxation to be uniform Jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Cobb's Digest. Children of divorced parents legitimate. Causes for divorce. 818, 819. Marriages of idiots and luna-	190 362 362	Elliott's Supplement. \$\$ 1539-1542. Establishment of branch highway \$ 1604. Corporations; laborer's wages Iowa. Code, 1851.	60 849
Art. 3. 5	Illinois. Constitution, 1848. Zi. Title of Acts	859 864	Chap. 94. Contempt	530 635 768 780

Kansas.	1	Statutes.	
Compiled Laws, 1885.	1	1851, chap. 206. Creditors' bills	312
Pp. 702-706, \$\$ 28-54. Service of process by		1856, chap. 38. Jurisdiction of supreme court.	311
publication	391		$\frac{245}{311}$
Civil Code.	Į	chap. 214. Jurisdiction of supreme court 1858, chap. 34. Creditors' bill 1870, chap. 224. Benefit associations; form of	312
1 72. Service by publication.	391	1870, chap. 224. Benefit associations; form of name	321
281. Discharge of jury	776	1884, chap. 285. Creditors' bills	309
Criminal Code.		1887, chap. 246. Liability of Commonwealth for tort	401
1207. Jurors, impaneling	777 776	chap. 348. Closing windows	188
208. Discharge of jurors	440	1888, chap. 429. Benefit corporations	320
Kentucky.	İ	Revised Statutes.	
	ļ	Chap. 81, \$7. Jurisdiction of supreme court. 90, 98. Creditors' bill	311
Statutes.		113, § 43. Jurisdiction of supreme court	813 811
1869, March 6. Warehouse receipts; negotia- bility of	153	General Statutes.	
Code.		Chap. 22, \$1. Authority to maintain alms-	
\$ 47. Process defined	553	house	244
667. Form of process	553 553	108, § 3. Power of married woman to buy and sell	728
	- 1	. 113, \$ 2, cl. 11. Creditors' bill	813
Louisiana.	ļ	Public Statutes.	
Civil Code.		Chap. 22, § 1. Suffolk County charges; respon-	
Arts. 3125, 3129. Pledge; delivery of possession		sibility for. 33, \$1. Authority to maintain alms-	244
necessary	153	nouse	244
7.F .		86, \$ 26. Expenses of state paper	401 821
Maine.		106, § 7. Conclusiveness of certificate § 17. Benefit association; form of	
Statutes.		name \$21. Issuance of certificate	321 321
1852, chap. 257. Blasting; precautions required	151	151, § 2. Attachment; equity jurisdic-	
Revised Statutes, 1841.		cl. II. Creditors' bills.	624 309
Chap. 81, \$ 21. Railroad companies; penalties		cl. 11. Creditors' bills	313
for neglect to maintain sign boards and	451	157, \$\$ 80, 81. Insolvency: discharge \$ 83. Trustee process	645 624
119, \$ 63. Garnishment; exemption of		§ 85. Attachment	625
wages	822	167. Practice Act. 168, \$\$ 3-7. Set-off	526 318
Revised Statutes.		183, § 1. Trustee process	624
Chap. 17, 83 23, 24. Blasting; precautions re-		chise; who may take advantage of	321
uurea	451	195. Liability of Commonwealth for tort	401
18, \$ 95. Adverse possession of highway 90, \$ 2. Right of mortgagee	832 569	204, \$ 29. Misdemeanors; punishment in house of correction.	244
94, § 2. Verbal lease; effect. 124, § 20. Lord's Day Act.	569	220, fol. Support of inmates in house	944
Vol. 4, chap. 30, \$ 9. Killing game	428	of correction	244
		Michigan.	
Maryland.		. Constitution.	
Bill of Rights.		Art. 6, 531. Unusual punishments prohibited	683
Art. 22 Due process of law	551	Statutes.	
	99T	1887. Bohemian oat notes Feb. 22. Cedar Springs; power to borrow	478
Constitution.		Feb. 22. Cedar Springs; power to borrow	852
Art. 3, § 20. Drawing money from public treasury	404	money	Odia
_		Revised Statutes, 1846.	
Statutes.		Chap. 55. tit. 10. Transfer of certificate of stocks	361
1759, chap. 72. Decree for assignment of pat-	314	Howell's Statutes.	
1842, chap. 393. Conjugal rights 1850, chap. 460. Police officers 1852, chap. 265. Conjugal rights	681	Chap. 188. Sporting club	RES
1882, chap. 265. Conjugal rights	847 681	191. Transfer of certificate of stocks	361
1886, chap. 265. Conjugal rights 1886, chap. 439. Regulating plumbers	551	7697. Execution; right to attach interest of stockholder	358
Code, 1860.		\$ 9180. Horse stealing	685
Art. 45, 87. Conjugal rights	681	Minnesota.	
Code.	-	Statutes.	
Art. 24, \$\$ 288-293. Police officers.	847	1887, chap. 13. Railroad companies; liability	
Pronibition of lottery	671	for injuries to servant	119
173. Definition of lottery	671	General Statutes, 1878.	
ited	671	Chap. 81, \$ 9. Mortgage; property to be sold in	
Art. 45, 57. Conjugal rights	672 681	Pp. 1024, 1030. Bonds to procure seed grain	53 287
		l -	
Massachusetts.		Mississippi.	
_ Constitution.		Code.	
Pt. 9 ahan 1 at m			100
- " wall 1. 1 . Power to provide for bub-		2424. Attachment	733 730
Pt. 2 chap. 1. 84. Power to provide for public service. 8 L. R. A.	433	2424. Attachment	730 730

Missouri.	Protective Union	179
Constitution, 1875.	1869, chap. 907. Railroad-aid bonds. 1870, chap. 221. Liability of State for tort. 1872, chap. 161. Protection of tax-payers. 1874, chap. 453. Sales of stock taken in ex-	249
Art. 2, \$22. Rights of defendant in criminal	1870, chap, 321. Liability of State for tort	402 252
prosecution	2 1874, chap. 453. Sales of stock taken in ex-	
Special Acts.	change for railroad-aid bonds	251 713
1863, Dec. 18. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co 8	2] chap. 153. Sales of stock taken in ex-	
Statutes.	change of railroad-aid bonds	251
1831, March 18. Cars for shipment of sheep 5	1878, chap. 321. Corporations; punishment of members who refuse to comply with	•
	by-laws	178
Revised Statutes, 1835.	1979, chap. 235. Abolishment of office of rail- road commissioner	252
P. 490, \$ 15. Attendance of witnesses in crim-	2 1881, chap. 531. Waste by public officer	252
inal cases	0 Revised Statutes.	
Revised Statutes, 1845.	Vol. 2, p. 135, \$5 6, 8. Lease for more than one	
P. 880, chap. 138, \$ 16. Attendance of wit-	year by parol, void	223
nesses in criminal cases	p. 704, 8 4. Limited partnerships; certificate for Certificate to be acknowledged	715 715
Revised Statutes, 1855.	7. Athgavit	715
P. 1191, chap. 127, \$ 18. Attendance of wit-	8. Partnership, when formed	715 715
nesses in criminal cases 6	Al Panamala	715
General Statutes, 1865.	17. Powers of special partner	716 621
P. 850, \$15. Effect of defendant's absence at		
' 4min 1 819 K	Code of Procedure.	
chap. 213, § 17. Attendance of witnesses in criminal cases.	§ 53. Jurisdiction of justices; action for penal-	191
****	\$ 129. Issuance of summons	
Revised Statutes, 1879.	Code of Civil Procedure.	
\$ 1891. Criminal to be present when tried 6 1907. Attendance of witnesses in criminal	\$ 1798. Corporations; punishment for illegal	
cases 6	9 conduct	177
Vol. 2, p. 1584. St. Louis charter; passage of ordinances; letting contracts	1 Penal Code.	
	\$168. Unlawful combinations to interfere with	
Revised Statutes, 1889.	trade; punishment	
\$558. Negotiability of warehouse receipts 1	North Carolina.	
	3	-
4191. Effect of defendant's absence at trial. 6	3 Constitution.	
	0 Art. 1, \$ 17. Law of the land	532
	Statutes.	
Montana.		444
Montana. Constitution.	1868-69, chap. 93, 88 32-37. Dower Act	444 260
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4	1868-69, chap. 93, 88 32-37. Dower Act	444 260 301
Constitution. Art. 3, \$29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act	444 260 301
Constitution. Art. 3, \$29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act	260 301
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act	260 301 535
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act	260 301
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution. 5, § 31. Public officers	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act	260 301 535
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act	260 301 535 381 537
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution. 5, § 31. Public officers	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act	260 301 535 381 537 260
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1028. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting \$ 2100, 2101. Right of surety.	260 301 535 381 537
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 § 4. Salartes of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska.	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 411
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, §§ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor 1887, chap. 187, §§ 44-51. Taxation Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. § 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument 1028. Forcible entry and detainer 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting § 2100, 2101. Right of surety § 240. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited 3671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting	260 301 535 381 537 260 382
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution. 5, § 31. Public officers § 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money. 7, § 1. Duties of state officers. 4 § 4. Salaries of officers. 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation. Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors. 7	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument 1028. Forcible entry and detainer 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. 182 130, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. 2240. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited.	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 411 260 260
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville. Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1023. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. \$ 2100, 2104. Right of surety. 2102, 2104. 2106, 2107. Dower Act. \$ 2740. Sale of liquor near religious meeting. 8 671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting.	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 444 260
Constitution. Art. 3, \$29. Construction of Constitution. 5, \$31. Public officers \$34. Warrant necessary for payment of money. 7, \$1. Duties of state officers. 4 & Salarties of officers. 15, \$7. Discrimination in transportation. Nebraska. Criminal Code. \$435. Discharge of jurors. 7 New Hampshire.	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument 1028. Forcible entry and detainer 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. 182 130, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. 2240. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited.	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 411 260 260
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 411 260 260
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 444 260 260 532
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, § 8 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laus. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 411 260 260
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 84. Salavies of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, § 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 New Mexico.	1868-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 444 260 260 532
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, § 8 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laus. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 444 260 260 532
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, \$ 31. Public officers 4 5 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, \$ 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 4. Salarties of officers 4 15, \$ 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. \$ 435. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, \$\$ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 New Mexico. Compiled Laws. \$ 157. Landlord's liens 6	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument 1028. Forcible entry and detainer 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. \$ 2100, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. \$ 240. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited. 3682. Violation of city ordinance. North Dakota. Constitution. \$ 185. Public credit for individual aid. Statutes. 1890, Feb. 14. Bonds to procure seed grain.	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 444 260 260 532
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 4. Salarties of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation. 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 435. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, § 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 New Mexico. Compiled Laws. § 1577. Landlord's liens 6 1589. Duration of chattel mortgage 6	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville. Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1023. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. \$\$ 2100, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. 2240. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited. 3682. Violation of city ordinance. North Dakota. Constitution. \$ 185. Public credit for individual aid. Statutes. 1890, Feb. 14. Bonds to procure seed grain. Compiled Laws. \$ 3582. Insurance; limitation of time for suits	260 301 535 537 260 382 444 260 260 532 285
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, \$ 31. Public officers 4 5 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, \$ 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 4. Salaties of officers 4 15, \$ 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. \$ 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, \$\$ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 New Mexico. Compiled Laws. \$ 157. Landlord's liens 6 189. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 189. Duration of chattel mortgage; affidavit of exten-	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 537 260 382 441 260 260 532 285 285
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 84. Salaries of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation. 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, §§ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 New Mexico. Compiled Laws. § 1537. Landlord's liens 6 1599. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1590. Chattel mortgage affidavit of extension 6	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1023. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. \$\$ 2100, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. \$ 2740. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3571. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited. 3580. Violation of city ordinance. North Dakota. Constitution. \$ 185. Public credit for individual sid. Statutes. 1890, Feb. 14. Bonds to procure seed grain. Compiled Laws. \$ 3582. Iusurance: limitation of time for suits on policy. 4186. Re-insurance; privity.	260 301 535 537 260 382 444 260 260 532 285
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 4. Salarties of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska Criminal Code. 8 435. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, § 8, 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 New Mexico Compiled Laws. 8 1577. Landlord's liens 6 1589. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1590. Chattel mortgage; affidavit of extension 6 New York.	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 537 260 382 441 260 260 532 285 285
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 6 Marrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 Salaries of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation. 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, §§ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 48. Police departments 6 New Mexico. Compiled Laws. § 157. Landlord's lens 6 1589. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1590. Chattel mortgage; affidavit of extension 6 New York. Statutes.	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 537 260 382 441 260 260 532 285 285
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 6 Marrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 Salaries of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation. 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, §§ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 48. Police departments 6 New Mexico. Compiled Laws. § 157. Landlord's lens 6 1589. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1590. Chattel mortgage; affidavit of extension 6 New York. Statutes.	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1028. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. 18210, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. 2104, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. 32740. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited. 3820. Violation of city ordinance. North Dakota. Constitution. \$ 185. Public credit for individual aid. Statutes. 1890, Feb. 14. Bonds to procure seed grain. Compiled Laws. \$ 3582. Insurance; limitation of time for suits on policy. 4186. Re-insurance; privity. Ohio. Revised Statutes. \$ 301. Life insurance; foreign company to	260 301 535 381 537 382 444 260 260 532 285 772 770
Constitution. Art. 3, § 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, § 31. Public officers 4 6 Marrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, § 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 Salaries of officers 4 15, § 7. Discrimination in transportation. 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. § 485. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, §§ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 48. Police departments 6 New Mexico. Compiled Laws. § 157. Landlord's lens 6 1589. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1590. Chattel mortgage; affidavit of extension 6 New York. Statutes.	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville. Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1023. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. 182100, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. 2102, 2104, 2106, 2107. Dower Act. 32740. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3370. Violation of city ordinance. North Dakota. Constitution. \$ 185. Public credit for individual aid. Statutes. 1890. Feb. 14. Bonds to procure seed grain. Compiled Laws. \$ 3582. Insurance; limitation of time for suits on policy. 4186. Re-insurance; privity. Ohio. Revised Statutes. \$ 3001. Life insurance; foreign company to procure certificate.	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 441 260 532 285 772 770
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, \$ 31. Public officers 4 5 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, \$ 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 4. Salaries of officers 4 15, \$ 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. \$ 435. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, \$\$ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 1549. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1559. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1559. Chattel mortgage; affidavit of extension 6 New York. Statutes. 1816. To suppress dueling 6 Session Laws. 1813. chap. 60, \$ 4. Church temporalities 7 1813. chap. 60, \$ 4. Church temporalities 7	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1028. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. \$ 2100, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104. 2105, 2107. Dower Act. \$ 2740. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited. 3672. Violation of city ordinance. North Dakota. Constitution. \$ 185. Public credit for individual aid. Statutes. 1890, Feb. 14. Bonds to procure seed grain. Compiled Laws. \$ 3582. Insurance; limitation of time for suits on policy. 4186. Re-insurance; privity. Ohio. Revised Statutes. \$ 3601. Life insurance; foreign company to procure certificate. 3616. Life insurance; duration of license.	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 441 260 532 285 772 770
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution 4 5, \$ 31. Public officers 4 5 84. Warrant necessary for payment of money 4 7, \$ 1. Duties of state officers 4 8 4. Salaries of officers 4 15, \$ 7. Discrimination in transportation 7 Nebraska. Criminal Code. \$ 435. Discharge of jurors 7 New Hampshire. Chap. 193, \$\$ 6, 14. Statute of Wills 3 New Jersey. Public Laws. 1886, p. 43. Police departments 6 1549. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1559. Duration of chattel mortgage 6 1559. Chattel mortgage; affidavit of extension 6 New York. Statutes. 1816. To suppress dueling 6 Session Laws. 1813. chap. 60, \$ 4. Church temporalities 7 1813. chap. 60, \$ 4. Church temporalities 7	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 187, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation	260 301 535 381 537 260 382 444 260 260 2532 285 772 770 134 134 131
Constitution. Art. 3, \$ 29. Construction of Constitution	1888-69, chap. 93, \$\$ 32-37. Dower Act. 1881, chap. 234. Prohibition of sale of spirituous liquor. 1887, chap. 137, \$\$ 44-51. Taxation. Private Laws. 1883, chap. 111. Charter of Asheville Code. \$ 152, par. 3. Limitation of action upon sealed instrument. 1028. Forcible entry and detainer. 1079. Sale of liquor near political meeting. \$ 2100, 2101. Right of surety. 2102, 2104. 2105, 2107. Dower Act. \$ 2740. Sale of liquor near polling place prohibited. 3671. Sale of liquor near religious meeting prohibited. 3672. Violation of city ordinance. North Dakota. Constitution. \$ 185. Public credit for individual aid. Statutes. 1890, Feb. 14. Bonds to procure seed grain. Compiled Laws. \$ 3582. Insurance; limitation of time for suits on policy. 4186. Re-insurance; privity. Ohio. Revised Statutes. \$ 3601. Life insurance; foreign company to procure certificate. 3616. Life insurance; duration of license.	260 301 535 535 535 260 382 444 260 532 285 772 770 134 134

	130 [Statutes.	
1 3600c. Foreign life insurance companies	335	1715. Statute of Limitations	483
from State	616	1889, April 8. Act to provide revenue	281
5916. Wills; witnesses 5919. Signatures to will	42	Acts.	
5925. Will; bequest to witness	41	1885, Extra Session, p. 43. Tax upon pool sell-	
5991. Validity of verbal will. 6761. Quo warranto.	41 135	1887, p. 17. Revenue Act; tax upon pool sell-	281
V V		ing	281
Oregon.	l	p. 43. Assessment Act; license of pool selling	281
Statutes.		1889, p. 168, § 52. Assessment Act; license of pool selling	
1885, Feb. 11. Mechanic's lien 1889, Feb. 25. Lien of sub-contractor	702 703	p. 260. Revenue Act; tax upon pool sell-	281
1005, Feb. 25. Lifen of Sub-contractor	400	ing	281
Session Laws.	1	Milliken & Vertrees' Code.	
1889, p. 75. Lien of sub-contractor	703	\$\$ 1549-1561. Eminent domain; procedure \$ 1562. Eminent domain; incidental damages	128 127
Code of General Laws.		\$\$ 1563, 1566. Eminent domain: appeal from	
\$\$ 4044, 4045. Railroad companies; killing stock on track	138	finding of jury § 2702. Instruments which bear interest	$\frac{128}{128}$
	199	2130. New suit.	482
Civil Code.		2931. Exemption of wages	413 281
651. Punishment for contempt	588 589	4881. Horse racing exempt from provisions	281
652. Contempt in presence of court	589	against gaming	COL
653. Contempt not in presence of court 655. Proceedings for contempt	589	Texas.	
916. Power of court to preserve order	589	Constitution, 1869.	
Compilation, 1887.	· .	Art. 1, \$14. Eminent domain; just compensa-	
\$ 3609. Mechanic's lien	705	tion	181
3673. Filing claim	702	Constitution, 1876.	
what included in	102	Art. 1, \$17. Eminent domain; adequate com-	
Pennsylvania.		pensation	151
Book of Laws, 1676-1700.		Statutes.	
	340	1889, April 5. Act for inspection of oils	827
P. 104. Act of union	341	Revised Statutes.	
Pp. 93-101. Freeman, who is P. 104. Act of union. Pp. 221, 222. Taxes. P. 233. Assessment of taxes. 247. Freeman defined	341	Arts. 188, 189. Garnishment; answer of prove-	
247. Freeman defined	841	nishee Art. 212. Garnishment; defense by principal	322
Statutes.		defendant	300
1682, Dec. 7, Body of Laws, chap. 58. Elections chap. 127. Taxes	341	218. Garnishment, exemption of current wages 277. Liability of common carrier	322
chap. 127. Taxes	341	277 Liability of common carrier	3:15
1855, May 7. Hotels: notices to enests	101	see Maching of common carrier	-
1855, May 7. Hotels; notices to guests	101	Paschal's Digest.	
1000, May 7. Hotels; notices to guests	101	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compen-	181
1874. Incorporation Act.	204	Paschal's Digest.	181
P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	204	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compen-	181
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	204	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation	181
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes.	181
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101	Paschal's Digest. Vol.2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1888, p. 59. Closing windows.	
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints. Statutes.	101 204 101 857	Paschal's Digest. Vol.2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws.	188
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints.	101 204 101 857	Paschal's Digest. Vol.2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and	188
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2436. Guardians of insane persons.	188
Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints. Statutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, § 12. Charter of Greenville;	101 204 101 857 855	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2425. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution	188
Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints. Statutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, § 12. Charter of Greenville; right to own property. § 19. Power to levy tax.	101 204 101 857	Paschal's Digest. Vol.2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution Virginia.	188
Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints. Statutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, § 12. Charter of Greenville;	101 204 101 857 855	Paschal's Digest. Vol.2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution.	188
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295	Paschal's Digest. Vol.2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution Virginia.	188
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints. Statutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, § 12. Charter of Greenville; right to own property. § 19. Power to levy tax. 31. Power to borrow money.	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2478. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take	188 708 112
Public Laws. Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3064, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to	188 708 112
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles	188 708 112
Public Laus. Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857 855 295 295	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles Session Acts.	188 708 112
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 688	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles. Session Acts. 1879-80, pp. 53, 54. Telegraph companies; right	188 708 112
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295 688	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles Session Acts.	188 708 112 452 431
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, \$ 12. Unlawful restraints. \$ tatutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, \$ 12. Charter of Greenville; right to own property. \$ 19. Power to levy tax. 31. Power to borrow money. Code. \$ 112. Fraud; limitation of actions. South Dakota. Compiled Laws. \$ 2588. Dury of husband to support his wife. 304. Duress defined. 305. Menace defined. 4457. Must be payable in money only.	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295 688 563 395 563 395	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2425. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles Session Acts. 1879-80, pp. 53, 54. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles Code. \$\$ 1287-1290. Telegraph companies; right to	188 708 112 452 431
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints Statutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, § 12. Charter of Greenville; right to own property § 19. Power to levy tax 31. Power to levy tax Code. § 112. Fraud; limitation of actions South Dakota. Compiled Laus. § 2588. Duty of husband to support his wife 3304. Duress defined \$ 1305. Menace defined 4459. Negotiable instrument defined	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295 688 563 395 563 395	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles. Session Acts. 1879-80, pp. 53, 54. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles.	188 708 112 452 431
Public Laws. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. South Carolina. Constitution. Art. 1, \$ 12. Unlawful restraints. \$ tatutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, \$ 12. Charter of Greenville; right to own property. \$ 19. Power to levy tax. 31. Power to borrow money. Code. \$ 112. Fraud; limitation of actions. South Dakota. Compiled Laws. \$ 2588. Dury of husband to support his wife. 304. Duress defined. 305. Menace defined. 4457. Must be payable in money only.	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295 688 563 395 563 395	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2425. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles Session Acts. 1879-80, pp. 53, 54. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles Code. \$\$ 1287-1290. Telegraph companies; right to	183 708 112 452 431 451
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints. Statutes. Statutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, § 12. Charter of Greenville; right to own property. § 19. Power to levy tax 31. Power to borrow money. Code. § 112. Fraud; limitation of actions. South Dakota. Compiled Laus. § 2588. Duty of husband to support his wife. 3004. Duress defined. 4556. Negotiable instrument defined. 4457. Must be payable in money only. 462. Must not contain any other contract. Tennessee.	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295 688 563 395 563 395	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2478. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property. Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles. Session Acts. 1879-80, pp. 53, 54. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles. Code. \$\$ 1287-1200. Telegraph companies; right to obstruct highway. Washington.	183 708 112 452 431 451
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests	101 204 101 857 855 295 295 295 688 563 395 563 395	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles. Code. \$\$ 1287-1200. Telegraph companies; right to obstruct highway Washington. Statutes.	183 708 112 452 431 451
Public Laus. Public Laus. P. 479. Hotels; notices to guests. Constitution. Art. 1, § 12. Unlawful restraints. Statutes. Statutes. 1841, Dec. 17. Power of corporate authorities Statutes at Large. Vol. 19, p. 103, § 12. Charter of Greenville; right to own property. § 19. Power to levy tax 31. Power to borrow money. Code. § 112. Fraud; limitation of actions. South Dakota. Compiled Laus. § 2588. Duty of husband to support his wife. 3004. Duress defined. 4556. Negotiable instrument defined. 4457. Must be payable in money only. 462. Must not contain any other contract. Tennessee.	101 204 101 101 855 855 295 295 295 688 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563	Paschal's Digest. Vol. 2, p. 1101. Eminent domain; just compensation Vermont. Statutes. 1886, p. 59. Closing windows. Revised Laws. \$ 2426. Guardians of insane persons. \$ 3664, subd. 10. Incorporation of literary and scientific institution. Virginia. Constitution. Art. 5, \$ 14. Eminent domain; right to take property. Statutes. 1880, Feb. 10. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles. Session Acts. 1879-80, pp. 53, 54. Telegraph companies; right to erect poles. Code. \$\$ 1287-1290. Telegraph companies; right to obstruct highway. Washington. Statutes. 1888, Feb. 2. Incorporation of towns and vil-	188 708 112 453 451 451 438

West Virginia.		Laws.	
10, \$ 7. Limit of taxation \$ 8. Municipal indebtedness prohibited \$ 9. Power of municipal taxation 12, \$ 5. School money \$ 6. School districts Statutes. [881, chap. 35. Alternate Road Law	305 306 308 306 306	1874, chap. 179. Married woman's action for damages 1881, chap. 89. Married woman's action for damages	812
\$ 56 b. Alternate Road Law 93. Forfeiture for nonpayment of rent Wisconsin. Constitution. Art. 1, \$ 9. Remedy for wrong \$ 13. Due process of law	813 813	Revised Statutes. § 1170. Publication of delinquent taxes	782 782 782 424 817 468 468 812

LAWYERS'

ANNOTATED.

INDIANA SUPREME COURT.

Edward ASZMAN, Appt., STATE OF INDIANA.

(___.Ind.....)

- One who is intoxicated to the extent of 1. One who is intoxicated would be being deprived of the mental capacity to deliberate or premeditate cannot commit a crime of which the statute makes premeditation an es-sential element, if he had formed no purpose to commit the crime prior to the time he L.came so intoxicated; hence upon the trial of a person charged with naving committed murder in the first degree, of which premeditation is an essential element, the fact that the accused was drunk at the time he committed the crime may be considered for the purpose of determining whether or not there was premeditation.
- 2. Instructions by the trial court which

are designed to cast discredit or suspicion upon a defense which is recognized by the law as legitimate, and which an accused person is making in apparent good faith, are not regarded with favor, even although such defense be that of insanity.

(Elliott and Coffee, JJ., dissent.)

- An instruction as to the individual responsibility of the jurors to be fully satisfied of the guilt of a person accused of crime before concurring in a verdict of guilty should be given if seasonably requested.
- 4. An accused person is not entitled to a special instruction to the effect that the mere finding of an indictment against him does not raise any presumption of guilt, where that idea is conveyed by the general charge of the court.

(April 22, 1890.)

Note.—Voluntary intexication in extenuation of 277: State v. Thompson, 12 Nev. 140: People v. Pine, crime.

It is well settled that voluntary drunkenness is no excess for crime. United States v. Clarke, 2 Cranch. 554; State v. John, 8 Ired. L. 330; State v. Wilson,

excuse for crime. United States v. Clarke, 2 Cranch, C. C. 158; United States v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28; United C. C. 158; United States v. Drew, 5 Mason, 23; United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1; Respublica v. Weidle, 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 88 (1 L. ed. 301); 1 Russ. Cr. L. 9th ed. 12; 1 Wharton, Cr. L. 8th ed. \$ 51; Desty, Cr. L. 28a; Williams v. State, 81 Ala. 1; Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 85; Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 23; State v. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413; Mooney v. State, 33 Ala. 419; Casat v. State, 40 Ark. 511; People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; People v. King, 27 Cal. 507; People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344; Green Cr. L. Rep. 412 People v. Lewis 23 Cal. 831; I Green, Cr. L. Rep. 412; People v. Lewis, 36 Cal. 531; Mercer v. State, 17 Ga. 146; Estes v. State, 55 Ga. 31; Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612; Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527; Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594; Marshall v. State, 59 Ga. 154; Henry v. State, 33 Ga. 441; McIntyre v. People, 38 III. 514; Rafferty v. People, 66 III. 118; Upstone v. People, 109 III. 169; Reed v. Harper, 25 Iowa, 87; Smurr v. State, 88 Ind. 504; Gillooley v. State, 53 Ind. 182; Sanders v. State, 94 Ind. 147; Dawson v. State, 16 Ind. 428; State v. White, 14 Kan. 538; State v. Horne, 9 Kan. 119, 1 Green, Cr. L. Kan. 538; State v. Horne, 9 Kan. 119, 1 Green, Cr. L. Rep. 718; Curry v. Com. 2 Bush, 67; Tyra v. Com. 2 Met. (Ky.) 1; Kriel v. Com. 5 Bush, 32; Blimm v. Com. 7 Bush, 320; Shannahan v. Com. 8 Bush, 463, 1 Cal. ability and mental condition. Ferrell v. State, Green, Cr. L. Rep. 373; Smith v. Com. 1 Duv. (Ky.) 224; Golliher v. Com. 2 Duvall, 163; State v. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691; Com. v. Malone, 114 Mass. 295; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 464; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 19; State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22; Kelly v. State, 3 Smedes & M. 518; Mix v. McCoy, 4 West. Rep. 894, 22 Mo. App. 488; State v. Dearing, 65 Mo. 530; State v. Sneed, 3 West. Rep. 797, 88 Mo. 138; Chiler v. State, 14 Mo. 562; State v. Harlow, 21 Mo. 448; Whitney v. State, 8 Mo. 165; State v. Lowe, 11 West. Rep. 910, 93 Mo. 547; Smith v. State, 4 Neb. 3 R. R. A. 8 L.R.A.

104 N. C. 868; Com. v. Hart, 2 Brewst, 546; Penusylvania v. McFall, Addison, 255; Kelly v. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484; McGinnis v. Com. 102 Pa. 66; Jones v. Com. 75 Pa. 403; Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55; State v. Paulk, 18 S. C. 514; State v. McCants, 1 Speers, L. 384; State v. Stark, 1 Strob. L. 479; State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439; Lancaster v. State, 2 Lea, 575; Cornwell v. State, Mart. & Y. 147; Clark v. State, 8 Humph. 671; Outlaw v. State, 35 Tex. 481; Scott v. State, 13 Tex. App. 31; Jeffries v. State, 9 Tex. App. 598; Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500; Com. v. Jones, 1 Leigh, Burrow's Case, 1 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 75; Rennie's Case, 1d. 76; Reg. v. Moore, 3 Car. & K. 319; Rex v. Meakin, 7 Car. & P. 297; Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 76; Reg. v. Moore, 3 Car. & K. 319; Rex v. Meakin, 7 Car. & P. 297; Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, Cr. Cas. 144; Rex v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817; Reg. v. Doody, 6 Cox, Cr. Cas. 463.

Evidence of drunkenness: when admissible.

83

A PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Criminal Circuit Court for Marion County entered upon a verdict convicting him of the crime of murder in the first degree.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.

Messrs. Duncan & Smith, for appellants:

The accused was entitled to an instruction that each juror must be satisfied of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before there could be a conviction.

Castle v. State, 75 Ind. 146.

The accused was entitled to the instruction that the mere return of the indictment by the grand jury did not raise any presumption of guilt.

The court erred in instructing that the defense of insanity should be very carefully

scrutinized by the jury.

Unruh v. State, 2 West. Rep. 632, 105 Ind. 117.

The defendant could not be rightfully convicted of murder in the first degree if at the time of the commission of the alleged offense his mental condition was such that he was not capable of deliberate thought and rational determination though his mental state was the result of mere intoxication.

liberation in the commission of the act charged. State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Swan v. State, 4 Humph, 136; Pirtle v. State, 9 Humph, 663; Haile v State, 11 Humph. 154; Boswell v. Com. 20 Gratt. 860. Compare, however, State v. Sneed, 3 West. Rep. 797, 88 Mo. 138.

It may be admitted to show that the accused was in hot blood at the time; but if the design to kill had been already formed, that he was in hot blood is immaterial as to the degree of the offense. State v. Garrand, 5 Or. 216.

In such case his intoxication furnishes no extennation. See cases cited in first paragraph of note; State v. Johnson, 41 Conn. 584; Malone v. State, 49 Ga. 210; Cinck v. State, 40 Ind. 263; State v. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 577; State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154; State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341; State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332; State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414; Friery v. People, 54 Barb. 319; People v. Fuller, 2 Park. Cr. Rep. 16; People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344, 1 Green, Cr. L. Rep. 412; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91.

It is admissible to prove that the accused was incapable of forming a premeditated design (Cartwright v. State, 8 Lea, 376); and is always admissible to disprove the specific intent which is necessary to constitute the crime. Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401; People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156.

It is admissible to prove that his condition was such that he could not form any intent. People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678; People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562; Barber v. State, 39 Ohio St. 660; Cline v. State, 1 West, Rep. 81, 43 Obio St. 332.

The fact of excessive drunkenness is admissible to reduce the grade of the crime only where the question of intent, malice or premeditation is involved. Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100.

It is admissible to prove that defendant was so intoxicated that he could not have or form the intent which is a necessary ingredient of the crime charged against him. Cline v. State, 1 West. Rep. 81, 43 Ohio St. 332.

In cases which involve intention as well as act, it may be proper to hear proof of the condition of the accused, at the time of the offense, to test his capacity to decide between right and wrong. Wenz v. State, 1 Tex. App. 36.

Drunkenness at the time of the act is a fact which may be essential in determining the nature and v. Garrand, 5 Or. 216. 8 L. R. A.

Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231; Hopt v. Utah. 104 U. S. 631 (26 L. ed. 873); Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555; Jones v. Com. 75 Pa. 403; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Dauson v. State, 16 Ind. 428; Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 494; Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543; Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 275; Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 440; Smurr v. State, 88 Ind. 514; Robinson v. State, 13 West. Rep. 309, 113 Ind. 510; Cartwright v. State, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 377; Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 46; People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 545.

Messrs. Louis T. Michener, Atty-Gen., and John H. Gillett. Asst. Atty-Gen., for Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231; Hopt v. Utah.

and John H. Gillett, Asst. Atty-Gen., for the State:

If the appellant before the killing was capa-ble of entertaining a purpose to kill, and of deliberating upon it, if only for a moment, his act, if preceded by such purpose and deliberation, was murder in the first degree; the mere fact that by intoxication appellant had deprived his reason of the power to dominate over his will does not excuse.

Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401. .

To constitute premeditation there need be no appreciable space of time between the formation of the intention to kill and the killing; they may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts.

character of the act as well as his purpose and intent. Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503.

For what purposes may be considered by the jury.

Where the very essence of the crime charged is the intention with which the act is done, it may be left to the jury to determine whether defendant was so drunk as to be incapable of forming any intention whatever. Reg. v. Cruse, 8 Car. & P. 541; Reg. v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox. Cr. Cas. 55; Com. v. Hogenlock, 1 New Eng. Rep. 105, 140 Mass. 125.

It can only be considered in cases involving the

condition of the defendant's mind when the act was done. State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369; State v. Lowe, 11 West. Rep. 910, 93 Mo. 547.

Although the voluntary state of drunkenness cannot excuse the commission of crime, yet where, as upon a charge of murder, the question is whether an act is premeditated or not, or whether done only from sudden heat or impulse, the fact of intoxication is a circumstance proper to be taken into consideration. Rex v. Grindley, cited in 1 Russ. Cr. 20 Am. ed. 8; Rex v. Carroll, 7 Car. & P. 145.

In cases which involve intention as well as act, proof of the condition of the accused as to sobriety at the time of his offense may be considered, to test his capacity to decide between right and wrong. Wenz v. State, 1 Tex. App. 36.

Drunkenness may be considered on the question of malice, and whether his expressions manifested a deliberate purpose or were merely the idle ut-terances of a drunken man. Rex v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817; Wilkerson v. Com. (Ky.) Sept. 13, 1888; Malone v. State, 49 Ga. 210; cases cited in first paragraph of note.

On the charge of murder it may be considered in determining whether there was that deliberation, premeditation and intent to kill necessary to con-

stitute the offense. State v. Mowry, supra.
If accused was so drunk as to have been incapable to form a design to kill, it cannot be murder in the first degree. Cartwright v. State, & Lea, 376.

If the design to kill had been already formed with deliberation and premeditation, it is not material that the accused was in a passion, at the time of killing, caused by his voluntary intoxication. State

Mitchell. Ch. J., delivered the opinion of court:

The Grand Jury of Marion County presented, in an indictment duly returned into the criminal court, that Edward Aszman, on a day named, did feloniously, purposely and with premeditated malice, kill and murder Bertha Elff, a human being. The defendant pleaded generally "not guilty," and specially, in writing, that he was of unsound mind when the offense was committed. He was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to suffer death

The homicide occurred on the evening of August 24, 1889. There was evidence tending to show that the accused came from Chicago, where he had been at work for some weeks, to Indianapolis, about twelve days before the homicide. There was also evidence tending to show that while at Chicago the accused exhibited some peculiarities of conduct, which indicated that he was laboring under some mental delusion or hallucination, as, for example, that he indulged the unfounded belief that he was being pursued by persons armed with long knives. It also appeared that he was addicted to the use of intoxicating drink.

The State attributed all his peculiar conduct to a condition brought on by excessive indulgence in intoxicating drink, while on his behalf it was claimed that his conduct, coupled with the circumstances under which the homicide was committed, and the attempt by the accused to commit suicide, all indicated such a state of mental disorder as rendered him irresponsible, or at least incapable of deliberate

thought or rational determination.

The accused seems to have maintained relations of intimacy with Bertha Elff, the victim of the homicide, to whose society he in some way laid claim, to the exclusion of other men. The evidence tends to show that he had been drinking to excess during the day, and that while walking with the deceased during the evening, the subject of her receiving attentions from another man was under discussion. She denied the right of the accused to question her conduct in the respects mentioned, whereupon he inflicted a mortal wound upon her by cut-ting her across the throat with his knife, and then attempted to take his own life by inflicting a long deep wound across his own throat with the knife. She was found dead from the wound inflicted, as stated above, in a few moments afterwards, and he was found within fifty feet of her body in an unconscious condition, with a self-inflicted wound, from which the evidence tends to show death would have ensued but for timely surgical aid. It is not claimed that there was any evidence tending to show that the accused had formed the design to take the life of the deceased prior to the evening on which the homicide occurred, and that he voluntarily became intoxicated in order to prepare himself for the execution of his premeditated and previously formed purpose.

There was evidence to which an instruction relating to the mental condition of the accused, as affected by the voluntary intoxication, at the time the homicidal act was committed, was ap-8LRA

Binns v. State, 66 Ind. 428; McDermott v. plicable. The only instruction given by the State, 89 Ind. 187; Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7. court relating to that feature of the case was the following:

"Frenzy, arising solely from the passions of anger and jealousy, no matter how furious, is not insanity. A man with ordinary will power, which is unimpaired by disease, is required by law to govern and control his passions. If he yields to wicked passions and purposely and maliciously slays another, he cannot escape the penalty prescribed by law on the ground of mental incapacity. That state of mind, caused by wicked and ungovernable passions, resulting, not from mental lesion, but solely from evil passions, constitutes that mental condition which the law abhors, and to which the term "malice" is applied. The condition of mind which usually and immediately follows the excessive use of alcoholic liquors is not the unsoundness of mind meant by our law. untary drunkenness does not even palliate or excuse."

The 13th and 14th instructions asked by the accused are in legal effect the same. The 14th

is as follows:

"While voluntary intoxication is no excuse or palliation for any crime actually committed, yet if upon the whole evidence in this cause you shall have such reasonable doubt whether, at the time of the killing,—if you shall find from the evidence accused did kill Bertha Elff, -he had sufficient mental capacity to deliberately think upon and rationally to determine so to kill deceased, then you cannot find him guilty of murder in the first degree, although such inability was the result of intoxication.'

The propriety of the ruling of the court in refusing to give the 13th and 14th instructions, or either of them, is now before us for consideration. Section 1904, Rev. Stat. 1881, reads "Whoever purposely and with as follows: premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of. premeditated malice, or in the perpetration or, or attempt to perpetrate, any rape, arson, robery or burglary, or by administering poison, or causing the same to be done, kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof," etc.

Other sections define murder in the second

degree, and declare what shall constitute vol-untary and involuntary manslaughter. The distinction between murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree has been so often stated, and is so well understood, that it would be useless repetition to reiterate it here. Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231; Binns v. State, 66 Ind. 428; McDermott v. State, 89 Ind.

187; Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7.

It is sufficient to say that, in order that there may be such premeditated malice as will make a homicide murder in the first decree, the thought of taking life must have been consciously conceived in the mind, the conception must have been meditated upon and a deliberate determination formed to do the act. Where a homicide has been preceded by a con-currence of will, with an intention to kill, and these are followed by a deliberate thought or premeditation, although they follow as instantaneously as successive thoughts can follow each other, the premeditator may be guilty of murder in the first degree. But as it is of the very essence of the crime that there should have been time and opportunity for delibera-

tion or premeditation, after the mind has consciously formed the design to take life, it fol-lows, as a necessary corollary, that there must have been the mental capacity to think deliberately upon and determine rationally in respect to the nature and consequences of the act which follows. It would be a legal as well as a logical incongruity to hold that the crime of mur-der in the first degree could only be committed after deliberate thought or premeditated malice. and yet that it might be committed by one who was without mental capacity to think deliberately or determine rationally. As a matter of course, the rule is universal that voluntary in-As a matter of toxication is no excuse for crime, nor does it in any degree mitigate or palliate an offense actually committed. To hold otherwise would unbridle crime and subvert public order. On the contrary, where there is reason to believe that one has conceived the design to commit a crime, and, while harboring the unlawful purpose, voluntarily becomes intoxicated in order to blunt his moral sensibilities and nerve himself up to the execution of his preconceived design, the offense is thereby greatly aggravated. State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep.

Where, however, the essence of a crime depends upon the intent with which an act was done, or where an essential ingredient of the crime consists in the doing of an unlawful act with a deliberate and premeditated purpose, the mental condition of the accused, whether that condition is occasioned by voluntary intoxication or otherwise, is an important factor to be considered. Smith v. Com. 1 Duvall, 227; State v. Garrey, 11 Minn. 163.

Thus in Cline v. State, 43 Obio St. 332, 1 West. Rep. 81, the learned judge, delivering the judgment of the court, said: "Where a person having a desire to do to another an unlawful injury drinks intoxicating liquors to nerve himself to the commission of the crime, intoxication is held, and properly, to aggravate the offense; but at present the rule that intoxication aggravates crime is confined to cases of that class . . . But in many cases, evidence of intoxication is admissible with a view to the question whether a crime has been committed: or where a crime consisting of degrees has been committed, such evidence may be important in determining the degree." Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555; Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196; Davis v. State, 25 Ohio St. 369; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401; State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22.

In the application of this principle, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a judgment of conviction of murder in the first degree in Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631 [26 L. ed. 873]. The court below instructed the jury to the effect that "a man who voluntarily puts himself in a condition to have no control of his actions must be held to intend the consequences. The safety of the community requires this rule. Intoxication is so easily counterfeited, and when real is so often resorted to as a means of nerving a person up to the commission of some desperate act, and is withal so inexcusable in itself, that the law has never recognized it as an excuse for crime."

The accused requested the court to give an instruction similar to that requested and re-fused in the present case. After asserting the tent does not in fact exist, and the murder is 8 L. R. A.

general rule of the common law, that voluntary intoxication affords no excuse, justification or extenuation of a crime committed under its influence, Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the judgment of the court, said: "But when a statute establishing different degrees of murder requires deliberate premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree, the question whether the accused is in such a condition tion whether the accused is in such a condition of mind, by reason of drunkenness or otherwise, as to be capable of deliberate premeditation, necessarily becomes a material subject of consideration by the jury." Com. v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412; Pirtie v. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 663; Haile v. State, 11 Humph. 154; Jones v. Com. 75 Pa. 403; Keenan v. Com, 44 Pa. 55; People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; State v. Johnson. 40 Comp. 136. Maxwell Crim Pres. pp. 227. 40 Conn. 136; Maxwell, Crim. Prac. pp. 227-229.

So in Buckhannon v. Com. 86 Ky. 110, the court said: "A deliberate intent to take life is an essential element of murder. Drunkenness as a fact may therefore be proven as bearing upon its existence or nonexistence. It is not admissible upon the ground that in and of itself it excuses or mitigates the crime, because one offense cannot justify or palliate another, but because, under the circumstances of the case, it may tend to show that the less and not the greater offense was committed." See also State

v. Sopher, 70 Iowa, 494. In State v. Johnson, supra, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in reversing a judgment of conviction of murder in the first degree, the court below having given and refused instructions similar to those involved in the present case, used the following language: "A deliberate intent to take life is an essential element of the offense. The existence of such an intent must be shown as a fact. Implied malice is sufficient, at common law, to make the offense murder, but under our Statute, to make it murder in the first degree, actual malice must be proved. Upon this question, the state of the prisoner's mind is material. In behalf of the defense, insanity, intoxication or any other fact which tends to prove that the pris-oner was incapable of deliberation, was competent evidence for the jury to weigh. Intoxication is admissible in such cases, not as an excuse for crime, or in mitigation of punishment, but as tending to show that the less and not the greater offense was in fact committed." State v. Johnson, 41 Conn. 585; Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594.

"In those States," says a learned author, "in which murder has been divided by statute into degrees, it has been held that if the accused was intoxicated to such an extent as to deprive him of the power to form a design, the offense could be no more than murder in the second degree." Lawson, Insanity, p. 74; 1 Wharton,

Crim. Law, §\$ 51, 52.

"Drunkenness, we have seen, does not incapacitate one to commit either murder or manslaughter at the common law," says Mr. Bishop, "because to constitute either the specific intent to take life need not exist, but general malevolence is sufficient. But where murder is divided by statute into two degrees, and to constitute it in the first degree there must be commit homicide, becomes so drunk as to be incapable of intending to do it and then kills a man." Bishop, Cr. L. § 404.

This court, although not always enunciating it with entire accuracy, has constantly recognized the rule declared in the above cases. Thus, in *Smurr* v. *State*, 88 Ind. 504, where it appeared that the accused was excited by intoxicating drink at the time of the homicide, an instruction was approved as accurately expressing the law, in which the jury were told that "voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime as long as the offender is capable of con-

ceiving an intelligent design."
So in Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435, a prosecution for larceny, after stating the general rule that voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime, unless the habit has been indulged to such an extent as to pervert or destroy the mental faculties, the court said: "There are cases which hold that, in prosecutions for mur-der, drunkenness at the time may be shown as saffecting the question of premediation." Daw-son v. State, 16 Ind. 428; Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 494; Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543; Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263; Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422; Robinson v. State, 113 Ind. 510, 13 West.

Rep. 309.

When a homicide results from the use of a dangerous and deadly weapon, the law implies malice and an intention to kill from the effective use of the weapon, and therefore the crime is presumably murder in the second degree. No degree of mental disturbance produced by voluntary intoxication will of itself, disconnected from sudden heat or other circumstances, avail to reduce the crime to a lower grade, unless such a diseased condition of the mind has followed the habit of intoxication as to render the accused incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or of controlling his conduct when free from the influence of intoxicating drink. But in the absence of evidence, either direct or circumstantial, there is no presumption from the mere fact that a homicide was committed, except it be in the perpetration of the offenses mentioned in the statute, that it was done with deliberation or premeditated malice. Hence the conclusion logically follows that murder in the first degree, in which, under our Statute, premeditated malice is the distinguishing ingredient, can only be committed by one possessed of the mental capacity to deliberate and premeditate, and that a homicide committed by one who was at the time for any reason incapacitated to think deliberately or determine rationally as to the quality, character and consequences of the act, cannot be murder in the first degree. Reg. V. Davis, 14 Cox, Cr. Cas. 563, 28 Eng. Rep. (Moak's notes) 657.

In order that there may be no misapprehension and to prevent voluntary intoxication from being used as a cloak to shield those who, from sheer wickedness of heart and regardless of consequences, allow themselves to be driven to the commission of crimes, it should be said that mere intoxication, in the absence of such mental incapacity resulting therefrom as renders one who takes the life of another incapable of thinking deliberately and meditating rationally upon the purpose to take human After admitting evidence tending to show that

8 L. R. A.

not in this degree where one, not meaning to | life, and which leaves him with full power to know the quality of his act and to abstain from doing it, cannot of itself be regarded as sufficient to reduce a homicide from murder in the first to murder in the second degree.

Walker v. State, 85 Ala. 7, 7 Am. St. Rep. 17;
1 Bishop, Cr. L. § 410.

"In other words, there must be the absence of

that self-determining power which, in a sane mind, renders it conscious of the real nature of its own purposes and capable of resisting wrong impulses. Where this self-governing power is wanting, whether it is caused by insanity, gross intoxication or other controlling influences, it cannot be said truthfully that the mind is fully conscious of its own purposes and deliberates or premeditates, in the sense of the act describing murder in the first degree. Jones v. Com. supra.

Drunkenness cannot be considered as an excuse for crime, but may be taken into consideration for the purpose solely of passing on the fact of premeditation, keeping in view the fact that a man may act with premeditation while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or he may have harbored the design to commit the crime before becoming intoxicated. People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 345; State v. Robin-

son, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799.

It seems scarcely necessary to add that we are not dealing with the question of voluntary intoxication as an excuse for crime, or as rendering the accused criminally irresponsible, but only with intoxication resulting in that degree of mental disturbance or distortion that renders the accused incapable of committing

murder in the first degree.

By giving the 12th instruction the court gave full recognition to the fact that the subject of the voluntary intoxication of the accused was before the jury for consideration. The jury were told, correctly enough, with what abhorrence the law looked upon frenzy arising solely from jealousy and anger, and from wicked and ungovernable passions, which did not result from mental lesion. They were also told, with eminent propriety, that the condition of mind which usually and immediately follows the excessive use of alcoholic liquors is not the un soundness of mind meant by our law, and that voluntary drunkenness did not excuse or palliate crime.

These instructions were all well enough as far as they went, but the question back of all that was, whether drunkenness, if it existed to the extent of depriving the accused of the power of deliberation, might be considered by the jury as disproving an essential ingredient in the crime of murder in the first degree, viz., the deliberate intention to take human life.

When the accused asked the court to instruct the jury that voluntary intoxication might, in case a mental condition had resulted therefrom which incapacitated him from deliberate thought or rational determination, reduce the crime from the highest to a lower grade of murder, the court refused. The jury were then left without the means of distinguishing between voluntary intoxication as an excuse for crime and intoxication as affecting that particular condition of mind necessary to consti-tute the crime of murder in the first degree.

the accused was in the habit of drinking alcoholic stimulants, and that he had drank to excess on the day of the homicide, the jury were not only told that drunkenness was not only no excuse or palliation for crime, but without any explanation they were left to infer that if it had any effect, it was to aggravate the offense. Either the jury must have excluded the evidence of intoxication from their minds altogether, or they must have given it an effect prejudicial to the accused. The jury may have believed, as did the court, that although the accused may not have had the mental capacity to think deliberately or determine rationally, if his incapacity resulted from voluntary intoxication, he might be guilty of murder in the first degree nevertheless. In the absence of any claim of preconceived design, it was therefore prejudicial error to refuse the instruction asked, which contains an accurate statement of the law.

The court of its own motion charged the jury as follows: "The defense of insanity is one very frequently made in cases of this kind, and it is one which, I may say to you, should be very carefully scrutinized by the jury. The evidence to this point should be carefully considered and weighed by the jury, for the reason that if the accused was in truth insane at the time of the commission of the alleged acts, then he ought not to be punished for such acts. The evidence on this question of insanity ought to be carefully considered by the jury for another reason, and that is, because a due regard for the ends of justice and the peace and welfare of society demands it, to the end that parties charged with crime may not make use of the plea of insanity to defeat the ends of justice and as a shield to protect them from criminal responsibility in case of violation of law."

This instruction met with unqualified approval in Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 80, and the principle therein enunciated has been referred to approvingly in Sanders v. State, 94 Ind. 147, and Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 378.

It can hardly be said to contain the statement of any proposition of law, but is rather in the nature of a general disparagement of the defense of insanity which the accused had pleaded as provided by statute. A case might possibly arise in which such a statement could be appropriately made by the court. As the judgment in the present case must be reversed for other reasons, we do not determine whether or not it constituted reversible error in this case. It is sufficient to say that, as at present constituted, the court does not regard with favor any statements by the trial court which are designed to cast discredit or suspicion upon any defense which is recognized by the law as legitimate, and which an accused person is making in apparent good faith. In this respect we are unable to appreciate any well-grounded distinction between the defense of insanity, self-defense or alibi. Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172; Sater v. State, 56 Ind. 378; Albin v. State, 63 Ind. 599; Simmons v. State, 61 Miss. 243; Dawson v. State, 62 Miss. 241; Thompson, Trials, § 2433.

In those jurisdictions where judges are permitted to comment upon the weight and value in the first degree. A judgment of a court of evidence, it has been held proper for the court to caution the jury concerning a defense law upon a human being should be free from S I. R. A.

which judicial experience has shown to be often attempted by contrivance and perjury. Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295; Thompson, Trials, § 2434.

This rule does not prevail in Indiana. Unruh v. State, 105 Ind. 117, 2 West. Rep. 632.

At the proper time the court was requested to give instructions numbered 10 and 11, which are in the following language:

"10. The court presumes the defendant to be innocent of the commission of any crime. And this presumption continues in his favor throughout the trial of the cause, step by step; and you cannot find the accused guilty of any of the crimes covered by the indictment until the evidence in the cause satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. And so long as you, or any one of you, have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the several elements necessary to constitute the several erimes above defined, the accused cannot be convicted of such crime.

"11. And here the court instructs you that the mere fact that a grand jury has returned an indictment against the accused does not raise any presumption that the accused has been guilty of any crime, and you must not take the filing of the indictment as raising any such presumption until you, and each of you, are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, by the evidence here introduced before you, without reference to the nature of the indictment, that the accused is guilty of some of the grades of homicide covered by this indictment, there can be no conviction."

The court declined to give either of the above, and it is conceded that the subjects embraced therein were not covered by the general charge.

In Castle v. State, 75 Ind. 146, a judgment

In Castle v. State, 75 Ind. 146, a judgment of conviction for an assault and battery with intent to commit murder was reversed for no other reason than the refusal of the court to give an instruction substantially like that numbered 10 above. While we might hesitate to reverse a judgment which was correct in all other respects, we can see no good reason why such an instruction should be refused when seasonably requested, unless the subject of the individual responsibility of each juror has been adequately covered in some other charge.

There was no error in refusing the 11th charge. It must be assumed that the jury understood from the general charge of the court that the law surrounded the accused with the presumption of innocence notwithstanding the return of an indictment against him, and that that presumption continued until it was overcome by the evidence. It must be assumed that jurors are men of ordinary intelligence and that they are possessed of the information common to well informed citizens.

After the most careful consideration of the instructions, we are impressed with the conviction that too many doubtful questions were resolved against the accused, and that prejudicial error may have intervened in the failure of the court to give the jury the instructions requested upon the subject of the mental incapacity of the accused, resulting from voluntary intoxication, to commit the crime of murder in the first degree. A judgment of a court which pronounces the extreme penalty of the law upon a human being should be free from

any error which may have resulted to the prej-1 of a court to abide by its decisions unless it is udice of the person condemned. Lest the one before us may, for the reasons given. not be, it is reversed.

The clerk will make the proper order concerning the appellant.

Elliott, J.:
The 19th instruction disapproved by the court is copied word for word from the instruction given in the case of Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 80. Worden, J., delivering the unanimous opinion of the court in that case said: "The observations of the court in that respect meet our unqualified approval. As stated by the court, where the defense of insanity is interposed to a criminal prosecution, the evidence relating to it should be carefully and intelligently scrutinized and considered for the double reason that a really insane person should not be convicted, and a really sane one should not be acquitted and suffered to go unpunished for his crimes on the false theory of insanity." This is, as I am unalterably con-vinced, sound sense and sound law. If the decision stood alone I should be heartily for sustaining it, for I believe that it is intrinsically right. But it does not stand alone, for it has been repeatedly approved. Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 378; Sanders v. State, 94 Ind. 147; Guetig v. State, 63 Ind. 278.

Other courts have declared a like doctrine. People v. Bumberger, 45 Cal. 650; People v. Dennis, 39 Cal. 625; Sellick's Case, 1 City Hall Rec. 185; McKee v. People, 36 N. Y. 113.

In one of the cases cited the jury were instructed, as to the defense of insanity, that, "from its nature it ought to be received in all cases by jurors with the greatest degree of caution and circumspection." In another case the jury were instructed, concerning the plea of insanity, that "it is a plea sometimes resorted to in cases where aggravated crimes have been committed under circumstances which afford full proof of overt acts, and render hopeless all other means of evading punishment. While, therefore, it ought to be re-ceived as a not less full and complete than it is a humane defense, when satisfactorily established, it yet should be examined with great care lest an ingenious counterfeit of the malady furnish protection to guilt.

It is, as is everywhere laid down, the duty

demonstrated that they are against reason, and this rule ought of itself to constrain us to adhere to former decisions; but in this instance I am convinced that the court is departing from a decision not only without reason, but against

the departure is, I deferentially affirm, a step in the wrong direction. Our decisions have already too greatly restricted the rights and duties of trial judges, and I am firmly convinced that it is a mistake to fetter them still more. A trial judge is, as I believe, more than a mere moderator, or a mere rehearser of stereo-typed phrases, for it is his right and his duty to give the jury such advice and such cautions as shall assist them in reaching a just conclu-

That the defense of insanity is one frequently resorted to is a matter of common knowledge, and it is so treated in the text-books and decisions, and yet the instruction before us is condemned simply because the jury are informed that it is a defense that is frequently made. This, as I understand the opinion of the court, is the only infirmity in the instruction. To me it seems an element of strength, not of weakness.

Our Statute makes the defense of insanity a peculiar one. Some of the courts hold that it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Other courts hold that it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and still others hold that it is enough if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt of the sanity of the accused; but, while the courts differ upon the points mentioned, they agree that the defense of insanity is a peculiar one, subject to be abused and meriting rigid scru-

tiny.
While I dissent from that part of the opinion which disapproves the 19th instruction, I concur in the conclusion that the judgment should be reversed, for I think that the very able opinion of the court prepared by the chief justice unanswerably proves that where the element of premeditation is essential to create the crime of murder in the first degree, the accused cannot be found guilty of that crime if at the time of the killing he was so completely overcome by intoxication as to be incapable of premeditation.

Coffey, J., concurs with Elliott, J.

OHIO SUPREME COURT.

Orris D. VROMAN et al., Plfs. in Err.,

George O. POWERS.

(47 Ohio St....)

1. Where a verbal will is reduced to writing, and subscribed by two witnesses, one

of whom is a legatee thereunder, and the other is his wife, the husband is not a competent, disinterested witness, within the meaning of section 5991 of the Revised Statutes, and the will is invalid.

The two witnesses to a verbal will must be competent, disinterested witnesses at the time of their attestation, and their dis-

NOTE.-Will defined. A will is a legal declaration of a man's intention which he wills to be performed after his death. Jasper v. Jasper, 17 Or. 590.

It is an instrument whereby a person makes a disposition of his property, to take effect after his death. Cover v. Stem. 9 Cent. Rep. 108, 87 Md. 449.

Although the statute requires a will to be in writing, yet where a will required certain property 8 L. R. A.

The more general and popular denomination of a will or testament embracing both real and personal property is "last will and testament." Compton v. McMahan, 2 West. Rep. 189, 19 Mo. App. 494.

Although the statute requires a will to be in writ-

qualification as witnesses, by reason of interest under the will cannot be removed by a renunciation of such interest at the time the will is admitted to probate, or at the trial of an Issue to contest the validity of the will.

3. Section 5925 of the Revised Stat-utes, as to the effect of a witness being a dev-isce or legatee under the will, is not applicable to verbal wills.

(March 18, 1890.)

RROR to the Circuit Court for Cuyahoga County to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered upon appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in an action brought to set aside a certain will upon the ground that the statutory requirements as to subscription were

not complied with. Affirmed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Alvord, Alvord & Baptiste, for plaintiffs in error:

Rev. Stat., § 5925, controls and governs in the case of nuncupative wills, as in that of wills generally, and under its provisions Orris D. Vroman was in the very moment that he signed the will by operation of law stripped of all interest and wholly devested of the same, and thus became a disinterested witness

The Statute devesting the husband of all interest, at the same instant devested the wife of all interest; so that she was the competent, disinterested witness named in the Statute.

Jackson v. Woods, 1 Johns. Cas. 163; Jackson v. Durland, 2 Johns. Cas. 314; Winslow v. Kimball, 25 Me. 493; 1 Redf. Wills, p. 258.

If the provisions of that Statute did not so

operate the filing of the written renunciation and release did; and thereafter for the purposes of making the will a valid verbal last will as it pertained to the other legatees therein named, they were both competent, disinterested witnesses.

Cook v. Grant, 16 Serg. & R. 198, 16 Am. Dec. 564; Burritt v. Silliman, 13 N. Y. 93, 64 Am. Dec. 532; 1 Redf. Wills, pp. 256, 257; 1 Schouler, Wills, § 351, p. 359.

This is so in the case of a nuncupative will as in that of any other.

Brayfield v. Brayfield, 3 Harr. & J. 208. Messrs. William C. Rogers and William Robison, with Mr. H. C. White, for defendant in error:

A bequest to a husband makes a wife incompetent to testify in behalf of the will.

petent to testify in behalf of the will.

Winslow v. Kimball. 25 Me. 493; 1 Redf.
Wills, pp. 188, 189, 257, 258; Holdfast v.
Dorsing, 2 Strange, 1254; Lyon v. Hamor, 73
Me. 56; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 48 Ill. 31;
Ryan v. Devereux, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 100; 1
Woerner, Administrator, § 41, p. 72; Pease v.
Allis, 110 Mass, 157; Dickinson v. Dickinson,
61 Pa. 401; Abbott, Law Dict. Disinterested;
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 106 Mass. 476.

The release offered in evidence should have
been filed in the probate court, and before pro-

been filed in the probate court, and before probate, and not for the first time in the circuit court.

Workman v. Dominick, 3 Strobb. L. 591.

Witnesses to wills must be, in every way,

competent at the time of signing.

Frink v. Pond. 46 N. H. 125; Patten v.

Tallman, 27 Me, 17; Morton v. Ingram, 11 Ired.

L. 368; Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 117, 140;

Stewart v. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25; 1 Schouler,

Wills, § 351; Pease v. Allis, 110 Mass. 157;

Haues v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. 350, 20 Am. Dec. 483.

Dickman, J., delivered the opinion of the

Mary A. Powers, the wife of the defendant in error, George O. Powers, died on the 13th day of December, 1881, leaving issue one child, Orris Irving Powers, who thereafter, and before this suit was begun, died aged six months. It was claimed that Mary A. Powers, in her last sickness, made a verbal will, which was on the 19th day of December, 1881, reduced to writing, and subscribed by Orris D. Vroman and his wife Emma J. Vroman as witnesses. The alleged verbal will was presented to and admitted to probate by the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County. By the terms of the will, Orris D. Vroman, Joseph Vroman, Albert K. Vroman and Adiram Vroman, the plaintiffs in error, brothers of Mary A. Powers, and Orris-Irving Powers are named as the several legatees

given to a person named to be distributed by him "according to private instructions I give him;"
which instructions were verbal and directed payment of the property, which is in a foreign country, to relatives in that country,—equity will carry out the intention by charging the legatee with a constructive trust in favor of the beneficiaries named in the private instructions to him, as against the other heirs; and he will not be charged with a trust in favor of the latter. Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420.

Nuncupative will; rule in various States.

A nuncupative will must be strictly proved in all essential points. Scaife v. Emmons (Ga.) March 10, 1890.

To render a nuncupative will valid, it must appear that the deceased was in extremis when he made it; and it is invalid where deceased had plenty of time and opportunity to execute a formal written will. Ibid.

One of the formalities required by the Louisiana Civil Code in the confection of a testament nuncu-8 L. R. A.

pative in form and received by public act is that the act must be received by a notary in the presence of three witnesses residing in the parish where the instrument is made. This formality must be observed; otherwise the testament is null and void. Weick v. Henne (La.) Dec. 17, 1888.

Nuncupative testaments are full proof of themselves. They must bear upon their faces the evidence that all the formalities required by law have been complied with. An omission of any formality cannot be supplied by evidence dehors the testament. Ibid.

If executed before two competent witnesses only it is invalid; and if executed before three witnesses, one of whom did not understand the language in which the will was drawn up and the testator expressed himself, it is invalid. Dauterive's Succession, 39 La. Ann. 1092.

A nuncupative will under private signature need not be shown to have been dictated by the testator when written out of the presence of the winess. Pfarr 7. Belmont, 39 La. Ann. 294.

A verbal will, to be valid, must be proved by three witnesses present at the making thereof, and

of Mary A. Powers. Suit was brought by George O. Powers, in the court of common pleas, against the plaintiffs in error, to set aside picas, against the plaintilis in error, to set aside the will, on the ground, among others, that it was not subscribed by two competent, disinterested witnesses. The case was tried in the court of common pleas in May, 1884, and by verdict and judgment of the court the will was set aside. The defendants appealed, and on February 15, 1887, the case was tried in the circuit court, and it was found by the verdict and judgment rendered therein that the paper purporting to be the last will of Mary A. Powers was not her last will. During the trial in the circuit court, a written renunciation of all interest under the will, made and signed February 13, 1887, by Orris D. Vroman and Emma J. Vroman, the two witnesses to the alleged verbal will, was filed in that court, which renunciation, on being offered in evidence, was ruled out by the court.

The court, among other matters, charged e jury as follows: "That if they should the jury as follows: find from the evidence that one of said witnesses to said will, Orris D. Vroman, was the brother of the testatrix and one of the residuary legatees mentioned in said alleged will, and that said Emma J. Vroman was at the time the wife of the said Orris D. Vroman, the said witnesses to said will were not, within the meaning of the Statute of Ohio, competent, distincted disinterested witnesses to said will, and because of that fact said will would not be the valid verbal will of the said Mary A. Powers."

It is contended in behalf of the plaintiffs in error that the circuit court erred, first, in charging the jury that Orris D. Vroman and Emma Vroman, under the conditions above stated, would not be competent and disinterested witnesses, within the meaning of the Statute; and second, in refusing to allow the paper containing their renunciation of interest to be put in evidence.

be made in the last sickness of the testator. The mental imbecility, interest or crime. Fuller v. term "last sickness" means in extremis. Carroll v. Bonbam, 8 Cent. Rep. 649, 42 N. J. Eq. 625.

If decedent could have made a written will, a nuncupative one will be of no avail, and where he lived nine days after, deliberately selecting the nuncupative method, such will cannot be admitted

to probate. Ibid. Under N. C. Code, \$ 2148, a nuncupative will which is put in writing within ten days after it is made, may be proved by the witnesses thereof, either before or after the lapse of six months next after it is made; and where the proofs and examination of the witnesses are taken, and an order of citation and publication of notice made within the six months, the proceeding cannot be dismissed because the will is not admitted to probate within the six months. Re Haygood's Will, 101 N. C. **574**.

The Texas statute authorizing any person who is competent to make a will, to "dispose of his property by nuncupative will," does not apply to real property. It must be considered as intending to re-enact the former law on the subject. Moffett v. Moffett, 67 Tex. 642.

Qualification of witness.

Where the statute requires "at least two credible witnesses" it means persons not disqualified by 8 L R.A.

I. It is provided by section 5991, of the Revised Statutes that "a verbal will, made in the last sickness, shall be valid in respect to personal property, if reduced to writing, and subscribed by two competent disinterested wit-nesses, within ten days after the speaking of the testamentary words; and if it be proved by said witnesses that the testator was of sound mind and memory, and not under any restraint, and called upon some person present, at the time the testamentary words were spoken, to bear testimony to said disposition as his will." The Statute requires that both the witnesses shall be competent and disinterested, and not one only. In our judgment, Orris D. Vroman did not meet the requirement of the Statute as to competency and disinterestedness. He had a sufficiently immediate, beneficial interest in the will to disqualify him from becoming a subscribing witness thereto. The alleged will provided that a certain sum of money in the hands of her brother, Orris D. Vroman, belonging to the testatrix, if not used for her sickness and incident expenses, should be placed where her son could have it on arriving at the age of twenty-one years; and that if he died before the age of twenty-one years, the money should go to her brothers; and that, whatever funds were to come from her mother's estate were to go in the same manner. One of the witnesses, therefore, being incompetent and disqualified by reason of interest, there was not a compliance with the statutory requirement that the two witnesses to the verbal will should be competent and disinterested, and the will, in consequence, cannot be held to be valid. We find no error in the charge of the court.

It is urged, however, that if there was a disqualification of interest in one or both of the witnesses, it was removed by the operation of section 5925 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that "if a devise or bequest is given to a person who is a witness to the will, and

Fuller, 83 Ky, 345.

A statute providing that a bequest shall be void when made to a subscribing witness, or the husband or wife of such, does not make void a charitable bequest for the poor of a religious society to which the subscribing witnesses belong. Goodrich's App. 57 Conn. 275.

A husband is not disqualified, on account of his interest, to act as a subscribing witness to a will, on the ground that his wife is named therein as a devisee of real estate. Bates v. Officer, 70 Iowa,

Prior to Statute of 1884, a will was void when one of three witnesses was the husband of one of the legatees. Giddings v. Turgeon, 2 New Eng. Rep. 466, 58 Vt. 106.

Where the will contains a devise or legacy to a town, in trust, a taxpaying inhabitant of the town is not thereby rendered an incompetent witness to the will. Re Marston, 3 New Eng. Rep. 601, 79 Me.

Where the will contains a legacy to an incorporated ball association, "in part to secure a liberal policy in respect to the use of the hall for objects of public interest," a stockholder in that association is not thereby rendered an incompetent witness to the will. Ibid.

the will cannot otherwise be proved than by the testimony of such witness, the devise or bequest shall be void, and the witness shall be competent to give testimony of the execution of the will, in like manner as if such devise or bequest had not been made."

This section, when considered in connection

with the preceding sections of the chapter, in-cluding section 5916, is clearly applicable only to duly executed written wills. Section 5919 requires that "every last will and testament (except nuncupative wills hereinafter provided for) shall be in writing, and signed at the end thereof by the party making the same . . . and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of such party by two or more competent witnesses," etc.

The sections immediately following, embracing section 5925, are so connected by obvious reference to a will in writing, as to preclude the idea of applying the last-mentioned section to nuncupative wills, which, by the Statute, are assigned to a separate and distinct class,

Section 5925 in providing that "the witness shall be competent to give testimony in the ex-ecution of the will," evidently refers to the full, legal formalities of a signature by the testator, and an attestation by competent witnesses who subscribe in the testator's presence, and not, as in a nuncupative will, to the testator's speaking testamentary words in his last sickness, which are to be reduced to writing and subscribed by competent and disinterested witnesses, within ten days after the words are spoken.

The renouncement and release by Orris D. Vroman of all right and interest was not filed until more than five years after the verbal will is alleged to have been made. Such a re-lease did not remove his disqualification as a witness. The Statute contemplates the verbal will as made in the last sickness. Within ten days after the speaking of the testamentary words, the will must be reduced to writing, and

The rule, it is said, which reason should now pronounce the universal one, is that the competency of witnesses, like that of the testator, section 5925 of the Revised is tested by one's status at the time when the will was executed. Schouler, Wills, plicable to nuncupative wills. the will was executed.

and are subject to different requisites and con-

subscribed by two witnesses who are then competent and disinterested.

§ 351.

In Patten v. Tallman, 27 Me. 27, the court says: "The competency of an attesting witness is not to be determined upon the state of facts existing at the time when the will is presented for probate, but upon those existing at the time of the attestation.

In Morton v. Ingram, 11 Ired. L. 368, it was held, that a person named as executor is not competent as an attesting witness to a will of personalty; and that his subsequent renunciation and release will not make him so; and that he must be disinterested at the time of attestation.

In Huie v. McConnell, 2 Jones, L. 455, the court remarks: "It is well settled that an attesting witness to a will must be competent at the time of attestation, and that no subsequent release, where the objection is one of interest.

can restore competency."

In Workman v. Dominick, 3 Strobh. L. 589, it was held that "credible" means competent; and the competency of the witness must be referred to the time of attestation. Frost, J., said: "This point is settled. It is affirmed by all the elementary writers. . . If the witnesses do not possess, at the time of the execution of the will, the quality required, it cannot afterwards be supplied. If any of them be not then credible, by reason of a benefit he may take by the instrument, he cannot be made credible by a future release. . . . The will would be absolutely in the power of the witness. If he consents to release, the will is established; if he refuses, the will is annulled. It is in his power to set up the estate at auction between the legatecs and next of kin, and sell it to the highest bidder. And thus, being first bribed by an interest in the will to make it, he is open to another bribe to vacate it."

See Stewart v. Harriman, 56 N. H. 25; Hawes v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. 350; Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115; Pease v. Allis, 110 Mass. 157; Allison v. Allison, 4 Hawks, 141; Tucker v. Tucker, 5 Ired. L. 161; Greenl. Ev. § 691.

The rule laid down in the above citations acquires additional force and significance when applied to the attestation and establishment of verbal wills. The rule, it is true, in its appli-cation to wills in writing, is controlled by section 5925 of the Revised Statutes, but that section, as we have before observed, is not ap-

Judgment affirmed.

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.

FREEMAN'S NATIONAL BANK NATIONAL TUBE WORKS CO.

(.___Mass.___)

 The owner of drafts, who indorses them in blank and places them with a bank for collection, may avail himself of the benefit of a restrictive indorsement placed thereon by such bank when it transmitted them to its correspondent for the purpose of effecting such collection.

. The legal title to commercial paper indorsed "For collection" passes only so far as to enable the indorsee to demand, receive

8 L. R. A.

Note.—Indorsement of note or bill deposited for collection.

A special indorsement "For collection" on a promissory note does not transfer the ownership an arrangement with another bank, whereby it

See also 9 L. R. A. 553; 13 L. R. A. 241; 15 L. R. A. 102, 498; 17 L. R. A. 291; 21 L. R. A. 753; 23 L. R. A. 161.

and sue for the money to be paid; upon such indorsement the owner may control his paper until it is paid, and may intercept the proceeds thereof in the hands of an intermediate agent.

- 3. A bank's indersement of commercial paper directing payment "for account of itself" does not imply that it is the owner of the paper, where the indorsement of the bank from which its title was derived was of the same
- 4. A bank to which commercial paper has been transmitted for collection will not be permitted to dispute the right of the owner to stop payment thereof, although it has made credits or advances to an intermediate collecting agent on account of the paper, if the same were made before the paper had been collected; nor can such advances be recovered from the owner as money paid for his use.

(May, 1890.)

REPORT from the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County (C. Allen, J.) for the opinion of the full court of an action brought to recover the amount alleged to be due upon certain accepted drafts, the payment of which had been stopped by the owner. Judgment Judgment for defendant.

undertakes to collect all paper sent it by the latter, and to transmit the proceeds at or upon designated dates; and, in addition to such agency and services, all paper transmitted for collection contains a special or restrictive indorsement, the form of which is suggested by the collecting bank, directing payment to the latter for the transmitting bank, and stating that the paper was to be collected at par and the proceeds remitted to the transmitting bank on specified dates, without exchange,—the relation thus created, both as respects the paper and the proceeds thereof after collection, is that of principal and agent, and not of debtor and creditor. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. Rep. 684; Farmer's Bank v. Owen, 5 Cranch, C. C.

Where a banker has received from his correspondent a draft indorsed for collection, which is indorsed in like manner to his correspondent, he cannot appropriate the proceeds collected thereon to the latter's debt to himself, and refuse to pay the owner. City Bank v.Weiss, 67 Tex. 331; Sweeny v. Easter, 68 U. S. 1 Wall, 166 (17 L. ed. 681); White v. Miners Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 659 (26 L. ed. 251); First Nat. Bank v. Reno County Bank, 1 McCrary, 491, 3 Fed. Rep. 257.

An indorsement by a collecting agent of a check sent to him for collection, without using the word "agent," is, in behalf of his principal, an indorsement merely for the purpose of collection, and is not a guaranty of the genuineness of the check. National City Bank v. Westcott, 118 N. Y. 468. The indorsement of the words "For collection,"

on invoices accompanying bills of lading attached as collateral security to drafts discounted, implies no guaranty of the genuineness of the bills. Goetz v. Kansas City Bank, 119 U. S. 551 (30 L. ed. 515).

An indorsee of a promissory note for collection has such a title as will enable him to sue thereon in his own name, though he paid nothing for the note. Roberts v. Parrish, 17 Or. 583; Roberts v. Snow (Neb.) Oct. 3, 1889.

He holds the note subject to the same defenses that could have been made to it in the hands of the original payee. Ibid.

Collecting bank as agent of owner.

agent of the owner and not of the maker who pays | charges the drawer from his liability, where it is 8 L. R. A.

The National Tube Works Company operated mills at McKeesport, Pa., and had an office in Boston, where the treasurer was located and the finances of the Company were kept. For the purpose of paying the running expenses of the mills it was in the habit of drawing drafts on the treasurer in Boston, and depositing them with the People's Bank of McKeesport, of which C. R. Stuckslager was cashier, for collection.

This suit was brought upon two of those drafts, which were alike with the exception that the amounts were different. There was also a count upon an account annexed for \$7,000 for money paid to defendant's use, and interest thereon, being the amount paid by plaintiff to the Penn Bank, under date May

20, 1884.
The following is a copy of one of the drafts:

\$20,000. McKeesport, Pa., May 17, 1884. At sight for value received, pay to the order of A. Chaudon twenty thousand dellars and charge this office as per margin.

National Tube Works Co.

by E. C. Converse, Asst. Mgr. for President. Wm. S. Eaton, Treas., 8 Pemberton Square, Boston, Mass.

it. The latter cannot recover back from the bank the money paid, on the ground that it has failed to account for it to the owner. Smith v. Essex County Bank, 22 Barb, 627; Ward v. Smith, 74 U. S. 7 Wall, 447 (19 L. ed. 207); Alley v. Rogers, 19 Gratt. 383.

It is liable for the neglect, omission or other misconduct of the bank or agent to whom the note or bill is sent by which the money is lost or other injury sustained. Atten v. Merchants Bank, 22 Wend. West Branch Bank v. Fulmer, 3 Pa. 399; Ivory v. State Bank, 36 Mo. 475; Hoard v. Garner, 3 Sandf. 179; Georgia Nat. Bank v. Henderson, 46 Ga. 493.

Liability for neglect of duty to give notice.

It is liable if it fails to give notice to the indorsers in case of the maker's default, where it is the usage of banks to give such notice. Smedes v. Bank of Utica, 20 Johns. 372; Bank of Utica v. Smedes, 3 Cow. 662; Bank of Utica v. McKinster, 11 Wend. 473; McKinster v. Bank of Utica, 9 Wend. 46; Cur-. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 157.

If the bill is payable at the place where the bank conducts its business, it is liable for any neglect of duty as to protest and notice, unless there be some agreement to the contrary, express or implied. Montgomery County Bank v. Albany City Bank, 7 N. Y. 459; Fabens v. Mercantile Bank, 23 Pick. 330; Halls v. State Bank, 3 Rich. L. 366; Caldwell v. Evans, 5 Rush, 380; Balme v. Wambaugh, 16 Minn. 120.

A notice issued by the Chicago bank to its customers, after the receipt of the notes for collection. that it would be compelled to place all funds received in payment of collections to the credit of its correspondents in such currency as was received in Chicago-to wit, bills of Illinois banks, to be drawn for only in like bills-does not change the rights of the parties. Marine Bank v. Fulton County Bank, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 252 (17 L. ed. 785).

If a bank fails to demand payment of a bill held for collection, it makes the bill its own, and becomes liable for the amount. It is agent for the holder, not of the drawer. Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 26 U.S. 1 Pet, 25 (7 L. ed. 37).

Its failure to give notice to the drawer that the drawee was not found at home when called upon The bank receiving the paper for collection is the to accept the bill is not such negligence as dis[In the margin:] No. 6511 charge to account Geo. P. Tenney, Esq. Ca.
Boston, Mass.

[Across the face:] May 19-84. Accepted E. R. Hall, Asst. Treas.

[Indorsements:] Pay to the order of C. R.

Stuckslager, Cashier. A. Chaudon.
Pay Penn Bank or order for account of People's Bank, McKeesport, Pa. C. R. Stuck-slager, Cashier. T. D. Gardner, As. Cash. Pay Freeman's Nat'l Bank, Boston, or order

for account of Penn Bank, Pittsburgh, Pa. G. L. Reiber, Cashier.

The drafts were deposited in the People's Bank, and on the same day they were sent by the People's Bank to its correspondent, the Penn Bank of Pittsburg, indorsed as above and inclosed in the following letter:

Penn Bank Pittsburg
Dear Sir,—We inclose for collection and credit.

W. S. Eaton, Tr.

St. \$20,000 \$9,900

Very Respectfully, C. R. Stuckslager, Cashier.

The Penn Bank acknowledged their receipt as follows:

People's Bank Your account has credit

Letter 17

723.89

Item 🆇 We charge your account Exchange

We enter for collection Eaton item 20,000.00 9,900.

To be used when paid.

Very Respectfully,

G. L. Reiber, Cashier.

May 17 the Penn Bank sent the drafts to its Boston correspondent, the Freeman's Bank, indorsed as above and inclosed in the following

Dear Sir,-We inclose for collection

W. S. Eaton, Trs., No. 6611 20,000 6612 9.900

[Stamp:] Y
FREEMAN'S NAT'L BANK,
BOSTON, MASS.
MAY 19, 1884. Yours Respectfully, G. L. Reiber, Cashier.

CORRESPONDENCE Acknowledged.

The drafts were received by the Freeman's Bank May 19, and were accepted by the defendant the same day.

May 20 the Penn-Bank check for \$7,000 reached the Freeman's Bank through the Bos-

ton Clearing House and was paid.

The drafts, when received by the Freeman's Bank, were entered upon its collection book, but have never been entered upon its account current or upon any other book or account to the credit of the Penn Bank.

On the 21st or 22d of May the Penn Bank failed, and the defendant's treasurer was notified by the People's Bank and the manager of the National Tube Works at McKeesport not to pay the same. Payment was accordingly refused on presentation on May 22, and this suit was thereupon commenced.

Messrs. W. G. Russell and Jabez Fox,

for plaintiff:

The legal title at least passed by the indorsement "Pay Penn Bank or order for account of the People's Bank.

First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227; Murrow v. Stuart, 8 Moore, P. C. 267.

A second restrictive indorsement like that of the Penn Bank in the present case is just as unequivocal an assertion of title in the second indorser as if it stood alone.

Merchants Nat. Bank v. Hanson, 33 Minn. 40, cited in Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Continental Bank, 2 L. R. A. 699, 148 Mass. 558.

The fact that the indorsement of the Penn Bank was restrictive would not prevent the title from passing to the plaintiff to secure the sum advanced.

not the usage of the bank to consider the bill dishonored in such a case. Ibid.

A bank receiving for collection drafts drawn against shipments of cattle, on which payment is refused, and which fails to send notice of such refusal for more than twenty-four hours, cannot appropriate the proceeds of the cattle, which it collects for the drawee of such drafts, to his indebtedness to the bank on overdrafts. Gillespie v. Union Stockyards Nat. Bank, 41 Fed. Rep. 231.

The bank is responsible for the amount of the bill in case of its negligence as to notice of presentment and nonpayment. Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321; Borup v. Nininger, 5 Minn. 523; Chicopee Bank v. Seventh Nat. Bank, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 641 (19 L. ed. 422); Essex County Nat. Bank v. Bank of Montreal. 15 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 418; Woolen v. New York & E. Bank, 12 Blatchf. 359; Indig v. National City Bank, 80 N. Y. 100; Ayrault v. Pacific Bank, 6 Robt. 337.

Liability of agent of collecting bank.

The bank receiving the note for collection, and not its agent, is liable to the owner. Hyde v. First

Nat. Bank, 7 Biss. 156.

Where a person goes to a bank, in the ordinary course of business dealing, and intrusts to it the collection of a draft drawn upon some person residing at a distance, and the home bank, through | made no advances and given no new credit to the 8 L. R. A.

the failure or dishonesty of another bank selected by itself to make the collection, never receives the money paid on such draft by the drawee, in the absence of any agreement in regard to the matter, the home bank is liable to the customer for the loss of the money. Simpson v. Waldby, 6 West. Rep. 158, 63 Mich. 439.

If a collecting bank surrenders a check to a bank on which it is drawn, and accepts a cashier's check or other obligation in lieu thereof, its liability to its depositor is fixed as much as if it had received the cash. Fifth Nat. Bank v. Ashworth, 2 L. R. A. 491, 123 Pa. 212.

If it employs some other bank or individual to collect the bill the latter becomes the agent of the former bank, and not of the owner, to which it is answerable for neglect of its duty as agent. Commercial Bank v. Union Bank, 11 N. Y. 203; Montgomery County Bank v. Albany City Bank, 7 N. Y. 459; Merchants & M. Bank v. Stafford Nat. Bank, 44 Conn. 564; Reeves v. State Bank, 8 Ohio St. 465; Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308 (23 L. ed. 392).

If a party sends a bill of exchange to his agent for collection, who remits it to a sub-agent, living in the same place with the drawee, who receives the money, the holder of the bill can recover the money of the sub-agent. If the sub-agent has

A banker who has advanced money to another has a lien upon all the securities in his hands, including paper deposited for collection, to secure the amount of such advance.

Wood v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 129 Mass. 358; Hackett v. Reynolds, 5 Cent. Rep. 521, 114 Pa. 328; Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 42 U. S. 1 How. 234 (11 L. ed. 115); Cody v. City Nat. Bank, 55 Mich. 379; Sweeny v. Easter, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 166 (17 L. ed. 681).

It cannot be said that the People's Bank, by permitting the Penn Bank to make this assertion of its own title and to put upon the drafts this direction to collect for its own account, gave that bank a less extensive authority to deal with them than it would have had under a power of attorney "to sell, indorse and assign" the securities "on behalf" of its principal, and yet it has been held that under such a power the agent could pledge the securities for a loan upon his private account.

Bank of Bengal v. Fagan, 7 Moore, P. C. 61. It could be no departure from the line of agency for the plaintiff to remit to the Penn Bank in advance of collection, and to rely up-

on the security of these drafts.

Where a person had purchased goods from a broker and had paid for them in part by an advance on his general account before the delivery of the goods, such payments would be allowed as against the principal, "if it was the usual practice for payments to be made from time to time, sometimes to a smaller and sometimes to a larger amount than was actually due at the time.

Catterall v. Hindle, L. R. 2 C. P. 368; Fish v. Kempton, 7 C. B. 692; Warner v. M'Kay, 1 Mees. & W. 591.

The money was paid to the defendant's use and at its request and we can recover independently of any question of title to the drafts. Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190; Bryant v. Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228; Mirick v. French, 2 Gray, 420.

Messrs. Hutchins & Wheeler, for defendant:

out of the National Tube Works Company

Commercial Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. Rep. 684; First Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 36 Fed. Rep. 59; Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Continental Bank, 2 L. R. A. 699, 148 Mass. 553; Fifth Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 40 Fed. Rep. 46.

If a bill be indorsed "For the use of" or "For account of" the indorser, it is a restrictive indorsement, and is not an assignment of the security, but merely an authority to col-lect. The title to the bill does not pass to the indorsee, and such indorsee cannot indorse the

bill so as to pass any interest in it.

White v. Miners Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 658
(26 L. ed. 250); Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225, 227; Wilson v. Holmes, 5 Mass. 543; Sigourney v. Lloyd, 8 Barn. & C. 622; Rock County Nat. Bank v. Hollister, 21 Minn. 385; Third Nat. Bank v. Clark, 23 Minn. 263; Lawrence v. Fussell, 77 Pa. 460; Williams v. Shadbolt, 1 Ca-babé & Ellis, 529; 2 Ames, Bills and Notes,

index, p. 837.

The Freeman's Bank had notice from the form of the indorsements that the Penn Bank had no interest in the drafts, and that the authority of the Penn Bank to collect might be revoked at any time before the maturity of the drafts. Therefore, if it paid the \$7,000 in reliance on acceptances, it acted at its peril.

Treuttel v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100.

The People's Bank, having received the drafts simply as agents to collect, indorse them "Pay Penn Bank or order for account of Peo-ple's Bank." This was a restrictive indorsement, and neither the Penn Bank nor any subsequent indorsee could claim to be holder for value without notice as against the National Tube Works, the real owners of the paper.

Treuttel v. Barandon, 8 Taunt, 100; Wilson v. Holmes, 5 Mass. 543; White v. Miners Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 658 (26 L. ed. 250); Sweeny v. Easter, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 166 (17 L. ed. 681); Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Continental Bank, 2 L. R. A. 699, 148 Mass. 553; First Nat. Bank v. Reno County Bank, 3 Fed. Rep. 257; Blaine The ownership of these drafts never passed 48 Me. 269.

agent on account of the remittance of the bill, he cannot protect himself against such an action by passing the amount of the bill to the general credit of the agent, although the agent may be his debtor. Wilson v. Smith, 44 U. S. 3 How. 763 (11 L. ed. 820).

In New York, a collecting agent to whom paper is sent to be collected at some place remote from his place of business has no implied authority to employ a sub-agent in the locality of the payee, and, without some express understanding to that effect or qualifying his liability, is deemed to make such selection and employment of another on his own account, and is alone chargeable for the conduct of the latter. Naser v. First Nat. Bank, 116 N. Y. 492

Where, upon a bank's agreement to transmit money to a person in a distant city, plaintiff makes with it a special deposit of the amount for that pur-Pose, and receives a letter of advice directed to a bank in that city, to the effect that the latter's account is credited with the money for the use of the one to whom it is to go, plaintiff may recover back the deposit in case the correspondent bank fails before receiving the letter, which is returned with the amount unpaid; and the fact that the money is credited to the account of the correspondent bank 8 L. R. A.

on the books of the bank of deposit is immaterial. See note to Cutler v. American Exch. Nat. Bank (N. Y.) 4 L. R. A. 328.

A bank holding an assignment of a policy of insurance to collect it and pay certain claims, including one of its own, therefrom, and pay the balance to the insured or his order, cannot be held liable on an order which it has accepted to be paid out of the balance, if, in the exercise of reasonable diligence and in good faith, it has settled the suit to collect the insurance for the amount merely of its own claim, after notice to the person holding the order who made no move or proposition to prosecute the suit. Meyer v. Farmers & T. Bank, ?7 Iowa,

Where a check was sent to a company for collection, of which fact the drawee was advised by the indorsement upon it, and the collecting company received the money from the drawee, and, prior to the time of the discovery of the fraudulent character of the check, gave the money to the company from which it was received for collection, the collecting company is not liable to the drawee as for money paid by mistake. National City Bank v. Westcott, 118 N. Y. 468.

Sweeny v. Easter, 68 U.S. 1 Wall. 166 (17 L. ed. 681); Wilson v. Holmes, 5 Mass. 543; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 25 (7 L. ed. 37); Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521; Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370.

"For the use of" or "For the account of"

the indorsee, or equivalent words, is the simplest and most direct way of expressing a re-strictive indorsement, and such has universally

been their construction.

Snee v. Prescot, 1 Aik. 245, 249; Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225, 227; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Hanson, 33 Minn. 40; Treuttel v. Burandon, 8 Taunt. 100; Wilson v. Holmes, 5 Mass. 543; Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269; White v. Miners Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 658 (26 L. ed. 250); Lawrence v. Fussell, 77 Pa. 460.

Knowlton, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The indorsement from the defendant to the People's Bank, although in terms unrestricted, was without consideration, and merely for the purpose of collection. The People's Bank became the agent of the defendant, and the defendant, as owner of the drafts, can avail itself of all that its agent did for its protection. The subsequent indorsements through which the drafts came to the plaintiff were both restrictive, giving notice that the ownership had not passed beyond the People's Bank. They purported to be made only for the purpose of collection on account of the owner, and they merely passed the legal title so far as to enable the indorsees to demand, receive and sue for the money to be paid. First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 132 Mass. 227.

It is well settled that upon such an indorsement the owner may control his negotiable paper until it is paid, and may intercept the proceeds of it in the hands of an intermediate agent. Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Continental Bank, 148 Mass. 553, 2 L. R. A. 699, and

cases there cited.

The indersement of the Penn National Bank. taken in connection with the former indorsement of the People's Bank, did not by the words "For account of Penn Bank," imply that the Penn Bank was the owner. It was a request to pay "For account of" the Penn Bank as agent of the People's Bank. An unbroken succession of such indorsements would indicate that each indorsee was acting by the direction of the next preceding indorser who was himself an agent of the owner who had before indorsed and for whom the collection was to be

Nothing was shown in the course of business of either of the banks necessarily to conflict with the implication to be derived from the form of the indorsements. The letter of the People's Bank, in which the drafts were

8 L. R. A.

The plaintiff may rely on the restrictive indersement made by its agent, the People's close for collection and credit" the drafts, describing them. The Penn Bank in its reply said. "We enter for collection" the drafts described, "to be used when paid." The drafts when received by the Freeman's Bank were entered upon its collection book, but have never been entered upon its account current, or upon any other book of account to the credit of the Penn Bank.

It has so long been held by the courts that an indorsement of this kind is restrictive, protecting the rights of the owner, that officers of banks must be presumed to have well under-stood the law, and, when they have honored overdrafts drawn by other banks which had sent paper for collection, must have done it trusting in part to the financial soundness of their correspondent, and in part to the probability that the drafts would be paid, and not to a supposed legal right to control the drafts a supposed legal right to control the drafts against the owner. Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225, 227; Wilson v. Holmes, 5 Mass. 543; Treuttell v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100; Sigourney v. Lloyd, 8 Barn. & C. 622; Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269; Sweeny v. Easter, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 166 [17 L. ed. 681]; Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 25 [7 L. ed. 37]; Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521; Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 42 U. S. 1 How. 234 [11 L. ed. 115], 47 U. S. 6 How. 212 [12 L. ed. 409].

One who collects commercial papers through

One who collects commercial papers through the agency of banks must be held to impliedly contract that the business may be done according to their well-known usages so far as to permit the money collected to be mingled with the funds of the collecting bank. Lorchester & M. Bank v. New England Bank, 1 Cush. 177.
When a payment is made to his agent and

the money is put with the money of the collecting bank he has a right to receive a cor-responding sum, but he loses his right to the specific fund. In the absence of directions to the contrary, the collecting bank may pay it to the bank to which it should regularly be remitted, by setting it off against a debt due from that bank and giving credit for it in the ac-

Very likely authority to collect would authorize the receipt of the money from the payor before maturity if he saw fit then to pay. and remittances afterwards made, whether by actual transmissions of money or by a set off and adjustment of accounts in the usual way, would be good against the owner. In the present case no collection was made, for payment was stopped before the draft became due. The plaintiff had no right to advance the Penn Bank \$7,000, or any other sum, on account of the defendant. Its only authority was to transmit or pay by adjustment and set-off money which it received for the defendant.

We are of opinion that upon the facts reported, the action cannot be maintained.

Judyment for the defendant.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

Thomas C. COOPER Philip D. ARMOUR et al.

(....Fed. Rep....)

- 1. An action for malicious prosecution will not lie in favor of one against whom an accusation has been preferred before a magistrate charging a criminal offense, if he was not apprehended and no process for his arrest was issued.
- 2. Although an action for libel or slander may be maintained in such case if the accusation was made with no bona fide intention of prosecuting it, yet an action brought for ma-licious prosecution cannot be retained and treated as one for libel and slander if the defamatory words are not set out in the complaint.

(April 16, 1890.)

A CTION to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecution. On plaintiff's mo-

tion for a new trial. Denied.

Defendants filed an information against plaintiff before a police justice, and made application for a warrant for plaintiff's arrest, for the alleged crime of forgery in the second degree. The justice subponaed witnesses to appear before him and be examined to determine whether or not the warrant should issue. Counsel appeared for the respective parties and the proceedings were conducted with all the formality of a regular trial. The justice finally refused to issue the warrant, and plaintiff thereupon brought this action to recover damages for the alleged malicious prosecution.

The action was brought on for trial before Judge Wallace and a jury, and the judge directed a verdict for defendants.

The plaintiff thereupon filed this motion for a new trial.

Messrs. Ward & Cameron, for plaintiff, in support of the motion:

Defendants inflicted a great injury on plaintiff and are liable therefor in damages in an action on the case.

See Smith v. Smith, 20 Hun, 555.

There was an actual and technical prosecu-

McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343; McPherson v. Runyon (Minn.) 40 Alb. L. J. 403; Smith v. Smith, 20 Hun, 555; Clarke v. Postan, 6 Car. & P. 423; Stephens, Mel Dec. W. 313 Mal. Pros. Wood's ed. p. 8; Addison, Torts, \$\\$ 852, 856; Townshend, Slander and Libel, p. 700, \$\} 422; Weston v. Beeman, 27 L. J. N. S. Exch. 57.

To put the criminal law in force maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause, is wrongful" for which an action will

lie for malicious prosecution.

Addison, Torts, §\$ 852, 856; Stephens, Mal. Pros. Wood's ed. p. 5; Clarke v. Postan, supra; Dawson v. Vansandau, 11 Week. Rep. 516; Townshend, Slander and Libel, § 422. p. 700.

It is not necessary in order to maintain this action for malicious prosecution, to show there without an arrest." 8 L. R. A.

was any interference with the person or property of the plaintiff.

McPherson v. Runyon, supra; McCardle v. McGinley, 85 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343.

It is not essential to the maintaining of this action that a warrant, summons or other process should actually have been issued.

Smith v. Smith, supra; Addison, Torts, 859; Stephens, Mal. Pros. Wood's ed. p. 8.

Messrs. Stedman, Thompson & An-

drews, for defendants:

In an action of malicious prosecution the gravamen of the charge is that the plaintiff has improperly been made the subject of legal proc-

ess to bis damage.

Newfield v. Corperman, 47 How. Pr. 87; Lawyer v. Loomis, 3 Thomp. & C. 393; Stevart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187 (25 L. ed. 116); Wetmore v. Mellinger, 64 Iowa, 741, 30 Alb. L. J. 55; Mildoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. 110, 29 Alb. L. J. 457; Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. C. 354; Kneeland v. Snitka, 10 Long & S. 470. C.) 354; Kneeland v. Spitzka, 10 Jones & S. 470; O'Driscoll v. McBurney, 2 Nott & McC. 54; Gregory v. Derby, 8 Car. & P. 749.

Wallace, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The question in this case is whether an action for malicious prosecution will lie against the defendants who have preferred an accusation before a magistrate charging the plaintiff with a criminal offense, notwithstanding the plaintiff was not apprehended and no process for his arrest was issued by the magistrate.

The gist of the action of malicious prosecution is the putting of legal process in force. regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury; and the inconvenience or harm resulting, naturally or directly, from the suit or prosecution, is the legal damage upon which it is founded. Some of the text-writers state that the action will lie whenever the defendant has made a charge of felony against the plaintiff with a view to induce a magistrate or tribunal to entertain it, whether any warrant or other process was issued or not. Stephens, Mal. Pros. Wood's ed. p. 8; Addison, Torts, § 856.

Actions have been maintained in the nature

of conspiracy for procuring a false indictment, and even for preferring a false charge of crime upon which the grand jury refused to indict; but the only decisions cited in support of the proposition that the action of malicious prosecution will lie although a criminal proceeding has not actually been instituted by the issuing of process, where the point actually arose, are in the Nisi Prius case of Clarke v. Postan, 6 Car. & P. 423, and in the case of Dawson v. Vansandau, 11 Week. Rep. 516, in which, although no process was issued, the plaintiff was taken into custody and held for examination upon the charge. On the other hand it was said by Patterson, J., in Gregory v. Derby, 8 Car. & P. 749, where there was a charge of stealing upon which a warrant was issued against the plaintiff, "that if the party was never apprehended no action would lie; and in O'Driscoll v. McBurney, 2 Nott & McC. 54, 55, it was said: "There can be no prosecution

The only injury sustained by the person accused when he is not taken into custody and no process has been issued against him is to his reputation; and for such an injury the action of libel or slander is the appropriate remedy, and would seem to be the only remedy. This is the view adopted by Hare & Wallace in their notes to American Leading Cases (vol. 1, p. 173); and the learned commentators state that slander or libel is the only appropriate remedy where a charge of felony has been made and a warrant was not thereupon issued, and that malicious prosecution, and not slander or libel, is the remedy whenever a warrant has been issued. The question was fully considered by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Heyward v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, L. 354, whether an action for malicious prosecution would lie founded on a criminal charge upon which no process was issued against the accused, and it was adjudged that it would not. In that case the charge was in the form of an information laid before the magistrate to procure a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff. To the same effect is the case of *Kneeland* v. *Spitzka*, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct. [10 Jones & S.] 470, where the question was decided in an appellate court.

In the early case of Ram v. Lamley, Hutt. 113, it was held that an action of slander could not be maintained for an oral charge of felony made to a justice of the peace upon an application for a warrant against the plaintiff, for the reason that if words so spoken were to be held actionable "no other would come to a justice of the peace to inform him of a felony." defamatory statement spoken or written in a legal proceeding, civil or criminal, which is pertinent and material, is so unqualifiedly priv-ileged that its truth cannot be drawn into question or malice predicated of it in an action for

slander or libel. Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B. 126; Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111; Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Hawk v. Evans, 76 Iowa, 593.

If upon considerations of public policy such an action cannot be maintained, upon the same considerations no other action should lie. Without doubt libel or slander will lie for an accusation to a magistrate when made with no bona fide intention of prosecuting it. Unless such facts can be shown by the person accused, or unless he is subjected to the vexation and expense of process against him, upon principle he ought not to be allowed to recover.

The more generally approved doctrine is that for the prosecution of a civil action maliciously and without probable cause, to the injury of the plaintiff, he may maintain an action for damages although there was no interference with his person or property. Pangburn v. Bull, 1 Wend. 345; Whipple v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 582; Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209; Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 56 Am. Rep. 77; Allen v. Codman, 139 Mass. 136; Marbourg v. Smith, 11 Kan. 554; Woods v. Finnell, 13 Bush, 629; Pope v. Pollock (Ohio) 4 L. R. A. 255; McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538, 44 Am. Rep. 343; McPherson v. Runyon (Minn.) 40 Alb. L. J. 403; Smith v. Smith, 20 Hun, 555.

The cases however which sustain this view do not countenance an action when the vexatious suit has not been actually instituted and prosecuted to such effect that the plaintiff has

sustained pecuniary loss.

Inasmuch as the defamatory words, which must be set forth in an action for slander or libel, are not alleged in the present complaint, the case cannot be treated as an action for slander or libel.

The motion for a new trial is denied,

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT.

George A. CASE, Respt., SUN INSURANCE CO., Appt.

(....Cal....)

The time for bringing suit on an insurance policy which provides that no suit or action shall be commenced unless within twelve months next after the fire, and also provides that a claim on the policy shall be due and payable sixty days after full completion by the asnot elapse with the expiration of the twelve months after the fire, where a cause of action has not then accrued by completion of such requirements, if the company has insisted on, and the insured has complied with, them as rapidly as he was able.

(March 26, 1890.)

A PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, sured of certain requirements of the policy, does in an action to recover the amount alleged to

NOTE.-Fire insurance; limitation of action on policy.

A condition in a policy of insurance, that an action cannot be maintained upon the policy unless commenced within twelve months after the loss, is valid. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 386 (19 L. ed. 257); Ghio v. Western Assur. Co. 65 Miss. 532.

The condition is not fulfilled by a previous ac-tion commenced within that period, which was dismissed. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford F. Ins. Co.

The statute of a State which allows a party who suffers a nonsuit in an action to bring a new ac- to the bringing of a second action within a year 8 L. R. A.

tion for the same cause within one year afterwards does not affect the rights of the parties in such case. Ibid.

The disability to sue imposed by the war relieves the assured wholly from the consequences of failing to bring suit within twelve months after the loss, as required by his policy. Semmes v. City F. Ins. Co. 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 158 (20 L. ed. 490).

Where a policy provides that no action shall be commenced after a year, and that lapse of time shall be taken as conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim, any statute of limitation to the contrary notwithstanding, the statute relative be due under a policy of fire insurance. Affirmed.

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion.

Messes. Rhodes & Barstow for appel-

Messrs. Haggin, Van Ness & Dibble,

for respondent:

Until full compliance with the provision of the policy, and the expiration of sixty days thereafter, right of action upon the policy did not accrué.

May, Ins. § 476; Doyle v. Phænix Ins. Co. 44 Cal. 264.

The limitation clause does not apply in those cases in which, without fault on the part of the assured, and by reason of the acts of the Company, the right of action does not accrue with-

in a year subsequent to the fire.

Friezen v. Allemania F. Ins. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 352; Vette v. Clinton F. Ins. Co. Id. 668; Ellis 352; Vette v. Clinton F. Ins. Co. Id. 668; Ellis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 64 Iowa, 507; Longhurst v. Star Ins. Co. 19 Iowa, 364; Stout v. Cliy F. Ins. Co. 12 Iowa, 371; Burber v. Wheeling F. & M. Ins. Co. 16 W. Va. 675; Owen v. Howard Ins. Co. 87 Ky. 571; Killips v. Putnam F. Ins. Co. 28 Wis. 472; Martin v. State Ins. Co. 44 N. J. I. 485; Little v. Phænix Ins. Co. 123 Mass. 389; Barnum v. Merchants F. Ins. Co. 97 N. Y. 188; May, Ins. §§ 486, 487.

Sharpstein, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The policy upon which this action is based contains, among others, the following clause:
"It is mutually agreed that no suit or action for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustainable in any court of law or chancery until appraisement shall be had, if demanded by this Company, and in accordance with the printed conditions of this policy, nor unless such suit or action shall be commenced within twelve months next after the fire shall occur." The fire is alleged to have occurred on the 12th day of September, 1884; and this action was commenced on the 22d day of November, 1885, more than twelve months next after the fire occurred.

The contention of appellant is that at the time of the commencement of the action it was barred by the terms of said stipulation. That contention must prevail unless the clause upon which it is based is modified by some other clause or clauses of the policy. One clause reads as follows: "The amount of loss or damage to be estimated according to the actual, cash, marketable value of the property at the time of the loss, which in no case shall exceed what it would then cost to replace the same, deducting therefrom a suitable amount for any depreciation of such property by reason of age,

wear and tear, location, change of style, lack of adaptation to profitable use or other causes. The adjusted claim under this policy shall be due and payable at the company's office in San Francisco, Cal., sixty days after the full completion by the assured of all the requirements herein contained."

Among the requirements therein contained were the following: "The assured, his, her and their agents and servants, shall, whenever required, submit to an examination or examinations, under oath, by any person appointed by this Company, and subscribe to such examinations when reduced to writing, and shall also produce their books of account and other vouchers, and exhibit the same for examination at the office of this Company in San Francisco as often as required, and permit extracts and copies thereof to be made. The assured also shall produce certified copies of all bills and invoices the originals of which have been lost, and shall exhibit all that remains of the said property, damaged or not damaged, for examination, to any person or persons named by this Company, and shall also furnish such further particulars, and such certificates of a magistrate or officer charged with the duty of investigating fires, as may be required. The proofs of loss shall be made by the party insured in regular form."

It is alleged and proven that appellant exacted a compliance by the assured with all of these requirements, and that the insured complied therewith as rapidly as he was able to, and that he was unable to fully comply therewith before the 16th day of October, 1885,more than thirteen months after the fire ocpiration of the time within which an action could be commenced, according to the construction which the appellant's counsel insist should be given to the policy. The adjusted claim under the policy was payable sixty days after the full completion of the assured of all the requirements contained in the policy. No right of action accrued until more than three months after it was barred by the twelve-months' limitation clause, unless that clause

is modified by some other clause.

In Spare v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Sawy. 142, 17 Fed. Rep. 568, the court, Deady, J., said: "On the authority of adjudged cases (Davidson v. Phanix Ins. Co. 4 Sawy. 594; Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co. 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 389 [19 L. ed. 259]; May, Ins. § 478), it is admitted by counsel for the plaintiff that this clause in the policy limiting the time within which a suit may be commenced thereon against the defendant is valid, but they contend that it must be read in connection with that other clause which provides

after a reversal of the first is inapplicable. Hocking v. Howard Ins. Co. 130 Pa. 170.

Under the Iowa Statute, which provides that no action on a policy of insurance shall be brought within ninety days after notice of loss, anything in the policy or contract to the contrary notwithstanding, any provision in the policy is controlled by the Statute, and receiving proofs of lose and claiming that the policy is void cannot be regarded as a waiver of the provisions of the Statute. Vore v. Hawkeye Ins. Co. 76 Iowa, 548.

The limitation clause in a policy, followed by a clause against a waiver of any conditions unless 1890. SLRA.

expressed in writing signed by the president or secretary of the company, are waived by a course of conduct of the company which induces insured to believe that the loss would be adjusted and paid without suit. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. v. Brodie (Ark.) 4 L. R. A. 458, and cases cited on p. 460.

A condition, in a policy of life insurance, that suit shall be brought within six months from date of death, does not apply where the superintendent of the defendant company, before expiration of the time to sue, has promised to pay the money. Met ropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Dempsey (Md.) April 18,

days after the proof of that fact is made; and that, taken together, the reasonable construc-tion of them is that, the right to sue on the policy being postponed until the loss is payable, namely, sixty days after proof thereof, the twelve-months' limitation upon such right does not commence to run until that time. This not commence to run until that time. This construction is supported by the decided weight of authority and in my judgment is correct on principle. New York v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co. 39 N. Y. 45; Hay v. Star F. Ins. Co. 77 N. Y. 241; Barber v. Wheeling F. & M. Ins. Co. 16 W. Va. 658; Chandler v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 21 Wing. 25. Stars v. Wiczer. Co. 16 W. Va. 658; Chandler v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 21 Minn. 85; Steen v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. 89 N. Y. 315; Killips v. Putnam F. Ins. Co. 28 Wis. 472; May, Ins. § 479.

"In Steen v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 323, the policy contained two similar conditions and the contained two similar conditions.

tions; and the court, in construing them, said: We think the intention of the defendant was to give the insured a full period of twelve months, within any part of which he might commence his action; and having, by postponement of the time of payment, secured itself from suit, it did not intend to embrace that period within the term after the expiration of which it could not be sued. In other words, the parties cannot be presumed to have suspended the remedy and provided for the running of the period of limitation during the same time. Indeed, the actual case is stronger;

that a loss does not become payable until sixty inot only was the remedy postponed, but the liability even did not exist at the time of the fire, nor until it was fixed and ascertained according to the provisions of the policy. Having thus made the doing of certain things, and a fixed lapse of time thereafter, conditions precedent to the bringing of an action, the parties must be deemed to have contracted in reference to a time when the insured, except for that contract, might be in a condition to bring an action. Under any other construction the two conditions are inconsistent with each other."

This case is distinguishable from Garido v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. (Cal.), 8 Pac. Rep. 512, in which the plaintiff had ample time after his right of action accrued to have commenced it within twelve months after the loss occurred. In this case it was more than twelve months after the fire before an action could be commenced. We must concede, however, that Garido v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., supra, is not altogether in harmony with the cases which we follow in this case. Under the construction which we give to the policy, we think the complaint states a cause of action not barred by the provisions of the policy; and the evidence is sufficient to justify the verdict of the jury Judgment and order affirmed.

We concur: McFarland, J.; Thornton, J.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT.

Susan B. WILLARD Andrew J. FINNEGAN.

(....Minn....)

*1. A sale, under a power in a mortgage, in gross as one parcel, of several separate and dis-tinct tracts of land, is not void, but only voidable, for good cause shown, as that it was the re-Head notes by MITCHELL, J.

sult of fraud, or that prejudice resulted to the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption.

2. A. executed a mortgage to M., and subsequently conveyed to W. M. foreclosed his mortgage, and purchased the property at the sale. Neither A. nor W. redeemed from the sale. but a redemption was made by F., as a judgment creditor of A., who obtained a certificate of redemption. But before F. redeemed A. duly tendered him the amount due on his judgment, which he refused to accept. Held, that, as be-

NOTE.—Power of sale in mortgage.

A power of sale coupled with an interest cannot be revoked by a mortgagor, and his death cannot defeat or suspend the right to execute the power. Hudgins v. Morrow, 47 Ark. 515; Way v. Mullett, 3 New Eng. Rep. 200, 143 Mass. 49.

The provision of the Montana statutes, that "a mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable an owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real property without forcelosure and sale." does not prevent giving to the mortgagee a power to sell the premises upon default. First Nat. Bank v. Bell Silver & Copper Min. Co. 8 Mont. 32.

It does not follow from the possession of a power of sale by the grantee in a deed absolute on its face, but in fact a mere security, that the power is to be exercised otherwise than by foreclosure. Pearson v. Sharp, 7 Cent. Rep. 494, 115 Pa. 254.

A power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust may be so limited that a sale under the power cannot be made, and yet there may be a remedy by foreclosure. Davis v. Bessehl, 4 West. Rep. 61, 88

8 L. R. A.

ate as a foreclosure. Way v. Mullett, 3 New Eng. Rep. 200, 143 Mass. 49,

Such sale cuts off the equity of redemption as effectually as a sale under a decree of foreclosure, leaving in the mortgagor nothing but a statutory right of redemption. Gassenheimer v. Molton, 80 Ala. 521.

The purchaser of a mortgage containing a power of sale cannot foreclose the same by advertisement under the statutes of Dakota, unless a written assignment of such mortgage has been first duly executed, acknowledged and recorded. Hickey v. Richards, 3 Dak. 345.

A purchaser purchases at the peril of the sale being void, if a material condition precedent to the exercise of the power does not exist. Hence a purchaser from a trustee under a deed of trust made to secure the payment of certain notes which had been previously paid, and the deed of trust having by its terms thereby become void, takes no Temple v. Whittier, 5 West. Rep. 144, 117 Ill. title. 282.

A mortgagee who becomes the purchaser at his own sale thereby arms the mortgagor with the op-The sale of premises under such power will oper- tion, if seasonably expressed, to disaffirm the sale tween F. and W. (who had no interest in the prop- 128; Vauter v. Crafts (Minn.) June 4, 1889. erty), the redemption was valid; that M., the purchaser at the mortgagesale, alone could raise the question whether the tender discharged the lien of F's judgment, so as to terminate his right to redeem.

(February 7, 1890.)

PPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the District Court for Hennepin County dismissing the complaint, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, in an action brought to determine an adverse claim made by defendant to certain real estate to which plaintiff claimed title. Affirmed.

A PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the District Court for Hennepin County determining that he had no right to redeem certain real estate from a mortgage sale thereof, and that he had no valid title thereto. Reversed. The case sufficiently appears in the opinion.

Mr. L. E. Stetler, for plaintiff: The sale of the land under the mortgage as an entire tract was unauthorized and absolutely void and the sheriff's certificate of sale void on its face, and Michael Maloney acquired no title to the premises by reason thereof.

Hull v. King, 38 Minn. 349. Mr. A. D. Smith, for defendant: A mere tender, even if kept good, will not extinguish or pay the debt itself. It merely stops costs; it does not even suspend the remedy against the debtor, or any remedy or legal right which the creditor may have as appurtenant to the debt in the form in which it may happen.

A fortiori a tender does not discharge a judg-

Jackson v. Law, 5 Cow. 248; Law v. Jackson, 9 Cow. 641; People v. Beeb3, 1 Barb. 379.
The foreclosure of the property in dispute was regular and legal, and passed the title to Michael Maloney, subject to the right of redemption.

Bottineau v. Ætna L. Ins. Co. 31 Minn. 125-

See also Abbott v. Peck, 35 Minn, 499.

Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

Action to determine an adverse claim of defendant to real property of which plaintiff alleges she is the owner. The defendant denies plaintiff's title, alleges that he is the owner, and asks that it be so adjudged. Plaintiff's title depends upon the validity of a sale, under a power, on a mortgage executed by her grantor, one Abbott, to the Maloneys. Defendant's title depends upon a redemption by him, as a judgment creditor of Abbott, from the sale on the Maloney mortgage. The facts are that Abbott executed to the Maloneys a The facts mortgage on a piece of land according to government description, then constituting a single tract; but subsequently he platted the land, dividing it into urban lots and blocks, the Maloneys not joining in the plat. Under these facts the Maloneys would doubtless have had the right to sell the entire premises as one tract, as it was described in their mortgage; at least, in the absence of a request that the sale be in separate parcels, by one interested in the property, who had some equitable right to have it sold in that way in order to protect his interests. Johnson v. Williams, 4 Minn. 260 (Gil. 183); Paquin v. Braley, 10 Minn. 379 (Gil. 304); Ab-bott v. Peck, 35 Minn. 499.

But where the mortgagor, subsequent to the mortgage, divides the premises into separate tracts, as by platting it into lots and blocks, the mortgagee has the right to adopt this division, and sell the property, as the Maloneys did in this case, as lots and blocks, according to the descriptions in the plat. But, if he does so, properly he should sell the different tracts according to the plat separately; whereas, in the present instance, although described in the notice of sale according to the plat as separate lots and blocks, all were sold together for one gross sum. This, it is claimed, rendered the sale absolutely void. The Statute provides

without regard to its fairness or adequacy of price; and when the sale is set aside, the decree relates back to the sale, and the parties are in the same position as if no sale had been made. Gassenheimer v. Molton, 80 Ala., 521.

Where a third party purchases for the benefit of the mortgagee, the sale is not absolutely void, but Voidable only. Nichols v. Otto (III.) Jan. 21, 1890.

Requisites to validity of sale.

A sale under a power contained in a mortgage may be set aside for insufficient notice. Dickerson v. Small, 1 Cent. Rep. 497, 64 Md. 395.

A foreclosure sale under a power in the mortgage is not invalidated by the omission of the names of the mortgagor and mortgagee in the advertisement of sale. Cogan v. McNamara, 16 R. L-EE, 52.

An advertisement of a sale under a power contained in a mortgage which required publication of notice in some newspaper in the County of Providence, Rhode Island, was not insufficient because it appeared in a newspaper published at a place in the county other than one of two certain cities in which the record of the mortgage erroneously required notice to be published. Ibid.

The non-observance of a custom among auc-lsuyra. 8 LRA

tioneers to place notices upon doors or windows of houses for sale, stating the time and place of sale, is not sufficient to set aside a sale made under a power in a mortgage. Chilton v. Brooks, 69 Md. 584.

The provision of the Montana statute for "thirty days' notice" of a sale under a power in a mortgage, by publishing once a week for three weeks successively, does not require that all three publications shall be thirty days before the sale, but only that the first one shall be. First Nat. Bank v. Bell Silver & Copper Min. Co. 8 Mont. 22.

A sale of mortgaged real property under a power is not invalid because the notice of sale does not sufficiently describe certain personal property also covered by the mortgage, especially where such description is as full as that in the mortgage. Ibid.

That the record of a mortgage incorrectly states the place of publication of the notice of sale will not avoid the notice, if the publication is made as provided in the mortgage. Cogan v. McNamara, supra.

A sale of land, under a power in a mortgage, for \$1,000 or more below the market value of the property, will be set aside where it was purchased by the mortgagee, and the sale was made on a day when the weather was so inclement as to prevent purchasers from attending. Chilton v. Brooks,

that, "if the mortgaged premises consist of | The inquiry whether the land sold consisted in separate and distinct farms or tracts, they shall be sold separately." Gen. Stat. 1878, chap.

81. § 9. Whether a sale, contrary to the Statute, renders it absolutely void, or only voidable where it is made to appear that there was fraud, or that the disregard of the Statute resulted in actual prejudice to the mortgagor or owner of the equity of redemption, is a question upon which there is some conflict of authority, at least in the case of non-judicial sales. As early as Tillman v. Jackson, 1 Minn. 183 (Gil. 157), it was held that a similar provision as to sales on execution was only directory, and that a violation of it by the sheriff would not invali-date the sale. This case, having stood apparently unquestioned for twenty-three years, was followed and recognized as having become a rule of property in Lamberton v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 24 Minn. 281, in which this court held that a sale on execution in gross, as one parcel, of several distinct and separate tracts of land not lying in a body, is not void, but might be vacated for cause shown, as that it

was the result of actual fraud, or that prejudice resulted to the owner from it, or that there

was no just ground for making the sale that way. This decision was followed by the United

States Circuit Court for the District of Minnesota, and the same rule applied in the case of a

mortgage sale under a power. Swenson v. Balberg, 1 McCrary, 96, 1 Fed. Rep. 444.

If this doctrine had become a rule of property thirteen years ago, it certainly is so yet, never having been, in the mean time, either overruled or questioned. There is no room for any distinction between sales on execution and sales under a power. Neither are judicial sales. A sale by a sheriff on an ordinary execution is a mere ministerial one, made by the officer by the naked authority of the writ and the requirements of the Statute. A sale under a power contained in a mortgage is made by the mortgagee or his agent pursuant to the convention of the parties. Viewed from a practical stand-point, we think the better rule is that a sale contrary to the Statute is merely voidable when fraud, prejudice or other good cause for vacating it is shown. The reasons in its favor given in Cunningham v. Cassidy, 17 N. Y. 276, although used with reference to a judicial sale, are equally applicable to one under a power. The consequences of a contrary rule would be disastrous. A great many titles would be open to question and doubt.

fact of separate and distinct tracts would often be attended with great difficulty. The question would be one of fact, dependent upon evidence dehors the record, and perhaps often doubtful or conflicting. The validity of titles ought not to be made dependent upon such extraneous facts. Our conclusion is that the mortgage sale was valid, and there baving been no redemption from it by either Abbott, the mortgagor, or the plaintiff, his grantee, it follows that the latter has no interest in the prop-

This disposes of her appeal.

erty. This disposes of her appear.

2. Defendant, a judgment creditor of Abbott, duly filed his intention to redeem, and seasonably produced to the sheriff, who made the sale, the proper proof of his right to re-deem, paid to such officer the proper amount of money, and received from him a certificate of redemption. The court, however, made what, for present purposes, we may assume was a finding that before defendant made this redemption Abbott made to him a good and legal tender of the amount due on the judgment, which defendant arbitrarily refused to accept. It was on this ground that the learned judge decided adversely to the defend-ant, holding that this tender operated as a pay-ment of the judgment, or at least as a discharge ment of the judgment, or at least as a unchange of its lien, so that he could not afterwards "use it for redemption purposes." Whether, as between defendant and Maloney, the purchaser at the mortgage sale, this proposition is correct at the mortgage sale, this proposition is correct. or not we need not inquire. It is a question that plaintiff is in no position to raise. Maloney alone can raise it, as he alone is interested in it. Defendant has made a redemption in fact which is good on its face. At most, it is merely voidable, at the election of Maloney, on account of the existence of an extrinsic fact. The redemption is good as against the plaintiff, who has no interest in the property. Maloney is not a party to this action, and consequently his interests cannot be adjudicated or in any way affected. A judgment in this case, adjudging that defendant is the owner of the property, will only determine that he is such as between him and the plaintiff, and to such a judgment he is entitled upon the facts found. Upon his appeal, therefore, the order of the trial judge is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to render judgment in his favor as prayed for in his answer.

Affirmed on plaintiff's appeal, and reversed on defendant's appeal.

KANSAS SUPREME COURT.

John WALLACE et al., Piffs. in Err., Joseph EVANS.

(....Kan....)

A party who built a dam, causing the back water to fill a ravine across which ran a public highway, made a causeway composed of logs,

brush, stone and earth at the place where the public highway ran across the ravine, and made a better way than existed before the construction of the dam. The public used it, and it was for a time maintained and repaired by the overseer of highways of the road district. Held, that the owner of the dam was not chargeable with its maintenance and repair, and was not liable for the value of mules whose death was occa-sioned by the causeway being out of repair.

*Head note by SIMPSON, C 8 L. R. A.

(April 4, 1890.)

plaintiff in an action to recover damages for the loss of certain mules which was alleged to have resulted from the obstruction by defendants of a public highway. Reversed.

Commissioner's opinion.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Messrs. L. H. Thompson and C.D. Jones,

for plaintiffs in error:
Although Wallace built the dam in question and caused the water to back up into a natural ravine crossing the highway, yet if he left the highway in as good condition as he found it, he had performed all that law or justice required of him.

Venard v. Cross, 8 Kan. 260; State v. Cum-merford, 16 Kan. 507; State v. Raypholtz, 32 Kan. 454; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Long,

27 Kan. 684.

The embankment built across the ravine was a bridge as defined by 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 222.

By the common law counties are chargeable

with the repair of all public bridges unless they can show that other persons are bound to repair particular bridges.

1 Wait, Act. and Def. § 3, p. 731. The corporation, for whose exclusive benefit a bridge is made over a highway, must keep it in repair, and is liable for injuries caused to third persons in consequence of its being out

Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446; Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58; Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass. 454.

bridge, though erected by individuals, yet if dedicated to the public, used by the public and found to be of public utility, must be repaired by the public.

State v. Campton, 2 N. H. 513; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129, 6 Am. Rep. 52.

Mr. John R. Hamilton, for defendant in

Where the owner of land over which a public highway passes digs a raceway across the road and builds a bridge across the same, and an injury is sustained by anyone in consequence thereof, such owner is liable to any person so injured for damages.

4Bl.Com. p.6; Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 445. Such bridge must be kept in repair by him

Who built it.

Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58.

This is not a case where the bridge or crossing was voluntarily built. They created the necessity for such crossing, which makes a dif-ferent rule applicable. They created and maintained a nuisance by obstructing a highway, and are liable for any damages as a result thereof.

Gen. Stat. chap. 89, § 17; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 3d ed. §§ 710, 1032-1035, 1060.

Plaintiffs in error were the creators and maintainers of the nuisance, and they could not shift the liability for any damage which might occur by reason thereof upon the public, who cannot be made liable.

Eikenberry v. Bazaar Twp. 22 Kan. 556; West Bend v. Mann, 59 Wis. 69.

Simpson, C., delivered the following opinion: The plaintiff below brought his action to parent that no liability can possibly attach to 8 L. R. A.

ERROR to the District Court for Norton recover the sum of \$400, the alleged value of a County to review a judgment in favor of pair of mules, and \$200 as exemplary dampair of mules, and \$200 as exemplary damages. He alleged that in August, 1882, Wallace constructed a dam across a creek that caused the water to fill up a ravine across which ran a public highway that had been lo-cated, opened and traveled long before the construction of the dam; that the water had flowed into the ravine until, at the time complained of, it was ten feet deep, and was a hazardous and dangerous obstruction to travel on said highway; that Wallace had sold said dam to Railsback, who, at the time the injury occurred, owned and maintained said dam; that on the 9th day of September, 1885, the plaintiff, with his team of mules, was traveling on said highway with no knowledge of the dangerous condition thereof at the place it crossed the ravine, and that in attempting to cross said ravine his two mules were drowned in the water flowing into said ravine by reason of the construction of said dam. The defendants demurred to the petition, and their de-murrer was overruled. They then answered, alleging, among other things, that, at the time the dam was built they caused a safe and suitable embankment to be made of brush, earth and other material across said ravine, on the line of said highway, thereby making a safe and suitable crossing; that this crossing was turned over to the road district, and ac cepted by it, and these defendants were released from any further liability, or any obligation to keep up and maintain said crossing. They also plead contributory negligence. Cause tried at April Term, 1887, to the court, who rendered a judgment for \$400, a motion for a new trial being overruled. Wallace and Railsback bring the case here. They claim that the trial court erred in overruling their demurer to the register and avidence: that the right rer to the petition and evidence; that the right of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, as the dam was constructed under § 14, chap. 66, Comp. Laws 1885; that there was a misjoinder of parties defendant; that there was an obligation resting on the road district to maintain the crossing and keep it in repair; that the evidence shows contributory negligence.

1. The petition in this case alleges that the place at which the loss occurred to the plaintiff below was a public highway, and alleges an obstruction thereof that was the cause of the loss of the mules. The erection of a dam caused the water to fill up a ravine across which the public highway ran. The man who built the dam constructed across the ravine an embankment of stone, logs, brush and earth, that made a good, safe and reliable crossing as long as it was maintained in the condition in which it was constructed. It was shown at the trial that the road overseer had caused work to be done thereon, and that for some years it was constantly used and rea-sonably safe. Wallace, one of the plaintiffs in error, built the dam and the embankment, and after owning the mill property, including the dam, for about one year, sold and conveyed it to one Page, who subsequently sold it to Railsback, the other plaintiff in error, who owned the dam at the time of the loss of the mules. On this state of facts it must be ap-

Wallace for the loss. Putting this question in the strongest possible attitude for the defendant in error, and assuming for that purpose that the erection of the dam and the back water in the ravine was a continuing nuisance, yet still Railsback and not Wallace is responsible for the damages occasioned by it. When Wallace sold the dam, and someone else purchased it and assumed all liability, there seems to be no point of view in which Wallace could be held longer responsible. The judgment

against him is wrong.

2. To constitute an obstruction to a public highway, it must appear that the public travel by reason thereof is actually hindered and endangered. No private action can be maintained if the obstruction continues and becomes a common nuisance on account of the nuisance per se; but if any individual suffers a more special injury than any other, from the continuance of such a nuisance, he has his action therefor. All this is alphabetical law, and affords a sure basis upon which the argument in the case must rest. The controlling question in this case is, Who is responsible for the care and repair of the highway at the point where it crosses the ravine? It is as much a part of the highway as any other portion of its length or breadth. The people at large have the right to the free and uninterrupted use of the right to the free and uninterrupted use of it, not upon the sufferance of the men who built the embankment, but as a matter of right. It has been held that, if a man builds a bridge that is useful to the public in general, it is the duty of the public authorities to repair it, notwithstanding it may be of benefit to the builder: Rex v. West Riding of Yorkshire, 5 Burr. 2594; Heacock v. Sherman, 14 Wend. 58; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129; Thompson.

Highw. 3d ed. 12.

If a bridge is erected over a natural stream by a man for his own benefit, and it is of public utility, and is used by the public, the public is bound to keep it in repair; for in such case, although the bridge is of advantage to the man who built it, he did not create the necessity for

it. Dygert v. Schenek, 23 Wend. 446.
Where a person erected a mill and dam for his own profit, and by so doing deepened the his own pront, and by so doing deepened the water of a ford, through which there was a public highway, but the passage through which, before the deepening, was very inconvenient, and the miller built a bridge over it, and the public used it, and the miller had repaired it, the court held that the county, and not the miller, was chargeable with the repair. Rex v. Kent Co. 2 Maule & S. 513.

All public bridges are prima facie reparable by the public. Most, if not all, of the earlier cases that have any bearing on this question make this distinction: If the bridge is built by a private person, and it is manifestly to the interest of the public to use it, and they do use it, and the way is better than it was before the bridge was built, the public are chargeable with its repair; but, if the improved way is not better than it was before, the public receives !

no benefit. This is certainly a very liberal interpretation of the law, so far as the public are concerned. If the principle of these cases is applied to the facts developed on the trial of this case, there can be no recovery against Railsback, as the duty to keep the crossing in repair is devolved upon the road district. Our statutory enactment, requiring railroad corporations to restore to its former condition any public highway it may cross in the course of its construction, seems to have this principle in view. This court, construing this provision, holds that when a railroad company restores the crossing of a public highway to the condition that existed at the time of the construction of its line across the highway, the railroad company is under no obligation thereafter, under this provision, to maintain it in a safe and sufficient state of repair. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Long, 27 Kan. 684.

It can be said that it is the Statute that re-

lieves the railroad company from the liability to maintain the highway after it has been restored to its former condition, and that there is no statute that operates in favor of the defendants in error. While it is true that the courts in this country have almost universally refused to hold the public to a common-law liability to repair public highways, the statutes of every State establish their liability, and this is so universal that prima facie they must be chargeable therewith; but the question in this case is, Has not the public, by its acceptance and use of this road-way, and by its control and repair, assumed the liability? It cannot be successfully contended that this particular fill or causeway across the ravine is not a part of the public highway. The public has the absolute control of it. The man who built it has no right to obstruct it. If he lives in that road district, he can be compelled to contribute money or labor to its maintenance and received. money or labor to its maintenance and repair. The moment he finished its construction it became a part of the public highway, and his control ceased for every purpose. It then necessarily became the statutory duty of the road district to keep it in repair. The record discloses that at the place where these plaintiffs in error filled the ravine they made a better and safer road-way than existed before. It is shown that it was used for some years by the public. There is some evidence tending to show that the road overseer of the district caused work to be done on it, and at times repaired it. It is not shown that it was located on the land, or that it was erected for the personal benefit of either of the plaintiffs in error. This case was tried and decided upon the theory that both Wallace and Railsback were chargeable with the maintenance and repair of a public highway, and this was error. We recommend that the judgment be reversed, and a new trial granted.

Per Curiam: It is so ordered. All the Justices concur.

8 L. R. A.

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT.

L. B. SKINNER et al., Appls.,

W. B. HENDERSON et al., Commissioners of Hillsborough County.

(....Fis....)

- *1. Under the Constitution and laws of this State a county cannot impose taxes except for county furposes, and the building of a bridge in a county within the corporate limits of a municipality in which the county outside of those limits is in nowise interested, the same being for the sole benefit and advantage of the municipality, is not a county purpose.
- 2. Where an injunction is sought against a county to prevent the appropriation of its revenues to aid in the building of a bridge in a city, and the allegations of the bill are that the bridge is on a city street, and not a county road or highway, and that the county outside of the city is nowise interested in it, and that it is for the sole benefit and advantage of the city, it was error to sustain a demurrer to the bill.
- 3. But the Statute authorizing the city to build bridges within its limits does not necessarily revoke the authority given to the county by General Statute, without restriction as to locality, to build a bridge within those limits. As there may be bridges serving only a city purpose, so there may be others demanded in the same territory for county purposes; and where the circumstances create this demand, and the bridge is for the use and benefit of the people of the county at large or of some considerable portion of them, and intended and needed as well for those outside as for those inside the city, the authority of the county to build it is not annulled by the local city statute:
- 4. The circumstances of each case must determine the line of authority, even where there is assent of the municipal government; but in case of conflict between municipal and county officials, it would seem that the county should give way, in deference to the general policy against one jurisdiction clashing with another.
- 5. If a county may build a bridge within the limits of a municipality when the circumstances suit, it may also aid the municipality in building one under like circumstances, even though it is to be constructed under a contract with the municipality, and is to be under its control.

(May, 1890.)

A PPEAL by plaintiffs from a decree of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County dismissing the bill in a suit brought to enjoin defendants from applying county revenues towards the building of a bridge within the City of Tampa. Reversed.

City of Tampa. Reversed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

Mr. William Hunter for appellants.

Messrs. Sparkman & Sparkman for appellees.

Maxwell, J., delivered the opinion of the court;

The City of Tampa, in Hillsborough County,

*Head notes by MAXWELL, J. & L. R. A.

made a contract with a certain bridge company for the construction of a bridge within the corporate limits of the city across Hillsborough River. The cost of construction was to be \$13,800. Upon petition to the County Commissioners of the County by the citizens of Tampa, and application in behalf of the city by the president of its council, said Commissioners ordered an appropriation of \$4,600 towards the construction of the bridge, to be paid by the County, this amount being one third of the contract price for its construction, and contributed on the understanding that it should be a free bridge. Thereupon appellants filed a bill against the County Commissioners (appellees), praying that they be enjoined from paying out said amount for the construction of the bridge,

Besides the foregoing facts stated in the bill, it alleges, among other things immaterial here, that complainants are citizens and taxpayers of the County of Hillsborough; that the Commissioners levied a tax for the year 1887 for general revenue purposes, which will produce a large surplus, and that they did this for the purpose and with the intent of assisting the City of Tampa "to build a bridge across Hillsborough River on Lafayette Street, which is a city street, and not a county road or highway," and said bridge "is to be entirely and exclusively under the jurisdiction and control" of said city; that the County "outside of said City of Tampa, is in nowise interested in the building of said bridge, and that the same is for the sole benefit and advantage of said city;" that the County "receives no consideration" for said appropriation; that "said bridge, being wholly within the corporate limits of said city, is entirely a municipal improvement, and the expense thereof should be defrayed entirely by said city; that the revenues collected from your orators by county taxation are not levied for the purpose of making such improvements in . . . Tampa, or any other municipality, and cannot be legally expended for such purposes, as the building of said bridge in said city is not a "county purpose" within the meaning of the Constitution.

The defendant demurred to the bill for want of equity, and the demurrer was in effect sustained, though the ruling and order thereon were irregular—the order being "that the injunction be denied and the bill dismissed." Then appellants entered an appeal, but no point has been made here on this irregularity.

It is contended by appellants that the money proposed to be expended by the Commissioners to aid in the building of the bridge is not for a "county purpose," and that they have no authority to appropriate money raised by taxation for the County to any other purpose. As to their authority this is clearly correct. The Constitution (§ 5, art. 9) provides that the "Legislature shall authorize the several counties and incorporated cities or towns in the State to assess and impose taxes for county and municipal purposes, and for no other purposes." What is a county purpose, as distinguished from a municipal purpose, is a question arising here from the fact that the City of Tampais a part of the County of Hillsborough,

and from the further fact that the County is case below, this question may be more pertiauthorized by statute to build bridges in the County without restriction as to locality, and that the city is authorized by its charter to build bridges within its corporate limits—both having authority for the same purpose there, if that given to the city does not exclude its territory from the domain within the jurisdiction of the County for such purpose. Confining ourselves to the allegations of the bill, it appears that the building of the bridge is wholly a matter belonging to the City of Tampa. The contract for building was its contract. The highway on opposite sides of the river, to be connected by the bridge, is alleged to be a city street, and not a county highway, and it is further alleged that the County outside of the city is in no wise interested in the building of the bridge, and that the bridge is for the sole benefit and advantage of the city, being wholly within its corporate limits, and entirely a muwithin its corporate limits, and entirely a mu-nicipal improvement. These facts, taken as true under the demurrer, show that the expendi-ture on the bridge would be for a city, and not a county, "purpose." They do not present the question, whether the County can build, or aid in building, a bridge in the city under any circumstances; or, in other words, whether the jurisdiction of the city entirely excludes the county from its territory for such work. If the Constitution will permit requirements of the county in its highways and in the interest and convenience of all its citizens to affect this question, so as to allow concurrent authority where the work will serve both a county and city purpose, that cannot determine the case here in its present shape. As there may be bridges in a city altogether for local convenience, for aught that appears before us the one in question may be of that class. The bill avers that it is. We know judicially that Tampa is the county seat of Hillsborough, and that outside of Tampa there is habitable territory on both sides of Hillsborough River; but these relations of the County to the city do not of themselves authorize the former to enter the latter for any work that answers only a city purpose, such as the bill alleges of this bridge. If allowed to enter at all, it must be for work that answers a county purpose—that is, work for the use and benefit of the people of the County at large, or of some considerable portion of them, and intended and needed as well for those outside as for those inside the city. The bill does not show that the bridge is a work of this kind, but on the contrary shows only such facts as bespeak a work for merely city use and benefit. We think the County Commissioners are not authorized to aid in such a work, and that their demurrer to the bill should have been overruled.

While this conclusion decides the case upon the present record, we find in the argument of appellant's counsel, and in that of counsel for appellees, a full discussion of the question, whether the legislative grant of authority to the City of Tampa to build bridges within its corporate limits does not intercept the general authority for that purpose given to the county, so far as the territory of the city is concernedthe counsel for appellants insisting that it does, they must pay a bridge tax for any and every and the counsel for appellees that it does not locality inside or outside thereof, if in the Anticipating that in the further progress of the county; while if not residing in a municipal-8 L. R. A.

nently presented, our views on it now will not be out of place.

The theory of appellants is that the officials empowered to act in the management of county affairs have no authority to expend money they raise by taxation for county purposes in building bridges within the corporate limits of any municipality in the County. Whether they have or not is the question to be solved. It is admitted for appellants that if the County has the right to build the bridge, it would likewise have right to appropriate for a part of the expense, but insisted that if it could not pay in whole, it could not pay in part. Then, the publem is, Can the county officials under their general authority, and notwithstanding the special authority of the city, go into the city to build a bridge, or to act in conjunction with the city for that purpose? The rulings on this question are diverse, but they all agree that it depends on constitutional provision or legislative enactment applicable in the particular case, with general principles of law to interpret or construe these. We have mentioned all there is in the Constitution and laws of this State on the subject. Counties cannot expend money except for county purposes; and where a county and municipality cover the same ground, there is nothing which expressly directs what each may do respectively in the line of its authority. The nearest approach to any decision on the question in this State is in the case of State v. Putnam Co., 23 Fla. 632, where it was held that the establishment of a municipality on territory over which passes part of a public road established by the road authortites of the county, does not of itself abolish the road as a public high way, nor revoke or sus-pend the powers and duties of those authorities in regard to it. The court was careful to go no further. But in this decision it appears that a county may, under some circumstances, have powers and duties touching highways in a city or town, for the proper exercise and enforcement of which it can be held responsible, and the same would be true of a bridge similarly situated.

There may be distinctively municipal purposes in respect to bridges within a corporation, as where a small stream, purely local, and having no connection with county highways, should be bridged for the convenience of citizens of the corporation; and it is con-ceivable that there may also be county pur-poses in the same respect therein, as where the bridge connects public highways of the county, and is of use and importance to the citizens of the county, irrespective of residence in the corporation, and especially if the court-house of the county is in the corporation. It would seem but just and reasonable in such case that the county should take or share the burden of furnishing to the public the convenience of the bridge. In this connection it is worthy of observation that all the taxpayers of the county, those in municipalities not excepted, are required to contribute to the revenue of the county for bridge purposes, without reference to residence. If residing in a municipality

be taxed for a bridge therein, though for a county purpose. It should not be assumed, and in the absence of assumption there is no and in the absence of assumption there is no reason to hold, that such inequality of tax burden was intended to be imposed. This involves relieving the county from the burden when a county purpose is to be subserved in a municipality, but holding the municipality liable for both county and municipal burden, whether in or out of the corporate limits. The palpable injustice of this is most striking. It is nothing more nor less than imposing a double burden upon municipal citizens, one of which is a burden for a county purpose within the municipality, and exempting other citizens of the county from any burden for such purpose, although interested in common in the object to

We hence conclude that the special authority given to any municipality to build bridges within its limits does not necessarily supersede the general authority given to the county. But as there may be a municipal purpose in which the county has no concern, and a county purpose in which all are alike, though perhaps not equally, interested, the circumstances of each case must determine the question of authority. And it seems to us that this would be so even where there is assent of the municipal government. Whether that authority should be exercised in the event of conflict between the two bodies is not involved in this case, as the city and county are in accord in the building of the bridge. In cases where such conflict would arise, we are inclined to the opinion that the County should give way, in deference to the general policy against one

jurisdiction clashing with another.

As we have said, the authorities differ on the main question under discussion. But much of this difference grows out of the difference in a review of the cases, but content ourselves with citing those which sustain the views we have expressed. In Ohioit is held that if there is nothing in the Act incorporating a town which limits the power of the county commissioners to establish a county road through or within its corporate limits, that power still exists. Wells v. McLaughlin, 17 Ohio, 99; Butman v. Fowler, Id. 101. In Connecticut (Norwich v. Story, 25 Conn. 44), it is held that the charter of a city conference of the conference charter of a city conferring power on its common council to lay out new highways, etc., did not devest the county court of the jurisdiction given by statute for the same purpose. similar ruling in Iowa is valuable as coming from Judge Dillon, one of the most eminent of American jurists and law authors now liv-ing, and valuable also as having been announced in an opinion which fully discusses the sub-ject—Bell v. Foutch, 21 Iowa, 119. See also Barrett v. Brooks, Id. 144.

There is this difference, however, between

our statutes and the statutes of Iowa: that while the authority to the counties to build bridges is the same, our statute gives authority to the City of Tampa to establish and regulate bridges within its limits, while that in Iowa (General Act) gives to cities and towns "care, supervision and control of all public . . . to roads not "state and territorial," and not bridges . . . within the city, and shall cause embraced within any authority of the county 8 L. R.A.

ity, if appellants' view is correct, they cannot! the same to be kept open and in repair," etc. But the reasoning on which it is held that the counties are not devested of authority to build bridges in cities is equally applicable to both, with proper modification, giving due weight here to the authority of counties to act for "county purposes." We think the doctrine of these cases is to be preferred under the system established by our Constitution and statutes.

The cases cited for appellants, and maintaining the position that county revenues cannot be expended under a contract to which the county is not a party, do not seem to us to have the force attributed to them here. *Colton* v. *Hanchett*, 13 Ill. 615, simply decides that where legislative authority is given to an individual to build a toll bridge, the county officials cannot appropriate county funds to aid in its construction, because no law of the State authorizes such appropriation. If the view on which we rest our opinion, that in this State a county may build a bridge in a municipality to meet a county purpose, is correct, there is law here to authorize county appropriation of money therefor, and the authority is none the less existent because the appropriation is in aid of a municipal contract to build the bridge, if a county purpose is thereby advanced. Why should not a county expend money to aid in building a bridge, when it has authority to pay the whole expense of building it. If there is anything in the Colton-Hanchett Case that seems to make a distinction, it goes beyond the controversy there, for it was a case where the authority to build the bridge was not in the county officials, and of course, therefore, they could not aid therein. The other case (Atty-Gen. v. Bay Co. 34 Mich. 46), was one where county supervisors undertook to appropriate money for township roads, leaving to the townships to say to what roads it should be applied. It was held this could not be done, partly because the county board had no occasion to raise money for other than its own roads, and partly because there was no definition of purposes, as the expenditure was to be under the direction of the town officer. As to the first ground, that is fully met in this case, if the bridge answers a county purpose, and, as to the second, there is no indefiniteness of purpose to which the money is to be applied. But the court says in the case that "taxes and loans, when authorized to be raised by any public body, must be raised under the implied condi-tion that they are to be applied to the public uses under the control or care of that body. They cannot be raised for the purposes or uses of others, unless such a power is plainly given." It will be seen, upon scrutinizing the case, that this and other similar language of the opinion applied to the action of county supervisors in respect to roads under the supervision of township supervisors, when by the statute their action was limited to "state and territorial roads.

The distinction between that case and the present is obvious. As in that it was held that county revenues could not be used for township roads, so in this we hold that county revenues cannot be used for city bridges as such, but in that the money was being applied supervisors; while in this, if the conditions met by the admission, connected with our view suit, it will be applied to an authorized "coun- as to the authority of the County to build the suit, it will be applied to an authorized "county purpose." It does not seem reasonable that in all cases there is such necessary connection between the expenditure of money for public uses and the control ordinarily resulting from such expenditure, as to prevent the expenditure when made for a lawful purpose, because in accomplishing that purpose it is done in a way to relieve from the control that entails further liability.

It is no objection to our conclusion, as applicable to the case at bar, if it can be shown that the bridge answers a county purpose, as distinguished from a local city purpose, that the bridge was to be constructed under a contract with the city, and that the city will have control of the same, and must bear the responsibilities connected with it. This will be that much better for the County. So far as it is said to be objectionable on the ground that the appropriation by the County is towards the payment of a debt of the city, the bridge being built under a contract with the city, that is met by the fact, if found to exist, that the appropriation is for a county purpose, and would be in effect a payment of its own obligation. And so far as it is said to be objectionable on the ground that the ownership and control of the bridge will be in the city, that is

bridge itself if thereby serving a county pur-pose, that if "the County would have a right right to appropriate for a part of it." As to responsibility for proper care and repair of the bridge, we express no opinion. But if the County discharges a duty in the attainment of a county purpose in such manner as to be relieved from further responsibility in the matter, this furnishes no reason against the va-lidity of its action. We are to understand that in making the appropriation the Commissioners acted, not as aiding the city in a work with which they had no concern, but as performing a primary duty of their own under the power vested in them to build bridges in the County. The reservation they made that the bridge would be a free one, was to guard against restrictions in its use which would not be within the scope of their authority, and was a proper consideration for joining in the work.

Under our conclusion it will be for the defendants to determine, upon existing facts of the situation, whether they will further resist

The decree is reversed, with leave to them to

INDIANA SUPREME COURT.

Mary J. LOGAN, Appt., Lewis V. STOGDALE.

(.....Ind.....)

1. The condemnation of land for a private way cannot be authorized by the Legislature; hence the Act of March 9, 1889, which attempts to do so, is void.

2. The circuit court has jurisdiction of a proceeding to establish a way of necessity over the land of another, since the Act of March 9, 1889, which attempted to confer jurisdiction of such proceedings upon the board of county commissioners, is unconstitutional.

NOTE.—Eminent domain; right of.

It is for the Legislature to determine the necessity which exists for the use of the property proposed to be taken. See note to Moore v. Sanford (Mass.) 7 L. R. A. 151.

But when the question arises whether the use for which it is sought to be condemned is really a public one, it must be determined by the courts without any regard to a legislative declaration that the use is public. Kansas City v. Baird, 98 Mo. 215; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Stockton & V. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pac. R. Co. 51 Cal. 269; Young v. Harrison, 6 Ga. 120; Parham v. Decatur Co. Justices, 9 Ga. 341; Ga. 153; Parnam v. Decatur Co. Justices, 9 Ga. 341; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 501; New Cent. Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & I. Co. 37 Md. 537; Talbott v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Re St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. 34 Minn. 227; Savannah v. Hancock, 8 West. Rep. 248, 91 Mo. 54; Dickey v. Teunison, 27 Mo. 373; Dayton G. & S. Min. Co. v. Seawell. 11 Nav. 234; St. Louis Co. C. ** Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394; St. Louis Co. Ct. v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; Scudder v. Trenton D. F. Co. 1 N. J. Eq. 694; Coster v. Tide Water Co. 18 N. J. Eq. 54; J. Eq. 694; Coster v. Tide Water Co. 18 N. J. Eq. 54; Re Deansville Cemetery Asso. 66 N. Y. 569; Harris v. Thompsou, 9 Barb. 350; Concord R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47; McQuillen v. Hatton, 42 Ohio St. 202; Pittsburgh v. Scott. 1 Pa. 309; Anderson v. Turbe-ville, 6 Coldw. 150; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Var-ner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534.

8 L. R. A.

the right of eminent domain, and in what cases it shall be exercised, is legislative, and not judicial; the questions whether the use to which it is sought the questions whether the use to which it is sought to appropriate property is a public use, and wheth-er the power is delegated to the corporation, are subjects of judicial determination. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Wiltz, 4 West. Rep. 121, 116 III. 449. Although the determination of the Legislature is

not conclusive that a purpose for which it directs property to be taken is a public use, yet it is con-clusive, if the use is public, that a necessity exists which requires the property to be taken. Moore v. Sanford (Mass.) 7 L. R. A. 151.

Private roads; way of necessity.

There is a way by necessity, where another cannot be got or made without reasonable labor and expense; and, in determining the question, the jury may consider the comparative value of the land and the probable cost of such way, and that the word "necessary" cannot be limited to absolute physical necessity. But yet the way must be necessary, and the facts of each case must determine whether it or any other easement thus claimed is necessary. It must be more than one of mere convenience, or one beneficial and convenient, and is only com-mensurate with the existence of the necessity upon which the implied grant of it is founded, and ceases when the necessity for it ceases. Marvin v. Brews-The question of the necessity for the exercise of ter Iron Min. Co. 55 N. Y. 553; Screven v. Gregoric. 3. A grantee of land across which a prior | grantee from the same grantor has the right to a way by necessity takes it subject to such right, although it had been neither exercised nor claimed before his title was acquired.

(April 23, 1890.)

A PPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Grant County sustaining a demurrer to the complaint in an action brought to establish a way of necessity over defendant's land. Reversed.

The facts fully appear in the opinion.

Messrs. W. H. Carroll and G. Dean for appellant.

Mesers. H. Brownlee and H. J. Paulus for appellee.

Elliott, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant, in her complaint, describes a tract of land of which she is the owner, and alleges that the appellee is also the owner of a parcel of land which she particularly describes. In addition to the allegations referred to the complaint contains the following: That in the year 1878, Enos Key was the owner of both parcels of land; that in January of that year he sold to the plaintiff the land she owns; that he subsequently sold and conveyed to the ap-pellec's grantor the land now owned by the appellee; that both of the parties to this action hold under Enos Key; that the land of the plaintiff is surrounded on all sides by the lands of divers persons, including the land of the ous route can be established over his said lands, appellant; that the plaintiff's land is com- or the lands of another; second, that the pro-

pletely shut off from any highway: that it is impossible to go to the plaintiff's land without passing over adjoining land; that the appellant refuses to permit the plaintiff to pass over his land to a highway, and for the purpose of pre-venting her from passing over his land has erected high and strong fences; that he threatens to sue her if she enters upon his land; that there are improvements on her land and her own home is there; that the best and shortest way to a highway is over the appellee's land and that the distance is sixty rods. The prayer is that the court shall establish for the plaintiff, as a way of necessity, a way to the highway across the land of the appellant. To this com-

plaint a demurrer was sustained.
All that is presented in argument in defense of the ruling of the trial court by the appellee's counsel is that, under the Act of March 9, 1889, the action ought to have been brought in the court of the county commissioners, and that the circuit court has no jurisdiction of the subject. The appellant's counsel contend that the Act of March 9, 1889, is in violation of the Constitution and is therefore void.

The Act in question assumes to provide for the establishment of branch highways, and to give any freeholder who has no outlet to a highway the right to petition the board of county commissioners to establish a way. Act provides that the owner of the land upon which it is proposed to establish a way may remonstrate on two grounds and no other; "first, that another convenient and less injuri-

8 Rich. L. 158; Alley v. Carleton, 29 Tex. 79; Ogden v. Jennings, 62 N. Y. 532; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507; Nicholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121; Oakley v. Stanley, 5 Wend, 523; Tabor v. Bradley, 18 N. Y. 109; LeRoy v. Platt, 4 Paige, 77; French v. Carhart, I N. Y. 96; Voorhees v. Burchard, 55 N. Y. 98; Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276; Pierce v. Selleck, 18 Conn. 321

Right of way by necessity arises from presumption of law that the parties did not intend that land to which the owner had no access should be retained or conveyed. Prowattain v. Philadelphia (Pa.) 2 Cent. Rep. 332.

This right of way by necessity may arise in favor of a parcel of land, when the same is surrounded by what has been the grantor's other land, or partly by this and partly by that of a stranger. Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39; Marshall v. Trumbull, 28 Conn. 183; Taylor v. Warnaky, 55 Cal. 350; Kuhlman v. Hecht, 77 Ill. 570; Trask v. Patterson, 29 Me. 499; Brice v. Randall, 7 Gill & J. 349; Bass v. Edwards, 126 Mass. 445; Kimball v. Cocheco R. Co. 27 N. H.
449; Lore v. Stiles, 25 N. J. Eq. 381; Wheeler v. Gilsey, 35 How. Pr. 145; New York L. Ins. & T. Co. v. Milnor, 1 Barb. Ch. 353; Tracy v. Atherton, 35 Vt. 52.

A right of way of necessity may be acquired over the land of another, although the road to which the way leads is not a county road, but a mere byroad open to the public. Cheney v. O'Brien, 69 Cal.

The rule allowing a way of necessity preserves access, but does not give two modes of access and double right of way. Kings Co. F. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 2 Cent. Rep. 439, 101 N. Y. 411.

Where a party acquires a new way by partition or otherwise the right of way by necessity ceases and because the right of way by necessity ceases and because the right of way by necessity ceases. and becomes extinguished. Carey v. Rae, 58 Cal. 159; Abbott v. Stewartstown, 47 N. H. 230.

If it ceases to be a way of necessity, and becomes 118. 8 L, R. A.

merely a way of convenience, it is extinguished, Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128; Pierce v. Selleck, 18 Seeley V. Bisnop, 19 Conn. 133; Pierce V. Seileck, 15 Conn. 321; Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 49; Viall v. Carpenter, 14 Gray, 123; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507; Lawton v. Rivers, 2 McCord, L. 445; Screven v. Gregorie, 8 Rich. L. 158; Alley v. Carleton, 29 Tex. 78.

Petition for private road.

The power of locating a private road is entirely of a public nature, and a petitioner therefor having pursued the mode pointed out by the Code is entitled to the road as a matter of right. Douglas Co. v. Clark, 15 Or. 3.

The county has no authority to take a bond to indemnify it against expenses of its location and

damages assessed thereon. Ibid.

A petition of a person asking for a "cartway leading from his dwelling and lands," stating that it "is the only practical way that petitioner can travel either to church, Sunday school or burying ground by wagon, buggy or cart," although informal, sufficiently alleges that he is "settled upon or cultivating land," and that the way is "necessary, reasonable and just." Warlick'v. Lowman, 103 N.

Where a person petitioning for a private way already has a private way, or by parol license an unobstructed way, across the land of another, his pe tition should be denied. Warwick v. Lowman, 104

A petitioner is not entitled to have a cartway simply upon the ground that no public road leads to his land, or because it will be more convenient for him to have it, but it must appear that it is necessary, reasonable and just, and that he resides on the land, and has no way to get to and from a public road without it. Burwell v. Sneed, 104 N. C. ceeding is wrongful, oppressive or malicious."

Elliott's Supp. §§ 1539-1542.

It is evident from the provisions to which we have just referred, and from other provisions of the Act, that the Legislature intended to grant a freeholder who is shut off from a highway a right to secure a way across the land of another upon the payment of damages. It is not made essential that the way shall be one required by the public, for the whole scope and tenor of the Act indicate that it was intended to secure a right of way to private property owners. That this was the intention is evident from the introductory part of the first section wherein it is provided "that, whenever any freeholder of this State owning lands surrounded by the lands of others, and over which he must necessarily travel in order to reach his own lands, and there is no other outlet to the public road, shall petition the board of com-missioners of the county in which the lands necessary to be traveled are situate for the location of a branch highway thereon, setting forth facts in his petition which shall be verified, such board, if it be satisfied that notice has been served upon the owner of such other lands, at least ten days before the meeting of the board at which such petition is to be pre-sented, shall appoint three disinterested persons to view such highway.'

The provision is an influential one, for it declares what the petition shall contain, and it is in harmony with other provisions of the Act, for all the influential provisions indicate and express an intention to authorize the seizure of property for private way. The provision as to what the petition shall show, the rigid and emphatic restriction of the questions that may be presented by the property owner whose land it is proposed to seize, and the provisions de-claring what questions shall be tried, all com-bine to prove that the Act was intended to authorize the seizure of property for a private way, and to compel an unwilling property owner to yield his land for that purpose. It is impossible to construe the Act as one authorizing only the establishment of public roads, for it will bear no such construction. Nor is it possible to effect a separation of its provisions, for they are so blended that severance is impossible; and as the provisions are inseparable, the Act must be taken in its entirety. Griffin v. State, 119 Ind. 520; State v. Indiana & O. O. G. & Min. Co. 120 Ind. 575; Baldwin V. Franks. G. & Min. 00. 120 Ind. 345; Batawin V. Franks, 120 U. S. 678 [30 L. ed. 766]; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269 [29 L. ed. 185]; Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 [25 L. ed. 550]; United States V. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 [23 L. ed. 563].

It is true that in the preamble and in some of the provisions in the body of the Act, there is an indirect assertion that the use for which authority is conferred to seize private property is a public one, but such an assertion, even if made in the clearest terms, cannot rescue the Act from condemnation, for it is not within the power of the Legislature to determine what is a public use within the meaning of the Constitution. Whether the use is a public one is a prior to the appellant, and as the appellee, the sadder v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311; Re Deansville Cemetery Asso. 66 N. Y. 569; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. In Taylor v. Warnaky, 55 Cal. 350, both par-648; Re St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. 34 Minn. 227; ites claimed, as do the parties before us,

Savannah v. Hancock, 91 Mo. 54, 8 West. Rep. 248; Concord R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47; Rensselaer v. Leopold, 106 Ind. 29, 3 West. Rep.

A private use cannot be transformed into a public one by a mere legislative declaration.

As the Act assumes to authorize the seizure of the property of one citizen for the benefit of another, it cannot be upheld. Our own decisions declare that land cannot be seized for a private road, and they are well sustained by the decisions of other courts. Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455; Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331; Sanzay v. Hunger, 42 Ind. 44; Blackman v. Halves, 72 Ind. 515.

The doctrine of our cases is sanctioned by

Judge Cooley, and many decisions asserting the same rule are cited by him. Cooley, Const.

Lim, 5th ed, 657,

We are compelled to sustain the contention of the appellant, and adjudge the Act of March 9, 1889, to be void because it violates the provisions of the Constitution. As that Act is without force, the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject, and the only question is whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

In the case of Anderson v. Buchanan, 8 Ind. 132, the court quoted with approval from Chancellor Kent the following statement: "Thus, if a man sells land to another which is wholly surrounded by his own land, in this case the purchaser is entitled to a right of way over the other's ground to arrive at his own land." 3 Kent, Com. 420.

This is an apt illustration of the old and familiar doctrine of ways by necessity, and the doctrine has often been given effect by our decisions. Steel v. Grigsby, 79 Ind. 184; Sanxay v. Hunger, 42 Ind. 44; Stewart v. Hartman, 48 Ind. 331.

If the appellant's grantor had remained the owner of the land now owned by the appellee, it is clear that she would be entitled to a way, as of necessity, to the public road. Kimball v. Cochecho R. Co. 27 N. H. 448, 59 Am. Dec.

A way by necessity exists by grant, and the grant is an implied one. Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302.

The theory is that where land is sold that has no outlet, the vendor grants one over the parcel of which he retains the ownership. It results from this that a way of necessity cannot be successfully claimed over the land of a stranger, and if the appellant were asserting a right of way over a stranger's land she could not succeed. If the appellee occupies the position of a stranger, then the appellant must fail; but if he occupies the position as to her that the common grantor did before he parted with title, then she is entitled to the relief she prays. In our judgment, the appellee is in the position of his grantor in so far as the question before us is concerned, and must yield the appellant a right of way. As the law implied a grant at the time the common grantor conveyed to the appellant, and as that grant was

8 L. R. A.

entitled to a way as of necessity across the land The decision in the case referred of the other. to is sustained by the doctrine, maintained by the ancient and the modern authorities, that the original grantor grants, as appurtenant to the parcel expressly conveyed, a way which will enable his grantee to obtain access to the corporeal property expressly conveyed to him. Both the corporeal property and the incorporeal right pass from the grantor at the same time, one as the inseparable incident of the other, and a subsequent grantee must necessarily take the land conveyed to him subject to the burden created by the implied grant.

Our ultimate conclusion is that the action was properly brought in the circuit court, and that such facts are stated in the complaint as require an answer.

Judgment recersed.

William MERRELL, Appt., Rebecca A. SPRINGER.

- (.....Ind.....)

The owner of a note which was, after maturity, surreptitionally taken, without his knowledge or consent, from his possession by its nominal payee and sold to a third party, may recover it from the purchaser although the latter paid value for it and had no notice of the defect in the title of his vendor.

(April 30, 1890.)

A PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Fayette County in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, in an action brought to recover possession of a certain promissory note. Affirmed.

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. Mesers. R. Conner and H. L. Frost for

*ppellant.

Messra. G. G. Florea and J. H. Claypool for appellee.

Coffey, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action of replevin to recover the possession of a promissory note alleged to be the property of the appellee, and wrong-

fully detained from her by the appellant.
The only questions discussed by counsel in their respective briefs relate to the alleged error of the circuit court in overruling the appel-

lant's motion for a new trial.

The evidence in the cause tends to prove that the appellee, in November, 1873, deposited with the appellee, in November, 1873, deposited with the cause tends to prove the control of the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove that the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove the cause tends to prove tends to ited with the maker of the note in controversy the sum of \$25, and took a note therefor in the about five years old. The note was taken in the name of her son for the reason that the hardward of the name of her son for the reason that the hardward for the reason that the reason th husband of the appellee was much addicted to becoming intoxicated, and was in the habit of

NOTE.—See Baldwin v. Ely, 50 U.S. 9 How. 580 (13 L. ed. 266), and note. 8 L, R, A.

through a common grantor, and it was held appropriating the appetlee's property to his own that the party whose land was surrounded was use. To prevent him from obtaining possession of the money represented by this note it was taken in the name of the son, but was kept in the possession of the appellee. The note was renewed from time to time, covering other small deposits, until the 16th day of December, 1884, when the present note for \$160 was executed. All the money represented by the note was the money of the appellee. In August, 1886, the son, without the knowledge or consent of the appellee, took the note from a bureau drawer in her possession, and sold it to the appellant.

The theory of the appellant was that the appellee, by making the note in controversy payable to her son, constituted him her trustee, and that as he assigned the note to the appellant, who had no notice of the secret trust between the appellee and her son, the appellant acquired a good title to the note. Acting upon that theory the appellant, at the proper time, prayed the court to give the jury the following

instructions, viz.:

"3. If the plaintiff, Rebecca Springer, furnished all the consideration for the execution of the note in question, but had the same made payable to Oria Springer for the purpose and with the understanding that he should hold the legal title to the same in trust for her, and that he has never since the execution of said note transferred his title to the plaintiff; that the said Orin Springer, before the bringing of this suit, for a valuable consideration, by his indorsement in writing, assigned said note to the defendant, and that the defendant, at the time said note was transferred to him, had no knowledge that anyone except said Orin Springer had any interest in said note; and that he purchased the same in good faith and for a valuable consideration, relying upon the apparent title said Orin Springer had to said note,-then, in such case, you should find for

the defendant.

"4. If said Rebecca Springer furnished all the consideration for the execution of the note in question, but had the same made payable to Orin Springer, and he has never since the execution of the same transferred his title to said note to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff took said note into her possession, and kept the same where said Orin had free and ready access to the same, and said Orin, without the knowledge or consent of said plaintiff, took said note into his possession, and the defendant in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and relying upon the apparent title thus conferred upon said Orin Springer, purchased said note of him without any knowledge of the claim of the plaintiff to said note; and the said Orin Springer, in pursuance of said purchase, on the 2d day of August, 1886, indorsed said note to the defendant,—then, in such case, you should find for the defendant."

The court refused to give these instructions,

but instructed the jury as follows:

"8. If the jury believe that said Rebecca Springer furnished all the consideration for the note in question; that said note was made payable to ber son, Orin Springer, by the direction of the said plaintiff, Rebecca Springer; that at the time of its execution it was placed in her hands, and that she never voluntarily parted

with the possession thereof, and that Orin | for value, without notice of any fraud by which Springer, the payee, got possession of said note surreptitiously, without the knowledge or con-sent of said Rebecca Springer, and while so holding the same he indorsed and transferred the same to the defendant Merrell, and the plaintiff, Rebecca Springer, before the commencement of this suit, demanded the possession of said note from the defendant Merrell, in such case the plaintiff will be entitled to recover, although the defendant may have paid a valuable consideration therefor, and had no notice that said Orin Springer was not the owner of said note."

The note in controversy is not negotiable by the law-merchant, and was sold and assigned to the appellant after maturity. In such case the purchaser must inquire as to the title of his assignor, and as to the defenses against the note in the hands of the assignor. Kastner v. Pibilinski, 96 Ind. 229; Sims v. Wilson, 47 Ind. 226; Robeson v. Roberts, 20 Ind. 155; Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 61; Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535.

It seems to be settled in this State that a purchaser of such a note can acquire no better title

than that held by his vendor.

In Summer v. Huston, 48 Ind. 228, it was said by this court: "It is a familiar principle that no man can confer a greater interest in, or title to, personal property than he has himself, and this principle is as applicable to choses in action (paper governed by the lawmerchant of course excepted) as to any other species of personalty. The principle that the purchaser of the legal title to real estate, without notice of an outstanding equity, takes it discharged of the equity, has no application in the case of the purchase of a chose in action. It is a general and well-settled principle that the assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to the same equity it was subject to in the hands of the assignor.

This was but a repetition of what was said in the case of Robeson v. Roberts, 20 Ind. 155. It was further said in this case that "an abuse of a trust can confer no rights on the party abusing it, nor on those who claim in privity with him."

To the same effect are Sims v. Wilson, 47 Ind. 226, and Payne v. June, 92 Ind. 252.

The doctrine that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the party who put it in the power of the wrong-doer to perpetrate the wrong must suffer the loss, has no application to this case, for there is no evidence in the cause tending to contradict the evidence of the appellee that Orin Springer took the note from her bureau drawer without her knowledge or consent. See authorities above cited.

Under the rules as established by these cases we are constrained to hold that the court did not err in refusing to give the jury the instruc-tions asked, and that the instruction given upon the subject now under consideration

states the true rule.

This case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Moore v. Moore, 112 Ind. 149, 11 West. Rep. 229. In that case the party claiming title had indorsed and delivered the note then in dispute, with the intention of vesting in the assignee title, and it was correctly held that as the note had passed to an innocent purchaser | Hopkins, 6 L. R. A. 792, 81 Cat. 551.

the assignment was procured, that the assignor was estopped from reclaiming the note from such innocent purchaser. That case rests upon the principle announced in Parrish v. Thurston, 87 Ind. 437, and Curme v. Rauh, 100 Ind. 247. The appellant also discusses in his brief

other questions appearing in the record relating to the admission and rejection of evidence. We have carefully examined these questions, as well as all others presented and discussed, but are unable to discover any error in the ruling of the circuit court.

Judgment affirmed.

Charles E. CATLIN, Receiver, etc., of Clapp & Davies, Appt., T.

WILCOX SILVER PLATE CO.

The right of a receiver appointed by a foreign tribunal to wind up an insolvent partnership situated within its jurisdiction, to take possession of money due to such partnertake possession or money due to such partnership from domestic debtors, will not be recognized as against the claims of nonresident creditors of the insolvent partnership who have attached such money under the domestic laws after the appointment of the receiver but before he obtained actual possession of the money or an enforceable lien thereon, even although he has received a general assignment of the partnership property.

(April 29, 1890.)

A PPEAL by intervenor from a judgment of the Circuit Court for La Porte County in favor of plaintiffs in an attachment suit brought to recover a debt due by the concern of which the intervenor was receiver out of money due such concern. Affirmed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Mr. L. A. Cole, for appellant:

Where two courts, of substantially concurrent jurisdiction, attempt to assert jurisdiction of the same matter, that court which takes the first step will retain the jurisdiction till the end, and the other cannot lawfully interfere.

Taylor v. Curryl, 61 U. S. 20 How. 583 (15

NOTE.—Foreign receivers.

Receivers appointed in one jurisdiction are not entitled as of right to recognition in other juris-See note to Humphreys v. Hopkins (Cal.) 6 L. R. A. 793.

A receiver of partnership assets, appointed by 6 competent court of another State, may maintain an action in New Jersey to set aside a sale of the assets situate in New Jersey by one partner in fraud of the other, when there are no creditors of the firm and the only one to be benefited is the partner defrauded. Sobernheimer v. Wheeler (N. J.) Aug. 16, 1889.

The possession of a receiver appointed in one jurisdiction, of the personal property of a debtor taken by him under order of court, does not exempt it, when taken into another jurisdiction. from attachment by creditors therein, or give the receiver any right to hold the property against the claims of such attaching creditors. Humphreys v.

8 L. R. A.

Melvin v. Robinson, Id. 634; Kohn v. Ryan, Id. 636.

This principle is applicable in every respect to the case at bar. This debt was located in

Dlinois.

Story, Conf. L. 362 a, 363, 399, note 3, 400; Connor v. Hanover Ins. Co. 28 Fed. Rep. 549; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657, and cases cited; Gale v. Carry, 10 West. Rep. 838, 112 Ind. 39.

An open account is susceptible of assignment, so as to absolutely vest the title thereto in the assignee.

Patterson v. Cranford, 12 Ind. 241; McFad-

den v. Wilson, 96 Ind. 253.

The attaching creditor can only hold the garnishee for such interest as defendant had at the time the process was served.

2 Wade, Atlachm. § 437; Williams v. Pomeroy, 27 Minn. 85; Lewis v. Bush, 30 Minn. 244; Knisely v. Evans, 34 Ohio St. 158; Schuler v. Israel, 27 Fed. Rep. 851; Faulkner v. Hyman, 2 New Eng. Rep. 181, 142 Mass. 53; Butler v. Wendell, 57 Mich. 62.

A court of chancery, having jurisdiction of the person, may for the benefit of creditors compel a debtor to execute such assignments or conveyances as will vest the title to such prop-

erty in the assignee.

Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606; Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298 (25 L. ed. 473); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster, 23 N. H. 462.

Messrs. John H. Bradley, F. E. Osborne and W. B. Biddle, for appellee:

The receiver acquired the property and effects of Clapp & Davies by operation of law by virtue of his appointment, or by an assignment in invitum, and, either way, he took no title or interest to or in any property beyond the limits of the State of his appointment.

Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196; Warner v. Jaffray, 96 N. Y. 248; Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367; Rhawn v. Pearce, 110 Ill. 350; May v. First Nat. Bank (Ill.) 7 West. Rep. 681; Weider v. Maddoz, 66 Tex. 372.

The situs of this debt for the purpose of attachment and graphishment is in this State.

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Smith's App. 104 Pa. 381; Wyman v. Hat-stead, 109 U. S. 654 (27 L. ed. 1068); Owen v. Miller, 10 Ohio St. 136.

Where creditors intervene the right of the receiver is always denied until such claims are Satisfied

Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577; Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1; Lycoming F. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 55 Vt. 526.

Mitchell, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The question for decision arises upon the

following facts:

Clapp & Davies, partners doing business in the City of Chicago, were indebted to certain judgment creditors residing in that city. They were also indebted to the Wilcox Silver Plate Company, and others, who were residents of the State of Connecticut. At the same time the State of Connecticut. At the same time creditors. Metzner v. Bauer, 98 Ind. 425, and Bagley & Oberreich, partners, residing and cases cited; Beach, Receivers, §§ 16, 19, 683: 8 L.R. A.

L. ed. 1028); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U. S. 24 doing business at La Porte, Indiana, were in-How, 450 (16 L. ed. 749); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 334 (18 L. ed. 257); Heidritter v. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co. 112 U. S. 294 (28 L. ed. 729); Senior v. Piece, 31 Fed. Rep. 625; proceedings in chancery against the latter firm, by filing a creditor's bill in the Superior Court of Cook County. In aid of its jurisdiction in the proceeding thus instituted, that court ap pointed the appellant, Catlin, receiver, and by an order made on the 14th day of April, 1887, required Clapp & Davies to execute a general deed of assignment transferring all their partnership property and effects to the receiver. Subsequently, in the month of June, the Wilcox Silver Plate Company instituted a suit in attachment in the La Porte Circuit Court against Clapp & Davies, and summoned Bagley & Oberreich to answer as garnishees. The other Connecticut creditors became parties to this last proceeding under § 943, Rev. Stat. 1881. Thereupon Catlin, as receiver of the Superior Court of Cook County, intervened by leave of the La Porte Circuit Court, and asserted the right, in virtue of his appointment as receiver and the assignment made to him, to take and hold the debt due Clapp & Davies, from Bagley & Oberreich.

The controversy, as will appear, involves the right to the fund in the hands of the garnisheedefendants, and the question presented is, Are the rights of the nonresident attaching creditors paramount, in the courts of this State, to those of the receiver of the Superior Court of Cook County, whose appointment antedates the issuing of the writ of attachment? The solution of the question depends upon the extent of power which a court of general jurisdiction, sitting in one State, can exercise over property whose actual situs is within the jurisdiction of the courts of a foreign State.

A receiver is nothing more than an officer or creature of the court that appoints him. acts are those of the court, whose jurisdiction may be aided, but in no wise enlarged or extended, by his appointment. His power is only co-extensive with that of the court which gives him his official character. While it has been held that a court may appoint a receiver and authorize him to take possession of property in a foreign jurisdiction, the doctrine is universal that the appointment confers no legal authority which the receiver can exert over the property without the aid of the courts in whose jurisdiction it is found. The appointment, of its own force, gives him the right to take possession of the property, but it confers upon him no power to compel the recognition of that right, outside the jurisdiction of the court making the appointment. High, Receivers, § 47, p. 241.

While there are authorities of great weight which seem to hold that a receiver appointed in one jurisdiction will not be permitted to maintain a suit in a foreign State, the generally prevailing doctrine, upon which all the decisions seem to be harmonious, is that, upon the principles of comity, the courts of the jurisdiction in which the property or fund is situate will recognize the rights of the receiver, so far as to aid him in reducing it to possession, unless to do so would in some way violate the local policy or interfere with the rights of resident Merchants Nat. Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. | jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Cook

But the recognition of well-established principles of comity and courtesy between courts of different jurisdiction is one thing, while the rights of resident or other attaching creditors, who are seeking to avail themselves of legal proceedings authorized by statutes of the State, for the appropriation of a fund belonging to a nonresident debtor, must be determined upon altogether different principles. As has in effect been said, courts are prepared to extend comity where there is no reason to the contrary; especially if there is no interest of their own citizens, or of the citizens of another State, who are asking the protection of their laws, injuri-ously affected by such recognition. Paine v. Lester, 44 Coun. 196; Milne v. Moreton, 6 Binn.

The rule may be considered as established that a receiver may invoke the aid of a foreign court, in obtaining possession of property or funds within its jurisdiction, to which he is entitled; but aid will only be extended as against those who were parties, or in some way in privity with the proceedings in the court in which his appointment was made, or who are in pos-session of the property or fund to which the receiver has a right; and not against creditors of a nonresident debtor, who are seeking to subject the property or fund to the payment of their debts, by proceedings duly instituted for that purpose. Accordingly, in *Hurd* v. *Elizabeth*, 41 N. J. L. 1, the court said: "That the officer of a foreign court should not be permitted, as against the claims of creditors resident here, to remove from this State assets of the debtor, is a proposition that appears to be asserted by all the decisions."

The principle upon which the decisions rest is, that it is the policy of every government to retain within its control the property of a foreign debtor until all domestic claims have been satisfied, and hence the right of the receiver of a foreign court to sue, which is allowed only upon considerations of comity, will be denied when it comes in conflict with the interests of domestic creditors. "We decline," said the court in Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 585, "to extend our wonted courtesy so far as to work detriment to citizens of our own State, who have been induced to give credit to the foreign insolvent." Bagby v. Atlantic, M. & O. R. Co. 86 Pa. 291: Lycoming F. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 55 Vt. 526; Thurston v. Rosenfield, 42 Mo. 474, 97 Am. Dec. 351: Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577. It follows, hence, that the available legal automatical statements of the statement of the

thority of a receiver is co-extensive only with the jurisdiction of the court by which he was appointed when the right of precedence or priority of creditors is asserted in respect to property or funds of a nonresident debtor, which the receiver has not yet reduced to possession. Hunt v. Columbian Ins. Co. 55 Me. 290; Warren v. Union Nat. Bank, 7 Phila. 156; Booth v. Clark, 58 U. S. 17 How. 322 [15 L. ed. 164]; State v. Jacksonville, P. & M. R. Co. 15 Fla. 202; Farmers & M. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 52 Mo. 17; Taylor v. Columbian Inc. Co. v. Needles, 52 Mo. 17; Taylor v. Columbian Ins. Co. 14 Allen, 353.

It is said, however, that as Clapp & Davies were residents of the State of Illinois at the time the receiver was appointed, the debt due be found in the decisions in respect to what them from Bagley & Oberreich was within the may or may not constitute a voluntary assign-8 L. R. A.

County, upon the principle that the domicil draws to it the personal property and choses in action of the owner, wherever they may be situate. Hence, the contention is, that as the appointment of the appellant as receiver was followed by a general deed of assignment, valid in the State of Illinois, it must be regarded as valid here, and as devesting Clapp & Davies of all title or interest in the debt in controversy after the date of the assignment. It is, of course, well settled that personal property is transferable according to the law of the owner's domicil, and that a voluntary assignment or transfer made without compulsion or legal coercion is to be governed everywhere by that law, unless the contract by which the transfer was made is limited or restrained by some policy of positive enactment of the State in which the property is situate, or unless it affects citizens of the latter State injuriously. Ames Iron Works v. Warren, 76 Ind. 512; Martin v. Potter, 11 Gray, 37, 71 Am. Dec. 689; Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 372, 59 Am. Rep. 617; Warner v. Jaffrau, 96 N. Y. 248; Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 150 [19 L. ed. 113]; Askew v. LaCygne Exch. Bank, 83 Mo. 366; Law v. Mills, 18 Pa. 185; Burrill, Assignm. 301; Story, Conf. L. 383-390.

"The voluntary transfer of a chattel by the debtor, if not forbidden in other respects by the law at the place of the situs, is to be as much regarded there or elsewhere as it would be at the place of the domicil." Lowry v. Hall, 2 Watts & S. 131; Smith's App. 104 Pa. 331; Chafee v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 71 Me. 514, 36 Am. Rep. 345. See 15 Am. L. Rev. 251.

Such an assignment will not be upheld, how-ever, if it contravenes the policy of the law of the place where the property is situate. Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Mass. 53, 2 New Eng. Rep. 181; Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa, 208; Re Waite, 99 N. Y. 433.

N. Y. 433.

The principles above stated are applicable of property only to transfers or assignments of property which rest essentially on contract and are voluntary in the sense that they are the product of a will acting without legal compulsion. Property in a foreign State that has passed from an assignor to an assignee by a voluntary deed, and not by proceedings in invitum, by process of law is distinguished from like property in the hands of a receiver by operation of law, or by an assignment made under legal compulsion.

Assignments of the latter class are held inoperative upon property not situate within the territory over which the laws that make of compel the debtor to make them have dominion. Rhawn v. Pearce, 110 Ill. 350; Smith's

App. and Weider v. Maddox, supra.
Involuntary assignments which are made under foreign Insolvent Laws, have no operation outside of the State under whose laws they were made, while a voluntary assignment is a personal common-law right, possessed by every owner of property, and may operate in one State as well as another. Walters v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86, 76 Am. Dec. 607.

Some conflict or contrariety of opinion may be found in the decigions in represent to what

ment under the statutes of different States, but it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of the cases relating to voluntary assignments, as all the authorities agree that where an assignment is made under compulsion of law, or where property is taken ab invitum, the transfer will not be regarded as voluntary, nor will it be effectual beyond the jurisdiction in which it was made, when it conflicts with the interests of citizens in a foreign jurisdiction. As we have seen, a court cannot extend its jurisdiction by the appointment of a receiver, so it is equally powerless to do so by coercing an assignment of the property in controversy. An assignment is regarded merely as a matter of convenience in aid of the jurisdiction of the court, the established doctrine being that, as against nonresident creditors, the assignment confers no additional or higher right to the property than the receiver had by virtue of his appointment. *Iddings v. Bruen*, 4 Sandf. Ch. 252; High, Receivers, § 443.

While it is true, as has been remarked before,

the domicil of the owner, in legal contemplation, draws to it his personal estate, wherever it may be, yet as this is so only by fiction of law, the rule is not of universal application. When, by the law and policy of the State where the property is actually located, it is subject to the process of attachment or garnishment of the months. ment at the suit of a domestic or other creditor, the fiction yields, and the actual situs of the property determines whether or not it should be subjected to the process of the court. Warner v. Jaffray and Green v. Van Buskirk, su-

In cases of attachment and garnishment, like those for founding administration, the situs of a debt is the residence of the debtor. Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654 [27 L. ed. 1068]; Ocen v. Miller, 10 Ohio St. 136.

It is said, however, that the principles of comity which control in aid of the receiver of a foreign court, who is seeking to obtain pos-session of a fund, should only be suspended in their operation in favor of domestic creditors, and that inasmuch as the attaching creditors in the present case are all nonresidents of the State, the aid of the court should have been extended to the receiver and denied the cred-While this position is not without support, it is not in our view maintainable. Although nonresidents, the attaching creditors are properly in our courts, pursuing a remedy which the Statute confers upon foreign as well as domestic creditors. Until the Legislature shall declare a different policy, the rights of a foreign creditor against the property of a debtor must be regarded by the courts as in all respects the same as those of resident creditors, so far as respects proceedings in attachment and garnishment. The rule which commends itself to our judgment is thus declared: "Once properly in the court and accepted as a suitor, neither the law, nor court administering the law, will admit any distinction between the citizen of its own State and that of another. Before the law and its tribunals, there can be no preference of one over the other." Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367; Rhawn v. Pearce, Warner v. Jaffray and Paine v. Lester, supra.

This rule governs the more recent decisions.

8 L.R. A.

The conclusions above stated lead to an affirmance of the judgment.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

BERKEY & GAY FURNITURE CO., Appt.,

Milo S. HASCALL.

.....(Ind.)

In case one, who has sold furniture for a hotel and contracted with the proprietor to deliver it by or on a certain date, knowing the purpose for which it is to be used and that it is necessary for the operation of the hotel, fails to deliver it uhtil long after the appointed time, thereby preventing the renting of the rooms to guests, he is liable for the loss sustained by reason of such failure; and such loss may be determined by finding the difference between the value, for the purpose for which they were intended, of the rooms furnished and unfurnished during the time they could not be used for such purpose.

(May 1, 1890.)

A PPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Elkhart County allowing defendant's claim to a set-off and rendering judgment against it thereon, in an acdering judgment against it thereon, in an action to recover the contract price for certain furniture sold and delivered. Affirmed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

Mesers. W. H. Vesey, C. W. Miller and J. M. Vanfleet for appellant.

Mesers. H. D. Wilson and W. J. Davis

for appellee.

Olds, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action by the appellant against the appellee to recover a balance of \$374.62 for goods sold and delivered.

The answer is in three paragraphs, setting

up a counterclaim:

1. It is alleged in the first paragraph that on August 26, 1881, the appellee had just completed his hotel with fifty rooms, and was in need of new furniture therefor, with-out which he could not carry on his business, as appellant well knew; that on said day, for the purpose of furnishing said hotel in all its parts with suitable furniture, the appellant agreed with him to furnish said furniture and every part thereof complete, and set it up in proper shape and condition in his hotel rooms ready for use by September 15, 1881; that said rooms were irregular and different in sizes, dimension and construction, and for the purpose of making said furniture suitable for said rooms, appellant measured said rooms, and a list of goods was agreed upon, and at the foot thereof appellant executed a memorandum in writing as follows:

We agree to put these goods all in good order (set up in hotel without charge except freight and cartage), castored, with bracket wood-wheels on all beds. All bureaus and washstands to have good wood-wheels on rub-ber castors. Goods to be ready the 15th of Sept. Any goods not according to order, or not satisfactory, may be returned free of charge. Goshen, Aug. 26, 1881. Berkey & Gay Furniture Co.

T. M. Moseley.

full knowledge of all the facts, violated said agreement, in this, to wit: It failed to deliver any of said goods prior to September 30, 1881, whereby he lost the daily use of twenty-nine rooms, of the rental value of \$2 per day for each room from September 15 to September 30; that appellant failed to deliver said goods prior to January 18, 1882, except as set forth in the complaint; that said furniture was pur-chased to be delivered in sets and suits for specific rooms and places, as set forth in said foregoing memorandum, but the articles so delivered were not in sets or suits, but in disjointed and unmatched pieces, and were not and could not be properly set up or used until all were delivered; by reason of which he lost the daily rental value and use of twenty of said rooms, worth to defendant \$2 each per day from October 1, 1881, to January 18, 1882, inclusive; that because of such failure he was compelled to turn away and did turn away twenty persons each day, who desired to become guests at said hotel, whereby the income and profits of said hotel business were diminished \$50 per day.

The second paragraph of the counterclaim alleges that on the 26th day of August, 1881, he had just completed his hotel at a cost of \$40,000; that it contained forty rooms (besides dining-room, kitchen, etc.) suitable for the entertainment of guests; that it was then operated and run by him in the business of hotelkeeping, and was so operated for the next two years; that the rental value of said hotel, when furnished, was \$5,500 per year; that on said 26th day of August, 1881, he was in great need of furniture to supply and furnish thirty of the aforesaid guest rooms in said hotel, which rooms were then unfurnished and empty, in which condition they were of no rental value that to supply and furnish said rooms and hotel as aforesaid, appellant promised and agreed with him to deliver and set up in good order and condition the furniture mentioned in its complaint by the 15th day of September, 1881, according to written specifications and agreement (copied into first paragraph above); that appellant failed and refused to deliver said goods until January 18, 1882, during which time, from September 15, 1881, to January 18, 1883, he was deprived of the use and rental in, which use and rental was of the value of \$2,000.

3. The third paragraph of the counterclaim alleges all the matters contained in the other two paragraphs, showing a little more minutely the rooms for which the different articles of furniture were designed.

A reply in general denial was filed to the answer. The cause was submitted to a jury for trial, and the jury returned a special verdict in the words and figures following:

SPECIAL VERDICT.

1. We, the jury, find that the plaintiff contracted with the defendant, on the 26th day of August, 1881, to sell and deliver to defendant the several items of property mentioned in plaintiff's complaint at and for the price of appellant assigns as error: 8 L.R.A.

The paragraph then alleges that he was each article as stated in plaintiff's complaint, ready, able and willing to comply with his and was to deliver the same and set the same part of said contract, but that appellant, with up in defendant's hotel in Goshen, Indiana, and have the same ready for use in defendant's hotel, known as Hotel Hascall, by or on the 15th day of September, 1881. That plaintiff at the time of making such contract knew the-purpose for which said furniture was to beused.

2. Plaintiff failed and neglected to deliver any of said furniture until the 30th day of September, 1881, and thereupon and thereafter until the 16th day of January, 1882, plaintiff delivered said furniture at the times, and in the specific articles, as severally set forth by the plaintiff in the complaint herein.

3. Defendant paid plaintiff the sums credited to defendant in plaintiff's complaint and returned to plaintiff the items of furniture, as stated in plaintiff's complaint, to the amount of \$121.85, thus leaving unpaid of the purchase price of said furniture the sum of \$374.62,

March, 1882, as stated by the plaintiff. 4. We further find that defendant, at and just prior to the making of said contract, had reconstructed and built his hotel building in the City of Goshen, Indiana, at a cost of \$40,-000, and defendant was proprietor and manager thereof, and had within said hotel thirty (30) rooms that were unfurnished, and when so unfurnished were of no use or value to the defendant; that all said rooms remained vacant, and of no use or value to defendant, from the 15th day of September, 1881, to the 30th day of September, 1881, on account and by reason of the failure of plaintiff to comply with itsagreement aforesaid; that twenty-three (23) of said rooms remained vacant, and of no use todefendant, from the 30th day of September, 1881, until the 19th day of October, 1881, because of the failure of plaintiff to comply with said contract; that seven (7) of said rooms remained vacant and of no use, from the 19th day of October, 1881, to the 5th day of November, 1881, because of the failure of plaintiff to comply with said contract; that from the 5th day of November, 1881, until December 15, 1881, six (6) rooms of said hotel remained vacant and of no use to defendant, because of the non-fulfillment of said contract by the plaintiff; that the use of each one of said rooms to the defendant was nothing when unfurnished.

5. We further find that the rental value and use of each of said rooms, when furnished with the furniture designated for same in said contract, would have been to the defendant 75-

cents per day, during said time.
6. If, upon the foregoing facts, the law be with the plaintiff, then we find for the plaintiff, but if the law be with the defendant, then we find for the defendant.

John A. Smith. Foreman.

The appellant moved for judgment on the special verdict, which motion was overruled and an exception reserved. The appellee moved for judgment on the special verdict and the court sustained said motion, to which the appellant excepted. Final judgment was then entered in favor of appellee for \$554.63, and

Appellant filed a motion for new frial, which was overruled and exceptions reserved.

1. That the court erred in overruling appel- | chaser to use and occupy the same, and operate the special verdict.

2. That the court erred in sustaining appellee's motion for judgment in his favor on the special verdict.

3. That the court erred in overruling appel-

lant's motion for new trial.

It is contended that, under the facts found, the appellee is only entitled to compensatory or general damages, and not for the special damages set up as a counterclaim.

We think the facts found in the special verdict entitled the appellee to recover the special

damages claimed.

In Vickery v. McCormick, 117 Ind. 594-597, the court says: "The general rule is, that a party who fails to comply with his contract to furnish goods is liable for the value of the goods in the open market at the time of the failure. But when similar goods cannot be purchased in the market, the measure of damages is the actual loss sustained by the purchaser in not receiving the goods according to the contract."

See Rahm v. Deig, 121 Ind. 283, and author-

ities there cited.

In Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341-Sedgwick, Leading Cases on the Measure of Damages, pp. 126-136—the court states what we deem to be the true rule governing the assessment of damages in such cases as this. In that case it is said: "When two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken. the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it."

The facts found by the jury show that the appellee, at and just prior to August 26, 1881, had reconstructed and built his hotel building in the City of Goshen, Indiana, at a cost of \$40,000, and that appellee was proprietor and manager thereof, and had within said hotel thirty rooms that were unfurnished, and when so unfurnished were of no use or value to the appellee; that upon said day he contracted with the appellant to sell and deliver to him the several items of property mentioned in the appellant's complete the several items of property mentioned in the appellant's complete the several interpretation of the several interpret appellant's complaint, which consisted of the necessary furniture to furnish said rooms at and for the price of each article as stated in the complaint, and agreed to deliver the same and set the same up in appellee's hotel, and have the same ready for use in said hotel by or on the 15th day of September, 1881; that the appellant, at the time of making of said contract, knew the purpose for which said furniture was to be used. The contract was to furnish the furniture for thirty rooms in a hotel and set it up in the rooms, and have it ready for use and occupancy by a day named. From these facts it necessarily follows as a conclusion that the party contracting to furnish the same knew that the rooms were valueless as hotel apartments when unfurnished; that the furniture was necessary to enable the pur-8 L. P. A.

lant's motion for judgment in its favor upon his hotel, and that the appellee would be deprived of the use of such rooms for such purpose until it complied with its contract.

The facts found further show that the appellant commenced furnishing the furniture soon after the date when it was all to have been furnished and put up in the rooms, furnishing part at one time and part at another.

The facts show the appellee had reconstructed and rebuilt a valuable hotel, and was operating it himself, and the damages naturally resulting from the breach of the contract, according to the facts found, were what the rooms would have been worth to appellee furnished according to the contract more than they were worth to him unfurnished, during the delay in complying with the contract. Appellee built the house for a particular purpose, and was having it furnished for such purpose; he was not bound to rent out the rooms for another purpose, even if he could have done so. If there had been a breach and a total failure of the appellant to have furnished the whole or any part of the furniture, and the appellee had been notified that he was not intending to furnish it, then the appellant would have been liable for the difference in value of the furniture between the price in the open market and the contract price, as well as the loss of the use of the rooms for the time necessary to have procured the furniture elsewhere; but in this case the appellant furnished the furniture and appellee accepted it, so that the damage was the loss sustained by reason of the delay.

We think the loss of the use of the rooms

as they were to be furnished might fairly be considered to have been contemplated by the parties at the time of the making of the con-

tract.

In Richardson v. Chynoweth, 26 Wis. 656, it was held that a defendant failing to deliver an article, knowing the purpose for which it was purchased, was liable for the profits the purchaser would have made. See 1 Sutherland, Damages, 7th ed. pp. 218-239; Field, Damages, § 250; Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542, 11 West. Rep. 333.

It is contended that the facts found do not

state the damages correctly; that if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the amount he is entitled to recover would be the difference between the rental value of the rooms unfurnished and furnished. This objection we do not think available for a reversal of the judgment. When special damages of this character are recoverable, it is the damage the party himself has sustained that he is entitled to recover.

If A purchase grain of B and at the time A has a previous contract to sell and deliver grain to C, and A purchases the grain of B with a view of filling his previous contract with C, and C is advised of that fact, and the contract is such as that, on failure to deliver, B becomes liable to A for the profit he would have made, the damage recoverable is the profit A would have made; and that amount might be determined by a finding of the facts showing the amount A was to pay B for the grain, and the amount he would have received from C for the same.

So in this case, the amount of damage that

difference in value to the appellee in the rooms furnished and unfurnished, for the time they remained unfurnished by reason of appellant's failure to furnish the furniture; and that amount is determined by finding what the use of the rooms was worth to the appellee unfurnished, and what they were worth furnished, for the time he was deprived of the use of them for the purpose for which they were to be used. The jury has found as facts that the use of the rooms unfurnished was worth nothing to the appellee during that time, and furnished they would have been worth 75 cents per day; and the number of days each room was unfurnished from the date appellant contracted to set up the furniture in the rooms is also stated and found in the verdict, and the gross amount may be determined by a mere computation. The facts found in the special verdict entitle the appellee to a judgment for the amount of the damages found to have been sustained by him **Descion** v. Landry**, not sustained by him. Fossion v. Landry, not yet reported, this term.

The facts found cover all the issues in the case, and that is all that is required by a special verdict.

It is further contended that the court erred in not sustaining the motion for new trial, for the reason that the judgment rendered upon the verdict is in excess of the amount found due the appellee by the verdict; but this question is not presented by the record. If the judgment does not follow the verdict, or is not such a judgment as the party was entitled to have rendered upon the verdict, to present any question as to the amount or form of the judgment, it was necessary to make a motion to modify the judgment, and properly reserve exceptions in case the motion was overruled.

It follows, therefore, from the conclusion we have reached, that there is no error in the record for which the judgment should be reversed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS (2d Div.)

Oceana A. BANCROFT, Appt.,

HOME BENEFIT ASSOCIATION of New York, Respt.

(....N. Y....)

- 1. A slight blow on the throat while engaged in fencing, which causes a person to raise a little blood in consequence of which he is confined to his bed and attended by a physician for the greater part of three days, with no further hemorrhage from the day he was struck to the date of his death a year and a half thereafter, does not con-stitute "any wound, hurt or serious bodily injury" within the meaning of a question in an application for life insurance.
- 2. The words "hurt" and "wound," in a question asked of an applicant for life insurance as to any "wound, hurt or serious bodily inreceived by him, mean an injury to the body causing an impairment of health or strength, or rendering the person more liable to contract disease, or less able to resist its effects.

(March 18, 1890.)

A PPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of General Term of the Superior Court of the City of New York, affirming a judgment of the Special Term dismissing the complaint in an action to recover the amount alleged to be due on certain mutual benefit certificates. Reversed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

Mr. William G. Wilson for appellant.

Mr. Francis Lawton, for respondent:

Where there is a warranty of the truth of the answers contained in the application, the materiality of the questions is eliminated from

the consideration of the court or jury.

Atna L. Ins. Co. v. France, 91 U. S. 510 (23) L. ed. 401); Jeffries v. Economical Mut. L. Ins. co. 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 47 (22 L. ed. 833); Foot v. Etna L. Ins. Co. 61 N. Y. 571; Edington v. provisions of law forbidding any physician 8 L. R. A.

Ætna L. Ins. Co. 77 N. Y. 564; Edington V. Zina L. Ins. Co. 1 Cent. Rep. 524, 100 N. Y. 536; Burritt v. Saratoga Co. Mut. F. Ins. Co. 5 Hill, 188; Dwight v. Germania L. Ins. Co. 4 Cent. Rep. 529, 103 N. Y. 346.

Follett, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of

April 28, 1885, John S. Bancroft became a member of defendant's life department, and received two certificates, by each of which the defendant promised to pay, on proof of his death during the continuance of the certificate, \$5.000 to the insured's wife, the plaintiff, from the benefit fund of the life department. Each certificate contains the following provisions:

"In consideration of the representations and agreements made in the application herefor, and which is a part of this contract, and of each of the statements made therein, which ... every person accepting or acquiring any interest in this contract hereby adopts as his own. admits to be material and warrants to be full and true, and to be the only statements upon which this contract is made."

"I. If this certificate . . . has been or shall be obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or concealment, . . . then the same shall be absolutely void."

absolutely void.

The application contained this question and answer: "3. Q. Have you received any wound, hurt or serious bodily injury? A. No."

The application contained the following declarations: "I do hereby declare that all the application and observed the serious productions of the serious productions of the serious productions." particulars and statements made by me in connection with this application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I do hereby acknowledge, consent and agree that any untrue or fraudulent statement made by me, or to any medical examiner for said Association, or any concealment of facts by me, shall forfeit

formation which he thereby acquired.

I further declare and agree that my answers to the questions put by the medical examiner are correct and true, and that I am the person who signed the application on the opposite side, and was examined as stated."

September 19, 1885, the insured died, and this action was brought to recover the amounts insured by the certificates, and was defended at the trial on the sole ground that the answer to the question above quoted was untrue. issue was tried before the court without a jury, which found as facts that February 21, 1884, the insured received a "wound" (5th finding), a "hurt" (6th finding), and a "serious bodily injury" (7th finding). The 8th finding of fact described with particularity the wound, hurt and serious bodily injury found in the 5th, 6th

and 7th findings, and is as follows:
"Eighth. That prior to the making and delivery of the said application, and on or about the 21st day of February, 1884, the said John S. Bancroft, while engaged in fencing, did receive a blow from a foil on the throat in the neighborhood of or upon the Adam's apple; that in a few seconds thereafter he raised a little blood; that said blow produced an extravasation of the sub-mucus membrane just over the cricoid cartilage in the posterior part of the throat, almost opposite or behind, but a little below, the Adam's apple; that the force of said blow produced an abrasion, wound or hurt on the inside of the wind-pipe; that shortly thereafter the said John S. Bancroft was confined to his bed the whole or the greater part of three days, and during that time was attended by a physician, and was by him treated with the same treatment that he gave persons who have the complaint of spitting of blood; but I find that the treatment was not for the com-

plaint of spitting of blood."
In the 9th finding the court found that the insured concealed from the defendant the injury described in the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th findings, and as a conclusion of law decided that the plaintiff, by reason of the answer given, was not entitled to recover. The plaintiff excepted to the 5th, 6th, 7th and 9th findings of fact, and to this sentence contained in the 8th finding: "That the force of said blow produced an abrasion, wound or hurt on the inside of the wind-pipe," and now insists that they are without any evidence tending to sustain them, and are reviewable in this court as questions of

law.

On the evening of February 21, 1884, the insured took at his own house a lesson in fencing with foils. His body was protected by a thickly padded buckskin jacket, fitting closely and high about his neck, and his face was shielded by a visor, which were specially desired for the protection of personal discovery. signed for the protection of persons engaged in this exercise. At the end of the exercise he spat, as found, "a little blood," and immediately called his family physician, who, after an examination, expressed the opinion that his throat had been hit by the button of the foil, though no external mark or evidence of injury could be found. The insured was not conscious of having been hit and was quite confident that he had not been. The physician fident that he had not been. The physician the injury had no permanent influence on her made a careful examination but found no evil health. The fact that the insured had fallen 8LRA

who has attended me from disclosing all in- ence that the blood came from the throat or lungs. After the examination the patient was put to bed and treated in the manner and for the time described in the 8th finding of fact. No other hemorrhage occurred. March 2, 1884, his throat was examined by Dr. Jarvis, a specialist, who testified that by the use of a specialist, who testified that by the use of a powerful light and mirrors he discovered the injury, which he described in the language used in the 8th finding. All the evidence descriptive of the injury and its effects was given by Doctors Wright, the attending physician, and Jarvis, the specialist, who were called by the defendant, and by the plaintiff, called in her own behalf. Dr. Wright testified that he had been the insured's family, physician for ten or been the insured's family physician for ten or twelve years prior to May, 1885. After hav-ing described the injury and its effects, he testified: "I was his attending physician for some time after this (the accident) until he moved away from that part of the city in May, 1885. During the time that I attended bim as a physician he was not at any time seriously ill with any complaint; he was not, to my knowledge, afflicted with any organic or chronic disease at that time; I do not believe that he was."

Q. After all you had seen of this patient at the time of the injury, immediately after the injury, and during the time you attended him as a physician, would you call that a serious

injury?

A. The result seems to justify the supposition that it was not a serious injury, but a man bleeding from the throat or lungs is always regarded as possibly a serious case; physicians always give them the benefit of the doubt under such circumstances, as though it was certainly serious.

Q. On the final result of this, would you call

it a serious injury?

A. I would not, for the patient got over it. Dr. Jarvis testified:

Q. Did you regard this as a serious injury? A. I cannot say that I took it in that light; it was simply to find out what the trouble was that I examined him.

Q. Was it your opinion he would lose the

effects of it?

A. I thought it would disappear.

The plaintiff testified that her husband spat no blood between February 21, 1884, and the date of his death. There is no conflict on the evidence and there is none justifying the inference or finding that the injury was serious, or that it was a hurt or wound within the meaning of the contract.

September 14, 1866, the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company insured the life of a Mrs. Wilkinson. The application, which was a part of the contract, and its statements war-ranties, contained this question and answer:

Q. Has the party ever met with any accidental or serious personal injury; if so, what was it?

A. No.

The insured died in 1869, and in the action on the policy the jury returned a special finding that in 1862 the insured fell from a tree, was injured in consequence thereof, was sick for some time, but that she recovered, and that and had been somewhat injured was not disclosed to the insurer. It was held that the injury was not within the meaning of the contract a serious one. Wilkinson v. Connecticut tract a serious one. Wilkinson Mut. L. Ins. Co. 30 Iowa, 119.

At about the same time the Union Mutual Life Insurance Company of Maine insured the same life. This application, which was also a part of the contract, and its statements warranties, contained this question and answer:

Q. Has the party ever had any serious illness, local disease or personal injury; if so, of what nature and at what age?

The accident which had happened to the insured was not disclosed to the insurer. On the trial of the issue joined, the jury returned a special finding that in 1862 the insured fell from a tree, was injured, but not seriously, and that its effects passed away without subsequently affecting her health. The fact that the insured had so fallen was not disclosed to the insurer. It was held that the injury described by the evidence and found by the jury was not a serious one, within the meaning of the contract, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Wilkinson v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. 2 Dillon, 570; Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 222 [20 L. ed. 617].

In discussing the case, the meaning of the term "serious bodily injury" when used in The court said: life policies was discussed. "On the first branch of the case the court said to the jury that, if the effects of the fall were temporary, and had entirely passed away before the application was taken, and if it did not affect Mrs. Wilkinson's health or shorten her life, then the nondisclosure of the fall was no defense to the action. On the other hand, if the effects of the fall were not temporary, and remained when the application was taken, or if the fall affected the general health or was so serious that it might affect the health or shorten life, then the nondisclosure would defeat recovery, although the failure to mention the fall was not intentional or fraudulent.

'It is insisted by the counsel for the defendant that if the injury was considered serious at the time, it is one which must be mentioned in reply to the interrogatory, and that whether any further inquiry is expedient on the subject of its permanent influence on the health, is for the insurer to determine before making insurance. But there are grave and obvious diffi-culties in this construction. The accidents resulting in personal injuries, which at the

moment are considered by the parties serious, are so very numerous that it would be almost impossible for a person engaged in active life to recall them at the age of forty or fifty years; and if the failure to mention all such injuries must invalidate the policy, very few would be sustained where thorough inquiry is made into sustained where thorough inquiry is made into the history of the party whose life is the sub-ject of insurance. There is, besides, the ques-tion of what is to be considered a serious in-jury at the time. If the party gets over the injury completely, without leaving any ill consequences, in a few days it is clear that the serious aspect of the case was not a true one. Is it necessary to state the injury and explain the mistake to meet the requirements of the policy?

"On the other hand, when the question arises, as in this case, on a trial, the jury, and not the insurer, must decide whether the injury was serious or not. In deciding this, are they to reject the evidence of the ultimate effect of the injury on the party's health, longevity, strength and other similar considerations? This would be to leave out of view the essential purpose of the inquiry, and the very matters which would throw most light on the nature of the injury, with reference to its influence on the insurable

character of the life proposed.

"Looking, then, to the purpose for which the information is sought by the question, and to the difficulty of answering when an injury was serious in any other manner than by reference to its permanent or temporary influence on the health, strength and longevity of the party, we are of the opinion that the court did not err in the criterion by which it directed the jury to decide the interrogatory propounded to them." See also Wilkinson v. Connecticut

Mut. L. Ins. Co. 30 Iowa, 119.

The words "hurt" and "wound" as used in the application mean an injury to the body causing an impairment of health or strength or rendering the person more liable to contract disease or less able to resist its effects. No such consequences followed from the hurt sustained by the insured. A cut on the face, sustained by the insured. A cut on the face, finger or on any part of the body from which blood flows, though healing in a few days and leaving no evil consequences, is a hurt or wound, but not within the meaning of the contract under consideration. There being no evidence tending to sustain the findings upon which the conclusion of law is based, the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide event.

All concur.

KANSAS SUPREME COURT.

GERMAN INSURANCE CO. of Freeport, Ill., Plff. in Err.,

Anderson GRAY.

(....Kan....)

 In an application for insurance, *Head notes by JOHNSTON, J.

where correct answers are given to a general agent of the company respecting incumbrances on the property of the applicant, and such agent fails to mention the incumbrances in the written application, but procures the signature of the applicant, accepts the premium and closes the contract, the company will not be relieved from liability on account of misrepresentations in the application, although it was stipulated therein

tions truthfully, but the agent of the company inserts the answers incorrectly in the application, Where an applicant for a policy answers quest such agent's error cannot be imputed to the appli-

NOTE.—Fire insurance; insured not affected by wrongful acts of company's agent. 8 L. R. A.

that it should be considered a part of the policy and a warranty by the insured of the truth of the statements which it contained.

- 2. A general agent of an insurance company can modify the insurance contract, or waive a condition of a written policy by parol.
- 3. A provision in an insurance policy respecting incumbrances on the property insured may be waived by the insurance company or its general agent; and this, although the policy contains a printed stipulation that no agent of the company or any person other than the president or secretary shall have authority to waive any of the terms or conditions of the policy, and all agreements by the president or secretary must be signed by either of them.
- . Where proofs of loss are taken by a duly authorized adjuster of the company, who expresses satisfaction with the same, and states that he will forward them to the office of the company, and that the loss will soon be paid, the insured has a right to assume, until notified to the contrary, that no other or different proofs will be required; and the fatlure of the company to object to them within a reasonable time precludes it from thereafter objecting that they are insufficient.

(April 4, 1890.)

ERROR to the District Court for Sumner County to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover the amount alleged to be due upon a policy of fire insurance. Affirmed.

cant. Bennett v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 8 Cent. Rep. 692, 106 N. Y. 243; Commercial U. Assur. Co. v. Elliott (Pa.) 12 Cent. Rep. 668.

The company cannot avoid payment because of misrepresentations as to value, location, incum-brances, etc., inserted by its agent, who had full knowledge of the facts, the assured being illiterate and placing reliance upon the agent, and having no reliable knowledge of the facts constituting such representations. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Golden, 121 Ind, 524.

And this is so although the application provided that the representations should be regarded as warranties. Stone v. Huwkeye Ins. Co. 68 Iowa, 737.

The act of an agent authorized to solicit and take applications for insurance in such a case is binding upon the company. Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Stark, 120 Ind. 444.

He must be deemed the agent of the company in all he does in preparing the application, and in any representation he may make as to the character or effect of the statements therein contained; and this rule is not changed by a stipulation in the policy subsequently issued, that the acts of such agent in making out the application shall be deemed the acts of the insured. Deitz v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co. 31 W. Va. 851,

The company is estopped from taking advantage of the falsity of an answer in an application, where, at the time of the issue of the policy, it personally or through its agent has knowledge of the facts which the question answered is intended to elicit. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. v. Brodie (Ark.) 4 L. R. A. 458.

Where he fills out the blanks in a policy signed by an applicant in blank, without the latter's instructions or authority, he does not thereby become the agent of the applicant; and misrepresentations of such agent will not avoid the policy, although it was afterwards signed by the applicant, who did not read it or know of such misrepresentations. Assur. Co. v. State, 13 West. Rep. 47, 113 Ind. 331.

Rogers v. Phenix Ins. Co. 121 Ind. 570. 8 L. R. A.

Statement by Johnston, J.:
This was an action for loss by fire upon a policy of insurance executed December 4 1885, insuring, among other property, the following, for the amounts named: barn and shed, \$200; hay in barn, \$200; grain in barn and in stack on cultivated premises, \$1,500; farming implements, \$300. The fire occurred on May 28, 1886, and the property mentioned, which is alleged to be of the total value of \$2,200, was wholly destroyed by the fire. plaintiff alleged that the contract of insurance was in full force at the time of the fire, and that the property was destroyed without any fault of his, and that he had fully complied with all the requirements and agreements of the contract, but the Insurance Company refused, and still refuses, to pay the amount of the loss. He demanded judgment in the sum of \$2,200, with interest from the time of the fire. The answer alleged that in the application for insurance by Gray he warranted that all the answers made by him to questions therein propounded were true; that, in response to a question in regard to what mortgages and inquestion in regard to what mortgages and in-cumbrances were upon the property, he failed to disclose a mortgage for \$5,749.35, dated March 23, 1885, in favor of John S. Woods; and, further, that Gray, after the issuance of the policy, and without the consent of the In-surance Company indorsed on the policy, and in violation of the terms of the policy, incum-bered and mortgaged the property insured unbered and mortgaged the property insured un-

Where an insurance agent has examined an applicant and received true answers, but omits certain answers, and the applicant signs the application under the agent's direction, the policy is not rendered null and void by such omissions, although it contains a provision that any false representation or omission in the material facts shall render the application void. Kansas Protective Union v. Gardner, 41 Kan. 397.

Plaintiff is not estopped by the fact that a copy of the application was attached to the policy, and he failed to notify the company that the statements were false. Donnelly v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co. 70 Iowa, 693.

If the company had knowledge, when it issued the policy, that the statements made in the application as warranties were not true, it must be regarded as having waived said warranties; and it is bound by whatever knowledge its soliciting agent had when he took the application. Stone v. Hawkeye Ins. Co. 68 Iowa, 737; Mullin v. Vermont Mut. F. Ins. Co. 2 New Eng. Rep. 483, 58 Vt. 113.

The insurance agent is presumed to be familiar with the construction of the building insured, as well as its divisions, manner of use and description, and the company is bound by his knowledge. Petrit v. State Ins. Co. (Minn.) July 19, 1889.
Limitations in an insurance policy as to the

powers of the agents are not conclusive; and if an act is within the scope of an agent's authority at the time it is done, it binds the corporation, without reference to restrictions in the policy. Niagara Ins. Co. v. Lee, 73 Tex. 641.

A restriction upon his powers in the policy, and not in the application, cannot be construed to refer to any act or knowledge of the agent that occurred before the delivery of the policy. Crouse v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. (Mich.) Jan. 24, 1890.

The assured is not bound by private instructions to the agent, not known to him. Commercial U.

der the policy as follows: On May 15, 1886, he made and delivered a mortgage to A. Brennaman for \$3,110, upon the real estate on which the insured buildings stood, and upon 2,000 bushels of wheat in the granary, and about 300 acres of growing wheat; and, further, on December 22, 1885, that he made and delivered to Sumner County Bank a mortgage of \$700 on some farming implements and other articles covered by the policy. In his reply Gray admitted the existence and the making of the mortgages mentioned in the answer, but alleged that he gave a full statement of all the incumbrances on the property when the application for insurance was made, and also made known to the defendant that the mortgages would mature during the existence of the policy, and that he would be wholly unable to meet the indebtedness or remove the incumbrances, except by making and giving new mortgages, and renewing the incumbrances on the property; and he alleges that it was expressly stipulated and agreed between himself and the Insurance Company that he should be permitted to incumber his property, and that H. Steinbuschel & Bro., the duly authorized agents of the Company, expressly waived the condition written in the policy against incumbrances, and expressly agreed in behalf of the Company that he should have the right, notwithstanding the printed stipulations, to re-new and extend the mortgages and incum-brances upon the property, or any part thereof.

Upon the trial the jury returned special findings of fact with their general verdict, as follows:

Were there any chattel mortgages on the wheat covered by the insurance policy sued on in this action at the time said insurance policy was issued and delivered to Anderson Gray?

A. Yes.
(5) Q. Did the said plaintiff at any time after the issuance and delivery to the said Anderson Gray of the insurance policy sued on in this action, and before the time plaintiff claims that the property covered by said policy was destroyed by fire, give to any person any chat-tel mortgage upon any of the property covered

by said policy?

A. Yes.

(7) Q. Were there any chattel mortgages upon any of the property covered by the insurance policy sued on in this action at the time said plaintiff claims the said property was decreased by the said property was destroyed by fire?

A. Yes.
(10) Q. What was the value of each item of property insured at the time plaintiff claims What was the value of each item of

the same was destroyed by fire?

A. 2,000 bushels wheat, \$1,500; six tons hay, \$18; 2 two-horse Bain wagons, \$80; 1 piano-box single buggy, \$100; 1 ten-foot Hodge header, \$100; 1 Buckeye mower, \$40; 1 Bradley hay-rake, \$15; 1 corn-planter, \$45; 1 Wier double cultivator, \$15; 1 press wheat-drill, \$40; 2 one-horse wheat-drills, \$30; 1 wheat fanning-mill, \$30; barn, \$800; harness, \$55. (11) Q.

What interest did the plaintiff have in and to each separate item of said property at the time he claims said property was destroyed?

A. Wheat, owner; hay, owner; Bain two-

Liability of agents for loss arising from their negliaence.

Local insurance agents who depart from their instructions are personally liable for losses arising from their negligent omission. Phœnix Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 36 Minn. 409.

Where a local agent, having received instruction from a state agent desiring him to relieve the company of a certain risk as soon as possible, answered by letter requesting as a personal accommodation that the policy might run until expiration, which would occur a few days later, such letter was sufficient evidence that he understood the instructions of his superior to be a direction to cancel, and a recognition of the authority of the latter to so order. Ibid.

An insurance company cannot recover more than nominal damages from its agent who has in good faith taken a risk somewhat different from what the company supposes, but not less valuable. State Ins. Co. v. Richmond, 71 Iowa, 519.

Where an insurance agent undertakes that property should be insured to a certain amount from a certain time, he is only liable for his failure to exercise diligence to procure the insurance by the time agreed upon. Arrott v. Walker, 10 Cent. Rep. 608, 118 Pa. 249.

Such agreement, considered as a contract of insurance against fire, on the part of the agent, is void, under Pa. Act 1870, p. 14. Ibid.

Acts of agent bind the company.

Insurance companies are responsible for the acts of their agents within the general scope of the business intrusted to their care. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U. S. 13 Wall, 222 (20 L. ed. 617).

8 L. R. A.

party as its agent, and then disavow responsibility for his acts. Southern L. Ins. Co. v. McCain. 96 U. S. 84 (24 L. ed. 653).

After his appointment in a particular business parties dealing with him in that business have a right to rely upon the continuance of his authority. until in some way informed of its revocation. Ibid.

The silence of a company after receiving from an agent, whose authority had been terminated, a statement that a premium on a policy had been paid to him, is equivalent to the adoption of the act of the agent. *Ibid*.

No limitations of their authority will be binding

on parties with whom they deal, which are not brought to the knowledge of those parties. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, supra.

An agent of a fire insurance company has authority to waive the conditions of a policy. Alexander v. Continental Ins. Co. 67 Wis. 422; Cleaver v. Traders Ins. Co. 8 West, Rep. 816, 65 Mich. 527.

So of a general agent authorized to represent it and transact its business at a particular place-Kruger v. Western F. & M. Ins. Co. 72 Cal. 81.

The acts of a general agent of an insurance company, through its sub-agent, bind the company Lingenfelter v. Phœnix Ins. Co. 1 West. Rep. 695, 19 Mo. App. 252.

If the agent authorizes another, for him and in his name, to solicit applications and collect premiums, the company is bound. Ibid.

If the agent receives and accepts a proposition for a policy obtained through his sub-agent, the company is bound by the contract. Bodine v. Exchange F. Ins. Co. 51 N. Y. 123; 4 Wait, Act and Def. 32; Keim v. Home Mut. F. & M. Ins. Co. 43 Mo. 41.

The Iowa Act declares that any person who so-The company cannot be allowed to hold out a licits insurance shall be held to be the agent of the horse wagons, owner; 1 piano-box single that he would not mention such mortgages in buggy, owner; header, owner; 1 mower, owner; aid written application?

A. Yes. double cultivator, owner; press wheat-drill, owner; 2 one-horse wheat-drills, owner; fanning-mill, owner; barn, owner; harness, owner,

(12) Q. What was the value of the plaintiff's interest in each item of said property at the time said plaintiff claims the same was de-

troyed by fire?

A. Same as No. 10.

- (13) Q. Did the plaintiff read the written application for insurance which has been offered in evidence in the case before or at the time he signed the same?
- A. No.
 (14) Q. Could plaintiff at that time read writing and printing well enough to read such written application

A. Yes.

- (15) Q. Did plaintiff have an opportunity to read said written application before or at the time he signed the same?
 - A. Yes.
- (16) Q. Did Anderson Gray, the plaintiff in this action, tell Mr. Steinbuschel, the agent of said defendant, at the time said written application for insurance was being written up, or before that time, of the existence of any mortgages upon any of the property covered by said insurance policy other than the one mentioned in said written application?
- A. Yes. . . . (18) Q. If you answer question 16 in the affirmative, then you may state if said agent of the defendant stated to plaintiff at that time ment in accordance with the verdict for

(20) Q. If all the mortgages that were upon the said property, or any part thereof, so covered by said insurance policy, were not mentioned in said written application, state fully why they were not so mentioned, and all the reasons therefor, so far as you find that they were known to plaintiff at that time?

A. Agent refused to put it in application, say-

ing it was not necessary, because "I issue my own policies and adjust the losses."

(21) Q. Was the plaintiff at any time au-(21) Q. Was the plaintiff at any time authorized by said defendant to mortgage or remortgage the said property covered by said insurance policy after the said insurance was issued and delivered to said plaintiff?

Yes.

(22) Q. If you answer question No. 21 in the affirmative, you will then please state at what time said authority was given, and by what officer or agent such authority was given, and whether such authority was given orally or in writing?

A. First, when application was made out; second, when policy was returned by Steinbuschel and brother, district agent.

Orally. "We, the jury impaneled and sworn

in the above-entitled case, do upon our oaths find for the plaintiff, and assess the amount of his recovery at \$2,018, with interest at 7 per cent from July 28, 1886."

A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and the court thereupon entered judg-

company and not of the insured; and for any mistake occurring in the transaction between him and the other agents the company is liable. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Shaver, 76 Iowa, 282.

That one of the trustees of a building insured agreed with the insurance agent that he should place insurance does not make such agent the agent of the trustee. Commercial U. Assur. Co. v. State, 13 West. Rep. 47, 113 Ind. 331.

Though the agent cannot delegate his agency, he may employ clerks and sub-agents, and their acts will bind his principal. Lingenfelter v. Phœnix Ins. Co. supra.

But an agent cannot waive the provisions of a policy in a matter outside the scope of his agency. Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 10 Cent. Rep. 577, 117 Pa. 460.

And a clause in an insurance policy accepted by the assured, prohibiting the waiver of its provisions by the local agent, is binding upon the assured. Hankins v. Rockford Ins. Co. 70 Wis. 1.

A local agent with authority to receive premiums and issue policies has no authority to waive the conditions of the policy, requiring the written or printed assent of the company to any change in circumstances or situation increasing the risk. Kyte v. Commercial U. Assur. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 884, 144 Mass. 43.

And although he has the fullest authority, conditions cannot be waived except in the manner provided. Ibid.

A provision in an insurance policy that no agent of the company shall be held to have waived any of its conditions unless such waiver is indorsed on the policy, is ineffectual to limit the legal capacity of the company to afterwards bind itself, contrary to the conditions of the policy, by an agent acting within the scope of his general authority. Lam-

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berton v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. 1 L. R. A. 222, 39 Minn. 129.

Breach of condition as to incumbrances.

A breach of warranty against incumbrances is not established by showing records of several unsatisfied judgments against a former owner. Ibid.

A judgment is not an incumbrance against insured property, under a condition in the policy sured property, under a condition in the policy that if the property shall become mortgaged or incumbered it shall be null and void. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Pickel, 119 Ind. 155. But compare Hench v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 122 Pa. 128.

Where the insurance was for separate amounts. a misrepresentation concerning one piece will not bar a recovery for the loss of other pieces with which it is not connected in any way. Ibid.

The fact of additional incumbrances on the property insured is not a breach of a condition against incumbrances, where the total amount of all such incumbrances at no time exceeded the amount represented by the assured. Kister v. Leb-anon Mut. Ins. Co. 5 L. R. A. 646, 128 Pa. 553.

But where it is stipulated in a policy that if either the real or personal property, or any part of it, be incumbered, it must be so represented in the application or the policy will be void, a misrepresentation as to one subject will invalidate the whole. Smith v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 118 N. Y. 518.

Where an applicant for insurance, on being asked if there is \$1,000 incumbrance on the property, answers "Over \$2,000," whereas there is \$5,000, there is a material misrepresentation. Ibid.

Where an application for insurance requires the amount of a mortgage on the premises to be stated, an answer stating the principal sum due on the mortgage is sufficient. Hosford v. Germania F. Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 399 (32 L. ed. 196). 1857, at the rate of 7 per cent per annum. The Insurance Company brings the case here, alleging error, and asking a reversal of the judgment.

Messrs. G. W. Barnett, George & King and W. F. Rightmire for plaintiff in

Messrs, McDonald & Parker, for defeedant in error:

The agent who made the contract in this case was a general agent.

Continental Ins. Co. v. Ruckman, 127 III. 364. The Company is liable for his acts and agreements and is infected with notice of all that was known to the agent.

Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanathan, 11 Kan. 549; Sullivan v. Phenix Ins. Co. 34 Kan. 174; National Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 41 Kan.

The tendency of the modern decisions is to constantly broaden the powers of the agent and make them co extensive with the business intrusted to his care.

Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 222 (20 L. ed. 617).

Even where a policy in terms provides that agents shall not waive forfeitures, alter or discharge contracts, or strike out or modify any of the provisions of the printed policy of insurance, the words of the policy are not conclusive, because it is within the power of the

company to waive this provision.

Wood, Fire Ins. 2d ed. p. 886; Eclectic L.

Ins. Co. v. Fahrenkrug, 68 III. 463; American

\$2,125.95, with interest thereon from June 4, Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36; Renier v. 1887, at the rate of 7 per cent per annum. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. 74 Wis. 89; Young v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 45 Iowa, 377; Morrison v. North America Ins. Co. 69 Tex. 353; Continential Ins. Co. v. Ruckman, 127 Ill. 364; McGurk v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 1 L. R. A. 563, 56 Conn. 528; Lamberton v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. 1 L. R. A. 222, 39 Minn. 129; Carroll v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 166; King v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 72 Iowa, 310.

Johnston, J., delivered the opinion of the

The greater part of the testimony taken in the case was with reference to the extent and value of the property destroyed, and as to whether or not the fire was the result of the action of the insured. But these questions, as well as all others upon which there was a conflict of evidence, have been determined by the jury in favor of the insured. The Insurance Company now seeks to escape liability upon the ground that Gray failed to disclose the existence of incumbrances upon the property when he made the application for insurance, and also because he had incumbered the property after the policy was issued without the consent of the Company indorsed thereon, and consent of the Company indorsed thereon, and in violation of its provisions. The application for insurance was made on December 2, 1885, to Steinbuschel & Bro., of Wichita, who were agents of the Company for that portion of the State in which the property was situated. They wrote the answers to the questions properly was situated. pounded to Gray, and the application contained

A mortgage executed within the term of a policy, and before its renewal, is not a breach of a condition in the renewal policy. Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leathers (Pa.) 6 Cent. Rep. 901.

An undischarged mortgage which has been paid is not an incumbrance. Smith v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. 7 New Eng. Rep. 82, 1 L. R. A. 216, 60 Vt. 682.

Waiver of conditions, what constitutes.

The execution of a policy with full knowledge of existing facts, which by its conditions render it void, is a waiver of those conditions, because otherwise it would be a fraud. Wheeler v. Traders Ins. Co. (N. H.) 1 New Eng. Rep. 322; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Ende, 65 Tex. 118.

And so as to knowledge of the agent, of incumbrances on the property insured. Breckinridge v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 4 West. Rep. 565, 87 Mo. 62: Phœnix Ins. Co. v. La Pointe, 5 West. Rep. 512, 118 111. 384.

If an insurer has knowledge of the assured's title, it is a waiver of the condition making an inaccurate statement of the title an avoidance of the policy. Wheeler v. Traders Ins. Co. (N. H.) I New Eng. Rep. 322; Lamb v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 70

A principal is chargeable with all the knowledge possessed by the agent in the transaction of the business which he had in charge. Clark v. Hyatt, 118 N. Y. 563; Slattery v. Schwannecke, 118 N. Y. 543; Little Pittsburgh C. M. Co. v. Little Chief C. M. Co. 11 Colo. 223; Wheeler v. McGuire, 2 L. R. A. 808, 86 Ala. 336.

Where an authorized agent of the company delivers a policy acknowledging the payment of the premium, such acknowledgment concludes the company from assailing the legal existence of the policy. Home Ins. Co. v. Gilman, 10 West. Rep. 842, 112 Ind. 7.

8 L. R. A.

The payment of the premium in cash may be waived by an agent authorized to deliver policies and receive payment, notwithstanding a stipula-

tion in the policy to the contrary. 10td.

Where a company authorized its agent to take insurance, collect the premium, deliver the policy, sign with his own name, and attach to the policy, printed provisions not contained in it,—it is bound by the agent's waiver of requirements in such printed slip. Niagara F. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 12 West. Rep. 815, 123 III. 356.

A provision that the use of general terms shall not be construed as a waiver of any condition in the policy may be waived by the company through its agent, and is not a limitation as to the manner of the exercise of his powers by the agent. Goldwater v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. 12 Cent. Rep. 49, 109 N. Y. 518.

Waiver by agent's knowledge of incumbrances.

An insurance policy cannot be avoided for failure to state all the facts as to the ownership of the property in the policy, if these facts were fully made known to the agent of the company who issued the policy. Crescent Ins. Co. v. Camp, 71 Tex. 503.

The insurer is estopped from showing a breach of warranty by the insured, when the agent of the insurer who effected the insurance is fully apprised of the existence of incumbrances before making the insurance. Breckinridge v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. 4 West. Rep. 565, 87 Mo. 62.

Where an answer to a question as to incumbrances is inserted in an application for insurance by the agent of a company, without the authority of the insured, who signs the application without knowledge of such answer, the company cannot avoid the policy for that reason. Dunbar v. Phonix Ins. Co. 72 Wis. 422.

the statement that the answers made were true. I The application only mentions one mortgage, but Gray testifies that he stated his indebtedness and the incumbrances on his property to the agents fully and in detail, telling them that it would be necessary for him to mortgage and remortgage his property in the conduct of his business during the time for which the insur-ance was contracted. This is disputed; but the jury sustain Gray, and find that the Company was fully informed in respect to the existing incumbrances. The policy was not delivered by the agents at the time the application was made, but was sent by them to Gray at Conway Springs, Sumner County, near which place he resided. Soon after it had been so delivered, he discovered that it contained a provision that if the property should thereafter become mortgaged or incumbered, or, in case a change should take place in the title, the policy should be null and void. He immediately went to the agent, called his attention to the provision prohibiting the incumbering of his property, and insisted that it must be changed. After looking at the policy, Steinbuschel said that he would waive the condition relative to incumbrances, stating that he had authority for that purpose, and Gray, acting upon this waiver and agreement, mortgaged the property, as has already been stated. The the property, as has already been stated. incumbrances placed on the property, how-ever, were mostly, if not entirely, the renewal and extension of debts and mortgages existing when the contract of insurance was made.

In regard to the misrepresentations in the

correct answers to all questions asked. was no concealment nor deception on his part. Steinbuschel, authorized by and acting for the Company, prepared the application, and purposely omitted a fuller statement concerning incumbrances. It was the fault of Steinbuschel or the Company which he represented, and not of the insured, that the application did not contain a complete statement. Steinbuschel having authority, his act must be treated as the act of the Company, and through him the Company had knowledge of all the incum-brances. With this knowledge, the Company accepted the risk, and the premium therefor, induced Gray to sign the application, which did not state the whole truth, and now, when the loss occurs, they cannot, under our decis-ions, insist on the breach of warranty or the untruth of the representations. Sullivan v. Phenix Ins. Co. 34 Kan. 170; Continental Ins. Co. v. Pearce, 39 Kan. 396; National Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 41 Kan. 161; Kansas Protective Union v. Gardner, 41 Kan. 401.

It is next contended that the giving of the subsequent mortgages by the insured avoided the policy; and in that connection it is urged that error was committed in admitting testimony of the verbal agreement modifying the terms of the policy, and waiving its conditions. We think the waiver must be upheld, and the point made by the Company overruled. The agents who made the agreement were more than mere local or soliciting agents. They fully represented the Company within a certain district; were authorized to solicit insurance, application, we must assume that Gray gave receive moneys and premiums, issue and renew

An agreement by an insurance agent to note on the application the fact of an incumbrance on the property, upon which agreement the applicant relied, estops the company from setting up the incumbrance to defeat a recovery on the policy. Copeland v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. (Mich.) Nov.

But the company is not estopped from claiming the forfeiture where the local agent who issued the policy gave the insured to understand that such incumbrances would not invalidate the policy. Smith v. Continental Ins. Co. (Dak.) Oct. 10, 1889.

Where an insurance agent as a matter of fact was informed of the existence of mortgages on the property insured, and obtained a signature of the insured, who was ignorant in such matters, to an application which he had himself made out, the agent's knowledge of the existence of the mortgages was binding upon the company, and a waiver of the condition of the policy against such incumbrances. Renier v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. 74 Wis. 89.

The knowledge of an agent, before the issue of an insurance policy, of the truth as to the ownership of the insured property and litigation concerning it, will prevent a defense on the ground of misrepresentations as to those matters in the application. Western Assur. Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala.

A warranty, in an application, of undisputed ownership is not broken by the pendency of an action by a judgment creditor of a former owner, but not disputing insurer's ownership. Lang v. Hawkeye Ins. Co. 74 Iowa, 673.

Objections to statement of loss. An objection made by the company to proofs of loss, that they are "deficient both in form and substance," is too general. Myers v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 72 Iowa, 176. 8 L. R. A.

Overestimates of value in proofs of loss, not fraudulently made, will not avoid a policy providing that it shall be void upon an attempt to defraud the company before or after loss. Towne v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. 5 New Eng. Rep. 484, 145 Mans.

Nor will such overestimates render proofs of loss insufficient as a written statement of loss to render the company liable. Ibid.

The tender by insured of a particular account of his loss to the duly authorized agent of a foreign company is a compliance with the condition of the policy to render such account to the company. North British & M. Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 7 West. Rep. 85, 108 Ind. 518.

A statement in proofs of loss that the cause of the fire is to the assured unknown sufficiently states the origin of the fire. Jones v. Howard Ins. Co. 117 N. Y. 103.

Under the Wisconsin statutes, fixing the measure of the value of the insured property in cases of loss, the fact that the insured knowingly and intentionally stated the loss to be greater than it actually was is no defense in an action on the pol-Cayon v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. 68 Wis. 510.

Where the loss was disputed by the company it was error to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the proofs of loss were insufficient. Karelsen v. Sun Fire Office, 45 Hun, 144.

It is sufficient to declare that "the said fire did not originate by any act, design or procurement on his [the insured's] part, or in consequence of any fraud or evil practice done or suffered by him." Howard

Ins. Co. v. Hocking, & Cent. Rep. 918, 115 Ps. 415.
In a suit upon a policy of fire insurance, where
the defense is that the plaintiff fraudulently misrepresented its loss the alleged fraud must arise out of and inhere in representations as to the personal property contained in the proof of loss; and

policies; and the testimony is that they aplicies, such person may assume that the pointed sub-agents and adjusted losses. Only agent is a general agent of the insurance coma short time previous to the making of the cona shot time previous to the making of the con-tract in question, they adjusted a loss under another insurance policy issued by the same Company to Gray, and paid him the amount of the loss. Gray had a right to assume, and we may fairly assume, that they were general agents of the Company.

In this State the courts have taken a liberal view with reference to the power of agents, and especially where they were representing foreign companies, which can only act through their agents, and where the agent is practically the principal in the making of contracts. Cent. Ins. Co. v. McLanathan, 11 Kan. 549,

and cases above cited.

Being general agents, empowered to make and renew contracts, they stood in this respect and renew contracts, they stood in this respect in the place of the Company, and certainly must be held to have the power to modify the same, or to waive any of the conditions in the contract which they had made. We are referent to the province of the Company. red to Burlington Ins. Co. v. Gibbons (Kan.), 22 Pac. Rep. 1010, where the power of the agent to waive a condition was denied. In that case the agent had no authority from his company except as a soliciting agent, and it did not appear that he had any authority to issue policies, and he did not even countersign them when issued. In that case, however, it was said that "it has generally been held that where a person in procuring an insurance upon his property acts in good faith, and without any knowledge of any limitations upon the authority of the

pany for that purpose; that he stands in the place of the company; and that the company will be bound by any terms or conditions or any waiver of terms or conditions which the agent may agree to while acting for the company in consummating the insurance.

If it was within the power of the Company, acting through its agents, to waive a condition or change the contract, it surely might do so by a parol contract, and might even waive the provisions stated in the policy with reference to the manner of altering or waiving its terms

and conditions.

In Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143, the court, in considering the question whether an agent of a company might change the conditions of a policy by parol, wherein it was provided that it could only be done upon the consent of the company written thereon, held that the written policy might be changed by parol, and stated that "a written bargain is of no higher legal degree than a parol one, Either may vary or discharge the other, and there can be no more force in an agreement in writing not to agree by parol than a parol agreement not to agree in writing. Every such agreement is ended by the new one which contradicts it." See also Eclectic L. Ins. Co. v. Fahrenkrug, 68 Ill. 463.

In the present case, as in some of the cases cited, it was stipulated in the policy that no agent of the Company, or any other person than the president and secretary, should have agent of the insurance company effecting the authority to alter or waive any of the terms or

in such representations the plaintiff must have | Ins. Co. 7 New Eng. Rep. 82, I L. R. A. 216, 60 Vt. been guilty of designedly attempting to perpetrate a fraud upon the insurance company. Oshkosh Packing & P. Co. v. Mercantile Ins. Co. 31 Fed. Rep.

Where the inventory containing the proofs of loss was made out by the wife of insured, negligence in failing to verify the same will be evidence of intended fraud. Mullin v. Vermont Mut. F. Ins. Co. 2 New Eng. Rep. 483, 58 Vt. 113.

A provision requiring proof of loss "in detail" is satisfied by setting out a copy of the description of the property insured by another policy referred Towne v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. supra.

Neglect of the insured to furnish a detailed statement of the loss, under the Massachusetts standard fire policy, will not of itself defeat a claim. 1bid.

And nothing more is required than a statement of the aggregate value of the property destroyed, unless a more particular account is demanded at the time. Miller v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 70 Iowa,

A waiver of notice and statement of particulars of a loss cannot be shown by the acts of an insurance agent who took the application, or of an adjuster, without proof of their authority. Barre v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 76 Iowa, 609.

Provisions requiring statement and proof of loss. See note to Kenton Ins. Co. v. Wigginton (Ky.) 7L. R. A. 81.

Waiver of notice and statement of loss.

A general agent of an insurance company-unless restricted in his power, and this is known to the plaintiff-can waive a statement of the loss, but orly in the manner provided by the policy, although by the terms of the policy that was a condition precedent to recovery. Smith v. Niagara F. | Bowlin v. Hekla F. Ins. Co. 36 Minn. 433. 8 L. R. A.

682; North British & M. Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 7 West. Rep. 89, 108 Ind. 518.

A local agent having authority only to receive proposals for insurance, fix rates of premium and issue policies, cannot waive the condition of a policy requiring a statement of loss. Smith v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. 7 New Eng. Rep. 82, 1 L. R. A. 216, 60 Vt. 682; Knudson v. Hekia F. Ins. Co. (Wis.) Dec. 3, 1989

Where a fire insurance policy stipulates that the insured shall give notice of loss forthwith, immediate notice to a local agent is sufficient. Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 544.

Where the facts are not in dispute, it becomes a question of law for the court to determine whether, in the given case, the notice was reasonable. What constitutes reasonable diligence depends upon the circumstances of the case. Insurance Co. of North America v. Brim, 9 West. Rep. 830, 111 Ind. 281.

A failure to object to the notice after the right of action has expired will not revive the right. Ibid.; Barre v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 76 Iowa, 609.

But a mere written notice of loss, not in form required by the policy of fire insurance, is insufficient. German-American Ins. Co. v. Hocking, 6 Cent. Rep. 911, 115 Pa. 398.

Proofs of loss to be furnished.

A provision in a policy of insurance, that agents cannot waive "any condition," does not relate to stipulations about proofs of loss. Loeb v. American C. Ins. Co. (Mo.) Nov. 18, 1889.

A local insurance agent authorized simply to fix rates and countersign and deliver policies, subject to the approval of the company, has no authority to waive a provision made a part of the contract, requiring assured to give notice and proof of loss-

dent or secretary must be signed by either of them. This provision, however, may be modified by the Company to the same extent as any other, and whatever the Company can do may

be done by its general agents.

Renier v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 74 Wis. 89, was a case somewhat similar to the one we are considering. In that case the policy provided that the application should form a part of the policy and a warranty by the assured. application for insurance it was stated that the property insured was not incumbered, but it appeared that the property was mortgaged, and that the insured informed the agent of the company of the existence of the mortgages, and he falsely wrote the answers therein, and the application was signed at the request of the agent. In the policy issued was a provision that "no act or omission of the company, or any act of its officers or agents, shall be deemed, construed or held to be a waiver of a full and strict compliance with the foregoing provisions of the terms and conditions of this policy, except it be a waiver or extension in express terms and in writing, signed by the president or secretary of the company." It was held that the action of the agent, with knowledge of the existence of the mortgage, was binding upon the company, and a waiver of the condition of the policy against incumbrances; and this, notwithstanding the limitation of authority of such agent expressed in the provision quoted on the face of the policy. Speaking of mutuality in such contracts, and that the pow-the restriction the court said: "We must ers of such general agents are limited to the

conditions of the policy, or make any indorse- | hold, however, that such attempted restrictions ment thereon, and all agreements of the presi- upon the power of the company or its general officers or agents, acting within the scope of their general authority, to subsequently modify the contract and bind the company in a manner contrary to such previous conditions in the policy are ineffectual. Especially is this true in respect to a foreign insurance company whose officers are practically inaccessible to the assured."—citing Gans v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co. 43 Wis, 108; American L. Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36; Shafer v. Phanix Ins. Co. 53 Wis. 361; Lamberton v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. 1 L. R. A. 222, 39 Minn. 129; Willcuts v. North-western Mut. F. Ins. Co. 81 Ind. 308; Steen v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. 89 N. Y. 326; Richmond v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. 79 N. Y. 230; Eastern R. Co. v. Relief F. Ins. Co. 105 Mass. 570; American L. Ins. Co. v. Green, 57 Ga. 469; Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Earle, 33 Mich. 143.

The court, proceeding further, says: "Of course, an insurance company, and especially a foreign insurance company, in making contracts of insurance, and adjusting, settling and paying losses, must act through its agents, if at all. To hold that, in such negotiations between such general agents and the assured, the latter is bound, but that in the same transaction the company, the agent's principal, cannot be bound by reason of having incapacitated it-self and them, by previous stipulations, from agreeing to anything contrary to the conditions contained in the original contract, is, under most policies, in effect to hold that there is no

A requirement in an insurance policy, that sworn proofs of loss be furnished to the company, is not complied with by the making of a statement of the property lost and its value, to the adjuster at his request. Knudson v Hekla F. Ins. Co. (Wis.) Dec. 3, 1889.

After the mortgagee of property damaged by fire has given the notice provided by the statute to the underwriter, he may furnish the preliminary proofs of loss. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 5 New Eng. Rep. 798, 80 Me. 100.

The provision of a policy that the assured shall, in his proofs of loss, state the interest and title, etc., means state the title at the time of the loss. Jones v. Howard Ins. Co. 117 N. Y. 103.

Reasonable time after he learned that something more was wanted in which to perfect his proofs of loss must be given. Miller v. Hartford F. Ins. Co. 70 Iowa, 704.

Whether proofs of loss were furnished within a reasonable time is a mixed question of law and Am. F. Ins. Co. v. Hazen, 1 Cent. Rep. 631, 110 Pa. 530.

Where the company receives the proofs of loss without objection, after the time prescribed in the policy, it is a reasonable explanation of the delay. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Haws (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 413.

Provision for payment in sixty days after due notice and proof of loss refers to the proofs required within thirty days, and not to other proof required for establishment of claim. Clover v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 2 Cent. Rep. 873, 101 N. Y. 277.

Where the loss was total and immediate notice thereof was given, a further detailed proof of loss is not requisite to the right of recovery. Ins. Co. v. Haws (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 413.

Proofs of loss signed and sworn to by one member of a partnership are sufficient. Myers v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 72 Iowa, 176. 8 L. R. A.

Where goods in two separate buildings are covered by one policy proof of loss should state the damage done in each building. Towne v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co. supra.

The failure to refer in the proofs of loss or otherwise to the lien of the lessor for rent on the building does not avoid the policy. United Firemen's Ins. Co. 45 Hun, 298. Dresser v.

An objection to the admission of proofs of loss in evidence, on the ground that they were not signed by the plaintiff, is untenable, where plaintiff's name was signed to the affidavit thereto, by another, in his presence and at his instance, and adopted by him. Breckinridge v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. 4 West. Rep. 565, 87 Mo. 62.

Waiver of proofs of loss.

Proofs of loss may be waived by the underwriter; and waiver is a question for the jury. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 5 New Eng. Rep. 798, 80 Me. 100.

A provision in a policy requiring insured to give notice and proof of loss is waived if the insurer makes no objection to the absence of the proofs, but joins in arbitration proceedings required by the policy to be taken. Carroll v. Girard F. Ins.

Co. 72 Cal. 297.
Objections to preliminary proofs of loss are waived by the failure of the company to disclose the same within a reasonable time. Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Floss, 9 Cent. Rep. 91, 67 Md. 403.

So retaining the proofs without objection is a waiver of objectionable defects. Cayon v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. 68 Wis. 510; Bennett v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 8 Cent. Rep. 692, 106 N. Y. 243.

And stipulations as to proofs of loss are waived when other proofs are accepted without objection by an authorized agent. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Cope-hart, 5 West. Rep. 669, 108 Ind. 270; Smith v. Niagara F. Ins. Co. 1 L. R. A. 216, 7 New Eng. Rep. 82, 60 Vt.

enforcement of the policies upon which they

It is clear that the Company was not so bound but that it might modify any contract which it but that it might mounty any contract which had made, or waive any of the conditions contained therein; and this may be done through its general agents. The knowledge of Steinbuschel & Bro. in this case was the knowledge of the Company, and their act was its act.
When Gray applied for the insurance he informed the Company with reference to the incumbrances, as well as his necessity and purpose to continue them. Knowing these facts, the premium was accepted and the policy issued. Subsequent to the issuance of the policy, there was an express agreement that he might renew his mortgages as he had informed the Company it would be necessary to do, and the renewal of the incumbrances did not in any material degree affect the risk which the Commaterial degree affect the risk which the Company took. Accepting his statement, as the jury have done, we must assume that he acted in good faith with the Company and its agents, and that he was induced by the agreements and action of the Company to believe that he was warranted in renewing the mortgages. After receiving and retaining the premium, knowing the purpose and necessity of Gray to renew the incumbrances, and after a specific agreement waiving that condition of the policy, and authorizing him to renew the incumbrances, and after remaining silent and allowing him to proceed as though he was insured, until a loss occurs, the Company will not be heard to repudiate its contract or to deny its liability. We are aware that the authorities are not uniform upon the subject of waivers in policies like this one, but forfeitures are not favored in the law, and the view we have taken of the power of a general agent to waive the condition of a policy is more satisfactory to us, and is sufficiently supported. In addition to the authorities already cited, see the following: Young v. Hart-ford F. Ins. Co. 45 Iowa, 377; King v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 72 Iowa, 310; Morrison v. North America Ins. Co. 69 Tex. 353; McGurk v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. 1 L. R. A. 563, 56 Conn. 528; American Ins. Co. v. Gallatin, 48 Wis. 36; Bartlett v. Fireman's F. Ins. Co. 77 Iowa, 155; Key v. Des Moines Ins. Co. 77 Iowa, 174; Sweetser v. Odd Fellows Mut. Aid Asso. 117 Ind. 97; 2 Wood, Ins. §§ 422, 525.

obtaining of premiums, and then defeating the curred by reason of the failure of Gray to send proofs of loss to the Company. It is shown that immediately after the fire he notified Steinbuschel & Bro. of the loss, and they stated that they would at once inform the Company. Within a few days an adjuster of the Company, whose authority is not denied, came to Gray's place, and requested him to go before an offi-cer and make proof of loss. The proofs were reduced to writing, signed and sworn to, and delivered to the adjuster; and there is testimony to the effect that he expressed satisfaction with them, and stated that he would forward them to the Company's office, and would return in a few days and settle the loss. This testimony was submitted to the jury under the following directions: "There is evidence tending to show that these statements were taken by said Winne as the agent of said Company, and sent to said Company, and it will be a question for the jury to determine whether such state-ments and proofs are such as are required by the policy; and, if not, whether the plaintiff was justified under the circumstances in believing, and did believe, that the proofs were sating, and the believe, that the proofs were satisfactory to the agent of the Company and to the Company, and that no further proofs would be required; and if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff was justified in believing, and did believe, that the proofs furnished to said Winne were satisfactory to him and to the Company; and further find that such proofs and statements were sent to the Company by said Winne, and that the Company made no said while, and that the Company made no objection thereto, and requested no further proofs to be made by the plaintiff within areasonable time, and within the sixty days after the fire,—the jury would be justified in finding that defendant had waived the making of further proofs of loss. If, at the time such affidavits and statements were made at the request of said Winne, it was understood between said agent and said plaintiff that such statements and affidavits should not constitute the proofs required by the policy, and should not be con-sidered as a waiver of such proofs, and that by taking such statements and affidavits said Winne should not and did not waive the making of the proofs in accordance with the provisions of the policy, then the jury would not be justified in finding that the taking of such statements and affidavits by said Winne, or that the acts and conduct of said Winne at the time It is further contended that a forfeiture oc- of taking such statements and affidavits, con-

Where the insurer bases his refusal to pay on other grounds, he thereby waives his right to object to their insufficiency. Bennett v. Agricultural Ins. Co. supra.

A refusal to pay a policy solely on the ground that the insured has no title to premises is a waiver of objections as to proofs of loss. German Ins. Co. v. Gueck (Iil.) 6 L. R. A. 835; Niagara Ins. Co. v. Lee, 73 Tex. 641.

Where the company denied its liability on the ground of a sale in violation of a condition in the policy, it waived proof of loss under the policy. Commercial U. Assur. Co. v. Scammon, 10 West. Rep. 337, 126 III. 364.

Directing the insured to make proofs of loss, without objection to a previous change of occupancy, which is known to the insurer at the time, is a waiver of objection on that ground. Jerdee v. Cottage Grove F. Ins. Co. (Wis.) Jan. 7, 1890.

Where the agent denies the validity of a contract of insurance, objections to proofs of loss furnished are waived. Commercial U. Assur. Co. v. State, 13 West. Rep. 47, 113 1nd. 331.

Proof of loss is waived by examination of premises by the insurer's agent, who refuses to pay the loss. Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 544.

Where the insurer adopts the acts of its agents, it cannot deny the authority of the agents to waive the proofs. Carroll v. Girard F. Ins. Co. 72 Cal. 297. Such a waiver is not prevented by a provision in the submission to arbitration, in case of their elec-

tion to make the submission. *Ibid.*Where offer of proofs would be a vain act proof of loss is deemed waived. See note to Kenton Ins. Co. v. Wigginton (Ky.) 7 L. R. A. SI; German Ins. Co. v. Gueck (III.) 6 L. R. A. 835.

8 L. R. A.

The testimony was sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury. Neither the adjuster nor anyone representing the Company returned the proofs, or claimed that they were insufficient. The Company recognized the loss, took all the proofs it deemed essential to an adjustment, and, instead of claiming that they were insuffi cient, expressed satisfaction with them, and stated that the loss would soon be paid. Assuming the existence of the facts stated, we

stituted a waiver of the proofs required by the policy."

think the assured had a right to assume, until notified to the contrary, that no other or different proofs would be required. There are some criticisms in regard to the refusal of the court to give instructions, but what has already been said in the opinion disposes of the material objections that are made. The charge of the court fairly submitted the questions involved to the jury.

Finding no error, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS (2d Div.).

Thomas HALPIN, Respt.,

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, of Philadelphia, Appt.

(....N. Y.....)

Machinery and apparatus used in the business of manufacturing leather and morocco, including boiler, engine, etc., being the only property covered by a policy of insurance, do not constitute a mill, or the standing still thereof create a forfeiture under a policy which provides that "if a building covered by this policy shall become vacant or unoccupied, or if a mill or manufactory shall stand idle . . . all liability hereunder shall thereupon cease," where a further provision of the policy as to the failing of a building expressly declares that the policy shall cease as to property therein as well as to the building. (March 21, 1890.)

PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of A the General Term of the Supreme Court,

NOTE. - Fire insurance: forfeiture in case of vacancy or non-occupancy.

General agents of an insurance company in the matter of issuing policies may make a valid stipulation for the insertion of a clause in a policy relating to the occupancy of the buildings insured. Continental Ins. Co. v. Ruckman, 127 III. 364.

And the insured will be presumed to have had knowledge of a provision in his policy that the policy shall be void in case of the property becoming vacant, unoccupied or uninhabited. Burlington

Ins. Co. v. Gibbons (Kan.) Jan. 11, 1890.

The condition against non-occupancy, in an insurance policy, must be construed and applied in reference to the subject matter of the contract and the ordinary incidents attending the use of the insured property. Halpin v. Phœnix Ins. Co. 118 N. Y. 165; Whitney v. Black River Ins. Co. 72 N. Y. 117.

The written agreement on a policy as to the use and occupation of the premises must be construed as an express promissory warranty, in the nature of a condition precedent, and a literal compliance Manhattan Ins. Co. 34 N. J. L. 24; Carson v. Jersey City Ins. Co. 43 N. J. L. 300; May, Ins. \$ 156; Wood, F. Ins. \$ 165; Flanders, F. Ins. 238.

Such a condition does not render the policy absolutely void upon the happening of the event; and if the insurer waives the forfeiture, neither the insured nor a third person can treat the insurance as void. Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Klewer (Ill.) Oct. 31, 1889.

If the insurer does not exercise the power in case of breach of the condition, to declare the forfeiture while the assured is in default, and the premises are again occupied, its right to do so ceases, and its liability on the policy again attaches. Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Garland, 108 III. 220; Schmidt v. Peoris, M. & F. Ins. Co. 41 Ill. 295; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. McDowell, 50 Ill. 120; Westchester F. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 90 III. 121.

Clauses avolding a policy on change of occupancy, or use for trade increasing hazard, are not Violated by premises becoming vacant. Somerset Co. Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Usaw, 2 Cent. Rep. 542, 112 8 L. R. A.

Pa. 80; Cumberland Valley Mut. Protection Co. v. Douglas, 58 Pa. 419.

Terms "vacancy" and "non-occupancy" construed.

The terms "vacancy" and "non-occupancy" are used interchangeably in a policy which specially provides that "in case the premises shall be left unoccupied" (Paine v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 5 Thomp. & C. 619); or "shall remain unoccupied" (Keith v. Quincy Mut. F. Ins. Co. 10 Allen, 228); or shall become "vacant" (Cummins v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 5 Hun, 554, 67 N. Y. 280); or "unoccupied" (Wustum v. City F. Ins. Co. 15 Wis. 138); or shall "be vacated" (Ashworth v. Builders Mut. F. Ins. Co. 112 Mass. 422),-the insurance shall be forfeited.

The questions of vacancy and non-occupancy, and of increase of risk from these and other changes of circumstances, are questions of fact for the jury. Gamwell v. Merchants & F. Mut. F. Ins. Co. 12 Cush. 167: Luce v. Dorchester Mut. F. Ins. Co. 105 Mass. 297: Williams v. People's F. Ins. Co. 57 N. Y. 274; Cummins v. Agricultural Ins. Co. supra; Robinson v. Mercer Co. Mut. F. Ins. Co. 27 N. J. L. 134; Wood, Ins. \$ 439.

Dwelling-house.

A dwelling-house chiefly designed for the abode of mankind is occupied when human beings habitually reside in it and unoccupied when no one dwells in it. North American F. Ins. Co. v. Zaen-ger, 63 Ill. 464; American Ins. Co. v. Padfield, 78 Ill. 167; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 92 Ill. 64; Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Kiernan, 83 Ky. 468; Stupetski v. Transatlantic F. Ins. Co. 43 Mich. 373; Cook v. Continental Ins. Co. 70 Mo. 610; Herrman v. Merchants Ins. Co. 81 N. Y. 184; Herrman v. Adriatic F. Ins. Co. 85 N. Y. 162; Alston v. Old North State Ins. Co. 89 N. C. 326; Fitzgerald v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. 64 Wis. 463.

The phrase "left unoccupied" will not be construed as implying an abandonment or willful vacation of the premises, leaving them uncared for. Sonneborn v. Manufacturers Ins. Co. 44 N. J. L. 220.

Object of stipulation

The object of the stipulation against vacancy and

Second Department, affirming a judgment of the Kings Circuit entered upon a verdict directed for plaintiff in an action brought to recover the amount alleged to be due upon a policy of fire insurance. Affirmed.

Statement by Vann, J.:

This is an action upon an insurance policy issued by the defendant on the 10th of February, 1883, whereby it insured the plaintiff, for the period of one year from that day, "against loss or damage by fire, to an amount not exceeding \$2,000, on his boiler, steam-engine and connections, machines, machinery, shafting, belting, pulleys, hangers, tubs, tanks, tables, tools, vats and all machinery and apparatus used in the business of manufacturing leather and morocco, all contained in the frame building and extension situate on the south side of Wallabout Street, about 375 feet westerly from Lee Avenue, Brooklyn, L. I."

The defendant answered, alleging that after the delivery of the policy, and before the loss occurred, the plaintiff permitted "the said building in said policy mentioned to become vacant and unoccupied, and the said mill to remain idle, . . . until and at the time of the fire in" question. It appeared that the property insured was totally destroyed by fire on the 4th of January, 1884, and that for several months prior thereto the morocco factory had "stood idle," although the machinery was not removed from the building.

Mr. Thomas E. Pearsall for appellant. Mr. Nathaniel C. Moak, with Mr. John Oakey, for respondent.

Vann, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The policy in question is a long instrument, containing some provisions that apply exclusively to insurance upon buildings or real prop-

erty, others that apply only to personal property, and others, still, that are applicable to property of both kinds. The form was evidently designed for use in insuring both kinds together, or either kind separately; but in the latter case, of course, certain provisions were not intended to be operative, as there would be nothing for them to act upon. The only provision specifically pleaded by the defendant ints answer, as a defense to this action, is the following, viz.: "If a building covered by this policy shall become vacant or unoccupied, or if a mill or manufactory shall stand idle, or be run nights or overtime, without notice to and the consent of the company, clearly stated hereon, all liability hereunder will thereupon cease; and if a building shall fall, except as the result of a fire, this policy, if covering thereon, or on property therein, shall thereupon immediately cease and determine."

It is contended by the defendant that "the machinery covered by the policy constituted a mill, and that its standing idle created a forfeiture." On the other hand, the plaintiff claims that a building is the sole subject of insurance contemplated by the first part of the clause above quoted, and that its true meaning is that if a building covered by the policy shall become vacant or unoccupied, or if, being a mill or manufactory, it shall stand idle, all liability shall at once cease. The plaintiff further claims that the property insured was not a mill or manufactory, and that it was not insured as a mill or manufactory, but simply as personal property.

property.

We think that the plaintiff is right in his contention, because it would not be a natural or ordinary use of language to describe machinery used in milling as a mill, or in manufacturing as a manufactory. Herrman v. Merchants Ins. Co. 81 N. Y. 184.

The property insured was neither a mill nor

non-occupancy is to guard against the increased risk arising from the absence of everybody whose duty or interest might afford protection from fire. Moore v. Phœnix F. Ins. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 57, 64 N. H. 140.

So a house from which the owner or tenant has removed with no definite intention of returning is unoccupied or vacant. Sleeper v. New Hampshire F. Ins. Co. 56 N. H. 401; Hartshorne v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 13 Cent. Rep. 132, 50 N. J. I. 427.

But a temporary absence, or the occasional and necessary absence of the family or servants, will not be so construed. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 92 Ill. 64; Laselle v. Hoboken F. Ins. Co. 43 N. J. L. 468; O'Brien v. Commercial F. Ins. Co. 6 Jones & S. 517; Franklin F. Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 95 Pa. 492.

A building is not vacant, unoccupied or not in use although unoccupied except by a clerk who entered and made repairs, occupied and slept therein. Stensgaard v. National F. Ins. Co. 36 Mins. 181; Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Kiernan, 83 Ky. 468; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 3 Colo. 422.

But where the tenant with his family removes from the building, merely leaving some furniture therein, and resides elsewhere, the building is deemed unoccupied and vacant. Bennett v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 51 Conn. 504: Sexton v. Hawkeye Ins. Co. 69 Iowa, 99; Feshe v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co. 74 Iowa, 676; Ashworth v. Builders Mut. F. Ins. Co. 112 Mass. 422; Corrigan v. Connecticut F. Ins. Co. 122 Mass. 228; Cook v. Continental Ins. Co. 70 Mo. 610; Watertown F. Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 84 Va. 72. 8 L. R. A.

Insurance on mill and machinery.

In a contract of insurance, made for a period of years upon a mill building and machinery, a description of the property as a "sawmill building" had not the effect to restrict the use to the purpose of a sawmill. Frost's D. L. & W. W. Works v. Millers & M. Mut. Ins. Co. 37 Minn. 300.

Where an engine driving planing-mill machinery twenty-two feet distant, and engine room and mill building were connected merely by a shaft transmitting power from the engine to the mill, and by a spout carrying shavings from mill to engine, while beneath these a roadway separated said buildings, insurance on such "mill building and addition and machinery therein" covers such engine-room and contents. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boe, 71 Wis. 33.

Clauses avoiding policy for non-occupancy and vacancy of premises.

To constitute occupancy of a building used for manufacturing purposes, within a clause in an insurance policy against non-occupancy, there must be some practical use or employment of the property. Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co. 118 N. Y. 165.

But a building used as a manufactory, which is closed and in the hands of an agent to rent, is unoccupied, within a provision in an insurance policy against non-occupancy, although occasionally visited by the agent and a watchman who resides next door. Ibid.

A cotton-mill building is not vacant and unoccupied within a policy, where a number of em-

. . .

a manufactory, as those words are commonly understood. While the word "mill" is used to describe "a machine for grinding," it is also defined as "a building, with its machinery, where grinding, or some process of manufac-turing, is carried on." Webster Dict.

A manufactory is "a house or place where enything is manufactured." Ibid.

Neither term would be understood or used by the mass of mankind to describe simply "machinery and apparatus used in the business of manufacturing leather and morocco," which is the description in the written part of the policy that is claimed to mean a mill or manufactory as used in the printed part. If the de-fendant intended to attach the condition in question to machinery used in a mill, it should have said so. In the condition relating to the fall of a building it is provided that "this policy, if covering thereon, or on property there-in, shall thereupon immediately cease." So the clause prohibiting the use of certain in-flammable substances provides that if they are "stored, kept or used in any building on which, or on the contents of which, there is any insurance," the policy shall be void.

Thus it appears that in certain instances, by the use of language that no one could mistake, the insurer made its intent clear that a certain condition should apply both to real and per-sonal property. If it intended that the condisonal property. It intended that the condi-tion under consideration should thus apply, why did it not say so? We think that this con-dition refers to a mill or manufactory in the sense only of a building used for milling or manufacturing, and that it has no application to the personal property covered by the

Moreover, if there is a reasonable doubt as to the meaning or application of this clause, it should be construed most favorably to the in-

cuted the contract, and is responsible for the language used. Kratzenstein v. Western Assur. Co. 116 N. Y. 54, 59; Dilleber v. Home L. Ins. Co. 69 N. Y. 256, 263.

As was said by this court in a recent case:
"The defendant is claiming a forfeiture.
When a clause in a contract is capable of two constructions, one of which will support, and the other defeat, the principal obligation, the former will be preferred. Forfeitures are not favored, and the party claiming a forfeiture will not be permitted, upon equivocal or doubtful clauses or words contained in his own contract, to deprive the other party of the benefit of the right or indemnity for which he contracted." Baley v. Homestead F. Ins. Co. 80 Y. 21, 23.

The learned counsel for the defendant has referred us to a case, recently decided by this court, in which the plaintiff sought to recover for a loss upon the building that contained the personal property involved in this action, and destroyed by the same fire. Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co. 118 N. Y. 165.

The policy in that case covered the building

only, and provided that if said building should become vacant or unoccupied the insurance should cease. We gave effect to that condition, which was clear and unequivocal, by reversing the judgment that the plaintiff had recovered. In another case arising out of the same fire, and decided during the present term, the policy covered personal property only, described as contained in said building; but it provided that "if the above-mentioned premises," referring to the building, should become vacant or unoccupied, the policy should be void. Halpin v. Æina F. Ins. Co. 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 259.

In that case, also, we were required by the clear and unmistakable terms of the contract, sured, because the insurer prepared and exe- and the facts as disclosed by the evidence, to

ployes are retained in the service of lessee, and are actually engaged about their usual work in the mill up to and on the day of the fire, and all the Plant and some material and manufactured goods are there. American F. Ins. Co. v. Brighton Cotton Mfg. Co. 15 West. Rep. 180, 125 Hl. 131.

Where, during repairs of machinery by a manufacturing company, watchmen were on duty and employes were about the factory from its closing until it burned, it is not unoccupied. Brighton Mfg. Co. v. Reading F. Ins. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 23; Brighton Mfg. Co. v. Fire Asso. of Phila. Id. 234; Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leathers (Pa.) 6 Cent. Rep. 901.

Provisions against ceasing to operate mill or machinery

Provision against ceasing to operate a tannery will not be violated, if at the time of the fire the use of the premises is the same as at the time of insurance. Lebanon Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Erb, 2 Cent. Rep. 783, 112 Pa. 149.

The temporary suspension of the operation of a steam engine in a planing mill, materially decreas-ing the risk, the other business continuing, does not avoid a policy conditioned to be void on sus-pending operations without a special agreement indorsed on the policy. Allemannia F. Ins. Co. v. White (Pa.) 10 Cent. Rep. 65.

But a building insured as a trip-hammer shop, the business therein suspended for more than thirty days, the machinery and tools remaining there and Mut. F. Ins. Co. (Mich.) Nov. 23, 1888. 8 L. R. A.

the plaintiff's son going through the shop nearly every day to see if things were right, did not constitute occupancy. Moore v. Phœnix F. Ins. Co. 3 New Eng. Rep. 57, 64 N. H. 140.

A temporary cessation of the operation of a manufactory, occasioned by the prevalence of an epedemic, is not a ceasing of operation. Poss v. Western Assur. Co.7 Lea, 704.

A mere temporary suspension of business to make repairs, or for want of materials, is not a cessation of operation. Lebauon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leathers (Pa.) 6 Cent. Rep. 901.

A sawmill lying idle for several weeks for lack of water or want of logs does not thereby cease to be occupied. Whitney v. Black River Ins. Co. 72

The stoppage of a mill, though for the purpose of necessary repairs, without the required notice, is within the provision of a policy that, if the mill shall be shut down or remain idle from any cause whatever, the policy shall be considered suspended until work resumed. Day v. Mill-Owners Mut. F. Ins. Co. 70 Iowa, 710.

A temporary suspension of the operation of a mill for forty-two days, occasioned solely by the want of logs to manufacture, while the logs were expected daily, does not make the policy void, under a provision that if the mill shall cease to be operated, unless shut down for repairs without notice to and consent of the company, it shall be void. City P. & S. Mill Co. v. Merchants M. & C. in favor of the plaintiff. But we are called up | property covered by the policy on in the case at bar to enforce a contract that differs materially from either of the others be affirmed. named, because it fails to attach any condition

reverse the judgment that had been rendered that was shown to have been violated, to the

The judgment in this case, therefore, should

All concur.

WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS.

John W. SMITH and Wife COUNTY COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY, Plff. in Err.

(.... W. Va....)

*The plaintiff and a lady friend were driving a single horse, in a spring wagon, along the road leading from the City of Charleston to the Town of Malden, in Kanawha County. At a point in said road where it was from twelve to eighteen feet wide, two calves yoked together came suddenly from the pawpaw bushes, and frightened the horse, which the plaintiff had owned for two years, and regarded as gentle; and he commenced backing, and continued so to do until he backed the wagon and its occupants and himself over the steep river bank, whereby the plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. In a suit brought by said plaintiff against the County Court of Kanawha County to recover damages for the injuries sustained, it was proven by plaintiff that she could have managed the horse but for the narrowness of the road; that she had traveled the same road two or three times a week for the previous two years without accident,-and by another witness that the road was *Head note by ENGLISH, J.

in good condition, smooth and cindered, and that he had traveled said road two hundred times a year for sixteen years, driving all kinds of horses and teams, and had never met with an accident; that the road at that point was wide enough for two teams to pass, and on one side of the road was a steep mountain which slipped into the road in wet times, and on the other side the river bank. Held, that under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was not liable for said injury.

(March 25, 1890.)

RROR to the Circuit Court for Kanawha. L County to review a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from a defect in a public highway. Reversed.

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. Messrs. Okey Johnson and S. C. Burdett, with Messrs. Sylvester Chapman and A. B. Littlepage, for plaintiff in error:
The County is not required to make the

traveled part of the highway the whole width of the road as laid out, and will not be liable for defects in that part not usually traveled upon which do not affect the safety of the other part.

NOTE.-Negligence; liability for injuries produced by.

One who violates a duty owed to others, or who commits a tortious or wrongfully negligent act, is liable not only for those injuries which are the direct and immediate consequences of his act, but for such consequential injuries as, according to common experience, are likely to and do in fact result from his act. McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290; Mctallic C. C. Co. v. Fitchburg R. Co. 109 Mass. 277; Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131; Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co. 104 Mass. 64; Smethurst y. Independent Congregational Church, 2 L. R. A. 695, 148 Mass, 261.

The resulting injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the original tortious or negligent act. See note to Louisville, N. A. & C. R.

Co. v. Lucas (Ind.) 6 L. R. A. 194.

A carrier's act, from which an injury results, will be deemed the proximate cause, unless the consequences were so unnatural and unusual that they could not have been foreseen and provided against by the highest practicable care, although the precise accident which occurred might not have been anticipated. See Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Lucas, 6 L. R. A. 193, 119 Ind. 583.

Negligence is the commission of a lawful act in a careless manner, or the omission to perform a legal duty, to the injury of another. Splittorf v. State, 10 Cent. Rep. 699, 108 N. Y. 205; Lehigh & W. Coal Co. v. Lear (Pa.) 8 Cent. Rep. 109.

The basis of liability in negligence is the violation of some legal duty to exercise care. Cusick v. Adams, 115 N. Y. 55.

The fact that an accident is unusual, unexpected or unheard of will not excuse the negligence which causes it. Doyle v. Chicago, St. P. & K. C. R. Co. 4 L. R. A. 420, 77 Iowa, 607. 8 L. R. A.

The loss or injury attributed to the proximate cause.

There should be such affinity or connection in the relation of the cause and the effect, that the influence of the wrongful act should predominate over other supervening causes. Brown v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 2 West. Rep. 558, 20 Mo. App. 222; Gilliland v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 2 West. Rep. 138, 19 Mo. App. 411.

When there is no intermediate efficient cause, the original wrong must be considered as reaching tothe effect and proximate to it. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 (24 L. ed. 256).

In all cases of loss it is to be attributed to the proximate cause, and not to the remote cause. This maxim governs in cases of insurance. Waters v. Merchants Louisville Ins. Co. 36 U. S. 11 Pet. 213 9 L. ed. 621; West Mahanoy Twp. v. Watson, 8 Cent. Rep. 543, 116 Pa. 344.

If negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, it is of no consequence whether it be by omission or commission. Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. 9 West. Rep. 448, 45 Ohio St. 11.

Negligence is not actionable unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. Mathiason v. Mayer, 7 West. Rep. 739, 90 Mo. 585; Pitts-burgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Conn, 1 West. Rep. 904, 104 Ind. 64; Carter v. Chambers, 79 Ala. 223.

Negligence in standing on the step of a car platform while the train is in motion is not the proximate cause of injury from a lever or signal of a switch which scraped the cars as they passed. Boss v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 5 Dak. 308.

The stoppage of a gas pipe is not the proximate cause of an accident, during an experiment made to increase the pressure. Taylor v. Baldwin, 78

Where one keeps a magazine of explosives in vio-

See also 12 L. R. A. 257, 482; 14 L. R. A. 743; 16 L. R. A. 106, 545; 17 L. R. A. 217, 310; 19 L. R. A. 365; 20 L. R. A. 582; 21 L. R. A. 316, 721; 35 L. R. A. 199.

If the road was dangerous, and the female plaintiff knew it was dangerous, but she was willing to risk it if anybody else was, then the evidence shows no right to recover, because she ought not to have driven over it, and it was negligence in her to do so.

Phillips v. Ritchie Co. Ct. 31 W. Va. 477; Moore v. Huntington, Id. 842; Hubbard v. Concord, 35 N. H. 52; Raymond v. Lowell, 6 Cush.

If the road was safe and good to the width of eleven to fifteen feet, and safe to pass, if the horse did not become frightened, and the cause of the injury was, not the narrowness of the road, but "the calves coming down from the hillside out of some pawpaw bushes," which frightened the horse and caused him to back over the bank, then she is not entitled to re-

A county is not liable for every object which renders a public road unsafe and inconvenient for travelers to pass over it, but only for such as not only render the road unsafe and inconvenient, but also defective or out of repair, and the injury must be attributable to the defect or want of repair.

Cook v. Charlestown, 13 Allen, 190, note. The duty of the County to the traveling public does not extend to the degree of keeping its

Dickey v. Mains Teleg. Co. 46 Me. 483; Phil- road in such condition that no injury could lips v. Ritchie Co. Ct. 31 W. Va. 481. possibly happen.

Wilson v. Charlestown, 8 Allen, 137. Messrs. Knight & Couch, with Mr. Sam

D. Littlepage, for defendant in error:
The complaint is good in that it alleges that that particular road, at that particular point where the injury occurred, was in a bad condition and out of repair in point of narrowness, and that that resulted in the injury complained of.

Stone v. Hubbardston, 100 Mass. 49.

The mere fact that a traveler is familiar with the road, and knows of the existence of a defect therein, will not impose upon him the duty to use more than ordinary care in avoiding it.

Shearm. & Redf. Neg. §§ 346, 376; Lyman v. Hampshire Co. 1 New Eng. Rep. 227, 140 Mass. 311; Henry Co. Turnp. Co. v. Jackson, 86 Ind. 111; Bullock v New York, 99 N.Y. 654; Lyman calves was the cause of the accident, a cause that could in no sense be attributed to any fault strong Co. 56 Pa. 204; Evans v. Utica, 69 N.Y. or neglect of the County.

Kingsbury v. Dedham, 13 Allen, 189; Lund 73; Smith v. St. Joseph, 45 Mo. 449; Karanaugh v. Janesville, 24 Wis 618. Karanaugh v. Janesville, 24 Wis. 618; Kenworthy v. Ironton, 41 Wis. 647; Murphy v. Indianapolis, 83 Ind. 76; Wilson v. Trafalgar & B. C. Gr. Road Co. 83 Ind. 326; Huntington v. Breen, 77 Ind.

Where two causes combine to produce an injury to a traveler upon a highway, both of which are in their nature proximate, the one being a culpable defect in the highway and the other some occurrence for which neither party is responsible, the municipality is liable, pro-

lation of law, he is not liable solely because of such violation, unless the violation is in some degree the cause of the injury. Lafin & R. Powder Co. v. Tearney (IIL) 7 L. R. A. 262.

Where a person willfully turned a stream from a hose upon horses hitched in front of his premises and they ran away and collided with a wagon, he was liable for the injury. Forney v. Geldmacher. 75 Mo. 113.

In determining the proximity of cause the true rule is that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence. West Mahanoy Twp. v. Watson, 8 Cent. Rep. 543, 116 Pa. 344; Southside Pass. R. Co. v. Trich, 10 Cent. Rep. 867, 117 Pa. 390.

The ascertainment of the dividing line between proximate and remote cause, in actions for damages for injuries by negligent use of highways by railroad trains, is so perplexing that to a sound judgment must be left each particular case, upon the special facts belonging to it. Brown v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. 2 West, Rep. 560, 20 Mo. App.

Slipping on an ky street and falling against a cellar door do not show a case of negligence in maintaining the door. Hunter v. Wanamaker (Pa.) 2 Cent. Rep. 70.

The mere act of shooting a dog, though itself a tort, is not the proximate cause of injury to one startled by the report who, owing to previous delicate health, became ill from the nervous shock. Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90.

The removal of a fence along a railroad is not the proximate cause of a subsequent injury to cattle. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Guthrie, 10 Lea,

Failure to signal the starting of a train is not the Proximate cause of injury to one who knew it was them on a street, neither can recover for injuries 5 L.R.A.

going to start or that it was in motion. Barkley v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 96 Mo. 367.

Where cattle stopped on a highway by a standing railroad train are injured by another train, the obstruction caused by the standing train is too remote a cause of injury to make the company liable. Brown v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. supra.

Damages resulting from fright or nervous shock to a person not actually struck, caused by the fall of a bundle of laths through the negligence of another person, are too remote to be recovered. Rock v. Denis (Super. Ct.) 4 Montreal L. Rep. 356.

Proximate and remote cause of injury. See notes to Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Lucas (Ind.) 6 L. R. A. 194; Erickson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. (Minn.) 5 L. B. A. 786.

Co-operating causes.

When two causes co-operate to produce damage the proximate cause is the originating and efficient cause which sets the other cause in motion. Lapleine v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & Steamship Co. 1 L. R. A. 378, and note, 40 La. Ann. 661.

If there be a concurrence of some other immediate agency, that event must have been the effect of the act complained of or within the range of probable occurrence. Gilliland v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 2 West. Rep. 138, 19 Mo. App. 411.

A railroad lawfully built on a public street, and carefully operated, is not liable for injury to a pedestrian, run over by a passing team, by reason of snow-drifts on the sidewalk. The injury in such case results by failure of the city to keep its sidewalks passable. McCandless v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 71 Wis. 41.

Where the united and contemporaneous negligence of two persons causes a collision between vided the injury would not have been sustained but for such defect.

Shearm. & Redf. Neg. § 346, and authorities cited in note; Ring v. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 264; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Palmer v. Andover, 2 Cush. 600: Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296: Hey v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 44; Brookville & C. Turnp. Co. v. Pumphrey, 59 Ind. 78; Hull v. Kansas City, 54 Mo. 599; Olson v. Chippewa Falls, 71 Wis. 558; Burrell Twp. v. Uncapher, 10 Cent. Rep. 328, 117 Pa. 353, 2 Am. St. Rep. 664; North Manheim Twp. v. Arnold, 11 Cent. Rep. 846, 119 Pa. 380; Flagg v. Hudson, 2 New Eng. Rep. 652, 142 Mass. 280; Rushville v. Adams, 5 West. Rep. 682, 107 Ind. 475.

The law requires every road to be thirty feet wide.

Warth's Code, chap. 43, § 34.

The defendant was clearly guilty of negligence, not only by reason of the unlawful narrowness of the road at that point, but also by reason of the total absence of any protection to travelers by fence, railing, barriers or other-

Olson v Chippeua Falls, 71 Wis. 558; Houfe v. Fulton, 29 Wis. 296, 9 Am. Rep. 568; Baldwin v. Greenwood's Turnp. Co. 40 Conn. 238, 16 Am. Rep. 33; Page v. Bucksport, 64 Me. 51. 18 Am. Rep. 33; Fage v. Bucksport, 64 Me. 51, 18 Am. Rep. 239; Hey v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 44, 22 Am. Rep. 733; Lower Macungie Twp. v. Merkhoffer, 71 Pa. 276; Hays v. Gallagher, 72 Pa. 136; McKee v Bidwell, 74 Pa. 218; Burrell Twp. v. Uncapher, 10 Cent. Rep. 328, 117 Pa. 353; Harris v. Clinton Tup. 64 Mich. 447, 8 Am. St. Rep. 842; Baltimore & H. Turnp. Co. v. Bateman, 88 Md. 389, 6 Am. St. Rep. 449 English, J., delivered the opinion of the

An action of trespass on the case was brought to the February Rules, 1888, in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, by John W. Smith and Leonora Smith, his wife, against the County Court of Kanawha County. On the 23d day of March, 1888, on the plaintiff's motion, the case was remanded to rules, with leave to them to amend their declaration, and on the 3d day of January, 1889, the defendant appeared by counsel, and demurred to the plaintiffs' declaration, which demurrer, being argued by counsel, and considered by the court, was overruled, and thereupon the defendant pleaded not guilty, and issue was therein joined; and thereupon a trial was had before a jury, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for \$750. The defendant then moved the court to set aside said verdict of the jury as being contrary to the law and the evidence, and award it a new trial, which motion the court, after consideration, overruled, to which action and ruling of the court the defendant excepted, and the court entered up judgment upon said verdict; and the defendant tendered a bill of exceptions to certain actions and rulings of the court, which was made a part of the record in the case; and the defendant applied for and obtained a writ of error and supersedeus to said judgment.

The facts set forth in the bill of exceptions

shows that the female plaintiff was driving a horse which she and her husband both regarded as gentle, returning home from Charleston in a spring wagon, accompanied by Miss Emma v. Bateman, 68 Md. 389, 6 Am. St. Rep. 449, Jacob, along the road leading to her home in

7 L. R. A. 678, and note.

Intervening agency breaks causal connection.

If a new cause intervenes sufficient of itself to cause the misfortune, the former must be considered too remote. Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 65 Tex. 274.

The negligence of a responsible agent intervening between defendant's negligence and the injury suffered, i. c. the damage, breaks the causal connec--, Feb. 23, 1889. tion. Mahogany v. Ward, 16 R. I. -

So where horses were frightened by the upsetting of a vehicle in a defective highway, and after running for some distance were killed by a train of cars, the town authorities were held not liable. West Mahanoy Twp. v. Watson, 3 Cent. Rep. 243, 112 Pa. 574.

Where a person traveling by night, driven by a drunken driver, is precipitated down an unfenced bank, the drunkenness of the driver, and not the defective condition of the road, is the proximate cause of the injury. Hershey v. Mill Creek Twp. Road Comrs. (Pa.) 8 Cent. Rep. 252.

One negligent person cannot escape liability for his negligence because the negligence of a third person concurred in producing the injury. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Lucas, 6 L. B. A. 193, and note, 119 Ind. 583; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186; Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N. Y. 138; Barrett v. Third Ave. R. Co. 45 N. Y. 623; Thomp. Neg. 1088.

A village is hable for personal injury caused by a fall from an unguarded sidewalk although the direct cause of the fall is the negligence of a third party pushing him off. Carterville v. Cook (III.) 4 L. R. A. 721, and note.

8 L. R. A.

sustained thereby. Evansy. Adams Exp. Co. (Ind.) | negligence of a stranger, is the direct and proximate cause of injury from a fall of the lumber pile. Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87.

Driving at an unlawful rate in the street is the proximate cause of a collision with another vehicle, although the parties were prevented from quickly turning out by reason of the condition of the street

railway. De Camp v. Sioux City, 74 Iowa, 392. Where the wrong of one party places another in a dilemma, such wrong is to be deemed the proximate cause of the injury which ensues. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v, Falvey, 2 West. Rep. 657, 104 Ind. 430; Harris v. Clinton Twp. 7 West. Rep. 666, 64 Mich. 447; Cody v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co. (Mass.) 7 L. R. A. 843.

Where one injured by the negligence of another does all that a prudent person could have done under the circumstances it will absolve him from the charge of contributory negligence. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Lucas, supra. See Carterville v. Cook (Ill.) 4 L. R. A. 721.

Effect produced by an intervening cause.

An intervening cause cannot affect the liability of a negligent party. Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. 9 West. Rep. 446, 45 Ohio St. 11. Where the intervening cause and its probable or

reasonable consequences could reasonably have been anticipated by the original wrong-doer the causal connection between the original wrongful act and subsequent injury is not broken. Scale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 65 Tex. 274. See note to Erickson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. (Minn.) 5 L. R. A. 787.

The fact that land of a third party intervened between the woodland of the plaintiff and the dearty pushing him off. Carterville v. Cook (III.) 4 fendant's road would not alone be decisive, if the R. A. 721, and note.

Negligently piling lumber, concurring with the natural and direct effect of the first firing. O'Neill the Town of Malden; that she had owned the horse for about two years, and had driven him from Malden to Charleston two or three times a week during that time, and had never known him to frighten; and that two calves came down from the hillside, out of the pawpaw bushes, and her horse became frightened, and commenced backing; that she tried to keep him in the road, but could not do so; that the horse backed until he backed across the road and over the river bank, a distance of about forty feet from the top of the river bank; that at the time her horse became frightened she was driving next to the mountain, on the side of the road furthest from the river; that she tried to keep the horse in the road, but he was so badly frightened she could not do so, although he was a gentle horse, easily managed, and had never become frightened before; that the road at that point was about from eleven to eighteen feet wide; that she received injuries from said accident of a serious and permanent character, and was under the treatment of a physician during the entire summer; that she was keeping a boarding-house in the Town of Malden, but had to give up the business on account of the injuries received, and since the accident had been unable to attend to her household affairs; that there was not room for two wagons to pass at the point where the accident occurred; that the road was in about the same condition it was during the two years she had been driving over it; that it looked dangerous; that said plaintiff had always considered it dangerous, but she was willing to risk it if anyone else was; that there was no other road by which she could return home; that she could have managed her horse had it not been for the narrowness of the road. This was, in substance, the testimony of the female plaintiff.

stance, the same, fixing the width of the road. at the point where the accident occurred, at twelve feet, and stating that his wife is helpless now, unable to do any work; that she had to give up her boarding-house in Malden, and remain with him in Charleston, where his business is; that the road where the accident occurred, as far as it was made, was a good road. and the road was a favorite driving place be-tween Charleston and Malden; that the slip from the mountain was not interfering with the road at the time of the accident, that he knew of.

J. E. Dana, a witness for the plaintiffs, proved that the road at that point was sixteen or eighteen feet wide; that the road was a favorite drive for pleasure; that he had driven along the road two hundred times a year for sixteen years, with all kinds of horses and teams, and had never met with an accident, and had never heard of one happening on said road; that the mountain on the upper side always slipped after a heavy rain, but the slips were always cleared away by parties in charge of the road; that the many slips had forced a curve in the road, throwing the road out close to the river bank; that the road was wide enough for two teams to pass; and that he, in driving, passed other teams at said point, and the road was as smooth as any road he had driven over in the County.

W. A. Bradford, a witness for plaintiffs, proved that he was well acquainted with the road at the point where the accident occurred; saw it next day after the accident; saw marks of the wagon wheel where it went over the bank; that the road was narrow at that point; that it was very difficult for two buggies to pass, but that they might, if they were careful; that he had known the road for forty years; that it had been narrow for five years; that it The testimony of J. W. Smith was, in sub- had been repaired, but not widened, and he

v. New York, O. & W. R. Co. 115 N. Y. 584; Vandenburg v. Truax, 4 Denio. 464; Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200; Webb v. Rome, W. &. O. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 420.

But where several buildings in succession take fire, each from another, and burn, the sparks which set the first one being carried past the last one burned, by a strong wind which changed its direction and subsided before the latter buildings took fire, while lack of fire apparatus or ladders prevented extinguishing the fire at the beginning, the burning of the last building is not the proximate result of the setting fire to the first one. Read v. Nichols 7 L. R. A. 130, 118 N. Y. 224

The falling of a tier of berths in a ship's cabin is the proximate cause of injury to a passenger, who, being dragged from her place of peril by the steward, was dashed on the floor and against a door by the sudden lurch of the vessel. Smith v. British & N. A. R. M. S. Packet Co. 14 Jones & S. 86.

A person who hitched his borses by the lines only is liable for injury caused by their fright and run

ning away. Wagner v. Goldsmith, 73 Ind. 517. So where a horse, through fright at the fall of ice from a building, started and thereby threw the driver and injured him, the fall of ice is the direct cause of the injury. Smethurst v. Independent Congregational Church, 2 L. R. A. 695, 148 Mass.

The blowing of a steam whistle is the proximate cause of injury to a traveler by a horse frightened by the whistle. Gibbs v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 26 Minn, 427. 8 L. R. A.

Where a stringer of a bridge breaks while a person is hauling a steam-boiler and a steam-engine over the bridge, and his horses are injured by the steam escaping from the boiler, the breaking of the bridge is the proximate cause of the escape of the steam and water, and the township is liable for the damage if it has been negligent in respect to the bridge. McKeller v. Monitor Twp. (Mich.) Dec.

Where by negligence the horses of defendant ran away and collided with a carriage, the occupant of which was killed by being dashed down a depression in the road, there is a direct causal connection between the collision and the killing. Belk v. People, 15 West. Rep. 59, 125 III, 584.

The unlawful speed of a train is the proximate cause of a collision at a crossing when, if the train had been going only at lawful speed, the traveler at the crossing would have passed over in safety before it arrived. Winstanley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 72 Wis. 375.

Where the employes of a railroad company placed a torpedo where children were in the habit of passing, and one was injured by its explosion, such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. Harriman v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. 9 West. Rep. 438, 45 Ohio St. 11.

An unnecessary act which would probably cause a chain to break, may be regarded as the proximate cause of the injury caused by its breaking. King v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 25 Fed. Bep. 799.

thought it was a very dangerous place, but that there was plenty of room for one vehicle to pass in safety, if the horse did not become frightened; that there was a great deal of pleas-

ure driving on that road.

Dr. Thomas, another witness for the plain-tiffs, stated that, a short time before the trial of the cause commenced, he examined the plaintiff Mrs. J. W. Smith, and took a measure-ment of her left arm; that it was three fourths of an inch less in circumference than the right arm,-caused, in his opinion, by an injury.

These, in substance, constitute the facts proven by the plaintiffs; and, under the rulings of this court, we must, in considering the motion for a new trial, reject all of the evidence of the exceptor which is in conflict with that of the plaintiffs, and give full force and effect to the evidence of the plaintiffs. See Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23.

And the same rule must be applied in considering the propriety of the action of the court upon the motion to exclude the evidence of the plaintiffs. See Wandling v. Straw, 25 W. Va. 692; Franklin v. Geho, 30 W. Va. 27.

In determining the question as to whether the court erred in overruling the demurrer filed by the defendant in this case, it is only necessary to call attention to the fact that the demurrer was general; and counsel for the defendant do not insist that there was any defect in the second count. Neither is there any error apparent on the face of said second count, so far as we are able to discover; and, the second count being good, the demurrer, being general, was properly overruled. Nutter stricker, 11 W. Va. 536.

The serious question, however, which is presented by this case for our consideration and determination, is whether or not the court erred in refusing to exclude the evidence of the plaintiffs from the jury as being insufficient to maintain their suit, or in overruling the mo-tion of the defendant to set aside the verdict of the jury as being contrary to the law and the evidence, and award it a new trial; and, as these rulings involve so nearly the same questions of law and fact, they may be considered together. What was it that caused the damage and injury to the female plaintiff on the day this accident is alleged to have occurred? Her own testimony shows that she had passed over this road two or three times a week for the preceding two years without injury. She was driving a horse that the evidence shows was gentle, and was driving him on the side of the road furthest from the river bank, and no doubt would have passed on as usual if the horse had not become frightened at the calves coming down from the hillside out of some pawpaw bushes, and commenced backing. That she tried to keep her horse in the road; but he was so badly frightened she could not do so, although he was gentle, easily managed and never had become frightened before. The witness Dana fixes the width of the road at that point at eighteen feet, and J. W. Smith at twelve feet. Dividing the difference between these witnesses would make the road fifteen feet. Then the plaintiff, driving at the edge of the road next the hill, was as far from the river bank as she would have been if the road had been thirty feet wide, and she had been stone at a distance of about 180 feet, throwing 8 L. R. A.

driving in the middle of the same; and the horse would have to back the same distance to reach the river bank. In the absence of the calves, then, would the narrowness of the road have injured the plaintiff? This question is answered by the testimony of the witness Dana in detailing his experience for the previous sixteen years in passing over said road two hundred times a year, with all kinds of horses and teams, and without an accident, and also by the experience of the plaintiff herself, in passing over the same road for two years, two or three times a week, with this same horse; she encountered no calves on these many trips. and she met with no accident.

What, then, are we to conclude was the proximate cause of the accident? Was it the narrowness of the road? If such was the case, why had it not occurred many times be-

fore?

1 Shearm. & Redf. Neg., § 26, says: "The breach of duty upon which an action is brought must be not only the cause, but the proximate cause, of the damage to the plaintiff. We adhere to this old form of words because while it may not have originally meant what is now intended, it is not immovably identified with any other meaning, and is the form which has been so long in use that its rejection would make nearly all reported cases on the question involved unintelligible. The proximate cause of an event must be understood to be that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces that event, and without which that event would not have oc-curred." And note 3: "If it cannot be said that the result would have inevitably occurred by reason of the defendant's negligence, it cannot be found that it did so occur, and plaintiff has not made out his case.

Applying this law to the facts of this case. can it be said the condition of the road was the proximate cause of the accidentor injury complained of? If the use of this road, which had been for years in the same condition, without any accident resulting therefrom, had continued uninterrupted or unbroken by any new cause, such as the calves rushing from the bushes, would we be sanctioned in saying the injury would have resulted? Or can we say that, without the occurrence of that unlookedfor event, the horse would have backed the vehicle over the river bank? The experience of the plaintiff and others for years answers in

the negative.

In the case of Kingsbury v. Dedham, 13 Allen 186, it was held that "an object in a highway with which a traveler does not come in contact or collision, and which is not shown to be an actual incumbrance or obstruction in the way of travel, is not to be deemed a defect for the sole reason that it is of a nature to cause a horse to take fright, in consequence of which he escapes from the control of his driver and causes damage." In this case the horse was frightened by a small pile of gravel in the road,

And in the case of Cook v. Charlestown, reported in a note (p. 190) of the same volume, a horse became frightened at another horse which had dropped dead, and was lying at the side of the street; and the frightened horse started and ran, and the carriage struck a tree and the curbthe plaintiffs out, and injuring them. There horse getting his tail over the lines and becom-was plenty of room for plaintiffs to pass with ing unmanageable. out coming in contact with the dead horse. Under instructions authorizing them to do so, the jury found damages for the plaintiffs, and the defendant excepted; and the case was reversed upon a writ of error.

In the case of Titus v. Northbridge, 97 Mass. 265, the court holds "that when a horse, by reason of fright, disease or viciousness, becomes actually uncontrollable, so that his driver cannot stop him, or direct his course, or exercise or regain control over his movements, and in this condition comes upon a defect in a highway, or upon a place which is defective for want of a railing, by which the injury is oc-casioned, the town is not liable for the injury unless it appears that it would have occurred if the horse had not been so uncontrollable. But a horse is not to be considered uncontrollable that merely shies or starts, or is momentarily not controlled by his driver.'

In the case of Horton v. Taunton, reported in a note [p. 266] to Titus v. Northbridge, supra, the facts were somewhat similar to the case under consideration: "A laborer employed by the city had deposited a load of stones within the limits of the highway, and near to, but wholly out of, the traveled portion of it, by the side of a reservoir. . . The plaintiffs were driving from west to east, and had come within a few feet of these stones when their horse took fright at them, and suddenly began to back, and continued backing until he reached a point beyond the end of the railing west of the brook, and within the thirty-one feet where the bank was unprotected by a railing; and there he backed himself and the wagon over the bank, and the injuries were sustained for which this action was brought. The accident occurred, and all the damage was done, within the limits of the highway. The plaintiffs remained in the wagon, and retained hold of the reins, and used the ordinary means to control the horse and prevent the backing, but without the horse. Neither the horse are the wagon. success. Neither the horse nor the wagon came in contact with the stones, . . . nor would the accident have occurred if the horse had not been frightened; and it was agreed that 'the accident would not, probably, have occurred had the railing extended further westward," that the want of a railing at the point where the horse backed over the bank was a defect in the highway, and had existed for many months." There was a judgment for plaintiffs in the court below. Chapman, J., de-livering the opinion of the court, said: "This case was considered by the court in connection with Titus v. Northbridge, and the two cases must be governed by the same principle;" and, after briefly reviewing the facts, gave judg-ment for the defendants.

In the case of Jackson v. Bellevieu, 30 Wis. 251, the court held as follows: "It is not the duty of towns to provide roads which shall be safe for runaway or unmanageable horses, or such as have escaped from control of their drivers without the fault of the town; and where injuries are sustained under such circumstances, it appearing that otherwise they might not have been sustained, the loss must fall upon the owners. See also Fogg v. Nahant, SLR.A.

ing unmanageable.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Smith, stated that "she tried to keep her horse in the road, but he was so badly frightened she could not do so." does not, however, state what she did in try-ing to keep her horse in the road. Jennie Jennie Jones, however, the witness for defendant, who swears that she was driving the calves, does tell what Mrs. Smith did, and her evidence cannot be regarded as conflicting with any evidence offered by the plaintiffs, for no other witness tells what Mrs. Smith did. She "I was driving two calves, and just as Says: they came up to the horse the horse got scared at the calves, and commenced backing; and Mrs. Smith, who was driving, commenced pulling on the lines, and the horse kept on backing, and the wagon and all went over the bank."

Mrs. Smith was in a situation that would have a tendency to excite a lady. The horse was frightened and backing, and the wagon was near the edge of the bank, which the witnesses speak of as being dangerous; and she may not have preserved that coolness which would enable her to properly manage a horse, although she was accustomed to driving. And pulling on the lines, under all the circumstances, would have a direct tendency to contribute to the result. She, however, says that she could have managed her horse had it not been for the narrowness of the road. her opinion; but the horse kept backing, till not only the wagon and occupants, but he, went over the bank after them.

Upon this question, as to the width a county road is required to be maintained and kept in order, it is true our Statute requires that "every road shall be thirty feet wide, unless the county court order it to be of a different width." The order establishing this road does not appear as a part of the record, and it does not appear whether it was ordered to be of a differ-

ent width or not.

Ang. & D. Kighw. § 260, says: "It is not required that towns-at least in the countryshould incur the expense of having the whole width of a highway of two or four rods passable safely with wheels on the sides, or even a double track for wheels over all public roads including causeways and bridges. But if the town suffers the traveled part to become widened, or a turnout to exist from the trav-But if the eled part to a private way over adjoining land with the characteristic marks of a highway, it is bound to keep such places, within the limits of the laying out of the highway, in suitable repair for travel usually passing,"—referring to Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708; Green v. Danby, 12 Vt. 338; Cobb v. Standish, 14 Me. 198, and others. He says further: "In many cases, as has been remarked, all the property of the town would be insufficient for that purpose. There may be ledges of rocks, ravines and watercourses in the road; and towns are not expected, in all cases, to bridge the whole width of the road, to fill up ravines or cut down ledges of rock. The most that could be required, in a road so difficult by nature, is that the sides should be in such a state as would Iall upon the owners. See also Fogg v. Nahant, admit of the passing of carriages when they 98 Mass. 578, where a carriage was upset by a meet without unusual delay or trouble. 'If a

road,' says Woodbury J., in the case of Hull although the plaintiff says "she could have v. Richmond, 2 Woodb. & M. 337, 'was on a managed the horse had it not been for the narsteep mountain side, or was carried up from rowness of the road." steep mountain side, or was carried up from the bed of a stream against a steep cliff of rocks, or through a narrow notch or gorge among the hills, a double track would seldom be expected, though places should be made, at no great distance, for persons to turn out en-tirely, and others where, by each turning out

in part, each could safely pass," etc.
In the case of Dickey v. Maine Teleg. Co. 46
Me. 483, the court held that "the law does not require the town, in preparing a highway for travel, ordinarily, to make the traveled path the whole width of the road. Towns are not liable for obstructions on the portions of a highway not constituting the traveled path, and not so connected with it as to affect the trav-

eled portion "

In this case, it is evident the road was a difficult one to keep in proper order. On the one side was the steep river bank, and on the other the hillside, which slipped and encroached up-on the road in wet weather; but, notwithstanding these facts, the evidence is that the road was in passable condition, and was wide enough for two teams to pass. All that the road surveyor, under our Statute, is required to do, is that "he shall superintend the county roads and bridges, cause the same to be put in good order and repair, of the proper width, well drained, and to be cleared, and kept clear, of rocks, falling timber, landslides, carcasses of dead animals and other obstructions, and remove all dead timber standing within thirty feet thereof." Code 1887, chap. 43, § 7. The only one of these requirements which it

is claimed was not complied with is the one in regard to the width of the road; and the au-thorities to which we have referred seem clearly to indicate that this requirement is not always to be complied with, but depends upon the character of the country over which the road is laid out; and, for a road located as this one was, with a steep river bank on one side and a slipping hill-side on the other, we think the evidence shows it was in as good condition as

could be expected.

Counsel for the defendant in error quote from 2 Shearm. & Redf. Neg., § 346, as follows: "The general rule is that where two causes combine to produce an injury to a travcler upon a highway, both of which are in their nature proximate,—the one being a culpable defect in the highway and the other some occurrence for which neither party is responsible,—the municipality is liable, provided the injury would not have been sustained but for such defect,"-and quote numerous decisions to sustain said proposition. We do not controvert this proposition; but, under the evidence adduced in this case, we hold that the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury was the sudden appearance of the calves from the pawpaw bushes, which frightened the horse, and without which the injury to plaintiff would not have resulted; that the narrowness of the road must be regarded as the remote cause, Lucas, J., concurred in the syllabus. 8 L. R. A.

There would, however, have been no necessity for managing the horse if the calves had not frightened him. Without that extraneous occurrence, we feel confident the plaintiff would have passed along the road as usual. There was no defect in the road that caused. the action of the horse, no hole in the ground left by the supervisor, or pile of stone or lum-ber placed there by him, that caused the backing, as there was in many of the cases reported. The plaintiff gives it as her opinion that she could have managed the horse but for the narrowness; but can we say, from all the circum-stances, the horse would not have backed over the bank if the road had been thirty feet wide? He showed no indication of ceasing to back, but kept on after the wheels went over, and until he went over himself; and I cannot say the result would not have been the same if the

road bad been thirty feet wide.

In the case of *Phillips* v. *Ritchie County Court*, 31 W. Va. 478, this court held that where the defect or obstruction in the road is merely a remote cause of the injury, and the want of care or negligence of the plaintiff is the direct or proximate cause of the injury, the

plaintiff cannot recover.

In the case of Fascett v. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co., 24 W. Va. 755, this court held that "the cause of an injury, in contemplation of law, is that which immediately produces it as its natural consequence; and therefore, if a party be guilty of a default or act of negli-gence which would naturally produce an injury to another, but, before such injury actually results, a third person does some act which is the immediate cause of the injury, such third person is alone responsible for the injury." See also the case of Washington v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 17 W. Va. 190.

In that case, Judge Green, delivering the opinion of the court, quotes from the case of Louisiana Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 52 [19 L. ed. 67], from the opinion of Justice Miller, as follows: "One of the most valuable criteria furnished us by these authorities is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power has intervened, of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the other must be

considered as too remote.'

In my view of the case, neither the instructions asked for by the plaintiff nor defendant were relevant, and they should have been rejected. Disregarding, then, the testimony offered by the defendant, and looking only to the tes-timony of the plaintiffs for the facts and circumstances of the case, and applying the law thereto, the judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the case remanded; and a new trial is awarded the appellant.

Snyder, P., and Brannon, J., concurred;

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURTA

Andreas M. MILLER, Appt., Luther MENDENHALL, Respt.

(____Minn.....)

- *1. The State holds the title to the soil in navigable waters to low-water mark in trust for the people, and chiefly for the protection of the right of navigation.
- 2. The riparian owner is entitled to fill in and make improvements in the shallow waters in front of his land to the line of navigability, and such improvements in aid of navigation are recognized as a public as well as private benefit. These rights pertain to the use and occupancy of the soil below low-water mark, and are valuable property rights, and the exercise thereof, though subject to state regulation, can only be interfered with by the State for public purposes.
- The establishment of a dock or harbor line in pursuance of legislative authority is to be considered as giving to the owners of the upland the privilege of filling in and building out to such line.
- 4. Where the owners of upland, bordering upon the Bay of Superior, in this State, after the establishment of the dock line, adopted a survey and plan of improvement for the use and occupation to such line of the submerged land abreast of the upland owned by them, in connection with the navigation of the lake,-Held, that they might not only possess,

*Head notes by VANDERBURGH, J.

occupy and improve the same themselves, in connection with the dry land, but might concede to other parties the same rights within the dock line, and might, by the appropriate covenants and stipulations in the deeds to their grantees of the upland, and of sites used or to be used and improved under low-water mark, obligate each and all to respect and recognize the validity of such grants made in conformity with the general plan of improvement of the premises within the dock line, all such grantees thus becoming a party thereto; and in such case a court of equity will not interpose in favor of a grantee of the upland to set aside prior deeds to grantees of sites in the submerged land.

(April 3, 1890.)

PPEAL by plaintiff from an order of the District Court for St. Louis County sutaining a demurrer to the complaint in an action to have a conveyance of certain land covered by the waters of Duluth Harbor declared of no effect and to remove the alleged cloud thereby cast on plaintiff's title.

firmed.

The facts fully appear in the opinion.

Mesers. Mahon & Howard, for appellant: All lands in the State of Minnesota, lying below low-water mark on navigable bays and rivers, belong to the State.

Brisbine v. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. 23 Minn. 114; Union Depot, S. R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297.

The establishment of a dock line, under au-

NOTE.—Title to soil below ordinary high-water mark.

All the soil below high-water mark, within the limits of the State, where the tide ebbs and flows, that is the subject of exclusive property and ownership, belongs to the State, subject only to such lawful grants of such soil as may have heretofore been made. Hess v. Muir, 5 Cent. Rep. 585, 65 Md.

But this soil is held by the State, not only subject to, but in some sense in trust for, the enjoyment of certain public rights, among which is the common liberty of taking fish, as well shell-fish as floating fish. Ibid.; Smith v. Maryland, 59 U. S. 18 How. 71 (15 L. ed. 269); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 367 (10 L. ed. 997); Den v. Jersey Co. 56 U. S. 15 How. 426 (14 L. ed. 757); Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 376; Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. L. 1; Parker v. Cutler Mildam Co. 20 Me. 353; Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day, 22; Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cush. 347; 1 Vattel, chap. 20, 8 246.

The State succeeds to the ownership of channels, and lands under them, formed by gradual encroachment of the sea, in case of permanent acquisition by the sea; but when the water disappears, the proprietorship returns to the original owner, without reference to the lapse of time. Mulry v. Norton, 1 Cent. Rep. 748, 100 N. Y. 424.

The sovereign succeeds to the ownership of such islands only as are originally created in tideways outside the boundaries of individual ownership. lbid.

Title to land under water, and to the shore below ordinary high-water mark, in navigable rivers and arms of the sea, was, by common law, vested in the sovereign. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 (24 L. ed. 224; Smith v. Maryland, supra; Pollard v. provements thereon necessary to navigation of Hagan, 44 U.S. 3 How. 212 (11 L. ed. 565); Goodtitle public passage by railways or otherwise, without 8 L. R. A.

v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13 L. ed. 220); Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11; People v. Davidson, 30 Cal. 379; State v. Sargent, 45 Conn. 358; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cush. 347; Com. v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 451; Gough v. Bell, 22 N. J. L. 441; Bell v. Gough, 23 N. J. L. 624; Stevens v. Paterson & N. R. Co. 34 N. J. L. 532; Providence Steam Engine Co. v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 12 R. I. 348; Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349; 3 Kent, Com. 427; 1 Bl. Com. 110, 234; Hale, De Jure Mar. chap. 4.

In England only tide-waters were regarded as navigable. This rule has been adopted in many of the States of this country; and in them the public title to beds and shores of navigable streams is confined to tide-waters. Barney v. Keckuk, su-

Since the decision in The Genesee Chief, in 1851 (53 U.S. 12 How. 443, 13 L. ed. 1058), declaring all the great lakes and rivers of the country navigable that are really such, there is no longer any reason for thus restricting the title of the State except as a change might interfere with vested rights and established rules of property. Ibid.

In Iowa the true rule has been adopted, and it is held that the bed of the Mississippi River and its banks to high-water mark belong to the State, and that the title of a riparian proprietor extends only to that line. Ibid.; Renwick v. Davenport & N. W. R. R. Co. 49 Iowa, 664.

This rule applies to land bounded upon the river generally. Barney v. Keokuk, supra.

Public authorities have the right, in Iowa, to build wharves and levees on the bank of the Mississippi below high-water mark,—the title below that line being in the State,-and make other im-

See also 8 L. R. A. 559; 13 L. R. A. 411, 590; 18 L. R. A. 668; 21 L. R. A. 62; 22 L. R. A. 736; 29 L. R. A. 539; 30 L. R. A. 497; 34 L. R. A. 184; 38 L. R. A. 606.

thority of the Legislature, cannot be regarded | as in any way operating as a conveyance from the State to the riparian proprietor of any title, interest or estate in the space between the shore and the dock line as established. The title to the bank and that to the submerged land remain precisely as they were before the dock line was established.

line was established.
Gould, Waters, § 138; Wetmore v. Brooklyn
Gas Light Co. 42 N. Y. 384; Atty-Gen. v. Hudson Tunnel R. Co. 27 N. J. Eq. 176; Boston &
H. Steamboat Co. v. Munson, 117 Mass. 34; People v. Broadway Wharf Co. 31 Cal. 13; Dana v.
Jackson Street Wharf Co. 31 Cal. 118; Kisling
v. Johnson, 13 Cal. 57; Schurmeier v. St. Paul &
P. R. Co. 10 Minn, 82; St. Paul & P. R. Co. v.
Schurmeier, 74 U. S. 7 Wall, 272, 287 (19 L. ed.
74, 78); McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa, 1;
Champlain & St. L. R. Co. v. Valentine, 19
Barb, 484. Barb. 484.

This case falls within the ruling of this court in Lake Superior Land Co. v. Emerson, 38 Minn. 406, which holds that the riparian right belonging to the owner of the shore is a mere natural right. It exists jure naturas. It is a right incident to the use of land. It follows the ownership and use of the bank and cannot

be severed from the abutting land.

For these reasons a deed of conveyance by the owner of the shore, of the submerged land in front of his premises, is inoperative. It passes no estate or interest in land.

Lake Superior Land Co. v. Emerson, 38 Minn. 406; Hanford v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. (Minn.) June 10, 1389.

It is doubtful whether the covenant for title

would bar the Improvement Company itself. should it attempt to assert, as against its grantee, the riparian right incident to other land owned by it.

Bliss v. Kennedy, 43 Ill. 67; Brigham v.

Smith, 4 Gray, 297.

Covenants for title in a deed cannot operate against the assigns of the covenantor even when named, excepting in the one case of a lease.

Rawle, Covenants for Title, § 313.

Where the truth appears upon the deed or instrument, a party shall not be estopped from taking advantage of it even to the extent of

showing that the grantor had nothing to grant.

Pelletreau v. Jackson, 11 Wend. 110, 118;

Wheelock v. Henshaw, 19 Pick. 341; Sinclair v.

Jackson, 8 Cow. 543; 2 Devlin, Deeds, § 1278.

To charge land with the burden of a cove-

nant, there must be some privity of estate be-tween the covenantee and the assignee of the lands so burdened or he will not be charged with the covenant.

with the covenant.

Brewer v. Marshall, 18 N. J. Eq. 337; National Union Bank v. Segur, 59 N. J. L. 173, 184; Van Rensselaer v. Smith, 27 Barb. 104, 146; Plymouth v. Carver, 16 Pick. 183; Norcross v. James, 1 New Eng. Rep. 327, 140 Mass. 188; Hurd v. Curtis, 19 Pick. 459; Bliss v. Kennedy, 231, 251, 257. 43 III. 67; Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory 40 N. Y. 191.

The benefits of these covenants and agreements will not at law accrue or pass to the de-fendant. They do not run with the land attempted to be conveyed to him.

Am. note to Spencer's Case, 1 Smith, Lead.

making him compensation. *Ibid.*On the admission of a new State into the Union, the "shore" or tide lands therein not disposed of by the United States prior thereto become the property of the State. Case v. Loftus (Or.) 5 L. R. A. 684, 39 Fed. Rep. 730. Upon admission the State of Illinois became en-

titled to and possessed of all the rights of dominion which belonged to the original States. Huse v.

Glover, 119 U. S. 543 (30 L. ed. 487).

The abutting owner has a right of access from his land to the water, and may, subject to the power of the Legislature, erect and maintain a private wharf for his own convenience, so long as he does not materially interfere with the rights of the general public. Case v. Loftus. supra.

The water front on the bay of "Florida Promenade"-a public park in the City of Apalachicola, Florida,-was, at the time of the dedication, vested in the United States, but on the admission of Florida as a State, became vested in her. Ruge v. Apalachicola Oyster Canning & Fish Co. (Fla.) Aug. 21, 1889.

The title to the shores of tide waters in this State has since been devested by statute in favor of littoral owners. Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 225; Alden v. Pinney, 12 Fla. 348.

The submerged lands of a bay, not disposed of by the State, are her property, and are not subject to disposition by the adjoining land owner. Ruge v. Apalachicola Oyster Canning & Fish Co. supra.

Under the New Jersey Riparian Laws, lands below the high-water mark of navigable waters belong to the State. Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 124 U. S. 656 (31 L. ed. 543).

The Colonial patents to Long Island towns vested in them the title to the soil under the waters of the bays within the bounds of the patents. Roe v. while covered with the sea, the public have the right 8 L. R. A.

the assent of the adjacent proprietor, and without Strong, 10 Cent. Rep. 33, 107 N. Y. 350; Brookhaven making him compensation. *Ibid.* v. Strong, 60 N. Y. 58; People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 540.

Private individuals asserting title to a part of the shore within such bonds must establish the devestiture of the title of the town and its acquisition by them. Roe v. Strong, 10 Cent. Rep. 33, 107 N. Y.

The State may either sell or convey its title to a riparian owner or his assigns, or, in case of their neglect to take from the State its grants on the terms offered them, to a stranger who, succeeding to its title, has no relation to the adjacent riparian owner, except that of common boundary. Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. Co. supra.

Grantees from the State have exclusive possession of the premises against an adverse claim of a municipality to an easement over them by virtue of a dedication of the streets to high-water mark by a former proprietor of the premises to whose rights such grantees have succeeded. Ibid.; Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Com. v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 451; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. L. 1; Bell v. Gough, 23 N. J. L. 624; Atty-Gen. v. Delaware & B. B. R. Co. 27 N. J. Eq. 1, 631; Atty-Gen. v. Hudson Tunnel R. Co. Id. 176.

Littoral owner, right to soll to low-water mark.

The proprietor of land on navigable water has an exclusive right to the soil between high and low water mark, for the purpose of erecting wharves and stores thereon. Ladies Seamen's Friends Society v. Halstead, 58 Conn. 144.

Mud flats on a seashore, between high and low water mark, may be used for any purpose which does not interfere with navigation. Ibid.

The owner may build upon and inclose it. But

Cas. 8th Am. ed. 174; Martin v. Drinan, 128 Mass. 515.

Mr. Walter Ayers, for respondent:

So far as anything but the pure legal title is concerned, lands under water in this State to the point of navigability are absolutely the property of the shore owner.

Tuck v Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 738.

The owner of city lots bounded on pavigable streams, like the owner of any other lands thus bounded, may limit his conveyance thereof within specific limits, if he shall so choose.

Watson v. Peters, 26 Mich, 508.

The ownership of the land under the water will become severed from the land upon the bank adjacent when such is the manifest in-

Smith v. Ford, 48 Wis. 115; Barker v. Bates,

13 Pick. 255, 23 Am. Dec. 678.

The covenant entered into by plaintiff runs with his land, even under the strict legal doc-

Shaber v. St. Paul Water Co. 30 Minn. 179; Kettle River R. Co. v. Eastern R. Co. (Minn.)

Oct. 4, 1889.

Where it distinctly appears in a conveyance, either by a recital, an admission, a covenant or otherwise, that the parties actually intend to convey and to receive reciprocally a certain estate, they are estopped from denying the operation of the deed according to its intent.

Bayley v. McCoy, 8 Or. 259; Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 627; 2 Herman, Estoppel, §§ 642, 648,

670.

to use it for purposes of navigation. Boston v. Lecraw, 58 U. S. 17 How, 426 (15 L. ed. 118).

The State also, to prevent encreachments in the harbors, may establish lines, and limit this power of the owner over his own property. Ibid.

The riparian owner of land only has the right, under North Carolina Entry Laws, to enter the water front up to deep water, for the purpose of erecting a wharf; and in such case, the title to the land passes. Gregory v. Forbes, 96 N. C. 77.

The State can grant land under navigable water for wharf purposes only; and county commissioners have no power to confer upon a party a right to build a wharf upon such land for the purpose of

a public road. Ibid.

By N. Y. Laws 1875, chap. 249, the dock department of New York City was given authority not previously possessed to authorize the erection of sheds on East River piers, and previous licenses were legalized. People v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 117 N.Y. 150.

Riparian owners of land on East River, in Brooklyn, have a superior right to build wharves and collect tolls, and may collect damages for a wrongful interference with their rights. Brooklyn, 1 Cent. Rep. 798, 101 N. Y. 51. Steers v.

A riparian proprietor whose land is bounded by a navigable river has the right of access to the navigable part of the river, and the right to make a landing, wharf or pier for his own use or for the use of the public. Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 497 (19 L. ed. 984); St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 272 (19 L. ed. 74).

He has the right to use the shore in front of his land for any purpose not inconsistent with the rights of the public. Parker v. West Coast Packing Co. 5 L. R. A. 61, 17 Or. 510; Boston v. Lecraw,

He may maintain a dock along the shore and extending the necessary distance into the water; and when thus erected, the dock is an appurtenance of the real estate. Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 738. 8 L. R. A.

Vanderburgh, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the consideration of the riparian rights of the owners of lands abutting upon the Duluth Harbor or Bay of Superior, in the shoals or land covered by water between low-water mark and the deep or navigable waters, and within the dock or harbor line established by the authority of the Legislature. These waters are within the jurisdiction of the state and federal governments, and the State holds the title to low-water mark in its sovereign capacity, in trust for the people, for the purpose chiefly of protecting the rights of navigation. But, though the title is nominally in the State, the common right of the people is limited to what is of public use for the purposes of navigation and fishery; and the riparian owners are permitted to enjoy the remaining rights and privileges in the soil under water beyond their strict boundary lines, after conceding to the State all the public rights. Gould, Waters, § 168.

The right of access and communication with the navigable waters, which pertain peculiarly to the ownership of the upland, in order to be available and of practical use, necessarily includes the right to fill in and to build wharves and other structures in the shallow water in front of such land, and below low-water mark, and the exercise of such rights, though subject to state regulation, can only be interfered with for public purposes; and such improvements are encouraged, because they are in the general

Right to construct piers, wharves, etc.

Piers or landing places, and even wharves, may be private or public, although the property may be in an individual owner. Dutton v. Strong, 68 U.S. 1 Black, 23 (17 L. ed. 29).

The owner may have the right to their exclusive enjoyment, and may construct them for his own exclusive use or benefit. Ibid.

His right is property of which the owner can be deprived only if necessary that it be taken for the public good, upon due compensation. Yates Milwaukee, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 497 (19 L. ed. 984).

But if erected without other authority than his mere ownership, the structures are unlawful and he will be liable for damages caused thereby. Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co. 88 U. S. 21 Wall, 389 (22 L, ed. 619).

Wharves and permanent piers constructed by the riparian proprietor on the shores of navigable rivers, bays and arms of the sea, or on the lakes, where they do not extend below low-water mark, are not a nuisance, unless they are an obstruction to navigation. Dutton v. Strong, supra.

Such structures differ materially from wharves or piers made to aid navigation, and regulated by city or town ordinances, or by statutes or other competent authority, and from piers built for railroad bridges across navigable streams, which are authorized by Acts of Congress or statutes of the States. Atlee v. Northwestern Union Packet Co. supra.

A railroad company under the power of eminent domain, granted by the State, cannot appropriate his pier to its own use without compensating him. Davenport & N. W. R. Co. v. Renwick, 102 U. S. 180 (26 L. ed. 51).

Right subject to control.

The State of California did not, by granting the use of the water front to the City of San Francisco, surrender control of the navigable waters of the

interest of navigation and commerce, and are all of legislative authority, a dock or harbor line

public as well as a private benefit.

In Dutton v. Strong, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 32 [17 L. ed. 32], it is said that, "wherever the water is too shoal to be navigable, there is the same necessity for such erections for lake navigation as in the bays and arms of the sea; and where that necessity exists it is difficult to see

any reason for denying to the adjacent owner the right to supply it.

And in Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U. S. 10 Wall.
497 [19 L. ed. 984], it is held broadly that these riparian privileges are to be treated as valuable property rights, which cannot be taken or in-terfered with for public use without compensation. Union Depot, S. R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 301.

And, if a stranger makes a filling or an obstruction in the waters in front of his land, the owner of the adjacent upland may enjoin its continuance, or recover in trespass, if not in

ejectment.

In the case before us the complaint shows that a corporation known as the "Duluth Improvement Company" was the owner of a large tract of land bordering upon the waters of Duluth Harbor, which communicates with Lake Superior, and is navigable for large boats and vessels. In front of this land, and for a considerable distance into the bay, the water is Duluth, first re-arrangement, according to the shallow, and not navigable; and, in pursuance recorded plat thereof, that lies easterly of a

had been duly established by the City of Duluth, extending in front of, and at a distance of a thousand feet or more from, the low-water mark on the tract of land referred to. Thereafter the Improvement Company caused this land, together with the land in front thereof under water, out to the dock line, to be surveyed and platted into lots and blocks, piers, slips, avenues and streets, and caused a plat thereof to be duly made and recorded under the name of the "Bay Front Division of Duluth," and thereafter proceeded to convey divers lots and parcels of the platted land, as well land under water as the dry land, to divers persons, by reference to the recorded plat, and by conveyances of the form set out in the complaint, and containing special covenants and stipulations, as hereinafter mentioned. The complaint further proceeds as follows: "That on or about the 27th day of June, 1887, the said Duluth Improvement Company sold and conveyed to Luther Mendenhall, defendant herein, by deed duly executed, a copy whereof is here-to annexed and made a part of this complaint, the following described tract or parcel of land, the same being a part of the land hereinabove referred to, to wit: All that part of block twenty-seven (27) in the Bay Front Division of

bay and the right to erect proper wharves and use them. Payne v. English, 79 Cal. 540.

By the common law of Massachusetts, the gran-

tee of land on navigable waters where the tide ebbs and flows is owner of the soil between high and low water mark. Boston v. Lecraw, 58 U. S. 17 How. 426 (15 L. ed. 118).

The Act of 1806, chap. 18, operates as a legislative grant of the interest in the soil below low water and confers the right to lot owners on Acushnet River to build wharves. Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg.

Co. 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, 141 Mass. 51.

The private interest in submerged soil at the bottom of a river, which had been granted to a person by a State, is subject to the paramount right of the public to use the river for navigation, and of the United States, in the regulation of commerce and navigation. Hawkins Point Lighthouse Case, 39 Fed. Rep. 77.

A State Legislature may authorize the building of a bridge or other structure tending to obstruct the navigation of a navigable river which is altogether within its own boundary; and it is only when Congress, by virtue of the constitutional provision, acts as to such obstructions, that its will must be obeyed so far as may be necessary to insure free navigation. Green & B. R. Nav. Co. v. Chesapeake, O. & S. W. R. Co. (Ky.) 2 L. R. A. 540, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 515.

A license under the New Jersey Wharf Act confers no right on licensee, unless he owns the upland abutting on tide-water. New Jersey Z. & I. Co. v. Morris Canal & Bkg. Co. 13 Cent. Rep. 342, 44 N. J. Eq. 398.

The owner of the land abutting on the stream has a license to fill in and dock out to such extent as does not interfere with public rights. Ibid.

Under the California statutes, a title to a lot on the Bay of San Francisco was in subordination to the control, by the City of San Francisco, over the space immediately beyond the line of the water-front, and to the right of the State to regulate the construction of wharves and other improvements; and his erection of a wharf was an encroachment | 83 Ala. 251. 8 L. R. A.

on the soil of the State. *Ibid.*; Weber v. State Harbor Comrs. 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 57 (21 L. ed. 798).

Public authorities have the right, in Iowa. build wharves and levees on the bank of the Mississippi below high-water mark, and make other improvements thereon necessary to navigation or public passage by railways or otherwise, without the assent of the adjacent proprietor, and without making him compensation. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (24 L. ed. 224).

The compact between Virginia and Maryland of 1785 secured to their citizens "the privilege of making and carrying out wharves" on the shores of the Potomac only so far as they were "adjoining their lands." Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac Steamboat Co. 109 U.S. 672 (27 L. ed. 1070). Subject to the exceptions established by par-

amount law, the City of New Orleans has the right of building levees and wharves on the banks of the

S. C. R. Imp. Co. (Me.) 7 L. R. A. 460.

Alienation of right.

The title to the upland bordering on a seashore, and the appurtenant rights in the shore and the mud flats between high and low water mark. are separable, and either may be conveyed without the other. Ladies Seamen's Friends Society v. Halstead. 58 Conn. 144.

A riparian owner conveying land may reserve to himself the right to build wharves out into the water from such land. Parker v. West Coast Pack-ing Co. 5 L. R. A. 61, 17 Or. 510.

A conveyance of land on a river bank passes all the land between high-water mark and the ordinary stage; and a survey which merely goes to high-water mark is not correct. Hess v. Cheney. equal distances from the lines dividing said block from block twenty-six (26), and from block twenty-eight (28) in said division. That said Duluth Improvement Company, on or about the 30th day of July, 1887, sold and con-veyed to plaintiff, by deed duly executed, and identical in form with and containing the same covenants as the deed to Luther Mendenhall, hereinabove referred to, the following described tract or parcel of land, being a part of the land bereinabove referred to, to wit: All that part of block twenty-seven (27) in the Bay Front Division of Duluth, first re-arrangement, according to the recorded plat thereof, that lies westerly of a line through said block parallel with and at equal distance from the lines dividing said block from block twenty-six (26), and from block twenty-eight (28), in said division, saving and excepting so much of said tract as lies within one hundred (100) feet of the southerly boundary line thereof, which said property so excepted is hereby dedicated for the perpetual use of a slip or water-way for the use and benefit of the owners and occupants of property abutting thereon. Plaintiff further alleges that the greater part of said block 27, so as aforesaid conveyed to plaintiff by the Duluth Improvement Company, consisted of dry land and shore, and that the same extended to the low-water mark on said bay. That all of that part of said block 27, so as aforesaid conveyed to Luther Mendenhall by said Duluth Improvement Company, lies under the water of the bay, beyond the low-water mark of said bay, and in front of and between that part of said block 27 so as aforesaid conveyed to plaintiff, and said established dock or wharf line upon said Duluth Harbor. That the said Luther Mendenhall claims title to the part of said block 27 so as aforesaid conveyed to him by the Duluth Improvement Company under and by virtue of said deed of conveyance to him, and claims the right to cut off and exclude plaintiff from access to the navigable waters of said bay over and across his part of that block, and denies the right of the plaintiff to dock out or make improvements in front of his part of the block to the established dock line, and claims and asserts that all the riparian rights to which plaintiff would be entitled, as owner of the shore along said harbor, are absolutely cut off and limited by the conveyance so as aforesaid made to him, said Mendenhall, as also by the conveyance made to the plaintiff."

Following the descriptions in the deeds to these parties, and to other grantees of the platted lands above referred to, we find the following clauses, covenants and stipulations, viz.: "Together with all the hereditaments thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, but subject, nevertheless, to the reservations, exceptions and conditions of this instru-And the said party of the first part, for itself, its successors and assigns, does covenant with the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, that it has not made, done, executed or suffered any act or thing whatsoever, whereby the above described premises, or any part thereof, now are, or at any time hereafter shall or may become, imperiled, charged or 8 L. R. A.

line through said block, parallel with and at | all persons lawfully claiming the same from or under it, the said party of the first part will forever warrant and defend. It being the intention hereby to vest in the said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, forever, the exclusive right to use, occupy and enjoy the space covered by the above-mentioned lots, as laid down upon the said recorded plat of said Bay Front Division of Duluth, first re-arrangement, and to estop the party of the first part, its successors and assigns, from having or claiming the use or occupancy of said space by virtue of riparian ownership or otherwise. This conveyance is and shall be construed as a contract between the parties hereto. The character and extent of the premises, and the rights and privileges thereunto appertaining, whether riparian or other rights, shall be determined solely by reference to the plat of said division. and no rights or privileges of any kind shall pass by this conveyance except such as said plat shows to be appurtenant to the premises herein conveyed. The said party of the second part thereby estops himself, his heirs and assigns, from asserting or claiming that the lots or blocks, if any are shown on said plat, be-tween the premises herein conveyed and the established dock line along the northerly side of the Bay or Harbor of Duluth, are not land. and estops himself from claiming or asserting any rights or privileges under this grant in any part of the territory covered by said plat, except such as would solely by reference to said plat vest in him.'

The case comes here upon appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. In connection with the general statement in respect to the rights of riparian owners already made, we are to consider the additional fact of the establishment of the dock or harbor line, and the effect of the restrictive covenants in the deeds to the respective parties. The court will take notice of the extensive commerce and great shipping interests which must be accommodated in the Duluth Harbor, and which will require corresponding facilities in the way of local improvements, which must be made in great measure by private enterprise; and in this case we may assume that the plan adopted by the Duluth Improvement Company, in the survey and plat of the submerged land in connection with the upland, was one which was suitable and proper for the improvement and occupation of the same in the interests of navigation, so as to subserve the public as well as private interests. The action of the State, through the Legislature, in establishing the dock lines, is to be construed in connection with the established doctrine of riparian rights of which we have spoken, and the practical use permitted and necessarily made by riparian owners of land under water in front of the dry

or upland.

In Aborn v. Smith, 12 R. I. 373, it is said by the court that the owners of the upland are in such cases impliedly permitted to carry the up-land forward to the harbor line, so that each owner will occupy the part abreast his own land.

In Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Comrs. 15 R. I. 334, 2 New Eng. Rep. 619, and in Engs v. Peckham, 11 R. I. 223, 224, it is held incumbered in any manner whatsoever; and Engs v. Peckham, 11 R. 1. 223, 224, it is need the title to the above-granted premises, against to be a permission and invitation by the State ate the flats with his upland to the line. Et-

dridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80.

In Fitchburg R. Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 3
Cush. 71, it appeared that the Legislature had established a harbor line for Boston Harbor, but prohibiting the extension of the existing wharves to the line without legislative permission. Afterwards the Legislature passed an Act authorizing the owners of certain wharves to extend them out to the line. This Act was held to be a grant, and not a mere revocable license (page 87); and in Hamlin v. Pairpoint Mfg. Co., 141 Mass. 57, 2 New Eng. Rep. 143, a legislative authority to extend wharves to the channel of a river was held equivalent to a grant of a possessory title, if not an absolute interest in the soil. In Norfolk v. Cooke, 27 Gratt. 438, the court treats the right to use and occupy the land within such lines with wharves, etc., as a qualified proprietary interest in the soil, sufficient to support an action for the possession. Guy v. Hermance, 5 Cal. 74; Power v. Tazewell, 25 Gratt. 786.

But the title of the State is not extinguished by such legislative action merely. In this country the generally accepted doctrine is that the jus privatum passes to the owner of the adjacent lands, and in this State extends to lowwater mark, with the accompanying riparian rights, while the jus publicum belongs to the State, which holds the title to the soil under the water as trustee. "The sovereign is trustee for the public, and the use of navigable waters is inalienable." 3 Kent, Com. 427.

See Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 89, 93.

The State is authorized to regulate the exercise of riparian rights in the interests of the public, and may also make concessions to private owners of possessory rights in the soil of navigable waters, the effect of which will be to give them private and exclusive rights equivalent to a grant. Gould, Waters, §§ 138-140

While the public right of navigation and fishery may not be extinguished until the waters are excluded, yet after the submerged land is filled or occupied the riparian owner will have the exclusive right of possession, and the entire beneficial interest; and whether his dominion would be absolute, and his title indefeasible as against the State, is not necessary to inquire. Union Depot, S. R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, supra.

The action of the Legislature in establishing a harbor line is to be construed as a regulation of the exercise of the riparian right. It settles the line of navigability, above which the State will not interfere; and is an implied concession of the right to build, possess and occupy to the established line, which amounts practically to a qualified possessory title. 141 Mass. 57,

supra.

The importance and substantial character of these rights are recognized by the courts, and there is a growing tendency in different directions to give effect to contracts and grants in respect to riparian occupancy and improvements. Norfolk v. Cooke, 27 Gratt. 436; Parker v. West Coast Packing Co. 17 Or. 515, 5 L.

It is true the right of access and communication with the navigable waters belongs ex- cordance with the general plan of improve-8 L. R. A.

to the riparian owner to fill out and incorpor-| clusively to the riparian owner, except with his permission. But if in the case of a railway corporation he may, for a consideration, concede the right to occupy with its road-bed the land under the shore, and obstruct such com-munication by a valid contract, which we presume will not be questioned, why may be not contract with natural persons to grant to them. the right of possession and occupancy of building sites within the dock line for wharves or elevators, for use in connection with navigation, or such other purposes (the State not objecting), as the grantees may be advised, with right of way, if need be, over his land, or, as in this case, impliedly over streets laid over the same as designated in the plat and dedicated to the public use? In many instances, how-ever, such right of entry or easement of pas-sage may be found entirely unnecessary, the occupant having other means of reaching the locus in quo. If the riparian owner may make such improvements, and afterwards grant and convey his possessory title, or contract to do so, the courts ought not to stand upon so narrow a distinction as that he may not bind himself by contract that another may have and enjoy the same possessory rights in a particular site or lot which he has in it; for his right is not a mere revocable license, though held in subordination to the public interest, and subject to some restraint for the general good as other property may be, though differently situated. Com. v. Alger, supra, 95.

There can be no doubt, we think, that a lease of such property would be operative between the parties, and a subsequent purchaser of the upland, with notice and expressly subject thereto, would also be bound to respect

the lessee's rights.

In reference to a lease of a mill-site in the bed of the Mississippi River (at a place not navigable), this court says in St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Morrison, 12 Minn. 254 (Gil. 162): "It is not for a private individual. under a pretense of vindicating the abstract rights of the public, to set up the intrusion, in a private and civil action, for the purpose of repudiating his own solemn contract obliga-

In this case the respondent does not find it necessary to question the correctness of the decision in the case of Lake Superior Land Co. v. Emerson, 38 Minn. 406, because there the granter simply undertook to convey a strict legal title, which until the land was reclaimed could not be the subject of transfer, and we are not called on to distinguish that case. But this case is rested upon the contract of the parties, incorporated in the several deeds, in which it will be seen the grantor covenants that "the grantees and their assigns shall have the exclusive right to use, occupy and enjoy the space covered by the lots as described in the deed, and as identified by the plat, and covenants to estop the company and its assigns from having or claiming the use and occupancy of such space by virtue of riparian ownership or other-wise." Here there is an express waiver and concession of the grantor's riparian rights in the premises, and consent to the use and occurpancy thereof, so as to cut off its access and communication with deep water, except in acsition of the property, in which there was to waive nothing unlawful. He took with notice of de- | Order affirmed.

ment indicated by the plat. And this is also made a part of plaintiff's contract, and undoubtedly entered into and affected the consideration of the deed to him. He thereby made himself a party to the general plan and arrangement for the improvement and dispose to cancel or declaration of the property in which there was

KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS.

James C. MURRAY, Appt.,

James A. MURRAY et al., Exrs., etc., of Henry H. Murray, Deceased.

(....Ky.....)

1. A conveyance on the eve of marriage, to be regarded in equity as a fraud upon the legal rights of the intended wife, and consequently not binding upon her, must be made without her consent or knowledge.

2. The fact that a conveyance, made by a man with the consent of his intended wife, reserved a life estate in himself, is not a matter of

which she can complain.

3. A prima facie case of fraud on a wife's marital rights in her husband's estate exists where, without her knowledge, he gives, either before or after marriage, all or the greater portion of his property to his children by a former marriage.

(March 8, 1890.)

A PPEAL by complainant from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Franklin County settling her rights in her deceased husband's estate in an action brought for the settlement of such estate, and to set aside certain conveyances made by him upon the alleged ground that they were in fraud of her marital rights. Rerersed.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Messrs. John W. Rodman and George

C. Drane, for appellant:

Voluntary conveyances, or gifts by the husband to his children or others of all or the bulk of his estate pending a marriage treaty or dur-ing the marriage without the knowledge or concurrence of the wife, will be presumed to be fraudulent and the onus is upon the grantees or donees, in a controversy with the widow, to show that no fraud was intended or practiced against her.

Fennessey v. Fennessey, 84 Ky. 519.
When such a gift is made with, and for, the purpose of defrauding the wife, it will be set aside to the extent it may affect her rights

as widow.

Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20. See 2 Bishop, Manikee v. Beard, 85 Ky. 20. See 2 Bishop, Married Women, § 351; Davis v. Davis, 5 Mo. 189: Stone v. Stone, 18 Mo. 389; Tucker v. Tucker, 29 Mo. 350: Hays v. Henry, 1 Md. Ch. 337; Smith v. Smith, 6 N. J. Eq. 521; Dunnock v. Dunnock, 3 Md. Ch. 140; Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 122; Dearmond v. Dearmond, 10 Ind. 194 10 Ind. 194.

Messrs. William Lindsay and John B. Lindsley for appellees.

8 L. R. A.

Holt, J., delivered the opinion of the court: In May, 1882, the appellant, Jane C. Murray, then Jane C. Jillson, first met Henry H. Murray. He was then a widower for the second time. During the summer of that year they became engaged to marry, the Christmas following being the time fixed for the consummation of the agreement. It was, however, postponed from time to time, at his instance, and upon one excuse or the other, until February 17, 1884, when they were married. He had three children living, to wit, William H. Murray by his first wife, and James A. and John W. Murray by his second wife. When he and the appellant became engaged, he was a gentleman of considerable fortune, being worth in lands and personalty probably not far from \$70,000. This was then known to her. They lived together until December, 1886, when he died. April, 1887, the appellant brought this action. seeking a settlement of his estate, and the cancellation, as to herself, of certain conveyances and gifts by him to his three sons, upon the ground that they were in fraud of her marital rights. Subsequent to their engagement to marry, and on August 17, 1883, he conveyed to his sons James A. and John W. Murray four houses and lots worth \$4,000 or \$5,000. It is conceded, however, in argument by appellant's counsel, that the consideration recited in the conveyance, to wit, that this property had come by the mother of the grantees, is true. The testimony so shows, and no recovery is now asked on account of it. It is therefore out of the case, and needs no further mention.

Subsequent, also, to their engagement, he, by a deed dated August 1, 1882, and acknowledged on October 30, and recorded November 28, following, conveyed to his sons James and John, in consideration of love and affection, the homestead where they were living, and another house and lot, the two pieces of property being worth from \$15,000 to \$25,000. The appellant admits, however, both in pleading and her evidence, that he informed her, before the making of this conveyance, of his intention to execute it, and she made no objection to it. She says, however, that she supposed it was to be an absolute one, by way of advancement to the two sons, and that it was not unreasonable in view of his financial condition as stated to her by him. She also says he then promised to do right by her, and provide well for her. She now claims, however, that the deed was in the nature of a testamentary disposition of the property, and in fraud of her coming marital rights, because it provided: "But there is reserved in said party of the first part [H. H. Murray a right for life, at his option, to occupy, of said property for and during his natural life."

A conveyance upon the eve of marriage, to be regarded in equity as a fraud upon the marital rights of the intended wife, and consequently not binding upon her, must be made without her consent or knowledge. Leach v. Duvall, 8 Bush, 201.

Here she knew of it, and the fact that it conveyed a less estate than she supposed cannot serve as a ground of complaint for her. It was an advantage to her. She, together with her husband, enjoyed during his life the use of at least the homestead, if not all of the property covered by the deed. The conveyances named appear to have embraced all the real estate owned by H. H. Murray.

April 3, 1884, he, in consideration of love and

affection, assigned to his son James A. Murray a judgment against the Blantons, secured by mortgage lien, and amounting to about \$7,000. The son says that his father had told him some four or five years before that he was to have this debt; and in this statement he is supported by the evidence of the draughtsman of the assignment of the debt, who says that the father said, when he executed it, that he had heretofore given it to the son. The gift was, however, not perfected until April 3, 1884. At the same time, the father, for the same consideration, assigned to the same son a mortgage debt on one Herrman for about \$4,000; also a certificate for Herrman for about \$4,000; also a certificate for thirty shares of bank stock, worth \$4,500. In November, 1885, he gave to James A., for John Murray, United States bonds of the value of \$13,750. Also, at about the same time, he gave to his son William railroad bonds, payable to bearer, worth \$4,800. Thus we see that shortly after his marriage he gave to his three sons about \$34,000. With the last of these gifts his fortune was substantially gone these gifts his fortune was substantially gone. The wife had no knowledge of those made after their marriage. At his death he was worth but about \$12,500, consisting altogether of personalty. A few days after his marriage he made a will by which he bequeathed all his estate, without naming his wife. It is contended for her that these gifts were merely colorable, and intended to be effective only in case his wife outlived him. In support of this, it is shown that the bank stock was never trans-ferred upon the bank books until after his death; that the checks for the dividends thereon, and for the interest on the United States and railroad bonds, were issued payable to him until his death; and there is some evidence tending to show that he took some control of the property which was purchased in payment of the Blanton debt. The transfers, however, vested the donees with either the legal or equitable title; and there is rebutting testimony showing that they controlled the property from the date of the gifts, and received the money upon the checks issued in payment of the bank dividends, and the interest upon the bonds.

The question remains, however, whether the gifts of the personalty are, under the circumstances, to be regarded as having been made in fraud of the appellant's marital rights. The sons testify—and they are doubtless honest in the belief-that they were bona fide, and made without any intention to defraud the appellant her favor. It is attempted to overturn it with 8 L. R. A.

use, lease and enjoy the profits of each and all as to her incheate rights in the estate of her husband. It is difficult, however, in the face of this record, to believe that there was not a purpose upon the part of the husband to lessen the wife's interest in his estate, in the event she survived him, by giving it to his sons. We do not mean to intimate that a husband cannot make any advances to his children, and must preserve his estate intact to meet the inchoate claims of his wife. If the advancements or gifts be reasonable, when considered with reference to the amount of property owned by the husband, and his purpose be to provide for the children, and not to defraud the wife, then she cannot complain, although they in fact diminish the property to which her inchoate rights have attached by the marriage. It is a question of intention upon the part of the grantor. If the property given away constitute all, or the principal part, of the husband's estate, and be such an advancement as is unreasonable, when compared with his entire property, then, while it should not be conclusively presumed to have been made in fraud of the wife's marital rights, yet prima facie it should be so regarded, and the onus of showing otherwise be cast upon the donee. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. If not done to prevent the wife from enjoying a reasonable portion of the husband's estate, or to deprive her of such an interest in it as she might reasonably expect upon her marriage, then the advancement should be upheld as to her. court must look to the condition of the parties, and all the attending circumstances, in judging of the transaction. It should take into consideration the amount of the husband's estate, the value of the advancements, the time within which they are made, and all other *indicia* which will serve to determine the intention accompanying the transaction.

If, however, a gift or voluntary conveyance of all or the greater portion of his property be made to his children by a former marriage without the knowledge of the intended wife, or it be advanced to them after marriage without the wife's knowledge, a prima facie case of fraud arises; and it rests upon the beneficiarics to explain away such presumption. If the husband have an ample estate, he may, of course, give to the children of a former marriage a reasonable portion of it, and the wife cannot complain. If this were not the rule, then the hands of the husband would be completely and unreasonably tied, and he could make no advancement to his children by a former marriage, however large his estate, and however needful to them; but he would be compelled to hold it all, except from purchasers for

value, to meet the inchoate claims of the wife.

Justice Story says that reasonable provision may be made for the children of a former marriage if done under such circumstances as evidence good faith. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 273. In this instance, however, the husband, by

successive gifts, advanced to his children without the knowledge of his wife, nearly all his large estate. They were not her children, and the transfers deprived her of that reasonable expectation as to the enjoyment of a portion of his property which she had a right to form at their marriage. A prima facie case arises in

band's property came by the second wife; but, while it appears that she derived some property from her mother, yet the amount of it is not even approximately shown, and is a matter of conjecture. The husband, within a comparatively short time after his marriage to the appellant, and without her knowledge, gave to his children by his former marriages between \$30,000 and \$40,000. What he so gave, together with his estate remaining at his death, amounts to about \$46,000. Allowing for reasonable advancements to the children, the wife was, in our opinion, entitled to \$10,000 as her distributable portion of the estate. This, it seems to us, is the equity of the case. The gifts made to the children subsequent to her sistent with this opinion. marriage must, under the circumstances, be re-

the claim that the greater portion of the hus- garded as having been made in fraud of her marital rights; and the amount of them, to-gether with the estate of the harband, remaining at his death, less what would have been reasonable advances to the children must be estimated in determining her rights. The chancellor will allow, as of the date of his decree, the sum above named. Any equities which may exist between the other parties to this action remain open for further settlement, not being now presented for determination.

The judgment below, and which allowed the appellant as her distributable portion but one third of the estate in her husband's possession, at the time of his death, is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings con-

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT.

EDWIN SHULTZ Frederick WALL, Appt.

(_____Pa,_____)

. The responsibility of an innkeeper for goods and moneys of his guest extends to moneys stolen from the guest, unless they were stolen by a servant or companion of the guest.

2. The intoxication of a guest at an inn is no excuse for his negligence which contributes to the loss of his property by theft.

3. On evidence that the vest of a guest in a hotel was taken in the night while the door of his room was locked and bolted, and found in the morning in the dining-room carefully folded and laid between two blankets, but his money which he left in it missing, and that an outer door of the hotel bore marks of violence while his door did not, and other evidence show-ing that plaintiff had been drinking, to some extent at least, the night before, the question of his negligence should be left to the jury, considering the general uncertainty and mystery of the robbery.

4. Whether a guest at a hotel should be

NOTE.-Innkeeper, responsibility of.

The relation of guest does not depend on the time the traveler remains, or on the contract to Pay. Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118.

The relation of innkeeper and guest is not neces-sarily and conclusively changed by an agreement as to price or any definite length of sojourn. Ross v. Meliin, 36 Minn. 421.

Innkeepers are responsible for the well and safe keeping and custody of the goods and chattels of their guests, and even the absence of negligence will not exempt them from liability. Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478.

The particular responsibility of an innkeeper does not extend to goods lost or stolen from a room occupied by a guest for a purpose of business distinct from his accommodation as guest, such as the exhibition of samples of merchandise. Fisher v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 383 (30 L. ed. 930).

He is not responsible under the Missouri statute, unless the guest shall have given written notice of having such merchandise for sale or sample, after entering the inn, or unless such loss shall be caused by fire intentionally produced by the innkeeper or his servants, or by their theft. Express knowledge of the innkeeper is not equivalent to written notice. Ibid.

They are liable for the loss of goods of a boarder only where they have been guilty of culpable negligence. Manning v. Wells, 9 Hump. 746.

Liability of innheeper as insurer. At common law, innholders, like common carriers, are regarded as insurers of the property committed to their care and are liable for any loss if not caused by the act of God, or by a public enemy my, or by the neglect or fault of the guest. Mason 14 III. 129; Johnson v. Richardson, 17 III. 302; Mc-v. Thompson, 2 Pick. 230; Berkshire Woollen Co. v. Daniels v. Robinson, 25 Vt. 318; Read v. Amidon, 41 8 L. R. A.

Proctor, 7 Cush. 417: Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221 231; 2 Kent, Com. 594; Story, Bailm. 3465.

But he is not an insurer of the goods of a traveler who is not a guest. Lusk v. Belote, 22 Minn. 468.

Either case or assumpsit lies for the loss of baggage through negligence of the innkeeper. Dickinson v. Winchester, 4 Cush. 114.

To make an innkeeper liable in trover, there must be an actual conversion of goods intrusted to him by the guest. Hallenbake v. Fish, 8 Wend. 547, 24 Am. Dec. 88; Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 188; Sager v. Blain, Id. 449; Needles v. Howard, 1 E. D. Smith,

Many cases hold that an innkeeper is liable as an insurer for the goods of his guest, and for losses by theft or fire which occur without the negligence of the in the energy and is only excused by the act of God, of the public enemy or of the guest. 2 Parsons, Cont. 146; 2 Story, Cont. 8 99; Saunders, Neg. 212; Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571; Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478; Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163; Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242; Burrows v. Trieber, 21 Md. 203; Lallenberg, First Sweet 547; Morrows v. Except Clark, 37 Ga. 222; Burrows v. Trieber, 21 Md. 220; 6 Hallenbake v. Fish, 8 Wend. 547; Morgan v. Ravey, 6 Hurlst. & N. 235; Day v. Bather, 2 Hurlst. & C. 14; Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. H. 553; Holder v. Soulby, 8 C. B. N. S. 254; Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb. 70; Cashill v. Wright, 6 El. & Bl. 891; Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Co. L. R. 6 C. P. 515; Fuller v. Coats, 18 Ohio St. 343; Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118.

In other cases, however, the liability has been restricted, particularly in losses by fire, to cases where there is negligence or default on the part of the innkeeper. Addison, Torts, \$684; 2 Kent, Com. 593; Cut-ler v. Bonney, 30 Mich. 259; Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798; Woodworth v. Morse, 18 La. Ann. 156; Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. 72; Metcalf v. Hess. frequently stopped there and there is evidence that on some visit his attention had been called to the safe by the landlord.

Whether carrying a certain amount of money to his room instead of placing it in the hotel safe is negligence on the part of the guest, is a question for the jury.

(April 21, 1890.)

A PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas for Chester County in favor of plaintiff in an action to re-cover from a hotel keeper the value of certain money which had been stolen from plaintiff while a guest in the hotel. Reversed.

Wall was the keeper of a hotel in Phœnixville. Shultz was the driver of a beer wagon and came to the hotel of Wall on the evening of July 2, 1888, with his wagon and team, put

treated as having notice of the existence his team in the hotel stable, and remained as a of a sate is a question for the jury, where he has guest of the hotel during the night of July 2. guest of the hotel during the night of July 2, the day and night of the third, and a part of the fourth. Shultz was assigned to a chamber on the door of which was a lock with key upon the inside, and also an inside sliding bolt. A notice was printed at the head of each sheet of the hotel register, which read as follows: "Money, jewelry and other valuables must be placed in the safe. Otherwise the proprietor will not be responsible for loss." Wall claimed

on the night of July 3, Shultz procured a night key to enable him to enter the hotel after it should be closed for the night. He testified that between eleven o'clock and midnight he entered the house by means of the night kev and went to his room and retired, and that upon rising in the morning he discovered that his vest was missing and that he had been robbed of some \$180 in cash.

Upon the door by which Shultz had entered

Baker, 1 Wilson (Ind.) 429.

The liability is in some cases held to extend only to necessary articles. Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 130; Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310; Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242; Myers v. Cottrill, 5 Biss. 465; Simon v. Miller, 7 La. Ann. 360.

But in others it is held that his liability is not limited to articles and money necessary for traveling. Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557: Sneider v. Geiss, 1 Yeates, 34.

An innkeeper is, however, liable for all losses which could have been prevented by ordinary care (Newson ads. Axon, 1 McCord, L. 509); but the loser must have been a guest at the time of the Towson v. Havre-de-Grace Bank, 6 Har. & loss. J. 47.

To render the innkeeper liable the goods must have been brought within the inn. Kent, Com. 593; Albin v. Presby, 8 N. H. 408; Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 32; Sanders v. Spencer, 3 Dyer, 266 b; Farnworth v. Packwood, 1 Stark, 249; Burgess v. Clements, 4 Maule & S. 306; Richmond v. Smith, 8 Barn. & C. 9; Jones v. Tyler, 1 Ad. & El. 522; Bennet v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273; Packard v. Northcraft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439; Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163,

The proprietor of a hotel is liable for the loss of baggage of guests through the negligence of a carrier to whom it has been delivered for transportation to the hotel, and whose apparent duty is, by authority of such proprietor, to transport guests and baggage to such hotel; and any private arrangement between the proprietor and carrier unknown to the guest is immaterial. Coskery v. Nagle (Ga.) 6 L. R. A. 483, and note.

Liability as bailee.

An innkeeper is liable for money deposited by a guest in the hotel safe, and stolen from it (Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172); and for money deposited with the barkeeper on the credit of the inn. Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92.

The admission of a servant of an inn that he had stolen the jewelry of a guest is not evidence against the innkeeper. Elcox v. Hill, 98 U. S. 218 (25 L. ed. 103).

He is liable for the loss of baggage of a guest left in his custody. Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65; Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 126.

He is liable for goods lost during the temporary absence of the guest although the absence extends over several days. Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 490; McDonaid v. Edgerton, 5 Barb, 560; Day v. Bather, 2 Hurlst, & C. 14; Bather v. Day, 32 L. J. N. S. (Exch.) man Palace Car Co. v. Lowe (Neb.) 6 L. R. A. 809. 8 L R A.

Vt. 15; Laird v. Eichold, 10 Ind. 212; Dessauer v. | 171; 1 Comyn, Dig. 421; Gelley v. Clerk, Cro. Jac.

Proof of loss of goods, while in charge of the innkeeper, is sufficient prima facie to charge him with liability. Hill v. Owen, 5 Blackf. 323, 35 Am. Dec. 124; Laird v. Eichold, 10 Ind. 212.

Innkeeper may defend on ground of contributory negligence of guest. Elcox v. Hill, supra; Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92; Hawley v. Smith, 25 Wend. 642; Chamberlain v. Masterson, 26 Ala. 371; Hadley v. Upshaw, 27 Tex. 547; Kelsey v. Berry, 42 TH, 469.

Where a guest, on leaving a hotel without the intention of returning as a guest, but without pay ing his bill leaves his valise in the charge of the hotel clerk, and returns within forty-eight hours, the innkeeper is liable as a bailee for want of ordinary care; and the loss of the valise raises a presumption of negligence against him. Murray v. Marshall, 9 Colo. 482.

Innkeepers are not bound to receive and keep property of a person who is neither a traveler nor a guest. Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 485.

A visit by one not requiring present accommodations, but for the purpose of simply depositing money for safe keeping, does not constitute the visitor a guest. Hence, a gambler depositing his money without registering his name is not a guest. Arcade Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, 2 West, Rep. 368, 44 Ohio St. 32.

In Illinois a hotel keeper is exempt from liability for money, jewels and the like, lost by his guest, where a safe for the keeping of such articles is provided, and notice given as required by the statute, and the guest fails to take the benefit of the protection thus furnished him. Elcox v. Hill, 98 U. S. 218 (25 L. ed. 103).

To this rule the statute makes one exception. If the loss occurs "by the hand or through the negligence of the landlord, or by a clerk or servant em-ployed by him in such hotel or inn," the liability remains; but not if the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the guest himself. Ibid.; 2 Story. Cont. \$ 909.

For a guest at a hotel to retain the sum of about \$500 in a belt upon his person while sleeping in a room by himself is not negligence as a matter of law, even though the bolt on the door could be opened from the outside by means of a wire. Smith v. Wilson, 36 Minn. 334.

See note to Coskery v. Nagle (Ga.) 6 L. R. A. 483, for a full discussion of this subject. See also Pull-

dead latch. He was himself the last person to enter that door upon that night, and the next morning the lock was found to have been broken

Shultz testified that he both locked and bolted his bed-room door before retiring, but that the next morning he found it standing partially open. If a thief entered that room it was admitted that he entered through that door, which bore no evidence whatever of the lock or bolt having been forced. The vest was found down stairs carefully folded and laid between two lap blankets on the hat-rack in the dining-room, with the pocket-book and everything intact, but the money gone. Matches of a kind not used in the hotel were

found scattered at various points. Wall's hostler, Rahn, testified that at about 11 o'clock of the night of the robbery some men called at his room seeking Shultz, and Mrs. Wall testified that between 11 and 12 o'clock she heard voices on the porch, one of

which she recognized as Shultz's. The court charged the jury, inter alia, as

["As I understand the law of this Commonwealth relating to the liability of an innkeeper, I instruct you that he is answerable for all losses happening to the goods of travelers becoming his guests, except such losses as are caused by the act of God or the public enemy, or by improper conduct of the guest himself. or his servant, or the companion whom he brings with him. Wherever the loss does not occur by reason of any of these excepted causes, then the innkeeper in this Common-wealth, in judgment of this court, is answerable for that loss."] (Fifth assignment of error '

["Mr. Shultz had no servant and he had no companion, and we say to you that we see no testimony in the case which would warrant the jury in concluding that Mr. Shultz by his conduct contributed to the theft, if that theft was committed. You will therefore see that under our view of the law, if a theft was committed in this house, Mr. Wall is answerable for the amount of the loss. You will also see that under the trade of the loss. that under the views of the court you have nothing to consider except the question whether or not there was a theft in this house. If there was, then you will ascertain the measure of damages which Mr. Shultz sustained, and the measure of damages will be the amount of that loss."] (Sixth assignment of error.)

Defendant requested the court to charge,

inter alia:

(2) If the jury find that there was a sufficient lock and bolt on the door of the room occupied by the plaintiff, if properly used, to insure the safety of his property, and if they be lieve, from the evidence, that the plaintiff did not make use of safety thus supplied him, it is for the jury to find from all the facts whether, under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff has not discharged the defendant, and, if they so find, the verdict should be for the defendant. Answer. In answer to this point, gentlemen, we say that we see no evidence in loss or theft, does not depend upon the measure. the case which would justify the jury in concluding that the plaintiff had not made use of the proper means of safety which were fur- to protect them. His liability is analogous to 8 L. R. A.

with his night key there was both a lock and a nished him, and therefore disaffirm the point.

(Second assignment of error.)

(3) The fact of the guest having the means of securing himself, and choosing not to use them, is one which, with other circumstances of the case, is for the jury to consider; and if they should find from that fact and other circumstances in the case, that the plaintiff did not exercise the ordinary care of a prudent man under the circumstances, and was thus guilty of contributory negligence, their verdict should be for the defendant. Answer. The principles of law, set out in that point, are correct. We say to you that there is no evidence in the case, in the estimation of the court, which would warrant you in applying them to the law as here set out, and we therefore disaffirm the point for the reason given. (Third assignment of error.)

There was a verdict for plaintiff for \$186.82 and, a rule for a new trial having been dis-

charged, defendant appealed.

Messrs. I. N. Wynn, Archibald M. Holding and Robert E. Monaghan, for

appellant:

Although the loss in itself raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the innkeeper, or of those for whom he is responsible, it is not irrebuttable, but may be overcome by sat-isfactory proof that the loss did not occur through the negligence of him, or those for whom he is responsible.

Jones, Bailm. 3d London ed. pp. 94-96; Story, Bailm. 7th ed. §§ 470-472; Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vt. 177.

If the iunkeeper was free from negligence

he is not responsible for the loss.

he is not responsible for the loss.

Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164; Howe
Mach. Co. v. Pease, 49 Vt. 477; Registrum
Brevium, 105; Fitzh. N. B. 94; Calye's Case,
8 Coke, 32; Jones, Bailm. 3d London ed. 94
a, note; McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 317;
Johnson v. Richardson, 17 III. 302: Kisten v.
Hildebrande, 9 B. Mon. 72; Metcalf v. Hess, 14
III. 129; Laird v. Eichold, 10 Ind. 212; Hill v.
Owen, 5 Blackf. 323; Dessauer v. Baker, 1 Wilson (Ind.) 429: Cutter v. Ronney. 30 Mich. 259. Son (Ind.) 429; Cutler v. Bonney, 30 Mich. 259; Howth v. Franklin. 20 Tex. 798; Weisenger v. Taylor, 1 Bush, 275; Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush, 41; Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163; Read v. Amidon, 42 Vt. 15; Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242; Metcalf v. Hess, 14 III.

There was evidence of contributory negli-

gence for the consideration of the jury.

Herbert v. Morkwell, 45 L. T. N. S. 649;

Weekly Notes (Eng.) 1882, p. 112; Oppenheim
v. White Lion Hotel Co. L. R. 6 C. P. 515, 517;

Bohler v. Ovens, 60 Ga. 185; Walsh v. Porter-

field, 87 Pa. 378; Story, Bailm. 472.

The plaintiff was guilty of negligence in not availing himself of the place of safety provided by the defendant for the safe keeping of his money, and he cannot maintain this action.

Purvis v. Coleman, 21 N. Y. 112; Chamberlain v. West, 37 Minn. 54; Jones v. Jackson, 29 L. T. N. S. 399.

Mr. H. H. Gilkyson, for appellee:

ure of care with which he keeps the goods of a guest, nor the means which he has employed that of a common carrier, who is held abso-control of his goods, and public policy which, lutely responsible for all loss of goods while in for the protection of the owner under such cirlutely responsible for all loss of goods while in his control, and under his custody, unless the loss be occasioned by an act of God or the public enemy.

lic enemy.
Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 32, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas.
*194, 7th Am. ed. 241; Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N.
H. 553; Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571; Packard v. Northeraft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439; Shaw v.
Berry, 31 Me. 478; Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga.
242; Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280.
The goods are under the protection of the

inn, so as to make the innkeeper liable for a breach of duty, unless the negligence of the guest occasions the loss in such a way that the loss could not have happened if the guest had used the ordinary care that a prudent man may be reasonably expected to have taken under the circumstances.

1 Addison, Torts, p. 615; Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92; Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376; Rommel v. Schombacher (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 742, 20 W. N. C. 262.

Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

As long ago as Chancellor Kent's day it was said: "The responsibility of an innkeeper for the goods of his guest . . . has been a point of much discussion in the books." 2 Kent, Com. 592.

The common-law rule, as established in Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 32, was that the innkeeper was bound absolutely to keep safe the goods of his guest deposited within the inn, and Kent, after considering the cases, lays it down that "an innkeeper, like a common carrier, is an insurer of the goods of his guest." 2 Kent, Com. 594.

The subject is also learnedly discussed in the note to Calye's Case, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. *197, and the notes to Coggs v. Bernard, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. *307, where the learned American annotators sum up the rule in the following form: "An innkeeper is answerable for all losses happening to the goods of travelers becoming his guests, except such losses as are caused by the Act of God, or the public enemies, or by the conduct of the guest himself, or his servant, or the companion whom he brings with him."

The learned counsel for the appellant has presented us a strong array of authorities to show that the true foundation of the rule as administered in the later cases both in England and many of our sister States is the negligence of the innkeeper, and the only difference between the innkeeper and ordinary bailees is that a loss is prima facie proof of the innkeeper's negligence, and throws upon him the burden of disproving it. If the question were open it might be interesting to examine how far the desire to fix the exact limits of the liability, by resting it on something more definite than public policy, has led to modification of the severity of the common-law rule. Con-ceding negligence to be the foundation, we must logically concede the desired result, that if the innkeeper shows by satisfactory proof that he took due care, he is absolved from liability. For my own part I apprehend that the liability, like that of a common carrier, rested fortunately did not receive the same considera-on the surrender of the owner's possession and tion. Neither the question of contributory negliability, like that of a common carrier, rested 8 L. R. A.

cumstances, precluded every excuse for not restoring the goods to the owner, except such as were the result of vis major, the act of God or the public enemies, which would be notorious, and could not be fraudulently pretended.

But the rule, whatever its foundation, is no

In Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92, the common-law liability was laid down by Williams, J., in the following emphatic terms: "His responsibility extends to all his servants and domestics. and to all the goods and moneys of his guest which are placed within the inn; and he is bound in every event to pay for them if stolen unless they were stolen by a servant or com-panion of the guest." The learned counsel for appellant has distinguished this case very carefully and accurately upon the facts, and claims that the enunciation of the general rule, above quoted, was not really necessary to the decision of the case actually before the court and that it is therefore only dictum. If the case stood alone there would be good ground for the claim, and we might be required now to re-examine the foundation and merits of the rule announced. But in Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376, the former case was distinctly affirmed in all the breadth of the opinion. The judge below had charged the jury that "at common law an innkeeper was liable, at all events, for the goods and baggage of his guests, . . . and the law is the same to-day It was, in fact, insuring, as it were, the safety of the property of guests, and it was immaterial (if a loss occurred or property was stolen whilst the guest was in the hotel) by whom it was stolen, unless it was by the guest's own servant or a fellow guest of the party who was robbed, or the negligence of the guest; and however vigilant the landlord might have been, he was responsible to the party losing the property. That was the common-law liability. He was practically an insurer of the safety of the property. erty whilst the guests remained in his house.

It was assigned for error that this charge was too broad, and eminent counsel argued there, as here, that the real foundation of the rule is the negligence of the landlord or his servants; but this court in affirming the judgment said:
"We adhere to the statement of the law as laid down by our late brother Williams, in Houser v. Tully, as to the extent and character of the liability of innkeepers for the goods of their guests. An innkeeper is bound to pay for goods stolen in his house from a guest, unless stolen by the servant or companion of the guest. . . . The learned judge below, in his charge to the jury, evidently adopted this case as his chart, and there is no error in his instructions upon the law."

After this deliberate affirmance of the common-law rule in a case where it was applied and the correctness of the instruction distinctly assigned for error, we must regard the rule as settled.

The learned judge therefore was right in the general instruction he gave the jury as to the foundation of the plaintiff's case. In the press of the trial, however, the defense unpresented to the jury as it should have been.

Volenti non fit injuria, and conduct of the plaintiff contributing to the loss, whether vol-untary or negligent, is always a defense. This principle, though not very clearly enunciated, was applied to the liability of an innkeeper even in Calye's Case, where the first resolution was that if the horse was put to pasture at the guest's request and stolen, the innkeeper was not liable, and the eighth (8 Coke, 32), that if the innkeeper requires his guest to put his goods in such a chamber under lock, and the guest leave them in an outer court and they are stolen, the innkeeper shall not be liable. And however it might have been in the days of good Queen Bess, when Calye's Case was decided, and when the length of his wine bill might have been deemed sufficient consideration for the duty of an innkeeper to take care of his guest drunk or sober, it is now held in our own case of Walsh v. Porterfield that intoxication is no excuse for the negligence of a guest which contributes to his loss.

The evidence in the present case leaves the circumstances of the robbery in some degree of mystery. According to the plaintiff's story, he locked and bolted his chamber door on going to bed, and found it open on waking in the morning. The back outer door of the hotel bore marks of violence with a hammer or other tool, the catch of the dead latch was broken off, and matches of a kind not used in the hotel were found scattered at various points. All this pointed to a burglary by outside parties. Yet the evidence is that the plaintiff's bedroom door bore no marks of violence anywhere, the key was in the lock, and the transom window was but a foot high and swung in the middle leaving only a space of six inches through which no person could possibly climb. How then did the thief get in? There is no theory which does not encounter some difficulties, and the first question that arises in the mind is whether the plaintiff may not be mistaken in supposing he locked and bolted his door. The testimony is, that though a sober man he was not a total abstainer, and had been drinking that evening. Did he get more than he thought and is his recollection thereby beclouded? Or did he lock and bolt the door as he thinks, and did the beer get him up again in a confused condition of mind, and was his open door the result of this? The other circumstances only add to the difficulty of a satisfactory explana-The evidence in general, as already said, points to a robbery by outside parties. But the vest carefully folded and laid between the two lap blankets on the hat-rack in the diningroom is hard to reconcile with such a theory. Again, the evidence of Mrs. Wall as to the voices on the porch, and of Rahn as to the men Judgme asking for plaintiff, suggest the possibility of awarded. 8 L. R. A.

ligence nor the effect of the Statute of 1855 was | other parties in company with plaintiff and the loss of the money before he entered his room. As already said, there is no view of the evidence that does not meet with some difficulty, and such difficulty is always for the jury to solve.

Jurors are to exercise the same common sense and judgment in the jury box that they do as men in the affairs of life, only with a strict regard, under the direction of the court, to the nature, relevancy and weight of evidence upon both sides. They cannot base verdicts on surmise or conjecture without evidence, but they are not bound to believe an incredible story because no witness contradicts it. It is for them to survey the whole case and say whether the party having the burden of proof has met it by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence. The learned judge below was of opinion that there was not sufficient evidence of plaintiff's negligence to be considered by the jury, and therefore, though stating the law correctly as to such negligence, he limited the jury to the consideration of the single question, whether or not there was a theft. this view we are unable to concur. The difficulties in the way of the plaintiff's theory and the general uncertainty of the entire occurrence should have sent the whole case to the jury with an affirmance of defendant's second and third points.

The evidence in regard to the safe and the notice to guests is not as full and satisfactory as it might be, but it was sufficient to go to the jury. The provisions of the Act of the 7th of May, 1855 (Pub. Laws, 479), in regard to the place where notices must be posted, are intended to secure knowledge brought home to the guest. They may be said to be mandatory in the sense that as they amount to constructive: notice; they must be strictly complied with if constructive notice is relied on. But if notice in fact is proved, then the provisions for constructive notice become immaterial. Defendant testified positively to having called the plaintiff's attention to the notice at the head of the hotel register, though it was probably not on this particular visit. The defendant denied This question should have gone to the jury for them to determine, under all the cir-cumstances, the lapse of time since plaintiff saw the notice, if they find that he did have his attention called to it, the frequency of his visits and his consequent familiarity with the customs of the house, etc., whether he should be treated as having notice of the existence of a safe, and if so, whether his omission to avail himself of that protection, and his carrying such an amount of money to his bedroom, was negligence for which he must himself bear the

Judgment reversed, and venire de novo

KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS.

Laura GOSS et al., Appts., Minnie R. FROMAN et al.

(.....Ky.....)

- 1. Proof of the conduct of husband and wife toward each other, and of their expressions of hatred and fear of each other, and of their statements, during the time they lived together apparently as husband and wife, as to non-access, may be admitted to show non-access, on the question as to the legitimacy of a child.
- 2. The presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate, where the husband and wife had opportunities of access, is not conclusive, but may be overcome by clear proof , of the contrary, which may consist of proof that the husband was incompetent to have sexual intercourse with his wife or she with him.
- 3. Proof of the wife's adultery is competent on the question of the legitimacy of a child. to corroborate proof that the husband was not capable of performing the sexual act or that he had abstained from performing it with his wife.
- 4. A mother is a competent witness to prove the legitimacy of her child begotten during wedlock if such legitimacy is attacked; and in case she becomes a witness she will not be permitted to withhold on cross-examination any part of the truth, even although it will disclose acts of adultery.
- A woman who, during her abandon-ment of her husband, admits any man

or men to her periodically or whenever it is convenient or opportunity is afforded, is living in adultery within the meaning of the Kentucky statutes which forfeit her dower or distributable sbare in her husband's property, when she voluntarily leaves him and lives in adultery.

(November 26, 1889.)

A PPEAL by cross-defendants from a judg-ment of the Louisville Law and Equity Court in favor of cross-petitioners in a suit brought by the executor of Solomon Froman, deceased, to obtain a settlement of his accounts, etc., the cross-petition setting up the birth of an heir after the making of the will, and praying a distribution of the estate to such heir subject to the dower rights of his mother. Reversed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Burton Vance for Laura Goss, appellant.

Messrs. Brown, Humphrey & Davie. C. B. Seymour and W. H. McGee for other

devisees and heirs, appellants.

Messrs. Thomas H. Hines and J. M. Wilkins, with Messrs. Abbott & Rut-

ledge, for Elizabeth Wilson, appellant: The prima facie evidence of legitimacy may always be lawfully rebutted by satisfactory evidence that access did not take place between husband and wife, as by the law of nature is necessary in order for the man, in fact, to be father of the child.

Note.—Presumption of legitimacy of child born in Bosville v. Atty-Gen. L. R. 12 Prob. Div. 177; Morwedlock.

Bastards are persons begotten and born out of lawful wedlock. Miller v. Anderson, 1 West. Rep. 810, 43 Ohio St. 473; 1 Bl. Com. 454; 2 Kent. Com. 208. If a woman pregnant at her marriage is delivered after marriage the child is legitimate. Miller v. Anderson, supra.

The law presumes a child to have been born in lawful wedlock, and this presumption must prevail until overcome by clear and convincing proof adduced by those alleging illegitimacy. Orthwein v. Thomas, 4 L. R. A. 434, 127 Ill, 554.

Children of a married woman, born during coverture, are presumed to be legitimate. Re Romero's Estate, 75 Cal. 379.

The fact that a woman gave birth to a fully developed child so soon after marriage as to render it certain that it was begotten before marriage raises a legal presumption that it was begotten by him who became her husband. McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 Tex. 682.

The presumption of regitimacy is a presumption juris et de jure. Miller v. Anderson, 1 West. Rep. 811. 43 Ohio St. 473.

The burden of proving illegitimacy lies entirely with the person seeking to establish it. Overlock v. Hall, 81 Me. 348; Plowes v. Bossey, 8 Jur. N. S. 352, 81 L. J. N. S. Ch. 681.

But in a later decision in England it has been held that it is not a presumption juris et de jure, but may be rebutted by evidence which must be clear and conclusive and not resting merely on a balance of probabilities. So where a child was born 276 days after the last opportunity of the husband's access, and there was evidence in the wife's conduct tending to show that she regarded the child as the offspring of her paramour, the question of its legitimacy was properly submitted to the jury. ure, have been begotten; fourth, and present only 8 L. R. A.

A legal presumption relieves him in whose favor it exists from the necessity of any proof, but may be destroyed by rebutting evidence. Otherwise as to presumptions juris et de jure, against which no proof can be admitted. Dugas v. Estiletts, 5 La. Aun. 559; Davenport v. Mason, 15 Mass. 85; Baalam v. State, 17 Ala. 451.

Presumption in favor of the legitimacy of children will not be made where the question is to be determined as one of fact and not of law. Blackburn v. Crawford, 70 U. S. 3 Wall, 175 (18 L. ed. 186).

The presumption of legitimacy may be rebutted.

The presumption of legitimacy may be rebutted both by positive and by presumptive evidence. Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 15 Ga. 160.

In Louisiana this legal presumption can be overcome only in the mode and within the time prescribed by law. Dejol v. Johnson, 12 La. Ann. 853.

Elsewhere it can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof of non-intercourse between the husband and wife. Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 250; Van Aernam v. Van Aernam, 1 Barb. Ch. 378; Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U. S. 6 How. 550 (12 L. ed. 553); Sullivan v. Keliy, 3 Allen, 148; Hemmenway v. Towner, I Allen, 209; Flettesham v. Julian, 1 Y. B. 7 Hen. IV. 9, pl. 13; Stegall v. Stegall, 2 Brock. 256; Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Humph. 410.

The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the period of marriage is not rebutted by circumstances which create only doubt and suspicion, but is wholly removed by showing, first, that the husband was incompetent; second, that he was entirely absent, so as to have had no access to the mother; third, or entirely absent at the period during which the child must, in the course of natAshmead, 271.

The presumption of sexual intercourse between husband and wife may be rebutted by evidence of the feelings and conduct of the

parties.

Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 161; Wright v. Hicks, 15 Ga. 169; Cannon v. Cannon, 7 Humph. 410; Strede v. Magowan, 2 Bush, 621; Remmington

v. Lewis, 8 B. Mon. 611.

Mrs. Froman was permitted to testify that she had never been unfaithful to her husband, and had never had intercourse, since her marriage, with anyone but him. This was error under the Civil Code, § 606, which provides: "Neither a husband nor his wife shall testify, even after the cessation of their marriage, concerning any communication between them during marriage."

See also Boykin v. Boykin, 70 N. C. 262; Patchett v. Holgate, 3 Eng. L. & Eq. 100; Rex v. Sourton, 5 Ad. & El. 180; Hamp v. Robinson, 13 L. T. N. S. 29; Aylesford Peerage Case, L. R. 11 App. Cas. 1.

Messrs. Helm & Bruce for appellees.

Bennett, J., delivered the opinion of the

Minnie R. Froman is the widow of Solomon Froman, deceased. He died testate on the 3d

Nicholas, Adulterine Bastardy, p. 182; day of June, 1884. Soloman White Froman, Banbury Peerage Case, 1 Sim. & Stu. 153; son of Minnie R. Froman, was begotten during Haues v. Draeger, L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 178; Morris v. Davies, 3 Car. & P. 215, 427; Shuler v. Balb, 18 S. C. 69; January, 1885, about seven months after the State v. Shumpert, 1 S. C. 85; State v. Petta-death of the putative father, Soloman Froman. vay, 3 Hawks (N. C.) 625; Com. v. Wentz, 1 Soloman Froman's will made no provision for this efter-horn child not any provision for son of Minnie R. Froman, was begotten during the wedlock of Soloman Froman and Minnie R. Froman and was born on the 3d day of this after-born child, nor any provision for Minnie R. Froman, the widow. Soloman White Froman claimed the entire estate, under the statute, as an after-born pretermitted child. The widow renounced the provisions of the will, and claimed her dowable and distributable share of the estate. Issue was joined as to the legitimacy of Soloman White Froman, and as to the forfeiture of the widow's dowable and distributable interest by reason of her abandoning her husband, Soloman Froman, and living in adultery. These issues were decided against the devisees under the will, and they

have appealed to this court.

It is to be regretted that questions like these should ever arise in the courts of this Commonwealth. Kentucky's matrons are famed for their high sense of virtue and exemplary conduct; and it is to be regretted that the conduct of Mrs. Minnie R. Froman was so radical a departure from this fair fame as to impel us to declare her son, Soloman White Froman, illegitimate. The proof is that Mrs. Froman left the house of her husband, Soloman Froman, on the morning of the 4th of April, 1884. and went direct to Bowling Green, to the house of a Mrs. Wilson, where she remained at least a week, and then returned to Louisville, and took boarding with a certain woman, and

under circumstances which afford clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual inter-course. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552; Com. v. Stricker, 1 Browne (Pa.) Append. XLVII.

Proof of impotency of husband.

It is presumed that a mature male has normal powers of virility, and the burden of proving the contrary is on the party asserting it. Gardner v. State, 81 Ga. 144.

The presumption of legitimacy arising from the eleeping together of husband and wife can be rebutted only by clear and satisfactory evidence that some physical incapacity existed. Legge v. Edmonds, 25 L. J. N. S. Ch. 125.

The evidence must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the husband could not have been the father. Phillips v. Allen, 2 Allen, 453.

The impotency of the putative father, if true and proven, would be conclusive, and evidence thereof is competent. State v. Broadway, 69 N. C. 411.

Proof of non-access

Access between man and wife is always presumed until otherwise plainly proved, and nothing is allowed to impugn the legitimacy of a child, short of proofs of facts showing it to be impossible that the husband could have been its father. Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U. S. 24 How. 553 (16 L. ed. 770).

But if a husband went beyond seas two years before the birth of her child, the conclusion is irresistible that it is illegitimate. Rex v. Maidstone, 12 East, 550.

So illegitimacy may be shown by proof of abandonment by the husband, and his continued absence from the State, for a period of four years before the birth of the child. Pittsford v. Chit-tenden, 2 New Eng. Rep. 191, 58 Vt. 49.

Non-access of the husband need not be proved during the whole period of the wife's pregnancy, 8 L. R. A.

if the circumstances show a natural impossibility that he could be the father, as where he had access only a fortnight before the birth. Rex v. Luffe, 8 East, 193.

Where a husband after a long absence did not rejoin his wife until eight months before the birth of a full grown child the could not have been the father. Heathcote's Divorce Bill, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 535.

Opportunity of access becomes important to consider, where the wife was notoriously living in adultery. Reg. v. Mansfield, 1 Q. B. 444, 5 Jur. 505.

Where the child was born three months after the marriage, the wife was asked on cross-examination, "When did you first become acquainted with your husband?" and on her answering "Twelve months" the subject was dismissed. Anon. v. your nusuality and our and an instance of the months? the subject was dismissed. Anon. v. Anon. 22 Beav. 481; State v. Romaine, 58 Iowa, 48. Where husband and wife, although living separations of the subject of the s

rate and apart, had been in such a situation that access might have been had, the presumption in favor of legitimacy can be rebutted only by strong evidence; and if the access is proved, no inquiry as to paternity can be made. Morris v. Davies, 5 Clark & F. 163, 1 Jur. 911.

Parties themselves not competent witnesses on the subject of access.

A woman cannot give evidence of the non-access of her husband to bastardize her issue, though the husband be deceased (Rex v. Kea, 11 East, 12: Goodright v. Moss, Cowp. 591); but the mother is a competent witness to prove the illegitimacy of her children. Rex v. Bramley, 6 T. R. 330; Stan-den v. Standen, 6 T. R. 331 note (b.), Peake, N. P. 3.; Rex v. Reading, Lee, Cas. t. Hardw. 79; Rex v. Luffe. 8 East, 193; Tioga Co. v. South Creek Twp. 75 Pa.

The evidence of the husband is not admissible to

there remained as boarder until the death of treated him for these diseases, until his death, April preceding, although she left him sick of a fatal disease, of which he died on the 3d of June. Mrs. Froman claims that her husband, testimony, which is as follows:

Troman continued to grow worse from the time Dr. Griffith commenced attending on him until he died. That his condition may clearly appear, we quote from Dr. Holloway's June. Mrs. Froman claims that her husband, testimony, which is as follows: Soloman Froman, on the morning of the 3d of April,—the day before she left his house, sent for her to come to his room; that she went, and he then had sexual intercourse with her, getting her with child. If this story is to be believed, the appellee, Soloman White Froman, having been thereafter born within the usual time of gestation, is the child of Soloman Froman. But is the story to be believed? Does not the proof disclose a state of case that utterly repels the truth of this story? Does not the proof show a state of case that repels any presumption of sexual intercourse whatever? We think it does. Let us see. find that Soloman Froman on the 11th day of November, 1883, was affected with Bright's disease, and dropsy of the bowels, scrotum and thighs. Dr. Griffith attended on him almost daily, and treated him for these diseases. until the 7th day of January, 1884, at which time he turned the case over to Dr. Holloway, and he attended on Froman almost daily, and of excitement, he was more talkative, but con-

clearly appear, we quote from Dr. Holloway's testimony, which is as follows: "He had ædema of the lungs, or asthmatic breathing, and frequent paroxysms of asthma, excessive bronquent paroxysms of asinma, excessive brou-chiae. He had general dropsy. This dropsy was more generally displayed by the accumu-lation in his abdomen; by enlargement of the skin; by the dropsy of the skin of the abdo-men, and the loins, back and thighs; of the skin of the thighs and legs, and by the general excessive accumulation of the fluid in the scrotum, and in the skin of the penis,—so much so that the penis proper could not be seen upon an examination, only the orifice. He had frequent attacks of vomiting and obstinate constipation, with loss of appetite. He was mentally dull, unless when aroused by some special cause of excitement. He had what is called 'bebetude.' With or without anodynes, he aroused at my visits in a sleepy way in his bed or chair, and had to be questioned before he would give any answer about his case. When aroused by any special cause-

prove access, or any collateral fact tending to show that he had opportunities of access. Wright v. Holdgate, 3 Car. & K. 158.

The rule precluding the husband or wife from proving non-access for the purpose of bastardizing the issue applies where, on the day following the marriage, the husband abandoned the wife, and the child was born shortly afterward at the house of her employer, whom she sought to charge with the paternity. Tioga Co. v. South Creek Twp. supra; Parker v. Way, 15 N. H. 45; Davis v. Houston, 2 Yeates, 289; Page v. Denuison, I Grant, Cas. 377; Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420; State v. Wilson, 10 Ired, L. 131; State v. Herman, 13 Ired, L. 502; 1 Phil. Ev. 87, note.

Evidence of intercourse with other men.

Evidence of intercourse with other men must be limited to a period such as to admit of the inference that the child derived its paternity from that intercourse. Bowen v. Reed, 103 Mass. 46. Compare Paull v. Padelford, 16 Gray, 263.

Evidence that another man had connection with the wife at about the proper time for begetting the child is not competent unless coupled with evidence that the husband had no connection with her at that time. State v. Bennett, 75 N. C. 305.

Evidence of acts of intercourse with other men twelve months before the birth is inadmissible. Sabins v. Jones, 119 Mass. 167.

The legal presumption is rebutted by the facts. that the wife led the life of a prostitute, was seen as such in company with other men, that though her husband lived in the same town he always avoided her, and that the child was born in jail three years after their separation. Sibbet v. Ainsley, 3 L. T. N. S. 583.

So illegitimacy is established by evidence of the mother living in adultery at the time when the child was begotten. Barony of Saye and Sele, 1 H. L. Cas. 507.

Megitimacy may be established by proof of other facts.

Illegitimacy may be established by any competent evidence, and proof thereof is not restricted 8 L. R. A.

to evidence of impotency on the part of the husband, or of impossibility of access, or of intercourse between the wife and a man other than her husband. Wilson v. Babb, 18 S. C. 59.

Hearsay evidence may be sufficient. Goerman's App. (Pa.) 1 Cent. Rep. 228.

Depositions are admissible on the trial of an issueof bastardy, as in other civil actions. State v. Hickerson, 72 N. C. 421. The fact of paternity may be established by a

fair preponderance of evidence as in other civil cases. People v. Cantine, 1 Brown, N. P. (Mich.) 140; Young v. Makepeace, 103 Mass. 50.

Evidence not admissible on question of paternity.

Declarations of parties made after cohabitation has ceased are not evidence to bastardize the issue. Re Taylor, 9 Paige, 611.

They are not admissible where no evidence is offered of non-access at the time of conception. Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420.

Neither the mother's declarations nor her husband's, she having since deceased, are admissibleon the question of paternity (Cope v. Cope, 5 Car. & P. 604, 1 Moody & R. 269); but a baptismal register describing the child as the illegitimate son of his mother is admissible. Ibid.

The father's declarations are insufficient to bastardize the issue of his marriage (Bowles v. Bingham, 2 Munf. 442, 3 Munf. 599); it requires the proof to show it was impossible that the husband could be the child's father. Vernon v. Vernon, 6 La. AED. 243.

But where non-access has been established by evidence aliunds, the declaration of the mother is admissible to prove the paternity of the child. Legge v. Edmonds, 25 L. J. N. S. Ch. 125,

Admissions of the wife cannot be received to es tablish non-access at the period of conception, to bastardize her issue. Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige, 139.

Evidence of the likeness of a child to its supposed: father is not admissible upon the question of paternity. United States v. Collins, 1 Cranch, C. C. 592; Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84. But consult-State v. Bowles, 7 Jones, L. 579.

·Nor is evidence of the color of the child's eyes. admissible. People v. Carney, 29 Hun, 47.

relapse into his condition of neperade. And urine was very scant, and when boiled with nitric acid it had the appearance of soiled boiled white of an egg. His case was plainly one of Bright's disease in its advanced stages. "This was his condition when I saw him in January, 1884. The dropsical condition of the penis and scrotum got steadily worse from the first time I saw him; only the orifice of the skin where the penis was could be seen. He could not have had sexual intercourse from the time I saw him in January, 1884. In his physical condition it was not possible for him to have emitted semen into a woman. It was not possible for him to have had connection with a woman at any time during my attendwith a woman at any time during my attenuance upon him. The usual period of gestation is from 273 days to 280 days." In his second deposition, he says: "I am satisfied that he was not physically capable of performing the sexual act. I do not think it was possible for him to enter a woman so as to bring the semen in the track in such a manner that the spermavisited him from the 3d to the 9th of February, excepting the 8th; then from the 10th to the 15th, excepting the 14th. I visited him the 17th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 23d, 25th, 27th and 1st of March; then the 4th and 7th of March, when the 15th of March. twice that week; then the 11th of March, once that week; then the 16th, 21st, 22d, 23d and 27th of March; then the 31st of March and 8th and 11th of April; then the 16th and 19th of April; then 23d and 27th of April and 3d of May, 6th of May and 10th of May. Then I visited him on the 11th, 12th, 14th, 15th, 16th of May, and the 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, 23d, and on the 24th; twice on the 25th; to the 31st, inclusive, twice every day; twice on the 1st of June; and twice on the 3d of June, the day of his death."

From what Dr. Holloway says, it was a physical impossibility for Soloman Froman to get his wife with child at the respective dates that he visited him. Is it possible that the swelling could have abated between the 31st of March and the 8th of April enough to enable him to have sexual intercourse at any time during said period? It may be possible, but it seems to us that such a conclusion is wholly irrational. The doctor, in his almost daily visits before and after said time, found him so swollen as to be incapable of performing the sexual act, and growing worse all the time. So it seems that there is no ground whatever for forming any rational conclusion that the swelling so abated within said time as to enable him to have had sexual intercourse. Such a conclusion would be wholly irrational. But we are not left to conjecture about this matter; for the nurse, who was in daily attendance upon Soloman Froman, and slept with him nightly, during said time, says that his swelling did not abate, nor did his condition at all improve. He also says that he knows Soloman Froman did not have sexual intercourse with Mrs. Froman on the morning of the 3d of April, nor at any other time for several months previous. It also appears that Soloman and Mrs. Froman lived like cats and dogs for several mouths prior to her leaving his house on unless it is such proof as unquestionably es-8LRA

fined himself to the subject that excited him; the 4th of April; that he usually spoke of her and then, when that passed away, he would as "the damned dirty bitch," and she of him as relapse into his condition of hebetude. His "the damned old son of a bitch." He accused her of poisoning him, and she said that she had poisoned him in order to get him out of the way. She also said, time and again, he could not, even before he was taken sick, have sexual. intercourse; that she and he had ceased, for at least a year before his death, to have inter-course with each other. He said the same thing. It also appears from the proof that she-had sexual intercourse with Ed Ward in Bowling Green, on the night of the 4th of April, and several other times during her stay in that city, and afterwards with another. also appears that during her marriage state, before and after her sojourn in Bowling Green, she wrote this Ed Ward unchaste and lascivious letters. The appellees did intro-duce proof to the effect that, in April and May, Soloman Froman was seen going about his business, and that no swelling was observed, and, from the way that he handled himself, no unusual swelling existed. unusual swelling existed. These witnesses might be mistaken as to the time. Their recollection may be explained upon the ground of mistake as to time; but these doctors and nurses had reason to fix and recollect the time. There is scarcely any room for an honest mistake. Their story is either true, at least as to the swollen condition of this man, or it is a fabrication. From the high character of the physicians, and the apparent honesty of the nurses, the latter fact is wholly improbable.

But it is contended that the proof of the conduct of Mr. and Mrs. Froman towards each other; their expressions of hatred and fear of each other; their statements during the time that they lived together, apparently, as husband and wife, as to non-access,—are incompetent as tending to show non-access. also contended that, where parties have oppor-tunities of access,—sexual intercourse,—the child begotten in wedlock is conclusively presumed to be legitimate. We do not so understand the law as to either proposition. derstand the law to be that where the husband and wife have opportunities of access, therearises a very strong presumption that they did. have it; but this presumption may be overcome by clear proof to the contrary, which may consist of proof that the husband was incompetent to have sexual intercourse, or from some cause he had declined to have sexual intercourse with his wife, or she with him. If such proof of conduct, declarations, etc., were not admitted as proof, it would be almost impossible to prove that the husband and wife had declined to have sexual intercourse with each other. It is a fact that husbands and wives, though living in the same house or on. the same farm, have often so lived, not as hus-band and wife, but in fact in a state of separation; so, in the absence of proof of constant watch over them, night and day, it would be impossible to prove non-access, unless the proof of conduct, declarations, etc., were admitted as evidence.

It is also contended that the proof of adultery on the part of the wife was incompetent. Where access is either expressly or impliedly admitted, such proof is ordinarily inadmissible.

the adulterous intercourse by a white woman, having a white husband, with a negro, and the child born in the usual course of time thereafter was a negro. But where proof shows that the husband is not capable of performing the sexual act, or that the parties have abstained from performing the sexual act, then it is competent to prove adultery on the part of the wife as corroborating the main fact. If Mrs. Froman was shown to be, in fact, a virtuous woman, such fact would create the belief that there was some mistake or false swearing in reference to the incompetency or non-access of her husband, or else incline the chancellor to adopt the theory of the expert physicians, to the effect that though, from the swollen condi-tion of Froman, he could not enter Mrs. Froman's person, yet in his effort to make the entry, his semen found its way into the vagi-na, and the appellee Soloman White Froman was the fruit. But the proof of her adultery drives away these conjectures and strained theories, made in behalf of chastity, and corroborates the proof of non-access.

We do not understand that, where the husband's access is either expressly or impliedly admitted or proven about the time the child is begotten, the child's legitimacy is in all such cases conclusive. The presumption, in such cases, is only conclusive where proof may be introduced, pro and con, as to the question of legitimacy. No probabilities can be weighed and considered. The fact of illegitimacy in such case cannot be established by the weight of evidence. Nothing short of some fact thoroughly established, and which, when established, cannot be explained away, as the case just mentioned of a white woman having a negro child, will be allowed to prevail against the presumption. The proof of the illegitimacy of the child, begotten in wedlock, is a direct attack upon the mother's virtue, and

tablishes the fact of illegitimacy; as that of an accusation of a wanton violation of her marriage yows, and is a stigma upon the child, and taints its blood, if the charge be true. Therefore, to hold that the mother, thus assailed, could not support her own innocence and honor, and the purity of the blood of her child, by her oath that she was true to herself and offspring by keeping sacred what is enjoined by both divine and human law, and upon the keeping of which the refinement and elevation of the race depend, would be a barsh rule indeed. But, while she is allowed to do this, and in dubious cases she should do this, she should not, upon cross-examination, be allowed to withhold any part of the truth. The whole truth should come, although she would have

to disclose acts of adultery. The General Statutes provide, in substance, that if the wife voluntarily leaves her husband, and lives in adultery, she shall forfeit her right of dower and distributable share in the hus-band's real and personal estate. This Statute band's real and personal estate. This Statute does not mean that she shall constantly live with one man in adultery during her abandonment of the husband, in order to forfeit her right of dower or distributable share; but if she admits any man or men to her periodically, or whenever it is convenient or opportunity is afforded, during said abandonment, such conduct constitutes a living in adultery, within the meaning of the Statute. It is clear from the proof in the cause, that Mrs. Froman's conduct was as above described, in consequence of which she forfeited her right to dower and dis-

tributable share in Soloman Froman's estate.

The judgment is reversed, with directions to deny Soloman White Froman any interest whatever in Soloman Froman's estate, and to deny Mrs. Froman any dower or distributable share in said estate, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petition for rehearing overruled.

WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT.

TERRITORY of Washington, ex rel. George O. KELLY, Appt.,

J. P. STEWART et al.

(.....Wash.....)

A statute authorizing the creation of a municipal corporation by a judicial court, upon petition of a majority of the inhabitants of the territory to be incorporated, is unconstitutional as delegating legislative functions to the court.

(Dunbar, J., dissents.)

(February 13, 1890.)

A PPEAL by relator from a judgment of the District Court for Pierce County sustaining A District Court for Pierce County sustaining
a demurrer to the complaint in a proceeding to
determine by what authority defendants
claimed to exercise the powers of trustees of a
certain municipal corporation and to dissolve

Belleh corporation.

Devoré's App. 56 Pa. 163; Borough of Blooming Valley, 56 Pa. 66; People v. Bennett, 29

Mich. 451, 18 Am. Rep. 115, 116.

The order incorporating Town of Puyallup
is void. The power to make such an order is such corporation. Reversed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.

8 L. R. A.

Messrs. Fremont Campbell, Pros. Atty., C. H. Hanford and Thomas Carroll, for

appellant:

Section 1889 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, together with chap. 168, p. 101, 24 United States Statutes at Large, of Congress, Second Session, conferring upon the Legislature the right to create municipal corporations, does not contemplate or permit the Legislature to delegate such right to courts or judges.

Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 153: People v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 89; People v. Nevada, 6 Cal. 143.

In States where the right is recognized, the courts have universally held that such statutes do not imply any such power against private consent.

not judicial and not vested in said judge by

107; People v. Nevada, 6 Cal. 143. Messrs. B. F. Jacobs and Town & Lik-

ens, for appellees:

The legislative function is the predetermina-tion of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its provis-

Bates v. Kimball, 2 D. Chipman (Vt.) 77; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. pp. 109, 110; Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 383.

The judicial function or power is "to adjudicate upon and protect the rights and interests of the citizens and to that end to construe and

apply the law.

Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton Co. 1 Ohio St. 77. Examine also King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447; Gordon v. Inghram, 1 Grant. Cas. 152; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501; Taylor v. Place, 4R. I. 324.

A statute may be conditional and its taking effect may be made to depend upon some sub-

sequent event.

See Burlington v. Leebrick, 43 Iows, 252; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449; State v. Kirkley, 29 Md. 85; Walton v. Greenwood, 60 Me. 356,

Act of Territorial Legislature approved February 2, 1888, does not delegate legislative authority to the courts, as the Legislature by that Act prescribes the liabilities, duties, powers and privileges of said corporations, and the Statute, and not the court, determines the extent and nature of the powers of the corporation.

Morristonon v. Shelton, 1 Head (Tenn.) 24; Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Burlington v.

Leebrick, 43 Iowa, 252.

The Act is not unconstitutional because of certain powers and duties conferred upon the courts in relation to the mode of organizing said towns, as these duties are judicial in their nature, and the Legislature, and not the court, prescribes the powers, duties and liabilities of

Which the corporation is possessed.

Kayser v. Bremen, Morristown v. Shelton and Burlington v. Leebrick, supra; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37; Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; Hammand v. Haines 25 Md 541. Com. v. Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541; Com. v. Montrose, 52 Pa. 391.

Anders, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of

This action was brought in the District Court of the Second Judicial District of Washington Territory, holding terms at Tacoma, in and for Pierce County, to inquire and determine by What warrant or authority the appellees claim to exercise the powers of a board of trustees of the Town of Puyallup, in that county, and to oust them from office as such board of trustees, and to dissolve said municipal corporation. The complaint states: "(1) That the abovenamed defendants, at a place called 'Puyallup,' in Pierce County, Wash. T., do now unlawfully act as a municipal corporation under the name and style of the 'Town of Puyallup,' without being legally incorporated as a board of trustees of said alleged municipal corporaof trustees of said alleged municipal corporation. (2) That said defendants act as such corporation, and exercise the powers of such board of trustees, under color of authority conferred local government, and the judge of the district 8 L. R. A.

People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451, 18 Am. Rep. by an order made by the judge of this court, at chambers, in the City of Tacoma, Wash. T., on the 31st day of July, A. D. 1888, and enterc upon record in this court. (3) That a certified copy of the record of said order, and of the proceedings in the matter relating to the alleged incorporation of said Town of Puyal-lup, marked 'Exhibit A,' is hereto annexed for reference, and made a part of this complaint, and a correct plat, showing the boundaries of said alleged incorporated Town of Puyallup, as defined in said order, and the location of the relator's farm, hereinafter mentioned, marked 'Exhibit B,' is hereto annexed for reference, and made a part of this complaint. (4) That said order is void, and of no effect; for the same was made by the judge, aforesaid, upon the ex parte application of John Beverly, Esq., without a hearing being granted to the relator, or to any of the inhabitants, or owners of property, within the boundaries of said alleged Town of Puyallup, and without any notice being given of said application; and no oppor-tunity was at any time given to the relator, or any other person whomsoever, to remonstrate against or oppose the incorporation of said town, or to question the validity or sufficiency of the petition upon which said order was made, or to make complaint as to the boundaries of said alleged town; and no legal or good evidence was produced before the judge upon which to base the findings of fact recited in said order; and power to make said order is not judicial, and not vested in said judge by law. (5) That the relator is the owner of real property situated within the boundaries of said alleged town, as defined by said order; and he and many others, owners of property situated within said alleged town, have not consented to the incorporation of said town, and are unwilling to have said town incorporated with boundaries including their said property, for that said property is partly improved and cultivated farming land, and no part thereof is platted into town lots and streets: and they are unwilling to consent to the laying out of and extending streets across their said land, or to taxation of said land, by such alleged municipal corporation."

To this complaint the defendants demurred for the alleged reason that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of ac-The district court sustained the demurrer, and caused judgment for costs to be en-

tered against the plaintiff.

From this judgment plaintiff appeals to this court; and we are called upon to determine the question of the legal existence of the Town of Puyallup, which also involves the validity of the Act of the Legislature approved February 2, 1888, entitled "An Act for the Incorporation of Towns and Villages," the first section of which, so far as is material to this case, is as follows: "Where a majority of the taxable inhabitants of any town or village within this Territory present a petition to the judge of the district court, having jurisdiction of real ac-tions in such county, setting forth the metes and bounds of such town or village, together with the adjacent bounds, in all not exceeding in area one square mile, which they desire to include therein, and praying that they may be incorporated, and police established for their taxable inhabitants of such town or village, as shown by the last assessment roll of said county, shall have signed such petition, such judge of the district court shall cause such petition to be entered in full on the records of such court, together with the names of the petitioners, and shall thereupon make and record an order declaring such town or village duly incorporated, designating in such order the metes and bounds thereof, and the name of such town or village, and thenceforward the inhabitants within such metes and bounds are a body pol-

itic and corporate,"

The proceedings for incorporating the town were inaugurated by the presentation to the judge of the district court, by one John Beverly, of a petition signed by sixty-three persons therein, representing themselves to be a ma-jority of the taxable inhabitants of the Town of Puyallup, praying that they might be incor-porated under the name of the "Town of Puyalporated under the name of the found in a jun-lup," and police established for their local government, and that trustees be appointed for the government of said town. The petition also specified and defined the metes and bounds of the proposed territory to be incorporated, and alleged the area thereof to be in all not ex-July, 1888, the judge of the district court, at chambers, in the City of Tacoma, in Pierce County, in response to the prayer of the petition, made and entered of record an order declaring the Town of Puyallup to be duly incorporated under and by virtue of the laws of Washington Territory, and in said order ap-pointed defendants as a board of trustees of the town, in accordance with section 2 of the Incorporation Act.

It is admitted by the demurrer, and was conceded by counsel on the argument of this case, that the relator is the owner of real property situated within the boundaries of the territory described in the petition, and defined by order of the court; that he did not consent to the incorporation of the town; that he was unwilling to have it incorporated with boundaries including his property; that his said real estate is partly improved and cultivated farming land, not platted into town lots and streets, and that he is unwilling to consent to the laying out of and extending streets across the same; that he is unwilling to submit to taxation of his land by said municipal corporation; that no notice of the presentation of the petition was given; and that the relator had no opportunity to be heard, or to remonstrate against, or oppose the incorporation of the town, or to question the validity of the order of the judge, or to make complaint as to the boundaries of the proposed

municipal corporation.

The proceedings are assailed by appellant as not being in accordance with the law relating thereto. He objects that the petition is de-fective in not stating that the signers thereof were a majority of the taxable inhabitants of the town, according to the last assessment roll of the county, and that the order of the judge was made upon the certificate of the county assessor who is not empowered by any law to so certify; that there was no evidence before the judge or court to warrant the order; and that 8 L. R. A.

court shall be satisfied that a majority of the subject matter by the court. As the law requires that the petition to be presented to the judge shall be signed by a majority of the taxable inhabitants of the town or village to be incorporated, and that the judge shall be satisfied, in some way not specified by law, that a majority of the taxable inhabitants of the town or village, as shown by the last assessment roll of the county, shall have signed the petition, it is quite doubtful whether an omission to state in the petition that the petitioners are a majority of the taxable inhabitants as shown by the last assessment roll of the county, is not a matter substantially affecting the subsequent proceedings. But, however this may be, we are not disposed to hold the incorporation invalid on that account, but will assume that the law was

substantially complied with.

We now come to the consideration of validity of the law itself. The object of the Act of the Legislature was the incorporation of towns and villages, as expressed in the title; and, as the meaning of the expression "towns and villages" is not defined by the law, we must presume that the words were intended to be used in their ordinary acceptation, as meaning an aggregation of houses and inhabitants more or less compact. The word "town" was originally from the Anglo-Saxon word "tun," an inclosure, and meant a collection of houses inclosed by a wall.

Anderson, Law Dict. title Town.

"The fundamental idea of a municipal corporation proper, both in England and in this country, is to invest compact or dense populations with the power of local self-government. Indeed, the necessity for such corporations springs from the existence of centers or agglomerations of population, having, by reason of density and numbers, local or peculiar interests and wants, not common to adjoining sparsely settled or agricultural regions. It is necessary to draw the line which separates the limits of the place and people to be incorporated. This is, with us, a legislative Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 183. with us, a legislative function." 1 Dillon,

In England, this power was formerly given by a royal grant or charter, presumably at the request of the municipalities themselves, but in this country municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes. "They possess no powers or faculties not conferred upon them, either expressly or by fair implication, by the

law which creates them, or other statutes applicable to them." Id. § 21.

It being conceded that the power to create municipal corporations is vested exclusively in the Legislature, the question arises, Can this power be delegated; and, if so, to whom, or to what agencies? Counsel on both sides agree that the Legislature may delegate its functions in some measure; but they disagree as to the legislative power to carry the principle to the extent attempted in the Act in question. On the one side, it is contended that the Act approved February 2, 1888, does not in fact delegate legislative authority to the courts; that the Statute, and not the court, determines the extent and nature of the powers of the corporation: that a statute may be valid, though its taking effect may depend on some subsequent event, and that the powers and duties of the courts in relation to the mode of organizing the order was made without jurisdiction of the towns are judicial in their nature; that the

Legislature, and not the court, prescribes the powers, duties and liabilities of the corporation,-and, on the other, it is urged that the law of Congress conferring upon the Territorial Legislature the right to create municipal corporations does not permit the Legislature to delegate such right to the courts or judges; that the law is mandatory upon the court, is against public policy and authorizes the taking of property without due process of law, and without notice or opportunity to be heard; and that the including of farming land in incorporated towns is unreasonable and unjust.

The incorporation of towns by general statutory law is a departure from original methods, and is of comparatively modern date; and it would naturally be expected that the procedure for their organization by this means would not be uniform throughout the different States of the Union. It would be practically impossible for the Legislature, by a general law, to fix and define the boundaries of every municipal corporation that might be organized under it; and that question is therefore determined in some other way, designated by the general law of the particular jurisdiction. But the authority to incorporate, with us as in England, has been restricted to cases in which compact communities already exist who desire to assume a corporate character, and have police established for their local government. Id. § 183. But, unless specially restrained by constitutional provisions, the Legislature may delegate the power to determine the territorial limits of the municipal corporation, and thereby settle what property and persons will be subject to municipal control, to appropriate local bodies or boards of officers. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. supra; People v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451.

It would hardly seem probable that the Legislature, while professing to pass a law for the incorporation of "towns and villages", really intended to include therein rural districts or farming lands not platted or laid out in lots or blocks, especially against the will of the owner of such property; and yet the Statute, by its terms, covers and includes just such cases; and we do not feel at liberty to construe

it otherwise.

We entirely agree with the learned judge who decided the case of *People v. Bennett*, when he says that "there are few, if any, acts of state, bearing upon individuals, more important than those which determine their liberty to be included in particular municipalities; and the cases are very rare in which they have not been allowed an opportunity of being heard in every step of the proceedings." And, where the individual has not expressly assented, or impliedly done so, by settling and remaining in a dense community needing corporate powers and privileges, it seems too plain for argument that he should at least be accorded a hearing before being compelled to subject himself or his property to the dominion of a municipality ipality with whose interests he has nothing in common. This view of the law was adopted in the case of People v. Bennett, above cited.

In the case of People v. Bennett, above cited.

In the case of Borough of Blooming Valley, 56 Pa. 66, it was held that farming land might be included in the limits of a municipal cor-Poration by consent of the owner, but not otherwise.

And in Borough of Little Meadows, 28 Pa. 256, it was held that the community proposing to be incorporated was too sparse to be called a "village", within the meaning of the law.

On the contrary, it has been held in New Hampshire, with equally good reason, that the selectmen of a town, in defining the boundaries of a village, could not exclude any part of it. but must include the whole within the village Osgood v. Clark, 26 N. H. 307. limits.

Appellees contend, as before intimated, that a statute may be conditional, and its taking effect made to depend upon some subsequent event; and, to a certain extent, the principle is recognized by the courts. As an illustration, the Legislature may enact a general statute for the formation of private corporations; and its taking effect, as to any particular corporation, may depend upon the assent of the parties interested. They may withhold their assent at pleasure, but cannot be forced to become incorporators. If they accept the terms and provisions of the law they are presumed to be incorporators. benefited thereby; but, if they reject, they cannot be injured.

While a statute may be conditional, and only take effect upon the happening of a future event, we hold that the place where it is to operate, its "situs," must be fixed definitely by the Legislature itself, or delegated to some body or agency capable of exercising legislative functions, and not left to the will or caprice of localities to determine whether it shall be applicable to their particular community or not. Local Option Laws have been sustained by some courts, but the place where they were to take effect has always been defined by law, and not left conditioned upon the discretion of the people of any and every locality in the State.

To sustain the position of appellees, counsel cite the case of Burlington v. Leebrick, 43 Iowa, 252. The question there was as to the power of the City of Burlington to enlarge its limits by extending its boundaries over contiguous territory; and the court held that the law authorizing a petition for the purpose by the city council, to be presented to, and acted upon by, the circuit judge, and issues to be found and tried as in other proceedings, was not invalid as an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, basing the opinion on the ground that the determination of the issues by the court was a judicial act, -a mere ascertaining of the condition upon which the law might take effect. But in delivering the opinion the court used the following language: "Nor is it proper to designate the thing to be accomplished by this Statute as the creation of a corporation. A corporation is an artificial being clothed with certain powers. In the present case, such a corporation exists, known as the 'City of Burlington.' When the Act sought in this petition is accomplished, no new corporation will have been created." From this language we might infer that, had the question before the court been that of the formation of a municipal corporation, the decision might have been different.

In the case of Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88, the incorporation of a town by the county court, in pursuance of a general statute, was upheld on the ground that the court acted judicially, and had no discretion, and no

3 L. R. A.

authority to vest any power in the corporation.

And in the case of Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head (Tenn.), 24, a law substantially like the one under consideration in this case was held valid and constitutional for the reason that no legislative power was delegated to or exercised by the court. This last decision, however, was under a Constitution which provided that "the Legislature shall have power to grant such charters of incorporation as they may deem expedient for the public good." We do not feel bound by the decisions in these cases. If the court in either of the cases acted judicially in the matter before it, then, certainly, it should have had a right or "discretion" to exercise its judgment. If its action was not judicial, then, surely, it must have been a delegated legislative power which it exercised. Counsel for appellees also cite the case of Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96. The controversy in that case was as to the validity of the Statute in relation to the annexation of territory to cities; and it was claimed by Bisterritory to cities; and it was claimed by Bissell, in a proceeding to enjoin the collection of certain taxes levied upon his property by the city council, that the order of the county commissioners for the annexation of the district embracing his property was void because it included his property with that of others, without his consent, and against his remonstrance. The court sustained the law on the The court sustained the law on the ground that the county commissioners were properly clothed with power to do the acts objected to. Each party was entitled to a hearing under that Statute, and the commissioners were empowered to order the annexation or not, as they might deem reasonable and prop-We agree with that decision; and, if our Statute were like the one upon which it was based, it would be stripped of its most objectionable features.

In the late case of *People* v. *Fleming*, 10 Colo. 553, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a law which provides that when the inhabitants of any part of the county not embraced within the limits of any city or incorporated town desire to be organized into a city or incorporated town, they may apply by petition to the county court, and providing, also, for the manner of procedure in the organization of such contemplated town or city, was not in conflict with the Constitution. The decision in that case seems to have been based upon the broad ground that the Legislature, if not Legislature was unconstitutional. expressly prohibited by the Constitution, may

delegate the power to form municipal corporations to unorganized private individuals; in other words, to the people themselves. We cannot consent to follow the reasoning in that case, or to concur in the conclusion reached by the learned court. We think the better doctrine is that laid down by Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 4th ed. 145, 146, which is as follows: "The prevailing doctrine in the courts appears to be that, except in those cases where, by the Con-stitution, the people have expressly reserved to themselves a power of decision, the function of legislation cannot be exercised by them even to the extent of accepting or rejecting a law which has been framed for their consideration." But we would not be understood as holding that the Legislature could not delegate the power to put the machinery of municipal corporations in motion to courts which are not purely legal tribunals. The Courts of Quarter Sessions of Pennsylvania, and the County Courts of Oregon, and perhaps of other States, are vested with administrative, and, in a measure, representative, powers; and they are properly intrusted with the functions attempted by our late Territorial Legislature, by the law in question, to be imposed upon the district

judge.
We hold that a judicial court cannot exercise legislative functions, and that the Legislature cannot impose such power upon it. People v. Bennett, supra; People v. Nevada, 6 Cal. 143; Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 153; People v. Carpenter, 24 N. Y. 89.

Owing to the importance of this case, we have given it all the consideration in our power, under the circumstances; and we have been greatly aided in our labors by the learning and diligence of counsel on both sides. And we are constrained to hold that the Statute under which the Town of Puyallup was organized is invalid, and cannot be sustained. The ized is invalid, and cannot be sustained. cause will therefore be remanded to the court below, with directions to overrule the demurrer, and to proceed in accordance with this opinion. And it is so ordered.

Stiles, Hoyt and Scott, JJ., concur.

Dunbar, J.: I concur in the result, because I do not think that the petition was sufficient; but I cannot concur in the opinion that the Act of the

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT.

BARBER ASPHALT PAVING 'CO., Respt., T.

Mary C. HUNT, Appt.

(.....Mo.....)

1. It will be presumed that an ordinance was properly signed by the Speaker of the House of Delegates, where the journal recites that his signature was affixed in open session, and no objection is noted on the journal although it does not expressly recite that all the "matters of detail were complied with, and the 8 L.R.A.

charter of the city provides that it shall be signed in open session, and that before the officer's sig-nature is affixed "he shall suspend all other business, declaring that such bill will now be read.

2. The adjournment of the House of Delegates on the day bills are presented to the mayor for his approval will not prevent them from becoming valid ordinances, if duly filed by the mayor, with his approval, in the city register's office, although the charter of the city provides the approval. vides that every bill shall become an ordinance when "returned within ten days to the House in which the same originated, with the approval of the mayor."

3. The facts that the work of street paving prescribed by an ordinance is covered by letters-patent, under which the exclusive right is held by one company, and therefore that no competition for the work is possible, will not prevent letting a contract for the work under a charter providing that such contracts shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder.

(February 24, 1890.)

A PPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis in favor of plaintiff in an action to enforce payment of certain special tax bills issued to plaintiff by the City of St. Louis in payment for

work done upon certain streets. Affirmed.

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion.

Mr. Charles M. Napton, for appellant: The journals must actually show, on their face, every fact necessary to make valid the proceedings of the General Assembly, and when they do not show this, no presumption will be made that the fact existed.

Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297; Turley v. Logan County, 17 Ill. 151.

The Legislature must be in session when a bill is presented to the governor, and when it is returned by him to the House. People v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9.

The governor or mayor forms one branch of the legislative body, and can do no act as a part of it after an adjournment...

Trustees of School Dist. No. 1 v. Ormsby Co.
1 Nev. 340; Fowler v Peirce, 2 Cal. 165.

A sending of the bill to the city register is

not a "return to the House."

Opinion of Judges (Re Soldiers Voting Bill), 45 N. H. 607.

Where a city is empowered by its charter to improve streets at the expense of the adjoining lot owners, but required to let all such work to the lowest bidder, it cannot contract for laying a pavement at the expense of such lot owners, the right to lay which is patented and owned by one firm.

Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590; Wells v. Burnham, 20 Wis. 112; Nicolson Parement Co. v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 v. Painter, 35 Cal. 699; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353, 377; Burgess v. Jefferson, 21 La. Ann. 143; Dolan v. New York, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 397; 1 Dillou, Mun. Corp. S. 467. See also Merritt v. Portchester, 71 N. Y. 309; O Byrne v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 225; Re Eager, 46 N. Y. 100; Harlem Gaslight Co. v. New York, 33 N. Y. 324; People v. Flagg, 17 N. Y. 584; Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St. 585.

Messrs. Witchcook Madill & Finkely.

Messrs. Hitchcock, Madill & Finkeln-

burg for respondent.

Sherwood, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

The grounds upon which the defendant resusts the payment of the tax bills in suit are two: first, that the ordinances in question were not passed and approved as required by the charter; and, second, that the work provided for in the ordinances was not let as provided in § 27, art. 6, of the charter.

The charter provisions in respect to passing ordinances (art. 3, § 22) are as follows: "No bill shall become an ordinance until the same shall have been signed by the presiding officer of each of the two Houses, in open session; and,

8 L, R. A.

before such officer shall affix his signature to any bill, he shall suspend all other business, declare that such bill will now be read, and that if no objections be made, he will sign the same, to the end that it may become an ordinance. The bill shall then be read at length, and, if no objection be made, he shall, in the presence of the House, in open session, and before any other business is entertained, affix his signature, which fact shall be noted on the journal. and the bill immediately sent to the other House." 2 Rev. Stat. 1879, p. 1584.

Defendant put in evidence the journal of the House of Delegates for March 20, 1883, which, after giving in full the report of the proper committee that these two bills were truly enrolled, proceeds as follows: "The bills, as above, were read at length. No objection being made, Mr. Speaker Marriot, in the presence of the House, in open session, affixed his sig-

nature thereto, as required by the charter."

Upon this fact being thus shown by the journal, the defendant contends that the charter provisions marked above initalics were not complied with, and therefore the ordinance passed is null. These provisions of the charter are copied from section 37, art. 4, of our State Constitution; and upon that section it has been ruled that a bill passed by the Legislature became a law where the same was signed by the presiding officer of each of the two Houses in open session; that this provision was mandatory, but the other provisions, relating to mere matters of detail, were but directory; and, as no objection was noted on the journal, the presumption would be indulged that the matters of detail were complied with; that the Legislature proceeded by right, and not by wrong. State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266.

Here the journal expressly recites that the signature of the speaker of the House was affixed in open session. On the authority of the case cited, it must be ruled that the bills in question become ordinances, as against the ob-

jection already considered.

But it is urged that the bills failed to become laws, because never returned to the House in which they originated. Section 23 of art 3 of the charter provides: "Every bill presented to the mayor, and returned within ten days to the House in which the same originated, with the approval of the mayor, shall become an ordinance."

The testimony shows the bills, though signed by the mayor, were not thus returned, both Houses having adjourned March 27, 1883, sine die,—the day on which the bills were presented to the mayor for his approval. But the testi-mony also shows that the mayor on the same day filed the bills in the city register's office

on the day of their approval.

Section 23 of art. 3 of the charter contemplates that cases will arise where a bill shall not have have been returned to the House where the same originates; and, besides, there become an ordinance," which shall not be returned by the mayor to the House where the same originated. The same considerations, therefore, apply here as were applied in Mead's Case, supra; and we hold the ordinance as valid, as against this objection also.

Section 27 of article 6 provides how bids

for work shall be awarded, to wit, that the rect basis. It certainly was never intended board of public improvements shall 'let out that the city authorities should be unable said work by contract to the lowest responsition make a contract, however necessary to the ble bidder, subject to the approval of the council." Upon this point it is insisted that such provision was violated, because the work of street paving prescribed by the ordinances was covered by letters patent, under which plaintiff held the exclusive right, and therefore there was no competition for said work. This point, though adjudicated in other jurisdictions, is a case of first impression in this State. In New York it has been ruled, under a statute requiring all city work to be let "to the lowest bidder," that the common council were not prohibited from letting a contract for paving a street with material or in a manner not admitting competitive bids or proposals. Re Dugro,

This ruling was approvingly followed in Baird v. New York, 96 N. Y. 567.

Prior to the time the subject was discussed in New York, a similar ruling had been made in Michigan. *Hobart* v. *Detroit*, 17 Mich. 246. These cases seem to us to rest upon the cor-

public welfare such contract might be, if the article desired, or the manner of the performance of the contract required the use of a patented article. Such a construction of the charter we regard as "sticking in the bark," and as subordinating the whole powers conferred on the common council to the meaning of two or three words contained in a single section of the charter. Besides, the rights of those interested are protected by the necessity of obtaining the approval of the council to any contract. A different view of the matter under discussion has been taken in Wisconsin (Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590), but by a divided court; and it is noteworthy that the Legislature of that State did not approve the view of the statute taken by the court, and so changed the statute, so as to prevent the continued prevalence of the objectionable ruling. Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 239.

For these reasons we affirm the judgment. All concur, but Barclay, J., not sitting.

VERMONT SUPREME COURT.

Mary J. TOWNSHEND

George H. GRAY et al., Censors of the Vermont State Eelectic Medical Society.

(..... Vt.....)

1. No power to confer the degree of M. D., or any other degree, is given to a corporation by the general law of a State authorizing incorporation for the purpose of maintaining a literary and scientific institution.

2. A diploma from an institution having no power to give it is not sufficient to entitle a person to demand a license as physician from the censors of a medical society under Kev. Laws, £ 3911.

(April 5, 1890.)

PETITION for a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to issue to complainant a certificate authorizing her to practice medicine within the State. Dismissed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Mr. J. C. Baker for complainant, Mr. A. H. Huse for defendants.

Powers, J., delivered the opinion of the

This is a petition by the complainant, claiming to be a graduate of the Vermont Medical College, and holding a diploma of that college conferring upon her the degree of M. D., against the defendants, who are the censors of the Vermont State Eclectic Medical Society, praying that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the defendants, as such censors, to issue to the complainant a certificate authorizing her to practice medicine in this State.

Our Statute provides that every medical so-ciety chartered by the Legislature "shall issue certificates to physicians and surgeons who have, namely: may have a corporate name,

8 L. R. A.

I furnish evidence by diploma from a medical college or university, or by certificate of examination by an authorized board, which satisfies said censors that the person presenting such credentials has been, after due examination, deemed qualified to practice the branches men-tioned in such diploma or certificate." The case shows that the complainant presented to the defendants, as such censors, her diploma aforesaid, and the defendants refused to issue the certificate above referred to on the ground that the Vermont Medical College had no legal power to issue a diploma conferring the degree of M. D., and so the complainant had not shown credentials entitling her to a license to practice medicine.

The main question in issue is whether said medical college has the power to issue diplomas which entitle the holder to the license provided for in the Statute. Without going into the question at length, touching the power conferred by the Statute upon the censors, which has been discussed in argument, it is plain that this board has the power to decide in the first instance whether a diploma pre-sented to it as evidence of the holder's right to a license is a genuine or spurious document. So far, at least, the board may sit in judgment upon a diploma; and in this case the board adjudged that this diploma did not have such legal efficacy, as evidence, as would warrant the issue of a licence.

The Vermont Medical College was organized under the provisions of the 10th subdivision of § 3664, Rev. Laws. That section provides that persons may associate together and have the powers of a corporation for either of the fol-lowing purposes: . . (10) To establish and maintain literary and scientific institutions."

Later sections in the same chapter enume rate the powers which such associations may corporate seal; may adopt by-laws; may sue studies of a literary or scientific character, and be sued; purchase and hold real estate; clearly does not exist at all. *Philadelphia* may raise money, and divide their capital stock *Medical College Case*, 3 Whart. 445. into shares.

Under this subdivision, it is argued that a medical college may be organized with the power to confer the degree of M. D. fundamental that a corporation has such power only as is conferred by its charter, with such incidental powers as are necessary to enable it to exercise its chartered power. No express power to confer degrees can be found in the Statute under which this medical college was organized, and hence the power to confer degrees must be classed as incidental to the general powers of a corporation formed for the purpose of maintaining a literary or scientific institution, if it exists at all. It would hardly do to say that literary or scientific institutions have such power upon any theory that without it they cannot answer the ends of their creation. The degree of M. D. is something more than a mere honorary title. It is a certificate attesting the fact that the person upon whom it has been conferred has successfully mastered the curriculum of study prescribed by the authorities of an institution created by law, law authorized to issue such certificate. It thus has a legal sanction and authority. it has more. In practical affairs, it introduces its possessor to the confidence and patronage of the general public. Its legal character gives it a moral and material credit in the estimation of the world, and makes it thereby a valuable property right of great pecuniary value. The scope of subdivision 10 of the Statute in

question may be discovered by looking at the other subdivisions of the same section. These provide for the organization of library associations: bands of music; associations for breeding fish, for bringing to justice thieves and burglars, building meeting houses, securing burial grounds, etc. The articles of association are to be filed in the town clerk's office, in the town where the association is arranged. the town where the association is organized. All this points to association of limited and local scope. The filing of the articles of association, which constitute the charter under which the association proceeds with its work, in the town clerk's office, indicates that the Legislature did not regard such associations as having powers, the exercise of which concerned the general public. The power to confer degrees, not being conferred explicitly by the Statute, and not being necessary to enable a literary or scientific institution to carry forward

It is no more appropriate to say that a literary or scientific institution, without special statutory power, can confer the degree of M. D., than to say that it may confer the degree of LL. D. or D. D. or A. B.; for it is plain that law schools, theological schools, universities and colleges can be organized under this ties and colleges can be organized under this subdivision equally well with medical schools. Every State in the Union has chartered these institutions, and it is believed that none of them has ever supposed that, with all the widely enumerated powers delegated to them, it had the power to confer degrees of any kind unless such power was expressly conferred in its charter. In the case of the Castleton Medi-cal School, chartered many years ago, the charter at first granted contained no delegation of power to confer degrees, but at the next session of the Legislature it was amended by an Act giving such power. Such has, manifestly, been the legislative idea respecting the necessity of special authority from the lawmaking power of the government touching the right to confer degrees; and construing this General Statute, providing for the organization, by voluntary association, of persons for local and comparatively unimportant purposes, in the light of the common usages and common understanding of people respecting the rights, privileges and emoluments universally accorded to persons upon whom degrees have been conferred, we are clearly of the opinion that the Vermont Medical College has no power, under its articles of association, to confer degrees of any kind. To hold that the Legislature, by a general law, intended that any three men in any town of the State, however illiterate or irresponsible, might organize and flood the State with doctors of medicine, doctors of law, doctors of divinity, masters of arts, civil engineers and all the other various titles that everywhere in the civilized world have signified high attainments and special equipment for professional work, is to liken it to the witty French minister who threatened to create so many dukes that it would be no honor to be one, and a burning disgrace not to be one.

The complainant, therefore, in submitting her diploma to the board of censors, did not furnish that board any sufficient evidence of qualification that entitled her to the license asked

The petition is dismissed, with costs.

CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS.

for.

Mary LAWLER, Appt., John P. MURPHY et al.

68 Conn. 294)

I. An agreement by an insurance assoclation to pay a sum received from a 2. Whatever is necessary to be done

death assessment, not exceeding \$1,000, with a further provision that the death claim shall be payable within sixty days after proof, giving the form of notice and process for collecting death assessments, and containing a promise by insured to pay assessments, imports a promise by the insurance association to make, or cause to be made, the necessary assessment.

NOTE.—Contract of mutual henefit association. The contract of mutual henefit association. | bership does not differ in any essential particular the contract made between a mutual benefit from an ordinary policy of mutual life insurance. company and its member by the certificate of mem- it having all the characteristics of an insurance 8 L R A

in order to accomplish work specially contracted to be performed is parcel of the contract, though not execified.

Whatever may fairly be implied from the terms or nature of an instrument is, in judg-

ment of law, contained in it.

- 4. A complaint alleging a state of facts from which an agreement to make an assessment upon members of an insurance organization can be implied, and claiming damages for failure to make the assessment, is not insufficient because it does not state in terms an agreement to make the assessment.
- 5. Individual members of an unincororated association are liable for contracts made in the name of the association without regard to the question whether they so intended, or so understood the law, and even if the other party contracted in form with the association, and was ignorant of the names of the individual members composing it.
- 6. An action at law can be sustained for breach of the contract of a mutual benefit society to make an assessment.
- 7. The measure of damages for breach of an agreement by an insurance organization to make an assessment, and to pay the proceeds thereof, not exceeding \$1,000, where each member contracts to pay an assessment of whatever the officials deem necessary, upon the death of any member, is prima facie the sum of \$1,000.

(December 30, 1889.

A PPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court for Hartford County sustaining a demurrer to the complaint in an action brought to recover upon a mutual benefit certificate of life insurance. Reversed.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Mr. C. E. Gross, for appellant:

This is an agreement to pay \$1,000 unless the defendants shall within the sixty days make a death assessment and fail to receive therefrom that sum, in which case the agreement is to

pay only the amount so received.

Niblack, Mut. Ben. Societies, § 405; Freeman v. National Ben. Society, 42 Hun, 252, 254, 257; O'Brien v. Home Ben. Society, 51 Hun, 495, 499; Peck v. Equitable Accident Asso. 52 Hun, 255; Kansas Protective Union v. Whitt, 36 Kan. 764; Hankinson v. Page, 31 Fed. Rep.

That no assessment was made with reference to this case is some evidence that none was necessarv.

Freeman v. National Ben. Society, 42 Hup, 257. See also Bailey v. Mutual Ben. Asso. 71 Iowa, 689, 692.

An averment of demand for an assessment is

not necessary.

Niblack, Mut. Ben. Societies, § 396; Freeman v. National Ben. Society, 42 Hun, 255.
See also Kansas Protective Union v. Whitt, 36
Kan. 760; Smith v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso. 24 Fed. Rep. 685.

When the contract provides that an assessment shall be levied and the proceeds thereof, not exceeding a certain sum named, shall be paid to the beneficiary, it has been held that the insurers are prima facie bound to pay the maximum amount named, and the burden of proof is on them to show that a less amount has been or could only have been collected.

Elkhart Mut. Aid, B. & R. Asso. V Houghton.

contract. Supreme Commandery K. of G. R. v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 443; State v. Bankers & M. Mut. Ben. Asso. 23 Kan. 499; Endowment & B. Asso. v. State, 35 Kan. 253; Bolton v. Bolton, 73 Me. 299; Miner v. Michigan Mut. Ben. Asso. 6 West. Rep-117, 63 Mich. 338; State v. Merchants Exch. Mut. Benev. Society, 72 Mo. 146; State v. Farmers & M. Mut. Benev. Asso. 18 Neb. 276; Folmer's App. 87 Pa.

An association for the transaction of the business of life and casualty insurance on the co-operative or assessment plan is in effect a mutual benefit society, the members of which must take notice of and are bound by its by-laws and articles of association. Hesinger v. Home Ben. Asso. 41 Minn. 516.

The members are presumed to contract with reference to the charter and by-laws of such associations, though they be not recited in the contract. Holland v. Taylor, 9 West. Rep. 606, 111 Ind. 121; Farmer v. State, 69 Tex. 561.

See, as to distinction between mutual benefit associations and life insurance. Burdon v. Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Mass. 360.

As to fraternal associations, see Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Asso. 2 L. R. A. 161, and notes, 126 III, 558.

Certificates issued entitling the holder to money. to be paid from assessments upon the surviving members, are in legal effect policies of insurance; and the rules of law governing such policies are applicable. Elkhart Mut. Aid B. & R. Asso. v. Houghton, 103 Ind. 286, 1 West. Rep. 284.

A nominee in the certificate is entitled to receive only the amount actually collected, on an assessment made for his benefit, and not a sum equal to \$1 assessed to each member. Re La Solidarite Mut. Ben. Asso. 68 Cal. 392.

8 L. R. A.

ance association operated upon the assessment plan cannot recover on the policy by action against the association, where the assessment to pay the policy has not been made; yet he may, by proper proceedings, compel the association to make the assessment. Rainsbarger v. Union Mut. Aid Asso. 72 Iowa, 19L

No claim can be made against a mutual aid association unless a certificate has been issued designating the person who is to receive payment. Bishop v. Grand Lodge E. O. of Mut. Aid, 43 Hun. 472. See Burdon v. Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. 1 Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. 1 Rep. 840, 147 Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. 1 Rep. 1 360; Davidson v. Old People's Mut. Ben. Society, 1 L. R. A. 482, 39 Minn. 303; Lorcher v. Supreme Lodge K. of H. (Mich.) 2 L. R. A. 206.

Payment of assessments by insured.

Where assured agreed in the application to pay "one assessment" within thirty days from its date. and the by-laws provide for suspension upon failure to pay assessments within thirty days from their date, the certificate lapses upon the failure to pay any one assessment within the prescribed time. Stanley v. Northwestern L. Asso. 36 Fed. Rep. 75. But to operate a suspension, notice must have

been duly given to the delinquent. Ibid.

Where the by-laws provide that the time of suspension is to be fixed by vote of the lodge, a suspension by an officer, without such vote, is illegal. Supreme Lodge K. of H. v. Wickser, 72 Tex. 257.

The thirty days within which an assessment is required to be paid should not be estimated from the date of the notice unless it was sent within 3

the date of the notice, unless it was sent within 8 reasonable time after the date of the assessment. Stanley v. Northwestern L. Asso, supra.

Where the member holding the certificate was habitually dilatory in the payment of assessments A beneficiary under a policy in a mutual insur- levied against his share, the fact that the association 1 West. Rep. 284, 103 Ind. 286; Lueders v. Hartford L. & Ann. Ins. Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 465; Kansas Protective Union v. Whitt, supra; Suppiger v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso. 20 Ill. App. 595; Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Hoffman, 110 Ill. 606.

There is no need to resort to a chancery court to compel an assessment before a recovery can

be had at law.

Niblack, Mut. Ben. Societies, §§ 408, 409; Hankinson v. Page, 31 Fed. Rep. 184; Taylor v. National Temp. Relief Union, 12 West. Rep. 92, 94 Mo. 35; Earnshaw v. Sun Mut. Aid Society, 11 Cent. Rep. 508, 68 Md. 465.

The defendants are liable as individuals. Davison v. Holden, 4 New Eng. Rep. 818, 55 Conn. 103; Niblack, Mut. Ben. Societies, § 105. See also Fredendall v. Taylor, 26 Wis. 286; Blakely v. Bennecke, 59 Mo. 193. Messrs. Charles E. Perkins and A. Per-

kins, for appellees:

Defendants could not be made liable personally on a written instrument signed by them only in the capacity of officers of the organization.

Hitchcock v. Buchanan, 105 U. S. 416 (26 L. ed. 1078); Hewitt v. Wheeler, 22 Conn. 557.

Upon such an agreement as this no action lies against anyone for the amount of the insurance, but the remedy is in equity to oblige the proper persons to make an assessment and pay it over.

Smith v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso. 24 Fed. Rep. 685; Eggleston v. Centennial Mut. L. Asso. 19 Fed. Rep. 201; Burdon v. Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng.

in many instances received assessments from him \ after they were due, and reinstated him as a member, was a waiver of these several forfeitures, but

as one of the conditions of the contract. Crossman v. Massachusetts Ben. Asso. 3 New Eng. Rep. 517, 143 Mass. 435. The by-laws may provide that upon the death of a member, each member should pay \$1, in order to make up the amount to be paid to the nominee in

not of the future prompt payment of assessments

the certificate of the deceased member. Re La Solidarite Mut. Ben. Asso. 68 Cal. 392. Under a law of a benevolent society, which makes the nonpayment of assessments for a given period after notice operate as a suspension ipso facto of the delinquent member, it is not necessary that the suspension shall be judicially determined by any Judicatory of the order. Borgraefe v. Supreme Lodge, K. & L. of H. 5 West. Rep. 98, 22 Mo. App.

The beneficiaries of a member who stands suspended at the time of his death cannot recover on the benefit certificate, upon the ground that the subordinate lodge had continued to treat him as a member, and to treat his unpaid dues to the supreme lodge as dues payable to the subordinate lodge for which it had extended him credit. Ibid.

Assessments on death of members

Where assessments upon the death of members were ordered by the association, they became due only after proper notice thereof was given to the insured; and the objection that the notice given was lasufficient, under the provisions of the by-laws, because it failed to give the lists of deaths as required, and that it did not notify the member of the amount due from him to the benefit fund, was properly sustained, where the defense rested upon forfeiture to defeat plaintiff's claim. Miner v. A. 786, 73 Wis. 507. 8LRA

Rep. 840, 147 Mass. 360; U. S. Mut. Accident Asso. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100 (33 L. ed. 60); Bailey v. Mutual Ben. Asso. 71 Iowa, 689; Newman v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Asso. 72 Iowa.

Seymour, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the superior court sustaining the defendant's de-murrer. The cause of demurrer upon which the issue was found for the defendants alleges that it appears from the contract for a breach of which the suit was brought, that the only agreement made therein was to pay such sum as might be received from a death assessment, and that it is not alleged in the complaint that any such sum was ever received.

To understand the force of this objection and the considerations applicable to it, it is necessary to set out the contract in full. It is as

follows

Certificate No. 446. Benefit \$1.000. Connecticut State Insurance Fund of the Ancient Order of Hibernians of the State of Connecticut.

In consideration of one dollar, initiation fee, and assessments levied from time to time by the directory, Thomas Lawler, of Division No. 2 of Hartford, County of Hartford, State of Connecticut, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the agreement on the part of the said Thomas Lawler to accept the following conditions and rules as a part of this contract between said A. O. H. Insurance Fund and himself, hereby constitutes the said Thomas

Michigan Mut. Ben. Asso. 6 West. Rep. 117, 63 Mich. 338.

Where it was the directors' duty under the bylaws to order an assessment, and the chairman was empowered to approve the proofs of death, and at the directors' meeting the notice of death was received, but not the proofs, and they instructed the chairman to examine the proofs upon arrival, and instructed the secretary to issue the notice of assessment if the proofs were found correct, and thereafter the assessment was accordingly made in good faith, it was legal; and a member's failure to pay it barred his beneficiary from recovery on his death. Passenger Conductors L. Ins. Co. v. Birnbaum, 10 Cent. Rep. 63, 116 Pa. 565.

Where, at the time the assessment was laid, the association had money enough in its hands to meet all its obligations, such fact will not render the assessment void. Crossman v. Massachusetts Ben. Asso. 3 New Eng. Rep. 517, 143 Mass. 435.

Where an Act provides that, in an action for the recovery of an assessment, a certificate of a mutual insurance company shall be evidence to prove the claim to the assessment, unless the party sued will make a certain affidavit, if such party makes the affidavit, the company must prove its claim. quehanna Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Gackenbach, 7 Cent. Rep. 588, 115 Pa. 492.

Damages, for neglect to make assessment, recoverable at law.

Damages against a mutual benefit insurance society for refusing to make an assessment are recoverable in an action at law, without resorting to an equitable action to enforce the assessment. O'Brien v. Home Ben. Society, 117 N. Y. 310.

It is so liable where it not only neglects and refuses to make an assessment, but denies all liability.

Jackson v. Northwestern Mut. Relief Asso. 2 L. R. Lawler a benefit member of said A. O. H. Insurance Fund, and agrees to pay Mary Lawler, wife, if living, if not, to the heirs-at-law of said member, in sixty days after due proof of the death of said member, a sum received from a death assessment, but not to exceed one thousand dollars.

CONDITIONS.

The conditions upon which this certificate is issued by the fund and accepted by said member, are the following:

First. That the statements and declarations made by and on behalf of said member in his application to become a benefit member of said fund, which are hereby referred to as a basis of this contract, and are a part thereof, and on the faith of which this certificate is issued, are in all respects true, and that no fact has been suppressed relating to his health and circumstances, affecting the interests of said fund or their inducement to accept the risk.

Second. That the said member must be a member in good standing in the order at the time of his death, otherwise this certificate will be null and void.

Third. Any assignment of this certificate

shall be void unless assented to in writing by said fund.

The death claim under this con-Fourth. tract shall be payable in sixty days after satisfactory proof of death of said member shall have been furnished at the office of the secretary of the fund, by the certificate of the attending physician, if there was any, and the full and particular statement of at least one competent and disinterested member of the order, stating the time, place, cause and circumstances of the death of the party.

Fifth. No officers of divisions are author-

ized to make, alter or discharge contracts or waive forfeitures, and any such act, to be valid, must be done in writing and signed by the president and secretary of the directory.

Sixth. This contract shall be void if the party shall die in or in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the violation of or attempt to violate any criminal law of the United States or of any State or county in

which he may be.

Seventh. A failure to comply with the rules of said fund as to payment of assessments, or falling into gross and confirmed habits of intoxication, shall also render the certificate void.

amount assessable upon all the insured, unless it is shown that the amount would be less because all members did not respond to assessments. Bentz v. Northwestern Aid Asso. 2 L. R. A. 784, 40 Minn.

Action upon the contract

An action at law can be maintained upon a certificate of membership of a mutual benefit association, and it is not necessary, first, to resort to mandamus to compel an assessment. Doty v. New York State Mut. Ben. Asso. 29 N. Y. S. R. 896; Bacon, Benev. Societies, 685; Excelsior Mut. Aid Asso. v. Riddle, 91 Ind. 84; Burland v. Northwestern Mut. Ben. Asso. 47 Mich. 424; Bentz v. Northwestern Aid Asso. 2 L. R. A. 784, 40 Minn. 202,

Asso. 2 L. R. A. 784, 40 Minn. 202.
The proper remedy upon such refusal is by a proceeding in equity. Burdon v. Massachusetts Safety Fund Asso. 1 L. R. A. 146, 6 New Eng. Rep. 840, 147 Mass. 360. See Eikhart Mut. Add. B. & R. Asso. v. Houghton, 1 West. Rep. 284, 103 Ind. 236; Taylor v. National Temp. Relief Union, 12 West. Rep. 92, 94 Mo. 35.

In such action plaintiff may recover what upon proof he can show such assessment would have yielded if it had been duly made. Earnshaw v. Sun Mut. Aid Society, 11 Cent. Rep. 508, 68 Md. 465.

Even after judgment, upon which execution is returned unsatisfied, sequestration proceedings in the court of equity, and not mandamus, is the proper remedy. Miner v. Michigan Mut. Ben. Asso. 8 West. Rep. 139, 65 Mich. 84.

On a certificate which provides for an assessment upon policy holders within ninety days from the proof of death, and for payment of the sum collected, less 10 per cent, if it does not exceed \$5,000, where, at the death of a member, certificates were in force upon which the full amount named could have been realized, but no assessments were made within the time provided, judgment may be rendered against the company for the maximum amount named. Kaw Valley Life Asso. v. Lemke, 40 Kan. 142.

Lack of sufficient money in the death fund to insurance. Keystone Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Norris, 7 pay a claim on an insurance certificate is no defense Cent. Rep. 204, 115 Pa. 446. 8 L R A

The measure of damages in such a case is the! to an action at law, although the promise was to pay from the death fund, where by the same contract the association undertook to make a call upon the members if the fund was then insufficient to meet the claim. Darrow v. Family Fund Society, & L. R. A. 495, 116 N. Y. 537.

In a suit by the payee and beneficiary, a com-plaint averring the death of insured and the refusal to pay or to order an assessment on the members is sufficient on demurrer. That the assessment would not produce the amount is matter of defense, and in the absence of such defense plaintiff is entitled to judgment. Elkhart Mut. Aid, B. & R. Asso. v. Houghton, 1 West. Rep. 284, 103 Ind. 286.

A report of the society to the state insurance department, to prove that an assessment would have produced enough to pay a death claim, is of equal dignity and certainty with the records of the society. Freeman v. National Ben. Society, 42 Hun,

Where a certificate of membership provides that the society, in case of the death of the owner, will pay the amount realized from an assessment upon its members, not exceeding a stated sum, no re-covery can be had without proof of the amount which would have been realized upon the assessment, or that some amount would have been thus realized. Martin v. Equitable Accident Asso. 55 Hun, 574, 29 N. Y. S. R. 421.

The corporation cannot resist payment of the death claim upon the ground that the promise to pay within ninety days after proof of death furnished was contingent upon an assessment, as there was an implied obligation on the company to make the necessary assessment, and it could not resist payment by omitting to make it. Freeman v. National Ben. Society, 42 Hun, 252.

The furnishing of proofs of death is a demand for payment and for the company to make the necessary assessment. Ibid.

An action instituted in a court having no jurisdiction of the defendant will not suspend the running of a condition of limitation in a policy of

Eighth. This certificate is subject to all | ranted in assuming that the insurers, in acceptrules and regulations that the state convention

The rules governing this contract, and which

form a part of the same, are as follows:

First. There shall be paid by the member under this contract to the secretary of the fund, on the day of the month in which this contract was made, the sum of one dollar, and he shall not be liable for any further sum except as fol-

Second. Upon the death of any member the said Thomas Lawler shall at once pay, if required, to its secretary, an additional assessment of whatever the directory shall deem nec-

Third. The form of notice to, and process of collection from, each of the members of the assessment above named, shall be as follows: A notice shall be sent announcing such assessment, and the number thereof, to the last postoffice address given to the secretary of the fund by each member, and if the assessment is not received within forty days from the mailing of said notice, it shall be accepted and taken as sufficient evidence that the brother has decided to terminate his connection with the fund, which connection shall thereupon terminate and the brother's contract with the fund shall lapse and be void; but said brother may again renew his connection with the fund by a new contract, made in the same manner as at first. or, for valid reasons to the officers of the fund (such as a failure to receive notice of an assessment), he may be reinstated by paying assessment arrearages.

Fourth. The above rule governing the collection of assessments for death claims shall also apply to the collection of the annual as-

sessment.

Each applicant to become such member must sign the fund's form of application, countersigned by the board of directors of the division of which he is a member.

In witness whereof the said A. O. H. State Insurance Fund hath, by its president and secretary, signed and delivered this certificate at its office, this 12th day of July, 1886.

John D. Cunningham, Secretary Ins. Fund. P. J. O'Comor,

Treasurer Ins. Fund.

John P. Murphy,

President Ins. Fund.

Is it true, as claimed by the defendants, and in the sense in which they claim it, that the only agreement contained in the above contract is to pay such sum as might be received from a death assessment? Or, to put it in another form, what does the agreement to pay a sum received from a death assessment imply and involve, when taken in connection with the other provisions of the contract?

The contract is a peculiar one. It is ver inartificially drawn, and it is undoubtedly difficult to give it a satisfactory construction.
Of course it should be so construed as to make legally be done. And we are, at least, war- the object."

8LRA.

ing the money of the insured, and the insured may, from time to time, adopt for the general in paying it, understood that some duty deadvancement and interest of the fund.

benefits of the contract to the latter.

In addition to the agreement to pay to Mary Lawler, if living, if not, to the heirs of Thomas, in sixty days after due proof of his death, a sum received from a death assessment, but not to exceed \$1,000, the contract further provides that the death claim shall be payable in sixty days after satisfactory proof of such death, except in certain cases not necessary to be stated here, and gives the form of notice and process for collecting the death assessment from each member of the association. Each contract contains, also, a promise by the insured that upon the death of any member he will at once pay, if required, to the secretary, an additional pay, it requires, to the secretary, an authorian assessment of whatever the directory shall deem necessary—additional as the contract shows to the dollar paid upon becoming a member. This is an agreement by the A. O. H. Insurance Fund to pay the proper person, within sixty days after satisfactory proof of the death of the insured, a sum, not to exceed \$1,000, received from a death assessment. The contract contains the agreement of members to pay such assessments and specifies the process by which its collection shall be under-taken—"a notice shall be sent" announcing such assessment, etc. All of which, taken in connection with the other provisions of the contract and the situation and manifest intention of the parties, seems to us to import a promise to make, or cause to be made, the necessary assessment to meet the death claim promised to be paid.

It is well established that whatever is neces-

sary to be done in order to accomplish work specifically contracted to be performed, is par-cel of the contract, though not specified. It is also a principle of general application that whatever may be fairly implied from the terms or language of an instrument is, in judgment of law, contained in it. Currier v. Boston & M. R. Co. 34 N. H. 498; Rogers v. Kneeland, 13

Wend, 114.

Addison, in his work on Contracts, § 1400, says: "Although the words of a contract under seal do not in themselves import any express covenant, yet the law, in order to promote good faith and make men act up to the spirit as well as to the letter of their engagements, will create and supply, as a necessary result and consequence of the contract, certain covenants and obligations which bind the parties as forcibly and effectually as if they had been expressed in the strongest and most ex-plicit terms in the deed itself."

In White v. Snell, 5 Pick. 425, an action of assumpsit, the defendant "for value received promised to pay a sum of money, if, and when, he should recover his demands against A." It was held competent for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had no demands against A, and that so the promise was absolute; or that he had not used due diligence to collect them.

In Savage v. Whitaker, 15 Me. 24, the court says: "An engagement to do a certain thing involves an undertaking to secure and use efits contemplated benefits available, if it can feetually all the means necessary to accomplish

Marshall, Ch. J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat, 341 [6 L. ed. 650], speaking of the power and policy of the law to supply in contracts what in that case is presumed to have been inadvertently omitted by the parties. says that the parties are supposed to have made those stipulations which as honest, fair and just men they ought to have made.

The contract in Freeman v. National Ben. Society, 42 Hun, 252, is, in many respects, similar to the one under consideration. Although the stipulation in that case was to pay a sum "equal to the amount received from a death assessment, but not to exceed \$3,000," instead of "a sum received from a death assessment," etc., yet the court held that "the provision in the body of the certificate that payment should be made of a sum equal to the amount received from a death assessment, not to exceed the sum specified, in ninety days after due proof of the death of the member was given, implies an obligation upon the company to proceed and make the necessary assessment to raise the fund within the time during which it was provided that the claim should remain in abeyance."

We conclude, then, that, in connection with the express promises contained in the contract in this case, there is an implied promise to make an assessment to pay the death claim agreed to be paid; an implied promise which the law, "in order to promote good faith and make the parties act up to the spirit as well as to the letter of their engagements, will create and supply as a necessary result and conse-quence of their contract." The contract to pay a sum received from a death assessment. taken in connection with the other express provisions, involves, in the language of one of the decisions above quoted, an undertaking to se-cure and use effectually all the means necessary to accomplish the result, and require that an assessment should be made.

In this view of the case the allegation of the demurrer, that "it appears by said contract that the only agreement made therein was to pay such sum as might be received from a death assessment," is not sustained. There was a further agreement, namely, to make such assessment. The complaint alleges that

full and alleges as a breach of it, for which it claims damages, that "said assessment has never been made by the defendants."

This method is sanctioned by the Practice Act and the forms and rules given under it. Rule III., § 5, states that it is unnecessary to allege any promise or duty which the law implies from the facts pleaded.

Whatever, therefore, may have been the theory of the plaintiff, inasmuch as the agree-ment to make the assessment to pay the death claim is implied in the contract, we cannot sustain the demurrer upon this point.

This disposes of the only ground for demurrer specifically decided by the superior court. The defendants, however, insisted, in the argument before us, that the real question is, luals who upon inquiry should be found to 8 L. R. A.

whether the suit can be maintained at all against these defendants; that it would be unreasonable not to dispose of the whole matter now and here; and that a demurrer goes back and searches out all the errors in the pleadings. Perhaps, in order to determine whether the plaintiff was injured by the decision of the court sustaining the cause of demurrer already disposed of, we ought to pass upon the other causes assigned, for, if the action cannot, in any event, be sustained against the defendants as individuals, the plaintiff has sustained no injury from the decision that the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action against any-

Then, too, all the causes for demurrer were argued before us, and the conclusions to which we have come will not make it unjust to the plaintiff to accede to the defendants' claim, and we should decide all the points which were argued.

The defendants assign for further cause for demurrer, that it appears from the contract declared on that the defendants made no personal agreement upon which they were personally liable, but that the contract was signed by them only as officers of he organization mentioned therein. This issue is raised, not as a question of fact, but as a question of law

upon the pleadings.

As a matter of law does the contract, upon its face, show that the defendants made no personal contract upon which they were personally sonal contract upon which they were personally liable? The complaint alleges that they were jointly engaged in carrying on life insurance business under the name of the "Connecticut State Insurance Fund," and that they entered into the contract sued upon. If the facts are so should they not be held liable? Does the contract, as a matter of law, preclude that state of facts? If they had simply been sued as individuals, upon a contract headed with the name of the association and signed by them respectively as president, secretary and treasorer, as appears to have been the case in *Hitch-cock v. Buchanan*, 105 U. S. 416 [26 L. ed. 1078], cited by the defendants, and the complaint had contained no allegation that they were carrying on the insurance business under was a littler agreement, namely, to make such assessment. The complaint alleges that it was not made nor the amount of insurance paid. This cause of demurrer therefore must fail.

It is true that the complaint does not state, in terms, that the defendants agreed to make an assessment, but it sets out the contract in tainly might be liable on a contract signed by fall and alleges that were carrying on the insurance business under the certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with a certain name and made the contract with thomas Lawler, the question would be a different one, especially if it appeared that the association was incorporated. But under the decision of Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103, and the contract with a certain name and made the contract with the contract with a certain name and made the contract with the contract with a certain name and made the contract with the con them as officers of an organization. If, as the statute permits, the organization consisted simply of individuals united under a distinguishing associate name for business purposes, they did not thereby acquire either corporate power or immunity from individual liability; consequently it could not appear, as a matter of law, from the contract declared on, that the defendar' made no personal contract or agree-

ment upon which they were personally liable.

The case of Davison v. Holden was a suit against certain individuals who were in fact the president and secretary of an unincorporated association. This court held that "as a matter of law the plaintiff, in giving credit to the associate name, gave credit to the individstand behind it." It seems clear, without pursuing the subject further, that this cause for demurrer cannot be sustained. Individual members of an unincorporated association are liable for contracts made in the name of the association, without regard to the question whether they so intended or so understood the law, and even if the other party contracted in form with the association and was ignorant of the names of the individual members composing it. And it is also held in the case just cited that the individual members of such an association do not acquire any immunity from individual liability by force of the statutes which provide that any number of persons associated and known by some distinguishing name may sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, by such name, and that the individual property of the members shall not be liable to attachment or levy of execution in a suit brought against the association.

The remaining causes assigned for the demurrer are that the only breach of the contract alleged in the complaint is that the defendants did not make an assessment, whereas there is no provision in the contract that the defendants or any of them should make any such assessment; and that the complaint alleges that by the contract the death assessment was to be made by the defendants, whereas it appears in the contract that death assessments were to be made by the directory of the association, and it is not alleged that the defendants are members of the directory. The conclusion to which we have already come, that the contract im-plies a promise that the defendants will make, or cause to be made, an assessment to meet death claims, makes further discussion of these causes unnecessary. We do not concur in the assertion therein made, that death assessments were to be made by the directory. Its duty was the subordinate one of ascertaining the amount necessary to be raised by assessment. This the contract undertakes that it shall do, and that an assessment shall thereupon be made by the insurance fund.

Two other questions were discussed before us, namely, whether, if it should be held that the contract contains an agreement to make an assessment, the plaintiff's remedy is at law, or whether she must first go into a court of equity to compel the defendants to make the assessment; and, If an action at law can be sustained, what is the rule of damages? As to the first, we think an action at law can be sustained. Neither circuity nor multiplication of actions is favored by our practice. If there is a contract to make an assessment, a breach of Which is alleged and damages demanded therefor, and a rule of damages can be provided, why should not an action at law be sustained? Both Niblack and Bacon, recent writers upon the subject of Mutual Benefit Societies, after examining a great number of cases, come to the conclusion, with which we fully agree, that the decided weight of authority is to the effect that an action at law will lie for damages for the breach of a contract to make an assessment.

8 L. R. A.

It makes no difference with the questions raised by the demurrer whether substantial or nominal damages can be recovered, for it ought to have been overruled if the plaintiff is en-titled to any damages at all. Still the rule of damages applicable to the case was thoroughly argued and both parties invited a decision

119

upon it.

Referring again to the contract, the insurance fund agrees to pay to the proper person, in sixty days after due proof of death, a sum received from a death assessment, but not to exceed \$1,000. Each member pays \$1 upon joining the association, and agrees, upon the death of any member, to pay at once, if required, an additional assessment of whatever the directory shall deem necessary. Deem necessary for what? Clearly not what it shall deem necessary to pay, leaving the amount discretionary with the directory and to be settled in each individual case as it may deem necessary, but what it shall deem it necessary for the association to raise by assessments in order to pay the \$1,000. In short, the contract is to be taken as an agreement to make an assessment which, if duly paid, will raise \$1,000, or so much thereof as, in addition to funds on hand, will make that sum. The in-The insured takes the risk of the neglect of members to meet their assessments, and of the consequent reduction of the maximum sum named. One thousand dollars is, prima facie, the value of the policy, and the insurance fund was bound to take all the steps which it contracted to in order to realize that sum. Cases cited by the plaintiff, and other cases which we have examined, fully sustain this conclusion. And the rule is a fair one, because it is always within the power of the association to live up to its contract, and thus fix the sum which a death assessment will bring.

In Elkhart Mut. Aid, B. & R. Asso. v. Houghton, 103 Ind. 286, 1 West. Rep. 284, the certificate entitled the beneficiary to \$1,000, or so much thereof as might be realized from one assessment. The complaint alleged the death of the beneficiary, proof of his death duly given, and the refusal of the defendant to pay the amount named in the certificate or any part thereof, and its refusal to order or make any assessment to raise the required sum or any part of it. The defendant was held liable for the maximum amount, it not being shown in defense that an assessment would not produce the full amount of the certificate. It was assumed that it was the duty of the defendant to make an assessment, though the contract contained no express agreement to that effect. Earnshaw v. Sun Mut. Aid Society, 68 Md. 467, 11 Cent. Rep. 508; Lueders v. Hartford L. & Ann. Ins. Co. 12 Fed. Rep. 465; Kansas Protective Union v. Whitt, 36 Kan. 760; Control of the Co enant Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Hoffman, 110 Ill. 606; Suppiger v. Corenant Mut. Ben. Asso. 20 Ill. App. 595; Niblack, Mut. Ben. Societies, § 410, commenting on Neuman v. Corenant Mut. Ben. Asso. 72 Iowa, 242.

There is error in the judyment appealed from. In this opinion the other Judges concurred. Cornelia M. BENEDICT et al.

Augustus S. CHASE et al., Admrs., of Charles Benedict, Deceased, et al.

(58 Conn. 196.)

- A case will not be remanded for a more specific finding of facts where the facts necessary are stated in effect, and have been assumed by both parties, and the case heard on its merits without objection.
- 2. The superior court has jurisdiction of a suit to compel an intestate's estate, which has been saved from insolvency by the voluntary act of all the heirs of legal age, to refund the expense incurred thereby before distribution.
- 3. Administrators have no power to guarantee the payment of bonds of a corporation, issued for the purpose of taking up its paper upon which decedent was liable as indorser, although such guaranty would procure an extension of time and save the estate from insolvency; hence they will incur no liability by authorizing third persons to make such guaranty on behalf of the estate.
- Infant heirs are not liable to a contri-bution at law for the amount of liability voluntarily incurred by other heirs in saving the estate from insolvency.
- 5. Where a decedent's estate is saved from insolvency by the act of all the parties interested who were of age and legally capable of acting, in guaranteeing, to a certain extent, with the approval of the administrator, the bonds of a corporation, for which the intestate was liable as indorser, the amount which they were compelled to pay on such guaranty should be refunded to them before distribution, although objection is made by the other interested parties who were infants at the time, and although no claim against the estate was presented within the time limited therefor by law. Having voluntarily sacrificed their own private funds to save the estate, and having in fact saved it, they are equitably entitled to have the whole estate, and not merely their shares of it, bear the burden.

(October 30, 1889.)

RESERVATION from the Superior Court for New Haven County of an action to recover from a decedent's estate the amount which plaintiffs alleged they had advanced to save the estate from insolvency. Judgment for plaintiffs advised.

The plaintiffs are the widow and two of the children of Charles Benedict, deceased. Defendants are the minor heirs of said Benedict and the administrators of his estate.

The complaint alleged that at the time of his death the decedent was liable as indorser upon a large amount of commercial paper of Mit-chell, Vance & Co., which notes were then maturing and if presented and allowed against the estate would have rendered it wholly insolvent; and that, for the purpose of relieving the estate, the plaintiffs, being then all the par-ties interested who were of age and legally capable to act, entered into an agreement with the corporation that they would guarantee its bonds to the amount of \$144,000, the proceeds of which should be used in taking up the notes, other bonds being guaranteed by other stock-reason of the indorsements and guaranties of holders, and that the bonds were issued and Benedict in his lifetime, so that no claim there-8 L. R. A.

guaranteed, and the notes paid with the proceeds: that the corporation failed in 1887 whilea portion of the bonds guaranteed by the plaintiffs remained unpaid, and that in consequencethereof they had been compelled to pay upon them the sum of \$47,699, which the administrators, upon demand made, had refused to pay; and that the estate of Benedict was being set-tled as a solvent estate, and that the time-limited for presenting claims against it had long since expired. Judgment at law was prayed for against the administrators for theamount so paid, and for equitable relief.

The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the superior court had no original jurisdiction in the matter. The demurrer was overruled and the defendants then filed a denial.

Upon the trial the following facts werefound:

Charles Benedict died on the 30th of October, 1881, and the defendants A. S. Chase and Gilman C. Hill were appointed administrators of his estate. The estate was represented solvent, and the court limited six months from and after the 14th day of November in which to present claims against it.

Benedict died intestate, leaving a widow, Cornelia M. Benedict, and two daughters, Amelia C. Benedict and Charlotte B. Hill, plaintiffs in this action, and minor children of a deceased daughter, heirs-at-law to his estate.

At the time of his death he was indorser of

a large amount of notes and drafts of Mitchell, Vance & Co. The total amount of his liability was \$600,000. Mitchell, Vance & Co. at the decease of Benedict were supposed to be solvent, but could not meet these notes when they matured without renewals; and for the purpose of enabling the corporation to renew its paper without such indorsement and guaranty they entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs, by which the plaintiffs were to guarantee bonds to be issued by the corporation to an amount equal to one half the stock which Benedict at the time of his death owned and held in the corporation, which amount of guaranteed bonds was \$144,000.

These bonds were used by Mitchell. Vance & Co. in taking up their obligations which Benedict had indorsed or guaranteed, which were paid by them upon maturity. These notes and drafts were paid by the corporation and not by the plaintiffs, nor were they in any manner assigned or conveyed to the plaintiffs, nor were they ever presented against Benedict's estate, nor any claim made upon the estate therefor. The bonds were so guaranteed by the plaintiffs on or before the 1st of December, 1881. In the summer of 1887 Mitchell, Vance & Co. failed in business, and a receiver was appointed to settle the affairs of the corporation, and on the 1st day of January, 1888, the plaintiffs were obliged to pay to the receiver the sum of \$47,699, being one half the amount of the bonds so guaranteed by them still outstanding and unpaid by the corporation, the corporation also settling its debts for 50 cents on the dollar. The plaintiffs in guaranteeing the bonds supposed they were acting for the benefit of the estate, and relieving it from its liability by reason of the indorsements and guaranties of ing that Mitchell, Vance & Co. would fully pay and discharge the bonds so guaranteed by them.

The estate of Benedict is now in process of settlement in the probate court. The plaintiffs have presented their claim and made demand

of the administrators for payment thereof. Benedict at the time of his decease was the largest stockholder in the corporation of Mitchell, Vance & Co., and the plaintiffs in making the guaranty of bonds acted as they supposed for the benefit of the estate, to preserve the stock as an asset of value to the estate, as well as to relieve the estate from liability for the indorsements.

If the notes so indorsed by Benedict had matured as a claim against his estate, and been presented against it, it would have subjected the estate to a much larger liability, and rendered it insolvent if compelled to pay them. The bonds were so guaranteed with the knowledge and approval of the administrators, so far as they had any power to approve it.

Upon these facts the case was reserved for

the advice of this court.

Mr. S. W. Kellogg, for plaintiffs:

The plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against the administrators. It was their duty to take the necessary steps to relieve the estate from liability.

Griswold v. Bigelow, 6 Conn. 258; Davis v.

Vansands, 45 Conn. 600.

This was money paid for their benefit as administrators, and can be recovered back.

Earley v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 108, 113, 114; Exall v. Partridge, 8 T. R. 308.

If the plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment at law against the administrators, a court of equity will grant them relief.

Wherever there is a wrong there is a remedy. Hawley v. Botsford, 27 Conn. 80; Bacon v. Thorp, Id. 251; Davis v. Vansands, supra; Booth v. Starr, 5 Day, 419.

Messrs. C. W. Gillette and G. E. Terry,

for defendants:

The superior court has no original jurisdiction to grant any relief. The estate is still in process of settlement in the probate court, and all questions relating to the settlement of the estate, or to the administration account, are exclusively within the jurisdiction of that court, and can only come to the superior court by way of appeal.

Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn. 315; Bailey v. Strong, 8 Conn. 278; Beach v. Norton, 9 Conn.

182.

The plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment at law against the administrators for the money paid as they had no power to bind the estate for any such purpose.

Rhodes v. Seymour, 36 Conn. 1.

Carpenter, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

There are two facts essential to the plaintiffs' right to recover: (1) that Benedict's estate not bound to take into consideration mere poswas in peril; (2) that it was relieved of that peril by the plaintiffs. The finding does not sibilities. It is possible that the property of the corporation may have been destroyed by state either fact in so many words. Are they in effect stated? If so, we can dispose of the heavy losses otherwise, and the like; but these

for would ever come against the estate, believ- | case; if not, we must remand the case for a more specific finding.

There are two considerations which incline us to regard the finding as sufficient: 1. The case has been heard upon its merits without objection from either party, or suggestions from the court. 2. Both parties have assumed that both facts exist, and have argued the case upon that assumption.

A careful consideration of the facts stated leads us to the conclusion, if not as a necessary inference, vet as a reasonable and proper one under the circumstances, that the estate was in peril, and that the plaintiffs at their own ex-

pense rescued it from its liability.

Benedict in his lifetime assumed a contingent liability for Mitchell, Vance & Co., a New York corporation, of which he was a stock holder, to the amount of \$600,000; which liability was on his estate at the time of his decease. The corporation was unable to meet the paper indorsed by Benedict as it matured. without renewals, and no renewals could be had. That finding seems to exclude the supposition that the corporation could meet its paper, unless aided by the estate or by some-one interested in it. In less than six years the corporation failed. That it was on the sarge of insolvency, if not actually insolvent, is evident from the fact that it was unable to meet. its maturing liabilities. Something must be done, or that paper will inevitably be presented against the estate. It necessarily follows that the estate was in imminent peril. Presentation meant payment, and payment by the estate meant insolvency

Did the plaintiffs relieve it of its peril? about one month after Benedict's death the plaintiffs guaranteed bonds of the corporation to the amount of \$144,000. That was done, as it is found, "for the purpose of enabling the corporation to renew its paper without such indorsement and guaranty." It is also found Vance & Co. in taking up their obligations which said Benedict had indorsed or guaranteed." A portion of the bonds were outstanding when Mitchell Vance & Co. failed, and the plaintiffs were obliged to pay thereon \$47,699. Had they advanced \$144,000 in cash instead of guaranteeing bonds, and the money had been used to take up the indorsed paper as it matured, it would have conclusively appeared that they relieved the estate. Is the fact that they accomplished the same result by loaning their credit any less conclusive? In either case it may be said that time is of some importance; that insolvency may have overtaken the corporation after the death of Benedict; so that it is uncertain whether the plaintiffs in fact benefited the estate. The reply is that there is no presumption to that effect; on the contrary, if insolvency originated subsequently, the presumption is that the defendants by an appropriate plea would have called the at-tention of the court to that fact. In the ab-sence of any claim on that subject, the court is Woodruff, 49 Ark. 394; Little Rock & Ft. S.
R. Co. v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 207; Amoskeap
Mfg. Co. v. Worcester, 60 N. H. 526; Low v.
Concord R. Corp. 2 New Eng. Rep. 275, 63 N.
H. 558; Goodin v. Cincinnati & W. Canal Co.
18 Ohio St. 181; St. Louis, K. & A. R. Co. v.
Chapman, 38 Knn. 307; Woodfolk v. Nashville
& C. R. Co. 2 Swan, 438.

Messrs. Vertrees & Vertrees and Lytton Taylor for appelless:

ton Taylor, for appellees:

The property is to be valued on the same principles and considerations as if both parties had agreed upon the sale, and had referred the single question of the intrinsic value of that particular property to the commissioners.

Woodfolk v. Nashville & C. R. Co. 2 Swan, 439; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 508; Code, 1563, note; Lewis, Em. Dom. § 478; Mills, Em. Dom. 2d ed. § 168.

It is the market value which is to be ascertained.

Lewis, Em. Dom. § 478; Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 408 (25 L. ed.

While the condition and surroundings of the property, and its availability for valuable purposes, may be shown, the witnesses are not to be asked, or be allowed to state, the value of

Low v. Concord R. Corp. 2 New Eng. Rep. 275, 63 N. H. 557; Stinson v. Chicago, St. P. & M. R. Co. 27 Minn. 291; Sullivan v. Lafayette Co. 61 Miss. 271; Black River & M. R. Co. v. Barnard, 9 Hun, 104; Virginia & T. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358; Re Boston, H. T. & W. R. Co. 22 Hun, 176; Union Depot, S. R. & Transfer Co. v. Brunswick, 31 Minn, 299; Albany Northern R. Co. v. Lansing, 16 Barb. 68; Lewis, Em. Dom. p. 624, § 486; Mills, Em. Dom. pp. 344, 355; Moulton v. Neuburyport Water Co. 137 Mass. 163; Central Pac. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 262; Searle v. Lackawanna & B. R. Co. 33 Pa. 57, approved in Reading &

Woodruff, 49 Ark. 394; Little Rock & Ft. S. P. R. Co. v. Balthaser, 12 Cent. Rep. 175, 119 R. Co. v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 207; Amoskeag Pa. 482; 3 Sutherland, Damages, 441, 442; Mfg. Co. v. Worcester, 60 N. H. 526; Low v. Haslam v. Galena & S. W. R. Co. 64 Ill. 353.

It is not competent as independent evidence of what the market value was to show that the city contemplated erecting this reservoir on this

Mills, Em. Dom. p. 354; Cobb v. Boston, 112 Mass. 181: Ro William & Anthony Streets, 19 Wend. 678.

The award of the jury of view would not bear interest, because the Statute does not provide for interest.

Freem. Judgm. 3d ed. § 441; Code (M. & V.) § 1564; Williams v. Inman, 5 Coldw. 269.

The money was paid in while the proceed-gs were pending. If, therefore, interest ings were pending. If, therefore, interest ought to have been allowed, it should have been allowed only on the difference between

\$12,532 and \$10,327.51.

Mills, Em. Dom. 2d ed. p. 359; Shattuck v. Wilton R. Co. 23 N. H. 269.

Damages to the residue are to be assessed on the basis that the work will be constructed and operated skillfully and properly.

operated skilifully and properly.

Mills, Em. Dom. 2d ed. § 220; Lewis, Em.
Dom. § 482; Jones v. Chicago & I. R. Co. 68
Ill. 380; Jackson v. Portland, 63 Me. 55; Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Whalen, 11 Neb.
585; Setzler v. Pennsylvania S. V. R. Co. 2
Cent. Rep. 357, 112 Pa. 56; Nason v. Woonsocket U. R. Co. 4 R. I. 377; Neilson v. Chicago,
M. & N. W. R. Co. 58 Wis. 516.

Caldwell, J., delivered the opinion of the

This proceeding was instituted by the City of Nashville, in August, 1887, to condemu and appropriate what is known as "Kirkpatrick's Hill," for reservoir purposes. The jury of view assessed the damages at \$9,686. Alloway and wife, the owners of the property, appealed from that report, and obtained a trial in the

In estimating the value of real property the jury

may not only look to the land itself and the actual

A statute authorizing condemnation of lands for municipal uses must provide an adequate, certain and definite source and mode of payment of just compensation to the owner. Re Mayor, etc. of N. Y. 1 Cent. Rep. 149, 99 N. Y. 569.

A municipal corporation acting under legislative authority may be authorized to take private lands for public use without first making compensation to the owner. State v. Perth Amboy (N. J.) Nov.

Where it takes private lands for public use without first making compensation to the owner there must, at the time of taking, exist a provision by which the owner can have his damages assessed and obtain the compensation on his own motion. Ibid.

The compensation to be paid must be fixed by the valuation of the property at the date of the filing of the petition. Hence, rights acquired by third parties after that date are acquired nendente lite, and are subordinate to the rights of the petitioner. Schreiber v. Chicago & E. R. Co. 3 West. Rep. 101, 115 Ill. 340.

Measure of damages.

In the assessment of damages for taking private property for public use, it is the duty of courts to exercise their powers with a view of enabling the party whose property is taken to obtain such compensation as is assured to him by the Constitution. Beekman v. Jackson Co. (Or.) Jan. 6, 1890.

site of it, but also to the use to which it is, or is intended to be, applied by the owner. Meinzer v. Racine, 74 Wis. 166; Haslam v. Galena & S. W. R. Co. 64 Ill. 353; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 110 Ill. 414; Kankakee Stone & Lime Co. v. Kankakee, 128 IIL 173.

So far as the adaptability of the land to uses other than that to which it is applied enhances its present market value, such uses may be considered by the jury. Reed v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 126 Ill. 48; Laffin v. Chicago, W. & N. R. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 415; Calimet River R. Co. v. Moore, 13 West. Rep. 506, 124 III. 329.

So the value of land taken for a bridge site for that purpose is an element of damages for the taking, although the owner himself had no authority to build a bridge. Little Rock Junction R. Co. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381.

The present market value of the land taken is the true basis of compensation, to be determined by the jury from evidence of witnesses, or by their personal inspection of the premises. Reed v. Ohio & M. R. Co. supra; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Schneider, 2 L. R. A. 422, 127 Ill. 144.

In Michigan a jury is not authorized to fix and determine the award to be made in condemnation proceedings, upon a mere view of the premises, regardless of the evidence. Grand Rapids v. Perkins (Mich.) Nov. 15, 1889.

8 L. R. A.

circuit court, when verdict and judgment were | ness was allowed to put a price upon any single

error to this court.

The assignment of errors presents several important and interesting questions of law and practice, which it is necessary to consider somewhat in detail in order to reach an intelligent decision of the case. It is objected, and assigned as error, that the owners of the land were not permitted to show its particular value as a reservoir site; and, again, that the trial judge, in his charge, instructed the jury that, in determining the value of the property taken, they could not single out from the elements of general value its value for one special pur-These two objections raise the same legal question, and will for that reason be considered together.

The "just compensation" required by our Constitution (art. 1, § 21) is the fair cash value of the land taken for public use, estimated as of the land taken for public use, estimated as if the owner were willing to sell, and the corporation desired to buy, that particular quantity at that place and in that form. Woodfolk v. Nashville & C. R. Co. 2 Swan, 437; East Tennessee & V. R. Co. v. Love, 3 Head, 67; Tennessee & A. R. Co. v. Adams, 3 Head, 600; Memphis v. Bolton, 9 Heisk. 509.

This value means the market value. Lewis

This value means the market value. Lewis, Em. Dom. § 478: Mississippi & R. R. Boom. Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 408 [25 L. ed. 208];

Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 699.

It includes every element of usefulness and advantage in the property. If it be useful for agriculture or for residence purposes; if it has adaptability for a reservoir site, or for the operation of machinery; if it contains a quarry of stone, or a mine of precious metals; if it possesses advantage of location, or availability for any useful purpose whatever,—all these before to the considered in long to the owner, and are to be considered in estimating its value. It matters not that the owner uses the property for the least valuable of all the ends to which it is adapted, or that he puts it to no profitable use at all. All its capabilities are his, and must be taken into the estimate. This does not mean that all the capabilities are to be priced separately, and the aggregate put down as the true value: for they do not exist independently of each other, and cannot all be realized at the same time. will it do to restrict the estimate to any one of them, because in one view that would exclude the other elements altogether, and in the other view it would tend to make the degree of benefit to the party appropriating and con-demning for a particular purpose the real measure of value, which is never allowable.

The field of investigation, in the case before us, was a very broad one. The location and elevation of the property were given. Its surface, area and present use were described. The existence and character of stone within its compass and the state of the state of the compass and the state of the state o compass, and the fact that the best of the stone was used in the construction of the walls of the reservoir, were disclosed. The City's engi-

rendered for \$12,532. From that judgment element of usefulness or advantage, but all the Alloway and wife prosecuted an appeal in foregoing facts and circumstances were stated in detail by one witness and another, and from them all the witnesses gave their opinions as to the market value of the property. The questions calling for such opinions were generally in this form: "Considering the property sought to be condemned in the form it was taken, and as it was taken, and having regard to the entire property, and the uses to which it was put, and also the uses to which it was adapted, and assuming that Mr. Alloway wanted to sell, but was not obliged to sell, this piece or parcel of land, and the City wanted to buy it, but was not obliged to have it, what was the cash market value of the same in August, 1887, and what would be just compensation to Mr. Alloway, and what damages should be allowed him?" Some of the witnesses, especially those put upon the stand by the owners, answered that question as to their acquaintance with the property and its market

value.

With respect to the mode of ascertaining the value of the land taken, the circuit judge instructed the jury in these words: "In estimating its value, all the capabilities of the property, and all the uses to which it may be applied, are to be considered, and not merely the condition it is in at the time, and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. It is not a question of the value of the property to the owner, nor can the value be advanced by his unwillingness to sell. On the other hand, the damages cannot be measured by the value of the property to the party condemning it, nor by its need of the particular property. City is entitled to bave the land at its fair, market, cash value, unaffected by the fact that it needs it, or desires it. If it were otherwise, the value of land would not be measured by what it is actually worth in the market, but by the extent to which it might be necessary for public use; and so, when an appropriation of land is made for a city reservoir, the question is not what the land is worth to the City for the special purpose, for that would be to measure the value by the immediate necessities of the public, rather than the actual worth of the land. In determining the market cash value, you cannot single out from the elements of general value the value for an especial purpose, but you are to consider all the constituent elements that make up the market value,—its availability, adaptability and capacity for different uses and purposes. In determining the market cash value, everything which enhances or depreciates its worth should be taken into If the existence of a rock consideration. quarry under the surface of the hill augmented or entered into the market value of the land, that fact should be considered; but the jury could make no separate allowance for the rock. for that would necessitate an inquiry into the cost of excavating and raising it. The cash cost of excavating and raising it. market value of the land with the rock in it would be the proper consideration." To a great extent, and entirely so, so far as the cases market value of the proper consideration." To a reservoir site," and this view was confirmed by Mr. John Overton, who said that there was only "one or two more good places for a reservoir" in reach of the City. No witR. Co. 33 Pa. 57, and in other cases not neces-

sary to be cited.

Thus, as we think, every legitimate question on this branch of the case was developed, and properly submitted for the consideration of the jury. The action of the trial judge was right, both in the rejection of evidence of the amount of value for a reservoir site, and in the instruction that the jury could not single out and esti-

tion that the jury could not single out and estimate the value for a special purpose.

We fully agree with the learned counsel of Alloway and wife, that "the particular purpose for which a piece of property is most applicable" must be considered in estimating the value of such property. That was done in this case. It was distinctly proven that "Kirkpatrick's Hill" was applicable, "mostly, for a reservoir site," and the jury was told to consider that, and every other element of value.

That they did so cannot be doubted for a mo-That they did so cannot be doubted for a moment, in the light of the whole proof, and the amount of the verdict returned. Our holding is that, while adaptability for a reservoir site must be considered, the value for such a purpose exclusively cannot be shown in proof, and made the sole basis of a recovery, especially when the property possesses other capabilities, as in this case.

There is a lack of harmony in the decisions on this subject, some of them permitting the inquiry as to the value of the property for one special use, and others holding, as we do, that the market value in view of all available uses is the measure of compensation. It is not desirable to review all the cases in this opinion, but some of them will be mentioned. The latest one in the former line is that of San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1888, and published in 78 Cal. 63, 3 L. R. A. 83. In that case it was held, distinctly, that it was competent to prove the value of land for a reservoir site, and to make that value the measure of damages, independent of any other consideration or element of value; and that, too, when the land sought to be condemned was in fact not the real site of the reservoir, but only necessary to contain backwater from the dam below. To reach that conclusion, the dam below. To reach that conclusion, two former decisions by the same court, holding a contrary rule, were overruled, and other authorities cited in the opinion, were followed, In a case of the other line this language is used: "But, where a condemnation is sought for the purposes of a railroad, to single out from the elements of general value the value for the special purposes of such railroad is, in effect, to put to a jury the question, What is the land worth to the particular railroad com-pany? rather than, What is it worth in gen-eral? The practical result would be to make the company's necessity the land owner's opportunity to get more than the real value of his land." Stinson v. Chicago, St. P. & M. R. Co. 27 Minn. 291

sound authority by counsel on both sides of mate. There it was treated as an element 8 L. R. A.

down in Lewis, Em. Dom. §§ 478, 479, 486; 3 this controversy. Patterson owned one island, Sutherland, Dam. 441, 442; Mills, Em. Dom. and parts of two others, in the Mississippi 2d ed. § 168; Moulton v. Newburyport Water River, which the boom company condemned. Co. 187 Mass. 163; Searle v. Lackawanna & B. The value was first appraised by commission-River, which the boom company condemned. The value was first appraised by commissioners, and afterwards by a jury in the circuit court of the United States. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The jury found a general verdict assessing the value of the land at \$9,358.33, but accompanied it with a special verdict assessing its value, aside from any consideration of its value for boom purposes, at \$300, and, in view of its adaptability for those purposes, a further and additional value of \$9,058.33. . . . In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be, What is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted? That is to say, What is it worth from its availability for valuable uses? Property is not to be deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go to waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to use it, and make it subserve the necessities and conveniences of life. Its capability of being made thus available gives it a market value which can be readily estimated. So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into the account in determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is perhaps impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation to the owner is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community. or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. The position of the three islands in the Mississippi fitting them to form, in connection with the west bank of the river, a boom of immense dimensions, capable of holding in safety over twenty millions of feet of logs, added largely to the value of the land. The boom company would greatly prefer them to more valuable agricultural lands, or to lands situated elsewhere on the river; as, by utilizing them in the manner proposed, they would save heavy expenditures of money in constructing a boom of equal capacity. Their adaptability for boom purposes was a circumstance, therefore, which the owner had a right to insist upon as an element in estimating the value of his lands." 98 U. S. 405, 407, 408 [25 L. ed. 98 U. S. 405, 407, 408 [25 L. ed.

207, 208].
This lengthy extract presents the rule for of the case. Both, as we understand them, are in harmony with, and suggest, the views expressed in this opinion. There the adaptability of the islands for boom purposes was held to be an element of value to be considered The case of Mississippi & R. R. Boom Co. v. by the jury; here it is decided that the adapta-Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 [25 L. ed. 206], is cited bility of the hill for purposes of a reservoir is by the California court, and is relied on as an element of value to be taken into the estielements of value; so it is here. In that case the contention of the condemning party was that the adaptability of the islands for boom purposes should not enter into the estimate at The court said it should, in the words quoted. No comment is made in the opinion on the fact that the jury, in a special verdict, assessed the value for boom purposes separably. That method is neither approved nor disapproved, by intimation or otherwise. The general verdict, as reduced by the owner on suggestion of the lower court, was affirmed.

A late author, speaking on this subject, says: "The market value of property includes its value for any use to which it may be put. If, by reason of its surroundings, or its natural advantages, or its artificial improvements, or its intrinsic character, it is peculiarly adapted to some particular use, all the circumstances which make up this adaptability may be shown, and the fact of such adaptation may be taken into consideration in estimating the compensa-Some of the cases held that its value for a particular use may be proved; but the proper inquiry is, What is its market value, in view of any use to which it may be applied, and of all the uses to which it is adapted? conclusion from the authorities and reason of the matter seems to be that witnesses should not be allowed to give their opinions as to the value of property for a particular purpose, but should state its market value in view of any purpose to which it is adapted. The condition of the property, and all its surroundings, may be shown and its availability for any particular use. If it has a peculiar adaptation for certain uses, this may be shown, and if such peculiar adaptation adds to its value the owner is entitled to the benefit of it. But, when all the facts and circumstances have been shown, the question at last is, What is it worth in the mar-

et?" Lewis, Em. Dom. § 479.
By statute the owner is entitled to compensation for land actually appropriated, and, in addition, to incidental damages for injury, if any, to the residue of the tract. Mill. & V.

Code, § 1562

Both were claimed in this case, but only the former was allowed by the jury. As ground for incidental damages, the use, amount and relative position of the residue, and the capacity (50,000,000 of gallons) and dimensions of the reservoir, were shown. It was also proven that the walls of the reservoir were made of stone taken from the hill; that some of the stone was good for such purpose, and some of it was not, the yield, altogether, being largely more than was used in the wall. Upon these and some other circumstances the witnesses express various opinions on the question of depreciation or no depreciation in the market value of the residue.

The general charge with respect to incidental damages is not assailed, but error is assigned upon this paragraph: "Damages are to be assessed on the basis that the work will be constructed and operated in a skillful and proper manner. All damages resulting from the neglect in these respects, or from negligence in the use of the reservoir, may be recovered,

only, to be considered in connection with other | sonable apprehension of danger would impair the whole of the property in the vicinity, and, when it had been shown that the walls were built from the stone taken from the site, and that most of the stone in the hill was of bad quality, this was ground to apprehend danger. And, besides, the present owner is entitled to the incidental damages." It seems to be well settled that damages to the residue are to be estimated on the assumption that the part actually appropriated will be used in a skillful and proper manner. Mi is, Em. Dom. § 482. Mills, Em. Dom. § 220; Lew-

Clearly, this must be so when the damages are assessed before the construction and operation are commenced. If it were otherwise, no appraisement could be made until after the work is completed, because it could not sooner be known how defective the work will be, nor the amount of depreciation caused thereby. The rule should be the same when the construction is in progress, and not completed. When the trial below occurred, the work on the reservoir had been going on a long while, and was approaching completion, but it could not be finished for several months to come. The City was under legal obligation to so construct its improvement as to do the least injury to the residue of the land; and the presumption that it would perform that duty faithfully should be indulged until the work was finished. and the presumption rebutted. Even though some defects should, through negligence, occur in the construction, it is fair to assume that it will be detected and cured before putting the reservoir to its ultimate use. In like manner, the law devolves upon the City the duty of operating the reservoir carefully and skillfully; and it would be unjust to assume in advance that it will not do so. A different rule would be impracticable, as well as unjust; for no one could tell the amount to be allowed for improper operation until the fact itself should be ascertained, and the consequences seen and

The owner is entitled to all his damages. those for the land taken, and those to the residue, so soon as the condemnation is made. Neither he nor the condemning party can await future developments to enhance or diminish the amount of damages. These must be estimated on the assumption that the land appropriated will be properly and in a reasonable time put to the use for which it is condemned. We by no means intend to decide that incidental damages must be estimated upon the assumption that the construction and operation of the improvement will be absolutely safe, and that apprehension of danger therefrom may not be considered by the jury. Our meaning is that such damages cannot be enhanced by the suggestion that the corpora-tion appropriating the land will act negligently. The presumption is that it will act carefully. If it act otherwise, and injury result from its negligence, that affords an independent cause of action; and the liability so incurred forms no part of the incidental damages. There may be reasonable apprehensions of danger from inherent defects and unavoidable accidents, notwithstanding skillful construction and careful operation of the improvement. If by appropriate suits, when such damages oc-cur." The objection to this is "because a rea-so, such apprehension, so far as it depreciates

verdict. Such apprehension was not excluded from the consideration of the jury in this case. Only that resulting from the neglect or negligence of the city was so excluded. At this point, it is well to note the fact that there was no proof that any of the inferior stone had been placed in the wall, or that any of the work had been unskillfully done.

Each side claimed the right to open and

close the argument before the jury. The trial judge decided in favor of the City, and that action is assigned as error. This question has been decided in several of the States, some of them holding one way, and some the other. The majority of the cases seem to give the opening and conclusion to the land owner. Lewis, Em. Dom. § 426.

The conflict in the decisions is largely due, no doubt, to difference in local practice, or statutory provisions. In this State the proceeding is inaugurated by the party seeking to appropriate the land. It is done by a petition setting forth the land wanted, the object for which it is to be condemned, the name of the owner, and concluding with appropriate prayers. Notice is to be given the owner, after which a jury, to inquire and assess the damages, is summoned and sworn. Either party may appeal from the finding of this jury, and have a trial anew before a jury in the circuit court. Mill. & V. Code, §§ 1549–1566, inclusive.

Not only is the corporation seeking the condemnation required to take the first steps, and bring the land owner before the court, in the prescribed order, but it must, of necessity, show that it is entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain, and that the particular land is necessary for its corporate use. In all this the petitioner is plaintiff, with the affirmative of its clain, and the burden of proof upon it. The question of the amount of damages is then considered, and generally one side seeks to make it as small, and the other as large, as possible. Starting out as plaintiff, with the onus upon it, the petitioner should be allowed to open and close the case, even though the burden of proof may be shifted to the other party on some question arising in the progress of the trial. Concession by the owner of peti-tioner's right to condemn, and to take the particular land, and contesting the question of damages only, cannot change the rule; nor can the fact that the owner alone appealed from the appraisement by the jury of inquest, for on that appeal the trial is de novo, and the attitude of the parties is the same as before,

The jury allowed no interest. No instructions on that subject were given or requested; but after the verdict was returned, and before judgment was entered, Alloway and wife moved the court to add interest. This the This the court refused to do; and his action in that regard is now assigned as error. The Statute authorizing the condemnation of private property for public use, and prescribing the mode of proceeding, is silent on this subject; and the General Statutes (Id. § 2702) which enumerates instruments that bear interest as a matter of law, does not embrace a case like that before est, and affirmed, with costs.

the present market value of the land not taken, us. Nevertheless, we have no hesitation in is an element of incidental damages, and should be considered by the jury in making up their should have been allowed from the time of the should have been allowed from the time of the appropriation of the property. From that time the original owner was deprived of the use and possession of the land taken. The liability of the City accrued at that date, though the amount thereof is not determined finally until long thereafter. Damages are properly as-sessed with reference to the value of the land taken, and the depreciation of the residue at the time of condemnation. The legal-rights of both parties, so far as the damages are concerned, are fixed at that time. Subsequent enhancement or diminution of the value, though ever so great, cannot be considered by the jury in estimating damages. Witnesses are exam-ined as to the amount of damages at the time of appropriation, and not at the time of the trial. That method was properly adopted in this case. The City, especially, asked her witnesses the value of the property "in August, 1887."

In the case of East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Burnett, 11 Lea, 526, the jury of inquest, though reporting several years after the land was appropriated, failed to allow interest. The petitioner did not appeal, and have a trial de novo, but excepted to the report because it did not include interest. The exception was overruled, and the petitioner prosecuted a writ of error. This court allowed the interest. Id. of error.

A discussion of the subject is found in § 499, Lewis, Em. Dom. Refusal to allow interest was error. In the language of one of the counsel for appellants: "If the party in whose favor there is verdict is, as a matter of law, entitled to something additional, the court may allow it." Inasmuch as the error can be readily Inasmuch as the error can be readily corrected here, that will be done, instead of reversing and remanding. This court will render the judgment that should have been rendered below. The land was taken about the 10th of August, 1887; hence judgment will be entered for the amount of the verdict, with interest from that date.

On September 22, 1888, the City paid into court, subject to the order of Alloway and wife, the sum of \$10,872.51, that being the amount of damages returned by the jury of view, with interest and costs added. Because of this tender, the City now insists that it can in no event be liable for interest on a larger sum than the difference between the verdict and the amount so paid into court. This contention, though plausible at first view, is not sustained by sound reason. A tender of part of a debt, in satisfaction of the whole of it, is no tender at all in law. The sum paid into court in this case was more than \$2.000 less than the amount due Alloway and wife, as has since been demonstrated by the verdict of the jury; hence they were under no obligation to receive it, and cannot have their claim for interest abated on account of their refusal to do

The other grounds of error assigned, so far as material, fall within principles already announced, and for that reason they will not be further mentioned.

Let the judgment be modified by adding inter-

8 L. R. A.

OHIO SUPREME COURT.

STATE OF OHIO, ex rel. ATTORNEY-GENERAL,

T.

WESTERN UNION MUTUAL LIFE & ACCIDENT SOCIETY of the United States.

(47 Ohio St.....)

- *1. Corporations organized under section 3630 of the Revised Statutes, which do not comply with the laws regulating regular mutual life insurance companies, have no power to issue policies guaranteeing any fixed amount to be paid at the death of the member, "except such fixed amount shall be conditioned upon the same being realized from the assessments made on members to meet it;" and those corporations so organized, which do comply with such laws, are authorized to issue endowment policies "promising to pay to members during life any sum of money or thing of value." Such Ohio corporations are not permitted to do business in another State upon substantially the same basis and limitations as they are in Ohio, when by the laws of such other State they are not permitted to issue such endowment policies, nor any policy of insurance so conditioned, nor any that does not specify the sum of money to be paid, and unconditionally obligate such corporation to pay the amount so specified, to the beneficiaries of such payment; and corporations organized on the assessment plan under the laws of such other State are not entitled to do business in this State.
- 2. The business, which corporations of

*Head notes by the Court.

NOTE.—Foreign insurance companies; conditions imposed by statute.

A law of a State requiring insurance companies of other States or countries to file security, or take out a license, or pay a specific tax or certain fees and percentages, before they can issue policies in the State, is constitutional. Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 410 (19 L. ed. 972); Liverpool & L. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 566 (19 L. ed. 1029); Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116 (23 L. ed. 825); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 188 (19 L. ed. 357). See note to Pennypacker v. Capital Ins. Co., post, —.

A State may require a deposit from a foreign company as a condition precedent to its right to do business. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Burdett, 11 West. Rep. 239, 112 Ind. 204.

Such a statute is constitutional, whether the moneys are regarded as taxes for revenue or as a license. State v. Ins. Co. of North America, 15 West. Rep. 93, 115 Ind. 257.

Under the laws of Michigan requiring a deposit of securities as a condition for the prosecution of their business, a British company must make such deposit, although it may have made the same in another State to acquire a license to do business there. Employers I. Assur. Co. v. Insurance Comr. 7 West. Rep. 851, 64 Mich. 614.

Under the Statute of Louisiana liceuse is imposed on the business pursued by an insurance company in the State of Louisiana, and not on business done by branches or agencies established in other States, subject to their laws and subject to taxation imposed thereby. Sections 6 and 7 of the same Act provide for rate of taxation. State v. Hibernia Ins. Co. 38 La. Ann. 465.

Act 1872, chap. 24, \$ 110, relating to incorporation 8 L. R. A.

- other States organized to insure lives of members on the assessment plan "shall be permitted to do in this State," under the provisions of \$ 3630c, Rev. Stat., is that contemplated by section 3630, which does not include the business of insuring the lives of members for the benefit of others than their families and heirs. A corporation of another State, organized for insuring lives upon the plan of assessments upon its members, without other limitation than that the policy holder shall have an insurable interest in the life of the member, is not embraced within either of said sections.
- That clause of section 3630 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that such company or association shall not be subject to the preceding sections of this chapter," does not apply to corporations of other States organized for insuring the lives of members for the benefit of others than their families and heirs. Corporations of that class are not entitled to transact any business of insurance in this State, until they procure from the superintendent of insurance a certificate of authority so to do; nor can any person act as agent in this State for such company, until a license to do so is procured from the superintendent of insurance, as required by \$ 3604, Rev. Stat. Such licenses continue in force, unless suspended or revoked, until the first day of April of the year next after the date of their issue, and no longer.
- 4. When a foreign corporation doing business in this State is exercising its franchises in contravention of the laws thereof, it may be ousted therefrom, by proceedings in quo warranto.

of cities, was repealed by Act 1879, \$30, which declares the tax directed to be levied upon the net receipts of foreign insurance companies to be in tieu of all town and municipal licenses. Chicago v. James, 1 West. Rep. 345, 114 III. 479.

Section 30 requires affirmative action by the city entitled to it, in fixing the rate, which may be less, but cannot be more, than 2 per cent upon the gross, and not upon the net, receipts of the agents of foreign corporations. Ibid.

A foreign corporation suing in Colorado on an insurance policy cannot be defeated by the fact that it has not complied with the statutes in regard to foreign corporations doing business within the State, where the only business done within the State relates to the insurance policy in suit. Tabor v. Goss & P. Mfg. Co. 11 Colo. 419.

The Act making it unlawful for anyone to aid a foreign insurance company in transacting business within the State renders any person so aiding liable, although acting under a contract with the insured as his agent only. People v. People's Ins. Exchange, 2 L. R. A. 340, 126 III. 466.

A condition in a policy of a foreign company doing business in this State, that anyone except the insured who procures insurance to be taken by the company shall be deemed the agent of the insured, is null and void. North British & M. Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 7 West. Rep. 85, 108 Ind. 518.

An agent of an insurance company incorporated in the District of Columbia is an agent of a company incorporated by a "State" other than the State of Indiana, within Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, \$ 3765, requiring a license from such agent. State v. Briggs, 116 Ind. 55.

A state statute, which provides that insurance companies of other States shall not do business in

(March 4, 1890.)

PETITION for a writ of quo warranto to oust defendant from exercising the franchise of transacting the business of a life insurance company within the State. Judgment of ouster.

Statement by Williams, J.:

The petition states that the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Michigan for the purpose of carrying on, upon the assessment or co-operative plan, the business of insuring the lives of its members, and of providing to its members indem-nity for disability by accident; that since the 1st day of April, 1889, the defendant has exercised and claims the right to exercise, in this the business of insuring lives upon the assessment plan, which it is not entitled to do, because neither it nor any of its agents obtained from the superintendent of insurance of this State the necessary certificate of authority or license to do business in this State, and also because, by the statutes of Michigan, corporations organized under the laws of Ohio, for the purpose of insuring the lives of members upon the assessment plan, are not permitted to do business in the State of Michigan upon the same basis and limitations as they are in this State; and, the commissioner of insurance of the State of Michigan has refused, and still refuses, to issue to such Ohio corporations his certificate of authority to transact business in that State.

The petition prays for a judgment of ouster against the defendant.

the State until they shall have designated an agent ! therein upon whom process may be served, confers jurisdiction upon a circuit court of the United States sitting in such State over an action by a citizen of the State against an insurance company of another State, commenced by service upon an agent therein, designated by it under the statute. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (24 L. ed. 853).

No foreign insurance company can take fire risks within the State of Michigan unless authorized by the commissioner of insurance. Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comr. 14 West. Rep. 632,70 Mich. 485.

The statutes of Missouri make it the duty of a foreign insurance company desiring to transact business in the State to file with the superintendent of the insurance department a written instrument designating someone as agent to receive service of process. A sheriff's return on a writ of garnishment served "on one of the agents" is insufficient. Gates v. Tusten, 4 West. Rep. 662, 89 Mo. 131.

It makes the certified copy of the certificate evidence of authority to do business in the State. American Ins. Co. v. Smith, 2 West. Rep. 149, 19 Mo.

App. 827.

Where a foreign company, undertaking to prove the existence of its certificate to carry on business for several years, omits proof of the year in question, the submission of the question to the jury, whether it had authority to do business at that time, is proper. Ibid.

The mere absence from a recorder's office of a certificate issued to a foreign corporation, will not warrant the inference that no such certificate exists. Ibid.

8 L. R. A.

The answer admits that the defendant was incorporated under the Michigan Statute set forth in the petition; that it has exercised, and claims the right to exercise, in this State, the privilege and franchise referred to in the petition, and alleges that it is entitled to do so. because, it avers that on the 9th day of June. 1886, it made application to the superintendent of insurance of this State for permission to carry on in the State of Ohio the business of life insurance, as contemplated in section 3630¢ of the Revised Statutes of Ohio; and that on the 13th day of September, 1886, the superintendent of insurance duly authorized the de-fendant to transact business in this State; since which time the defendant has continuously prosecuted its business in this State as contem-State, the privilege and franchise of transacting plated in section 3630 of the Revised Statutes. The answer further alleges that Ohio corporations organized for the purpose of insuring their members upon the assessment plan are not debarred by the laws of Michigan from transacting business in that State, and that the insurance commissioner of that State has not refused to issue certificates of authority to transact business in that State, to such Ohio corporations as can and will comply with the laws of the State of Michigan. It is also alleged in the answer that the petition was filed at the insti-gation of "The People's Mutual Benefit Association of Westerville, Ohio," which corpora-tion, on or about the 24th of October, 1888, made application to the insurance commissioner of Michigan for authority to do business The provisions of the Michigan statutes upon the subject are set out in the petition. Such because, upon examination, it was ascertained of them as are deemed material to the decision its business, in part, was that of endowment insurance, which the laws of Michigan did not surance, which the laws of michigan did not assess. permit corporations organized on the assessment plan to do.

> The Legislature has fixed no limit as to the amount of cash business these companies may do: and if the law is defective in this respect, the remedy must come from the law-making power. State v. Manufacturers Mut. F. Ins. Co. 8 West, Rep. 258, 91 Mo. 311.

> In New York the Legislature did not intend to prohibit such adjustments by uncertified agents of fire insurance companies of other States and foreign countries, where there appeared to be nothing unlawful in the contract out of which the indebtedness had arisen. People v. Gilbert, 44 Hun,

> Under the Nebraska Statute a foreign insurance company, to be authorized to transact business in Nebraska, must be possessed of at least \$200,000 of actual paid-up capital, exclusive of any assets of such company deposited in any other State or Ter-

> ritory. State v. Benton, 25 Neb. 834.
> The provision of the Wisconsin Statute which imposes a penalty upon every life or accident insurance company doing business in Wisconsin which fails to file the annual statement thereby prescribed, does not apply to a nonresident corporation which has not been licensed, although doing business within the State in violation of law. State v. United States Mut. Accident Asso. 69 Wis. 76.

> The Statute of Wisconsin which enacts that a corporation organized in another State shall not transact business within its limits unless it agrees in advance that it will not remove into the federal courts any suit that may be commenced against it by a citizen of Wisconsin, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void; and the

The defendant also filed a supplemental | the defendant is not entitled to carry on its answer (so called), which charges that the superintendent of insurance has embodied in the annual report which he is required to make to the General Assembly, relating to the conduct and condition of all insurance companies doing business in this State, a statement to the effect that he has lawfully revoked the authority of the defendant to do business in Ohio after April 1, 1889, since which time it has been doing business in this State without authority of law; and that he has omitted to make any statement in his report showing the condition of the defendant Company.

By this pleading, it is sought to make the superintendent of insurance a party to the action, and enjoin him from making such report.

The case is submitted upon demurrers to the answer, and the supplemental answer.

and R. A. Harrison for plaintiff.

Mr. C. D. Robertson, for defendant: Corporations of the class of this defendant, by the provisions of § 3630, Rev. Stat., are not subject to the laws of this State relating to life insurance companies, and are not required to receive annual renewals of authority

State v. Mutual Protection Asso. 26 Ohio St. 19; State v. Standard Life Asso. 38 Ohio St. 281.

To be permitted to do business in this State foreign companies are simply required to comply with the laws of this State regulating like companies and organizations in this State, and obtain from the superintendent of insurance a certificate of such compliance. State v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 10.

Williams, J., delivered the opinion of the

business of insurance in this State, and that it is therefore exercising its franchises here in contravention of law, because: (1) Ohio corpo-rations organized under section 3630 of the Revised Statutes are not permitted to do business in the State of Michigan on substantially the same basis and limitations as they are in Ohio: (2) the law under which the defendant is organized authorizes it to engage in the business of insuring lives on the plan of assessments upon surviving members, without other restriction than that policy holders shall have an insurable interest in the lives of the members, which companies organized for the mutual protection of its members within this State are not permitted to do; and (3) the defendant has failed to comply with the laws of this State, which require that such corporations shall obtain annually, from the superintendent of insurance, a certificate of authority, and licenses to their agents, to do business in this State.

1. The business of life insurance, and the terms and conditions upon which foreign companies may be admitted to carry on that business, are regulated in this State by statute; and the right of the defendant to transact its business of insurance within the State, if possessed by it, must be derived, it is conceded, from 8 36300 Rev. Stat. which is as follows: "Any § 3630e, Rev. Stat., which is as follows: corporation, company or association organized under the law of any other State to insure lives of members on the assessment plan, and authorized to transact the business contemplated in section 3630, shall be permitted to do such business, to wit: the business contemplated in section 3630, in this State, by first complying with the laws of the State of Ohio, regulating corporations, companies or associations organ-It is contended, in behalf of the plaintiff, that 1 ized for the mutual protection of their members

agreement of an insurance company made in conformity to this Statute is also void. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U. S. 20 Wall, 445 (22 L. ed. 365).

In Vermont an information under Acts 1884, charging an agent with receiving risks for insurance in behalf of a foreign insurance company which has not complied with the Statute, must allege assured's name. State v. Hover, 2 New Eng. Rep. 201, 58 Vt. 496.

Retaliatory legislation.

Under Iowa Code, \$ 1154, providing that, where another State imposes prohibitions upon Iowa insurance companies doing business therein, the law of such State shall be the law of lowa, as against insurance companies from such State doing business in Iowa, there need not be any enforcement in such other state of the prohibition imposed on lowa insurance companies. The existence of such law is sufficient to warrant enforcement of said section. State v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 77 Iowa,

The Illinois statutory provision that, whenever any other State shall require Illinois insurance companies doing business therein to deposit and pay a greater amount than the Illinois laws require of such companies, then companies of such State doing business in Illinois shall be required to pay or deposit the same amount of tax or license fee, becomes operative upon the passage of a law laying an additional burden upon Illinois companies. whether any such companies are doing business within the State passing the law or not. Germania Ing. Co. v. Swigert, 128 III. 237. 8L.R.A.

A statute of New York providing that if any State shall require a greater deposit of securities or payment of any kind from a corporation of New York, than from foreign corporations of other States, a corporation of such State in New York shall be required to make the same deposit or pay-ment, does not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Philadelphia Fire Asso. v. New York, 119 U. S. 110 (30 L. ed. 342).

Article 4, § 2. U. S. Const., giving citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the States, does not apply to corporations. Ibid.

In accordance with the policy of Minnesota and of the Interstate Law of Comity, foreign insurance corporations are allowed to carry on business in that State. A foreign corporation which has complied with Minnesota laws should not, as measure of retaliation, by force of the retaliatory Statute (Minn. Gen. Stat. chap. 34, \$ 269), be excluded from doing business in Minnesota, upon the ground that the laws of the State where such foreign corporation was created would exclude corporations of Minnesota from doing business there, unless it is clearly apparent that such is the effect of the foreign law. The proper effect of the statutes of New York in this particular being considered doubtful, and the manner of their practical administration being undisclosed, a judgment of ouster against the New York corporation was refused. State v. Fidelity & C. Ins. Co. 39 Minn. 538.

Quo warranto is a proper proceeding to try the right of a foreign corporation to carry on its corporate business in Minnesota. Ibid.

within this State, upon obtaining from the su-perintendent of insurance of this State a certificate of such compliance, which certificate shall not be granted until such foreign corporation, company or association shall have appointed an agent or attorney within this State upon whom service of process may be had. Provided, that the superintendent of insurance shall not be required to issue certificates to do business in Ohio to an agent of any such corporation, company or association organized in any State in which such Ohio corporations, companies or associations are not permitted to do business on substantially the same basis and limitations as they are in Ohio."

In view of the proviso contained in this section, it becomes important to determine upon what basis and limitations Ohio corporations are permitted to do business in Ohio. These are ascertained by reference to section 3630 and 3630c of the Revised Statutes. The former

section is as follows:

'Sec. 3630. A company or association may be organized to transact the business of life or accident insurance on the assessment plan, for the purpose of mutual protection and relief of its members, and for the payment of stipulated sums of money to the families or heirs of the deceased members of such company or association, and may receive money either by voluntary donation or contribution, or collect the same by assessment on its members, and may accumulate, invest, distribute and appropriate the same in such manner as it may deem proper; that all accumulations and accretions thereon shall be held and used as the property of the members and in the interest of the members, and shall not be loaned to, used, appropriated or invested for the benefit of any officer or manager of such company or association; and, provided, that no company or association shall issue a certificate for a greater amount than such company or association shall be able to pay from the proceeds of one assessment; and such company or association shall not be subject to the preceding sections of this chapter."

It is provided in section 3630c that, "no such corporation, company or association issuing endowments, certificates or policies, or undertaking, or promising to pay to members during life any sum of money, or thing of value, or certificate, or policy guaranteeing any fixed amount to be paid at death, except such fixed amount or endowments shall be conditional upon the same being realized from the assessments made on members to meet them, shall be permitted to do business in this State, until they shall comply with the laws regulating regular mutual life insurance companies."

Whatever powers such companies possess are derived exclusively from the laws of this State, and the limitations and restrictions imposed upon them by those laws, both with respect to the classes of business they may transact, and the mode of doing it, operate upon them as well when doing business out-side of the State as within it. Their corporate capacity, in these respects, cannot be enlarged by the laws of any other State in which they may be permitted to do business. By the plain provisions of these Statutes, no company organized under section 3630, unless it com- cate of authority from the commissioner of

plies with the laws regulating regular mutual life insurance companies, can issue any policy guaranteeing any fixed amount to be paid at death, "except such amount shall be conditional upon the same being realized from the assessments made on members to meet them. In other words, the obligation of the policy, and the only one the company can thus contract, is to pay, upon the death of the member, such sum, and only such, as may be realized from the assessments made on members to meet it. The policy does not create an unconditional obligation to pay the amount specified in it, nor has the company corporate power to issue such policy, or contract such obligation, in this State or elsewhere. Then those companies, so organized, which do comply with the laws regulating mutual life insurance companies, are authorized to issue endowment policies, undertaking to pay members "during life, any sum of money or thing of value," and policies guaranteeing a fixed amount to be paid at death. These are the basis and limita-tions upon which such companies are authorized to do business in Ohio, and the question to be determined here is whether they are per-mitted by the laws of Michigan to do business there upon substantially the same basis and limitations. It is not enough that they be permitted, there, to exercise some of their franchises, or transact a part only of the business they are authorized to do in Ohio, but they must there be permitted to do substantially the same business upon substantially the same terms and conditions as they are in Ohio. by the laws of Michigan any substantial limita-tion or restriction is placed upon such Ohio companies in regard to the character or extent of the business they may transact there, to which they are not subject in Ohio, it cannot be said that they are permitted to do business there upon substantially the same basis and limitations as they are in Ohio.

By section 15 of the Michigan Statute, under

which it is admitted by the answer the defendant was reorganized, it is provided that "every policy or certificate issued by any corporation in that State and doing business under that Act, and promising a payment to be made upon a contingency of death, or of disability by accident, shall specify the sum of money it promises to pay upon such contingency insured against, and the number of days after satisfactory proof of the happening of such contingency at which such payment should be made; and that upon the occurrence of such contingency, unless the contract shall have been voided by fraud or by breach of its condition, the corporation shall be obligated to the beneficiaries of such payment, at the time and to the amount specified in the policy or certifi-cate; and that this indebtedness shall have priority over all indebtedness thereafter incurred, except as provided in ease of the distribution of assets of an insolvent corporation."

And section 17 of the same Act provides that no corporation or association organized under the laws of any other State for the purpose of insuring lives or furnishing accident indemnity upon the co-operative assessment plan shall be authorized to do business in Michigan until it shall have obtained a certifi-

insurance of that State; and that no such certificate of authority shall be issued unless the corporation or association applying therefor "has in force policies of insurance upon which the proceeds of one assessment will pay the highest amount insured upon each of the lives of the members for which the assessment is levied, the full amount agreed to be paid upon the death of any one member, and that it is paying, and for twelve months next preceding has paid, the highest amount named in its

policies or certificates in full."

Thus it appears that by the laws of Michigan every policy issued by a corporation in that State "promising a payment to be made that State "promising a payment to be made upon a contingency of death, . . . shall specify the sum of money it promises to pay, . . . and, upon the occurrence of such contingency, ... the corporation shall be obligated to the beneficiaries of such payment, . . . to the amount specified in the policy," and no certificate of authority to do business in Michigan shall be issued to any corporation or association organized under the laws of any other State unless for the twelve months next preceding it has paid, and is paying, the full amount named in its policies, nor unless it has in force policies upon which the proceeds of one assessment will pay the highest amount insured upon the lives of the members for which the assessment is levied, the full amount agreed to be paid upon the death of any one member. While, as we have already seen, corporations organized under the Ohio Statute are not obligated to pay the full amount specified in the policy. but only such sum as may be realized from assessments made on its members; and their policies must so provide. They are incapable of making any other contract, or issuing any policy of insurance not so conditioned, unless they comply with the laws regulating mutual life insurance companies; in which event they are permitted in Ohio to issue endowment policies.

It is admitted by the answer that the laws of the State of Michigan do not permit endowment policies to be issued or contracts of that kind to be made by corporations organized to do business on the assessment plan, and for that reason the commissioner of insurance of that State refused to issue his certificate of authority to an Ohio company, organized un-der section 3630, to do business in that State.

Whether, therefore, the Ohio corporation does or does not comply with the laws regulating regular mutual life insurance companies, it is not, in either event, permitted to do business in the State of Michigan upon substantially the same basis and limitations as it is in

Ohio.

2. Does the defendant come within the class of companies which, under the provisions of section 3630, may be admitted to do business in this State? It will be observed that only companies organized under the laws of any other State to insure the lives of members on the assessment plan, and authorized to transact the business contemplated in section 3630, are entitled to do business in this State; and furthermore, that it is only the business contemplated in section 3630 that such companies plated in section 3630 that such companies shall be permitted to transact. The lauguage of the Statute is: "Any corporation, comment plan, shall be authorized to do business 8 L. R. A.

pany or association, organized under the laws of any other State to insure lives of members on the assessment plan, and authorized to transact the business contemplated in section 3630, shall be permitted to do such business, to wit: the business contemplated in section 3630. in this State," upon the conditions therein speci-fied. As often as the question has been pre-sented, it has been held by this court that section 3620 does not contemplate or permit the business of insuring the lives of members otherwise than for the benefit of their families and heirs

In State v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 7, it is decided that "a company of another State organized for insuring lives upon the plan of assessment upon surviving members, without limitation, does not come under the class of companies provided for in section 3630. That section does not embrace companies insuring the lives of members for the benefit of others than their

families and heirs."

And in State v. Moore, 39 Ohio St. 486, the relator, a New York corporation, organized on the assessment plan and authorized by the law governing it to issue policies payable to the legal representatives of the member, or to any beneficiary designated by such member, sought to compel, by mandamus, the insurance commissioner of this State to issue to it the necessary certificate entitling it to do business in this State. But the writ was refused. Doyle, J., in the opinion, after quoting the above paragraph of the syllabus in State v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 7, says: "The principle thus announced must exclude the relator unless the law has been changed by subsequent legislation."

The legislation has not in this respect been changed. It is admitted by the pleadings that the defendant is authorized by the law of its reorganization to issue policies on the lives of its members for the benefit of any person who has an insurable interest in such life,

By section 15 of the Michigan Statute set out in the petition, it is provided that corporations doing business under the Act shall not issue any policy "upon a life in which the beneficiary has not an insurable interest;" and it is further provided by the same section that any member "shall have the right at any time, with the consent of such corporation or association, and with the consent of the beneficiary, if he be a creditor, to make a change in his beneficiary," within certain specified limits; and further, that "such corporation shall not issue policies or certificates to beneficiaries as a creditor or creditors that do not state that they are for collateral security payable as the interest of such beneficiaries may appear; and in every such case said creditor or creditors shall only be entitled to such portion of the amount insured (not exceeding the face of the policy) as shall cover the indebtedness of the member to said creditor at the date of his death. And section 17 of the same Statute provides that "no corporation or association organized or doing business under or by virtue of the laws of any State or Territory of the United States, or District of Columbia, or foreign country, for the